DIVERGENT ANTHROPOCENTRISMS:
AN INUIT EXERCISE OF SELF-DETERMINATION VIA LIVING RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

by

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ABSTRACT

Since the establishment of self-government in Nunavut, the Inuit have gained domestic self-determination over the management of important living resources such as the polar bear. By exercising self-determination, the Inuit have been better able to realise the maximum economic utility of these resources by pursuing their commodification in international markets. Recently, however, the ability of the Inuit to use the international market as a medium for economic development has been constrained by environmental campaigns that oppose the commodification of the polar bear as a hunting trophy. This paper examines the impact of these international forces on Inuit self-determination, and on the capacity of Inuit to achieve their longer term economic development goals. Using polar bear management as a case study, I argue that in order to achieve their longer-term economic development objectives in relation to living resource management, the Inuit must employ a more pragmatic and strategic approach to the pursuit of economic opportunities in the international marketplace. In order to advance their pursuit of economic self-determination, I argue that the Inuit must seek to establish more cooperative relationships with international actors such as environmental NGOs, and with respect to the commercial development of Arctic wildlife, establish a common set of goals that are based on a shared anthropocentrism.
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INTRODUCTION

0.1 The Issues

The government of Nunavut provides political representation and systems of self-government that afford the Inuit a means to exercise self-determination unlike any other Indigenous peoples in the world. For the Inuit, managing living resources is both culturally and economically important to their society, and thus constitutes an important part of their self-determination. Self-government has provided the Inuit with the ability to manage these resources in a way that they deem most appropriate for their economic development. In exercising domestic self-determination, the Inuit have pursued the international market as the place most advantageous for maximising the economic utility of their living resources.

Living resources can be integrated into the international market in various ways. In the case of the polar bear, the example at the heart of this paper, the Inuit deemed the trophy hunt to be the most efficient way to pursue the maximum economic utility of this resource. By marketing the bear to hunters internationally, producers (in this case, outfitters) have gained access to new sources of demand that increase the bear’s monetary value (as a trophy) far more than if domestic markets were used.¹ Due to its profitability, the international trophy hunt has allowed the Inuit to pursue their goal of economic development more efficiently.

More recently, however, the ability of the Inuit to use the international market as a medium for promoting economic development has been constrained by the actions of international actors attempting to advance their own independent political agendas. These actors, specifically international environmental NGOs and the US government, have significantly reduced the profitability of the trophy hunt by strategically influencing public opinion in favour

of polar bear conservation. In addition to its more immediate economic effects, this development raises two key questions from the point of view of the Inuit’s longer-term interests in living resource management. First, is there an inherent conflict between Inuit and non-Inuit interests with respect to the management and economic development of living resources? Second, and more fundamentally, is the capacity of the Inuit to exercise self-determination over living resources constrained by the interests of other, more powerful, actors with whom they are required to interact in the international marketplace?

Like any other self-determining community, indigenous and non-indigenous alike, the Inuit of Nunavut encounter both opportunities and constraints when they seek economic development opportunities in the international marketplace. The degree of self-determination that the Inuit enjoy over the development of their living resources is therefore partly dependent on their ability to manage these constraints and opportunities in an effective manner. Given this reality, I argue that in order to achieve their longer-term economic development objectives in relation to living resource management, the Inuit must employ a more pragmatic and strategic approach to the pursuit of economic opportunities in the international marketplace. Specifically, I contend that the Inuit must seek to establish more cooperative relationships with international actors such as environmental NGOs and, in the process, establish a common set of goals with respect to the commercial development of Arctic wildlife. By managing wildlife in a manner that is more inclusive of other interests a more stable economic environment can be created, with the Inuit better able to pursue economic development.
0.2 An Inuit Exercise of Self-determination via Living Resource Management

In a broad sense, self-determination refers to a community’s capacity to take control of its internal affairs and to determine its own future. There are many different components of self-determination but in this paper I use the ability to pursue appropriate economic development as the benchmark to measure self-determination. The term appropriate economic development is used to describe an autonomously defined path of development that not only acknowledges the need for economic growth, but also the practical and cultural considerations relevant to a society’s economic development. Scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred, who argue that “meaningful progress toward self-determination can never be made until Native communities are free of economic dependency”, speak to the importance of economic development as a measure of Aboriginal self-determination.2 The link between economic development and self-determination is further corroborated by an international discourse that sees the management of resource development and allocation as vital to maintaining traditional Aboriginal cultures, while advancing the political interests of Aboriginal peoples in a globalised world.3

Because of their cultural and economic importance to Inuit society, living resources are an important part of appropriate economic development.4 Living resources play an especially crucial role in the economies of small isolated communities in the Arctic. Through hunting and

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stewardship activities, living resources have retained a high level of cultural significance to Inuit society. Thus, for appropriate economic development to become a part of an Inuit exercise of self-determination, autonomy in the domain of living resource management is crucial.

Aboriginal self-determination, including increased control over natural resources, can be advanced through numerous kinds of political and economic arrangements. The self-government arrangement in Nunavut represents one of the more sweeping types of political concessions made by a contemporary state to advance the interests of Aboriginal people. In order to provide self-determination, institutions of public governance have been flexibly adapted to the culture and concerns of the majority of its residents (the Inuit), while providing sufficient levels of domestic autonomy.

Living resource management is included within the sphere of domestic autonomy provided by self-government. This has allowed the Inuit to manage living resources as they see fit, often resulting in increased interaction with the international market to secure increased economic benefit for local communities. Thus, in providing domestic autonomy over the management of living resources, self-government has given Inuit the increased ability to pursue appropriate economic development.

Despite the ways in which public government increases the Inuit’s control over the development of their land and resources, there remain concerns as to whether they are truly able to exercise self-determination within this institutional format. For example, because public government is designed to represent all Nunavummiut, it is possible to argue that self-government will inevitably fail to represent the interests of the Inuit, as it itself is a product of western political traditions. However, the debate over whether public government is inherently problematic as a means of advancing Aboriginal self-determination is already well-rehearsed in
the literature. Moreover, the demographic, geographic, social, and political characteristics that are unique to the North render this debate less salient to an examination of Inuit self-determination.

Other constraints on the ability of the Inuit to exercise self-determination include the unequal political or economic relationships Aboriginal governments experience with provincial or federal governments. The government of Nunavut is politically and economically dependent on the Canadian federal government. Some administrative jurisdictions have remained under the control of the federal government. This situation may raise doubts as to whether public government is an effective means of advancing Inuit interests. While it is still unclear whether Nunavut will evolve towards provincehood, or some new form of Aboriginal self-government, it is safe to assume that without decreasing their economic dependency on Ottawa, the Inuit will also have a difficult time reducing their political dependency on other levels of government.

With economic dependence precluding Nunavut’s political autonomy, the question of whether the Inuit can manage and truly benefit economically from the use of their resources becomes even more pertinent to a discussion of self-determination. In other words, controlling their land and resources and achieving the maximum economic utility from resource development helps determine whether the Inuit can advance their political and economic autonomy within the Canadian federal system. Herein lies the importance of understanding the international determinants of Aboriginal economic development and self-determination.

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result of achieving self-government, Aboriginal people have become increasingly integrated into a vast array of global political, social and economic networks. In other words, renegotiating their relationship with the state and the dominant non-Aboriginal society that surrounds them often requires successfully advancing their goals amidst both domestic and international forces.

The influence of international forces affects all varieties of Aboriginal governments, including ethnic and non-ethnic arrangements alike. This external source of influence presents new challenges and opportunities for Aboriginal groups who exercise domestic self-determination via self-government. For example, the chances of success greatly improve if, when pursuing their own economic or political goals internationally, Aboriginal groups are able to promote shared interests with other actors. However, if Aboriginal groups pursue their goals in a way that treats their long-term interests as being exclusive of those of most other actors, there is a greater chance that their relationships with international actors will be antagonistic.

Since the 1960’s, the political and economic aspirations of the Inuit have been both supported and constrained by the international environmental community. For example, the Inuit’s movement towards self-government received support from the international community. This support was in part due to the fact that the Inuit’s argument for greater political autonomy reflected a degree of common interest with other actors in the international community. However, because these interests have recently diverged and come into conflict over the use of living resources, a relationship of antagonism has formed between the Inuit and many in the international environmental community. While the environmental community does not oppose the Inuit’s right to economic development, many disagree with how the Inuit have used the polar bear as an economic resource. This paper examines the recent episode of conflict between the Inuit and environmental groups such as Greenpeace, the World Wildlife Fund, the Humane
Society, Greenpeace, and the Defenders of Nature over the question of polar bear management. In my view, this conflict has arisen because the current living resource management regime has ignored the growing opposition to the trophy hunt. This opposition is rooted in a particular brand of southern-centric anthropocentrism that on the one hand places restrictions on the commercial hunting of animals such as the polar bear, but on the other hand creates new opportunities for using these more “exotic” animals to further other human-centric interests. Therefore, I view the recent opposition to the polar bear trophy hunt as a herald not only of new constraints on Inuit economic development, but also of new opportunities that the Inuit have yet to capitalise on.

Despite numerous examples of how environmental groups have influenced the fight for Aboriginal land rights, the academic literature has paid little attention to how international forces affect the pursuit of self-determination. This issue has a broad application when discussing Aboriginal self-determination. For example, because processes of globalisation such as the liberalisation of markets are so prevalent in today’s global society, the influence of international forces are a significant determining factor in whether any form of Aboriginal self-government, be it public or ethnic, is capable of advancing self-determination.

Aboriginal peoples all over the world are succeeding in carving out new domestic jurisdictions to further their cultural, political, and economic aspirations. As these new jurisdictions take shape, globalisation presents new challenges and opportunities to Aboriginal peoples who become increasingly integrated into new global economic and political relationships. For these relationships to be supportive of Aboriginal aspirations, domestic policy that is relevant to the demands of external actors must be made to promote a common ethic and set of goals that is shared by both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples. In no other jurisdiction has the nature of the relationship between international forces and Aboriginal self-
determination been more evident than that relating to the protection and use of natural resources. Therefore, the Inuit's demonstrated need and capacity to interact with international forces via self-government provides an excellent point of departure for exploring the relationship between international forces and Aboriginal self-determination.

In examining how the polar bear trophy hunt was constrained by international forces, this paper develops our understanding of the relationship between international forces and the Aboriginal pursuit of economic development. Moreover, in providing recommendations on how living resource policy can be better structured to facilitate cooperation with international forces, this paper aims to help Inuit policy makers better navigate Inuit economic interests within living resource management within the international sphere.

0.3 Chapter Outline

This paper is divided into three chapters. The first chapter introduces and defines the concepts of self-determination and self-government. I argue that having autonomy over living resource management is vital to an Inuit exercise of self-determination because of the role it plays in appropriate economic development. A literature review follows, where I provide an overview of three distinct scholarly discourses relevant to the research question posed in this paper. I begin with literature on Aboriginal-state relations, where I draw upon some of the more general issues pertaining to the relationship between Aboriginal self-determination and self-government. Scholarly sources that describe both the structure and operations of the government of Nunavut make up the second category of literature. This literature completes the analytical framework needed to establish that self-government affords the Inuit a significant degree of self-determination. Specifically, it helps contextualise the broader theoretical arguments raised with respect to Aboriginal-state relations in an Arctic political context, making them more salient in a
discussion of Inuit self-determination. The third category of literature reviewed is international relations theory dealing with liberalism and neoliberalism. I provide a general overview of the most prominent ideas in these schools of thought, and explain how they help us understand the relationship between international forces and the Inuit’s pursuit of economic development.

Chapter two is divided into two sections. In the first section I provide an overview of how concerns over the management of living resources fuelled the political mobilisation of the Inuit and their struggle for self-government. I stress how the Inuit’s approach to emphasising common goals with international actors aided their pursuit of self-government. The Inuit’s use of strategic pragmatism in this case later serves as a point of contrast with how the Inuit have recently pursued the polar bear trophy hunt, often at the expense of their long-term goal of economic development. In the second section I offer an overview of the institutions that provide the Inuit with domestic autonomy over living resource management. I argue that public self-government has provided the Inuit with a significant degree of domestic self-determination, represented in their ability to integrate living resources such as the polar bear into the international market in order to secure its maximum utility for economic development. In chapter three, I examine how international forces have restricted the Inuit’s access to the lucrative polar bear trophy hunt market. I explain how constraints to Inuit interests are the result of a rise in a global perception regarding the aesthetic value of the polar bear, and a divergence of interests over its use between the Inuit and other external actors.

The political use of wildlife is not new, and in the concluding chapter, I argue that this trend need not negatively affect the Inuit’s pursuit of economic development. I provide a general set of policy recommendations to help ensure that living resource use aids in advancing Inuit cultural and economic independence. Generally speaking, my recommendations call for a more
pragmatic living resource policy that is more inclusive of both the Inuit’s economic interests and
the interests of other actors, as well as the dominant anthropocentric ideology that underpins
contemporary conceptions of “appropriate” animal resource use.

0.4 Methodology

I base my analysis and recommendations on information drawn from secondary literature,
and documents from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Polar Bear
Specialist Group (PBSG). I devote particular attention to the secondary literature on self-
determination, self-government, and the impact international NGOs have had on the Inuit pursuit
of self-determination. Concerning the literature on Inuit self-determination, I draw on sources
that discuss the cultural and economic importance of living resources to the pursuit of self-
determination. These sources range from anthropological descriptions of Inuit culture to
International Environmental Protocols that uphold human rights by securing Indigenous
stewardship over traditional lands. These sources back up my conclusion that maximising the
economic benefit of animal resources like the polar bear is vital to appropriate economic
development.

