Abstract

In the 1980s, internal and external economic, social, and political restructurings in Taiwan created a need for low-skilled foreign labourers (FLLs). Today after more than a decade of Taiwanese foreign labour policy, these FLLs workers, especially female FLLs, have been repeatedly mistreated and discriminated against. Using Taiwanese governmental reports and statistics, academic articles, newspaper, and popular writings, this project discusses common features of current international migration patterns and presents four theories to explain these features. This project also presents and examines the evolution and the impacts of Taiwan’s foreign labour policy. Special attention is given to female migrant labourers.

The findings of this project indicates that FLLs are mistreated, Taiwanese workers’ long-term employment prospects maybe undermined, and Taiwanese society in general is negatively impacted. To improve foreign low-skilled labourers’ working and human rights in Taiwan, this project makes three recommendations. Firstly, it is necessary to improve current foreign labour policy by refining its regulation, extending its jurisdiction to include foreign domestic and health workers, and ensuring its implementation. Secondly, the Taiwanese public needs to be informed in order to develop a keener understanding of the value and importance of FLLs. Thirdly, Taiwan must follow international labour standards for the protection of its foreign low-skilled workers. Overall, this project helps to provide a basis for anticipating migration problems resulting from this emerging aspect of globalization; while this project focused on Taiwan, the findings could be analogous to the conditions in other countries, thereby exposing similar problems and providing possible solutions.
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<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (亞太經濟合作組織)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>Council of Labor Affairs (中華民國行政院勞工委員會)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dgbasy</td>
<td>Directorate General of Budget Accounting Statistics (中華民國行政院主計處)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLL</td>
<td>Foreign low-skilled labourers</td>
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<td>ILM</td>
<td>International Labour Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization (國際勞工組織)</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (國際移民組織)</td>
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Preface and Acknowledgements

The origins of this project stem from a conversation with Yang Cui, a faculty member at Providence University in Taiwan, about low-skilled and -income migrants in Taiwan. Realizing that low-skilled and low-income migrants' experiences are significantly influenced by Taiwanese policy, I decided to do a policy analysis. How people deal with foreigners reflects the way they value these migrants and the ways they connect themselves with these migrants. It is interesting to know both how people value migrants economically, culturally, and even politically; and how official policy responds to this evaluation. Although Taiwanese society provides these foreigners working opportunities with higher salaries than in their own countries, this should not become an excuse to justify any mistreatment toward these foreign workers or to negate the need of developing a humane foreign worker policy. After coming to this realization, I decided to explore this topic in my graduate project.

I offer my appreciation to many people and institutions that all generously helped me to conduct this research. I would, first, like to profoundly thank my supervisor Dr. Fiona MacPhail for her assistance and encouragement. I would also like to extend a special thank-you to my Committee members, Professor Paul Bowles and Professor Kwong-Leung Tang, who were both so helpful and supportive. A special acknowledgement must be extended to the staff and tutors at the Learning Skill Center at
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I am also thankful to my friends who helped me in so many different ways: to Hsueh-Lin Wei for explaining university policies and sharing her study experiences. To Chihya Hung, Ted Renguist, and John Bogle for frequently helping me with my research and treating me like family. I am also grateful to Auntie Baby, Bao-Ru Chen, Dennis and Terry Groshuria, Jon Lee, Dokwan Kim, Dr. Tomson Ogwang, Dr. Christopher Opio, Yong Wang, Jessica Yin, and Brenda Yang for being so caring and considerate. I must thank the graduate students in the UNBC graduate office who shared my burden and for what we learned from each other. Most importantly, I want to thank my family: to my parents for their support and encouragement; to my brother-in-law, You Wu, for his encouragement and his effort to gather information for me; to my sisters, Mei-E and Mei-Fei for their effort and humour. Finally I thank Buddha and Bodhisattva. I am indebted to all of you.
Chapter 1: Introduction

"Migration is as old as human history and as new as the forces shaping events in a post-Cold War world" (Meissner, Hormats, Walker, & Ogata, 1993, p. 1). Over the last two decades, the changes in the international political order, the intensification of international capital investment and material trade, and improvement in communication have all reinforced the trend of international labour movement. There are many different kinds of international migrations. Conventionally, international migrations have been divided into two broad groups: voluntary and forced migrations (IOM, 2000, p.15).

Voluntary migrations include labour migration, family reunification, and foreign students. Forced migrations refer to refugee migrations. This project focuses on the experiences of Taiwan's foreign low-skilled migrant workers, who comprise more than 80% of current labour migration in Taiwan, and the impacts of Taiwan’s current foreign labour policies. The features and dynamics of current international migration globally are relevant to Taiwan’s situation. This project will also provide theoretical discussions to explain the features of current international labour migration (ILM).

The three questions posed in this research are: (1) what are the features and dynamics of international labour mobility; (2) why did Taiwan introduce foreign low-skilled workers; (3) what are the impacts of Taiwan’s foreign worker policy on foreign workers and Taiwanese society and does this policy affect male and female foreign low-skilled labourers differently?

This project analyses these questions based upon a literature review of theories of migration, global migration trends, and migration in Taiwan. The materials reviewed are from journal articles, reports from international organizations and Taiwanese social

1 Appendix A: Map of Taiwan.
groups, Master Theses, Taiwanese government reports and statistics, various newspapers, and Internet sources. The time frame that is covered in this analysis is from the 1980s to December 2001.

Low-skilled temporary migrant workers are prominent in this study because these labourers more than other migrants suffer from class, race and gender discrimination in the labour-importing countries. Their migration experiences are different from that of skilled labourers, who normally enjoy the power of choosing jobs and employers, reasonable treatment, and family company. The issue of ILM is related to not only traditional international relations and the concepts of state’s sovereignty, identity, and security, but it is also directly related to discussions of global economic interdependence, especially to the relationship between developing and developed countries. These are the more conventional perspectives, but there are equally relevant issues such as race, culture, and human rights (including children’s, women’s, and labourers’ rights). These important factors are central to this project. Globalization arguably will be the most prominent trend of the 21st century, and ILM is a critical component of this process. Hence, the growing global interdependence will only increase the significance of this issue.

This project is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the purposes of the project and provides a brief outline of the remaining chapters. Chapter 2 provides an overview of recent literature about ILM on a global scale. This chapter introduces the features of current ILM and four theoretical perspectives of ILM: neoclassical economic theory, the global division of labour theory, the migration transition theory, and feminist theory. The discussion in this chapter helps to promote a greater understanding of ILM on a global scale and provides a framework for understanding the situation in Taiwan.

Chapter 3 addresses the question of why Taiwan introduced foreign low-skilled workers, and examines the evolution and impacts of Taiwan’s foreign labour policy. It
brides or mail-order-brides have been included with international low-skilled labourer migration (Hsia, 2000; Sassen, 2000; Wang, 2001). Female FLLs and foreign brides are marginalized by Taiwan's society, policy, and law, because of their immigrant status, low income, lack of skills, and because of their gender. This chapter analyzes the impacts of Taiwan's foreign worker policy on female migrants and how a migrant's gender affects his or her experiences in Taiwan.

Finally, in Chapter 5 (Conclusion), I briefly summarize the findings of this project and reveal the weaknesses of Taiwan's foreign worker policy. In addition, this chapter will make some recommendations that might improve the effectiveness of Taiwan's foreign worker policy and the condition of Taiwan's FLLs.
Chapter 2: International Labour Migration (ILM)

2.1 Introduction

In order to comprehend the reasons why Taiwan began importing foreign workers, it is necessary to understand the persistence of international labour migration and place Taiwan in the context of the global labour market. This chapter will provide four theoretical perspectives to explain the features of current international labour migration (ILM).

The flow and the volume of ILM have been seen as part of a global economic integration process (Stalker, 2000, p. 31). As the global economy has developed rapidly and become an important dimension in people's lives, issues of ILM have become more important. As a result, many theoretical models to explain ILM have been used. However, Arango (2000, p. 283) points out that most so-called migration theories were not originally conceived to explain migration. He argues these theories were developed "to explain other human behaviours and then imported and adapted for explanation of migration" (Arango, 2000, p. 283). Recognising the importance of international migration and the need for more comprehensive theoretical structures, Faist (2000), Ghosh (2000), and Massey et al. (1998) all systematically analyse relevant theories, and take their research as the first step for building more reliable theories in this subject. In these three studies, they discuss many theories including world system theory, social capital theory, migrant network theory, cumulative causation theory, neoclassical economic theory, the global division of labour theory, the migration transition theory, and feminist theoretical perspectives.

This project will not apply the world system theory, the social capital theory, the migrant network theory, or the cumulative causation theory for the following reasons. The world system theorists Sassen (1990) and Portes suggest that ILM is driven by a global
labour market; thus the influence of political interventions will gradually diminish (Arango, 2000, p.290). In addition, it argues that migration is more likely to occur between past colonial countries and their former colonies (Massey et al., 1998, p.55). Therefore, it is unable to explain the situation in Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and its labour resource countries.

The other three theories can be grouped together. The migrant network theory, the social capital theory, and the cumulative causation theory analyze ILM in terms of migrants’ social and personal networks rather than analyzing global ILM features (Faist, 2000, p.31). Migrant network theorists, such as Thomas and Znaniecki, argue that people gain both information and assistance from their interpersonal ties or so-called network. These migration networks provide people with knowledge, assistance, and other resources in a foreign country; such networks reduce costs and encourage migration (Arango, 2000, p.291; Massey et al., 1998, p.43). Similarly, social capital theory analyses how the resources embedded in social structures and networks can be translated into other forms of capital and facilitate collective action (Massey et al., 1998, p.42). In terms of migration, theorists of social capital, like Bourdieu and Coleman, argue that a migration decision is made according to a person’s social capital resources including their interpersonal ties, cultural norms, and so on (Faist, 2000, p.15). The cumulative causation theorists such as Myrdal, argue that international migration has gradually become a self-perpetuating system after migration. An international migration system either radically changes or simply reinforces the original social contexts in the migrant receiving and sending countries and thus facilitates more migrations (Massey et al., 1998, p.45). As Massey et al. state (1998, pp.45), “Causation is cumulative in the sense that each act of migration alters the social context within which subsequent migrant decision[s] are made, typically in ways that make additional movement more likely.” While interesting ideas, these three
Theories do not fit with either the purpose of this project (to explain the common features of current international migration including Taiwan) or its methodology (a review of secondary literature).

This project will only apply the perspectives from the neoclassical economic theory, the global division of labour theory, the migration transition theory, and feminist theoretical perspectives to analyse and explain the political, economic, and cultural factors contributing to the four features of ILM.

The contemporary international migratory order can be divided into several sub-systems; this chapter focuses on the common factors and patterns. Four key features of the current ILM will be discussed below: (1) the global scale; (2) the polarization trend; (3) the increase of government intervention; and (4) the growing number of female migrants. In the following section, the way the four theories that have been used to explain these features will be reviewed.

2.2 Features of international labour migration (ILM)

Based on analyses of the composition, volume, and direction of international labour migration, a new pattern of cross-border migration has emerged since the 1960s (Aguilar, 2000, p.174; Sassen, 1990, p.43). After the 1973 oil crisis, this new migratory pattern has become more developed and reinforced and extended all over the globe. There are three features of this world labour migration since the 1980s: (1) the global scale, (2) the polarization trend, and (3) the increase of government intervention (Castles & Miller, 1998, p.9; Massey et al., 1998, p.2; Stalker, 2000, p.7). In addition to these features, the current ILM should not be seen as a gender neutral. Not only does both research and empirical data reveal that the number of female migrant workers has steadily increased since the World War II, but the entire process has impacted women differently from men,
and most female migrant workers tend to concentrate in certain industrial sectors (Sassen, 2000, p.507). This project, therefore, recognizes the feminization of migration as a fourth feature of ILM.

The first feature, the global scale, takes into account the volume of immigrants and the increasing number of countries that are involved. International migration is not new in human history; however, over the past two decades, it has presented a new face. First, since the 1980s, the number of international migrants has rapidly increased (Castles & Miller, 1998, p.8; Ghosh, 2000, p.8). Second, the sources and destinations of immigrants have become more diverse and the number of states involved has steadily increased (Massey et al., 1998, p.5; Stalker, 2000, p.7).

