The Changing Governance of Rural Regional Development:  
A case study of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition

by

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ABSTRACT

This case study of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition (C-CBAC) examines one regional governance organization in the context of contemporary economic and political transition. First to what extent is C-CBAC representative of dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development? Second, what factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC? C-CBAC was devolved the responsibility of rural regional development planning in the Cariboo-Chilcotin and this is representative of dominant trends. C-CBAC formed in response to the mountain pine beetle (MPB) epidemic, but the history of working together and transition towards neoliberal policies supported their formation. However, the same factors also hindered its formation. First, the MPB was a crisis and was not able to sustain interest of regional stakeholders or senior governments. Second, the history of working together resulted in exclusion. Finally, neoliberal policies resulted in the lack of financial or policy control devolved to C-CBAC required for implementation.
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**ABBREVIATIONS**

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<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Allowable Annual Cut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACOA</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Beetle Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-CBAC</td>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-CIC</td>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Investment Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-CLUP</td>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-CRRRC</td>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Resource Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>Cariboo Communities Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEF</td>
<td>Cariboo Economic Action Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>Community Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDI</td>
<td>Community Economic Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Cariboo Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Commission on Resources and Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD</td>
<td>Cariboo Regional District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRB</td>
<td>Cariboo Regional Resource Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>District Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREE</td>
<td>Department of Regional Economic Expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDBG</td>
<td>Economic Development Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GWG</td>
<td>Governance Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAMC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Management Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILMB</td>
<td>Integrated Land Management Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAC</td>
<td>Indian and Northern Affairs Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IWA</td>
<td>International Woodworkers of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEADER</td>
<td>Liaison Entre Actions de Développement Rural</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLA</td>
<td>Member of Legislative Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoCD</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoCRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Community and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoCS</td>
<td>Ministry of Community Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoED</td>
<td>Ministry of Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoF</td>
<td>Ministry of Forests</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFR</td>
<td>Ministry of Forests and Range</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPB</td>
<td>Mountain Pine Beetle</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>Northern Development Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBAC</td>
<td>Omineca Beetle Action Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Regional District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDO</td>
<td>Regional Development Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDWG</td>
<td>Social Development Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIBAC</td>
<td>Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Timber Supply Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBC</td>
<td>University of Northern British Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>WED</td>
<td>Western Economic Diversification</td>
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“Tough times never last, but tough people do.”
– Robert H. Schuller
Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Introduction

The intent of rural regional development initiatives is to overcome regional (economic) disparities and to promote regional self-reliance and endogenous growth (Savoie 1992; Markey et al. 2005). However, traditional initiatives by senior governments to promote rural regional development in Canada have seldom achieved this goal. At times, they have achieved the opposite, increasing regional disparities and dependence on the central state. As a result, over time, investments in regional development have become less of a priority for the central state (Fairbairn 1998). Recent research suggests that a regional approach to development is receiving renewed interest, but with a different scale and structure of decision-making (Wallis 1994a; Amin 1999). Specifically in rural regional development, more local decision-makers are seeking and are being permitted greater control over development decision-making (Paquet et al. 2000; Odagiri and Jean 2004). The resurgence of interest in rural regional development in Canada warrants investigation, particularly given the changing pattern of decision-making from ‘top-down’ initiatives to those which are energized from the ‘bottom-up.’

The organization central to this case study, the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition (C-CBAC), formed in early 2005. In this organization, local government organized with industry and regional special interest groups to address the significant impacts that were expected to result from the emerging mountain pine beetle (MPB) outbreak. C-CBAC’s initiatives to address the economic and social impacts of the MPB were supported by senior governments. The situation appeared to be a collaboration between senior governments
and a regional organization concerned with their future. Thus, the establishment of C-CBAC provides an opportunity to study the changing governance of rural regional development.

1.2 Situating C-CBAC

In rural and small town places, economic, political, social, and physical environmental changes are taking place (Hayter 2000; Apedaile 2004). Economic, political, and social changes are often influenced by changes in the scale at which industry and government operate, with operations increasingly centralized to achieve economic efficiency (Hayter and Barnes 1997b; Hanlon and Halseth 2005). In response to this, some rural and small town places in BC have re-scaled their development initiatives, from being locally- to regionally-based (Halseth et al. 2006). Changing environmental conditions have also driven responses. For example, C-CBAC and the Omineca Beetle Action Coalition (OBAC) both formed to address impacts of the MPB (C-CBAC 2005c; OBAC 2005). In both the Cariboo-Chilcotin and the Omineca areas, local governments are collaborating with other regional stakeholders to collectively respond to challenges which are too large to be addressed otherwise.

The establishment of rural regional development organizations in BC is paralleled by new approaches to regional development internationally (Tonts 1999; Bruckmeier 2000; Thompson 2000; Sancton 2001; Alpert et al. 2006). ‘New regionalism’ literatures argue that, given economic and political globalization, contemporary regional activity requires new governance approaches (Wallis 1994b). In a new region, wide participation in governance is encouraged, emphasizing the inclusion of private and non-profit sectors (Marsden and Murdoch 1998; Smyth et al. 2004; Coulson and Ferrario 2007).
Movements towards a new regionalism are happening at the same time as many senior governments around the world are adopting neoliberal policies (Lovering 1999; Ward and Jonas 2004). Under a neoliberal agenda, the central state removes itself from some of its post-war Keynesian roles and defers to the private sector (Young and Matthews 2007). Among other things, these changes have encouraged local actors to adopt the role of rural regional development planning (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005; Pinkerton et al. 2008).

Thus, there has been a change in who takes up issues of rural regional development. Decision-making that used to be the role of the central state is now being adopted by local public entities. Moreover, involvement in decision-making is extended to include private and non-profit sectors; this is consistent with the overall trend from government to governance (Marsden and Murdoch 1998). Thus, governing rural regional development appears to have shifted from the ‘top-down’ to ‘bottom-up.’ The examination of C-CBAC will provide insight into the governance of such new regional development approaches.

The intent of this thesis is to examine the organization and operation of one contemporary approach to rural regional development in the context of dominant trends in Canadian policy, and against local factors which may influence the formation of such an organization. As such, historical approaches to rural regional development in Canada, the framework of neoliberalism, and the new regionalism literatures are used to understand how C-CBAC fits in the larger context of Canadian and international development trends.

1.3 The Cariboo-Chilcotin
Located in the central interior of BC, the Cariboo-Chilcotin (Figure 1.1) has a history of regional governance and development activity. The Cariboo Regional District (CRD) was incorporated in 1968 as a form of local government for areas outside of municipalities, but
generally within the Fraser River Plateau (Demarchi 1996; BC Statistics 2007; Bish and Clemens 2008). Also, in 1992, a regional land use planning process was initiated by the provincial government. This process led to the development of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan (C-CLUP) in 1994; the subsequent regional economic development process, the Cariboo Economic Action Forum (CEAF); and a land use plan implementation group, the Cariboo Regional Resource Board (CRRB). Thus, past experiences of regional responses and regional governance activity are drawn upon to understand the current regional organization, C-CBAC.

Regional governance and development activity was spurred again in 2005 with the emergence of the MPB epidemic. The MPB (*Dendroctonus ponderosae*) is part of a natural disturbance regime in western pine forests (Patriquin *et al.* 2005). However, the current outbreak is the largest on record, and has drastically changed the available timber supply. The timber supply supports the region's major industry (McGarrity and Hoberg 2005). Given that the forest industry directly employs 21% of the region's labour force, the MPB epidemic poses a serious economic threat to the region's short- and long-term economy (BC Statistics 2009b). C-CBAC formed to address the economic and social impacts of the MPB epidemic in the Cariboo-Chilcotin.
1.4 Research Questions

Two research questions are central to this thesis. First, given the devolution of rural regional development governance to local levels, to what extent is C-CBAC representative of dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development? Second, against the background of a history of regional activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, a transition towards neoliberal policies, and the emergence of the MPB epidemic, what factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC?
1.5 Thesis Outline

This thesis is presented in seven chapters. Following this introduction, the second chapter contains a review of the literatures which frame this research. The three primary literature areas reviewed are neoliberal reform, new regionalism, and the roles of social cohesion and social capital in governance.

Chapter three, Methods, is organized into six sections. Following a brief introduction, the chapter presents a brief discussion of methodological considerations and outlines the methods of data collection and data analysis. The chapter also reviews considerations with respect to rigour, credibility, and dependability of this research. The final section concludes the chapter.

Chapter four, Context, is organized into seven sections. Following an introduction, the second section presents the Cariboo-Chilcotin as the case study location. The third and fourth sections outline some of the region’s demographic and economic characteristics, respectively. The fifth section reviews the various local governments in the region, including municipal, regional, and First Nations. The sixth section outlines the region’s twenty-year history of regional planning, while the final section summarizes the chapter.

Chapter five, Results, presents the thesis findings organized around the research questions. Following the introduction, the chapter explores the issues of role devolution and autonomy in rural regional development. This is followed by a review of factors which participants identified assisted the formation of C-CBAC and those which participants identified hindered the formation of C-CBAC.

Chapter six, Discussion, considers the research results in the context of the literature in four sections. Following an introduction, the second section considers the changing scale
and structure of rural regional development decision-making. The third section assesses the factors which contributed and detracted from C-CBAC’s formation. The chapter is concluded with a summary.

The concluding chapter provides a summary response to the research questions. It also considers lessons which may be extracted from the case of C-CBAC and presents future research directions.
Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Introduction
This literature review addresses several issues considered important in contemporary rural regional development. First, it discusses past approaches to rural regional development, including both federal and BC provincial approaches. Second, it addresses more recent challenges of rural change and restructuring. Third, it explores the re-orientation of state roles in changing political economies. Fourth, it reviews the role of (new) regional responses in the context of these changes. Within new regionalism, it examines the concept of governance and, within governance, outlines the roles of social cohesion and social capital. These literatures provide a greater contextual understanding of C-CBAC’s situation in a larger web of economic, political, and social processes.

2.2 Rural Regional Development History: Canada and British Columbia
Two distinct periods exist in the history of rural regional development in BC and Canada (Markey et al. 2008). The first period, from the 1940s to the mid-1980s, was generally characterized by the heavy intervention of senior governments in coordinating policies and programs. The second period, from the mid-1980s to the present day, has been generally characterized less by government intervention and more devolution to local levels. Each period is described in more detail below.

2.2.1 Post WWII to Mid-1980s
In Canada, the federal government intervened heavily in its first attempts at regional development, following geographically unequal economic growth in the post-WWII economic boom (Table 2.1) (Savoie 1992; Fairbairn 1998). Adopting a Keynesian economic
approach, such central state strategies were directed at attracting private investment to locate in slow-growth regions. Over time, the various initiatives became more concentrated in the hands of the federal government as comprehensive redistribution programs were developed to narrow economic gaps between regions. Programs focused on targeted investments in rural areas, research and infrastructure development, tax concessions, and capital grants (Fairbairn 1998). Some programs achieved job creation in some high unemployment regions. However, they are generally regarded as not being successful in achieving their primary goal of overcoming regional economic underdevelopment. In this era, regional development was based on comparative advantages, decisions were centrally made, and programs were administered by senior levels of government (Savoie 1992).
### Table 2.1 Federal Regional Development Initiatives (Post-WWII to Mid-1980s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Department/Program Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| 1957–present| Fiscal Equalization Program                             | • Reduce disparities between regions  
• Nationally standardized public services  
• Offer financial stability to the provinces to provide consistent public services  
• Not required to spend on economic development |
| 1960–1966   | Agriculture Rehabilitation and Development Act/Agricultural and Rural Development Act | • Private industry offered increased capital-cost allowances to produce new products if located in regions of high unemployment and slow growth  
• Goal: reduce rural poverty |
| 1962–1969   | Atlantic Development Board                              | • Active only in the Atlantic provinces  
• Focus: improve region's basic economic infrastructure; no direct assistance to private industry |
| 1963–1968*  | Area Development Incentives Act                          | • Focus: private sector to stimulate growth in economically depressed regions  
• Increased tax incentives and capital grants in designated areas |
| 1966–1968*  | Fund for Rural Economic Development                      | • Applied in designated regions only  
• Focus: private industry investment and job creation |
| 1968–1981   | Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE)         | • Nationally coordinated  
• Focus: infrastructure, private investment, cash grants, and growth pole development |
| 1972–1987   | General Development Agreements Ministry of State for Economic and Regional Development Department for Regional Industrial Expansion | • Greater control to each province  
• Attempted to retain parts of DREE  
• Regional incentive programs  
• Provide finances to reduce regional economic disparities |

Sources: Savoie 1992; Fairbairn 1998.  
*This program subsequently became a component of DREE.

Following international and national trends, the BC provincial government also instituted a Keynesian policy approach in the post-WWII era and this was expressed through rural regional development initiatives (Young and Matthews 2007). In the 'WAC Bennett era' (termed for the Premier at the time), the provincial government invested heavily in
‘province building’ development planning (Table 2.2) (Williston and Keller 1997). This involved a large-scale coordinated policy and investment strategy to develop the hinterland through improving transportation networks, hydro and other resource developments, and made provincial policy more conducive to long-term investments (Hayter and Barnes 1997a). However, during this time of great industrial expansion into the ‘hinterland’, little interest or attention was given to existing places and residents in decision-making. With respect to hydro electric dam projects, for example, many people were displaced and resettled from lands they called home without recourse (Loo 2004). Thus, positive impacts were not felt uniformly and negative impacts were experienced across the hinterland.

Though not perfect, this era of development planning included many factors now understood as important for success, including a coordinated long-term vision, clear policy goals to link economic and social development, and recognizing the importance of non-metropolitan development (Markey et al. 2008).

Table 2.2  Provincial Regional Development Initiatives (Post-WWII to Mid-1980s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950s – 1970s</td>
<td>Social Credit Party (‘WAC Bennett’ era)</td>
<td>• Province building: Roads to Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic expansion, infrastructure development, access to resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional District legislation passed (1965)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Two Rivers Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972 – 1975</td>
<td>New Democratic Party</td>
<td>• Attempted radical changes to resource policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Address industry inefficiencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 – mid 1980s</td>
<td>Social Credit Party</td>
<td>• Resources used to stimulate the provincial economy during a recession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Upgrades to rail network and northern port</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Adapted from Markey et al. 2008, 416; Tindal and Tindal 2004; Bish and Clemens 2008.

Federal and provincial programs during the Keynesian period can generally be described as ‘top-down’ (Fairbairn 1998). ‘Top-down’ development programs are developed
and administered by governments external to the region. Such approaches are beneficial in that they generally have large budgets and policy control (Savoie 1992). In BC, the provincial government was able to fund its province building initiatives and had control over policies necessary to support its actions (Young and Matthews 2007; Markey et al. 2008). However, ‘top-down’ approaches to development are often criticized because the local level is not represented, nor do they have control over key policy decision-making (Bruce 1997; Markey et al. 2005).

2.2.2 Mid-1980s to Current

In the mid-1980s, however, an important shift occurred in Canada’s approach to rural regional development (Hodge and Robinson 2001). The federal government devolved responsibility to supra-provincial development organizations, Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) in Atlantic Canada and Western Economic Diversification (WED) in Western Canada (Table 2.3). The focus was no longer a federal response to regional economic disparities, but rather programs that took place within regions, with offices located in the regions and staffed by local residents. This signaled a shift towards a more ‘bottom-up’ approach to rural regional development on the part of the federal government.
### Table 2.3 Federal Regional Development Initiatives (Mid-1980s to Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Department/Program Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980–1984</td>
<td>Regional Development Funds</td>
<td>• Funds provided to regions for small business development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Megaprojects</td>
<td>• Large-scale natural resource development projects (e.g. Alberta Tar Sands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986–present</td>
<td>Community Futures</td>
<td>• Job-creation and economic development program for rural areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987–present</td>
<td>Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency (ACOA)</td>
<td>• Head offices located outside of Ottawa; programs sensitive to regional goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Economic Diversification (WED)</td>
<td>• Focus on small entrepreneurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–present</td>
<td>Interdepartmental Committee on Rural and Remote Canada</td>
<td>• Twenty federal departments and agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Collaborating to share information, networking, and research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–present</td>
<td>Rural Secretariat</td>
<td>• In the Ministry of Agriculture and Food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Focal point for the federal government to address rural issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Goal is to create partnerships between departments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Savoie 1992; Fairbairn 1998.

In the case of BC, the central government also relinquished considerable control over rural regional development strategies in the mid-1980s (Williston and Keller 1997; Young and Matthews 2007; Markey et al. 2008). In place of a centrally coordinated regime, the provincial government designated a provincial ministry to oversee various regional development programs (Table 2.4). However, the departure from central state control meant that programs became disaggregated and there was no longer a coordinated response to address social and economic development. Moreover, in this restructuring, regional development regimes rarely lasted longer than three years and lost the long-term vision of previous programs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Department/Program Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1987 – 1992      | Minister of State and Regional Development Officers (RDOs)  | • Minister of State assigned  
• Regional offices (8) w/ RDOs, with regional development liaison officers and clerical staff  
• Mandate: establish regional priorities, implement government programs, conduct evaluations, reporting |
|                  | Minister of Regional Economic Development (1989)            |                                                                                                                                               |
| 1993 – 1996      | Regional Economic Development Offices                       | • Regional offices (5) w/ Regional Economic Development Officers  
• More community-based approach towards economic development and implementation of government programs |
| 1995 – present   | Columbia Basin Trust                                        | • Development funding for the region most affected by the Columbia River Treaty                                                             |
| 1998 – 2001      | Northern Development Commission                             | • Instituted by *Northern Development Act*  
• Headed by a Commissioner and 5 staff  
• Support for 3 northern regions  
• Mandate: establish advocacy and consultation, small fund to assist development projects |
| 1999 – present   | Nechako-Kitamaat Development Fund                           | • Granting agency to assist those in the area affected by the Kemano project/creation of the Nechako reservoir |
| 1999 – 2001      | Ministry of Community Development, Cooperatives, and Volunteers | • Variety of CED programs and transition funds (e.g. Community Enterprise Fund)                                                             |
| 2001 – present   | Provincial Liberal Government                               | • Macro-environment: tax reductions, deregulation, and labour flexibility                                                                   |
| 2001 – present   | Northern Caucus                                             | • BC Liberal northern Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) advocate for northern issues                                                  |
| 2003             | Heartland Strategy                                          | • Government resources to revitalize the economy of rural and northern communities; the ‘heart’ of BC’s economic strength |
| 2003 – present   | Community Charter                                           | • Legislation increasing the autonomy of municipalities, including authority for inter-municipal schemes |
| 2005 – present   | Northern Development Initiative (NDI) Trust                 | • Economic development funding corporation for northern and central BC                                                                       |
| 2005 – present   | Beetle Action Coalitions (BACs) Economic Alliances           | • Regionally-based, voluntary development organizations                                                                                     |
| 2006 – present   | Southern Interior Development Initiative Trust              | • Economic development funding corporations for the southern Interior and north Island/coast area                                           |
|                  | Island Coastal Economic Trust                               |                                                                                                                                               |

Sources: Adapted from University of Northern British Columbia (UNBC) Community Development Institute 2004; Bish and Clemens 2008; Markey *et al.* 2008; BC Ministry of Community and Rural Development (MoCRD) 2010.
In the mid-1980s, we can start to see the dissolution of Keynesian programs and policies. In the face of rural economic, social, and political restructuring in the early 1980s, the policy response has been to withdraw from previous programs:

*successive governments have been gradually withdrawing from a commitment to providing equitable access to standardized services ... while making modest (and incomplete) efforts to assume a secondary role of facilitating transition through various community and regional development programs* (Markey et al. 2008, 415).