I also draw upon literature that speaks to the relationship between Inuit self-government
and theories of Aboriginal self-determination, Arctic governance and international relations. I
discuss these sources in detail within the literature review. Together, these sources provide a
conceptual framework needed to show how increased access to the international market is
demonstrative of an exercise of domestic self-determination. In examining the relationship
between Inuit self-determination and international forces, I draw upon sources that highlight the
underlying political and economic agendas that inform the recent pattern of political antagonism.
I also draw on sources that explore the role anthropocentrism plays in explaining political
interaction, policy changes in Arctic resource management, and the interaction between Inuit self-determination and the international political environmental movement.
CHAPTER ONE: MEASURING INUIT SELF-DETERMINATION

1.1 Introduction to the Concepts of Self-Determination and Self-Government

When referring to a group, self-determination denotes the ability to influence the determinants of collective well-being. Self-determination has numerous components. One important component is having the ability to internally define and manage economic development. Gudmunder Alfredson, a human rights scholar at the Raoul Wallenstein Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, claims that having autonomy over the pursuit of economic development is crucial to the preservation of group identity. Gaining autonomy over economic development enables Aboriginal people, in a post-colonial era, to renegotiate their relationship with the dominant state. For example, Article 5 of the United Nations’s Declaration of Indigenous Rights states:

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

For many Aboriginal groups, the ability to preserve their traditional institutions while engaging in the modern pursuit of economic development depends on whether they are able to regain autonomy over their lands and resources. The International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs argues that “land and related resource rights are of fundamental importance to

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indigenous peoples since they constitute the basis of their economic livelihood and are the source of their spiritual, cultural and social identity.\textsuperscript{10}

In pursuit of self-determination, Aboriginal peoples have sought to negotiate new political and economic arrangements with the state in order to establish their autonomy over their land, resources, and other vital determinants of their cultural and economic independence. Out of many possible state concessions, self-government represents one of the more sweeping arrangements that can be used to enhance Aboriginal autonomy. W.J. Assies identifies two main forms of Aboriginal self-government and categorises them according to how they integrate the concepts of territoriality and ethnicity into governance.\textsuperscript{11} The first category of Aboriginal governance encompasses arrangements that formally link territorial autonomy with a specific ethnicity. In other words, these arrangements reserve participation exclusively for members of a particular ethnic group.\textsuperscript{12} The second type of self-government arrangement includes systems where ethnicity does not play a formal part in deciding membership. Instead, an Aboriginal group achieves political or cultural dominance by having the administrative boundaries drawn in a way that secures them as the demographic majority. This Aboriginal group is then able to realise self-government within nationally established political frameworks.\textsuperscript{13} The latter of the two arrangements is often referred to as public self-government, and it is representative of the type of system employed in Nunavut.

\textsuperscript{10} IWGIA, "Indigenous Peoples and Land Rights."
\textsuperscript{11} Natalia Loukacheva, "Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic: Legal Status of Inuit (Case Study of Greenland and Nunavut)" (Phd, University of Toronto, 2004), 47.
\textsuperscript{13} Assies, "Self-Determination and The "New Partnership."
1.2 Literature Review

1.2.1 Aboriginal-State Relations

Aboriginal-state Relations is the first discourse presented in this literature review. Generally, scholars within this discourse are interested in the issues and concerns that arise as Aboriginal peoples seek to renegotiate their relationship with the state and the non-Aboriginal society that surrounds them. Although largely theoretical in nature, the majority of this literature focuses on geographic areas outside of the Arctic. Nevertheless, the theoretical discussions, particularly those relevant to the issues of Aboriginal self-determination and self-government, are still relevant to the conceptual framework needed to understand and measure Inuit self-determination. More specifically, this literature provides useful insights about the cultural appropriateness of western political institutions and the ability of self-government to empower Aboriginal peoples. The experience and voice of the Inuit must be explored within these broad theoretical debates, in order to illustrate the literature’s applicability to the political context in the North.

A Southern Context: A Critical Look at Self-Government

There are concerns that public governments and other self-government arrangements that remain a part of the existing state political and economic framework do not alter the unequal power relations between Aboriginal peoples and the state. For example, jurisdictional devolution often considers the state to be the sole legitimate proprietor of authority. The state then exercises this self-legitimised authority in devolving limited political autonomy to

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Aboriginal communities it deems deserving. This fact is important to scholars who see the creation of self-government as simply more evidence of state domination over Aboriginal people.

Inuit leaders raised similar concerns prior to the creation of Nunavut. While the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NCLA), the precursor to the Nunavut Act, afforded the Inuit greater political autonomy, it also required the forfeit of their Aboriginal title. Inuit leaders acknowledged the colonial undertones of this condition, yet many still perceived self-government as a positive step towards strengthening Inuit autonomy. This recognition of the promise of self-government, even within a broader context of subjugation, was evident to NCLA negotiator Paul Quassa:

> It was very hard for us (Inuit) to do that. It is the colonial legacy when you have to give up a certain thing in order to get something. This is not the Inuit way. That certainly is from another form, because the federal government adopted that policy, because that mentality of colonialism is always there. We had to accept it, but in return, we said: ‘give us Nunavut government’, ‘give us Nunavut territory’.

After shared power arrangements are established, they remain part of the larger political framework that created them. Some scholars see this jurisdictional subjugation as being proof of the continued subordination of Aboriginal peoples through self-government. Kiera Ladner, for example, uses the term “municipalities plus” to describe the fact that while self-government may

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17 Loukacheva, "Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic: Legal Status of Inuit (Case Study of Greenland and Nunavut)".

provide increased administrative jurisdiction to some, it does not confer real autonomy. Instead, she claims that self-government is the equivalent of self-administration within the old colonial paradigm.\(^\text{19}\) Ladner argues that these power-sharing arrangements are mislabelled as arrangements of "self-government", because they are not constitutionally defined.\(^\text{20}\) She argues that they are "publicly elected corporate entities that are responsible for looking after the interests and needs of property owners and for performing all other duties and administrative responsibilities as delegated or mandated by provincial governments. In short, they are subordinate governments."\(^\text{21}\)

Ladner brings up an important point regarding the detrimental influence that bipartite or tripartite arrangements of self-governance can have on Aboriginal peoples. In terms of its applicability to Nunavut, however, much of Ladner’s concern fails to account for the tremendous level of jurisdiction exercised by the territorial government over its domestic affairs. As demonstrated later in detail, the Nunavut government provides local residents with domestic autonomy over almost all spheres of jurisdiction.

In agreeing to self-government, Aboriginal peoples accept a shared citizenship with the dominant non-Aboriginal society. To scholars such as Taiaiake Alfred, shared citizenship means that Aboriginal people accept a version of citizenship that treats them as a minority group and ignores the validity of their own constitutional orders.\(^\text{22}\) Alfred contends that domestic or internal self-government is unacceptable because it does not accept Aboriginal peoples as sovereign


\(^\text{21}\) Ladner, "Negotiated Inferiority: The Royal Commission on Aboriginal People's Vision of a Renewed Relationship."


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nations that have the authority to decide the extent and nature of their relationship with other societies. Here Alfred presupposes a causal connection between realising Aboriginal autonomy and separating Aboriginal societies from other societies. He subscribes to the assumption that not only is Aboriginal culture unique, it inherently conflicts with intuitions and processes rooted in western culture. Some of these views are shared by scholars like Boldt, who claim that internal self-government perpetuates Aboriginal subordination because it reflects Eurocentric political and economic traditions more than the Aboriginal societies it claims to represent.

Concerns over the cultural appropriateness of self-government may be more applicable to southern contexts than to the Inuit situation. For example, the Inuit's concept of autonomy is indicative of a much more inclusive notion of culture and society than assumed by Alfred. An overview of the Inuit pursuit of self-government, provided in this paper, demonstrates this level of inclusiveness. It shows that for the Inuit, obtaining real autonomy by achieving real increases in jurisdictional authority was possible while remaining a part of the larger Canadian society. Numerous statements made by Inuit leaders further demonstrate their willingness to reconcile the concept of autonomy, without the need for ethnic-based governance or secession from Canada. For example, in explaining the Inuit stance on adopting a domestic western-style of governance Simon Awa stated:

... because we are Canadians, we embraced parliamentary governance, Canadian institutions of parliamentary governance. We adapted to the Canadian institutions of parliamentary governance in Nunavut. Also it may be not perfect, I could see

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some changes down the road. Yes, we have adapted the Canadian institutions of governance.\textsuperscript{25}

Others, such as Nunavut MLA Jack Anawak, claimed that the NLCA and the creation of Nunavut as a Canadian Territory was meant to preserve the Inuit’s “...relationship with the land and ensure our survival as a people in the larger society surrounding us.”\textsuperscript{26}

The discussion regarding the cultural appropriateness of self-government also includes concerns more specific to Aboriginal social economy. Gabrielle Slowey has argued that self-government represents the final phase of assimilation for Aboriginal societies. Because a market-based society must underpin a “working” arrangement of self-government, Slowey argues that Aboriginal peoples are coerced into accepting modes of production that are incompatible with Aboriginal models of economic production and social order.\textsuperscript{27} Often economic “requirements” for a working government mean that Aboriginal people must sacrifice the more communalistic aspects of their culture in order to emphasise economic relations based on profit and economic growth. Other structural adjustments that have been required of Aboriginal peoples have included the paying of Canadian taxes and the adoption of an on-reserve system of private property.\textsuperscript{28} Through this process, the political and economic subordination of Aboriginal people continues through their conversion into consumers within the lower stratum of a class system.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} Loukacheva, "Autonomy and Indigenous Peoples of the Arctic: Legal Status of Inuit (Case Study of Greenland and Nunavut)", 85.
\textsuperscript{28} Gabrielle Slowey, "Boom Not Bust: Self-Determination and the Mikisew Cree First Nation” (paper presented at the Beyond Boom and Bust in the Circumpolar North Conference, Prince George, 2003).
\textsuperscript{29} Slowey, "Boom Not Bust: Self-Determination and the Mikisew Cree First Nation."
The value of Slowey's argument is that it provides a better understanding of how the cultural or ideological leanings of political institutions can inhibit the capacity of self-government to protect Aboriginal culture. In other words, there is a danger that even if self-government does fulfill its mandate, the type of empowerment provided can only facilitate a greater participation in one type of social order, one that is inherently antagonistic to Aboriginal culture.

In assuming that there is an inherent conflict between Aboriginal culture and a market society, there is a danger of over oversimplifying and reducing the vast diversity of Aboriginal cultures into one archetype. Since becoming politically mobilised, Inuit leaders have declared their intention, not to stop resource development, but to ensure that their people are included as participants in that development and that they profit from the economic benefits that it brings. The Inuit's pursuit of self-government as a self-conscious means of increasing their participation in resource development contradicts Slowey's assertion that increased Aboriginal participation in the market generally comes only as a result of pressure or coercion. In my view, the Inuit's pursuit of the polar bear trophy hunt is evidence not only of their desire to pursue development opportunities in the international market, but also of the fact that they enjoyed a sufficient level of political autonomy (provided by public self-government) to do so.

A Southern Context: Aboriginal Self-Determination within a Context of Connectedness

In opposition to those who emphasise the inherent limitations of self-government are scholars who conceptualise Aboriginal autonomy in a manner that highlights its interconnectedness with non-Aboriginal society. Proponents of this view, unlike those who espouse arguments for ethnic secession, stress the importance of acknowledging the variety of social, economic, and cultural interdependencies created as Aboriginal groups live and intermix
with other Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. In this view, the secession option is rendered unlikely, not only by practical concerns like the financial and capacity constraints that often beset small Aboriginal communities, but also by “intercultural forces” such as education, urbanisation, politics, and intermarriage. These forces undermine the possibility of entirely separate spheres of existence between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies. Moreover, according to this view shared citizenship is not necessarily in fundamental conflict with Aboriginal sovereignty. On the contrary, by recognising the relationship of interdependence between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies, proponents of domestic self-government see shared citizenship as the most viable way that Aboriginal sovereignty can be advanced.

Alan Cairns, for example, supports the idea of linking Aboriginal self-determination with the interests of Canada as a whole. He argues for a package of citizenship rights that would allow Aboriginal people to realise some of their political aspirations while retaining a “Canadian solidarity firmly based on a common, shared, equally valued citizenship.” Other scholars such as Will Kymlicka view Aboriginal autonomy within a liberal framework of equality. He argues that special rights should be extended to Aboriginal peoples to protect their cultures from political decisions of the dominant majority. However, like Cairns, Kymlicka sees Aboriginal people as a minority group and, by adhering to the liberal conception of justice, does not conceive Aboriginal autonomy as being independent from the larger society of which it is a part.

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part.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, arguments in opposition to Aboriginal secessionist movements can be buttressed by accepting the idea that practical and ethical limitations are placed on groups seeking greater autonomy because Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies are geographically, culturally, and socially interconnected. Therefore, these limitations create a need for shared or co-operative forms of government to “manage this interdependence in a way that is both effective and democratic.”\textsuperscript{35}

Due to the advent of colonialism and the creation of settler states, acknowledging the multitude of interdependencies that exist between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal societies is an important part of understanding, and in some instances advancing, Aboriginal autonomy.\textsuperscript{36} It is important to note, however, the extent to which the conditions of interdependence, which are often assumed to be universal amongst Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples in Canada, in fact differ in the case of the Arctic. For example, there has been significantly less foreign settlement in the Arctic than there has been in most Aboriginal territories in the south.\textsuperscript{37} Therefore, calls for more “realistic” approaches to granting Aboriginal autonomy that perhaps acknowledge the more “practical” considerations of interdependency are less salient in the Arctic. However, the fact that the dominant cultural characteristics of the Arctic have remained reflective of its Aboriginal population does not necessarily imply the need for or viability of secession. Many Inuit do not see their interests as being antagonistic to a broader Canadian interest but instead see the two as


\textsuperscript{36} Papillon, “Federalism from Below? The Emergence of Aboriginal Multilevel Governance in Canada. A Comparison of the James Bay Crees and Kahnawake: Ke Mohawks”, 36.