According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), the overall migrant population in the world was 75 million in 1965, 85 million in 1975, 105 million in 1985, and 120 million in 1990 (IOM, 2000, p.5). Although the year 1990 was the last date for the total international migration, it is estimated that the international migrant population increased by 2-4 million per year in the 1990s, and there were about 150 million people moving into new countries in 2000 (IOM, 2000, p.5). While the international migrant population represents 2 to 3 percent of the world population, international migrants represent sizable percentages of the populations of the population in certain countries. In addition, the increasing rate of international migration has gradually exceeded the growth rate of the world population. From 1965 to 1975, the world population increased by 2.04 per cent per year and annual growth rate of the international migrant population was 1.16 per cent. However, between 1985 to 1990, this situation shifted. During this period, the

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2 For example, in Australia international migrants presented about 20 percent of its total population (IOM, 2000, p.7). The United Arab Emirates and Qatar have been the countries with the highest proportion of international migrants. In these two countries in the 1990s, international migrants presented more than 70 percent of the population (IOM, 2000, p.7).
average world population growth rate decreased to 1.7 percent per year while the average annual increase rate in international migrants kept growing. From 1985 to 1990, the average annual increase rate of the international migrants was 2.59 percent.

Although these numbers have been cited frequently, they are just a rough estimation. It is notable that there are still no adequate data to indicate exactly the number of international migrants in the world. The real international migrant population is probably bigger than these estimations for three reasons. First, these data were collected only from countries and areas with more than 200,000 people on their soil, and where the stock of immigrants or emigrations were no less than 2 percent of the total population (Stalker, 1994, p.271). As a result, countries with a huge emigrant population such as Mainland China and India were excluded from this data because the numbers of emigrants in these two countries were less than two percent of their total population. Second, these data represent only the flow of migrants (how many people move into a country) but not the stock of migrants (how many people already living there) (Martin & Widgren, 1996, p.5). Third, these data only include migrants who stayed in foreign countries for at least one year, including contract workers, students, permanent settlers, refugees and unauthorized migrations. Short-term migrants were excluded (IOM, 2000, p.3). Fourth, these estimates exclude illegal international migrants.

Besides its volume, current international migration is characterized by its far-reaching impacts as more and more countries get involve: “There are few states that do not experience the movement of migrants inwards or outwards in one form or another” (Aguilar, 2000, p.174). For example, based on the criteria mentioned and the volume of remittances in 152 observed countries, the ILO reported that, from 1970 to 1990, the number of migrant-receiving countries increased from 39 to 67, and the number of migrant-sending countries increased from 29 to 55, and the number of countries that were
identified as both migrant receiving and sending countries increased from 4 to 15 (Stalker, 2000, p.7). These data demonstrate how the international migration has developed into a global phenomenon.

The second feature, the polarization trend, refers to the economic and demographic differential between major international labour-importing and -exporting countries. As well as being a feature of international migration, it can also been seen as a cause. Although people’s decisions to migrate are complex, and the direction of international migration is not static, migrants, excluding refugee migrants tend to move to economically richer areas. As a result, even though not all of the world’s migrants head to the world’s economically richest countries and regions, most migrants settle in areas with a higher degree of industrialization and oil-rich resources than the countries they leave (Faist, 2000, p.7). For example, with only about 20% of the world’s population, so-called developed countries received 46% of international migrants in the 1990s (Martin & Widgren, 1996, p.6). To illustrate, in 1990, one-third of all international migrants concentrated in seven of the world richest countries: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Martin & Widgren, 1996, p.2). In 1996-1998, more than 46 million international migrants flowed into Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom (IOM, 2000, p.6). In the global scale, in the 1990s, Western Europe, North America, and Oceania (mainly, Australia and New Zealand) were net migrant receiving regions, while Africa, Asia, and Latin America were net migrant sending regions (Martin & Widgren, 1996, p.6).

International migrants come from many corners of the world and head to economically richer countries than the countries from which they come (Martin & Widgren, 1996). This project is not going to further list the all major migrant exporting and sending countries in the world but focuses on intra-regional flows of labour migration.
in East Asia (Table 2.1). First, this project is focusing on international migration to Taiwan, especially low-skilled migrant workers. As a result, it is important to understand the current migratory pattern in East Asia and its neighborhood countries. Second, it is suggested that flows of current international migration are essentially regionally limited; every region has its own uniqueness (Salt, 1996, p.1901). Finally, no single researcher or research institution can provide a comprehensive data to describe the flow of international migration on the global scale. Furthermore, due to the diversity and complexity of current international migration, even some studies that focus on specific regions or countries can provide only selected and limited data.

Generally speaking, the flows of international migration within Asian countries are dominated by labour migration, especially low-skilled workers. It emerged in the late 1970s and developed phenomenally in the 1980s (Rosewarne, 1998, p.964; Castles & Miller, 1998). During this period of time, besides Gulf oil-rich countries and Brunei, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have all become new destination for international low-skilled workers from other part of Asia (Abella, 1995; Hugo, 1998, p.213-214; IOM, 2000, p.63; Tyner, 1998, p.332).

In Japan, the main foreign labour resource countries are the Philippines, South Korea, China and Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia (IOM, 2000). In South Korea, migrants are mainly from China, the Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Vietnam. In Hong Kong, most non-professional and low-paid foreign workers are from China, the

3 Six member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council are the main immigration countries in the Middle East. In 1990, immigrants were mainly from five Asian countries: India (20%), Bangladesh (11.7%), Pakistan (7.2%), Sri Lanka (6.4%), and the Philippines (6.1%).

4 The main emigration countries are Bangladesh, China, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam. Malaysia and Thailand are countries with both significant immigrant and emigrant volumes (Hugo, 1998, p.17).

5 Japan and South Korea have developed a so-called trainee system and import workers to alleviate labour shortages. While these workers are called “trainees”, in reality they assume all the duties of low-skilled foreign workers in other countries.
Philippines, and Thailand (Wickramasekara, 1996, p.105). Singapore has foreign
low-skilled labourers mainly from India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the Philippines (Tess
& Williams, 1996, p.41). Finally, in Taiwan, the foreign low-skilled workers are mainly
from Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In sum, corresponding to
the overall world migratory order, the flow of ILM in East Asia and its neighbouring area
reflects economic disparities and the uneven distribution of population between countries
in this region (Portnov, 1999, p.586).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main source or destination countries</th>
<th>Year and number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Philippines, South Korea, China and Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia</td>
<td>1992*-381,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>China, the Philippines, and Thailand</td>
<td>1993-71,100**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>India, Bangladesh, Thailand, and the Philippines</td>
<td>1990-200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>China, the Philippines, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Vietnam.</td>
<td>1990-170,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Malaysia.</td>
<td>2000-326, 515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Including legal low-skilled workers, students, trainees, and illegal migrants.
** Including legal entrance from China.
Sources: IOM, 2000; Skeldon, 1996; Tess & Williams, 1996; Wickramasekara, 1996.

The third feature of current ILM refers to the shift in a state's strategy for dealing
with the ILM issue. Miller (2000, p.43) argues that "globalization and greater economic
interdependence have meshed sovereign societies and created a greater need for the
 orderly movement of people between societies for economic purpose.” Castles and Miller
 (1998, p.9) suggest “it was only in the late 1980s that international migration began to be
 accorded high-level and systematic attention.” For example, a United Nations survey of
 190 countries in 1993 revealed that from 1976 to 1993 the percentage of countries with a
 policy aimed at lowering immigration had increased from 6.4% in 1976 to 35.3% in 1993
 (Ghosh, 2000, p.14). Mittelman (1994, p.10) further suggests that faced with the
 globalization of the labour market, states in the Asian region act as agents of labour
 recruitment, and direct the flow of the ILM in order to accumulate material gains.
 Labourers find their migration opportunities are increasingly restricted by official
 regulation as compared to before World War II (Brah, Hickman, & Mac an Ghaill, 1999,
 p.5).

 Research indicates that, over the past two decades, women have played a more
 prominent role in ILM. This feminization of labour migration has become a distinctive
 feature of ILM, although scholars have been slow to appreciate this trend (Cheng, 1996,
 p.139; Mittelman, 1996, pp.4-5; Rodgers, 1999, p.5; Salt, 1996, p.1081; Truong, 1996,
 p.28). Lycklama à Nijeholt (1994, p.23) argues that people have ignored the influx of
 women into the ILM process and considered it a gender-neutral process. In fact,
 according to research, the world-wide number of female migrants has increased rapidly
 (ILO, 1996). In addition, in some sectors, female migrant workers outnumber their male
 counterparts; this is especially true for domestic workers (Castles & Miller, 1998, p.150;
 Massey et al., 1998, p.185). Misconceptions about female migrants not only affect the
 women themselves but also impede researchers from gaining a broader understanding of
 the ILM issue. Thus, it is important to have an insight into the feminization of migration.

 These four features provide a general picture of current ILM. A study of these
features will help to understand the dynamics of current ILM and to contextualize
Taiwan's situation in broader international trends.

2.3 Theories of Current International Labour Migration (ILM)

Neoclassical economic theory, the global division of labour theory, the migration
transition theory, and feminist theoretical perspectives will be discussed in this section.
All these theories focus on the relationships between ILM and a state's social and
economic development, including changes in income and unemployment rate,
demographic shifts and inherent cultural attitudes (Faist, 2000, p.31).

Although these four theoretical perspectives do not directly interpret the role of a
state's government, they do explain some conditions that create the pressures of
emigration and immigration in a state and reflect the role of the state's policy in the ILM
process. In doing so, these theoretical discourses give the reader explanations for a state's
actions with regard to current ILM.

Neoclassical economic theory explains why a country like Taiwan has become a
magnet to attract international low skilled and low-paid workers in terms of economic
factors (Tyner, 1998, p.332). From a neoclassical economic perspective, the disparity of
economic development among countries leads to wage differentials and determines the
directions of ILM; it helps explain the polarization trend. In his study Workers without
Frontiers, Stalker (2000, p.21) adopts a neoclassical economic perspective and conducts a
comparison of wage differentials of occupations that are open to immigrants in labour
exporting and importing countries. This research suggests that a large wage differential
exists between labour-exporting and -importing countries. For example, in 1996 the
weekly wage for a manufacturing worker was $31 US dollars in Mexico and $278 US
dollars in the USA (Stalker, 2000, p.21). According these findings, Stalker (2000, p. 33)
argues that the large wage disparity inevitably makes the countries with higher wage rates become magnets for labour from poorer countries (Stalker, 2000, p.21). The neoclassical economic perspective partly explains the second feature of the current ILM.

In a society, different jobs bear different social prestige. Some jobs have high prestige and others are socially stigmatized. The global division of labour theory connects this social structure and labour migration in the global scale. The global division of labour theory suggests that the current global economic system deepens the global division of labour and refers to the specialization of a country in production and trade of particular goods and services (Mittelman, 1996, p.4). From the global division of labour perspective, the structure of the world labour market takes the same hierarchical form as the structure of a national labour market. In this global hierarchical labour market, workers from select countries or areas are sought after for their particular skills. Thus, the issue of workforce shortage must account for more than merely numbers of workers, but also consider what kinds of labourers are required. In addition, the global division of labour theory suggests that people are not just working for wages, but also for their social status (Massey et al., 1998, p.179). This theory argues that “low wages, unstable conditions, and the lack of reasonable prospects for mobility in the secondary sector make it difficult to attract native workers...” (Massey et al. 1998, p.31) “Employers recruit immigrants to fill secondary sector positions because they are rejected by natives (Massey, 1998, p.83). In terms of international low-skilled labour migration, this theory emphasises the drawing power of labour-importing countries. This theoretical perspective provides a scenario of hierarchical international labour circulation system and can explain why many developed countries with high unemployment rates still import low-skilled workers from developing countries.

Both neoclassical economic theory and the global division of labour theory
provide explanations of the first two features of the current ILM, namely, its global scale and the polarization trend. They also provide an explanation of the third feature of the current ILM: the increase in government intervention. In other words, facing the economic disparities and global division of labour among nations, a state must integrate its domestic economy into the world market and use a variety of government strategies to accumulate capital and create competitiveness (Mittelman, 1996, p.4). These state interventions can determine through an economic strategy how labour migrations are arranged by labour-exporting and -importing countries (Athukorala & Wickramasekara, 1996, p.540).

The economic consequences of international labour migration in both labour importing and exporting countries are not fixed and the political, cultural, and social impacts of international labour migration are even more complex. Clearly, international migration patterns are shaped by cultural, social, political, and economic factors. At the same time, in both importing and exporting countries, it also has become an important factor to change a society’s cultural component, social attitude, political order, and economic development. As a result, more and more countries are attempting to control the flows of international labour migration in order to control the benefits and cost of ILM through domestic policies and international cooperation (Rosewarne, 1998, p.977).

Global economic integration has drawn more and more countries into a global market system. As a result, a state government reacts with its labour policy, which is based on the international circulation of labour and strengthens labour market segmentation (Rosewarne, 1998, p.973).