Part of this response was to 'enable' local communities to have greater representation in development decision-making\(^1\), but it is also argued that senior governments have abandoned their role in rural regional development (Polèse 1999).

### 2.3 Rural Restructuring and Change

Change in the rural Canadian landscape is not a new phenomena; however, the pace at which it occurs is increasing (Hayter 2000; Reimer 2002). Beginning in the 1980s, rural places have faced unique challenges in the face of global change. As places restructure to be more competitive in a global market, the economic fortunes of many rural and small town places fell with the onset of industrial restructuring (Bradbury and St-Martin 1983). In BC, large-scale industries began to restructure production regimes to respond to market volatility and competitiveness. This was achieved through increasing technology and a subsequent concentration of many smaller firms into fewer and larger firms. This contributed to the transition from a 'fordist' to a 'flexible' production regime (Hayter and Barnes 1997b; Hayter 2000). The replacement of labour by technology led to significant job

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\(^1\) 'Subsidiarity', a term from literature on European politics, is the principle that decision-making should be devolved to lowest decision-making level possible/closest to the citizens. In this, central government should have a subsidiary function (Sikow-Magny 2004). This principle supports local community involvement in decision-making.
losses, increasing part-time or ‘flexible’ workers, and the provision of little to no job stability (Barnes and Hayter 1994).

Such economic restructuring has also meant a restructuring of social life, as social change in rural and small town places is closely linked to economic change (Cater and Jones 1989; Reed and Gill 1997). For example, job loss, population loss, and service loss are attributed to industrial restructuring in a failing economy (Furuseth 1998; Reed 2003). In other places, where economic fortunes may improve, there is the potential for job creation, population increases, and service increases. Specifically given resource employment migration patterns, local populations in resource-dependant places fluctuate with local economic prosperity (Hayter 1979; Halseth 1999). As such, many rural and small town places have to plan for their futures with a changing population structure and social circumstances.

Coupled with economic and social changes, rural and small town places have to consider the role of physical environmental change in their futures, namely climate change (Parkins 2008). Early predictions of climate change on rural areas include changes to traditional activities, population (through changing migration patterns), further restructuring of local economies, natural resource management, and changes to local government systems (through changing taxation structures) (Shackleton and Shackleton 2004; Hunter 2007; Drake 2009). The impact of climate change on local economies, particularly those reliant on climate-sensitive resources, such as agriculture, forestry, and fishing, has the potential to be significant.


2.4 Neoliberalism: Re-Orienting Roles

With increasing global economic interconnectedness since the 1980s, some governments have reformed their political strategies to be more internationally competitive (Amin 1999; Keating 2003). This neoliberal reform is a “political strategy based on deregulation of the economy, privatization, a reduced commitment to social welfare, and a focus on international competitiveness” (Tonts and Haslam-McKenzie 2005, 183) and is occurring internationally. This political strategy has altered the “scale and nature of state intervention across the globe” (Jones et al. 2005, 397) and, as Tonts (1999, 581) argues, “one of the immediate outcomes ... [is] the demise of long-standing interventionist regional development policies in favour of free market forces.”

Following international trends, the Canadian government has reformed its political strategy to increase international economic competitiveness (Polèse 1999; Markey et al. 2008). As discussed above, prior to the 1980s, Canada’s regional development was defined by a Keynesian approach to the planning of public services, with “public planners creating conditions to make private-sector growth more efficient” (Fairbairn 1998, 13). However, with a transition to neoliberalism, centrally coordinated responses to regional economic disparities at the federal and provincial levels began to be phased out in the early 1980s (Markey et al. 2008).

Neoliberalism is defined by state downsizing and placing greater emphasis on the adoption of these roles by individuals and the private sector (Tonts 1999). As Klein et al. (2009, 29) note, “state intervention did not disappear entirely, but the state began assuming more the role of facilitator, or guide than that of initiator.” In rural regional development, this translates into the private sector and individuals assuming roles which
have traditionally been that of the central state. Programs are withdrawn and roles which traditionally defined government involvement in rural regional development are left to individuals and the private sector.

Neoliberalism has been characterized as both a destructive and a creative process. Peck and Tickell (2002, 384) identify ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism as the “active destruction and discreditation of Keynesian-welfarist ... institutions.” Conversely, they argue, the creative side of neoliberalism is the ‘roll-out’ of new state forms which construct and consolidate the neoliberal movement. Thus, ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism is the removal of rural regional development programs and policies which were representative of a Keynesian era while ‘roll-out’ neoliberalism speaks to new social and institutional responses and forms of rural regional development (Markey et al. 2008).

This reorientation of the BC provincial government over time is well-documented (Markey et al. 2008). Following 50 years of government intervention in provincial rural regional development, the current BC Liberal Party has drastically altered the policies, programs, and vision of previous governments (Young and Matthews 2007). Local residents have been creative in filling this gap. In place of government intervention in BC’s rural regional development, voluntary, place-based organizations have emerged to assume the role of development planning (Table 2.5). The state has supported this by ‘rolling-out’ several fragmented programs to facilitate their development.
Table 2.5  Voluntary Rural Regional Development Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Formed</th>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>C-CBAC</td>
<td>To ensure that our communities are economically stable, that there are jobs in all sectors, and support the entrepreneurial spirit that is fundamental to the Cariboo-Chilcotin lifestyle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>OBAC</td>
<td>To make the best of the short-term increase in forestry activity, while at the same time preparing for the future challenges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>16-97 Economic Alliance</td>
<td>To grow and diversify the regional economy of north central BC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2007</td>
<td>Southern Interior Beetle Action Coalition (SIBAC)</td>
<td>To diversify opportunities for the southern interior region in support of long-term sustainability, and a vision of working collectively to accomplish its goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: C-CBAC 2005a, 3; OBAC 2005, np; 16-97 Economic Alliance 2010, np; SIBAC 2010, np.

The academic literature presents two arguments for why senior governments have changed their role with regard to rural regional development planning. First, there have been greater calls for ‘bottom-up’, local representation and control over future development trajectories (MacKinnon 2002; Markey et al. 2005). In this, citizens no longer want government to provide for them, but rather to facilitate them in taking control of their own future development (Bruce 1997). Proponents of this approach argue that the local level needs to be empowered and local capacity needs to be increased. A ‘bottom-up’ approach works to address limitations of previous ‘top-down’ regimes (Herbert-Cheshire 2000; MacKinnon 2002).

Others argue that the central state is vacating its ‘top-down’ role as an organizer of rural regional development (Young and Matthews 2007; Markey et al. 2008). As Polèse (1999, 309) notes, *the author cannot help but feel that ‘local development’, as a policy ideal, is in the end closer to a silent surrender, an implicit admission that the central state really cannot do much about unequal development and regional disparities.*
As some have demonstrated, previous federal policy interventions have not produced satisfactory results for endogenous growth (Savoie 1992; Fairbairn 1998). At times, they have achieved the opposite. Consequently, Polèse suggests that the central state is abandoning this role and relegating it to a more local level. If the central state abandons its involvement with regional development, then the benefits which came from centralized programs, such as large budgets and having access to the policy levers which can affect change, are removed.

2.5 New Regionalism

As the central state plays less of a direct role in regional development and less support is available from ‘above’, places have to address issues of local capacity to adopt new roles (Alpert et al. 2006; Markey et al. 2007). In such a changing world, innovation is key and “new ways of organizing are required to mobilize human, financial, and other resources necessary for facilitating actions across sectors (public, private, non-profit) and communities that share common problems” (Cigler 1999, 87).

Internationally, regions are increasingly important as political, economic, cultural, and social spaces (Storper 1995; Lovering 1999; Keating 2003). As demonstrated above, the region has been a political economic focus in the past, but the region has resurged as the “basis for economic and social life” (Lovering 1999, 383). Economic and political justifications for a new regional approach are related in the literatures and are tied to economic globalization (Wallis 1994b; Kitson et al. 2004).

The new focus on political initiatives to address regional (economic) disparities is particularly demonstrated in the European Union’s (EU) LEADER (Liaison Entre Actions de
Developpement Rural) programs (including LEADER I, LEADER II, and LEADER+) (Ray 2000; Böcher 2008). An innovative policy intervention which provides funding to lagging rural regions, LEADER is targeted at “small, homogenous, socially cohesive [territories], often characterised by common traditions, a local identity, a sense of belonging or common needs and expectations” (European Commission 2006, 8). Though this definition is challenged (cf. Shucksmith 2000), the area-based approach of the program differs from previous sector-based rural development policies and programs which many developed countries have followed (Pérez 2000). Moreover, LEADER is innovative because the state has removed itself as a central actor in regional development and supports local regions to form their own initiatives.

Research on new regionalism argues that that the next rural economies will be more sustainable if they are based upon competitive advantages as compared to comparative advantages (Morgan 2004; Markey et al. 2006; Halseth et al. 2010). Regional approaches of the past were largely based on comparative advantages and occurred in an era of economic growth in manufacturing. A comparative advantage is had when a place can produce something “at the greatest cost or efficiency advantage over others, or for which they have the least disadvantage” (Smith 2000, 102). However, competitive advantages are based upon traditional quantitative factors of economic development (e.g. infrastructure, location) and qualitative factors. Thus, a region is encouraged to determine their place-based specialization founded upon local assets (Kitson et al. 2004; Markey et al. 2009).

Such qualitative factors include innovation, learning, and trust (Kitson et al. 2004; Morgan 2004; Markey et al. 2006; Markey et al. 2008). Unique from previous approaches to
rural regional development, new regionalism promotes partnerships and networks to exchange information about successes and failures so as to create a shared and collective knowledge regarding rural regional development ‘best practices’ (Ray 2000). Trust within the network provides actors with confidence in the reciprocity of information and knowledge sharing (MacKinnon et al. 2002).

However, despite international research and discussion of what will constitute successful regional development in the next rural economies, policy approaches by senior governments must acknowledge the new approach to rural regional development (Drabenstott and Sheaff 2002; Bradford 2005). Policy must support a different type of rural economic growth, whereby rural regions develop their competitive niche in the global markets. Thus, policies must depart from a previous sector-centric focus (e.g. agriculture or other commodity production) and be flexible enough to support multiple economic development strategies (Drabenstott et al. 2004). Policies which recognize new regionalist thinking, as demonstrated in LEADER and others, adopt a place-based policy approach (Halseth et al. 2010). They seek to support networks and partnerships to formulate local and regional processes of social cohesion and social capital. These local processes support innovation, learning, and trust so places can identify locally competitive assets.

2.6 Governance, Social Cohesion, and Social Capital
Research indicates that new ways of governing are required to effectively respond to changing economic, political, social, and physical conditions (Lovering 1999; Drabenstott and Sheaff 2002; Markey et al. 2008). Governance, as compared to government, focuses on wider participation in decision-making, collaboration among stakeholders, networks, and
process, rather than formal structural arrangements and coordinating plans and action (Wallis 1994b, Goodwin 1998; Marsden and Murdoch 1998). As Hamin and Marcucci (2008, 468) argue, in governance, “the official and unofficial networks of power reach beyond government to include civil society.” In this, greater emphasis is placed on the role of networks and trust in the decision-making process (Markey et al. 2008). To understand how social factors contribute to governance and other outcomes, we can look to concepts of social cohesion and social capital (Woolcock and Narayan 2000; Dawe 2004; Wall et al. 2004).

Social cohesion is produced through social interaction and involves the development of feelings of common identity, mutual support, and confidence (Beckley 1994). People in a common situation can learn to identify with one another and support one another’s initiatives (Portes 1998). As Marshall et al. (2003, 177) explain,

[through] regularized contact over time players establish the operating understandings and codes of conduct which expedite negotiation and lead to workable compromises. These attributes constitute vital lubricants in network activity and build strength [and] cohesion.

Thus, social cohesion is produced among a network of people through repetitive interaction where they become familiar with one another and develop a shared sense of norms, values, and expectations.

Social cohesion, then, is an input to the development of social capital. As Reimer (2002, 2) notes, “social cohesion can be used for productive ends, thus providing a form of social capital.” Social capital is the established networks, norms of reciprocity, and trust among a group that govern interaction (Portes 1998; Woolcock 1998; Iyer et al. 2005).
However, such social characteristics “are construed as capital when some transformation takes place ... to create a desired outcome” (Wall et al. 2004, 283).

Putnam (2000) deconstructs the concept of social capital into two forms: bonding and bridging. Bonding social capital has to do with the networks which exist between like-minded people. It tends to occur within groups and its geographic extent is typically localized. Bridging social capital is theorized to involve networks which exist between less like-minded people. It links outsiders to a group and can have a wider reaching geographic extent. Putnam (2000, 22) suggests that both forms of social capital are important, but that bridging social capital is “better for linkage[s] to external assets and ... information diffusion.” As such, bridging social capital is particularly important for economic revitalization as local groups are exposed to external influences. Bridging social capital is also important locally because people may come from diverse backgrounds and need to ‘bridge’ these differences to build networks of reciprocity and trust to achieve goals of economic development.

In concert, social cohesion and social capital work to reduce transaction costs (Magnani and Struffi 2009). They are assets that function as a resource and can be drawn upon to enhance the capacity of place (Reimer 2002; Alpert et al. 2006).

Some research suggests that relational assets, such as social capital, do not just facilitate regional collaboration and development, but may be required for successful organizations (Dawe 2004; Wall et al. 2004; Marshall et al. 2006). Given that existing examples tend to meet and exceed expected economic returns, Marshall et al. (2006) suggest that the future policy environment seems favourable for the types of inter-
municipal cooperation which require social capital. They note that “attributes such as cooperation, trust and openness are critical features underpinning high-performing [regional collaborations]” (Marshall et al. 2006, 241). Hamin and Marcucci (2008, 470) support this, noting that the formation of locally-based governance organizations are much more likely – and are even necessary – for rural places in the future: “a culture of volunteerism combined with suspicion toward and lack of capacity in ... government makes grassroots, community-based approaches both possible and necessary for rural areas.”

Bottom-up, new regional organizations often form in response to change or crisis to their local conditions, particularly in rural areas (Martin 1997; Cigler 1999; Hamin and Marcucci 2008; Larsen 2008). Crises are commonly related to the physical environment (Wallis 1994a). For example, Martin (1997) describes how widespread dryland salinity triggered collaboration in one rural region of Australia. However, economic crises are becoming more common (Penrose et al. 1998; Griffin 2008).

A crisis serves as a ‘catalyzing’ event for an initial group to form quickly to address a specific project or need (Wallis 1994a), but as Wallis (1994b, 294) notes,

> although alliances often form to address a single project or need, there is often a good deal of stability in relationships among participants. Consequently, over a course of decades an alliance may create several different structures to meet specific needs or changing conditions, but the same core of key participants involved in each.

Thus, the institutional structure may be initiated by a crisis, but the legacy of that structure may continue through subsequent events or work proactively to prevent future concerns (Cigler 1999).

Such ‘bottom-up’ or grassroots organizations can benefit rural regional development. Their network-based structure allows for greater flexibility and
“responsiveness to variable conditions on the ground” (Turok 2004, 1072), wider participation encourages “decentralized, participatory, and consensus-based problem-solving arrangements” (Bidwell and Ryan 2006, 827), and their self-organization provides a sense of autonomy and discretion over their own affairs (O’Toole and Burdess 2004). Place-based policy approaches support such organizations to form and address the range of changes associated with economic, social, and political restructuring. Moreover, place-based policy provides for an equitable response to such restructuring, as best-suited for the given locale (Bradford 2005).

However, such organizations are also faced with a number of challenges. Often, groups are self-appointed and this challenges the legitimacy and accountability of the organization (Rhodes 1996; Alpert et al. 2006; Brown 2008). Given self-appointment, there are also concerns with exclusion from decision-making structures (Wallis and Dollery 2002; Lockwood et al. 2009). Exclusion from a self-appointed organization can also be explained using the concept of social capital. As networks and trust may exist among one group of individuals, trust may be so strong that it excludes others (Portes 1998; Sibley 1998; Woolcock 1998). In such a case, bonding social capital prevents the development of bridging social capital. The lack of permeability into this group can then inhibit change and innovation (Magnani and Struffi 2009).

Another challenge is the concern for insufficient jurisdiction, power, or resources devolved to the organization (Wilson 2004; Parkins 2008; Lockwood et al. 2009). Smyth et al. (2004, 603) note that, despite theoretical stances, “in practice, decentralized policy approaches often reveal very little real decentralization of power and resources.” Finally, it
can be challenging for rural and small town places to collaborate with one another (Markey et al. 2009). As Freshwater (2004, 5) notes: “traditionally, rural places viewed their immediate neighbours as being their main competition, not their partners.” Moreover, as Kennedy (2005, 55) has observed in the context of northern BC, municipalities only often cooperate for “pragmatic, issue-specific, and localized” reasons.

2.7 Neoliberalism and New Regionalism in Northern BC

While municipalities in northern BC have cooperated on pragmatic matters, past efforts at more significant regional cooperation often deteriorated to inter-municipal competition. For example, attempts at inter-municipal cooperation in the past “tended to undermine their own [collective] lobbying by intense rivalries and competition between sub-regions and communities” (Kennedy 2005, 56). However, there is indication that this “culture of opposition” (Kennedy 2005, 56) is changing in response to the increasing role local governments are playing in regional development.

In northern BC, many rural and small town places are reacting as the provincial government retracts from assisting with rural regional development (Markey et al. 2009; Young and Matthews 2007). Shared experiences bind these places together, including those with previous provincial policies surrounding rural regional development and now a feeling of being ‘on their own’ with less support (Markey et al. 2006). A collective frustration with federal and provincial development policies and programs acts to unify these places “against a larger ‘foe’” (Markey et al. 2007, 69). As such, many rural and small town places in northern BC are recognizing their similarities and the potential benefit in regional collaboration to collectively respond to new challenges.
Potentially fuelling the current regional movement in northern BC are the lessons of regionalism learned from other places (Markey et al. 2009). For example, ‘economic clusters’ are encouraged by government-sponsored reports for development in areas outside of metropolitan BC. As Edgington (2004, 311) notes, such reports call for “more effective deployment of a full range of regional resources and attributes, including human, social, cultural and infrastructure capital.” Thus, there may be opportunity to experience the benefits of regional collective action in northern BC – particularly given the regional efforts (and successes) of many international competitors (Alberta Economic Development 2005; Markey et al. 2009).

Beyond economic motivations, residents of northern BC are drawn to the notion that development is socially embedded (Markey et al. 2009). A perceived collective history exists among rural residents in many places and this is commonly tied to the land, the landscape, and local environmental and industrial history and practices (Hamin and Marcucci 2008). In northern BC, a perceived sense of shared history exists – one of living in a more remote environment which calls for greater cooperation for survival. This collective history binds places socially, and this cooperation should be foundational to future northern development as places work to determine their competitive advantages (Markey et al. 2009).

2.8 Conclusion

Local actors can draw on relational assets to address issues which affect local conditions. The inclusion of state and non-state actors may represent new social and institutional responses to changing economic and political situations. Such organizations can
be examined through the lens of new regionalism to understand how it is expressed in place.