\textsuperscript{37} Ailsa Henderson, \textit{Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture} (Vancouver: UNBC Press, 2007), 140.
being intrinsically connected. In clarifying their position on the Inuit relationship to Canada, Inuit leader Peter Ittinuar stated:

We do not take the position that we own everything in the North. Rather, we accept the fact that we are a part of Canada, and that we can make a contribution to the country as a whole by sharing the wealth that can be drawn from out lands. Such sharing is consistent with our traditional philosophy of life. But at the same time we insist that the sharing arrangement must protect and guaranteed our cultural integrity, which is dependent upon our continuing links to the land.38

Similarly, in speaking at a meeting regarding devolution, Paul Kaludjak, president of Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI),39 expressed his desire for a type of devolution “that is good for Inuit, Nunavut, and Canada as a whole” and noted further that “... the development and growth of Nunavut, and better social and economic conditions for Inuit, benefit Canada as a whole.”40 The comments made by Kaludjak and Ittinuar reveal a conception of Inuit autonomy that does not imply the necessity of separating from Canada. As this paper demonstrates in detail, the Inuit’s conception of self-determination is less focused on issues of ethnic separation and more on obtaining autonomy over the determinants of their wellbeing, including economic development. As such, the Inuit’s pursuit of domestic self-government reflects a desire to benefit from being a part of a larger non-Inuit society.

Because the Inuit seek to exist as part of a broader market-based society, and because the focus of this paper is on issues of economic development, examining whether public self-government increases Inuit self-determination is measured by an increased ability to create, participate, and benefit from capitalist development on their lands. Slowey and other scholars,

39 Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated is an organization representing the legal interest of the Inuit in land claim processes.
who view Aboriginal culture to be in conflict with capitalism, would view an attempt to measure
an exercise of self-determination through capitalist benchmarks as being ineffectual. However,
unlike Slowey, authors such as Dominic O’Sullivan see no inherent conflict between capitalism
and Aboriginal culture. Instead, he views cultural and economic security as being interdependent
variables.  41 With specific reference to the Maori of New Zealand, O’Sullivan regards those who
attempt to isolate Aboriginal culture from capitalist development as being unable to deal with
“the evolution” of Aboriginal society.  42 O’Sullivan argues that self-government is a means
through which Aboriginal peoples can advance their access to the international economy. Unlike
domestic economies where the dominant non-Aboriginal group controls most of the available
capital, O’Sullivan sees the international economy as being more culturally neutral and, despite
its market “fluctuations”, a more efficient means of advancing self-determination.  43 For
O’Sullivan, Aboriginal peoples exist in an interconnected relationship with non-Aboriginal
societies, governments, and a global mode of economic production. It is through this relationship
that “evolving” Aboriginal societies who adopt market principles can advance their cultural and
economic independence.

Since the establishment of Nunavut, many Inuit leaders and politicians have supported a
type of development that is in accord with O’Sullivan’s view of Aboriginal independence and
capitalist enterprise. For example, as the NCLA guarantees Inuit inclusion in the development of
Nunavut’s mining and gas industry, organisations such as the NTI have placed significant faith

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41 Dominic O’Sullivan, Beyond Biculturalism: The Politics of an Indigenous Minority (Wellington: Huia
Publishers, 2007), 201.
in it becoming a major generator for economic development. While far from opposing development or capitalism, other leaders such as Sheila Watt-Cloutier caution Inuit to "refuse the dangerous compromises between our principles and development that might diminish our own moral standing and claim to high ground as indigenous peoples." 

The Inuit are not opposed to economic development but are still discussing how it should be implemented. However, their desire to remain a part of Canada and actively pursue economic development supports O'Sullivan's view that all cultures, including Aboriginal cultures, have some capacity and free will to adapt or "evolve" to ensure their survival. Furthermore, it is logical that the willingness to adapt to other societies and social orders (including market-based societies), not just for survival but also for peace and goodwill could be reflective of "traditional" culture. Moreover, it could be argued that the value of inclusiveness and pragmatism is more identifiable with Aboriginal cultures than European cultures. The view that Aboriginal cultural security and capitalism do not inherently conflict is substantiated by the Inuit's openness to remaining a part of a non-Inuit society and their desire to adapt to, and benefit from, a market society (and the capitalist development of their lands).

The Inuit's emphasis on inclusiveness and pragmatism provides support for the argument that public self-government is an appropriate means of pursuing self-determination. While the adoption of the market and public self-government are tools with which the Inuit are able to further their autonomy, they themselves cannot provide absolute autonomy or independence. As this case study on polar bear management demonstrates, public self-government cannot insulate

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Inuit interests from international forces. In fact, engagement with the international market, although necessary in terms of bolstering Nunavut’s financial autonomy, further exposes the Inuit to international forces.

It is important to note that not all societies share in the same values of inclusiveness or pragmatism as demonstrated by the Inuit. The Inuit’s experience with the international trophy hunt demonstrates that international influence is the result of strategic political actions on the part of competing actors. Furthermore, the level of influence that these actions have had on the Inuit is rooted in perceptions about animal use that predominate within southern industrialised societies. This fact could re-open the debate regarding the appropriateness of public self-government, as one could argue that these international perceptions regarding appropriate living resource use are incompatible with northern or Inuit worldviews and aspirations. However, as self-determination implies the ability to exercise choice, the Inuit’s desire and ability to pursue the international market becomes a logical benchmark against which to measure whether public self-government provides self-determination. In order to determine whether public self-government affords the Inuit autonomy over the development of their lands and resources, it is important to examine the structure and workings of the government of Nunavut.

1.2.2. A Northern Context

There is an emerging literature that looks specifically at the workings of public self-government in Nunavut. In accounting for the unique characteristics of the Arctic, this literature helps demonstrate the level of flexibility that these arrangements of public governance have in terms of reflecting Inuit culture and concerns. This literature also helps demonstrate that the level of jurisdiction provided by self-government, allows the Inuit to exercise free choice and engage
with the international market, in order to maximise the economic utility of their natural resources.

The literature on public self-government describes how the unique social, demographic, and geographic characteristics of the Arctic influence governance. These characteristics are what set the North’s political context apart from the south, which are often assumed to be universal in the literature on Aboriginal-state relations. A big part of this difference is that the Inuit of Nunavut constitute an overwhelming 84% of the population of the territory. This demographic dominance is uncharacteristic of many places where Aboriginal people’s lands have been fully settled and culturally and demographically transformed by non-Aboriginal peoples. This demographic reality also means that the public institutions of Nunavut are freer to reflect the culture and concerns of the Inuit because they make up the majority of the residents and political representatives. This numerical majority effectively transforms de jure public government into de facto Aboriginal self-government. However, a numerical majority does not guarantee that a system of governance reflects the unique interests and culture of any given Aboriginal society. In this regard, the literature on public self-government emphasises the flexibility that these

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institutions have in terms of reflecting Inuit concerns and culture. While the Inuit desired a
system of governance that differed from southern models, they did not want an ethnic-based
model. Consultations undertaken by the Nunavut Implementation Committee with residents of
the eastern Canadian Arctic demonstrated the Inuit’s lack of desire for an ethnic-based
government. Alisa Henderson states that the consultations “… did not reveal an appetite for
radical institutional reform in Nunavut. Rather, voters wanted a territory of their own, with a
more approximated capital and with Inuit in positions of power.” In addition to delivering on
these preferences, self-government in Nunavut has also allowed for an administration that is
more amenable to the culture and worldview of the Inuit.

During the negotiation process, the desire to create a unique and culturally appropriate
model of governance led to the adoption of programs designed to train Inuit to fill administrative
positions and to implement the use of Inuktitut as an administrative language. Another element
designed to make self-government in Nunavut more reflective of Inuit culture was the
incorporation of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ) into the territorial bureaucracy. IQ roughly
translates into “the Inuit way of doing things: the past, present and future knowledge, experience
and values of Inuit society.” In acknowledging the importance of the relationships between
land, family, spirit, and organisations, the integration of IQ creates a bridge between Inuit culture

49 Henderson, Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture, 106.
and government services.\textsuperscript{53} All departments now have an IQ committee or working group, as well as an elder on staff to advise on IQ. Government employees are given greater flexibility in working hours, so they have more opportunities to practice traditional cultural activities such as hunting, picking berries or clam digging.\textsuperscript{54} These are not considered leisure activities, but rather essential components of Inuit culture. As such, they are an important part of “retaining a connection to the land and a process of knowledge acquisition.”\textsuperscript{55}

Most political scientists point to decentralisation and consensus decision making as features of Nunavut’s governance model that reflect local culture.\textsuperscript{56} A consensus style government is made up of members of the legislature who are independent of any political party, and who are elected on the basis of their own personal merit.\textsuperscript{57} The absence of parties and party discipline help this type of government to strive toward a political environment where ministers can work closely and cooperatively with regular MLA. As a bid to move further away from “southern models” of centralised administration, the Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) recommended abandoning the administrative regions, regional health boards, and the regional educational boards that Nunavut was to inherit from the Government of the Northwest Territory (GNWT).\textsuperscript{58} Nunavut instead opted for a more dispersed administrative model consisting of ten departments (plus a legislative assembly) with over 550 “headquarters” of

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\textsuperscript{54} Henderson, \textit{Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture}, 192. \\
\textsuperscript{55} Henderson, \textit{Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture}, 197. \\
\textsuperscript{56} Henderson, \textit{Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture}, 197. \\
\textsuperscript{58} Henderson, \textit{Nunavu: Rethinking Political Culture}, 107.
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administration. Nunavut’s decentralised government means that local communities have become bureaucratic employment centres and are part of a broader system of resource distribution.\textsuperscript{59}

Co-management boards also play a large role in the decentralisation process in Nunavut. The Nunavut government is comprised of five institutions of public governance (IPGs), or co-management boards. The co-management boards derive their power through their central position in Nunavut’s land and resource management system. This system links a number of institutions and processes together with jurisdiction over both crown and Inuit lands in Nunavut.\textsuperscript{60} As there is equal representation among different stakeholders, co-management boards decentralise the decision-making process.

In providing an overview of resource management in Nunavut, my objective has been to demonstrate how public self-government has allowed the Inuit to exercise control over living resource management in order to participate in the international market. The Inuit’s ability to transform their living resources into international commodities (represented here in their pursuit of the polar bear trophy hunt) demonstrates both an exercise of free choice and an adequate level of political autonomy provided by self-government. However, this paper casts doubt on O’Sullivan’s assumption that the international market is more predisposed than the domestic market to the advancement of Aboriginal self-determination. Although I argue that the Inuit gaining autonomy over the development of their resources is evidence that they enjoy a significant degree of domestic self-determination, autonomy is never absolute and the international context represents a new arena within which governments, both ethnic and public, must successfully navigate their interests amidst numerous competing actors and forces.

\textsuperscript{59}Henderson, \textit{Nunavut: Rethinking Political Culture}, 107.
\textsuperscript{60}Hicks and White, "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?,” 407.
1.2.3 International Relations

International relations (IR) theory forms a third body of literature specific to understanding how international variables affect the political and economic interests of the Inuit. The most appropriate school of thought in IR for explaining the interaction between Inuit and external forces is neoliberalism. Like liberalism, neoliberalism assumes that human beings share a common, reconcilable set of goals. Unlike other IR theories such as realism, liberalism views goals such as peace, health, and prosperity as universal and mutually achievable through cooperation. 61 In keeping with the centrality of cooperation, liberalism looks at how the interactions between states exist within a context of absolute gain, where the interests of one state can be advanced without compromising the interests of another. 62 Conversely, proponents of realism believe that the interaction of state actors exists only within a context of relative gain, whereby the advancement of the interests of one group necessarily detracts from the interests of a competing group. 63 The concept of relative gain helps explain how and why, at different times, international forces can either support or constrain Inuit interests. However, liberalism shares with realism an assumption that the interests and actions of the state are the most important factors in understanding IR.

Since the onset of globalisation, non-state actors have become influential forces with distinct interests and roles in the international political arena. Unlike traditional liberalism, neoliberal thought sees the political realisation of a universal common ethic (often framed as the

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goals of peace, health, prosperity) as being possible through mediums outside the state. This acknowledgment of non-state actors was first proposed in Koehane and Nye’s “Complex Interdependence Theory”. Since then, neoliberalism has provided an understanding of how multiple channels external to the Westphalian system of states connect societies and create instances of political interaction and interdependence. These external mediums include such things as intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and trans-national corporations. This addition to liberal IR theory is important to understanding the level of influence international environmental NGOs can exercise over the government of Nunavut.

Neoliberalism is highly connected to liberal economic theory, in that it emphasises the role the international market has in increasing the rate at which actors must interact. Moreover, it views the international market as a mechanism for increasing interdependency between actors. In other words, the market acts as a platform on which domestic interests either converge with or diverge from external interests, ultimately helping to inform the nature of relations between two actors.

Neoliberal theory establishes three facts that are important to understanding the relationship between Inuit self-determination and external forces. Neoliberalism shows that while the international market can increase the profitability of resource development, it also has also created a need for the Inuit to interact with external actors in order to advance their domestic economic agenda. Neoliberal theory also shows how any relationship of support or antagonism is a result of either diverging or converging interests between actors. In other words, by assuming

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66 Woods, "The Uses of Theory in the Study of International Relations."
that there exists an underlying shared ethic amongst all actors, neoliberalism reveals new
opportunities for non-state actors, like the Inuit, to advance their long-term goals via cooperation
with other actors. Lastly, while the actions of external actors have constrained the Inuit’s
participation in the polar bear hunt, neoliberalism provides a framework for recommendations
for advancing Inuit economic and cultural goals in this international context. For example, by
accepting that international relations exist within a context of relative-gain, an exercise of
domestic self-determination over living resource policy can create relationships of
interdependence and cooperation with external actors. Therefore, while the Inuit have gained
domestic self-determination via self-government, neoliberalism provides a better understanding
of how the process of interaction with external forces can either constrain or support the ability
of the Inuit to achieve their long-term goals.
CHAPTER TWO: LIVING RESOURCES AND INUIT SELF-DETERMINATION

2.1 Introduction

This chapter shows how public self-government in Nunavut secures domestic self-determination for the Inuit. The first section provides an overview of the movement towards self-government. Specifically, it examines Inuit political mobilisation and their appeal for international support in their quest to achieve self-government. By examining these two important flashpoints in the political development of the Inuit, the significance that controlling the development of their land and resources has in exercising self-determination is established. Furthermore, the Inuit’s willingness to be pragmatic in gaining international support for self-government helps demonstrate their capacity to pursue their short-term political goals in a way that advances their longer-term interests. The chapter will demonstrate how this exercise in strategic pragmatism during the early phases of the Inuit’s political mobilisation contrasts with the more recent tactics employed by the Nunavut government in relation to polar bear management.