The migration transition theory explains the relations among a society’s demographic changes, economic and education improvement, and international labour migration. The migration transition theory suggests that along with the growth of a
country’s economy, a state will finally reach a ‘turning point’ (Freeman & Mo, 1996, p.156). This turning point is where the transition of economic and demographic forces produces a migration transition. This transition changes a country’s labour market from one with a labour surplus to a prosperous society with tight labour markets (Freeman & Mo, 1996, p.156). Migration transition theory suggests that economic growth would release more workers from agriculture sectors and cause a labour surplus situation (Castles, 1999, p.9). As economic development continues, a society’s fertility rate tends to fall and the demand for labour increases. In the process of a state’s economic growth, at a certain point, a labour surplus becomes a labour shortage and generates a demand for imported labour. In other words, a society’s economic development reshapes national labour markets, and combined with changing demographic structures, eventually results in a labour shortage that affects direction of the ILM (Stahl, 1999, p.547). This perspective helps explain the second feature of the current ILM: the polarization trend among major labour-importing and -exporting countries in terms of economic development and demographic characteristics. The economically less developed countries export their abundant and less-skilled labourers to economically richer countries.

Because the preceding theoretical perspectives are gender neutral, they cannot provide an explanation for the increasing numbers of female migrant workers playing an important role in current ILM. As a result of the rapid increase of female migrant workers and the fact that they are concentrated in certain occupations, the concept of feminization in labour migration has gradually been noticed over the past two decades. Truong (1996, p.31) argues that female migrant workers are “referred to as reproductive [social reproduction] labour and tend to be deployed in a narrow range of occupations shunned by the local female population.” Lim and Oishi (1996, p.86) concur with this statement; they use female migrant workers from Asian countries as an example of women who are
concentrated in feminized occupations such as domestic and health care workers, wives, and entertainers (Lim & Oishi, 1996, p.95).

The feminist theoretical perspective critiques the relationship between a gendered division of labour and international labour mobility. To analyse the different impact of ILM between male and female migrant workers, it is necessary to include the feminist theoretical perspective. The feminist perspective argues that low-skilled female migrant workers are more readily subjected to servile employment arrangements than male migrant workers and thus become more vulnerable during their overseas employment. Compared to male migrant workers, female foreign workers, especially domestic workers, face numerous incidents of discrimination through racial bias, gender stereotyping, and socio-economic class differences. Female migrants working as domestic servants are further subjected to unpleasant working conditions, including long hours, no days-off, limited personal freedom, censored mail, physical and sexual violence, and other forms of oppression (Cox, 1997, p.65). Besides having the potential for different working and living conditions from their male counterparts in host countries, female migrant workers also face different labour recruitment processes including those used by international marriage (mail-order-brides) brokers and the sex trade industry (Sassen, 2000). In short, migrant women's difficult situations are caused by their being both women and migrants (Lim & Oishi 1996 p.85).

From a feminist perspective, low-skilled female migrant workers are not just part of a new Pettman international division of labour, but also are subjected to a gendered division of labour (. 1996). Global economic development has increased economic disparities within and between countries and impoverished many people, especially women. In addition, global economic development has resulted in many women being at risk to satisfy the demand for cheap labour (The workshop group on migration and
trafficking, 2001). Mungall (u. d.) argues that females migrating to other nations have kept women in the private sphere and subordinate roles as domestic service and mail-order-brides. Overall, the increasing mobility of female low-skilled migrant workers does not mean these females have escaped the gendered division of labour. Instead, it is apparent that female migrants’ experiences are profoundly shaped by gender (Lee, 1996, p.13).

The integration of neoclassical economic theory, global division of labour theory, and migration transition theory, the feminist perspectives, together explain the four features of current ILM. The neoclassical economic theory claims that wage differences among countries contribute to the economic motivation for labour migration (Kim 1995, p. 351). The global division of labour theory conceptualizes the international spatial division of labour, which has reinforced present ILM (Salt, 1996, p.1105). The migration transition theory takes demographic factors into account and suggests that a nation’s demographic structure changes along with a nation’s economic growth. As a result of economic development, the nation will produce a more highly educated and aging population that results in fewer labour resources, especially in labour-intensive sectors. This theory also suggests that the exporting and importing of labour is a stage in a nation’s economic development process. Feminist perspectives argue for the need to bring in a gendered perspective because of the phenomenon of feminization of migration and the imbalanced power relationship between the two genders.

While these theories do not completely depict the whole scenario of current international labour migration, they are all valuable for gaining a theoretical analysis of ILM features. In addition, although these theories have very different assumptions on how ILM has been developed and its impacts, overall, these four theories all indicate that the ILM is a result of imbalanced economic power between countries (Thorpe, 1999, p.222).
This statement reveals that as long as the economic disparity between countries exists and keeps growing, international migration will continue to develop. While labour migration (importing and exporting) has become a country's economic development strategy, without appropriate protection policies, the world's workers are readily subjected to worldwide competition, especially among low-skilled workers (Huang, 2000). In this sense, this economic globalization does not necessarily yield a channel for low-skilled migrant workers to improve their situations; rather it is more likely to deepen the division of labour.

2.4 Conclusion

"Labour might be more mobile, but entry into the global market has not affected labours economic enfranchisement" (Rosewarne, 1998, p.978). To gain a better understanding of current ILM, this chapter provided four theories to explain the four features of ILM. It shows that the current ILM is characterized by its large volume, its feminization of migration, and regulation by state governments and international institutions for economic purposes. Also, the flow of current ILM has been directly influenced by the dynamics of global economic development, especially since the 1980s (Massey et al. 1998; O’Connor & Farsakh, 1996, p11).

At first glance, it appears that labourers might receive more working opportunities through the liberalization of international trade and capital investment, as well as advanced information and technology. In reality, the bargaining power of poor and low-educated labourers still remains low because employers have more possibilities of adopting labour-saving technology, outsourcing, or relocating; while labourers’ mobility is are still highly restricted (Hugo & Stahl, 1997). The number of international migrants has increased rapidly. Their relationship with global economic development and the
protection of international migrant labourers has become central to the debate (Tingo, 2001, p.203). The subject of labour migration is one dimension of the complex issue that involves discussions of human rights as well as global economic and political development (Rogers, 1992, p.33). Clearly, previous research helps us raise awareness and adds insight into the ILM issue. However, research is still unable to uncover all the various problems, especially in the improvement of international low-skilled migrant workers' working conditions. When analysing this subject it is imperative to take into account the structure and nature of global labour mobility, as well as the institutional factors that are behind the current regulation of labour migration, both at the national and the international levels.

Discussions in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will apply the main concepts of the four theories to analyse the reasons for introducing foreign low-skilled labour in Taiwan. Based on neoclassical economic theory, this project will look at the economic disparities between Taiwan and its foreign labour resource countries in terms of GDP growth rate, wage differentials, and unemployment rate. This project will also use the global division of labour theory to provide an overview of the jobs and working conditions of Taiwan’s foreign low-skilled workers. The migration transition theory will be used to analyse concurrent changes in Taiwan’s economic development, demographic structure changes, and education improvement. Finally, this study will incorporate the feminist perspectives to see if Taiwan is experiencing feminization of migration; especially, whether the number of female FLLs is growing, to verify if female FLLs have been concentrated in certain so-called “women’s jobs” and whether female FLLs have been treated differently according to their gender.
Chapter 3: International Labour Migration in Taiwan

3.1 Introduction

During the 1980's Taiwan experienced many fundamental social and political changes that, when combined with a labour shortage, posed a major threat to Taiwan's economic competitiveness in the global market (Lin, 2001, p.2). These changes included a shifting demographic structure as the population aged and the population growth rate decreased, the lifting of martial law, a rising labour movement demanding higher wages, an improvement in the national education level, and the sharp appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar (NT$) (Mackay & Missen, 1995, p.61; Lin & Liaw, 1998, p.2). These factors exacerbated the labour shortage for Taiwanese employers in general and particularly for small and medium sized labour-intensive companies. Under these circumstances, employers began to emphasize the need for cheap foreign labourers; some employers began illegally hiring unskilled foreign workers who came from other Southeast Asian countries (Islam & Chowdhury, 1997, p.180).

In response, in 1989 the Taiwanese government started to legalize the introduction of foreign low-skilled labour. By the end of August 2000, there were 326,515 FLLs in Taiwan. The breakdown of the FLL labour pool is as follows: Thais (43.69%), Filipinos (30.06%), Indonesians (23.84%), Vietnamese (2.73%), and Malaysians (0.03%) (See Appendix B). These FLLs were working in the following job categories: manufacturing (52%), social and personal service (37%), construction (11%), and fisheries (0.4%) (See Appendix C). An analysis of the nationalities and jobs of Taiwan's FLLs corresponds to the theories of neoclassical economics and global division of labour. Compared to the FLLs' home countries, Taiwan has relative economic power in terms of higher GDP growth and annual wages for workers in industrial and service sectors, as well as
unemployment rates (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Growth of GDP</th>
<th>Wage (in US$/yr)</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7,188</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>873-1052</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>120-151</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1068-4764</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The relationship between the labour shortage and the importation of foreign labour is not necessarily fixed, but is subject to emerging trends and fluctuations in the market place. In addition, it is influenced by states’ economic and political policies, as well as the relationships between international labour-exporting and -importing countries. To gain an understanding of both why Taiwan decided to introduce FLLs and the development and impact of its foreign labour policy, it is necessary to examine some of the internal and external factors that Taiwan has encountered in its unique economic and political context.

This chapter will discuss the evolution of Taiwan’s foreign labour policy and critically assess its impacts on foreign workers and on Taiwanese society. It will examine the internal and external factors that created the labour shortage in the 1980s, and how the Taiwanese government dealt with this labour shortage using solutions such as legalizing the importation of FLLs and through other alternatives such as overseas investments. The chapter will focus on FLLs in manufacturing and construction industries that are

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6 This legalization of FLLs has encouraged the importation of FLLs: the numbers have increased from 2,999 people in 1991 to 326,515 people in 2000.
dominated by male FLLs. A discussion of FLLs who work as domestics and health care workers, two sectors dominated by female FLLs, is provided in Chapter 4. Differences in the nature of their work and the manner in which Taiwan’s foreign worker policy deals with these two gendered groups of FLLs have created different impacts and working experiences for male and female FLLs.7

3.2 The internal and external reasons for introducing FLLs

In 1987, Taiwan lifted martial law and the restrictions on media and political activities were eased. As a result, the controversy as to whether Taiwan should introduce low-skilled foreign labour was politicized and gradually became one of the most pressing economic and social issues in Taiwanese society during the late stages of the 20th century (Zhang, 1995, p.585). The arguments ranged from the view that the nation should open its doors and freely accept foreign workers, to the call for a closed policy, excluding foreign workers. Both points of view criticized the government’s passive attitude. Those in favour of an open-door policy emphasized the urgency of building a legal system to introduce foreign labour for Taiwan’s economic development (Lin, 1993, p.19). Those favouring a closed-door policy including Taiwanese trade unions claimed that introducing foreign labour would not necessarily contribute to national economic growth and development (Tsay, 1992, p.654; Zhang, 1995, p.589). Foreign low-skilled workers, they emphasized, would cause a higher unemployment rate, decrease local labour’s bargaining power, especially among native low-skilled labourers, and cause problems with social security and cultural integration (Lin, 1993, p.19; Zhang, 1995, p.589). As the labour shortage intensified and the illegal foreign labour volume expanded, the official labour and immigration policies became a subject of public, academic, and political discourse (Lan.

7 There are also foreign fishing crews employed in Taiwan. However, due to their limited number, only 0.06% of the total FLLs, they are not factored into this project.
In addition to these domestic disputes, there were many external factors involved in Taiwan's foreign labour policy-making process. For example, the increased number of illegal foreign workers, and the emerging trend of domestic major enterprises moving to Mainland China also influenced Taiwan's official attitude toward a foreign labour policy (Lu, 2000, p.126). Eventually, the Taiwanese government opened the door for FLLs.

3.2.1 The internal reasons

Rapid social, demographic, and economic changes and labour shortage

From the mid 1960s to the late 1980s, Taiwan's labour market was transformed from a labour surplus market to a labour shortage market (Iguchi, 1996, p.264; Zhang, 1995, p.576). During this period, Taiwan experienced steady economic growth requiring large numbers of labourers. Simultaneous improvements in national education levels and changes in Taiwan's demographic structure (aging and decreasing growth rate) partially decreased the labour supply resources in the 3-D sectors (dangerous, dirty, and physically demanding) and contributed to a labour shortage in Taiwan (Chan, 1999, p.383; Findlay, et al, 1998, p.656; Grunsven, et. al, 1995, p.151; Selya 1992, p.789).