Therefore, this thesis will examine how one contemporary rural regional development approach may or may not be representative of Canadian dominant trends. The thesis will also explore the role of various factors in the formation of one particular governance organization, C-CBAC. Factors include macro-political-economic changes through neoliberalism, the role of local social assets of social cohesion and social capital, and the role of the MPB epidemic.
Chapter 3 Methodology and Methods

3.1 Introduction
Discussion of research methods demonstrates transparency in, and contributes to the rigour of, the research process (Mansvelt and Berg 2005). Moreover, it provides grounds for research evaluation, highlighting the strengths and limitations of the process (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Bailey et al. 1999). This chapter is an overview of the methodology and methods used to examine the changing governance of regional development and factors which influenced C-CBAC’s formation.

The chapter is organized into five sections. Following this introduction, the second section touches on my methodological approach. The third section discusses data collection mechanics, specifically addressing field work, and primary and secondary data collection. The fourth section outlines methods of data analysis and the fifth section addresses rigour in the research process. The chapter concludes with a summary.

3.2 Methodology
Ontology is how one believes the world to operate (Winchester 2005). A researcher’s ontology contributes to the establishment of the research framework and shapes the methods used. My personal belief is that much of what we know is shaped by social definition. I believe that we can only understand social phenomena through how they are represented by people (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Thus, individual experiences lead to multiple versions of reality, or how people believe the world to be ‘true.’
My belief of how the world operates accepts the use of qualitative research to understand pluralistic and negotiated truths (Guba and Lincoln 2004). As Denzin and Lincoln (2005, 10) note, “qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality.” One of the strengths of qualitative research is that it can allow for greater understanding of complex nuances in attitudes and behaviours. It is argued to emphasize “the study of natural real-life settings, a focus on participants’ meanings and context, ... open-ended data collection, [and] analytical strategies that retain the contextual nature of the data” (Maxwell and Loomis 2003, 250). As such, it is the intent of this research to give a rich and in-depth description about the experiences of a sample population.

3.3 Methods

This thesis is a single-case study; a detailed examination of a single example which “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context” (Yin 2003, 13). Case studies have two principal benefits. First, they allow for the investigation of complex relationships with multiple sources of evidence. Thus, a case study is complementary to qualitative research. Second, they allow the researcher to contextualize the circumstances of a single example in larger theoretical generalizations (Yin 2003). However, as with qualitative methods in general, case studies cannot produce statistical generalizations (Patton 1990; Dunn 2005; Flyvberg 2006). A single-case study is commonly used to allow the researcher to focus on the holistic situation of a specific example to seek a deeper understanding of the issues. In this situation, the single-case can determine the applicability of theoretical propositions or if an alternate explanation may be more relevant.
As with many case studies, multiple methods of data collection are used in this thesis (Yin 2003). Different methods illicit different information and results can be complementary in the research process (Schoenberger 1991; Babbie 2004). For example, demographic statistics, meeting minutes, newsletters, and policy documentation are used in concert with qualitative information from the interviews to develop a more comprehensive understanding of processes in place. Different methods can be brought together using method triangulation, which will be discussed below (Baxter and Eyles 1997).

However, the use of quantitative and qualitative data in concert is contested in the methodological literature (Guba and Lincoln 2004). A common argument is that the “research methods are permanently rooted in epistemological and ontological commitments” and that the two are in opposition to one another (Bryman and Teevan 2005, 322). However, Yin (2003, 15) states that “case studies can be based on any mix of quantitative and qualitative evidence.” Moreover, Bryman and Teevan (2005, 322) note that different methods “are capable of being put to a wide variety of tasks” depending on the theoretical stance of the researcher. As such, I recognize the compatibility debate in the methodological literature, but have chosen to use quantitative data in conjunction with my qualitative data to provide a “context that amplifies and enriches” derived meanings (Schoenberger 1991, 181).

3.3.1 Primary Data Collection

3.3.1.1 ‘The Field’
Primary data were collected from the field. ‘The field’ is a demarcated spatial and temporal entity defined by researchers as their site of inquiry. This site is “artificial in its
separations from a geographical space and flow of time” (Katz 1994, 67). As such, research results are a suspended ‘snapshot’ of one place at a specific time. However, field work was chosen as a research component because “field research is especially effective for studying the subtle nuances in attitudes and behaviors” (Babbie 2004, 307). By having a personal presence in the field, and by doing a single-case study, I was able to gain greater depth of understanding of these nuances, and therefore increase the validity of my research (Babbie 2004).

Field research was undertaken in the incorporated municipalities, unincorporated settlements, and Indian Reserves of the Cariboo-Chilcotin region (see Chapter 4). I was present for 29 days between 27 April and 27 June 2008. Primary data were collected through interviews, observing, and field notes. Each is discussed below.

3.3.1.2 Power Relations in Field Research
Power imbalances can affect data and data collection (Clifford 1986). As a young female conducting research in a typically male dominated domain of politics and regional industries, where participants hold relatively high societal positions, I was particularly concerned with asymmetrical power relations (Dahl 1968; Shoenberger 1991). Asymmetrical power relationships exist when “those being studied are in positions of influence in comparison to the researcher” (Dowling 2005, 25). However, at times, my university education seemed to initially intimidate some participants. This was resolved by adopting a supplicant position (McDowell 1992). In this position, the researcher “explicitly acknowledges her/his reliance on the research subject to provide insight into the subtle nuances of meaning that structure and shape everyday lives” and fieldwork is “predicated
upon an unequivocal acceptance that the knowledge of the person being researched (at
least regarding the particular questions being asked) is greater than that of the researcher”
(England 1994, 82). In this position, the researcher is “requesting time and expertise from
the powerful, with little to offer in return” (McDowell 1992, 213). By adopting this position,
I was able to put some participants more at ease.

Power relations are also impacted by the researcher’s relative insider or outsider
position to research participants (Dowling 2005). An insider is similar to, and accepted by,
participants. Conversely, an outsider is less similar, and may not be accepted by,
participants (Lofland and Lofland 1995; Acker 2000). Some argue that an insider has greater
contextual knowledge, access, and opportunities, which “facilitate[s] access to the
participants, rapport in the interviews, analysis of the data and communication of the
results” (Acker 2000, 189). However, it is also argued that outsiders have different strategic
advantages. For example, not being more socially connected to one group over another
gives the researcher ‘space’ to move between and associate with different social factions in
a given place (Lofland and Lofland 1995). Also, participants may make more of an effort to
articulate concepts more clearly to an outsider and an outsider is less likely to take everyday
features of social life for granted in the unfamiliar setting (Acker 2000; Dowling 2005).

In this research, I was an outsider because I do not live in the Cariboo-Chilcotin.
However, feelings of ‘being outside’ varied depending on the situation and how much I had
in common with those around me (Naples 1996). For example, my personal characteristics
of being white, middle class, and having an interest in the future development of rural and
small town places let me be less of an outsider to many participants, as they can hold
similar societal positions and interests (Schoenberger 1991). Additionally, when interviewing participants who had not lived in the region for a long time, they commented to me that they were considered an outsider within the region because “I do not have a 100 year history here” (Interview 31). As such, at times my status of not living in the region gave me a dimension upon which I was more of an insider with some participants.

Having a limited understanding of First Nation cultures and practices made me more of an outsider when interacting with First Nation participants. This manifested itself during the interviewing process. For example, I was not able to fully comprehend the attachments (personal, familial, cultural, spiritual, etc.) to place that one individual was trying to explain to me. The participant’s family has lived in the same place for generations and is committed to continue to live in the same place for future generations; this commitment impacted how they perceived regional development and I was challenged to consider this perspective. My experiences of interviewing First Nations will be discussed in greater detail below.

3.3.1.3 Interviewing

While in the field, I conducted 47 personal, semi-structured interviews with 50 participants. As a method of data collection, personal interviewing has many strengths. As Schoenberger (1991, 188) notes, “the richness of detail and historical complexity that can be derived from an interview-based approach allows one to reconstruct a coherent representation of how and why particular phenomena came to be.” Personal interviews were chosen for this research because of the potential for in-depth information. The interviewer can encourage elaboration through probes, offer clarification to questions, seek
clarification to responses, and observe and record non-verbal communication (Johnson and Turner 2003; Babbie 2004; Dunn 2005).

Personal interviews, however, can be limiting because they are expensive, time consuming, and the results are not generalizable to larger populations (Clifford 1986). For this research, the interviewing process was time consuming. The average interview was 61 minutes in length, ranging from 33 minutes to 85 minutes. In addition to the direct time spent in each interview, there was the process of seeking, contacting, and scheduling with each participant and then traveling for each interview. The interviewing process overall was the largest time commitment in data collection and fundamentally consumed the entire field work budget and time in the field.

Understanding the subject at hand in an interview setting is a negotiation between the interviewer and the participant (McDowell 1992; England 1994; Dowling 2005). The accuracy of this understanding is related to the validity of the research results (Babbie 2004). It can only be assumed that interview questions (and responses) are interpreted as intended, but measures can be taken to improve the likelihood of this, such as pretesting the interview guide. However, nothing can “uncover all possible misunderstandings” (Schoenberger 1991, 181). In attempt to address interpretation challenges, the interview guide was pretested in two separate interview settings with non-participating informants. Feedback was obtained on interpretation, content, and flow.

Semi-structured interviewing allows a predetermined set of topics and questions to be asked consistently in each interview (Dunn 2005). Also, this method offers flexibility in the order of which questions are addressed. This allowed various topics to be covered more
naturally. It also provided the opportunity for unanticipated topics to emerge and to follow these leads (Schoenberger 1991). However, the flexibility offered in this method can reduce the comparability between participants (Bernard 2000). Due to time limitations, not all organizations in which the participants were involved were addressed in the interview. Moreover, not all sections of the interview guide were addressed in each interview. There were some analytical challenges in comparability between interviews because not every participant was asked every question in the interview guide; however, this method was still preferred because the breadth of responses and topic areas provided rich data.

Open-ended questions were used for the entire interview guide because they provide the space and time to reveal potentially rich data and respondents can use their own words to emphasize elements which are most important to them (Schoenberger 1991; Babbie 2004). However, the interviewing literature notes that open-ended questions can be challenging to analyze because responses are not necessarily compatible or consistent between participants (McGuirk and O’Neill 2005). Despite potential analytical challenges, in-depth responses in the participant’s own terms that emphasize elements most important to them make open-ended questions well-suited to my ontology and the aims of this research.

Prior to beginning field work, the interview guide and consent form were approved by the Research Ethics Board at UNBC (Appendix A). Interviews took place in locations chosen by the participant, provided that my safety was secure. Having the participant self-select the location was strategic to help them feel more comfortable with the intent to facilitate the ease of the conversation (Dunn 2005). I reviewed the consent form with each
participant before starting the formal interview (Appendix B). Each participant kept a signed copy of the consent form and I will retain a copy until the completion of this thesis. As part of the consent form, participants were asked if the interview could be audio recorded using a small digital recorder. Having an audio recording of the meeting helped to ensure that the fullest amount of detail was extracted from the meeting (Dunn 2005). This also allowed me to be more attentive to the participant and the conversations. Most participants (47/50) permitted the recording. Recognizing that participants may be somewhat uncomfortable with the recording device because “[it] serves as a reminder of the formal situation of the interview” (Dunn 2005, 95), I was conscientious of the need to help participants feel more relaxed. The recorder was usually placed out of the direct visual field of the participant and minimized my own reactions to the recorder; lots of positive reinforcement, eye contact, and great attentiveness to the individual were given (Bernard 2000). Participants also had the opportunity to review the notes taken from our conversation (see below).

The interview guide is comprised of five sections (Appendix C). Question order within the guide was carefully considered to maximize the opportunity to build rapport with the participant (Dunn 2005). As such, a funneling technique was employed whereby more sensitive questions were reserved for later in the interview. Recognizing the potential sensitivity around asking about personal and professional relationships in governance situations, funneling allowed us to develop rapport such that the participant may be more willing to share sensitive information (Schoenberger 1991). However, I recognize that I was only told a portion of what I was asking about because, as Price (1983) notes, “knowledge is
power, and that one must never reveal all of what one knows” (as quoted in Clifford 1986, 7).

I feel that I was able to achieve a level of trust with most participants, with the notable exception of some First Nation participants; the same questions did not elicit as much of an ‘open’ response with this segment of the sampling frame. For example, in one interview, a question was asked and the initial response was probed further, but the participant firmly stated that they would not elaborate. This same situation happened in four interviews, three of which were with participants associated with a First Nations group or organization. Upon reflection, I realize that cultural differences between myself and First Nation participants were not fully appreciated in the design of the interview guide and interviewing methods. Expectations and assumptions were made based on the expected homogeneity of participants; the guide and methods were not responsive to cultural differences among participants (Tuhiwai Smith 1999).

Interview summary notes were sent to all participants once they were drafted. Interview summaries are a record of the interview in which I eliminated false starts and corrected for grammar (Dunn 2005). Summary notes were produced and provided to participants rather than a transcript because I wanted participant checking to improve the quality of my record, while recognizing the “political effects of exact transcription” (Dunn 2005, 99). When participants read their own words, there can be feelings of embarrassment or self-censorship around articulation, grammar, repetition, and hesitancy, potentially resulting in participants withdrawing their interview. Participants were invited to correct any errors, omit information, or add information. In addition, this gave me the opportunity
to communicate any questions I had about the interview notes. Over one-third of all participants (17/50) offered a response to participant checking. Of the 17 I heard back from, nine offered no comments, five deleted or omitted details, four made minor corrections (e.g. dates of involvement altered), and two added information. No major changes were noted by any participant.² I also took the opportunity to seek clarification on some points which were vague or confusing from our original conversation. In total, 18 participants were asked for further clarification on at least one point in the interview summary notes. Of those asked, one-third (6/18) responded to requests for further detail. Generally, participants expressed that they welcomed the opportunity to review the interview summaries. Verified summaries were used in analysis.

To gain insight to the central research questions, I wanted to seek the perspectives of individuals involved and not involved in regional collaborations and regional development in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, currently and in the past. Participants who had been involved with previous regional collaborations could offer first-hand experiences of being included in regional planning processes. They could speak to issues of working together. Participants who had not been involved with previous regional collaborations could provide the perspective of someone who has not been invested in regional planning processes. Thus, they could offer a different perspective on the same situations. The two perspectives could be compared to one another in analysis and through triangulation. This would be a form of negative case testing (Berg 1989).

² Numbers add to more than the total because some participants did more than one correction. For example, one participant deleted some information and made additions.
However, I had to select a subset of all decision-makers in the Cariboo-Chilcotin because enumeration of them all is beyond the manageable scope of this thesis. As such, I employed purposive stratified sampling, a non-probability sampling method. This method used personal judgment in selecting participants (Schoenberger 1991; Babbie 2004). This sampling method is appropriate for qualitative research, particularly when seeking information-rich cases (Patton 1990; Babbie 2004) and was most applicable for this research because participants could speak intimately about the regional organizations and processes under investigation. However, I acknowledge that this sampling method limits results since they are not representative of a larger population (Babbie 2004).

To select participants, I developed a sampling frame (Babbie 2004). Prior to the selection process, I determined that I wanted to explore by geography and sectoral involvement. So, in the sampling frame, I sought representation from across the region and across various sectors and interest groups. To facilitate meeting these objectives, I developed a stratified sampling frame using these variables (Table D.1). Once the frame was established, I filled in the matrix with names of potential interviewees. Names were sought through reading meeting notes, public documentation, and by consulting organization-specific websites.

However, prior to fully developing the sampling frame, I began interviewing based on convenience. As such, some sectors in the resulting sampling frame are oversampled. Geographically speaking, the Central Cariboo is overrepresented, leaving the South Cariboo and the Chilcotin relatively underrepresented (Table 3.1). However, representation of those who live in rural areas and urban areas is fairly close (Table 3.2). With regards to sector
representation, government (elected and staff) is overrepresented and First Nations are relatively underrepresented (Table 3.3). This will bias the results, which may favour a non-First Nations government perspective from the North and Central Cariboo sub-regions.
Table 3.1  Sample Frame: Sub-Regional Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-region</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reserve</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Mile House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reserve</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilcotin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2  Sample Frame: Urban/Rural Representation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban/Rural</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Urban'</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Mile House</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Rural'</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Regional District</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Reserve</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>50</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3 Sample Frame: ‘Sector’ Participants

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Sector</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal – elected</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal – staff</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional – elected</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial – elected</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional – staff</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Development Centre</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic/business development</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamber of Commerce</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Futures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment/conservation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour (organized)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<td><strong>Industry</strong></td>
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<td>27.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minor licensees</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Nations</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Council – staff</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band – elected</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tribal Council – elected</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>58(^1)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^1\)Six participants identified with two sectors (e.g. an individual is associated with an industry, and is an elected local representative). One participant identified with three ‘sectors.’
Stratified sampling is advantageous because it seeks to ensure representation across variables (Babbie 2004); however, the fulfillment of this frame was challenging in practice. I faced limitations of time, money, and access. Moreover, assumptions made in the sampling frame construction posed limitations. Methodologically, this sampling method assumes that subsets are discrete (Babbie 2004). However, categories were not discrete given the generalist practices and involvement of many rural residents (Fitchen 1991). I found that some individuals were able to fulfill more than one ‘box’ across the sector variable. Operationally, I also found that there were not always participants in each sub-region from each sector. For example, one central office may serve two sub-regions of the Cariboo-Chilcotin. As such, the sampling frame was not completely filled as expected (Table D.2). This sampling method also assumes that subsets are homogenous, but, varying levels of commonalities and segmentation exist among the subsets (Bryant 1995). As such, these results are only representative of the specific collection of interviews in this thesis.

### 3.3.1.4 Observations and Field Notes

While in the field, I attended public gatherings and meetings to immerse myself in local activities and to increase my visibility (Babbie 2004); this included farmer’s markets, a Council meeting, the unveiling of a local monument, and a public meeting to discuss issues of local importance in the upcoming local government elections. I also attended one invitation-only meeting on social development concerns, where I was invited to present my research topic. Some of these gatherings and meetings were more relevant to the research objectives than others. For example, I was not guaranteed to run into regional decision-makers at farmer’s markets. Despite this, I chose to attend to get a better ‘feel’ for the local
sense of community. In all situations, my role as a researcher was made transparent and I did not participate as a contributing member of any group (Babbie 2004).

As a data collection method, observation has many benefits. Specifically for this thesis, the opportunity to gain complementary evidence was the most beneficial. I was able to “gather additional descriptive information ... during ... other more structured forms of data collection” (Kearns 2005, 193). I could then compare the experiences that I was hearing about in the interviews to what I was seeing ‘on the ground.’ The experiences gave me knowledge upon which I could ask more probing questions in interviews. Moreover, the experiences gave me the opportunity to say “I was there” in interviews and potentially more of an insider status in some situations. My experiences were recorded in field notes (discussed below).

In observation, the presence of a researcher has the potential to impact the situation to some degree. For example, those who are being observed may self-censor (Babbie 2004). However, by adopting the position of non-participant observer, I avoided direct interference in the process (Babbie 2004). In most meetings and gatherings, I did not notice how, if at all, my presence impacted the situation. Most gatherings had a lot of people and my clothing was similar (Kearns 2005). However, in observing the Council meeting of one municipality, my presence impacted the situation. I was one of two audience members and my presence seemed to break the concentration of the Mayor who kept looking at me. Given that it was early in my time in the field, I expect that the individual was questioning who I was and my reason for being there.
Field notes were used extensively to document my experiences of ‘being there’ (Geertz 1988). Each day I made notes about interviews (e.g. nonverbal communication, gained insights, ‘off the record’ commentary), ‘everyday’ interactions with non-participants (e.g. what the ‘word on the street’ seemed to be), empirical observations (e.g. what I physically saw), and the research process (e.g. were interview questions being interpreted as I had intended?). These provide an extensive record of my experiences and observations while in the field (Babbie 2004). Beyond having a good record of experiences, field notes encouraged me to be critically reflexive about my research, positionality, and research limitations, which helped me to adjust the work accordingly (England 1994). Field notes were referred to during analysis.