The second section of this chapter demonstrates how public self-government provides self-determination for the Inuit. Specifically, this section provides an overview of the level of jurisdiction that the Nunavut government has over natural resources and explains how, through public institutions, the Inuit exercise free choice over the domestic management of living resources. The chapter concludes by showing how an exercise of self-determination over living resource management has allowed the Inuit to better pursue opportunities in the international market, via the trophy hunt, as a means of maximising the economic utility of the polar bear.
2.2 Living Resources and Self-determination

2.2.1 The Role of Living Resources in the Political Mobilisation of the Inuit

The geographic isolation of the Arctic region insulated the Inuit from rapid European settlement and social change that was more common in southern regions. The scholarly literature has noted that the slow pace of European settlement was a factor that made the Inuit more open to western education. As a result, the Inuit have a substantial pool of highly educated political elites. It was the existence of an Inuit ethnic majority and their successful use of western education that Marybell Mitchell claims led to the development of “Inuit nationalism” in the mid-20th century. Mitchell described Inuit nationalism as the creation of a pan-Inuit identity that resulted from a societal transformation from an apolitical, egalitarian, family-based social affiliation model to a more regionalised, ethnic-centred polity.

While the acculturation process was slow, the transition from a traditional life on the land to one in larger sedentary communities created significant problems for Inuit society. By the 1960s, most Inuit had been relegated to a life of cultural and structural marginalisation. Much of this marginalisation came as a result of government programs designed to relocate, resettle, and re-socialise the Inuit. The loss of land and a traditional way of life led to social disintegration with alcoholism, abuse, and suicide becoming prevalent in a once stable society. These social problems were compounded by political disempowerment. The Inuit became “wards” of the

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70 Mitchell, From Talking Chiefs to a Native Corporate Elite, 398.
Canadian state: "The native peoples knew that the real power in the north lay with whites. Inuit had literally been taken from their hunting grounds and placed in new bungalow communities where the white people could better administer them and run all aspects of their lives." Billson and Mitchell maintain that the search for Inuit political autonomy stems from the Euro-Canadian domination of Inuit, which started the settlement initiative of the 1950s. Therefore, the political mobilisation of the Inuit and the birth of the Nunavut project can be understood only by accounting for this dramatic shift from the land to village life.

With the marginalisation of the Inuit being so heavily contingent on their loss of lands and traditional way of life, it is only logical that the rise of Inuit political activism, which began in the 1960s, took aim at re-gaining autonomy over their traditional lands and resources. In 1971, the Inuit formed a political organisation, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), to help regain their autonomy. The importance of regaining control over land and resources was central to the ITC's goals. The ITC's third land claims proposal to the federal government in 1979, "Political

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75 Other legal, political, and social developments, which took place in Canada in the 1960, and 70s also helped spur on the emergence of Inuit political activism. For example, the "White Paper" and the "Calder Case" are two developments which helped fuel the emergence of Aboriginal political activism in Canada. The "White Paper" was a federal policy document produced in 1969 by the Minister of Indian Affairs. Among other things, the document is most famous for detailing the proposed abolition of the *Indian Act*. Many Aboriginal groups saw this proposal as an attempt by the Canadian state to reject land claims and assimilate Aboriginal peoples into Canadian society as an ethnic minority. The proposal resulted in a nation-wide protest by Aboriginal groups, and many of these groups, including the Inuit, created their own organisations (e.g. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC)) to defend their rights and counter the recommendations espoused in the "White Paper". See, Andre Légaré, "The Process Leading to a Land Claims Agreement and Its Implementation: The Case of the Nunavut Land Claims Settlement," *The Canadian Journal of Native Studies* 16, no. 1 (1996): 144; Peter Jull, "Nunavut: The Still Small Voice of Indigenous Governance," *Indigenous Affairs* 3, no. 01 (2001). The Calder Case helped push the Canadian government towards recognising Aboriginal title and the need settle outstanding claims. This decision provided the legal precursor to the establishment of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA). See, Légaré, "The Process Leading to a Land Claims Agreement and Its Implementation: The Case of the Nunavut Land Claims Settlement," 144; Sally Weaver, *Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 1968-1970/ Sally M. Weaver* (University of Toronto Press, 1981).
76 Légaré, "Canada's Expeviment with Aboriginal Self-Determination in Nunavut: From Vision to Illusion."
Development in Nunavut," became the starting point toward an agreement in principle and then a final agreement over a decade later. Through the document’s stated four objectives, the ITC’s focus on land and resources was made clear: (1) ownership rights over portions of land rich in non-renewable resources; (2) decision making power over the management of land and resources within the settlement area; (3) financial indemnity and royalties from resources developed in the area; (4) a commitment from Ottawa to negotiate self-government once a land claim agreement-in-principle is signed.77 Even though there is debate within the Inuit leadership on how the development of their land should be pursued, there is a clear consensus that access to land and resources is vital to advancing their economic and cultural independence.

With land and resources being so important to the Inuit, their vision of self-determination focused less on issues of ethnic separation or total jurisdictional independence and more on regaining stewardship over their cultural and economic futures. Self-government was conceptualised not as "...an abstract concept [in need of] definition... [but as] the means by which Inuit [would] regain control over their lives."78 By focusing on regaining control over the development of their lands and resources rather than on achieving full statehood or ethnic separation, the Inuit exhibited the politically inclusive nature of their pursuit of self-government. As the next section demonstrates, the Inuit’s inclusive version of autonomy and their pragmatic style of interacting with external actors helped ensure that their pursuit of self-government was successful.

2.2.2 Culture and the Land: The Pursuit of Inuit Political Autonomy in an International Context

The importance of re-establishing stewardship over the development of their land and living resources for the benefit of the Inuit and Canadian society served as a moral platform from which Inuit leaders launched pragmatic domestic and international appeals for self-government. The Inuit pursuit of self-government reflected a vision of autonomy that did not conflict with the interests of many domestic and international forces. This version of autonomy (as opposed to full ethnic or jurisdictional separation) allowed the movement for self-government to avoid dealing with competing visions of nationality and sovereignty. Inuit leader Mary Simon consistently reminded Canada and the international community that an appropriate level of political autonomy for Inuit self-determination was available “within our liberal democracies” and “without the need for ethnic secession.”

Aware of how the conceptualisation of international human rights had evolved to include cultural considerations, leaders like Simon were adept at marketing self-government with mass appeal to domestic and international audiences:

In addition to aboriginal rights, ‘Inuit rights’ must also refer to those fundamental economic, social, cultural and political rights which the world community has enshrined in international conventions. These include such rights as the right to self-determination (which we believe includes the right to self-government); the right of a people not to be deprived of its own means of subsistence; the right to an adequate standard of living; and the right of persons to enjoy their own culture . . . these international rights in effect confirm our aboriginal rights.

Here the argument for self-government connects human rights to cultural rights and the need for autonomy over living resources with territorial autonomy. Apart from being consistent

with accepted notions of human rights, the Inuit’s pursuit of greater autonomy seemed to overlap with the goals of the international environmental movement. In the early 1970s, activists were pushing environmental issues to the top of the domestic and international political agendas. Around the same time, the political environment within the international system began to perceive a connection between the concepts of Aboriginal stewardship and sustainable development. For example, the 1972 United Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment and the Brundtland Report of 1987 both drew a connection between Aboriginal land use patterns and sustainability. The Brundtland Report explicitly recognises the contribution of Aboriginal societies to sustainable development:

Indigenous people, who represent a significant part of the world’s population, depend on renewable resources and ecosystems to maintain their well-being. Over many generations, they have evolved a holistic, traditional scientific knowledge of their land, natural resources and environment. . . The ability of indigenous people to practice sustainable development on their lands has been limited by economic, social and historical factors. Indigenous people should be allowed to actively participate in shaping national laws and policies on the management of resources or other development processes that affect them. 

In her PhD dissertation, entitled *Reconceptualizing Sovereignty through Indigenous Autonomy: A Case Study of Arctic Governance and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference*, Jessica Shadian examines the impact of this new international political environment on the Inuit’s pursuit of political autonomy. In examining the effectiveness of a politically mobilised Inuit political organisation, Shadian explains that the idea of Inuit “environmental stewardship” became a central component to the broader definition of *sustainable development*. Further,

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81 United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, "Recognizing and Strengthening the Role of Indigenous People and Their Communities: Programme Area."
Shadian argues that Inuit leaders “... have promoted a collective myth of the Inuit as the official stewards over Arctic development.”\textsuperscript{82}

By avoiding a focus on the need to obtain greater access to opportunities for economic growth, Inuit leaders avoided the political pitfalls that otherwise would have been created had their argument for self-government placed their goals at odds with the ends of environmental conservation. In his maiden speech to the House of Commons, the first Inuk MP Elijah Takkiaipik demonstrated the need to juxtapose environmental rhetoric with economic concerns in an argument for greater autonomy over resources:

We very much dislike white people taking our land for granted. It seems they feel they can destroy our land any time they feel like it without even asking for permission. We want to have the freedom of conservation with the animals. They steal the raw materials without even consulting us or giving the Inuit a percentage of what they are taking. We need to get power to control the land.\textsuperscript{83}

Having an inclusive conception of autonomy and the political expertise to launch pragmatic arguments made the Inuit argument for self-government highly appealing to both domestic and international audiences. For example, by arguing that regaining control over the development of their lands secured both their cultural and economic security, as well as sustainable development, the Inuit were able to demonstrate how achieving self-government promoted a celebration of liberal rights as well as responsible environmental stewardship. Additionally, by broadcasting their desire to remain a part of Canada the Inuit skirted domestic fears of secession and the need to address competing visions of sovereignty. If the Inuit appealed for self-government in a manner that was exclusive to their interests, like for example, one that

\textsuperscript{82} Shadian, "Reconceptualizing Sovereignty through Indigenous Autonomy: A Case Study of Arctic Governance and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference", 7.

placed their cultural rights above international human rights, or their right to economic development above that of environmental sustainability, it is doubtful that they would have succeeded in achieving self-government. However, unlike their recent management of polar bears, the Inuit's pursuit of greater political autonomy reflected both Inuit and non-Inuit interests. By being pragmatic in their pursuit of self-government the Inuit ensured that external forces supported their long-term goals of economic and cultural independence. While the mismanagement of Inuit land and resources fuelled their political mobilisation, the goal of self-government was not to provide the Inuit with a tool to stop the commodification and development of the Arctic. Although the Inuit are still debating the manner in which economic growth should be pursued, most see public self-government as the most practical way in which they can better participate in and benefit from this process.

2.3 Self-government: Advancing Self-determination via Living Resource Management

2.3.1 Self-Government in Nunavut: An Overview

In 1999, Nunavut, the newest Canadian territory, was established.\(^8^4\) Nunavut is one of three territories in the Canadian North. It has a consensus style governance model with a wide range of jurisdictional powers. The territorial government exercises full authority over the jurisdictions of education, health, welfare, municipal governments, and local transportation.\(^8^5\) However, Nunavut is still considered a “proto-province” because it lacks formal constitutional status.\(^8^6\) In other words, while Nunavut is a self-governing entity with a broad range of

\(^8^4\) Dahl, *Nunavut: The Inuit Regain Control of Their Lands and Lives.*

\(^8^5\) White, "And Now for Something Completely Northern: Institutions of Governance in the Territorial North," 82.

\(^8^6\) White, "And Now for Something Completely Northern: Institutions of Governance in the Territorial North," 82.
jurisdictional powers, its “constitution” remains a federal statute. This relegates formal power to the federal government in Ottawa, but in reality, like its disallowance power over provincial legislation, Ottawa’s authority in Nunavut remains limited.  

A large portion of Nunavut’s territorial revenue (up to 90%) comes from Ottawa via revenue transfers. Because of Nunavut’s territorial status within the Canadian federation, much of the revenue created by resource development is controlled by the federal government. Federal legislation that will eventually secure the transfer of authority over resource revenues to Nunavut has been adopted by the Canadian parliament, but the process of implementation has been slow.

In addition to the benefits gained by being a demographic majority, the Inuit are beneficiaries to the rights and resources provided by the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NCLA). The NCLA, signed between the Tunngavik Federation of Nunavut (on behalf of the Inuit of Nunavut) and the federal government, is the largest native land claim settlement in Canadian history and part of the negotiation process that led up to establishment of Nunavut. The NCLA provides the Inuit with title to over 350,000 square kilometres of land, and capital transfers from the federal government of over $1.1 billion over 14 years. While there are clear limits to Nunavut’s jurisdiction, it provides local residents with access to systems of governance that far surpass many, if not all, of the attributes contained in Ladner’s “municipality-plus” critique.

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2.3.2 Self-Government: Increased Stewardship over Land and Wildlife Resources

While there has been immense social change in the north, the goal of retaining a cultural and economic connection to land-based resources remains vital to Inuit society. Living resources in particular are beneficial to Arctic economies because the capital and expertise needed for production are readily available in most communities.\(^9^9\) Harvesting activities such as hunting are a major source of income and food for people living in remote communities. They are also a vital part of Inuit culture.\(^9^0\)

The importance of land and living resources to their development has always been emphasised by Inuit, even prior to the creation of Nunavut. The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA), the legal precursor to the Nunavut Act, established a case for creating a new territory and government. In justifying the creation of Nunavut, the NLCA emphasised the Inuit’s need for greater autonomy over their lands and living resources. In fact, two of the four stated objectives of the NLCA aim at increasing Inuit authority over wildlife and resource management for the purposes of economic development and conservation.\(^9^1\) The NCLA also included provisions that gave the Inuit rights to harvest wildlife for domestic, sport, and commercial purposes throughout lands and waters covered by the land claim agreement (350,000 km\(^2\)).\(^9^2\)

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\(^9^1\) Hicks and White, "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?," 33.