At the beginning of the 1980s, Taiwan had full employment, but by the late 1980s, a situation of over-full employment prevailed, meaning there were more job opportunities than people to fill them (Lu, 2000, p.119; Zhang, 1995, p.576). For example, there were 2.1 jobs available for every job seeker in Taiwan by 1975, which increased to 4.5 in 1987 (Dgbasy). This data covered all employment in Taiwan. However, at that time, the Taiwanese labour shortage was concentrated in the low-skilled labour industrial sectors, a
trend exacerbated by a decline in young workers. Taiwan's labour shortage in the late 1980s was a result of two factors: 1) the smaller proportion of the workforce engaged in construction, manufacturing, and other so called 3-D jobs; and 2) a reduction of young people's participation in the labour market (Chan, 1999, p.383; Findlay, et al., 1998, p.656; Grunsven, et al., 1995, p.151).

The decrease of fertility rates and the improvement of educational levels are factors for a decrease in young labour supply for 3-D sectors. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the significant demographic trends of the Taiwanese population and education improvement alongside the country's economic growth rate. Those aged 65 or more formed 3.03% of population in 1971 and increased to 8.4% in 1999 (Table 3.2). In addition, based on Harris's research, those aged 65 or more will reach 10.1% in 2011 and 21.6% in 2036 (Harris, 1995, p. 179). At the same time, the Taiwanese high school enrolment rate increased from 73.55% in 1971 to 94.02% in 1989, and the rate of post-secondary education enrolment also increased from 15.7% in 1971 to 30.56% in 1989 (Table 3.3). This trend of increasing participation in educational programs has continued: in 2000, the high school enrolment rate was 99.23%, and 68.42% for post-secondary education.

The decrease in low-skilled labour resources, combined with steady economic growth, corresponds to the migration transition theory (Freeman & Mo, 1996). The migration transition theory claims that economic growth will cause both demographic change and improvement in education levels, which will increase the pressure for the introduction of foreign workers in low-skilled positions.
Table 3.2

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age 65+ (%)</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate (%)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>12.74</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>8.23</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>7.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate (%)*</td>
<td>9.55</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>8.69</td>
<td>8.48</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.54</td>
<td>7.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age 65+ (%)</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate (%)</td>
<td>7.49</td>
<td>7.01</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>4.57</td>
<td>5.42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:* Population growth rates are by 1000’s;
Source: Adapted from Republic of China. Executive Yuan. Directorate General of Budget Accounting
Statistic (u.d.). 人力資源調查統計年報 (Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan area).

Table 3.3

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and below (%)</td>
<td>85.03</td>
<td>88.37</td>
<td>90.82</td>
<td>91.25</td>
<td>91.66</td>
<td>92.01</td>
<td>92.42</td>
<td>92.85</td>
<td>93.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (%)</td>
<td>73.55</td>
<td>82.54</td>
<td>92.19</td>
<td>93.76</td>
<td>94.08</td>
<td>94.02</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>95.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post Secondary (%)</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>18.71</td>
<td>25.18</td>
<td>26.16</td>
<td>28.26</td>
<td>30.56</td>
<td>34.13</td>
<td>37.92</td>
<td>41.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and below (%)</td>
<td>93.41</td>
<td>93.74</td>
<td>94.01</td>
<td>94.33</td>
<td>94.66</td>
<td>94.92</td>
<td>95.28</td>
<td>95.55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary (%)</td>
<td>95.32</td>
<td>95.93</td>
<td>95.66</td>
<td>95.79</td>
<td>97.21</td>
<td>98.55</td>
<td>99.61</td>
<td>99.23</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Secondary (%)</td>
<td>45.04</td>
<td>45.32</td>
<td>46.42</td>
<td>47.71</td>
<td>51.06</td>
<td>56.09</td>
<td>60.99</td>
<td>68.42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Republic of China. Executive Yuan. Directorate General of Budget Accounting
Statistic (u.d.). 人力資源調查統計年報 (Yearbook of Manpower Survey Statistics, Taiwan Area).

3.2.2 External reasons

Illegal immigrant labourers in the 1980s

During the 1980s, the void created by the lack of low-skilled workers was filled by imported illegal foreign workers. This immigration was possible because Taiwan did not impose heavy punishment on illegal immigrants and there was no law to prevent employers from hiring foreign workers without working visas until 1994 (Freeman & Mo,
1996, p.167). Also, the penalty for foreigners who overstayed was miniscule. Before the foreign labour policy was enacted in 1989, foreigners paid only a penalty of NT $600 no matter how long they overstayed their visa in Taiwan (Kanjanapan, 1992, p.574). The Taiwanese government rarely attempted to crack down on illegal international employment arrangements (Lin, 1995, p.96). Naturally, the illegal foreign labour volume in Taiwan increased. Tsay (1992, p.637) estimates that the number of illegal workers in Taiwan prior to 1989, based on the Taiwanese official data for overstay (outdated visa) visitors, was around 40,000 to 50,000 people. The exact number of illegal workers was definitely larger than this estimate from official statistics because the study did not consider those who entered Taiwan by illegal channels. With the increasing number of illegal FLLs, the government felt compelled to change immigration policies so that FLLs fell within the law.

*International relations and official Southward investment policy*

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the impacts of rapid social, political, and economic restructuring were not confined to the island of Taiwan. These internal changes interacted with global economic trends and international political developments, which in turn affected Taiwan’s relationship with other countries, especially Mainland China.9 Despite the uncertain relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China, and a ban on direct trade and investment, there has been a large increase in Taiwanese investment in Mainland China through intermediary countries, mainly Hong Kong. As a result, the Taiwanese capital investment comprised about 13 per cent of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) projects in Mainland China in 1992, and Taiwan was the second largest

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9 These foreign relations are complex and very important since Taiwan is not recognized by the international community (for example, Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations).
foreign investor in Mainland China before 1995 (Grunsven, et. al, 1995, p.159). This created a sense of insecurity in Taiwanese society (Lu, 2000, p.126). Both the public and academics were concerned that the large investment flow to Mainland China would lead to Taiwan’s loss of economic independence from Mainland China and eventually weaken Taiwan’s political power. At that time, the Taiwanese media used the term “haemorrhage” to describe the relocation of manufacturing factories and capital investment from Taiwan to Mainland China (Lu, 2000, p.126).

To cope with its labour shortage, to reduce the pressure of the mass relocation of industries to overseas production sites, especially Mainland China, and to cope with the problem of illegal foreign labour migration, the Taiwanese government opened the door to foreign low-skilled labourers in 1989 (Lee, 1998, p.154; Ku, 2000). Later, in 1993, Taiwan’s government also developed the so-called Southward Investment Policy that tried to direct the investment flow of Taiwanese companies. This Southward Investment Policy encourages labour-intensive industries to move to Southeast Asian and South American countries. This policy was not just a strategy for economic development and for alleviating the labour shortage problem in labour-intensive industries but also contained political implications. Facing the rapidly growing economic power of Mainland China and the trend of global economic liberalization, the Taiwanese government was tempted to develop a closer relationship with its Asia-Pacific neighbours and to gain more international political diplomatic power (Findlay, et. al., 1998, p.656).

To a large extent, Taiwan’s Southward Investment Policy and Taiwan’s foreign worker policy are interrelated. These two policies were created almost at the same time, and were both related to the labour shortage in the low-paying labour-intensive sectors. Tseng (2001) argues “the foreign worker policy in Taiwan is closely linked with its foreign affairs policy; the short list of approved labour-exporting countries reflects the
support given to state interests in international political forums.” This strategy can also be applied to Taiwan’s Southward Investment Policy. In this policy, the Taiwanese government similarly had a favoured country list in order to “direct foreign investment to gain political influence with other governments” (Tseng, 2001). These two lists often overlapped and reflected Taiwan’s need for economic and diplomatic security. At the same time, despite its cultural and geographic closeness with Mainland China, Taiwan’s government neither encouraged Taiwanese companies to invest or relocate to Mainland China, nor encouraged capital investment there.

3.3 The evolution of Taiwan’s foreign labour policy

In response to the tightening of its labour market, the increasing number of illegal foreign workers, and the possibility of the mass relocation of industries to overseas production sites, the Taiwanese government opened its doors to FLLs for the first time in late 1989 (Islam & Chowdhury, 1997, p.180). A programme to permit legal FLL was limited to state-funded construction projects. The Taiwanese government emphasized that the importation of 35,000 foreign construction workers was an exception, and that there would be no openings in other sectors. However, two years later, permission to employ foreign workers was extended to another five state-funded industrial sectors, as well as opened to private corporations. In 1992, foreign labour employment policies, in the form of revisions to the Employment Service Act and The Regulation on Employment and Management of Foreign Nationals, were enacted and further opened more industrial sectors to foreign labour. These included the personal and social service sectors in which women predominated.

To minimize the negative impacts of importing foreign low-skilled workers, the Taiwanese government, like many other labour-importing countries, has always used
three principles when developing its foreign labour policy (Lu, 2000, p.114). These principles include: 1) ensuring that FLLs are merely a supplemental labour force and that the importation of FLLs will not hinder Taiwan’s economic structure; 2) ensuring that FLLs are temporary, and 3) minimizing the national social costs. These three principles underlying Taiwanese labour policy are outlined below. In the following section, the principles are assessed and the impacts of Taiwanese policy on FLLs are examined.

**Three principles of Taiwanese foreign labour policy**

1. *A supplement but not a substitute*

   To ensure that the flow of FLLs would be only to industries with the most severe labour shortage, the Taiwanese government placed a series of regulations and limitations on the types of industrial sectors eligible to apply for FLLs. The percentage of foreign labourers in the workforce, the company’s size, and foreign worker recruitment procedures were regulated. These regulations were set to counter preferences for cheap foreign labourers rather than local ones, and the possibility that cheap foreign labourers could become a way for labour intensive industries to continue without upgrading which would eventually impede Taiwan’s industrial development.

   In addition to the limitation on industrial sectors, the Taiwanese government also limits the percentage of foreign labourers in the workforce. Foreign employees could only make up 30 percent of the total number of employees for a company in general, 35 percent for the 3-D industries, and 50 percent of the crew on fishing boats. There is also a minimum size requirement for companies: firms with less than ten employees are not allowed to employ any foreign workers (Lee & Wang, 1996, p.286). Finally, all applicants

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looking for foreign workers, including domestic and health care workers, are required to post an employee-wanted advertisement in three nation-wide newspapers for a minimum of three days.

(2) Temporary residence only

To prevent foreign low-skilled workers from becoming permanent residents, the Taiwanese government imposed strict regulations limiting their duration of residence, inhibited the extension and renewal of working visas, and banned family members from visiting. Initially, the duration of stay was limited to one year, and the re-entry visa was either not renewable or limited to one time only, depending on the industrial sector. In addition, low-skilled foreign labourers were distinguished from skilled foreign labourers. FLLs were not permitted to have dependant family members accompany them. The family members of FLLs are not allowed to obtain visiting visas.

(3) Minimize the economic and social cost

Concerned about the danger of ‘free riders’ on its public social security and health care system, the Taiwanese government has tried to minimize the potential for such abuse when importing foreign labourers. The government required all foreign workers to submit both an official certificate of good conduct and a medical report of good health from a hospital recognized by the Taiwanese government before entry into Taiwan. After entering Taiwan, FLLs are required to have medical checkups within 3 days. Then employers are responsible for ensuring that their foreign employees have regular health checkups every three to six months. Although acquisition of national health insurance is mandatory for every foreign worker, if they are stricken by a serious or infectious illness, or even if they become pregnant, the foreign workers are deported.
Labor Standard Law

Based on the previous three principles, Taiwan’s government has developed more detailed regulations in the Employment Service Act and Regulation on Employment and Management of Foreign Nationals, which are two chapters in Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law. The criteria involved in applying to hire foreign workers, recruitment procedures, the rights and obligations of foreign workers and the relationships between foreign workers and their employers are all regulated by these two specific chapters and through bilateral agreements between Taiwan and the individual foreign labour exporting countries. Based on Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law, foreign workers are entitled to receive the same minimum wage, working hours, and stipulated days of holiday, as native workers; the only exception is foreign domestic and health care workers (Lin, 1995, p.41). This omission of domestic and health care workers shows that the law is not always applied evenly.

Wage and working hours

Reasonable monetary compensation is a key factor for overall job satisfaction. As a result, in the Taiwanese Labor Standard Law, the regulation of working hours and the minimum wage have always been seen as a basic strategy to protect Taiwanese labourers’ rights. To gain an understanding of the working conditions of foreign labourers and whether they have been discriminated against, one has to start by appreciating their salary structure and workload. In theory, the law entitles FLLs to have the same wages and working hours as native workers; however, in practice, it has not been very successful.

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According to Taiwanese official data, from 1993 to 1997, the average monthly salary difference between native workers and foreign workers has dropped from 16% to 4% in the construction and manufacturing industries. In 1997, these foreign workers generally earned 96% of a native workers’ salary (Lee, 1998, p.159). Based on this data, the Taiwanese government claims that FLLs have been protected by its *Labor Standard Law* because the FLLs’ average salary is above Taiwan’s stipulated minimum salary and the salary difference between foreign and native workers is marginal and continues to shrink.