3.3.2 Secondary Data Collection

Secondary data were sought to corroborate information from interviews, fill information gaps, and provide clarification where contradictions existed in the interviews (Johnson and Turner 2003; Kindon 2005). It was an inexpensive way of learning about previous processes; the information was particularly important in establishing timelines of previous processes. Given my inquiry about events and processes which happened up to 15 years prior, some participants had a hard time recalling timelines. Recollection errors are common when interviewing about past events and the researcher has to be aware of forward telescoping; “when someone reports that something happened a month ago when it really happened two months ago” (Bernard 2000, 217). Secondary sources can be particularly advantageous because there is no opportunity for the researcher to impact this data (Johnson and Turner 2003). However, caution has to be exercised because the
publications and notes were recorded for the purposes of the author, and not to fulfill the specific aims of this research (Johnson and Turner 2003).

Documentation from regional processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin was accessed for this thesis. Authors included organizations from within, and external to, the region. To obtain this information, I searched libraries prior to field work to obtain what information I could. When in the field, I searched local libraries to make sure I had considered most local works. I also obtained personal meeting minute collections from two participants involved with past organizations. Another two participants had reports that they thought would be of importance to my work and arranged for me to obtain copies. The Internet was also searched extensively for information relating to previous processes.

3.4 Data Analysis
Prior to beginning analysis, data were reduced to focus on the research questions (Sherry 2004). An extensive list of possible regional organizations emerged in discussions (Appendix E), but many were excluded from direct analysis based on at least one of three qualifications. First, the geographic boundaries do not align with those of the case study (e.g. the South Cariboo Community Planning Council focuses only on the South Cariboo). Second, the organization’s mandate does not address area-based development (e.g. the Cariboo-Chilcotin-Coast Tourism Association focuses on sector-specific development). Third, the organization does not employ a model of governance which seeks the inclusion of government and non-government organizations, including the not-for-profit sector (e.g. the CRD is governed by an elected, legislated body).
My goal in analysis was to develop a close relationship with the interview data (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Bailey et al. 1999). To achieve this, multiple rounds of content analysis were conducted to determine patterns in the data. This method allows for the analysis of recorded human communications through the investigation of two specific types of content: manifest and latent (Babbie 2004). Manifest content is the explicit use of language – the “visible, surface content” of words (Dunn 2005, 100). The process of manifest content analysis entails counting word and word-pair frequencies in the text. Latent content is the inferred or underlying meaning of the text. The process of latent content analysis involves the systematic coding of data “into categories that facilitate the comparison of data within and between ... categories” (Maxwell 1996, 78). Concepts can then be linked to broader themes and the relationships between themes can be better understood.

As an analytic method, content analysis is advantageous because data are not changed in the process. Thus, the process can be repeated to check for consistency (Babbie 2004). Also, the method is not expensive; it does not require software. However, a limitation to this method in this thesis is that data were analyzed by only one person (Cope 2005). To overcome challenges of having data analyzed by only one person, I conducted multiple iterations of data analysis and had participants review their interview summary notes.

3.4.1 Manifest Content Analysis
Two complete rounds of manifest content analysis were conducted. In the first round, a list of words and word-pairs was generated. These words and word-pairs seemed
to be of importance according to the literature and my experiences in the field. For example, terms that participants seemed to use a lot were included. The first list contained 549[^3] words and word-pairs (Appendix F).

In the second round, occurrences of words and word-pairs in all interviews were counted. To do this, terms were physically highlighted and tallied. After having counted terms through all interviews, like-terms and words/word-pairs with the same root word were grouped and occurrence counts were combined. For example, the terms ‘Aboriginal’, ‘First Nation’, ‘Indian’, and ‘Native’ were combined. After this, ‘government’ had the greatest number of occurrences once all types of government were considered (‘federal’, ‘provincial’, ‘senior levels’, ‘regional’, ‘local’, and ‘municipal’). On the opposite end of the spectrum, 111 words had only one occurrence each in the interview summary notes.

The process of manifest content analysis made me look more objectively at the interview content. In this, some of the anecdotal assumptions I had developed while in the field were lost. Manifest content analysis increased the reliability of the concepts and themes for latent content analysis.

3.4.2 Latent Content Analysis

Three rounds of latent content analysis were conducted. Prior to beginning the first round, I brainstormed a list of concepts (themes) which came across from my field notes. To this list, concepts deduced from the literature were added. The first round of latent content analysis produced more concepts which were added to the list. Initially, an issue or idea was attributed to be a concept of importance if it was something repeated through different

[^3]: This number is high because I did not condense words to root words. For example, ‘participated’ was initially recorded as being a different word from ‘participating.’
interviews – a recurring idea or issue. After the list was complete, codes were developed for the different concepts (themes) (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Codes were then tested against manifest content analysis results; some were expanded upon and others were refined.

After a few weeks away from the data, I started the second round of latent content analysis. This began with reading and coding interview data according to codes from the first round. After reading through the text once, I employed concept mapping to understand linkages between themes. Concept mapping is used to learn relationships between concepts by arranging them visually (Babbie 2004). In this, all themes from my analysis were sketched onto paper while drawing linkages where necessary to understand relationships between (or not between) concepts. Through concept mapping, it was determined which concepts were related strongly enough to follow in subsequent analytical rounds. As such, some themes were expanded upon, others were refined, and those with no further support were eliminated. The result was a more refined list of themes (Appendix G).

In the third round of latent content analysis, interview summaries were re-read. Kirby and McKenna (1989, 135) note that, “to do analysis, the data must be divided into portions that are manageable.” Thus, when data were coded in this round, a code was applied to each bibbit. A bibbit is a “piece, snippet or bite of information” (Kirby and McKenna 1989, 135). Each bibbit was organized by theme in a separate digital file, a ‘theme file.’ Sometimes, one bibbit spoke to more than one theme. In this case, it was recorded in all relevant theme files. All bibbits within a theme were re-read to understand dimensions that exist within that theme. A dimension is comprised of a group of related bibbits (Kirby
and McKenna 1989). For example, within the theme Autonomy, participants tended to indicate if they favoured the approach by the current provincial government, or not. In this case, a dimension within the theme of Autonomy was Participant Preference. Also from the theme files, bibbits were organized according to the sampling frame to determine if patterns existed across or within sampling characteristics.

From the multiple rounds of content analysis, three macro-themes emerged:

1) the role of autonomy in rural regional development decision-making,

2) factors which facilitated the formation of C-CBAC, and

3) factors which hindered the formation of C-CBAC.

Each is discussed in depth in Chapter Five. However, it is important to note that, despite each being described independently, themes are not independent of one another. Instead, they describe processes which occur concurrently. They are artificially extracted for the purposes of detailed examination and analysis. Themes are integrated in Chapter Six because, at times, each theme is better understood in contrast to, or coupled with, others.

3.5 Ensuring Rigour

To demonstrate rigour in this research, reliability and validity were assessed in method-related decisions through the research process (Baxter and Eyles 1997; Long and Johnson 2000). Reliability refers to the extent to which results are consistent and reproducible (Dunn 2005). Measures taken to address the reliability of research results include standardized questions asked in the interviews, replication of manifest and latent content analysis processes, and recording each step of the research process in a process file (Kirby and McKenna 1989; Long and Johnson 2000). Finally, data from interviewing,
observation, field notes, and all secondary sources were compared and contrasted against one another in method triangulation (Baxter and Eyles 1997).

Validity refers to the accuracy of the findings (Dunn 2005). Validity is further considered in terms of internal and external validity. Internal validity refers to confidence in research which considers casual relationships (Johnson 1997; Yegidis et al. 1999; Yin 2003). Given that this research seeks to understand factors which in-effect led to the development of an organization, measures taken to address the internal validity of research results included interview guide pretests, participant-review of interview summary notes prior to analysis, and a fairly large sample size (Babbie 2004; Dunn 2005).

External validity refers to “the extent to which findings are believed to apply beyond cases that were actually studied” (Yegidis et al. 1999, 120). Assessment of external validity in case studies is of particular importance (Yin 2003). The situations reported are unique to participants interviewed in this case study. I do not assume that these findings are representative of participants not interviewed or regions not studied. As Yegidis et al. (1999, 139) note, “case studies make it possible to achieve insights” however, “a case study does not allow the researcher to generalize ... [to do so] would be presumptuous.” As such, the findings of this thesis pertain only to those who were interviewed.

In method triangulation, findings from different methods of data collection are juxtaposed with one another to test the findings. Because each method has its own strengths and weaknesses, method triangulation is an attempt to ensure that findings do not reflect a single method of inquiry (Babbie 2004; Long and Johnson 2000). By using
method triangulation, rigour and depth are added to the research (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).

3.6 Conclusion

This thesis is a qualitative case study which draws heavily on semi-structured interviews to explore factors which impacted the formation of rural regional development organizations and processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. Forty-seven interviews were conducted in May and June 2008. Interview data were analyzed using manifest and latent content analysis methods. In addition to interviews, other primary and secondary data were used to corroborate and challenge results through method triangulation. By combining qualitative results from interview data with information from other primary and secondary sources about regional processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, insight was gained into issues which face the changing governance of regional development in this rural area. Results are discussed in Chapter Five and their theoretical implications are discussed in Chapter Six. Steps were taken through the research process to ensure rigour and to increase confidence in the findings.
4.1 Introduction
The Cariboo-Chilcotin is the study area for this thesis. This chapter introduces the region so as to understand the contemporary governance of its rural regional development. To achieve this, the chapter is organized into seven sections. Following this introduction, I discuss study area boundaries, the region's population and economy characteristics, and the various local governments in the region, including municipal, regional, and First Nations. The chapter also presents a brief history of regional planning processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin and how they have worked to guide land use, economic, and development.

4.2 Study Boundaries
The Cariboo-Chilcotin is located in the southern interior of BC and is roughly bisected by the Fraser River. To the west of the Fraser River is the 'Chilcotin', bounded to the west by the Coast Mountains. To the east of the Fraser River is the 'Cariboo', bounded to the east by the Cariboo Mountains (BC Commission on Resources and Environment (CORE) 1994b). Locally, residents refer to three sub-regions within the Cariboo: the North Cariboo (Quesnel and area), the Central Cariboo (Williams Lake and area), and the South Cariboo (100 Mile House and area).

This thesis adopts the geographic boundaries of C-CBAC\textsuperscript{4} to define the case study area (Figure 4.1). However, the boundaries of the CRD – a political unit – will be employed to describe the Cariboo-Chilcotin region due to data availability. The C-CBAC area is larger

\textsuperscript{4} C-CBAC adopted the boundaries of the C-CLUP (C-CBAC 2005a). C-CLUP adopted the boundaries of the Cariboo Forest Region in the early 1990s (CCC 1995a).
than the CRD area (Table 4.1). Also, the C-CBAC area includes five municipalities, while the 
CRD includes four municipalities (Table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4.1 Member Municipalities: CRD and C-CBAC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member Municipalities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Mile House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Cariboo Communities Coalition (CCC) 1995b, 6; Statistics Canada 2006b.
Figure 4.1  C-CBAC Boundaries

Legend
- Highways
- BC Parks
- C-CBAC Area

Map Credit: Jennifer Herkes 2010
4.3 Regional Population

There are four municipalities, 12 electoral areas, and 15 First Nation Bands in the CRD, with a total population of over 62,000 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) 2002; Statistics Canada 2006b). However, the population is not evenly distributed across the region. Urban areas tend to have greater populations, while the rural areas tend to have lower populations spread over larger areas. Williams Lake has the largest municipal population, followed by Quesnel (Table 4.3). Rural electoral areas adjacent to municipalities tend to be more densely populated than more remote electoral areas (Table 4.3). For example, Electoral Area A (Red Bluff), just south of Quesnel, is the smallest geographic electoral area (783 km$^2$), yet has the largest population (nearly 6,000). Bish and Clemens (2008) note that this situation can result in concerns with ‘free riders’, whereby municipal services and infrastructure are used by those who do not contribute to these through property taxation.

The CRD experienced relative growth in its total population until 1996 (Table 4.2). However, since 1996, the total population has declined. Between 2001 and 2006, the CRD experienced its greatest relative loss of population in recent history (5.3%), despite a slight increase in jurisdictional land area. However, population loss is not uniform across the region; it is greatest in rural areas (Table 4.3). Between 2001 and 2006, eleven of the twelve electoral areas experienced population decline with an average of -8.7%. During this time, urban population loss was greatest in Quesnel. However, 100 Mile House’s population increased by over 8%.

Determining Aboriginal population trends in the Cariboo-Chilcotin is challenging due to limited data availability (Table 4.3). However, among the eight Indian Reserves which
reported consistently in the data collection period, four experienced population increases and four experienced population decreases. While population decreases on Indian Reserves were lower on average (-7.5%) than the CRD’s electoral areas, Indian Reserves experienced much higher population increases than electoral areas or municipalities. The average population increase on Indian Reserves in the Cariboo-Chilcotin was 18.5%, with the highest population increase in Tl'etinqox-t'in (36.3%). This overall average increase supports other findings that Aboriginal population in BC is experiencing strong growth (BC Housing 2008).

Table 4.2 CRD Population, 1976-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Population Change (%)</th>
<th>Total Land Area (km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976¹, ²</td>
<td>51,616¹</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>69,168.9²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981³</td>
<td>59,252</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>69,168.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986⁴</td>
<td>59,495</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>69,168.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991⁵</td>
<td>61,059</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>69,168.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996⁶</td>
<td>66,475</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>69,168.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001⁷</td>
<td>65,659</td>
<td>-1.2</td>
<td>80,626.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006⁸</td>
<td>62,190</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>80,629.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Statistics Canada ¹1976a, ²1976b, ³1981, ⁴1986, ⁵1991, ⁶1996, ⁷2001, ⁸2006b.
### Table 4.3 CRD Population Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td># ppl/km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Regional District</td>
<td>65,659</td>
<td>62,190</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>80,629</td>
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<tr>
<td>‘Urban’</td>
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<td>100 Mile House</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<td>Quesnel</td>
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<td>9,326</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>266.46</td>
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<td>Wells</td>
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<td>159</td>
<td>1.48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>11,153</td>
<td>10,744</td>
<td>-3.7</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>325.58</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Electoral Area A</td>
<td>6,428</td>
<td>5,859</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
<td>783</td>
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<td>Electoral Area B</td>
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<td>Electoral Area C</td>
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<td>Electoral Area D</td>
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<td>Electoral Area F</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
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<td>Electoral Area H</td>
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<td>Electoral Area I</td>
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<td>-6.3</td>
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<td>Electoral Area J</td>
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<td>808</td>
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<td>25,948</td>
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<td>Electoral Area K</td>
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<td>552</td>
<td>-18.1</td>
<td>13,651</td>
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<td>Electoral Area L</td>
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<td>4,316</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,268</td>
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<td>Indian Reserve†</td>
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<td>1,970</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>21.65</td>
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<td>363</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nazko</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.40</td>
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<td>Red Bluff</td>
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<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soda Creek</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stone</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tl’etinqox-t’in</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toosey</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulkatcho</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>56.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xeni Gwet’in</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada 2006a.

... Data not available

†Data does not equal 100%. This caused by data suppression practices by Statistics Canada to protect privacy and confidentiality of Canadians (Statistics Canada 2009).

Census records of First Nation and aboriginal people should be treated as an ‘undercount’ of these populations as “content or reporting error exists to an unknown degree in census data” (Kerr et al. 2003, 59). Content or reporting error can be caused by misinterpreting questions, particularly related to aboriginal identity.
4.4 Regional Economy

Throughout its history, the economic foundation of the Cariboo-Chilcotin has been based on natural resource extraction, including fur, gold, agricultural products, and forest products (Little 1996; Williston and Keller 1997; McGillivray 2005). Currently, the forest industry employs the greatest number of people in the region (Table 4.4), and residents of the CRD are more likely to be employed in forestry than residents in the rest of the province. About 21% of the CRD population is directly employed in the forest industry. By the same measures, 3% of the provincial population is directly employed in the forest industry. Other industries in the region include agriculture, mining, and tourism.

Table 4.4 Employment Sector Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Sector</th>
<th>CRD</th>
<th>BC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation and Food Services</td>
<td>2,490</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,575</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>6,995</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry &amp; Logging</td>
<td>1,990</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Activities for Forestry</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood Product Manufacturing</td>
<td>3,630</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Manufacturing</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and Mineral Products</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The state of the forest industry is important to consider in the Cariboo-Chilcotin because of the high percentage of employment in the industry. The provincial forest industry has faced many stresses in recent years, with specific concern for the interior forest industry.

The MPB epidemic of 2004 has seriously impacted the fibre supply of the BC interior. The MPB is a naturally occurring bark beetle that attacks, and eventually kills, mature
lodgepole pine (BC Ministry of Forests and Range (MoFR) 2010). Adult MPBs emerge from infested trees in the summer and early fall. Finding a new host tree, the adult burrows into the tree and lays eggs. Following egg hatch, larvae continue to feed on the wood under the bark through the winter and spring until they transform into pupae in early summer. When adult beetles enter a tree, they also transmit bluestain fungi spores which give the infected tree’s sapwood a characteristic blue colour. The fungus does not affect the integrity or quality of the wood. The tree is eventually killed by the beetle’s eating habits and presence of the fungi (Leatherman et al. 2010). The MPB is native to the forests of North America, from Mexico to the central interior of BC. It normally plays an important role in the natural life cycle of healthy pine forests by attacking older and weakened trees (BC Ministry of Forests (MoF) 2003). While there have been outbreaks in the past, the 2004 infestation witnessed a massive expansion of its habitat in BC (DeBoice 2008).

This expansion is attributed to two factors: climate change and forest management practices (McGarrity and Hoberg 2005; DeBoice 2008; BC MoFR 2010). Historically, MPB populations have been managed by cold winters. However, the average minimum winter temperature has increased approximately 2.5°C in the BC interior in the past 100 years and MPB populations are surviving the winters. At the same time, summers have become hotter and drier allowing the MPB to spread to higher elevations and more northern latitudes, as drought-stressed trees are more susceptible to attack. With respect to forest management practices, the total area of mature pine has increased three-fold since 1910 due to improved technology for fire suppression and focus upon replanting harvested areas with pine (McGarrity and Hoberg 2005). Thus, climatic barriers have been reduced and the range
of mature host trees has escalated. The resulting habitat for the MPB has grown and the current infestation is unprecedented (Table 4.5). Despite its natural occurrence, the current infestation “has the potential to kill more than 80 percent of the merchantable pine in the province’s Interior” (BC MoFR 2007c, 2).