\(^9^2\) Jack Hicks and Graham White, eds., *Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?*, The Provincial State in Canada: Politics in the Provinces and Territories (Peterborough: Broadview
Additional provisions for Nunavummiut Inuit included the creation of a series of co-management boards or institutions of public government (IPGs). The boards that oversee land and resource management include: the Nunavut Planning Commission; the Nunavut Water Board; the Nunavut Impact Review Board; and the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board. These IPGs are organisations with separate authority and decision-making responsibilities protected and mandated by the NLCA. IPGs consult with government and Inuit organisations, but generally, it is the IPGs’ responsibility to make the final decisions on the management of the land and resources in Nunavut. This system of power sharing ensures that all decisions that affect residents are made within Nunavut, and not through external bureaucratic networks.

In 2009, the devolution of authority over natural resources to the Government of Nunavut advanced with the federal appointment of a Ministerial Representative for Nunavut Devolution. The Representative has held meetings with interested parties, including the IPGs and territorial and federal governmental departments, in order negotiate future processes of devolution. The government of Nunavut is seeking to acquire provincial-like powers by gaining responsibility over the management of land and resources still held by the federal department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. In addition, the government of Nunavut is seeking a significant share

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of resource revenues.\textsuperscript{97} Another important issue for the Nunavut government is gaining control over internal waters. Specifically, the Nunavut government is seeking to increase authority over the resources under the seabed within Nunavut’s internal waters and Inuit traditional territories. Nunavut’s offshore resources include oil and gas reserves valued at over a trillion dollars.\textsuperscript{98}

Currently, the IPG that advances Inuit autonomy over living resource management is the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB). The NWMB is the main authority on wildlife management in Nunavut.\textsuperscript{99} The legal context in which the NWMB operates is defined by its role as an institution of public government and by the NLCA. The NWMB has a mandate “to help ensure the protection and wise use of wildlife and wildlife habitat for the long-term benefit of Inuit and the rest of the public of Nunavut and Canada.”\textsuperscript{100}

The NWMB consists of an equal number of Inuit and territorial appointees, and is responsible for making decisions that include setting quotas and non-quota limitations (fishing and hunting seasons, methods of harvest, etc.); approving management plans; and classifying endangered species.\textsuperscript{101} Technically, the territorial Minister of Sustainable Development, the federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, and the Minister of the Environment must give final approval of NWMB decisions. However, federal interference in the NWMB decision-making


process is extremely rare and occurs only to avoid a conflict with national interests.\textsuperscript{102} It is important to note, however, that the NWMB is a part of a larger wildlife management regime that is accountable to the federal government and regulated by the international agreements to which the federal government must adhere.

The NWMB is in charge of enforcing and regulating harvesting rights and economic activities related to guiding, sport hunting, and other commercial marketing of wildlife products.\textsuperscript{103} It also helps to transfer responsibility and control over living resources to local communities. This transfer is made possible by the role played by Hunter and Trapper Organisations (HTOs) in living resource management. HTOs are responsible for administering the board’s decisions at the community level. As such, HTOs have the legislated authority to ensure that the interests of the community are represented at the policy enforcement level. For example, it is through the HTOs that Inuit hunters and outfitters have the ability to decide how NWMB rulings, such as the setting of quotas, should be best applied within the community.\textsuperscript{104}

The management of living resources in Nunavut is tied to a larger management regime. As both the governments of Nunavut and Canada are subject to the same international agreements, there is not an inherent conflict between territorial and federal interests in living resource management. It is also safe to assume that even if the Inuit had complete legislative authority over the management of living resources, they would still need to adhere to international standards. As a result of their numerical majority and Nunavut’s decentralised governance structure, the Inuit have positioned themselves as policy makers in living resource

\textsuperscript{102} Hicks and White, "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?,”

\textsuperscript{103} Hicks and White, "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?,”

\textsuperscript{104} Hicks and White, "Nunavut: Inuit Self-Determination through a Land Claim and Public Government?,”
management. Moreover, while not diminishing the need to adhere to international conventions, the current devolution process ensures that public self-government will continue to afford Inuit a significant degree of self-determination over living resource management.

No government in the world exercises complete authority over wildlife management. All governments are subject to broader international conservation frameworks. Therefore, in the case of the Inuit, self-determination is measured in terms of their ability to exercise free choice over the domestic use of living resources. In pursuing economic development, the Inuit considered the internationally sanctioned polar bear trophy hunt to be the most efficient method to maximise the economic utility of the polar bear. The following case study on polar bear management demonstrates how the Inuit have exercised self-determination by being able to restructure domestic management practices in order to better access the trophy hunt market.

2.3.3 The Polar Bear as a Product: Advancing Self-determination via the Trophy Hunt

The polar bear is a living resource that is culturally and economically important to many Inuit communities in Nunavut and throughout the Arctic.\(^5\) In Canada, hunting the polar bear for

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commercial purposes was introduced to the Inuit by the federal government in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{106} Federal representatives argued that the commodification of wildlife was part of the effort to "modernise" Inuit society.\textsuperscript{107} However, research now demonstrates that far from serving as a means of assimilating the Inuit, the commercialisation of wildlife has supported and maintained hunting as part of a broader traditional livelihood and Inuit identity in a modern market-based society.\textsuperscript{108}

When first sanctioned in Canada, the polar bear trophy hunt was legislated through the Government of the Northwest Territories’ Wild Life Act (GNWTWLA).\textsuperscript{109} This act was inherited by Nunavut, but in 2003 it was replaced by the Nunavut Wild Life Act (NWLA). Like the GNWTWLA, the NWLA adhered to the international agreements signed by Canada, including the International Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears (IACPB) and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).\textsuperscript{110}

Hunters must have a licence and possess a tag to harvest polar bears. Tags representing an individual polar bear kill are distributed amongst the various communities in particular polar bear management areas.\textsuperscript{111} The number of tags allocated to an individual community is based on historical use and negotiated agreements between the HTOs and the Department of Sustainable

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\item \textsuperscript{106} Wenzel, "Polar Bear as a Resource: An Overview".
\item \textsuperscript{107} International Union for Conservation of Nature, "IUCN Bulleing " (paper presented at the Proceedings o f the First Meeting of Polar Bear Specialists., 1968).
\item \textsuperscript{109} Alan Diduck, "Unpacking Social Learning in Social-Ecological Systems: Case Studies of Polar Bear and Narwhal Management in Northern Canada." 277.
\item \textsuperscript{111} Dowsley, "The Role of Regional Government in Sustainable Use of Common Pool Resources: The Case of Polar Bear Management." 6.
\end{enumerate}
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Development.\textsuperscript{112} Since the collapse of the commercial seal hunt in Nunavut, the polar bear has become an increasingly important economic resource for many communities. Policy makers have designated the trophy hunt as a way to maximise the bear’s economic utility. The government has built infrastructure and developed personnel training programs in order to facilitate the growth of the trophy hunt industry in Nunavut.\textsuperscript{113}

Each sport hunt provides approximately 20 times the monetary value of a polar bear taken in a subsistence hunt.\textsuperscript{114} In 2002, the annual economic value of the polar bear hunt was approximately two to three million Canadian dollars.\textsuperscript{115} While seemingly small, as a source of cash revenue sport hunting and the sale of skins are extremely important for small, economically undiversified settlements in northern Canada.\textsuperscript{116} A steady demand for polar bear trophies came from wealthy southern tourist hunters who were willing to pay up to $30,000 USD for the opportunity to shoot a polar bear, and take their trophy home.\textsuperscript{117} Through their role in the HTOs, local communities have been able to support the growth of the trophy hunt industry by allocating more tags to trophy hunts compared to subsistence hunts. Since the inception of self-government and the NWMB, tag allotments for the trophy hunt have increased steadily in both absolute terms and relative to those allotted to the subsistence hunt.\textsuperscript{118}

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\textsuperscript{113} Martha Dowsley, “The Forgotten Role of Regional Governments in Polar Bear Management” (paper presented at the 11th Biennial Meeting of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, Ubud, Indonesia, 2006).


\textsuperscript{116} David Klein et al., \textit{Management and Conservation of Wildlife in a Changing Arctic Environment}, 626.


\textsuperscript{118} Dowsley, “The Role of Regional Government in Sustainable Use of Common Pool Resources: The Case of Polar Bear Management.”
Living resources are vital for the wellbeing of both a traditional and modern Inuit society as well as the development of their economy. For the Inuit, the polar bear trophy hunt clearly demonstrates a link between an exercise in self-determination and the management of living resources for appropriate economic development. Through their ability to allocate more tags towards the trophy hunt, HTOs have given local communities the ability to maximise the economic utility of hunting the polar bear. However, in choosing to pursue opportunities in the international market, the Inuit are increasingly presented with new challenges and opportunities in maintaining and advancing the maximum utility of their resources.
CHAPTER THREE:
CONTEXTUALISING POLAR BEAR MANAGEMENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

3.1 Introduction

Self-government has provided the Inuit of Nunavut with domestic autonomy over important living resources such as the polar bear. However, the Inuit’s entry into the international market comes with the consequence that their ability to maximise the economic utility of their resources is now increasingly influenced by external actors. Whether these externalities turn out to support or antagonise the Inuit’s pursuit of economic development depends largely on how the Inuit construct their short-term management policies. In other words, if a policy creates a situation of relative gain, in that both the Inuit and other relevant actors benefit from the commodification of a particular animal resource, the Inuit succeed in creating a supportive international context for the advancement of their long-term development. As the polar bear case study demonstrates, failing to create sufficient overlap between the interests of the various groups with a stake in development creates an atmosphere of competition where actors resort to advancing their interests at the expense of others. Without the support of other actors, the Inuit face little to no chance of influencing the living resource market, or advancing their long-term interests.

Unlike the Inuit’s appeal for self-government, their pursuit of the polar bear trophy hunt, has promoted neither shared interests nor relative gains with other actors who also invested their political and economic interests in the management of the polar bear. While the polar bear trophy hunt provided a lucrative source of revenue to many isolated Inuit communities through outfitting, it has also generated an increasing amount of international controversy. This controversy recently climaxed and turned the international discussion of polar bear conservation
and management into a political battleground for competing Inuit and non-Inuit agendas. For example, environmental NGOs and the US government have used the bear as a tool to advance their own political and economic goals at the expense of the trophy hunt and the long-term economic interests of the Inuit. While not directly influencing Nunavut's autonomy over the bear, actions taken by these external actors have reduced the international markets for polar bear trophies and parts, thereby constraining the Inuit's ability to maximise the bear's economic utility via the trophy hunt.

3.2 The Polar Bear as a Consumptive Product

In the 1990s, outfitters in Nunavut had already been supplying polar bear parts to a steady source of demand, a market made up predominantly of wealthy American trophy hunters. Nunavut had obtained access to this market by ensuring its hunting program adhered to the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) and the American Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). Both set out strict guidelines which hunts in Nunavut must adhere to so that American clients can qualify for the necessary import permits to bring their trophies home. In other words, in order for businesses in Nunavut to profit from incoming American tourist hunters, the NWMB has to ensure that its domestic hunting program follows these external regulatory regimes. Failing to abide by these external regulations would result in a major loss of the consumer market (i.e. trophy hunters) for Nunavut's polar bear industry, and a substantial loss of income for Inuit communities. Such a situation did in fact arise in 2001, when the US Fish and Wildlife Service (US FWS) found inconsistencies within the NWMB's statistical records for the McClintock polar bear population. These statistical inconsistencies showed the management of the McClintock population to be in violation of the MMPA, and the
US subsequently banned all polar bear parts from this population from entering the US.\textsuperscript{119} In response the Government of Nunavut and the NWMB moved to regain this portion of the consumer market, and immediately placed a two-year harvesting moratorium on the McClintock population.\textsuperscript{120}

While local hunters were shocked at the abrupt increase in hunting restrictions, NWMB representatives made it clear that the moratorium was established to allow further study of the McClintock numbers and to attempt to abate the concerns voiced by the US FWS.\textsuperscript{121} Moreover, discussions within the NWMB “occurred within the shadow of the MMPA and concerns as to the US reaction.”\textsuperscript{122} NWMB meeting minutes demonstrated how internal discussions began to revolve around the need to meet external expectations. References were constantly made to the US FWS, with the “...concern that the missteps by the board on this issue might trigger distrust of the NWMB’s ability to manage its polar bear populations.”\textsuperscript{123}

The moratorium allowed statistical inconsistencies to be corrected and a more rigid risked-based method of determining quotas was established.\textsuperscript{124} With these changes, the US FWS was again satisfied that the management of the McClintock population adhered to the MMPA.

\textsuperscript{119} Alan Diduck, “Unpacking Social Learning in Social-Ecological Systems: Case Studies of Polar Bear and Narwhal Management in Northern Canada.”

\textsuperscript{120} The term “polar bear population” refers a grouping of bears that has been separated into 1 of 19 separate management units, or “populations”. For a map of the populations see: http://pbsg.npolar.no/en/status/population-map.html


and began to re-issue import permits to American hunters. The moratorium was subsequently lifted. 125

The McClintock “affair” serves as an example of how much the internal decision making process was geared towards maintaining the economic profitability of the trophy hunt. It also shows that the ability of the NWMB to respond to an external variable (represented here as a US FWS ruling) was dependent on having adequate jurisdictional power to enforce a moratorium. In other words, the government of Nunavut was able to exercise a level of domestic autonomy, in order to interact with external forces, in a way that advanced the Inuit’s economic goals. While successful at advancing the Inuit’s short-term goal of maintaining the trophy hunt, the moratorium did not address the underlying causes of the rising international opposition to the trophy hunt. The success of the moratorium in restoring US confidence was wholly contingent on alleviating concerns relating to the collection of scientific data. However, as I argue below, the capacity of the Nunavut government to employ similar tactics in attempting to legitimise the trophy hunt was reduced drastically when the nature of the external concerns became rooted in a political agenda.

3.3 The Politicisation of the Polar Bear Debate

3.3.1 The Political Articulation of the Rising Value of a Living Polar Bear

The international politicisation of the polar bear was preceded by a steady increase in NGO activity that focused on the well-being of the bear. Some NGOs, such as Polar Bears International, focus specifically on the bear, while others such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), the Humane Society (HS), Greenpeace, Defenders of Nature, and Conservation of Biodiversity...
have each established polar bear programs within their larger frameworks of operations. While most organisations are opposed to the "non-essential human exploitation of polar bears, such as capture for display or trophy hunting," all have clearly identified climate change as the greatest detriment to the polar bear's well-being. Most of the arguments made by NGOs regarding climate change and the polar bear are rooted in a series of studies conducted on the Western Hudson Bay population (WH) by a group of scientists led by Ian Stirling. The WH population is one of the most southerly and is one of 14 polar bear populations found in Canada.