The official figures are quite misleading because differences in the working hours between foreign and native workers are not taken into account (Lee, 1998, p.159). In addition, the minimum wage in Taiwan has always been criticized by labour unions because there is a huge gap between the minimum wage paid to FLLs and actual wages paid to native workers. In the Taiwanese labour market, native workers’ salaries are much higher than the token minimum wage (World Bank, 1996, p.22). In response to the question of whether Taiwanese employers pay foreign labourers differently, Lee (1998, p.159) suggests that rather than focusing on whether these FLLs receive the stipulated minimum wage, it is more practical to compare the hourly wages earned by foreign workers and native workers.

By analysing the government’s data, Lee compared the hourly wage differential between FLLs and native workers. Lee (1998, p.161) indicates that FLLs in the manufacturing industries earned 81% of native manufacturing workers’ wages; FLLs in

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13 For instance, the minimum wage in the manufacturing industries is about 47% the average actual wage in this sector (Lee, 1998, p.157).
the construction sectors earned only 62% of native construction workers’ wage. Lee (1998 p.157) argues that the lower wages paid to foreign workers relative to native workers is the most enticing factor for employers of foreign workers. It is worth noting that Lee compares FLLs with Taiwanese who have been in Taiwan’s labour market for less than two years (inexperienced workers) and not with average native workers who tend to earn more based on experience. Therefore, Lee’s estimation are likely be lower than the actual differences.

In addition to accepting lower wages, FLLs are also willing to work more flexible and longer hours than native workers, both of which are extremely attractive for employers (Lan, 2001, p.25). The Taiwanese official census report, The Foreign Labour Force Management Report from 1995 to 1997, demonstrated that in 1997 the average working hours for FLLs in manufacturing and construction industries were greater than for native workers. During this period, FLLs in manufacturing worked an average 245 hours per month, which were 36 hours more than native workers per month. The average working hours for FLLs in the construction industry was 257 per month, which was 58 hours more than native workers. The highest average working hours per month was 283 in the furniture and fixtures sectors. Clearly, FLLs work longer than the stipulated maximum working hours (maximum 48 hours per week).

FLLs’ flexible working schedules and lack of freedom to change companies and working location are an additional incentive for employers to hire them. Lin (1995, p.84) states that FLLs as a group tend to endure longer working hours and stricter demands at their work places and seldom change companies. Furthermore, foreign workers tend to

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14 In 1997, the average monthly salaries for foreign manufacturing and construction workers were NT$ 20,693 and NT$ 20,662; the average working hours per month for foreign workers in these two sectors were 244.76 hours and 257.32 hours. In the same year, the average monthly salaries for native manufacturing and construction workers were NT$ 21,638 and NT$ 25,587; the average working hours per month for native workers in these two sectors were 208 hours and 198.8 hours ((Lee, 1998, p.161).
maximize their income, have fewer family concerns and restricted social lives while in Taiwan which allow them to be more flexible in terms of working hours and more cooperative than native workers when their employers ask for overtime work. Employers thus tend to prefer foreign labourers for these reasons and it eventually will reduce the bargaining power native of native low-skilled workers.

**Bonus and welfare**

Employers of FLLs are not required to offer FLLs bonuses, days off, or financial subsidies for marriages and other family events. The employers are required, by the Labor Standard Law, to supply a free return ticket for FLLs to visit their home country once a year and to cover the accommodation and food expenses for these foreign workers. This official policy is meant to equalize the cost differential between FLLs and native workers. The reality, however, is quite different. Interestingly, the present average salary of an FLL, already includes the expense of accommodation, food, and in some cases even return tickets. Thus, the breadth of the wage differential between FLLs and native workers is definitely larger than the government’s report and Lee’s estimation. Due to the failure of a legislated minimum salary and a lack of regulatory power, the Taiwanese Labor Standard Law and related labour and employment regulations are unable to protect the rights of foreign workers. As a result, FLLs have been paid differently from their native counterparts, and they generally earn less for doing more work.

The case of Taiwan’s FLLs corresponds to the perspective of the global division of labour theory, which suggests that nationals usually work not merely for income but also for social prestige. Thus, they actively avoid and refuse to work at the bottom of the

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15 For example, according to the Labor Standard Law, every employee can have seven to eleven days off-work with pay per year.

job hierarchy because these jobs are associated with low social status and offer little chance for promotion. Migrant workers, however, from poorer countries, excluded from the labour-importing society’s cultural norms and motivated to earn large salaries in short time periods, consider these jobs in foreign countries a means to an end (Massey, et al, 1998, p.29).

Today, foreign workers in Taiwan can be divided into the following types: private and major governmental construction projects, health care workers, domestic workers, fishing workers, and manufacturing workers. The number of FLLs in all fields has increased from 2,999 people in 1991 to 326,515 people in 2000 (see Appendix C). Almost the same population as the Taiwanese aboriginal peoples, FLLs are often referred to as a fifth ethnic group. The regulations on the duration of stay and the renewal of a working visa have also been revised several times because of the combined effects of labour shortages and employers’ requests to simplify recruitment procedures. Currently, the duration of stay can be two to three years, and a re-entry visa can be renewed to a maximum of 6 to 8 years based on the industry. Although there is no precise research to examine how much of Taiwan’s economy depends on FLLs, the expanding number of FLL shows the growing importance of migrant workers in Taiwan’s economic development. Lan (2001, p.2) suggests that it is becoming more difficult to judge whether these FLLs are a labour supplement or a substitution.

Clearly, the social costs and impacts of foreign low-skilled workers in Taiwan are far more difficult to estimate and monitor because such impacts are difficult to quantify. These concerns are related to sensitive issues such as human and citizen rights, culture, nationhood, and social security. For example, more and more incidents or conflicts are

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17 Because of their different ethnicities and cultural historical experiences, people in Taiwan have been divided into the following four groups, namely, Hokkiens, Hakkas, Mainlanders, and Aboriginals.
occurring among FLLs from different countries (Chang, 2000, p. 52). These police incidents in FLLs communities not only help foster negative images and attitudes toward foreigners but also cause unrest in Taiwan's society. Surveys and interviews with the Taiwanese living in foreign worker-concentrated communities reveal that they are most concerned about security and health issues, and feel it is unfair to have to share living space with “problematic” low-skilled foreign workers (Tseng, 2001).

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter examined the evolution and impacts of Taiwan's foreign worker policy. It shed light on the reasons for the demand for foreign low-skilled workers. It has shown that Taiwan's foreign worker policy has been influenced by the following factors: the economic situation at national and international levels; demographic changes; educational development; and official foreign policies.

By analyzing the internal and external reasons for Taiwan's foreign worker policy, it is found that most situations in Taiwan corresponded to the four features and theories of current international labour migration outlined in Chapter 2. First, the flow of FLLs into Taiwan reflects Taiwan's economic position in the global production and labour markets. Second, compared with its foreign labour resource countries in terms of economic power and demographic character, Taiwan has a relatively higher GDP and hourly wages, as well as a lower unemployment rate and lower population growth rate. Third, the importation of FLLs is highly regulated by the Taiwanese government, particularly in terms of FLLs' nationalities, numbers, job categories, duration of work, and working hours and wages. Finally, in terms of the rapidly increasing numbers and rates of female FLLs in Taiwan (Appendix C), Taiwan is now experiencing a feminization of migration.
The neoclassical economic theory helps to explain why FLLs are from countries with lower GDP and salaries than that of Taiwan. The global division of labour explains why FLLs are concentrated on the bottom of the job hierarchy, filling jobs that native workers tend to avoid. The migration transition theory offers an explanation of how the improvements in Taiwan’s economy and in native education, combined with the decrease of national fertility and mortality rates, have contributed to the restructuring of Taiwan’s labour market and caused the need for introducing foreign low-skilled labourers to cope with the country’s labour shortage. Three reasons indicate that ILM in Taiwan corresponds to the feminist theory. First, the number and percentage of female migrants has increased rapidly over the past decade. The number of female FLLs has increased from 669 in 1992 to 112,934 in 2001; and the percentage has increased from 4.2% to 37% in 2001. Second, Taiwan’s female migrant workers have been concentrated in certain types of jobs, such as domestic and health care workers. Finally, Taiwan’s foreign worker policy has impacted male and female FLLs differently in terms of wage and working hours. (See Chapter 4).

Over the past decade, Taiwan’s foreign worker policy has been constantly modified for political and economic purposes. Through this process, Taiwan’s government has established three guiding principles and has also developed The Employment Service Act and the Regulation on Employment and Management of Foreign Nationals, two specific chapters in its Labor Standard Law. These regulations govern the recruitment of FLLs, attempt to protect native workers’ job opportunities, and ensure that the introduction of cheaper foreign workers will not delay industrial structural upgrading. However, after analyzing the implementation and effects of these policies, this project argues that the current Taiwanese foreign labour policies are not only unable to protect
the human rights of foreign workers, but have negatively impacted the rights of native low-skilled labourers.

The general policies related to FLLs' rights are not explicitly discriminatory in text; however, the government ignores the reality of the situation through insufficient investigation and a lack of overt regulation. Therefore, the current foreign labour policy has failed to equalize the employment costs between foreign and native workers. This situation has had several negative impacts on FLLs, on native workers in low-skilled labour intensive industries, and on Taiwanese society. This situation has damaged native workers' bargaining power. Furthermore, the Taiwanese foreign worker policy is also unable to deal with potential social problems that stem from the importation of FLLs, such as conflict among FLLs and with local residents. All of these factors contribute to create and reinforce negative stereotypes of FLLs and social resistance toward them. FLLs have to face discrimination and are excluded from mainstream Taiwanese society. As a result, the current situation undermines and threatens Taiwan's social harmony.
Chapter 4: The Minority of the Minority: Female Foreign Low-Skilled Labourers in Taiwan

4.1 Introduction

This chapter will focus on the experiences of female foreign low-skilled labourers (FLLs) in Taiwan and their impact on Taiwan’s economy and society. The following discussion of female FLLs demonstrates how Taiwan’s foreign worker policy operates and how this policy affects female FLLs and Taiwanese society. This project divides the discussion of Taiwan’s FLLs along gendered lines because male and female FLLs are employed in different occupations, a direct result of Taiwanese gender norms. As a result of this occupational segmentation, some Taiwanese foreign worker policies do not apply to domestic and health care workers who are predominantly females. Thus, in practice, male and female FLLs are regulated by different foreign labour policies.

The feminization of labour migration has become a trend in current ILM globally, and Taiwan has also experienced this trend. The number of female FLLs in Taiwan has greatly increased since 1991, but because the data for FLLs are not broken down by gender, one must examine traditional women-specific occupations. Over the past decade, assuming that all migrant domestic and health care workers were women (and that there were no women in any other categories), the percentage of female FLL in Taiwan has increased from 4.2% of the total FLLs in 1991 to 37% in 2001 (see Appendix C). However, another important and growing female labour source that is not accounted for in official estimates are foreign brides. While foreign brides are not necessarily paid for their work, their important contributions merit recognition and consideration.

Asis (2000, p.269) argues that the emerging phenomenon of mail-order-brides, between males from major low-skilled labour-importing countries such as Japan and
Taiwan and females from low-skilled labour exporting countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, needs to be studied alongside the feminization of international labour migration (ILM). The terms foreign bride or mail-order-bride, for the purpose of this project, are interchangeable and exclusively describe women imported from Southeast Asia and Mainland China to marry Taiwanese men. Such arrangements are primarily accomplished through international matchmaker companies that specialize in the importation of women. Although most foreign brides are not wage-earners, this subject is directly related to the topic of female low-skilled labour migration because foreign brides have become a common source of household and care-giving labour (Taiwan Normal University, 2000). They take over responsibilities that more and more Taiwanese women are avoiding. Also, becoming a mail-order-bride is a migration strategy for females in developing countries to emigrate and eventually to work in more developed countries. Thus, some researchers (Hsia, 2000; Sassen, 2000; Wang, 2001) correctly argue that foreign brides is part of international low-skilled female labourer migration.

On the issue of labour migration, the feminist perspective sheds light on the relationship between gender, state policy, and the gender division of household and care-giving work. Hefti (1997) argues that a discussion about labour immigration from a gender perspective can discover the best indicators of migrant and non-migrant female workers’ quality of life. Similarly, Lycklama à Nijeholt (1994, p.22) argues that a country's immigration policy towards foreign female workers also reflects the society’s traditional attitudes toward its female nationals. This chapter will examine Taiwan’s immigration policy towards these foreign female workers, and also discuss Taiwan’s gendered culture in relation to those foreign female workers.