Table 4.5 Record MPB Infestations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Infestation Period</th>
<th>Area Affected (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930-1936</td>
<td>650,000 (peak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-current</td>
<td>16,300,000 (cumulative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Pine is the dominant species in the Cariboo-Chilcotin and the most used by industry in the region (C-CBAC 2008). The MPB epidemic is “expected to have significant economic impacts on the communities of the Cariboo-Chilcotin region, including sawmill closures, forest sector job losses, and service sector [job losses] that depend on expenditures by companies and residents” (C-CBAC 2008, 6); it will impact the short- and long-term economic situation of the Cariboo-Chilcotin.

In the short-term, the MPB epidemic caused an economic uplift through increased harvesting and subsequent production (Patriquin et al. 2007). Beginning in 2004, the allowable annual cut (AAC) for the 100 Mile House, Quesnel, and Williams Lake Timber Supply Areas (TSAs) was increased (Table 4.6) to compensate for the “limited time during which one can economically recover lumber from harvested logs” (BC MoFR 2007c, 2). The AAC increased by over 50% in all TSAs, and this resulted in increased production in the regional forest industry and a parallel short-term economic ‘uplift’ in the regional economy (Patriquin et al. 2007).
Table 4.6  TSA Harvest Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TSA</th>
<th>1981</th>
<th>Prior to MPB Review</th>
<th>Post-MPB Review</th>
<th>Increase due to MPB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100 Mile House</td>
<td>1,250,000</td>
<td>1,334,000</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>666,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
<td>3,248,000</td>
<td>5,280,000</td>
<td>2,032,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
<td>3,768,400</td>
<td>5,770,000</td>
<td>2,001,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹BC MoF 2004; ²BC MoFR 2006, ³2007c.

However, the MPB epidemic is expected to result in a long-term economic decline as the amount of fibre available for harvest significantly declines (Patriquin et al. 2007). The impact will be felt quickly as the AACs are expected to fall below pre-epidemic levels in a relatively short time period (Figure 4.2). This will translate to mill closures and higher unemployment (C-CBAC 2008). Already, unemployment rates are increasing in the region faster than the provincial average. In July 2008, the unemployment rate in the CRD was 7.8%, while BC was 4.5%. In July 2009, the unemployment rate in the CRD had nearly doubled to 14.2%, while BC’s rate had increased to 6.9% (BC Statistics 2009g).

Figure 4.2  Estimated Increase and Decrease in Harvesting, Quesnel TSA

In summary, the regional economy of the Cariboo-Chilcotin has historically been based on natural resource extraction and the region’s economic foundation remains particularly focused on the forest sector. The region’s forestry sector has recently seen a short-term economic ‘boom’, but this will be countered by a long-term economic ‘bust’ in the near future. Agriculture, mining, and tourism remain important secondary economic sectors in the region.

4.5 Local Government in the Cariboo-Chilcotin

A local government “has jurisdiction over a defined territory, is governed by a body of locally elected public officials”, and has taxation authority (Bish and Clemens 2008, 5). As such, it is important to understand these institutions, particularly their jurisdictions, mandates, and legal responsibilities in regional development decision-making. There are three local government institutions in the Cariboo-Chilcotin: municipal government, regional government, and First Nations government. Each has been provided authority by a more senior agency: municipalities and regional districts by the provincial government, and First Nations by the federal government. In addition to these local governments, provincial and federal governments have jurisdiction in the region, but are not addressed here.

4.5.1 Municipal

The five incorporated municipalities in the C-CBAC area include the City of Quesnel, the City of Williams Lake, the District Municipality (DM) of 100 Mile House, the DM of Wells, and the Village of Clinton. Under the Local Government Act, incorporation establishes that a local government will govern the defined jurisdiction. Quesnel and Williams Lake were the first to incorporate in the late 1920s (Table 4.7).
Table 4.7  Local Government Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incorporation Year</th>
<th>Quesnel</th>
<th>Williams Lake</th>
<th>Clinton</th>
<th>100 Mile House</th>
<th>Wells</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Designation</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>City</td>
<td>Village</td>
<td>DM</td>
<td>DM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (2006)</td>
<td>9,326</td>
<td>10,744</td>
<td>578</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council Members</td>
<td>Yes (6)</td>
<td>Yes (6)</td>
<td>Yes (4)</td>
<td>Yes (4)</td>
<td>Yes (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Each municipality is governed by a Mayor and Council (Bish and Clemens 2008).

Mayor and Council are elected for three year terms by municipal residents and non-resident property owners. The usual basic responsibilities of council include municipal bylaws, financial planning and budget approval, appointment of administrative officials and representatives to the regional district board, and determination of the basic internal organization of the municipality (Bish and Clemens 2008, 32). The provincial government mandates some service responsibilities to municipalities, including local road construction and maintenance, and they must have a fire inspector. Municipalities then have the option to adopt further voluntary functions. Economic development and planning are voluntary functions for a municipality.

4.5.2 Regional

Regional Districts (RDs) perform the role of local government for a rural area. They are unique to BC and stand in “marked contrast to the imposition of municipal reforms ... evident in ... a number of other provinces” (Tindal and Tindal 2004, 87). RDs were legislated in 1965 and RD boundaries were based on informally recognized functional regions (Tennant and Zirnhelt 1973; Bish and Clemens 2008).
RDs are governed by a Board of Directors. Residents of each electoral area elect one representative to serve a three year term on the Board. Municipalities within a given RD appoint one representative from Council to serve up to a three year term. The Board elects its own chair (one year position); other board members are chosen to sit on committees and commissions that address various regional issues (Bish and Clemens 2008; BC Ministry of Community Services (MoCS) 2006).

Incorporated in 1968, the CRD is comprised of a chair and sixteen directors (BC Statistics 2007; CRD 2008). Of the sixteen directors, twelve represent the rural electoral areas and four represent municipalities within the CRD. The Board meets every three weeks in Williams Lake. Like municipalities, RDs have mandated and voluntary functions; authorized voluntary functions that a RD can adopt are defined in the Local Government Act (Bish and Clemens 2008). Mandated functions include corporate and financial administration and waste management planning. In the past, RDs were mandated to address regional development planning, but now RDs can elect to undertake a Regional Growth Strategy and a long-term regional development vision (BC MoCS 2006).

4.5.3 First Nations

Prior to contact with Europeans, First Nations of the Cariboo-Chilcotin had well-established political systems (Skelton 1980). In traditional systems, hereditary chiefs received their title “in accordance with a strict conception of blood right” (Otis 2006, 218). In contemporary forms of government, hereditary chiefs are not necessarily elected chiefs, but despite disruption of these well-established systems, hereditary chiefs remain socio-politically important (Otis 2006).
After European settlement, First Nation systems “were ignored or legally suppressed while the federal government attempted to impose a set of vastly different Euro-Canadian political ideals on [First Nation] societies” (Wherrett 1999, 1). First Nation governments became regulated under the Indian Act in 1876 and are currently organized into three broad systems. There are no self-government agreements in the Cariboo-Chilcotin at this time. The remaining two governing systems are the Indian Act system and the custom electoral system.

In the Indian Act system, band leadership is determined through an election of Chief and Council (Band Council) (INAC 2007). Alternatively, bands can choose to select a Chief and Council through a custom electoral system. In this system, the band outlines the procedures and rules surrounding leadership selection. This system is perceived to be a return to traditional practices, but as Otis (2006, 220, emphasis added) notes, “custom is not necessarily synonymous with tradition. Instead, it is a consensual and community-based means of producing law that, while not materially constrained by ancestral practices, enables contemporaries to find their own path between tradition and modernity.”

In both of these systems, Chief and Council are elected for two to three year terms where they are invested with the responsibility of governing the community by the federal government. The Band Council is responsible for providing basic local services to residents, including education, water, sewer and fire services, bylaws, community buildings, schools, roads, and other services (INAC 2002). The range of services provided by a Band varies (Bish and Clemens 2008).
The Tribal Council is a separate organization. It is generally a regional society which represents the interests of member Bands (Bish and Clemens 2008). They are not invested with governing power (Otis 2006); however, they may administer funds and provide collective services to members “on a larger and more efficient scale” (Bish and Clemens 2008, 222).

In the Cariboo-Chilcotin, fourteen Bands are organized into three Tribal Councils: Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council: Kluskus, Nazko, Red Bluff, Toosey, Ulkatcho; Northern Shuswap Tribal Council: Canim Lake, Canoe Creek, Soda Creek, Williams Lake; and Tsilhqot’in National Government: Alexandria, Alexis Creek, Stone, Tl’etinqox-t’in, Xeni Gwet’in. One Band is independent from a Tribal Council: Esketemc (Table 4.8). Each Band has its own Band Council; eight Bands elect their leadership under the Indian Act and seven follow custom election systems. Economic development and planning services are provided by Tribal Councils. The Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council has a staff member committed to economic development and community planning (Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council nd). In the Northern Shuswap Tribal Council, there is overlap between the Tribal Council and the Treaty Society to provide services related to treaty settlement, management of land and resources, economic development, mapping, and planning (Northern Shuswap Tribal Council and Treaty Society 2006). The Tsilhqot’in National Government has a total of eight staff members in departments which address stewardship, mining, mapping, forestry, and economic development (Tsilhqot’in National Government 2006).
In summary, there are five legislated municipal governments, one legislated regional government, and 15 legislated First Nation governments in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region.

Each is provided its authority by a more senior level of government to govern a specific area. Each governing body can choose to take on a variety of voluntary activities in their mandate. By understanding the jurisdictions, mandates, and legal responsibilities of the different local governments, particularly in relation to economic development and planning, we can start to understand who the potential participants may be in regional development discussions.
4.6 Regional Planning Processes

A number of non-governmental organizations have formed over time to address regional issues in the Cariboo-Chilcotin through various regional planning processes (Table 4.9). In each, public, private, and not-for-profit organizations have come together to address the future of the Cariboo-Chilcotin. To varying degrees, the organizations have planned for land use, economic, environmental, and social change.

Table 4.9 Regional Planning Processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (1990 to Present)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process Name</th>
<th>Abbreviated Name</th>
<th>Active</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission on Resources and Environment</td>
<td>CORE</td>
<td>Jan 1992 - July 1994¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan</td>
<td>C-CLUP</td>
<td>July 1994 - Oct 1994²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Economic Action Forum</td>
<td>CEAF</td>
<td>May 1994 - May 2001²,³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Resource Board</td>
<td>C-CRRB</td>
<td>April 1995 - Present²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition</td>
<td>C-CBAC</td>
<td>Feb 2005 - Present⁴</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹BC CORE 1994a; ²CCC 1995b; ³Hilbert 2003; ⁴C-CBAC 2008.

Each has operated without government status; however, they have worked to influence regional, provincial, and federal policy as it pertains to society, the environment, and the economy of the Cariboo-Chilcotin. As Hodge (2003, 260) notes, “regional planning is a public, governmental activity”, but does not translate to government activity. Rather, regional planning processes tend to be advisory processes. These processes, however, are a form of governance. According to Marsden and Murdoch (1998, 1), governance is “the interdependence of governmental and non-governmental forces in meeting economic and social challenges. [It] is about governmental and non-governmental organizations working together.” The consideration of these organizations in the governing of the Cariboo-Chilcotin is important. As Goodwin (1998, 8) argues, “those groups which now seek to influence government ... perform what were once seen as the traditional tasks of formal government.”
4.6.1 Commission on Resources and the Environment

The formation of the provincial Commission on Resources and the Environment (CORE) in 1992 signaled a concerted effort at regional land use planning and coordination in some rural regions of BC. CORE’s goal was to develop a provincial sustainability strategy through regional land use planning (BC CORE 1995). To achieve this, CORE was to facilitate regional discussions with high levels of public participation in four regions in the province, including the Cariboo-Chilcotin (Owen 1998).

In the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process, 24 interest sectors came together to address land use in the region (Figure 4.3). Each sector was represented at the table by one person and, as McAllister (1998, 130) notes, “the most influential members of the round table are those that have relevant and persuasive information, are well prepared, confident, articulate, and [are] respected by other members of the community.” As such, despite equal opportunity at the table, not all sectors were equally effective in their representation and some suggest that inadequate technical and administrative support were provided in the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process (Owen 1998).
With regards to the participation of First Nations, CORE had a statutory duty to encourage participation, maintain communication, respect their rights and treaty negotiations, and give their interests due consideration (BC CORE 1994a). However, First Nation participation in the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process was informal. With the exception of the Cariboo Tribal Council who “indicated its willingness to participate from the beginning” (BC CORE 1994a, 33), First Nations chose not to participate because they did not have a “government-to-government agreement with the province” (BC CORE 1994a, 33), nor did they know if the Tribal Council was the best institution to represent Bands in the process.

Between December 1992 and February 1994, the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE group formally “met 27 times for 62 days of discussion and negotiation” (BC CORE 1994a, 24). The
province provided mediators to facilitate meetings; decisions were to be based on consensus, defined as unanimous agreement (BC CORE 1994a). The 24 discrete groups were unable to negotiate and “most sectors joined one of two coalitions: industry – ‘the browns’ and conservation – ‘the greens’” (Penrose et al. 1998, 31). The two coalitions were in opposition to one another and consensus was not achieved. The process concluded when land use decisions for the Cariboo-Chilcotin were made by provincial authorities (McAllister 1998). The final decisions did not sit well with local residents and immediately led to a more locally made solution – the C-CLUP (CCC 1995b).

### 4.6.2 Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan
Given that the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process was externally concluded, many stakeholders were not satisfied with the end result. As such, more than half of the participating sectors from the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE process self-organized between September 1994 and April 1995 to develop “a made in the Cariboo land use plan, by the people of the Cariboo-Chilcotin for the people of the Cariboo-Chilcotin” called New Solutions (CCC 1995b, 4). Those who participated in the development of New Solutions felt that “CORE’s recommendations for land use ... [did] not represent the interests of the major economic drivers ... such as ranching, mining, forestry, small business, tourism, etc...” (CCC 1995b, 85). Public input was obtained for New Solutions through “door to door [visitation], public forums, mail-ins, newspaper clippings and presentations” (CCC 1995b, 5).

Fourteen of the 24 interest sectors from the CORE process signed off on New Solutions (Table 4.10). Signatories did not include most conservation-oriented sectors of the CORE discussions (likened to ‘the green’ side of the CORE discussions), such as
Conservation, Sustainable Forestry, Sustainable Communities, and Resorts and Campgrounds. First Nations were not included in this process. Even among signatories, some felt that New Solutions was ‘as good as it was going to get.’ As one signatory notes, “a full table solution is impossible” (CCC 1995b, 47). In October 1994, New Solutions was negotiated with the provincial government to determine the C-CLUP (BC 1994).

Table 4.10  Signatories to the C-CLUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Sector</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Beings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Communities</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial Backcountry</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment – General</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish and Wildlife</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Employment</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry – Major</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry – Minor</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry – Sustainable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government – Federal/Provincial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government – Local</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining – Hard Rock</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining – Placer</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable Communities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism – Freshwater Fishing</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism – Resorts &amp; Campgrounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism – Hotels &amp; Restaurants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildcraft</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CCC 1995b, 2

1 Cariboo Tribal Council was listed as a CORE participant (BC CORE 1994a, 23), but is not in the CCC’s list of CORE participants (CCC 1995b, 2)

This regional process concluded with the C-CLUP – a legislated high-level land use plan for the Cariboo-Chilcotin (BC 1994). The plan was to guide sub-regional land use plans,
conducted more locally “to refine many of the broader goals established at the regional level” (CCC 1995b, 13).

### 4.6.3 Cariboo Economic Action Forum

While regional discussions continued around land use in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, a regional approach was also undertaken by those in the field of economic development. Initiated by two local MLAs, CEAF was a regional organization designed to undertake economic planning in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (CEAF 1994a). CEAF received funding from the Ministry of Small Business, Tourism, and Culture to develop and implement an economic plan for the Cariboo which reflects regional priorities (CEAF 1994b). In contrast to the CORE and C-CLUP processes, which focused on the development of a planning document, CEAF was to focus on economic action – seeing planning results more immediately ‘on the ground.’ But, the same theme remains – that the organization will deliver a “‘Made in the Cariboo’ solution to the ... problems of the region” (CEAF 1994e, np).

CEAF’s initial steering committee consisted of representatives from across the region, without emphasis on the interest sectors in which they were involved (Table 4.11). The initial committee was to dissolve within a period of about six months from its formation, after having produced a report to the Minister on regional economic development priorities (CEAF 1994c). However, a commitment of CEAF Co-Chairs to the CRRB (see below) in October 1994 resulted in CEAF being given a longer-term mandate (CEAF 1994d). As such, the CEAF steering committee continued to host a regional conference each October between 1994 and 2001 (Interview #23). Funding was not renewed by the province after 2001 and CEAF folded (BC Legislative Assembly 2001).
Table 4.11 CEAF Steering Committee, July 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International Woodworker's of America (IWA) Local 1-425</td>
<td>Wade Fisher</td>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>Co-Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Ranch</td>
<td>Muriel Dodge</td>
<td>Big Lake</td>
<td>Co-Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Regional District</td>
<td>Ted Armstrong</td>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside Forest Products</td>
<td>Don Niquidet</td>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hills Resort</td>
<td>Pat Corbett</td>
<td>108 Mile</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNBC</td>
<td>Ellen Facey</td>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quesnel New Focus Society</td>
<td>Sharon Hill</td>
<td>Quesnel</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Tribal Council</td>
<td>Bruce Mack</td>
<td>Williams Lake</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher/School Board Trustee</td>
<td>Pat Tait</td>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CEAF 1994c.

4.6.4 Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Resource Board

Over a period of 90 days between November 1994 and February 1995, an Implementation Team, comprised of government ministry staff and regional stakeholders, negotiated the technical framework for the implementation of the C-CLUP (CCC 1995c). Supervision of ongoing implementation was to be managed by the Cariboo Inter-Agency Management Committee (IAMC)⁵, an organization of regional directors from relevant government ministries, and the CRRB⁶.

Established in 1995, the key role of the CRRB was to provide direct local input on implementation “to ensure that the spirit and intent of the land use plan ... will continue” (CCC 1995a, 280). The Board was comprised of 13 regional representatives from various sectors, each appointed by government (Table 4.12). First Nations were involved initially, but have not been involved in more recent years. Government also tried “to the extent possible ... to achieve some level of geographic and gender balance” (CCC 1999, 80).

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⁵ The IAMC was renamed to the Cariboo Management Committee (CMC) in April 2007 (CCC 2007, 10).
⁶ The CRRB was renamed to the Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Resource Committee (C-CRRC) in September 2002 (CCC 2007, 11).
Funding for the CRRB was initially provided by the provincial government (CCC 1995a); however, funding was not guaranteed after 2001 (CCC 2007).

Table 4.12 CRRB Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Sector</th>
<th>Board Composition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAF</td>
<td>✓✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Nations</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ranching</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trapping</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guide/Outfitting</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Labour</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Business</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹CCC 1995a, 275; ²CCC 2007, 12.
*Sector name changed to Forest Licensees.

The CRRB was to be involved in four primary areas: sub-regional land use planning, address issues which came up in areas not covered by sub-regional planning processes, land and resource use policy, and social and economic impacts in conjunction with CEAF. They were also to communicate with the public, and monitor implementation and compliance with the C-CLUP. The C-CRRC, in conjunction with the CMC, continues to monitor C-CLUP compliance (Interview #28).

4.6.5 Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition

C-CBAC self-organized to address the economic impacts of the MPB epidemic.