These NGOs claim that data show that summer sea ice in the Arctic has been declining 7.7 percent per decade since 1978. In addition, most studies maintain that summer melting is occurring earlier and lasting longer than in previous years. As a result of these conditions, many NGOs argue that the polar bear's ability to hunt on the ice and store up fat reserves is being considerably reduced by global warming. Polar bears go longer without food, which

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131 World Wildlife Fund, "Threats to the Polar Bear."
increases stress and infant mortality, reduces fertility, and arguably throws the future survival of the species into question.\textsuperscript{132}

The idea that climate change poses the most considerable threat to the future of the bear is relatively new within the scientific community. In fact, it was not until 1993 that any mention was made of climate change during the annual meetings of the IUCN Polar Bear Specialist Group.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, many of the claims made by Stirling et al., regarding the correlation between climate change and the future of the polar bear, are disputed by other scientific studies.\textsuperscript{134}The scientific debate has been recorded in a lengthy exchange of articles in the journal \textit{Ecological Complexity}.\textsuperscript{135} Referring to data showing consistent spring air temperatures within the last 70 years, Dyck et al. claim that the climate models used by Stirling et al. to formulate their arguments are simply not adequate to the task of projecting regional sea-ice changes either in Hudson Bay or in the Arctic as a whole.\textsuperscript{136} Furthermore, they argue that the role of anthropogenic climate change remains difficult to prove and that "the extrapolation of polar bear disappearance is highly premature."\textsuperscript{137} Instead, they claim that other variables such as increased human–bear interaction must be taken into account to provide a more holistic explanation of the population ecology of WH polar bears.

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\textsuperscript{132} World Wildlife Fund, "Threats to the Polar Bear."
\textsuperscript{134} Markus Dyck et al., "Polar Bears of Western Hudson Bay and Climate Change: Are Warming Spring Air Temperatures the "Ultimate" Survival Control Factor?," \textit{Ecological Complexity} 4, no. 3 (2007).
\textsuperscript{135} Ian Stirling et al., "Response to Dyck et Al.(2007) on Polar Bears and Climate Change in Western Hudson Bay," \textit{Ecological Complexity} 5, no. 3 (2008); Markus Dyck et al., "Reply to Response to Dyck et Al.(2007) on Polar Bears and Climate Change in Western Hudson Bay by Stirling et Al.(2008)," \textit{Ecological Complexity} 5, no. 4 (2008); Ian Stirling and Claire L. Parkinson, "The Possible Effects of Climate Warming on Selected Populations of Polar Bears (Ursus Maritimus) in the Canadian Arctic," \textit{Arctic} 59, no. 3 (2006); Steven Amstrup et al., "Rebuttal Of" Polar Bear Population Forecasts: A Public-Policy Forecasting Audit", "\textit{Interfaces} (2009).
\textsuperscript{136} Markus Dyck et al., "Polar Bears of Western Hudson Bay and Climate Change: Are Warming Spring Air Temperatures the "Ultimate" Survival Control Factor?," \textit{Ecological Complexity} 4, no. 3 (2007).
\textsuperscript{137} Dyck et al., "Polar Bears of Western Hudson Bay and Climate Change: Are Warming Spring Air Temperatures the "Ultimate" Survival Control Factor?"
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Even Stirling et al. have admitted that long-term warming trends may not be the “ultimate factors” in determining the polar bear’s well-being, and confess that “that there is still much that is not fully understood.”138 Moreover, scientists are aware of the role that scientific uncertainty plays in politicising the plight of the polar bear:

Both scientific papers and public discussion that continue to fail to recognize the inherent complexity in the adaptive interaction of polar bears with both humans and nature will not likely offer any useful, science-based, preservation and management strategies for the species. Unfortunately, polar bears and their shrinking ice habitat are commonly used as rhetoric to argue for the possible severity of climate change and global warming to the general public.139

During the debate between the two groups of scientists, concerns were raised with respect to the impartiality of some of the research and conclusions produced by Dyck et al. It was revealed that one scientist, astrophysicist Willy Soon, received funding from the oil company ExxonMobil. An investigation carried out by the US House Committee on Science and Technology revealed and questioned the motives behind the funding, and the impact it might have on the research findings.140 In rationalising the investigation, sub-committee member Brad Miller stated: "The public has a right to know why ExxonMobil is funding a scientist whose writing is outside his area of expertise."141 With Soon’s qualifications in polar bear management in question, and ExxonMobil’s interests being clearly rooted in advancing its own economic agenda, this issue helps underline the level of political posturing that has occurred in the polar bear debate. While the extent of political posturing that has occurred is still unclear, many NGOs

139 Dyck et al., "Polar Bears of Western Hudson Bay and Climate Change: Are Warming Spring Air Temperatures the “Ultimate” Survival Control Factor?"
141 The New Scientist, "Exxon’s Funding of Polar Bear Research Questioned."
have continued to actively propagate their own correlation between climate change and the polar bear as scientific fact, claiming:

The planet is rapidly moving towards a tipping point with climate change impacts on polar bears. Unless immediate action is taken by responsible governments, we may be relegating polar bears to extinction in the wild within the lifetime of our children.\textsuperscript{142}

In understanding why international NGOs have opposed the trophy hunt, it is important to identify the incentives that exist around using animals such as the polar bear as tools or “poster-animals” for advancing a broader political agenda. In using an effective “poster-animal”, environmental campaigns are able to play upon popular anthropocentric judgments regarding the aesthetic value of particular specific species of animals and, in doing so, garnish substantial financial and political support for their cause.\textsuperscript{143} In most southern industrialised societies, the polar bear has always commanded a high degree of reverence and mystique. While outfitters have used the bear’s mystique to promote it as a trophy for wealthy southern hunters, more recently, the bear’s symbolism has been connected to political campaigns against climate change. In 2008, the IUCN reported that 35% of birds, 52% of amphibians and 71% of reef-building corals have traits that are likely to make them particularly susceptible to a climate change driven extinction.\textsuperscript{144} However, the polar bear has become a poster-animal used in everything from

\textsuperscript{142} World Wildlife Fund, "The Polar Bear: The Meeting of the Parties.",

\textsuperscript{143} Unfortunately, the scope of this paper does not include an in-depth examination of the reasons why some nonhuman animals, such as the polar bear, are given higher symbolic value than others. For research that examines how differing human-centric views of animals (speciesism) influences political interaction see Roger Yates, "The Social Construction of Human Beings and Other Animals in Human-Nonhuman Relations. Welfarism and Rights: A Contemporary Sociological Analysis" (Ph.D diss., University of Wales, 2005); Mark Smith, "Humans and Non-Human Animals," in Ecologism: Towards Ecological Citizenship (Univ of Minnesota Press, 1998); Robert Garner, "Animal Rights, Political Theory, and the Liberal Tradition." Contemporary Politics 8, no. 1 (2002).

leaflets to TV advertisements and giant ice sculptures, all in order to draw attention to the global impacts of climate change.\textsuperscript{145}

The bear has emerged as a popular manifestation of a human-centric concern and, as a result, its rising symbolic value has made it an effective marketing tool for the campaign against climate change. Like the panda bear, whales, seals, and the great apes, the polar bear has become an important political and economic tool. Its aesthetic value has made the polar bear a useful and politically expedient symbol for companies and organisations looking to rally monetary and political support behind their political campaigns.\textsuperscript{146}

3.3.2 Politics and Law: The Polar Bear as a Tool in the Fight Against Climate Change

Throughout the late 1990s, an international movement began to take shape that increasingly framed the conservation of the polar bear as being tantamount to stopping the global threat of climate change. The activities of this movement recently climaxed, leading to substantial political and legal attempts to protect the polar bear from anthropogenic climate change. This process indirectly reduced the ability of the Inuit to pursue the maximum economic utility of the polar bear via the trophy hunt.

The international legal campaign to "protect the polar bear" began in 2005, when the Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, and the National Resource Defence Council filed a petition with the US Fish and Wildlife Service to list the polar bear as a threatened species on the US Endangered Species List (ESL).\textsuperscript{147} This petition was designed to protect polar bears and, therefore, had direct relevance to the broader agenda to restrict the activities causing climate


\textsuperscript{146} Arne Kalland, "Whose Whale Is That?: Diverting the Commodity Path," in \textit{Third IASC\textsuperscript{P} Common Property Conference.} (Washington DC1992).

change. Listing the polar bear on the ESL would have required the Department of the Interior to work with other federal agencies to ensure that activities conducted by the US or US citizens are not undermining the bear's survival.\textsuperscript{148} Furthermore, an ESL listing would require regulatory agencies to take into account how their decisions affect the polar bear, potentially resulting in stricter pollution laws.\textsuperscript{149} A listing would also require the government to investigate whether a habitat reserve for the species needed to be established.\textsuperscript{150} Since Alaska is home to two polar bear populations, the prospect of a listing posed a potential threat to US oil and mining interests. It could also have been considered a threat to the US's broader goal of reducing its dependency on foreign oil by increasing its access to its domestic supply.\textsuperscript{151}

The Center for Biological Diversity, Greenpeace, and the National Resource Defence Council's petition to list the polar bear on the US ESL influenced polar bear management in two important ways. First, if passed, the proposal threatened the profitability of the trophy hunt because it would ban all US hunters from returning to US soil with polar bear parts. This ban would result in the removal of the largest source of demand for polar bear trophies. Second, the international discussion on polar bear conservation became increasingly politicised as the listing threatened US economic interests, particularly those in the oil and gas sector.

Initially, the US government's concern over the proposed listing of the polar bear centred around its potential impact on the development of non-renewable resources in Alaska. For many US conservatives, it was clear that the polar bear was being used as a political tool in the

\textsuperscript{149} Humane Society of the United States, "Polar Bears."
campaign against resource development. Opposition to the listing materialised in the form of delays to a ruling on the issue. From the time between the first petitions to list the bear and to the eventual ruling in 2008, the FWS continually delayed the process of finalising a decision.

For many environmentalists, these delays were obvious attempts to provide the Department of the Interior (DOI) with more time to auction off the exploratory and development rights to the offshore oil reserves that the listing would impact. Throughout the petition process, the US FWS continually failed to meet the deadlines on providing a ruling and, as a result, it needed to be compelled to do so by further litigation brought forth by the petitioners.

In the time from the initial petition to the polar bear's listing as "threatened", 29.7 million acres in the remote Chukchi Sea off north-western Alaska went up for auction, with sales being made to oil companies Statoil, Conoco, Eni, and Repsol.

For the petitioners, it was quite clear that the continual litigation brought forth by environmental groups allowed for the listing of the polar bear. This demonstrates the ability of non-state actors, such as NGOs, to press for state legislative change. It also suggests that the nature of the opposition coming from within the US was predominantly rooted in the mineral and oil sectors. For example, the legal attempts made by NGOs to push for a ruling met with legal counter resistance from representatives of the mining and oil industry. In September of 2008, a number of industry organisations, including the American Petroleum Institute and the National Mining Association, filed a motion to intervene in one of the petitioner's legal attempts to force a

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155 United States Fish & Wildlife Service, "Timeline of Polar Bear Actions."
156 Rosen, "MMS to Hold Oil Lease Sale in Alaska's Chukchi Sea."
157 Brendan Cummings and Kassie Siegel, 'Ursus Maritimus: Polar Bears on Thin Ice,' Natural Resources and Environment 22(2007).
US FWS ruling. The group claimed that the listing of the polar bear would have an immediate
adverse effect on its members, especially in Alaska where the imposition of special management
considerations and protections would increase costs and potential delays of operations:

... by way of either their members companies’ own operations or projects that
those companies supply that may emit greenhouse gases, thereby potentially
triggering the requirements that flow from the Listing Rule and 4(d) Rule. These
operations or projects could be subject to additional costly and time-consuming
ESA requirements (in addition to MMPA requirements) or be subject to
governmental enforcement actions or citizen suits if the Court grants Plaintiffs’
requested relief.

Not only would the listing of the polar bear carry immediate economic impacts, but as
some on the US House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming warned,
it also threatened national security by constraining the ability of the US to reduce its dependency
on foreign oil.

3.3.3 The Listing of the Polar Bear as “Threatened”

On April 28 2008, a third and final attempt by the petitioners to force a FWS ruling was
successful when the US District Court for the Northern District of California ordered the FWS to
Kempthorne announced the listing of polar bears as “threatened” under the ESL. Following
the decision, a representative from the Center for Biological Diversity reiterated the importance
the ruling had in terms of advancing its broader political fight against climate change, calling it

160 Sensenbrenner, “Polar Bears Need Protections Based on Science, Not Politics.”
"the first listing rule in which the impacts of global warming are cited as the sole reason for the listing." However, with the petitioners being successful in adding the polar bear to the ESL, the DOI moved to ensure that the ruling would neither advance the broader political goals of the petitioners nor compromise the national economic interests of the US in any significant way. A statement made by Secretary Kempthorne outlined the government’s stance on the ruling:

While the legal standards under the ESA compel me to list the polar bear as threatened, I want to make clear that this listing will not stop global climate change or prevent any sea ice from melting. Any real solution requires action by all major economies for it to be effective. That is why I am taking administrative and regulatory action to make certain the ESA isn’t abused to make global warming policies.

Kempthorne later clarified that the phrase “administrative and regulatory action” meant that the amendment to the ruling was designed to ensure that the listing was “to protect the polar bear while preventing unintended harm to the society and economy of the United States.” In elaboration, he announced that the US FWS:

... was using the authority provided in Section 4(d) of the ESA to develop a rule that states that if an activity is permissible under the stricter standards imposed by the Marine Mammal Protection Act, it is also permissible under the Endangered Species Act with respect to the polar bear. This rule, effective immediately, will ensure the protection of the bear while allowing us to continue to develop our natural resources in the arctic region in an environmentally sound way.

