Biological weapons: a plague upon all our houses - strengthening the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention

Throughout history humanity has faced widespread suffering and death from the proliferation and use of various types of weapons. In an attempt to alleviate the threat to people and states from the global spread of these weapons, the international community has met in arms control negotiations countless times to restrain, reduce, or ban various weapons systems. In 1972, in recognition of the threat biological and toxin weapons posed humanity, the international community met in Geneva to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. However, this agreement has proven unable to prevent member states from possessing biological and toxin weapons. Serious inadequacies of the Convention include the ambiguous nature of the text of the Convention, the allowance of biological and toxin agents for research for defensive purposes, a lack of verification provisions and a lack of provisions in the text to regulate advances in the biotechnology field. This thesis analyses the weaknesses of the Convention that have led to its inability to eliminate biological and toxin weapons. It offers suggestions on how to strengthen the Convention with the ultimate objective of creating an international norm against the possession and use of biological and toxin weapons that will halt both member and rogue states from pursuing biological and toxin weapons capabilities.