Founding members drew “on proven community cooperation and spirit to work [together]” (C-CBAC 2005c, 4), specifically noting that they “have the benefits of the Cariboo-Chilcotin

7 After the dissolution of CEAF in May 2002, the Board continues to seek membership from two economic development representatives rather than from CEAF (CCC 2007, 12).
Land Use Plan experience to guide their actions” (C-CBAC 2005c, 1). This included municipal government, economic development representatives, regional government, community members, organization representatives, and one First Nation representative (Table 4.13). They submitted a funding proposal in February 2005, very shortly after their initial meeting.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title/Representative</th>
<th>February 2005</th>
<th>October 2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Member</td>
<td>☑ ☑ ☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Mayor</td>
<td>☑ ☑ ☑</td>
<td>☑ ☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>☑ ☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRD Director</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo-Chilcotin Conservation Society</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Communities Coalition</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHARE</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cariboo Licensees Land Use Strategy Committee</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esketemc First Nation</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsi Del Del First Nation</td>
<td></td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: 1 C-CBAC 2005c, 2 C-CBAC 2008, 1.

Like previous regional processes, achieving and maintaining First Nations participation in C-CBAC has been difficult (Table 4.12). Initially only calling for one First Nations representative for the entire region (C-CBAC 2005a, 1), the founding members expanded this to allow three First Nations representatives, one from each language grouping in the region (Interview #5). Finding representatives to fill these positions was challenging. In the Business Plan, the space for a First Nation signatory is left unassigned. Moreover, when outlining the Board structure, there is room for First Nation representation, but the exact position or role of that person is “unknown” (C-CBAC 2005a, 4) or simply identified with a question mark (C-CBAC 2005d, 2). Membership on the Board wavered and attendance of First Nation representatives at meetings was not consistent. As
such, First Nation participation in C-CBAC was low, particularly given the number of bands in the region.

In the meantime, C-CBAC received funding from the provincial government to consider the potential impacts of the MPB epidemic to “land use and corresponding economic or community development activities” in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (C-CBAC 2005a, 7). The organization developed a business plan to undertake a regional development planning process and to determine economic opportunities within the region. By 2008 (the time of thesis fieldwork), the organization had developed to the point whereby the Board (Table 4.13) oversaw the work of three working groups: Economic Development Working Group (EDWG), the Social Development Working Group (SDWG), and the Governance Working Group (GWG) (Figure 4.4). The working groups produced a number of development strategies (Table 4.14).
To ensure that C-CBAC's activities had a “regional focus and responsibility”, they sought representation from a wide range of interests and expertise from region-wide groups (C-CBAC 2005a, 2). Development strategies were to be regional in nature, but the Board recognized that each community has different assets and aspirations, such that one of two primary guiding principles of the Board was: “sector strategies will include a regional perspective ... [acknowledging] the development aspirations of each individual community” (C-CBAC 2005e, 1). This guiding principle is evident in some sector strategies. For example,
the log home strategy presented the potential for growth and expansion of this sector in the region, but the desire to create this strategy came from the business and community interests specific to the 100 Mile House area.

Table 4.14  C-CBAC’s Working Group Regional Development Sector Strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Working Group</th>
<th># Produced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development Working Group</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts, Culture, &amp; Heritage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest Worker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Home</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Technology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retention/Attraction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Wood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsilhqot’in National Government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Secwepm’c Beetle Working Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance Working Group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development Working Group</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development *</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: C-CBAC 2009b, 2009c, 2009d; ESP Consulting 2009; Glessing 2009; Social Development Advisory Committee 2009.

*This strategy resulted in a funded regional coordinator position prior to completion of the final report.

All strategies produced by the three working groups were brought together to produce the Cariboo-Chilcotin MPB Mitigation Strategy (‘the final report’), but some strategies were awarded funding prior to the completion of the final report. Regional coordinator positions were all one year terms between August 2008 and September 2009.

To support the various strategies, regional coordinators were directed to work towards regional action in their respective position (conservation, forest worker transition, and social development). In these, three independent contractors took the aims laid out in
the sector development strategy and made the first strides towards regional adoption. The regional coordinator for the forest worker strategy prepared and supported forest workers for employment and career shifts in the face of the MPB epidemic. Workshops for forest worker transition were held in Quesnel, Williams Lake, and 100 Mile House. The regional sustainability coordinator (conservation strategy) worked to “facilitate and build awareness of sustainability” in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (Glessing 2009, 1). Working in collaboration with many existing organizations, the work of the regional sustainability coordinator focused on the municipalities and surrounding areas of Quesnel, Williams Lake, and 100 Mile House. Finally, the regional coordinator for the social development strategy worked to coordinate activities and support existing social planning bodies in 100 Mile House, Quesnel, and Williams Lake. At the conclusion of their contract, each coordinator produced a report of their activities, but there was no formal continuation of their work (ESP Consulting 2009; Glessing 2009; Social Development Advisory Committee 2009).

Tracking the activity of regional coordinators demonstrates that implementation activities were focused in the Quesnel, Williams Lake, and 100 Mile House areas. Thus, the Chilcotin, Wells, and Clinton areas appear to have been neglected in these first steps. Thus, C-CBAC’s implementation activities are not pan-regional in scope.

C-CBAC’s final report calls for the formation of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Investment Corporation (C-CIC), a publicly funded, regionally-based development organization. Should it be created, this organization would address rural economic development issues that the region faces now, as a result of the MPB epidemic, and in the future (C-CBAC 2008). The report elaborates on potential strategic directions for the C-CIC, but the current fiscal
situation of the provincial government will likely limit the scope of what C-CBAC will be able to implement (C-CBAC 2009).

The Cariboo-Chilcotin has a 15 year history of forming more ‘bottom-up’ regional organizations to address future development of resources, environment, society, and the economy. These regional organizations have been voluntary and have no legal status, but have consistently worked to influence decisions and to ensure that policies which impact the region have regional input. Their experience illustrates the plurality of participants in governance (versus government) and in regional development discussions, particularly when it comes to decisions about economic development and planning. Despite support for such organizations, they have not been able to affect policy directly, but serve to advise more senior levels of government.

4.7 Conclusion

The Cariboo-Chilcotin is located in the southern interior of BC. The region’s population is experiencing relative decline. The five municipal governments, one regional government, and 15 First Nation governments are legislated governing powers within the region, including having direct jurisdiction over economic development and planning.

Over the last 15 years, many regional organizations comprised of government and non-governmental actors have formed in attempt to influence policies and decisions which impact the region. The recent regional governance activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin is to address current and future economic challenges. Their formation, and the support that they are receiving from more senior levels of government, signals a potential shift away from traditional, centralized, rural regional development decision-making practices. Moreover,
given recent political-economic trends of devolution to more local levels, it is crucial to understand the factors which have influenced the formation of more locally-based, non-governmental organizations which are looking to address issues of rural regional development.
Chapter 5 Results

5.1 Introduction

To understand C-CBAC in the context of Canadian rural regional development trends, and to explore factors important in the organization's formation, this chapter presents my analysis results. Data obtained in my interviews, field notes, and documentation from regional organizations within the Cariboo-Chilcotin and from senior governments (e.g. press releases, reports, and meeting minutes) were analyzed in response to my two research questions:

1. How does C-CBAC compare to dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development? and,

2. What factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC?

To answer these questions, this chapter is divided into three sections (Table 5.1). The first explores issues around the devolution of power and responsibility to local levels for governing rural development. The second and third sections explore factors which facilitated and hindered the formation of C-CBAC, respectively. The data demonstrate the interplay of complex processes from higher and lower levels in governing rural regional development.
Table 5.1  Results Guide: Relationship of Results/Themes to Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Section Heading</th>
<th>Theme(s) Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| To what extent is C-CBAC representative of dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development? | Governing Rural Regional Development | • Devolution  
• Autonomy  
• Abandonment |
| What factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC?                   | Assisting Factors                | MPB epidemic  
• (Economic) impetus for regional collective action |
|                                                                                  | Hindering Factors                | History of working together  
• Replication of previous models  
• Same ‘regional leaders’ involved over time |
|                                                                                  |                                   | Role of senior governments  
• Supports provided by senior governments |
|                                                                                  |                                   | MPB epidemic  
• No regional culture of working together outside of crises |
|                                                                                  |                                   | Role of senior governments  
• Federal government funding; provincial government legislation, programs, and general policy directions |

5.2  Governing Rural Regional Development

Canadian regional development decision-making has characteristically been ‘top-down’ (Savoie 1992, Markey et al. 2005). Decisions about rural development trajectories were made in Ottawa without input from local residents. However, in the new regionalism movement, there are calls for greater involvement by regional players in decision-making processes (Wallis 1994b). As such, the governance of rural regional development, particularly the shift from top-down decision-making to a more bottom-up approach, is an area that warrants inquiry (Markey et al. 2007). In this section, I will address my first research question, how does C-CBAC compare to dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development?
development? To do this, I will outline the traditional model of Canadian regional
development and then draw on my thematic finding of regional autonomy to discuss
devolution of power and responsibility.

5.2.1 Autonomy
Canada’s first attempts at coordinated rural regional development were
characterized by heavy involvement on the part of the federal government (Markey et al.
2005). Beyond the provision of funding, development programs were decided upon and
instituted by more senior levels of government. In this model, the region is considered a
static administrative unit and development approaches are deficiency-based. However, by
the late 1980s, such federal programs were consistently not producing the desired results of
endogenous, self-sustaining growth, and there was an international trend towards the
decentralization of development decision-making (Polèse 1999).

In 1987, the federal government began to devolve responsibility for regional
development to regionally-based federal departments – ACOA in Atlantic Canada and WED
in western Canada – and to provide funding to more local organizations within their region
to promote growth and development (Fairbairn 1998). They are advantageous because they
are located in, and staffed by residents of, their mandate regions. The thinking is that they
are more place-based and easier to access (Savoie 1992). In BC, provincial ministries also
fund projects which may have a regional development component if it is within their
ministry mandate (BC Ministry of Economic Development (MoED) 2005; BC MoF 2005; BC

8 While agencies are located in the mandate regions, administrative offices are often located in major centres
(e.g. Vancouver). As such, staff may still be removed from rural and small town places.
development responsibility from senior governments to the more local level while making funding supports available ‘closer to home.’

In my study, participants were asked about the role of senior governments in the formation of C-CBAC and nearly one-third (13/47) expressed that development decision-making was being devolved more to the local level. This was likened to a more bottom-up approach. Participants generally felt that they were better suited to make decisions about development trajectories for their region. As one participant commented: “There must have been some recognition by the provincial government that they were not as equipped to handle economic development in our communities as we were. That is a shift in decision-making” (Interview 10). Moreover, this approach to regional development was favoured. For example: “I am very complimentary about the provincial government’s role with C-CBAC. They resourced it very heavily and they gave responsibility for it almost entirely to the regional citizens. ... I give them full marks for that” (Interview 23). The issue of devolved power and responsibility in regional development decision-making was raised by most of the founding Board (4/5) and most of the Board at the time of field work (5/7). It was noted also by a little more than half of the EDWG (5/9), but was not noted by First Nation participants (0/5).

However, when the participants’ comments are compared to provincial government records, there are mixed messages about the amount of authority devolved. First, no documented agreement exists between the provincial government and C-CBAC, or any other regional BAC, about the authority over regional development allocated to each party. Second, according to most (7/10) press releases which address regional development and
the MPB epidemic (Table 5.2), the provincial government intends to have the regional strategies contribute to an overall provincial MPB Action Plan. For example, strategies were “to deliver components of the province’s mountain pine beetle strategy” (BC MoF 2005, np). Most (6/10) press releases make at least one reference to the province’s MPB Action Plan and contextualize funding to regional BACs within that larger plan. One release states: “As part of our Mountain Pine Beetle Action Plan, we’re providing funding and support for economic development strategies designed by communities” (BC MoFR and Natural Resources Canada 2007, 1). This message does not give the impression that plans developed regionally will be implemented. Therefore, there are mixed messages regarding the amounts of authority devolved to regional BACs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Press Release Headline &amp; Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| April 8, 2005       | **Grant Will Help Cariboo-Chilcotin Cope with Beetle**<sup>1</sup>  
  • $800,000 to C-CBAC  
  • Purpose: to complete plans “to deliver components of the province’s mountain pine beetle strategy” |
| September 16, 2005  | **Funding Helps Omineca Communities with Beetle Impacts**<sup>2</sup>  
  • $800,000 to OBAC  
  • Purpose: to “build an economic diversification plan” |
| September 21, 2005  | **$50M for Pine Beetle Mitigation, Economic Development**<sup>3</sup>  
  • $50 million to NDI Trust ($30 million specifically for MPB mitigation activities)  
  • Purpose: “to help communities respond to beetle infestation ... to ensure a long-term and sustainable future for the forest sector and forest workers” |
| March 22, 2007      | **Cariboo-Chilcotin Receives Beetle Funding**<sup>4</sup>  
  • $900,000 to C-CBAC  
  • Purpose: “to complete its comprehensive Regional Community Economic Diversification Strategy for the Cariboo-Chilcotin region.” |
| April 5, 2007       | **Southern Beetle Coalition Receives Start-Up Funding**<sup>5</sup>  
  • $50,000 to SIBAC  
  • Purpose: “to assess potential social and economic impacts in the region” |
| April 12, 2007      | **Omineca Region Receives Beetle Funding**<sup>6</sup>  
  • $900,000 to OBAC  
  • Purpose: “to identify economic opportunities” and to build on work already done |
| July 25, 2007       | **$800,000 to Southern Interior for Pine Beetle Planning**<sup>7</sup>  
  • $800,000 to SIBAC  
  • Purpose: “to quantify the impact of the beetle on the region’s timber supply” |
| March 31, 2008      | **$250,000 to Help Finalize Regional Pine Beetle Plan**<sup>8</sup>  
  • $250,000 to C-CBAC  
  • Purpose: to complete planning phase and “to create one-year positions for a forest worker transition co-ordinator and a climate change/sustainability co-ordinator” |
| June 4, 2008        | **Omineca Receives Funding for Pine Beetle Response Plans**<sup>9</sup>  
  • $870,000 to OBAC  
  • Purpose: “to complete its remaining strategies ... [for] economic growth and job creation” |
| August 1, 2008      | **BC Funds Cariboo-Chilcotin Social Development Position**<sup>10</sup>  
  • $75,000 to C-CBAC  
  • Purpose: “to hire a social development coordinator” |

Sources:  
<sup>1</sup> BC MoF 2005;  
<sup>2</sup> BC MoFR 2005;  
<sup>3</sup> BC MoED 2005;  
<sup>4</sup> BC MoFR 2007a;  
<sup>5</sup> BC MoFR and Natural Resources Canada 2007;  
<sup>6</sup> BC MoFR 2007b;  
<sup>7</sup> Office of the Premier and BC MoFR 2007;  
<sup>8</sup> BC MoFR 2008a, <sup>9</sup> 2008b;  
<sup>10</sup> BC MoCD 2008.
Hansard records show that the government is hesitant to devolve authority or significant amounts of funding to regional BACs given their self-appointment and voluntary status as an organization. For example, in a discussion about the allocation of $30 million to the NDI Trust between Honourable Colin Hansen, Minister of Economic Development, and Bob Simpson, MLA for North Cariboo, Mr. Simpson asks “Why was NDI chosen as the place to put this $30 million” (BC Legislative Assembly 2005, 888) rather than with regional BACs? Hon. Hansen responds:

*I think the crux of it is that the NDI is established and governed by individuals who have accountabilities to an electorate in the north. As I mentioned, the beetle action coalitions ... are certainly great organizations, but I guess the question we need to ask ourselves as MLAs and members of this House is: where should the decisions be made as to who is best in a position to manage funds for beetle recovery?* (BC Legislative Assembly 2005, 890)

As such, it appears that the provincial government wanted the BACs to develop regional plans for development, but did not want to devolve control over regional development or regional development funding to the regional BACs. Thus, the provincial government did not devolve authority for regional development to the BACs.

Also of significance, the justification for not devolving authority to the BACs, according to Hon. Hansen, is that the NDI is governed by “individuals who have accountabilities to an electorate in the north”; however, both the NDI and BACs have similar governance structures. They are both governed by municipally elected officials and regional representatives. The difference between NDI and the BACs is that the NDI is a legislated body. This highlights that the transition to governance is challenging.

The devolution of responsibility for regional development must also be considered in the context of a neoliberal ideology. Polessé (1999, 310) argues that the devolution of
responsibility for development to a more local level is “in the end closer to a silent surrender, an implicit admission that the central state really cannot do much about unequal regional development.” This ‘abandonment’ by the state relates well to a neoliberal ideology which Young and Matthews (2007: 117) observe is a strategy that transfers authority and responsibility from the public sphere to private domains, “be they corporate, group and/or individual.” In as such, a case may be made that the autonomy (not) provided to C-CBAC for regional development decision-making is part of a larger neoliberal agenda by the provincial government; this could be an example of abandonment by the state without the provision of authority.

Participants were asked what they felt the role of the provincial government has been in the formation of C-CBAC. Most (39/47) did not observe a connection between the autonomy provided to C-CBAC and abandonment by the state. For example, one participant responded: “If provincial policy changes had any impact [on the formation of C-CBAC], it would have been very subsidiary. I do not recall any of that being discussed” (Interview 10). As the participant highlighted, changes were not discussed explicitly in the formation of C-CBAC, but changes which represent a neoliberal ideology have not been overly manifest or explicit in the public eye. As noted by Young and Matthews (2007, 183): “deep reforms ... have proceeded without significant organized protest.” Some participants (8/47) alluded to a sense of abandonment by the provincial government, but generally did not believe that this strategy could be successfully carried out. They felt that, if C-CBAC failed, the public will continue to hold the provincial government accountable. As one participant observed:

*The government can say [in the end] ‘it was not us who screwed this up.’ The ministers that I talked to were keenly aware that one of the advantages of giving*
everything to a group is that there is some deniability, but it is a double-edged sword because the government will still be blamed... they are going to take a hit if we do something really stupid. (Interview 23)

Across the sampling frame, those who addressed abandonment by higher levels of government had typically been involved in three or more regional processes (5/8).

5.2.2 Summary
Participants in my research described a shift in regional development decision-making and felt that they were provided with greater autonomy. Most favoured this approach over older, top-down approaches. However, when participant opinions are compared to official records, there are mixed messages about the devolution of any real authority over regional development. As the literature highlights, in rural regional development, devolution can suggest abandonment by the state – an admission that they do not know how to effectively address development in this context. While participants agreed that they are better suited to determine development within their own region, participants did not feel that this was abandonment by the state because the state retained funding control and decision-making authority. At best, the regional BACs are currently in an ‘advisory’ position to the state.

5.3 Assisting Factors
This thesis considers three factors in C-CBAC’s formation: the history of regional activity, a transition towards neoliberal policies, and the emergence of the MPB epidemic. Such place-specific factors are representative of factors raised in various literatures, including governance, social cohesion/social capital, and legislative frameworks. The governance literature considers interaction between state and non-state actors, including
the private and non-profit sectors (Goodwin 1998; Painter 2000; Mayntz 2003). Much of this literature considers why actors come together and observes that, in many cases, governance institutions form in response to a common challenge (Bidwell and Ryan 2006; Margerum 2007; Griffin 2008; Lockwood et al. 2009). Moreover, the role of social capital in governance has been explored to consider attributes of networks, relationships, and trust (Jones and Little 2000; Dawe 2004; Marshall et al. 2006). Finally, governance institutions operate within a larger legislative framework, so it is important to consider influences of this larger framework on more localized organizations (Thomas 2002; Papadopoulos 2007).