The amendment helped insulate US economic interests by making sure that any mining operations would not be held legally accountable for their impact on the polar bear. The

163 Cummings and Siegel, "Ursus Maritimus: Polar Bears on Thin Ice," 3.
165 Office of the Secretary, "Secretary Kempthorne Announces Decision to Protect Polar Bears under Endangered Species Act: Rule Will Allow Continuation of Vital Energy Production in Alaska."
amendment also ensured that the NGOs’ agenda to use the polar bear as a way to impose legal restrictions on oil development did not succeed.

While doing little to protect the polar bear, the listing was an important turning point in the trophy hunt debate. Besides deflecting much of the political momentum the NGOs had created, the listing also resulted in an indefinite ban on any US tourist/hunters bringing polar bear parts home. This ban, therefore, removed the biggest market for Nunavut outfitters. However, because the listing of the polar bear on the US ESL was strictly an internal matter, it excluded the Inuit from the political debate that occurred between the US government and the NGOs. The impact the ruling had on the Nunavut trophy hunt was devastating. Although it did not directly affect Nunavut’s jurisdiction over the management of the bear, the economic impact was felt immediately with a 45 percent drop in trophy hunts the next year in Nunavut.166

The US interest in relation to polar bear conservation was rooted in its broader economic agenda; specifically, in protecting its interests in Alaskan oil development. However, the rise in international fervour to “protect the bear from climate change” was not congruent with the US agenda. Instead of emphasising a habitat-based approach, a more selective, reductionist approach to wildlife conservation is often more appropriate for the economic agendas of most industrialised nations. In terms of polar bear management, this latter approach to conservation focuses more on regulating direct human-bear interaction, such as hunting. In 2008, the US made a proposal to CITES to have the polar bear moved from Appendix II to Appendix I.167 Appendix

II is a designation given to a species that allows for the regulated international trade of the species, while Appendix I would prohibit all international trade of the species.\textsuperscript{168}

3.4 Continuing Antagonism by Diverting Commonality

3.4.1 The Inuit Response to Growing Opposition to the Trophy Hunt

It is important to recognise that, like the listing of the polar bear on the US ESL, an international ban on the trade of polar bear parts would not affect the Inuit’s ability to hunt the bear. On the contrary, Frank Pokiak, an Inuvialuit leader from the Northwest Territories said that regardless of a CITES ruling the Inuit could and would continue to do so in accordance with Inuit traditions. However, an international ban on the trade in polar bear parts would be the final blow to the profitability of commercial hunt.

Unlike the process leading up to the listing of the polar bear in the US ESL, which occurred almost exclusively between the US and NGOs, the Inuit were active in the debate around the CITES proposal. For example, in the lead up to the March 2010 CITES meeting in Qatar, the Inuit lobbied the 174 voting country delegates to oppose the US proposal. This lobbying effort involved representatives of Inuit organisations and the governments of Greenland, Nunavut, and Canada.

While some participants opposed the US’ proposal, not all used the same grounds in calling for its defeat. Some arguments were firmly rooted in a Canadian discourse on Aboriginal rights and culture. These types of arguments called on foreign states to respect Aboriginal rights, as well as the role traditional culture should have in determining the well-being of a species. In a similar manner to arguments made during the movement towards self-government, Inuit

\textsuperscript{168} Reuters, “IFAW: Wildlife Groups Seek Halt to Polar Bear Trade.”
representatives told CITES delegates of the unique relationship Inuit culture has with the land and its resources, again attempting to create a connection between the advancement of Inuit political or economic interests and environmental sustainability. Prior to the vote Inuit leaders appealed to delegates, reminding them that the Inuit have hunted polar bears sustainably for generations. Frank Pokiak argued that the Inuit: "... have always cared for land and the wildlife because we have a lot to lose... if it wasn't for polar bears and other wildlife that we harvest, we wouldn't exist today." 169

Some Inuit representatives rooted their arguments in an assumption that traditional or community knowledge carries the same level of authority in international circles that it does domestically. Statements made by the NTI exemplified this type of argument. For example, Gabriel Nirlungayuk, director of Wildlife for NTI, opposed the US proposal on the grounds that information collected from Inuit hunters proved that polar bear numbers were increasing rather than decreasing. 170 Importantly, Nirlungayuk also used traditional knowledge as a way to question the dominant perceptions regarding climate change. He claimed that Inuit traditional knowledge records periods of warming going back as far as 2,000 years, during which the polar bears survived. 171 He also stated that "the bears can survive in a warm climate," and that the "Inuit don't think that the polar bears are going to be disappearing so I hope that good heads will prevail in Qatar and vote against this proposal." 172 Nirlungayuk’s statements are based on polar bear sightings and views voiced by hunters.

169 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Global Polar Bear Trade Ban Defeated."
171 Hayley, "Conservation Groups Oppose U.S. Ban on Polar Bear Trade."
172 Hayley, "Conservation Groups Oppose U.S. Ban on Polar Bear Trade."
While NGOs are an unlikely source of support for the trophy hunt, some have minimised their objection to it at times when doing so was opportune for advancing their long-term interests. For example, in opposing the US proposal, the WWF stated that “any new protection for polar bears must have the support of the people who live with them... we have concerns about the impact ... on northern people... the people on the ground have to be involved with the solution.” In addition to contradicting their earlier support for listing the polar bear on the US ESL (which destroyed most of the polar bear hunter market), the comments made by the WWF show their attempt to use Inuit hardship as leverage in opposing the US position. However, the new concern over the Inuit’s economic well-being is still consistent with the WWF’s focus on climate change. As the WWF later stated, their “… initial analysis indicated that hunting was not the primary threat,” and they asked “the international community to urgently make deep and long-term cuts to greenhouse gas emissions.”

While many NGOs share in the Inuit’s opposition to the US proposal, their objections are solely rooted in their own political agenda against climate change. Moreover, the majority of environmental groups have an inherent opposition to the mechanised and highly commercial harvest of animals that southern societies deem aesthetically pleasing. It is doubtful, for example, that an NGO could maintain full support for any trophy hunt. This unlikelihood is not necessarily due to conservation concerns exclusively, but because supporting the commercial harvest of an aesthetically pleasing animal would negate the NGO’s ability to use it as a poster-animal.

There were calls for rejecting the US proposal, which were more successful in promoting cooperation and a sense of shared interests amongst external actors. These calls were rooted in

174 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “U.S. Effort to Nix Polar Bear Trade Angers Inuit.”
discrediting the role that hunting has on the bear’s future, either by placing a greater emphasis on climate change or by arguing that the management system in place is adequate. For example, Nunavut Environment Minister Daniel Shewchuk emphasised the efficiency of the management system in place stating: “the U.S. does not understand that Canada has a good polar bear management system, and that the species is neither threatened nor endangered.”

Unlike arguments which debate the existence of climate change or its impact on the polar bear, this type of argument demonstrates a rationale more easily acceptable by interests not exclusive to the Inuit. Inuit leader, Mary Simon, exemplified this more inclusive approach to opposing the US CITES in stating: “I don’t understand, and many Inuit don’t understand to this day why the US is so intent on actively pursuing the implementation of highly restrictive protections on Polar Bear at the expense of Inuit, despite the fact that the species is one of the most managed species in world and is nowhere near being threatened with extinction. This is direct attack on our rights, culture, hunting practices, conservation and management agreements, and local economies as an Indigenous peoples of the Arctic.”

Simon’s comment demonstrates a more pragmatic approach when interacting with external forces. She still maintains that hunting is important to Inuit society, yet she clearly and carefully frames her opposition to the US proposal by underlining the effectiveness of the existing management regime. Moreover, because Simon does not question the existence of climate change or its impact on the polar bear, her argument promotes a greater degree of commonality with the interests of the NGOs who also opposed the US proposal.

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Unlike arguments that use TEK to question the existence or impact that climate change has on the polar bear, Simon's more pragmatic argument presents Aboriginal culture in a manner that promotes greater inclusivity. Aboriginal culture is presented in a way that highlights the need to shelter it from harm. Instead of using it in an attempt to negate popular perceptions regarding a global human threat, Aboriginal culture is used in a way that draws upon an underlying anthropocentric view, shared by all CITES members: that if wildlife is managed properly (which is argued by Simon), then any reduction of human benefit derived from harvesting living resources is not only unnecessary, but also unjust. While environmental conservation often equates to reductions in economic security, cultural security is also threatened by using Aboriginal culture in this way. Simon's argument is clear in claiming that the current management system, not simply Inuit culture, is an efficient mechanism for regulating the hunting of the polar bear.

This type of argument would be more palatable for those in the international community who see the commercial harvest of exotic wildlife as corrosive of traditional Aboriginal cultures, and is thus less open to charges of hypocrisy. Furthermore, by not assuming that any particular race or culture is inherently inclined towards sustainable resource use, arguments for the sustainability of the commercial harvest of wildlife can be couched in a logic that is more harmonious with the beliefs of other market-based societies.

The type of argument voiced by Simon places Aboriginal culture in a position more consistent with the ideas presented in "conservation hunting". Proponents of "conservation hunting" celebrate capitalism and see trophy hunting as a way to help ensure the sustainable
harvest of an animal stock by creating human incentives based on a profit motive.\textsuperscript{177} They argue that sustainable harvests help increase the monetary value of an animal, thus creating a more profitable and sustained source of revenue, as well as incentives to maintain the well-being of polar bear populations.\textsuperscript{178} Conservation hunting assumes that the activity in question operates with no conflict of interest amongst stakeholders, and that there is perfect knowledge regarding stocks and the variables that influence their well-being. Therefore, this type of logic supports the assertion that restricting the commercial use of the bear is actually tantamount to removing the incentives that regulate human greed. Because it does not assume human use is sustainable, and instead relies on regulatory mechanisms rooted in liberal capitalist assumptions, conservation hunting provides a much more persuasive argument to many international organisations. Stephen Nash, the CITES secretariat’s chair of capacity building, concurred with the view that conservation hunting and well-managed trophy hunts can “bring a lot of conservation benefits by bringing in a lot of money to the communities.” Nash continued by stating that “in Africa and Asia, for example, a well-managed sport hunt can actually encourage people to take care of the species.”\textsuperscript{179}

Conservation hunting views human nature as something that needs to be managed properly in order to obtain a sustainable harvest level. Unlike views that hunting carried out by Aboriginal people is sustainable, strictly because of provisions within traditional culture, conservation hunting is much more compatible with arguments that espouse the efficiency of market principles and the current management regime. Moreover, in addition to the role


\textsuperscript{179} Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Polar Bear Trade Ban Wouldn't Affect Sport Hunt."
Aboriginal culture can play in arguments like Simon’s, conservation hunting further reinforces the anthropocentric moral justifications for not increasing hunting restrictions. With the type of human-centric logic used in conservation hunting, it is then possible to argue (as some NGOs such as the WWF have) that commercial hunting should not be reduced for the apparent sake of the wellbeing of a species. This type of reasoning can then be supported by arguments that emphasise the impact of climate change on the bear’s wellbeing.

Canadian delegates to the CITES convention argued that “increasing international trade restrictions will not mitigate the climate change impacts affecting the polar bear and many other species, and will harm the livelihoods of Canadian Aboriginal peoples.” Various NGOs, including the international wildlife trade monitor TRAFFIC, supported the Canadian declaration. TRAFFIC reiterated the point that “shrinking sea ice is the main threat facing polar bears, not the trade of bear products that are often harvested by aboriginal hunters....”

The US proposal failed to receive the required amount of votes and the motion was defeated. The US responded to the defeat and reiterated the role climate change had in the outcome stating:

A number of nations recognized the threat that the polar bear faces from loss of sea ice due to climate change but disagreed over whether the requirements of the listing criteria were met, asserting that polar bears are not significantly affected by international trade and, therefore, should not be listed in Appendix I.

While many Inuit communities and NGOs alike celebrated the decision, other more animal rights-oriented NGOs were disappointed with the ruling. Voicing his concern over the role the climate change debate played in the recent decision, a representative from the

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180 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Polar Bear Trade Ban Wouldn’t Affect Sport Hunt.”
181 Hayley, “Conservation Groups Oppose U.S. Ban on Polar Bear Trade.”
International Fund for Animal Welfare stated 

"...parties are using the fact that climate change poses a greater long-term threat to the species as an excuse to do nothing about immediate threats hastening their decline."\textsuperscript{182} Clearly, the defeat of the US proposal came as a result of the successful deployment of arguments that highlighted the efficiency of current management regimes and the greater threat to polar bears posed by climate change—arguments that were couched in the sort of anthropocentric moral assumptions shared by most members of CITES.

3.5 Conclusion

Although self-government provides the Inuit with a significant degree of domestic self-determination in deciding how to manage resources like the polar bear, it is clear that external actors are able to influence whether or not the use of living resources is profitable. Self-government, however, allows the Inuit to interact with external forces and attempt to ensure market access for their producers, as demonstrated in the example of the McClintock hunting moratorium. However, as the international politicalisation of the polar bear discussion progressed, there was a reduction in the Nunavut government’s ability to defend the trophy hunt’s legitimacy. The listing of the polar bear on the ESL, the subsequent removal of the biggest trophy hunter market, and the recent proposal to ban all international trade in bear parts exemplifies a growing international opposition to the trophy hunt.

Closer examination of this opposition does not point to an inherent antagonism between environmental organisations and Inuit economic interests. On the contrary, as this paper has demonstrated, independent actors who were motivated by their own broader political and economic agendas have instigated the majority of the activism in polar bear conservation. It has

\textsuperscript{182} Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, "Global Polar Bear Trade Ban Defeated."
been the advancement of these agendas, not exclusively concerned with the polar bear, which has placed greater constraints on the profitability of commercially harvesting the bear.