Female FLLs and foreign brides will be the central focus of this chapter. Section 4.2 identifies gendered culture, social class, and governmental policy as key
aspects affecting the working and living experiences of female migrant workers. Section 4.3 reviews Taiwan’s immigration policy toward foreign brides and how this policy affects both these women’s lives and Taiwanese society.

4.2 Female Foreign Low-skilled Labourers

Since 1992, Taiwanese employers have been able to apply for foreign domestic and health care workers. During this period, the number of foreign domestic workers has increased more than 25 times, from 363 workers in 1992 to 9,154 in 2001. The number of foreign health care workers has increased 339 times, from 306 workers in 1992 to 103,780 workers in 2001 (Appendix C). Only these two groups have experienced significant growth in terms of numbers and percentages compared to other industrial sectors that import foreign labourers. The increasing feminization of FLL is consistent with the previous discussions in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, suggesting that a society with an aging population, like Taiwan, will increase the demand for labour-intensive service workers including health care workers and social reproduction workers.

Historically, these workers were categorized into two groups: domestic workers and health workers. As a result of changes in the work context for foreign health care workers, the distinction between these two occupations is now blurred. The working definition for foreign health care workers’ duties has expanded from taking care of a patient’s daily life to taking care of the daily life of both the patient and the patient’s family. This could include domestic work. Thus, the duties of these foreign health care workers are more demanding than those of foreign domestic workers. In view of the lack of efficient regulation and monitoring, it can be predicted that more foreign health care workers will enter Taiwan as domestic workers (Lin, 2001, abstract). The situation that treats foreign health care workers as domestic workers is becoming more prevalent and
will cause difficulties in compiling specific data to understand the real working conditions of these foreign migrant workers.

According to Taiwanese foreign labour policy, certain conditions are required in order to apply to hire a foreign domestic or health care worker.\(^\text{18}\) To be granted permission to hire a foreign domestic worker, applicants must have 16 points, which are awarded for having children less than 6 years of age, and elderly family members, as shown in Table 4.1. To encourage foreign investment, expatriate executives of foreign-based companies in Taiwan with investments over NT$200 million, or general managers of foreign investments over NT$100 million, are also allowed to hire domestic helpers in their families. Different from the point system for hiring a foreign domestic worker, the Taiwanese government reviews case-by-case applications to hire a foreign health care worker. Foreign health care workers are permitted for households, non-profit health institutions and sanatoriums that take care of seriously handicapped and comatose patients.

Table 4.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point system for applying for a foreign domestic worker</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age of Applicant’s Child</td>
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<tr>
<td>Points</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<th>Age of senior member of the family</th>
<th>Year (age)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Points</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
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The labour in these two sectors is not culturally regarded as a job. According to Taiwanese gender norms, these jobs are the role of women and do not require professional training. Therefore, people in these sectors are not treated as workers, although they are paid. This attitude is also reflected in legal regulations since workers in these two sectors are not covered by the provisions of Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law. These factors have led to much difficulty in protecting the rights of foreign female workers, leaving them in vulnerable positions. The following section will discuss Taiwanese social and cultural attitudes as well as the government’s position on female FLs, and how these factors affect the lives of FLs and Taiwan’s society.

Culture and social class: Gender norms, working conditions, wage disparities, and vulnerability

A recent Taiwanese government foreign worker policy report claims that the purpose of introducing foreign domestic workers and foreign health care workers was to relieve the pressure of housework on Taiwanese career women and to encourage more married women to join the labour force (Council of Labor Affairs, 2001; Yan, 1999, p.3;). As this policy implies, household labour is unequally divided between Taiwanese women and men. It also suggests the inefficiency of the current social security system with regard to the needs of children, seniors, and the disabled.

Two pieces of evidence reveal that this policy has not succeeded. First, although the number and percentage of foreign domestic and health care workers increased steadily from 1992 to 2001, the labour participation rate of Taiwanese women, including married women did not experience a noticeable increase (Table 4.2). Second, according to the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) census data, in 1997 the initial population of married career women hired foreign domestic workers was 170,094 out of which 998 women left
their jobs; and only 180 out of 477 housewives joined the Taiwanese labour market after hiring a foreign domestic worker (Young, 1997).

Table 4.2.

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<td>45.7</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46.1</td>
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The significant social and economic gaps between female FLLs and their employers and the long working hours of foreign domestic and health care workers demonstrate a pronounced hierarchical relationship between female FLLs and their Taiwanese employers. After analysing the income gaps between the FLLs and their Taiwanese employers based on 1995 data, Yan (1999, p.6) argues that the current Taiwanese foreign domestic and health care worker policy has become an instrument that reinforces the socio-economic class disparity between foreign female workers and their employers. Yan (1999, p.6) found that, for 63% of the employers of foreign domestic workers, the household monthly income was greater than NT$86,000. According to the Taiwanese official data, the average monthly income of these employers was higher than the average income of Taiwan’s second richest households in 1995 (Appendix D).

However, in 1995 the average monthly salary for foreign domestic workers was NT$14,802 not including NT$892 for over-time work (CLA. 1998). This data indicates the significant social and economic inequality between foreign domestic workers and their employers easily subjects these female domestic and health care workers to
exploitation.

Overall, the opening of foreign domestic worker employment opportunities has not increased the participation of Taiwanese female's in the labour force since 1992 (Chan, Shin & Liu, 2001 p. 31). In addition, after analyzing the income levels of employers, the system clearly benefits principally those women in the Taiwanese wealthier households to transfer their housework responsibilities to foreign domestic and health care workers (Lin, 2001, abstract).¹⁹

Policy

According to Taiwanese foreign labour policy, foreign workers’ wages are supposed to be guaranteed by a stipulated minimum wage. However, in June 1999, the Taiwanese government cited the difficulty of regulating working hours and announced that domestic and health care workers would not be covered by the Labor Standard Law after January 2000.²⁰ This change of government policy reflects the lack of respect for female FLLs' jobs and rights. As a result, employers are no longer required to follow the Labor Standard Law that governs the stipulated minimum wage, days-off, and working hours. Hence, employers of foreign domestic and health care workers enjoy more freedom in designing working contracts that can infringe on the rights of these female workers in the work place. To date, the only legal protection for these foreign workers is governmental agreements between their home countries and the Taiwanese government. However, due to the intense competition between low-skilled labour-exporting countries, the rights of these workers are readily subordinated to the economic concerns of the

¹⁹ In this project, "wealthier household" refers to those in the medium high and highest quintile (see Appendix D).
labour-importing and -exporting countries, creating a relationship that favours the
employers (Dias, 1994, p.136). In this buyers market, it is questionable how much the
governments of these foreign labourers’ can affect and improve their foreign nationals’
situations. Raj-Hashim (1994, p. 120) states “[labour exporting] governments often find
themselves in a dilemma situation as they compete with other countries for jobs for their
nationals, thereby having to offer lower wages, while trying to protect the [their] overseas
migrants in terms of wages and conditions of service.” In this disadvantaged position,
female workers are inevitably exploited at every stage of the recruitment and placement
process. Female domestic and health care workers share a qualitatively different
experience from male foreign workers because they are excluded from Taiwan’s Labor
Standard Law. These foreign domestic and health care workers receive lower wages than
those foreign low-skilled workers in manufacturing and construction industries.21

The social impacts of Taiwanese female FLL policy

Cheng (1996, p.146) argues that without the legal protection of government
policies, female low-skilled migrant workers have become targets of race, class, and
gender discrimination. However, Taiwan’s FLL policy needs further examinations in
order to evaluate its social impacts within Taiwanese society. This project identifies three
negative impacts.

First, foreign domestic and health care workers are relatively inexpensive to hire.
This allows the Taiwanese public and government to ignore the need to build a
well-developed social infrastructure that could transfer the traditional responsibilities of

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21 In 1997 the average regular monthly salary of foreign domestic and health care
workers was NT$ 14,802. That year, the average monthly salaries were NT$ 20,693 in
manufacturing sector and NT$ 20,662 in construction sector. Manufacturing and
construction foreign workers were paid hourly for overtime work. In the case of foreign
domestic and health care workers, their wages were capped at NT$ 892 for overtime
work. (CLA, 1998).
women to the public sector. For example, Taiwanese government statistics reveal that in 1995, 20% of Taiwanese women were not in the labour force because of household responsibilities, while 32% of Taiwanese women did not work because of their responsibilities to take care for family members. In addition, according to these statistics, Taiwanese women still have to do most of household and care-giving work whether or not they have jobs (Dgbasy). These findings reveal a need to build a social infrastructure to counter Taiwan’s unequal gender division of housekeeping and social reproduction responsibilities and to alleviate the domestic burden on Taiwanese women. To improve the labour participation and lives of Taiwanese women by reducing their domestic responsibilities, Taiwan could have three choices: to build a well-developed social infrastructure, to educate men to share more equally, or to continue importing foreign workers. However, as long as there are foreign domestic and health workers in Taiwan, it is necessary to protect their human rights. Over the long term, since importing FLLs has not contributed to a large increase in female labour force participation rates, building a self-reliant social service network would be a more effective alternative than continuing to import female FLLs.

Second, because foreign female workers are not covered by the Labor Standard Law in Taiwan, foreign domestic and health care workers have become a cheap labour source for the Taiwanese wealthier household and may reinforce class disparity within Taiwanese society. The Taiwanese government claims that the purpose for introducing foreign domestic workers and foreign health care workers was to relieve the pressure of housework responsibilities on Taiwanese career women to encourage more married women to join the labour force. However, more than 60% of female foreign workers are

employed in Taiwan’s wealthier households. It is reasonable to think that women from wealthier households have less economic motivation to join the Taiwanese labour force. This reveals the uneven distribution of foreign workers among Taiwanese socio-economic classes, and limits the effectiveness of the policy in assisting women from the middle and lower socio-economic classes. The effect of introducing foreign domestic and health workers plays on creating and reinforcing class disparity in Taiwanese society still needs more research. However, according to studies on other Asian countries, foreign domestic and health care workers have become a symbol for social status (Heyzer & Wee, 1994, p.38). The continued importation of cheap foreign labour could widen the gap between different socio-economic classes in Taiwan, which was not the official intention of the foreign domestic and health care policy (Lin, 2000).

Third, because female FLLs are not covered by Taiwan’s Labor Standard Law, their rights are not protected in terms of working hours, work conditions, or salary. The lack of sufficient legal protection may possibly contribute to the problem of illegal migration. In their research on female labour migration in Asia, Lim and Oishi (1996, p.91) find that one of the main reasons for a migrant worker to work illegally was to avoid the high cost of employment broker’s fees, to avoid tedious application procedures for a working visa, and to avoid premature deportation. Lim and Oishi (1996, p.91) also argue that women are more likely to access illegal labour recruitment channels because of their relatively lower education levels and resultant lack of information. Thus, lack of legal protections for legal female FLLs could contribute to the problem of illegal migrant workers, a growing issue of social concern for many international worker-importing countries.

4.3 Foreign brides

From 1994 to 2000, there are more than 153,000 recorded marriages to foreign
spouses from East and Southeast Asia as well as mainland China in Taiwan (see Appendix E). The ratio of these international marriages to the total number of marriages has jumped from 1:7 in 1998 to 1:5 in 2000 (Ministry of Interior, 2001a). In these marriages, over 90% were Taiwanese men marrying foreign brides (Wang, 2001). Unfortunately, the data before 1994 is unavailable.

The improvement of women’s educational levels and the change of women’s social status have resulted in more Taiwanese women refusing to follow the traditional wife’s role and challenging traditional gender norms and attitudes toward marriage (Wang, 2001). These changes have made it difficult for some Taiwanese men to find wives in the Taiwanese marriage market and have created a demand for foreign brides. The importation of the foreign brides, like the importation of FLIs, arises from Taiwan’s rapid social and economic change. These brides are mainly from China, Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Except for China, these countries are also the main labour-exporting countries providing Taiwan’s FLIs. The majority come from Mainland China and Vietnam because of the similarities in culture and physical appearance of these brides to Taiwanese women.

This section examines Taiwanese immigration policy, Taiwan’s gender relationships, and how these affect foreign brides (and their families) and the Taiwanese society. Wang (2001) points out that massive Taiwanese economic investment in China and other Southeast Asian countries has increased the flow of information and created a new kind of social network between these nations that has acted as a catalyst for the development of international marriage markets. In addition to the personal and social network, the uneven global capitalist development processes and the unbalanced global division of labour between countries and genders have played an essential role in increasing the number of low-skilled women from poor countries who become foreign
brides or migrant workers (Hsia, 1997). Thus, the rising number of foreign brides in Taiwan from Southeast Asian countries should be viewed in terms of regional and global divisions of labour and should reflect Taiwan’s position in the global economic system (Tang & Cai, 2000 p.5). These perspectives help to explain why Taiwan’s foreign brides are mainly from neighbouring poor countries and provide grounded theoretical explanations for the increased numbers of foreign brides.