In this section, I will address the first part of my second research question, what factors may have assisted the formation of C-CBAC? To do this, I will draw on my three thematic findings: impetus, a history of working together, and external supports.

5.3.1 Impetus

The governance literature suggests that new problems challenge us to reconsider governing institutions (Ali-Khan and Mulvihill 2008; Griffin 2008). Moreover, literature on community conflict and literature on social capital suggest that when people are faced with an external threat, bonds between local groups are heightened in response to that threat (Halseth 1998; Portes 1998; Woolcock 1998). In my research, participants were asked what they felt was the most important factor that contributed to the formation of C-CBAC. Nearly all (44/47) participants felt that the MPB epidemic was the chief factor. As one participant commented, the MPB epidemic was new and challenged them to consider how they were going to address it: “The MPB was the stimulus. It takes something to come along and make us say ‘Oh wow, how are we going to deal with that?’” (Interview 17). Moreover, another
participant recalled that they were not satisfied with how the provincial government was addressing the MPB epidemic and this caused action towards C-CBAC:

[C-CBAC] got started by what the government was not doing. ... When we went to the Ministry of Economic Development and asked what they were going to do about the MPB, their response was for us to wait until it happens and then come back to ask for help. It only took a couple of phone calls to ... [determine] that this was an unsatisfactory answer. ... They were not able or prepared to think about the MPB in the same way that forest-dependent communities are able and prepared to.

(Interview 26)

Furthermore, those who observed that the MPB epidemic was the most important factor (44/47) expressed that it threatened their economic, political, environmental, social, and cultural lives and this motivated action. The most commonly noted dimension was economic change (22/44). Participants expressed concerns related to job loss and the future role of the forest industry in the region. As one participant noted: “We are being forced into this [working collaboratively] now by the very economics that we are faced with. ... We will have to change simply because our industry is changing” (Interview 01). This sentiment was echoed by another participant who commented that economic change was the fundamental catalyst for taking regional action: “There was a realization that the economy is going to change. People are going to be out of work and the forests are dying. That was the most important thing – to realize that it is not always going to be the same” (Interview 11). Many participants, including most First Nation participants (3/5), raised the economic impacts of the MPB epidemic.

Beyond discussing the MPB epidemic specifically, many participants (28/47) drew attention to a pattern of responding to threats with regional collective action. Many participants (17/47) felt that a crisis, catastrophe, or stimulus is required to bring people
together, for example: “people need a crisis to shake them out of their traditional way of
doing things” (Interview 44). Participants cited examples of direct and tangible threats (e.g. the loss of passenger rail services) and inferred or perceived threats (e.g. provincial government concluding a land use planning process). For example, a few (4/28) participants inferred that there was a threat to regional autonomy when the CORE process was concluded in the region. For example:

> When the CORE process was over and Stephen Owen came up here to present [the results], they hung him in effigy. People were not happy. There has always been a feeling in the years that I have been here that we are ‘doers’ and we do not like to be told what to do. ... we know what we want for our area. (Interview 32)

This sense of loss of local control was echoed by another participant:

> ‘Made in the Cariboo’ is a big phrase that you hear a lot. It would be hard to say this if there were external control ... by the United States or Ottawa. It is very much a pioneering mindset in this region. There are lots of very strong and forceful people who do not want outsiders telling them what to do. (Interview 24)

Independence and the ‘pioneering mindset’ are strongly associated with regional identity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin (Skelton 1980; Furniss 1999), so a loss of this may have been perceived as a threat to the potential loss of regional identity. The need for a crisis to bring people together was raised by all founding members of C-CBAC (5/5), but not by any participants associated with the tourism sector (0/3).

The question then becomes, what is it about a crisis or threat which brings people together? Some participants (15/47) expressed that a crisis provides a central focus which emphasizes similarities and energizes the group. More than half of these people (8/15) remarked that differences between people and groups were minimized. For example, one participant commented: “When survival is at stake people tend to get rid of their more petty
little differences and wishes for their own little area ... if you bring a crisis along, then – snap – everybody is buying-in” (Interview 10). Additionally, nearly half of these participants (7/15) observed that a crisis energizes a group; it provides motivation, sustains interest and focus, and provides a collective driven purpose. As one participant noted: “Whenever something major happens, you see people come together and do something. But it seems to take a crisis. ... it seems to be a fear-driven survival instinct that is bringing groups together, and that is what will keep them together” (Interview 25).

Crises have bound local actors together in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. In a crisis situation, similarities are realized and they are provided with the energy to act. This was particularly raised by all participants involved with the major licensees (2/2), most of those involved with social development (4/5), but not by those involved with tourism (0/3).

5.3.2 History of Working Together

Literature on governance and social capital suggests that those who have worked together, and have achieved a sense of collective success, are likely to work together again (Woolcock 2001; Bowles and Gintis 2002; Marshall et al. 2003). This was addressed in my research by asking participants about their perception of the region’s history of working together. Many participants (25/47) commented that, in addition to having a crisis to respond to, coming together as a region was supported by a history of working together. In general, the history of working together provided two specific benefits: there was an established ‘model of success’ and repetitive regional leadership.
5.3.2.1 Structural Dimension: Model of Success

Beckley et al. (2008) argue that achieving desired outcomes is an important step in building social capital. To assess if working together was positively reinforced in previous processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, I wanted to consider to what extent previous processes were considered successful. As such, it is important to talk with people who have been involved in past processes (22/47) to learn their perceptions of perceived success. Those who commented on organizational structure over time (20/22) had largely been involved in three or more previous processes (13/20). For example, two participants were involved in the CORE process, the C-CLUP process, the CRRB, and were founding members of C-CBAC. Both noted that C-CBAC was directly linked to the structure of the CORE process: “By and large, the structure is still there from the CORE days” (Interview 44) and “CEAF was an economic derivative of CORE and C-CBAC was formed to revisit the C-CLUP ..., so they are both derivatives of CORE” (Interview 20).

Connections between C-CBAC’s organizational structure and past processes are further supported when considering how people participated in the decision-making process. In the CORE and C-CLUP processes, decision-making was directed through sectors based on land use interests (BC CORE 1994b; CCC 1995b). Participation in C-CBAC’s decision-making process was initially directed through sectors based on economic interests (e.g. forestry), but other groups were brought into the process as suggested (e.g. First Nations) (C-CBAC GWG 2008). When sector participation is enumerated over time (Table 5.3), continued participation by some sectors in central decision-making through the ‘different’ processes is apparent (e.g. agriculture, forestry, organized labour, and tourism). This also indicates that some land use interest sectors are translated into economic interest
sectors. As one participant commented: "The land use planning creates the opportunity for economic development in the region" (Interview 05).

Table 5.3 Sector Participation in Regional Decision-Making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>CORE¹</th>
<th>C-CLUP²</th>
<th>CEAF³</th>
<th>CRRB⁴</th>
<th>C-CBAC (2005)⁵</th>
<th>C-CBAC (2009)⁶</th>
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<tr>
<td>All Beings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo Communities Coalition</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEAF*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cariboo Forest Contractors</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conservation</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
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<td>First Nations</td>
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<td>- Major licensees</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Minor licensees</td>
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<tr>
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<td>X</td>
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<td>Small Business</td>
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<td>Youth</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ¹BC CORE 1994a, 23-24; Penrose et al. 1998, 32; ²CCC 1995b, 2; ³Williams Lake Tribune Staff 1994; ⁴CCC 1999, 90; ⁵C-CBAC 2005a, 1; ⁶C-CBAC 2009a, np.

TC – Tribal Council

X – Identifies participation by one person in that process by that sector.

X’ – Identifies disaggregated participation by sub-sectors.

*CEAF had not formed until 1994, nor could they be participants in their own process.
Table 5.3 demonstrates that decision-making is still funneled through sectors, but the breadth of sectors participating in the decision-making process is narrowing. For example, 24 sectors were involved in the CORE process, 14 sectors were involved in the C-CLUP process, 8 sectors were involved in CEAF, and 5 sectors are involved in decision-making in the C-CBAC process (BC CORE 1994a; CCC 1995b, 1999; Williams Lake Tribune Staff 1994; C-CBAC 2009a). This diagram does not show that other sectors contributed to the C-CBAC process, but were not part of the decision-making Board (C-CBAC 2009a, b, c).

This table also demonstrates that, as the number of different sectors involved in decision-making is narrowing, contributions by government in decision-making is increasing. Two government representatives were involved in decision-making during the CORE process representing three levels of government, but three representatives are involved in C-CBAC decision-making from one level of government (BC CORE 1994a; C-CBAC 2009a). As such, these data suggest that decision-making in regional development is becoming less sectoral with more government involvement. This process may suggest a new ‘top-down’ process, but that the distance to the ‘ground level’ is shorter.

A few (3/47) participants felt that C-CBAC could not be linked to past processes. They felt that the various regional processes had been formed to address different issues and, as such, could not be compared to one another. As one participant stated:

*The C-CLUP and C-CBAC processes are two entirely different issues. C-CLUP was a land use ... group ... [and] C-CBAC is more looking at what can be done to protect communities. If the two are related, they are related on a fine thread, but I do not think that they are related.* (Interview 13)

Furthermore, processes could be differentiated based on the process’ legal standing. For example, CORE was initiated by the provincial government, but C-CBAC is an organization of
self-appointed volunteers. As one participant commented: “C-CBAC is a totally separate group and a whole new process. C-CBAC is not a legislated process. Nobody said that we had to do this” (Interview 05). Participants who felt that the processes were not comparable had been regionally involved since the CORE process (2/3) and had been involved in at least two different processes (3/3).

Most of those who made a connection between C-CBAC and past regional processes (20/22) considered past processes to be successful (13/20). In particular, past processes were considered successful because participants felt that a support system had been developed, they had opportunities to gain political power and targeted resources from senior governments, and they were able to obtain a level of perceived autonomy in decision-making about development trajectories. As such, this model of regional collaboration is a well-practiced approach that local actors are familiar with and have obtained successes with in the past. As one participant recalled:

... it was a logical next step when you have a disaster like the MPB. We dealt with major problems before by forming a coalition. We put parties of people together with a like mind and with common goals. We were able to influence government and we were able to do some good things. I think that everybody who was involved in that process felt that they came away a winner. (Interview 40)

Of those participants who raised this issue (13/20), over half (8/13) felt that the achievements of previous processes contributed to a sense of success and this resulted in subsequent regional collaboration processes following a similar structure. This included all of C-CBAC’s founding Board (5/5).

However, not everyone felt that past processes were successful. A few (3/47) participants did not feel that they had achieved desired outcomes in previous processes.
They felt that the final land use plan for the Cariboo-Chilcotin was ‘won’ by the industrial sectors who sought resource extraction. This was in contrast to the goals that conservation sectors were seeking. As one participant recalled:

_It was negative because we [the environmentally aware sectors] did not achieve anything. It was supposed to be a land use planning exercise and we were trying to achieve some security for animal habitat, wilderness values, and land-based tourism values. We did not get that. Major licensees got exactly what they wanted for the most part, which was the ability to do business as usual with a few concessions._

(Interview 16)

According to the social capital literature, if participants do not feel that they are a part of a shared success, then social capital can be diminished (Portes 1998; Anderson and Bell 2003). This idea is supported by one participant associated with conservation efforts who did not think that the CORE and C-CLUP processes were successful. This contributes to their continued mistrust for the Board:

_If you take an organization and you want it to be equally represented, then you pick someone to manage it that is neutral. The manager who was hired runs a timber organization and has very strong feelings towards industry... That is where we met our resistance._

(Interview 24)

Those who did not feel that past processes were successful were involved with the environment or conservation sectors (2/3), or observed the process from this angle (1/3).

### 5.3.2.2 Social Dimension: Repetitive Regional Leadership

The social capital literature tells us that social connections facilitate and make it easier for groups coming together time and time again. As Marshall _et al._ (2003: 177) note “through ... regularised contact over time players establish the operating understandings and codes of conduct which expedite negotiation and lead to workable compromises. These attributes constitute vital lubricants in network activity.” This concept is supported by my
case study; participants suggested that social connections made while working together in the past facilitated contemporary regional collaborations.

Participants may not have targeted that the same sectors have been involved over time, but many (21/47) recognized that the same people have been involved over time. As one participant recalled: “by the time we came to C-CBAC, many of us were old hands – it was the same bunch of us at the table” (Interview 31). This is supported by another participant who commented that responding specifically to the crisis of the MPB epidemic was supported by a history of working together: “the actual formation of C-CBAC was a direct response to the MPB infestation. ... but I think that [working together in the past] made it easier for [C-CBAC] to function because of those previous processes” (Interview 16).

Those who highlighted that the same people were involved in regional collaborative processes over time (21/47) had generally been involved in two or less regional processes (12/21), but a few participants (3/21) had been involved in five and six regional processes.

Participants suggested many social dimensions for why the same group of people has continued to be involved in regional decision-making processes, without necessarily being elected. Such social dimensions include: a shared interest in regional issues (10/21), the development of skills in negotiating and coming to a conclusion (10/21), and the development of trusting relationships amongst themselves (7/21). Each of these reasons will be discussed below.

Sharing a common interest in regional issues was one of the most commonly noted reasons (10/21) why the same people continue to work together in regional collaborations. Participants feel that those involved in many regional organizations are involved because
they have passion, and possess a personal sense of responsibility, for regional issues. For example, one participant observed:

...people continue to be involved because they have strong feelings about certain issues ... they don’t see anyone else stepping up and ... they want to see things through without seeing anyone else as passionate as they are. I guess you could look at it as why some people stay in politics for years and others are only in for short terms. (Interview 35)

This issue was highlighted by most of those from the social sector (4/6) and half of municipal economic development staff (2/4). However, sharing a common interest in regional issues was not raised by elected government officials (0/8), First Nations (0/5), the environment sector (0/3), or minor licensees (0/3).

Regional leaders who have developed skills for collaborating with one another was another of the most commonly noted reasons (10/21) why the same people continue to work in regional collaborations. It was particularly raised by most (7/10) that these individuals possess such skills among one another despite their association with traditionally opposing sectors. For example, individuals from the conservation movement and individuals from the industrial resource development movement were able to negotiate in the C-CLUP process. One participant explained how skills across conflicting sectors were built in the land use planning process:

... we were so proud of the C-CLUP. It managed to get people with very different interests that could barely speak to each other because their interests were so conflicting to come together and build a land use plan ... If they had not been involved in this experience, they would have never been able to move so quickly [to form] C-CBAC. (Interview 10)

Furthermore, some (6/10) participants expressed that the possession of these skills was positively correlated with the formation of C-CBAC: “without the skills learned in C-CLUP,
there would not be a C-CBAC. It started in the Cariboo-Chilcotin and not anywhere else
because we have those skills” (Interview 26). Most who raised this issue had been involved
in three or more regionally collaborative processes (6/11), particularly those who had been
involved in five or more regional processes (2/3).

That this group of regional leaders has developed relationships with one another in
the CORE and C-CLUP processes was the third most commonly noted reason (7/21) why the
same people continue to work together in regional collaborations. Participants noted that
relationships were trusting and that they became personal. For example, one participant
commented:

*We built trust and relationships that have survived for years simply because of that
process. It put people together that would have otherwise never come to sit at the
same table to work together for a common goal. That builds strong bridges and
lasting relationships with people. ... people would become your friends. They are no
longer a person who sits across the table – they are a friend...* (Interview 40)

However, of the participants who raised this (7/21), only two spoke of these relationships in
the first-person – that they had personally developed a trusting relationship in a previous
process. Participants who commented on this external to themselves (5/7) were
commenting on trusting relationships that they perceived *other people* to have developed
in previous processes because *those same people* had previous experience working
together. As such, pre-existing relationships were assumed. For example, one participant
commented that they were able to tell that others had relationships prior to working
together in C-CBAC: “*Relationships were formed before coming into C-CBAC. ... there was
enough chemistry there that you could see that*” (Interview 35). All of those who spoke of
pre-existing relationships (7/21) were connected to C-CBAC process or felt that they were
close enough to the process to comment based on their observations and most (5/7) had participated directly in either the CORE and/or C-CLUP process. Those who spoke about trusting relationships in the first-person (2/7) were involved in the CCC. However, pre-existing relationships were not mentioned by participants from the conservation/environment side in the CORE and/or C-CLUP processes (0/3).

5.3.3 External Supports
The first section of this chapter illustrates that higher levels of government have had a changing role in rural regional development in Canada over time (Savoie 1992; Fairbairn 1998). However, recent literature on this subject suggests that regional development requires some level of government initiative, expertise, and resources (Markey et al. 2005). In my research, participants were asked about the government’s presence and role in the region and if they felt that this impacted the formation of C-CBAC. Similar to above discussions of autonomy, over half of all participants (26/47) felt that senior levels of government supported C-CBAC. Most (23/26) drew attention to the financial support provided by the federal and provincial governments, but most of these people (20/23) targeted provincial funding over federal funding (Table 5.2). Financial support was viewed favourably by over half of these participants (12/23), noting that C-CBAC could not have done any work without the funding provided: “[the provincial and federal governments] have had a huge impact. No work could have been done without the core funding that they put in” (Interview 01). Across the sampling framework, the provision of funding to C-CBAC was raised by all of those who were involved with the EDWG (8/8), the GWG (5/5), and by most (6/7) of the Board at the time of field work. However, the provision of funding was
only mentioned by one First Nations participant (1/5) and was not mentioned by any participants involved with small-scale forestry (0/3).

Non-financial resources were also made available to C-CBAC by the provincial government and this was raised by some participants (9/26). Human resources and expertise were provided by ministers, deputy ministers, and the MPB Emergency Response Team\(^9\). All (9/9) favoured the provision of non-financial resources made available to C-CBAC. One participant specifically noticed that, in this process, the region gained access to higher levels of government and that, by having this access, there is the potential to gain further resources now and in the future:

*There was ... a deputy minister from forestry in Kamloops ... He certainly supported the C-CBAC process, and ... when you have someone at the deputy minister level ... they also have access to ministers, funds, expertise, and data.* (Interview 31)

Moreover, one participant specifically stated that government support (beyond financial support) is required: “*You need government there to assist*” (Interview 05). All of those who recalled non-financial supports were either involved with the Board of Directors (5/9), the EDWG (3/9), or the SDWG (2/9); this is likely because these people would have worked directly with these supports. As one participant from the SDWG comments: “*The Ministry of Community Services was helpful to the SDWG. We had a two day workshop with members of that ministry*” (Interview 17).

\(^9\) The MPB Emergency Response Team is a team of representatives from eight provincial ministries responsible for coordinating a response to varied effects of the MPB epidemic (BC Integrated Land Management Bureau (ILMB) 2007).
5.3.4 Summary

With regard to the research question, participants commented on three factors which have assisted C-CBAC’s formation. First, based on past experiences, an impetus was needed to encourage regional collaboration in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. More specifically, an economic threat is more likely to encourage regional collaboration than threats to other dimensions (e.g. environmental or social). Having an impetus provides motivation, a central focus, and sustains interest by the local actors. Second, past models of regional collaboration have proven to be successful to some players, most notably repetitive regional leaders. This model has been replicated over time when those players are involved. Participants suggested that the same people – those repetitive regional leaders – have been involved in regional collaborations over time because they share a common interest in regional issues, they understand how to work together and come to workable solutions, and they have formed relationships with one another. Finally, external supports of funding and expertise from more senior levels of government have proven to be of great importance C-CBAC’s formation and for C-CBAC to pursue its achievements.