Some may interpret the recent defeat of the US CITES proposal as a turning point towards increased acceptance of the commercial polar bear hunt. However, a closer examination of the arguments made in opposition to the US’ proposal demonstrates a significant underlying divergence between the goals of the Inuit and the majority of the environmental community. The general thrust of polar bear conservation remains tied to the issue of climate change and a southern version of anthropocentrism. This has inevitably created an international context that is inhospitable to the commercial harvest of exotic species whose habitat and sustainability diminishes with the increasing impact of climate change. Therefore, if the Inuit seek to further their long-term goal of economic independence through the international market, they must seek ways in which the use of living resources such as the polar bear reflect dominant ideological or political trends, and promote a convergence of goals with external actors.

The politicisation of the polar bear debate illustrates two important factors relevant to the Inuit’s pursuit of the maximum utility of living resources in the international market. First, the successful commercialisation of exotic living resources is highly influenced by whether the particular use conflicts or overlaps with the broader political and economic goals of other actors, and the particular anthropocentric views they reflect. Second, as demonstrated in the differing rationales for opposing the US CITES, the desire to continue a focus on commercially harvesting exotic living resources (represented in the refusal to accept the link between climate change and the polar bear), illustrates a growing divergence of interests between the Inuit and many external actors. Inuit arguments for self-government were successful because they created an overlap between the Inuit’s political goals and those of other actors who wanted to promote
environmental sustainability or human rights and the self-determination of indigenous peoples. However, in contrast with the pragmatism displayed during their pursuit of self-government, the Inuit’s recent assertion of their cultural “right” to commercially hunt the polar bear is out of line with dominant international perceptions regarding the appropriate use of these animals, and challenges the political and economic interests of a number of different international organisations. This argument appeals exclusively to the interests of Inuit. Without incorporating southern anthropocentric interests into their reasoning, the Inuit’s attempt to legitimise the trophy hunt will continue to lack persuasive power. With external forces restricting the profitability of trophy hunt, it has become clear that if the Inuit are to commodify living resources in a way that advances their long-term economic goals, they must construct policies which better promote a shared anthropocentrism with other actors.
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A SHARED ANTHROPOCENTRISM

For the Inuit, exercising self-determination over living resource management has meant that they are better able to increase the economic utility of living resources through the international market. Through the trophy hunt, the international market has provided many Inuit communities with a substantial increase in revenues. However, like all other producers of international goods, the ability of Inuit to maximise the economic utility of the polar bear depends on a host of external variables.

As first exemplified in the McClintock issue, the Inuit’s ability to benefit from the use of the polar bear has not been immune to the tumultuous global process of supply and demand. The recent constraints on the Inuit’s use of the bear are rooted neither in market fluctuations nor in scientific opposition to the trophy hunt. Instead, constraints such as the removal of the American trophy hunter market and the recent CITES proposal to ban all international trade in polar bear parts are consequences of political actions taken by actors in pursuit of their own political and economic agendas rooted in a more southern-centric anthropocentrism.

Three important factors underpin the political antagonism towards the Inuit’s interests in living resource management. The first factor relates to the fact that the living resource that the Inuit wish to exploit for profit has a high aesthetic value in southern industrialised societies. Unlike sheep, cows, pigs, fish, numerous birds such as chickens, ducks, and other “production” animals, most members of southern societies deem it inappropriate to kill aesthetically valuable animals, such as the polar bear, for commercial purposes. The polar bear’s aesthetic value has increased further due to its connection to the human-centric fear of climate change.

The second factor underpinning the political antagonism towards the Inuit’s interests in living resource management is the fact that international actors such as NGOs have been able to
advance their broader agendas by taking action to protect of the polar bear. The polar bear also became a useful means to advance the broader political and economic agendas of these actors. While these agendas were not wholly concerned with the wellbeing of the polar bear, US economic interests in Alaska and the campaign against climate change have underpinned international discussions of polar bear management.

Lastly, while the Inuit’s persistence in pursuing the trophy hunt demonstrates their openness to the international market, the current state of antagonism between them and international forces has been exacerbated by the Inuit’s inability to cooperate with any other actor that also has a vested interest in the use of the polar bear. Even at times when the short-term goals of the Inuit and external actors overlap, the Inuit, have ignored opportunities to establish longer-term relationships of interdependency and cooperation. For example, during their calls for a rejection of the US CITES proposal, the Inuit distanced themselves from the NGOs assertion that climate change poses a threat to the long-term survival of the bears. Instead, by using TEK to contradict the dominant perception that climate change poses a threat to the bear, the Inuit chose to further distance themselves from their potential allies in the fight against climate change. By maintaining a determined interest in the trophy hunt and ignoring opportunities to establish relationships of mutual gain, the Inuit are in danger pursuing short-term goals at the cost of long-term interests. Inuit leader Sheila Watt-Cloutier has identified the costs of short-sited policy on this issue:

The world is finally starting to “get it” and more recently, governments including Canada and the United States, are actually considering taking solid action to address the issue of lowering greenhouse gases, which as I state above, is now largely accepted worldwide as the cause of climate change. A stronger global consensus on this important issue is very good news for us living in the Arctic. But I am worried that if we remain focused on the smaller picture, playing
smaller politics where we only focus on the numbers issue in terms of polar bear populations, we will lose, and lose big. 183

It is not necessary to examine all the points of contention between the Inuit’s current focus on commercialising the harvest of the polar bear and the dominant international perceptions reflected in the actions taken by NGOs. However, the points of contention that were mentioned in this paper support the conclusion that, currently, there exists an irreconcilable conflict between the commercial harvest of the polar bear and dominant international perceptions regarding appropriate animal use. Nevertheless, it is clear that self-government has afforded Inuit the ability to exercise choice in how to interact with external forces. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in some of the arguments made by Inuit leaders leading up to the CITES meeting, and by the persistent pursuit of the trophy hunt amidst mounting opposition and market closures, the Inuit have been unwilling to address the relationships of interconnectedness that their interests have with those of other actors. The Inuit’s persistence in pursuing the commercial harvest of exotic species such as the polar bear has left them unable to establish any common goals with external actors, or use living resources in a way that truly advances their pursuit of economic development.

If the Inuit still desire to use living resources in a way that provides maximum utility for economic development, policy needs to acknowledge, not ignore, the role external forces have in advancing Inuit interests in the international market. In other words, by remaining open to the international market the Inuit also need to increase their level of strategic cooperation with international forces that have similar long-term goals in wildlife commodification. By ensuring that their use of living resources dovetails with dominant international perceptions regarding the

appropriate use of living resources, in a way that does not compromise their pursuit of cultural and economic security, the Inuit will be better able to pursue cooperative relations with international actors such as NGOs. In other words, in order to achieve greater cultural and economic security, the Inuit need to ensure that the pursuit of short term goals does not compromise their long-term interests. In terms of living resource management, the Inuit’s long-term interests are best represented by policies that secure a stable and profitable pattern of wildlife commodification. Securing such a pattern does not necessitate that the Inuit forgo pursuing their own interests when encountering external actors. On the contrary, it is important to remember that the primary goal is economic development and not the success of a particular industry. Therefore, in order for the Inuit to use living resources in a way that advances their interests in an international context, their management of living resources must be made to reflect a more inclusive version of anthropocentrism.

In terms of the trophy hunt industry, policy should promote a shift away from harvesting animals deemed aesthetically valuable to southern societies. Instead, trophy hunts should incorporate a greater focus on elk, reindeer, musk oxen, and other animals that have significantly less aesthetic value in southern societies. In the long run, however, ecotourism presents itself as the most viable option for the Inuit to use living resources in a way that promotes their primary goal of economic development by capitalising on a more global anthropocentrism. Especially in terms of exotic animals such as the polar bear, ecotourism presents itself as a way in which the Inuit can benefit economically from the global rise in its aesthetic value. Moreover, ecotourism would transfer more economic benefits to the Inuit in activities that utilise exotic animals as non-consumptive resources. The use of living resources as non-consumptive resources would in turn
create synergies between the interests of the Inuit and NGOs and ultimately promote greater cooperation.

While not necessarily ecologically valuable, ecotourism has become an integral part of "greening" the commodification of more exotic natural landscapes. The transformative process that has turned aesthetically pleasing animals from consumptive to non-consumptive living resources is an integral part of this new "green" commodification of nature. Therefore, when animals such as the polar bear become "poster-animals", their increased symbolic value enriches the monetary value of ecotourism. This maximises the bear's utility for Inuit economic development by increasing the interest from tourists, not to shoot the bear, but to see it in its natural habitat, or in some cases, to pay a fee to partake in its conservation.

There are some encouraging examples of living resource management regimes that have successfully transformed "unpopular" consumptive systems into thriving non-consumptive systems. In northeast Iceland, for example, many communities have successfully converted their long history of whaling into a thriving whale watching industry. In many central African countries, the popularised plight of gorillas (particularly mountain gorillas) has created an ecotourism boom, where tourists pay, not only to see the great apes, but also to volunteer in various "conservation" activities. For many communities, great ape ecotourism has changed their view of primates from being valued as food sources, traditional medicines, or trophies, to having a greater monetary value alive, as non-consumptive resources. The actual benefit that

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184 Niels Einarsson, "From Good to Eat to Good to Watch: Whale Watching, Adaptation and Change in Icelandic Fishing Communities," Polar Research 28, no. 1 Special Issue: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability in the Arctic (2009).

ecotourism has on the physical wellbeing of wildlife is still being debated in scientific circles, with some seeing it as being detrimental to mental and physical health of individual animals.\textsuperscript{186} However, these activities have been viewed in a positive light by environmental organisations due to their capacity to promote economic growth and human development.\textsuperscript{197}

This type of management system does not necessitate a reduction in all hunting activities. The commercial harvest of numerous animals closer to those considered “production animals”, such as caribou, elk, musk ox, have all remained virtually invisible during campaigns to save the polar bear, seals, or whales. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the commercial harvest of these less aesthetically pleasing animals could remain a productive source of revenue whilst developing an ecotourism industry. Moreover, treating more aesthetically pleasing animals as non-consumptive resources does not imply a need to stop all hunting. On the contrary, not only has the subsistence hunting of these animals been left untargeted by NGOs, the Aboriginal right to carry out “traditional” hunts is protected by numerous international treaties, declarations, and by the working principles of wildlife management regimes such as the International Whaling Commission and the Agreement for the Conservation of Polar Bears.

The more an animal’s aesthetic or symbolic value increases in southern societies, the greater the chance that it will be used as a poster-animal in political campaigns. As the interests of actors become more invested in activities that seek to generate economic benefit from the use


of a particular animal, any discussion regarding the wellbeing of the animal often becomes politicised, and reflects human-centric concerns. As the Inuit pursued the trophy hunt, this process usually resulted in conflict between the interests of the Inuit and NGOs. However, if the use of exotic animals such as the polar bear is integrated into ecotourism, relationships of antagonisms will be replaced by a more politically and economically symbiotic relationship with other actors.

In reflecting their broader political agenda, many NGOs are poised to support ecotourism as a “sustainable” method of commodifying exotic landscapes. For example, the WWF supports Arctic tourism, based on the idea that the “... tourism industry and conservation interests share a common goal: preserving the arctic environment that, with arctic cultures, is the basis for tourism in the region.”188 In order to promote ecotourism in the Arctic, the WWF has created the Arctic Award for Linking Tourism and Conservation, an award it gives annually to a tourist company it deems promotes sustainability.189

In summary, by making policy that attaches the monetary value of exotic Arctic wildlife to conservation via ecotourism, the Inuit are set to gain from having their interests overlap with numerous powerful actors in the international environmental community. Furthermore, by having living resource management reflect the more dominant international perceptions regarding appropriate living resource management, the Inuit are also set to advance their long-term goal of economic autonomy by accessing a more economically reliable source of international demand for their exotic wildlife.

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189 World Wildlife Fund, "Alaskan Tour Company Wins WWF Arctic Tourism Prize."
This paper has contributed to a broader discussion of Indigenous politics by showing how public self-government has provided the Inuit with domestic self-determination over the management of living resources. However, the interests of the Inuit are becoming increasingly interconnected with those of other actors as they integrate their natural resources into the international market. This paper's focus on the experience of the Inuit with external forces does not exclude it from having relevance to discussions of Aboriginal self-government that exist outside of the Arctic. On the contrary, because of globalisation, examining the role international forces can have on Aboriginal self-determination is applicable and important to all varieties of self-governance, including public or ethnic self-governance.

This paper emphasises the role that international forces can have in Aboriginal self-determination. In pursuing self-determination, Aboriginal peoples must not only successfully navigate domestic structures and actors, but also those in the international sphere. The structures and actors that make up the international context, while not being void of impregnated cultural or ideological leanings, are not inherently antagonistic or supportive towards Aboriginal aspirations. On the contrary, the vast array of interests present in the international context exists in a relationship of relative gains, where mutual support and cooperation is available when goals overlap. The Inuit's pragmatic pursuit of self-government demonstrated their ability to achieve a supportive international context for their goals. However, antagonism between Aboriginal people and external actors can arise when their interests diverge and come into conflict. This antagonism has been apparent at numerous points throughout Inuit's attempt to commercially harvest Arctic wildlife that is often seen as "exotic", such as seals, polar bears, and whales.

To scholars that see Aboriginal self-determination as being dependent on obtaining a separation from non-Aboriginal institutions, the instances of external antagonism detailed in this
paper may seem proof of the irreconcilability of western culture and the worldviews of the more
dominant international actors, on the one hand, and the aspirations of smaller Aboriginal groups,
on the other. However, as demonstrated in this study of the trophy hunt, the recent international
antagonism towards the Inuit's interests are not rooted in an opposition to their pursuit of
economic development, but in the exclusive nature in which they have attempted to achieve it.
Policy alternatives such as ecotourism would be more adept at manufacturing ethical credibility
and economic opportunity for the Inuit by commodifying animals in a way that converges upon a
type of anthropocentrism shared by both Inuit and southern environmentalists. Therefore, the
recent conflict over the trophy hunt is not demonstrative of an inherent irreconcilability between
Inuit aspirations and international forces. Instead, the Inuit's experience with international forces
demonstrate how new constraints and opportunities can arise when Aboriginal peoples pursue
their goals internationally. In order for international forces to support a domestic exercise of self-
determination, policy must adequately reflect a common ethic and set of long term goals shared
by all humans, or at least, by those actors most relevant to advancing Aboriginal cultural and
economic independence.
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