A brief comparative profile reveals several differences between foreign brides and local brides and also helps to illustrate the subservient position of foreign brides in Taiwan. Data concerning foreign brides, as a group is still incomplete, and only the situations of Vietnamese foreign brides have been documented. According to Taiwan Normal University research (2000), in 1999, the average age of foreign brides who came from Vietnam was twenty-five years old, and their average education level was junior high school. Only 20% of them held paying-jobs after they married in Taiwan. Moreover, most of these women gave birth within one year after their weddings. In contrast, Taiwanese women had a 45% participation rate in the labour market and felt less pressure to bear children immediately after being married (Ministry of Interior, 2001b). Taiwanese women tend to wait 3-5 years after marriage to have their first children.

Although foreign brides from Mainland China are listed as the most prevalent group, foreign brides from Vietnam have become another popular choice, as demonstrated by the high rate of growth in the number of Vietnamese who registered for a residence visa (Appendix E). This is a result of different government migration policies being applied to brides from Mainland China and other countries. The popularity of Vietnamese brides also reflects the Taiwanese men’s preference for obedient women. According to mail-order bride advertisements on the Internet, foreign brides from Vietnam as a whole are described as more obedient than brides from Mainland China and other countries. In
these advertisements, one of the promotional features of Vietnamese brides is that they cannot speak Mandarin like brides from Mainland China. This feature will reduce the chance of them creating their own social network in Taiwanese society, and maintain the male’s dominant position within the marriage.

Foreign brides are one of the most marginalized and isolated groups in Taiwanese society and they experience high rates of mistreatment, abuse, and health problems.23 The background of foreign brides, their unfamiliarity with Taiwanese language and culture, and the fact that they come from poorer countries, readily creates negative stereotypes of them in Taiwanese society. This situation is further complicated by the fact that their marriage partners are often from the bottom of Taiwanese society (Tang & Cai, 2000, p.15; Wang, 2001). In most cases, the spouses of foreign brides are divorced or widowed with dependants. Their spouses or their spouses’ dependants may be disabled mentally or physically or aged. These factors combined with their lack of political power because of their immigrant status make these foreign brides part of the lowest tier of Taiwanese society.

Immigration policy

Despite the increasing number of foreign brides, Taiwanese immigration policy, with regard to foreign brides, has not been changed significantly over the past two decades. According to current Taiwanese immigration law, foreign brides have to stay in Taiwan at least three years before being able to gain citizenship.24 Before obtaining citizenship, some are only able to gain a visitor’s visa, or a resident visa, depending upon their situation or nationality. Their highly regulated situation not only limits their working

opportunities and socio-political participation rights, but also affects their personal freedom.\(^{25}\) For example, in some cases to stop brides from running away, their partners or new family may confiscate their passports and identification documents. Furthermore, if foreign brides divorce before they obtain citizenship, their resident permit (visa) will be cancelled, and they will be sent back to their home countries. In such cases, they are unable to gain custody of their children and may even lose visitation rights.\(^{26}\) Before foreign brides gain either citizenship or a resident visa, they depend on their partners to gain legal status and economic support. Therefore, it is the main concern of foreign brides to gain a resident visa and citizenship.\(^{27}\) Faced with the threat of losing the opportunities to get a resident visa and citizenship, most of these women choose to be silent if their rights are violated (Pearl S. Buck International).\(^{28}\)

**Foreign brides from Mainland China**

Foreign brides from Mainland China face a more difficult situation than those from other East and Southeast Asian countries because of the political tensions between Taiwan and Mainland China. Under current immigration law, women from Mainland China are not allowed to stay continuously in Taiwan longer than 180 days per year (with

\(^{25}\)According to Taiwanese law, foreign brides who wish to work but only have residence visas must apply for working visas and are only permitted to work in limited occupations, which are open to foreign low-skilled labourers. These jobs are characterized by low-skill, low-pay, lack of promotional opportunities, and highly demanding physical labour. Foreign brides from Mainland China are not allowed to work until they become citizens. These factors make it more difficult for brides from Mainland China to find a job. It also reflects the hostile nature of relations between Taiwan and Mainland China.\(^{26}\)

\(^{26}\)The China News (2000, May 03).

\(^{27}\)In Taiwan, applicants have to stay in Taiwan for three years to gain their citizenship, and those who want to gain citizenship have to first gain resident visa.

\(^{28}\)A report presented by Pearl S. Buck International Foundation reveals that due to foreign brides' social economic status and cultural backgrounds, these women are less aware of their rights and easily isolate themselves from social support resources. For example, in most of their home countries, it is not unusual for a woman to be beaten by her husband. Thus, they will not search for help when they encounter domestic violence.
a visitor visa) until they gain a resident visa. They are required to wait for at least two years to apply for a resident visa after either marrying a Taiwanese man or having a child with a Taiwanese man. In addition, the current quota system limits the number of resident visas granted to foreign spouses from Mainland China to 3,600 persons per year. Between 1994 and 2000, 74,708 foreign spouses from Mainland China came to Taiwan from Mainland China (Appendix E). Since only 3,600 persons are awarded a Taiwanese residence visa per year, this implies that by the end of 2000, only 28,800 people had received a Taiwanese residence visa, while 45,908 people remained on the waiting list. Even if no more Mainland Chinese brides (or grooms) come to Taiwan after 2000, it would still take at least ten years to sort through all the applications. In contrast, brides from other Southeast Asian countries are entitled to apply for a resident visa after only six months and there is no quota limitation on this type of immigration.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, foreign brides are part of an enterprise that is based on both capitalist and patriarchal principles. It costs a Taiwanese man around NT$250,000 to NT$450,000 to marry a foreign bride through an international marriage broker; and the bride’s family may receive an average of 4% to 10% of this money (Hsia, 1997; Tang and Cai, 2000, p.26). An advertisement for mail-order-brides on the Internet provides an example of the breakdown of costs and expenditures (see Appendix F).29 According to Appendix F, the international marriage agencies receive at least 38% of the total expense. Marriage brokers do not publicly disclose profit margins, but the high commission fees, combined with the volume of foreign brides, reveal the enormous economic potential of

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this industry. It is clear that mail-order-brides are a lucrative industry and that these foreign brides have become “merchandised goods” (Hsia, 1997).

Media perceptions and problematic stereotypes of various groups of foreign brides are prevalent in Taiwan and shape Taiwanese society’s perception of foreign brides. Regardless of whether these brides come voluntarily with information or are deceived into marrying Taiwanese men, they live under stressful conditions because of social discrimination, economic pressures, and lack of social support networks. For most Taiwanese, these women, as a group, may be a public discussion topic. Based upon a review of newspaper articles, however, it appears that there is little interest in their real living conditions and they remain alienated from Taiwanese society. Reports show that marginalizing this group affects these women’s lives and their children’s lives and eventually affects the whole of Taiwanese society as well.30 Two decades after Taiwan began importing these women, foreign brides and their families as a group have a higher proportion of family violence (China Times, 2000, June 05). In addition, they often suffer from contagious diseases such as dysentery and AIDS that go undiagnosed before and after they migrate to Taiwan because of their unfamiliarity with Taiwan’s health system.31 All of these affect the Taiwanese social justice system, health system, and society as a whole.

4.4 Conclusion

The experiences of female migrant workers in Taiwan are evidence of how female immigrants are continually marginalized by the dynamics of a patriarchal culture and the current global capitalist economy (Hsia, 1997; Yan, 1999). Lycklama à Nijeholt (1994).

p.19) argues that the experiences of female immigrants in receiving countries, especially
domestic workers, reflects a world-wide persistent process of hegemonisation. She (1994,
p.19) further states that this ‘hegemonisation’ process involves the creation of social
constructs of superiority and inferiority based upon the prejudices of gender, race, and
class and probably religion. Taiwan is part of this trend.

The female migration pattern experienced by Taiwan in the past twenty years is a
reflection of a society undergoing social and economic restructuring. A traditional
patriarchal value system that devalues child care, care of the sick and elderly, and
housework as women’s jobs is clashing with the attitude of modern Taiwanese women
who refuse to accept or adapt to traditional social reproduction duties and ideology.
Taiwan’s policy makers have not yet seriously dealt with either the clash of ideologies or
the increasing number of foreign FLLs through labour immigration and international
marriages. This chapter identifies three problems that are the outcome of policy-makers’
disregard for female FLLs’ rights. Ignoring female FLLs’ rights has probably
contributed to the Taiwanese public’s reluctance to build a well-developed social
infrastructure to counter Taiwan’s uneven gender division of domestic responsibilities. In
addition, the introduction of cheap female FLLs reinforces the socio-economic class
disparity in Taiwan. Finally, the inefficient protection system and limited welfare for
female FLLs could discourage them from gaining legal status and thus contribute to the
problem of illegal migration. It is worth noting that the protection of female FLLs’
working and human rights would benefit not only female FLLs in Taiwan, but also
Taiwanese women and society. In terms of foreign brides’ rights, this project has shown
that foreign brides are readily marginalized in Taiwan’s society because of the lack of
political and economic power. They are also easily marginalized because of their gender,
their unfamiliarity with Taiwan’s culture, and their social status.
Without sufficient protective management, female immigrants, whether they are contract workers or imported brides, easily become a resource to meet the need of employers or partners for low-paid workers, who can be easily controlled on the basis of patriarchal stereotypes (Castles, 1999, p.11; Tang & Cai 2000, p.17). In Taiwan, to counter these gendered biases and stereotypes, to ensure social justice for these female migrants, and to maintain a stable social security and health system, the improvement of legal protection of female migrants’ rights is essential. In order to do so, the first step is to regulate domestic and health workers’ working hours and conditions, as well as remuneration. Domestic and health workers should be recognised as regular labourers and should be under the protection of Taiwan’s Labour Standard Law. In terms of foreign brides, it is necessarily to amend Taiwan’s current migrant law to improve foreign spouses’ civil, political, and economic rights.
Chapter 5: Conclusion

International labour migration is a complex issue; different societies have developed various labour migration processes, and this has yielded different consequences. Through the theoretical discussions and the case study of Taiwan, this project examined how low-skilled migrant workers have been influenced by the dynamics of the global economic development, a state’s foreign worker policy, and a society’s gendered culture. It is found that without appropriate protection, the world’s low-skilled international migrant workers, especially women, are considered to be a group that easily suffer pressures from economic, racial, and gender-biases in labour importing countries (Gardezi, 1995, p.14).

Chapter 2 in this project argues the current ILM is a result of uneven economic development and different demographic structures between low-skilled labour importing and exporting countries, which is based on and enhanced by the global division of labour. In both the labour exporting and importing countries, labour migration has been integrated into economic development programs and therefore most immigration regulation reinforces the pattern of the global labour division. At first glance, low-skilled labourers might seem to receive more working opportunities through the intensification of the international labour market. Over the long term, however, low-skilled labourers’ migrations bring neither the expected rewards nor spur their economic enfranchisement (Rosewarne, 1998, p.979). This is particularly true for female low-skilled migrant workers, as their increased mobility does not mean these women have escaped the gendered division of labour.

Chapter 3 analyses the factors contributing to the continued importation of FLLs in Taiwan and demonstrates how male FLLs have been mistreated in terms of additional
overtime working hours and depressed wages. This chapter also explores the relationship between the mistreatment of male FLs, the decrease of native workers’ employment prospects, and increasing social security concerns. Over the long term, a biased social attitude and a discriminatory policy have had negative impacts on both foreign and native workers, as well as on Taiwan’s society in general.

Research has also shown that ILM is a gendered process; women and men’s experiences differ in many dimensions. However, the amount of research about female low-skilled migrant workers is limited and these workers remain invisible and vulnerable. In Chapter 4, this project outlines how Taiwanese women are burdened with virtually all housework responsibilities, and how these duties have been transferred to female FLs and foreign brides for a certain segment of the Taiwanese population. Despite the value of foreign low-skilled workers and brides, particularly in social reproduction, and the increasing number of these female migrants, the Taiwanese government does not offer legal protection for foreign domestic and health care workers in terms of minimum wage and maximum working hours. In the case of Taiwan’s foreign brides, these women are readily abused and suffer more pressure from traditional gender norms. Apparently, neither the Taiwanese public nor the government have developed an encompassing support network to protect foreign brides’ human rights and ease assimilation into the Taiwanese society. In sum, the situation of female low-skilled migrants in Taiwan is the epitome of how patriarchy and capitalism interact to create a system that devalues female migrants’ contributions and ignores their human rights.

