Crude federalism: decentralization and control over oil and gas resources in the Russian Federation

This thesis explores how the decentralization of control over Russia's oil and natural gas resources is shaping Russian federalism. A political-economic methodology is employed that draws from literature on decentralization, federalism, intergovernmental relations in the Russian Federation, and the Russian oil and gas sector. The study focuses on how and why some of Russia's regions have secured relatively more autonomy from the centre. It is argued that under Russia's asymmetrical brand of federalism, regions with the administrative status of "autonomous republic" and natural resource-rich regions have been able to build stronger bases of regional power and authority because they are negotiating from positions of strength in intergovernmental relations. Autonomous republics have been delegated legal and political-administrative powers that the rest of Russia's regions simply do not possess. The distribution of control over Russia's abundant oil and gas resources has changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union and, though there has been some decentralization in the oil and gas sector, the Russian government retains decisive influence in these strategic industries. The other main beneficiaries of oil and gas development are the producing regions, a significant improvement from Soviet times to be sure. Examinations of the Sakha Republic (Y akutia) and Tyumen' Oblast, including the autonomous okrugs of Khanty-Mansiisk and Yamal-Nenets, demonstrate both the importance of republic status, and the political power derived from natural resource wealth. The thesis concludes that the push for Russian "federalization" will continue to be led by republics and resource-rich regions, and that Russian federalism is attainable as long as asymmetries do not become overly acute.