The evolution and implementation of Taiwanese foreign labour policy reflects a complex policy-making process that is based upon social, political, and economic considerations. In fact, this process has mirrored the changes in Taiwanese culture, economy, politics, and the shifts in the international political and economic order. As a
result, the impacts of importing FLLs are not limited to economic sectors. The negative impacts of this policy outlined in this research include: the mistreatment or abuse of low-skilled immigrants, especially women; decreased bargaining power of native low-tier labourers; increased conflicts between native and foreign workers; and a threat to Taiwanese society’s security. Furthermore, this project has shown that the need for FLLs in Taiwan is not only limited to business and industrial sectors, but also to health care institutions and domestic households. The labour shortage in health care and households reveals the insufficiency of the current social security and social reproduction mechanisms, including in both the public and private sectors. However, the introduction of cheap foreign labour leads the Taiwanese public to overlook the existing unequal gendered division of labour in the domestic sphere and to underestimate the necessity of building a more sound and encompassing social security and welfare network.

The inefficient implementation and poor design of Taiwan’s foreign labour policy are two of the main reasons that the policy has been unsuccessful. Because of its ambiguous, incomplete, and exclusive nature, it is unable to guard FLLs’ human and labour rights. Moreover, it is also unable to protect native workers’ long-term employment prospects.

Considering the flaws of the current foreign worker policy and the ongoing search for an ultimate solution, there are three points that should not be ignored. First, it is necessary to improve the current foreign labour policy, including refining its regulation, extending its jurisdiction and including foreign domestic and health workers. This will ensure that foreign workers are protected by law and therefore granted important rights. However, these rights are meaningless if the regulation and law are not adhered to. The existing provisions within the foreign worker policy have often been overlooked or ignored by employers and government. It is essential that this policy be respected and its
regulations enforced. Also, to ensure the protection of FLLs’ human rights, a new Taiwanese foreign worker policy should include more programs that help FLLs to understand their rights within Taiwanese society. These programs will enable FLLs to better access their situation and act upon their individual rights.

Second, the Taiwanese public needs to be informed to develop a keener understanding of the value and importance of FLLs economically and culturally. The Taiwanese government and public should reassess the value of FLLs and appreciate their importance to the economic prosperity of Taiwan. This will eliminate FLLs from being blamed for economic and social problems.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the vulnerability of international low-skilled migrant workers can be derived from the global economic market, which subjects migrant workers to world labour market competition. International labour migration is not merely an individual’s rational choice. In fact, it is highly regulated by national and international institutions as well as the dynamics of the global economy. It is must be recognised that the increasing mobility of low-skilled migrant workers does not necessarily increase low-skilled migrant workers’ income. In fact, low-skilled migrant workers are easily mistreated, especially women. To improve migrant workers’ rights and to balance this with the mechanism of a buyers’ market, it is imperative to ensure Taiwan, a country that has not had a sound foreign worker policy, follows the principles of the Migration for Employment Convention and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migration Workers and Members of Their Families, the two major ILO conventions concerning migrant workers (ILO)\(^\text{32}\). Since Taiwan is not a member of ILO, Taiwan may be not invited to sign these international conventions. These recognized international standards could serve as tools to ensure migrant workers receive full equal treatment as

\[^{32}\text{International Labour Organization. (n.d.). Text of ILO Conventions.[Internet version].}\]

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native workers in Taiwan. In the long term, it will also protect the bargaining power of Taiwan's local low-skilled workers.

Recently, the Taiwanese government acted against the best interests of FLLs when they announced that from January 2000, employers of FLLs are under no longer obligated to provide free housing, boarding and food to their foreign employees. This trend suggests that the situation for FLLs will not improve in the near future. In fact, judging from this pattern, it seems that the Taiwanese government has not yet realised the importance of FLLS or the difficulty of their situation; moreover, positive changes in the labour policy seem unlikely in the immediate future.

This study still confronts a number of research difficulties. Some of these difficulties are those that many other researches have encountered, such as the challenges of interpreting other research. Another difficulty was the task of finding reliable and comprehensive data. For example, data on the number of low-skilled migrant workers globally is still unavailable. These difficulties reflect the complex nature of ILM and the needs for more precise research including theoretical discourses and empirical data building. For future studies about international labour migration, more case studies on these issues are needed in order to gain more empirical material and comprehensive theoretical perspectives.

Taiwan is only one of the countries that is involved in the international migration process, but the problems confronted by foreign workers and natives are not all endemic to this nation. Being conscious of Taiwan’s state of affairs and control measures is useful for furthering the understanding of this issue. More importantly, this project helps to provide a basis for anticipating problems resulting from this emerging aspect of globalization. In this project, this was accomplished by means of integrating several

theories, and this approach could be an effective method for future research about other countries. In particular, understanding the increasing feminization of migration trend and how gendered division of labour affects workers differently are key aspects of this project. While this project focused on Taiwan, the findings could be analogous to the conditions in other countries, thereby exposing similar problems and providing possible solutions.
References


The Taiwanese government data and reports


min166.htm.


Daily Newspaper Articles.


Appendix A. Map of Taiwan

Source: United States Central Intelligence Agency. [Base maps]/ Central Intelligence Agency.
Appendix B. Taiwan’s foreign low-skilled workers by nationality, 1994-2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>151,989</td>
<td>6,020 (3.96%)</td>
<td>2,344 (1.54%)</td>
<td>38,473 (25.31%)</td>
<td>105,152 (69.18%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>189,051</td>
<td>5,430 (2.87%)</td>
<td>2,071 (1.10%)</td>
<td>54,647 (28.91%)</td>
<td>126,903 (67.13%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>236,555</td>
<td>10,206 (4.31%)</td>
<td>1,489 (0.63%)</td>
<td>83,630 (35.35%)</td>
<td>141,230 (59.70%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>248,396</td>
<td>14,648 (5.90%)</td>
<td>736 (0.30%)</td>
<td>100,295 (40.38%)</td>
<td>132,717 (53.43%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>270,620</td>
<td>22,058 (8.15%)</td>
<td>940 (0.35%)</td>
<td>114,255 (42.22%)</td>
<td>133,367 (49.28%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>294,967</td>
<td>41,224 (13.98%)</td>
<td>158 (0.05%)</td>
<td>113,928 (38.62%)</td>
<td>139,526 (47.30%)</td>
<td>131 (0.04%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>326,515</td>
<td>77,830 (23.84%)</td>
<td>113 (0.03%)</td>
<td>98,161 (30.06%)</td>
<td>142,665 (43.69%)</td>
<td>7,746 (2.37%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Appendix C. Taiwan's foreign low-skilled workers by industrial sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Fishing</th>
<th>Manufacturing</th>
<th>Social and Personal Service*</th>
<th>Domestic Workers</th>
<th>Health Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,999</td>
<td>2,999 (100%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>15,924</td>
<td>6,463 (49.5%)</td>
<td>70 (0.4%)</td>
<td>8,722 (54.4%)</td>
<td>669 (4.2%)</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>97,565</td>
<td>17,287 (17.7%)</td>
<td>426 (0.4%)</td>
<td>72,327 (74.1%)</td>
<td>7,525 (7.7%)</td>
<td>6,205</td>
<td>1,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>151,989</td>
<td>28,317 (18.63%)</td>
<td>1,044 (0.6%)</td>
<td>109,170 (71.8%)</td>
<td>13,458 (8.8%)</td>
<td>9,201</td>
<td>4,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>189,051</td>
<td>36,212 (19.5%)</td>
<td>1,454 (0.7%)</td>
<td>133,978 (70.8%)</td>
<td>18,307 (9.6%)</td>
<td>8,505</td>
<td>8,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>236,555</td>
<td>41,051 (17.3%)</td>
<td>1,384 (0.5%)</td>
<td>163,865 (69.2%)</td>
<td>30,255 (12.7%)</td>
<td>13,947</td>
<td>16,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>248,396</td>
<td>41,543 (16.7%)</td>
<td>1,144 (0.4%)</td>
<td>166,597 (67%)</td>
<td>39,112 (15.7%)</td>
<td>12,879</td>
<td>26,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>270,620</td>
<td>46,866 (17.3%)</td>
<td>1,109 (0.4%)</td>
<td>169,277 (62%)</td>
<td>53,368 (19.7%)</td>
<td>11,524</td>
<td>41,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>294,967</td>
<td>44,517 (15%)</td>
<td>993 (0.3%)</td>
<td>174,664 (59.2%)</td>
<td>74,793 (25.3%)</td>
<td>7,730</td>
<td>67,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>326,515</td>
<td>35,813 (10.9%)</td>
<td>1,185 (0.3%)</td>
<td>183,186 (56.1%)</td>
<td>106,331 (32.5%)</td>
<td>7,823</td>
<td>98,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>304,605</td>
<td>32,121 (10.5%)</td>
<td>1,249 (0.4%)</td>
<td>158,301 (51.9%)</td>
<td>112,934 (37%)</td>
<td>9,154</td>
<td>103,780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Social and Personal Service is the sum of domestic and health care workers.

Appendix D. Taiwanese household average monthly income by quintile, 1994-1999 (NT$).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average monthly income</th>
<th>The lowest quintile</th>
<th>Medium-low quintile</th>
<th>Middle quintile</th>
<th>Medium-high quintile</th>
<th>Highest quintile</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>64,146</td>
<td>23,355</td>
<td>41,592</td>
<td>55,832</td>
<td>74,335</td>
<td>125,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>67,612</td>
<td>24,681</td>
<td>43,812</td>
<td>58,726</td>
<td>79,040</td>
<td>131,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>68,865</td>
<td>24,870</td>
<td>44,770</td>
<td>60,256</td>
<td>80,509</td>
<td>133,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>71,952</td>
<td>26,038</td>
<td>46,452</td>
<td>62,827</td>
<td>83,651</td>
<td>140,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>72,765</td>
<td>25,905</td>
<td>46,731</td>
<td>63,781</td>
<td>84,564</td>
<td>142,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>74,088</td>
<td>26,417</td>
<td>47,821</td>
<td>64,875</td>
<td>85,972</td>
<td>145,354</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The amount in each cell is represented the average monthly income of each quintile.

Appendix E. Number of registered foreign spouses by nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
<th>Malaysia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>870(6.8%)</td>
<td>55(0.4%)</td>
<td>1,183(9.3%)</td>
<td>2,247(17.6%)</td>
<td>7,885(61.8%)</td>
<td>530(4.15%)</td>
<td>12,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1,301(7.79%)</td>
<td>86(0.51%)</td>
<td>1,757(10.52%)</td>
<td>2,409(14.42%)</td>
<td>9,180(54.96%)</td>
<td>1,969(11.79%)</td>
<td>16,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1,973(9.60%)</td>
<td>73(0.36%)</td>
<td>2,085(10.15%)</td>
<td>2,950(14.36%)</td>
<td>9,349(45.51%)</td>
<td>4,113(20.02%)</td>
<td>20,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2,211(8.88%)</td>
<td>96(0.39%)</td>
<td>2,128(8.54%)</td>
<td>2,464(9.89%)</td>
<td>8,951(35.93%)</td>
<td>9,060(36.37%)</td>
<td>24,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1,173(6.07%)</td>
<td>102(0.53%)</td>
<td>544(2.82%)</td>
<td>2,331(12.06%)</td>
<td>10,528(54.49%)</td>
<td>4,644(24.03%)</td>
<td>19,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1,184(4.67%)</td>
<td>106(0.42%)</td>
<td>603(2.38%)</td>
<td>3,643(14.36%)</td>
<td>13,046(51.42%)</td>
<td>6,790(26.76%)</td>
<td>25,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,259(3.67%)</td>
<td>65(0.19%)</td>
<td>487(1.42%)</td>
<td>4,381(12.78%)</td>
<td>15,769(45.99%)</td>
<td>12,327(35.95%)</td>
<td>34,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,971(6.48%)</td>
<td>583(0.38%)</td>
<td>8,787(5.71%)</td>
<td>20,425(13.27%)</td>
<td>74,708(48.54%)</td>
<td>39,433(25.62%)</td>
<td>153,907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix F. Cost disbursement and profits for marrying a Vietnamese foreign bride: the breakdown of costs and expenditures

- **NT$250,000**
  - **Taiwan Broker**
    - Transportation (return tickets), accommodation (21 days), for groom and broker (NT$40,000)
    - Transportation (one-way ticket) for a foreign bride (NT$10,000)
    - Service fee for broker
  - **Vietnamese Broker**
    - Document (NT$55,000)
    - Brides’ family (NT$10,000)
    - Server fee for Vietnamese Broker (NT$35,000)

Source: Adapted from Ya-Dou Vietnamese Foreign Brides Agency (亞都越南新娘), 費用說明(Expenses). Retrieved March 8, 2002, from http://netcity5.web.hinet.net/UserData/84023319/