5.4 Hindering Factors

In considering the formation of governance institutions, factors which hinder or constrain their development must also be addressed (Lane 2003; Weber 2003). Given the role of relationships in governance, there is potential for social factors to place limitations on regional development (Portes 1998; Ali-Khan and Mulvihill 2008). Moreover, due to the embeddedness of regional development in a hierarchy of governmental powers, higher levels of government have the potential to hinder localized activities (Tonts 1999). In addition, the place’s history must also be considered as it will affect contemporary actions
(Massey 1984; Halseth et al. 2010). In this section, I will address the second part of my second research question, what factors may have impeded the formation of C-CBAC? To do this, I will draw on my three thematic findings of: exclusion, lack of institutionalized regional collaboration, and government policies and programs.

5.4.1 Exclusion

The social capital literature argues that when people work together and come to decisions, trust may be built among one another (Portes 1998; Beckley et al. 2008). However, a negative consequence of strong trust among a group of individuals is that it can lead to the exclusion of others (Sibley 1998; Anderson and Bell 2003; Hulse and Stone 2007). Waldinger (1995, 557, as quoted in Portes 1998, 15) argues, “the same social relations that ... enhance the ease and efficiency of economic exchanges among community members implicitly restrict outsiders.” As Putnam (2000) warns, when exclusion is raised as a negative effect, it may indicate that bonding social capital is so intensely formed that it limits new participation or new ideas. As such, exclusion can affect outcomes in governance and development. Exclusion was raised in my interviews along two dimensions: (A) it led to a small and concentrated decision-making Board, and (B) it resulted in some people being considered ‘inside’ and others ‘outside’ of the process.

5.4.1.1 Exclusive Board

Exclusion from C-CBAC was a concern for many participants (24/47). Exclusion was mostly discussed in the context of the decision-making Board (13/24); however, it was also raised with respect to the working groups (4/24) and the strategy development groups (3/24). Participants considered the Board to be exclusive because it was comprised of self-
appointed representatives who were explicit about controlling the size and composition of the Board. When other groups indicated that they wanted to be included in the Board, their participation was directed to an advisory role. As one participant indicated:

_They self-identified. I do not understand how a community-based entity can determine its own membership and then close that membership to anyone else who wants to participate. ... The unions wanted to be involved, but they were told that they could be on an advisory group. The business community wanted to be on it, but they were also told that they could be on the advisory group. I question who they are to determine who has the rights of decision-making on the Board and who is relegated to the advisory group?_ (Interview 20)

Participants specifically articulated that First Nations (5/24) and organized labour (5/24) were excluded from the Board. Also, some (8/24) indicated they were excluded from C-CBAC based on their geographic proximity within the region. Participants from the region’s periphery expressed that they did not feel as included in C-CBAC. Specifically, the Mayor of Wells was not invited to be a member of the Board (2/24), despite the fact that the Mayors from all other municipalities in the CRD were invited. Also, participants from other less central places, such as the municipality of Clinton (2/24) and the Chilcotin plateau (2/24), expressed that they felt left out of the process. As one participant commented:

_I have not been able to go to a lot of their meetings. Sometimes it seems that we do not hear about those meetings until the last minute. It is like we are an afterthought sometimes. We have not been as active in C-CBAC as 100 Mile House, Williams Lake, and Quesnel have been. We are kind of on the bottom-end of it. ... you only get out of it what you put into it. If you do not attend the meetings, you cannot expect to get that much back._ (Interview 21)

More than half of those who raised concerns around exclusion had been involved in one or less regional process (14/24), and specifically all minor licensees (3/3), and those who were involved with non-municipal economic development (2/2). Exclusion was raised by a little more than half of First Nation participants (3/5) and by half of the participants associated
with the social sector (3/6). Exclusion was not raised by major licensees (0/3) or those who were involved with agriculture (0/3). In terms of those with connections to C-CBAC, exclusion was raised by most participants associated with the EDWG (7/9).

Conversely, some participants (12/47) indicated that C-CBAC was inclusive. Some argued that the C-CBAC process was inclusive from the beginning (6/12) and others indicated that, as time went on, the process became more inclusive (6/12). Those who argued that the process was inclusive from the beginning indicated that participation was varied and diverse, as one participant stated: “C-CBAC really is huge – it has all the different social groups, forestry – from small scale salvage to the mill workers – conservation, and agriculture. They have worked to include all sectors” (Interview 01). Those who felt that the process became inclusive over time indicated that the Board was persuaded by the government and special interest groups to be more inclusive – most specifically to bring First Nations on to the decision-making Board. As one participant notes: “there was a big kafuffle about First Nations not being represented on the Board and the provincial government made a stipulation that they had to resolve that issue for any further money” (Interview 20). Most of those who felt that the process was inclusive from the beginning had been involved in one or less regional process (4/6). Most of those who noted that the process became more inclusive over time had generally been involved with the social sector (4/6).

5.4.1.2 Insiders and Outsiders of the Process

With exclusion, people are going to be considered inside of the process while others are outside of the process (Portes 1998). In my research, some participants (12/47)
suggested that C-CBAC had a group of insiders and that others are left outside of the
process. ‘Insiders’ of the C-CBAC process were typically active in the decision-making Board.
They were aware of the current state of C-CBAC’s funding progress, completion of sector
strategies, and general state of negotiation with higher levels of government. Conversely,
‘outsiders’ were typically not aware of C-CBAC’s general progress, nor sometimes even its
mandate.

Feelings of exclusion from the process are reflected in what participants felt that C-
CBAC could have done better. Most participants (24/47) addressed the issue of having trust
or mistrust in C-CBAC, and most (15/24) indicated that C-CBAC’s external communications
failed causing people to feel left ‘outside’ of the process because of lack of information. As
one participant notes:

*People who are at that leadership level understand the planning process that has
taken place, understand what is in place now, and understand that now is the time
to start the implementation. I think that the average citizen is very concerned that
they do not see any action happening. ... they do not see it because they have not
been involved in the process. They are out in left field somewhere.* (Interview 10)

Between May 2005 and August 2007, C-CBAC produced a newsletter in print and online that
was made widely available within and outside of the region. This newsletter informed
readers of varying aspects of the MPB, the epidemic, and the regional impacts of the
that they generally enjoyed this newsletter; it was used to stay informed about C-CBAC’s
activities. However, the newsletter ended abruptly after August 2007. This research was not
able to identify why the newsletter ended. The termination of the newsletter left at least
one participant feeling disconnected from the process:
I do not hear anything about it anymore. There is no longer a C-CBAC newsletter. ... I do not hear of any steps forward ... So, it becomes another one of these ‘yay, the region got together and we talked again about all of our complaints and all of our issues, but nothing was done again.’ That is frustrating. (Interview 18)

Feelings of being ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of the C-CBAC process, and the role of external communications in this, was also discussed by one participant who was considered to be ‘inside’ the C-CBAC process:

I think that the biggest thing that we did not do properly initially was our communications. We did not reach out far enough, soon enough and we paid for that over the first year. We did not reach out to the community at large ... We kind of played the inside game at first (Interview 44)

Feelings of being ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of the process were also reinforced in the use of language. Terms which indicate inclusion, such as ‘we’, were commonly used in reference to the Board by those who were involved with the founding of the organization, for example: “We then formed a society and got a representative from the CRD and we asked for three First Nation Chiefs to be a part of our society” (Interview 05). Alternatively, terms indicating less involvement or that something was happening external to oneself, such as ‘they’, were used by participants not involved in the formation of C-CBAC when discussing the Board. For example: “They made an honest attempt to include Aboriginal voices, though I do not think that they were particularly successful” (Interview 17). The concept of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the process was raised across the sampling framework with no discernable pattern.

Exclusion impacted the levels of trust that some people had in the organization.

When participants were asked if they had trust in C-CBAC, most (28/47) indicated that there were reasons which led them not to trust the Board. Participants had concerns with
communications (13/28) – they were either not aware of the general purpose of the organization (7/13) or they were not kept up-to-date on the organization’s activities (6/13). Furthermore, some (6/28) harboured suspicion that the Board was self-serving given their self-appointment (2/6) and connections to major licensees (3/6). Moreover, many (13/28) indicated that, to have trust in C-CBAC, is likely dependent on your respective ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ position in the process. It was perceived that ‘insiders’ are more likely to have more trust than ‘outsiders’ because they understand more about the organization’s activities. For example:

*I think that those who are engaged and involved feel that the process is working. They feel that they are doing the consultation and that they are doing the work. They do not understand why there is mistrust because they are engaged and involved.* (Interview 29)

Across the sampling frame, those who suggested reasons not to trust the Board included all those participants associated with municipal government staff (7/7) and organized labour (2/2). Furthermore, most participants from the EDWG (8/9), forestry (5/6), major resource extraction (4/5), and elected officials (5/6) indicated at least one reason which led them to have less trust in the Board.

**5.4.2 Lack of Institutionalized Regional Collaboration**

Looking at collaboration with a geographic lens necessitates that the role of place be considered. As Massey (1984, 9) argues, “in each place the local conditions/characteristics operate on general processes to produce a specific outcome.” Markey et al. (2009, 223) identify that, despite an expressed desire to collaborate regionally, the industrial development history of the northern and interior parts of BC “truncated the development of, and indeed the need for, inter-community dialogue and cooperation.” As such, my
research explores the impact of the region’s history of cooperation on today’s collaborative
efforts. Many participants (27/47) observed that towns within the Cariboo-Chilcotin are
unwilling to commit to a collaborative model of working together. They noted that, despite
municipalities frequently working with surrounding electoral areas on sub-regional joint
projects and for service provision, regional culture in the Cariboo-Chilcotin generally lacks
cooperative practice. Joint projects and service provision encourage interaction between
groups, but the delineation of roles, responsibilities, and timelines hinder iterative
collaborative practice. Factors which contributed to this culture, as identified in my case
study, included: not working together when there is not a threat, no history of inter-
municipal cooperation, economic protectionism, and political partisanship.

A lack of institutionalized collaborative practice in the Cariboo-Chilcotin is most
notably demonstrated by the lack of collaboration in the absence of a threat or crisis.
Participants were asked if they felt a regional group would have come together to address
regional development if the MPB epidemic had not occurred. Some participants (10/27)
mentioned that, in the absence of crisis, regional collaboration falls by the wayside. As one
participant explained: “There is so much other work to do – other projects. ... it takes a
disaster or something coming after you to get people to do something” (Interview 03).
Another participant commented that it is not part of their usual practice to collaborate
regionally: “without the MPB, it would have been business as usual” (Interview 27). Others
(6/27) expressed that demands of daily tasks are compounded by a lack of resources,
including staffing; financial resources for wages, mileage, and expenses; and time away
from an existing full-time position. For example, one participant drew on their experience of being part of a small staff in their office and being a part of the EDWG:

> everybody thought that there was value in the meetings and discussions ..., but it came down to who could commit to attend on a regular basis and still keep up with their regular work. ...The regional concept is great, but it comes down to: how do you resource participation? (Interview 02)

Across the sampling frame, no one involved in the SDWG (0/4), GWG (0/5), or municipal staff (0/7) raised the issue of regional collaboration only happening in response to a crisis. It was only raised by one person associated with tourism (1/3). Those who suggested that regional collaboration will only happen during a crisis were typically observers of collaborative processes (3/10), including most First Nation participants (3/5). Concerns about the resourcing of regional collaboration were raised mostly by working group participants (5/8) and minor licensees (2/3).

Some (8/27) participants observed that a history of inter-town rivalry in the region contributes to the lack of regional collaboration. By most accounts of this rivalry, it has always existed. Participants were unable to point to specific reasons for the existence of these rivalries and, but they continue to be socially reproduced. For example, one participant commented:

> there is a lot of mistrust and old history. ... Friction continues from events that happened ten years ago between long-time electoral area CRD directors and councilors from [this municipality] who have served for a long time. This is where there is mistrust. (Interview 06)

This history – although it may not be personally known by those presently involved in local government – continued to stifle regional collaboration. As another participant stated: “[the history of] a lack of cooperation [means] that people are not likely to cooperate now”
Moreover, these rivalries are deeply embedded in social phenomena which make them challenging to address. As raised by another participant:

*the idea that you can take very different and distinct urban centres, especially in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, and come up with a regional economic development model that makes sense for all of them and not have it fall into turf protection – it would take a second coming of Christ to make that happen. Williams Lake, 100 Mile House, and Quesnel are very different from each other in their make-up, their psyche, their old boys’ networks, and how the communities are run.* (Interview 20)

Across the sampling frame, this issue was raised mostly by participants from 100 Mile House (3/8) and Quesnel (3/8), and by most Mayors (3/4).

Economic protectionism was another factor that participants felt contributes to the unwillingness to collaborate regionally in the Cariboo-Chilcotin today. Some (11/27) mentioned that there is competition between towns for economic development. This competition stems from the need to attract and protect initiatives within jurisdictional boundaries resulting in development silos. It was also noted that municipal staff and elected representatives are supported by local taxpayers and constituents, and the primary responsibility of these people is to serve local needs first. As a result, some felt that there was a mismatch between the need to provide basic local services and being open to discussing regional development. Sentiments about regional development were that, at best, it may assist the local economy. But, it also has the potential to harm the local economy if, for example, a town were to lose an economic initiative to a neighbouring town. As one participant commented:

*I get paid by the residents in this city and I have an obligation that I do my best to ensure financial stability and that I protect our tax base ... My counterpart in [another city], that is what [their] role is. [That person] really does not care if I lose a mill and likewise with [my counterpart] in [another city]. There is that inherent*
competition amongst jurisdictions within a region. ... this notion to take this holistic approach of regional economic development is off message. (Interview 12)

This same participant also remarked: “A lot of these processes, such as C-CBAC, I am not sure how they are going to help me achieve that objective” (Interview 12). The notion of economic protectionism between towns was raised by all local government staff (7/7) and by half of the Mayors (2/4).

Finally, political partisanship, or alliances to provincial political parties, was identified as a barrier to regional cooperation in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. Some (6/27) noted that this is a challenge when trying to work on regional initiatives because these ideologies can cause friction, divide groups, and distract from regional initiatives. For example, one participant recalled how partisan alliances interfered with Board decisions:

This Board became very susceptible to that partisan thinking. This was a dysfunction that grew as the coalition evolved. It has impacted our effectiveness because, when it came time to make difficult choices, they had already drawn lines in the sand about who would support who because of the politics. (Interview 26)

This was echoed by another participant who noticed the prevalence of partisanship as a barrier to regional collaboration: “We are a very political region. You have strong Liberals and NDPs. This creates a big divide between groups and it surfaces at every meeting” (Interview 18). Political partisanship as a barrier to regional collaboration was raised by most local government staff (4/7), particularly those who were involved in economic development (3/4), likely because they work closely with elected officials but are at enough of a distance to identify factors which prevent coming to decisions. Political partisanship was raised by only one elected official (1/8) and not by any Mayors (0/4).
5.4.3 Government Policies and Programs

The regional development literature argues that senior levels of government have the potential to play an important role in the negotiation of successful regional development (Polèse and Shearmur 2006; Markey et al. 2007). However, different from the past, no single model will be effective in all regions (Savoie 1997). Participants discussed limitations to a ‘one size fits all’ approach in my interviews. Moreover, the new regional development literature outlines that government policies can undermine local or regional initiatives (Tonts and Jones 1997; Tonts 1999; Beer et al. 2005). Clear distinctions were made between the limitations posed by federal and provincial governments.

5.4.3.1 Federal Jurisdiction

Many participants (29/47) spoke of the federal government in my interviews, particularly when asked about the role of higher levels of government in the formation of C-CBAC and about what C-CBAC has done well. Most (24/29) associated the federal government with being a source of funding for economic development. As one participant observed: “C-CBAC got funding from the federal government to address economic issues of ... the MPB” (Interview 39). The provision of funding by the federal government was raised by all of those who were involved with non-municipal economic development (2/2), and most First Nations (4/5), municipally elected (6/8), and local government staff (5/7).

Funding provided by the federal government was welcomed by participants, but some (10/29) highlighted that provisions to gain access to funding create more work for those ‘on the ground’ and is distracting from other work. Participants expressed how funding, particularly that from the federal government, is provided on a project-by-project basis and is based on the development of new projects. This is particularly challenging
because time and energy is then spent meeting the criteria for the 'project of the day' rather than focusing on long-term needs for place-based development, as suggested by one participant:

_This is one of the frustrating things in dealing with all these funding programs. They are still mired in a 1970s mentality – particularly the federal programs – all funding opportunities are largely project-driven. ... this approach has to be fundamentally rethought. Get rid of project-driven funding. It is skewing your priorities when you consider your eligibility criteria. We are trying to satisfy the priorities of the funding agencies rather than satisfy the priorities of the city. Quite often there is a fair degree of distance between the two. ... They are asking us to manufacture projects and some are so ridiculous._ (Interview 12)

Project-based funding places limitations on what participants can do, for example: "If they only give us $10,000 for a literacy program, or $50,000 for projects like the Spirit Square, those are fine, but they are not the answer" (Interview 11). This is supported by another participant:

_We can already see that communities have to massage their grant requests to such a degree to fit criteria ... Our communities know what we need and ... that should be good enough. Those needs should not have to be massaged to meet criteria that satisfy the federal government..._ (Interview 17)

Across the sampling frame, the issue of project-based funding was raised mostly by those who have participated in three or more regional processes (5/10).

The most commonly mentioned federal funding department was WED (12/24), and some participants (9/12) specifically noted WED’s Community Economic Development Initiative (CEDI) program\(^\text{10}\) (Table 5.4).

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\(^{10}\) CEDI is a two-year federal program instituted by WED in January 2007 to assist with diversification of forest-dependent places impacted by the MPB epidemic (WED 2009).
Table 5.4  Federal Government Funding Sources, as identified by participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Funding Branch/Program</th>
<th># of Participants Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Economic Diversification (WED)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDI</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government of Canada $1 billion MPB response</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal gas tax</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment Agriculture Foundation</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Participants were divided in how they perceived WED’s CEDI program. Those associated with the Board who raised the CEDI program (2/2) were opposed to the program. They felt that program-based funding through CEDI was not well coordinated with the regional approach that C-CBAC was working towards, as explained by one participant:

...forces that pull it [regional collaboration] apart include things such as the federal government’s $34 million grant through WED – the Community Economic Development Initiative. Everything that was going on in our area regionally was basically dropped because WED had said that they were not interested in regional stuff... The EDWG virtually disintegrated that week because those very same resources had to be reallocated to CEDI applications. So, we had spent two and a half years getting communities to collaborate and work together and not be in competition because they had spent the last 20 years being in competition for provincial and federal funds. In a week, WED destroyed that whole two and a half years’ worth of work without even knowing it. (Interview 26)

The Board’s view of CEDI was countered by those associated with the EDWG. Those associated with the EDWG who raised the CEDI program (7/7) were in favour of applying to the funding, despite not being able to do so through C-CBAC. They noted that the program did not fit with the mandate of C-CBAC, but most (5/7) recalled that EDWG participants came together to form an ‘informal’ regional economic group. This informal group, they observed, was based on the working relationships developed between one another while developing strategies for C-CBAC, as one participant stated: “Many of us who were involved in the EDWG had not worked together before. We formed working relationships that have
led to several proposals. As professionals, we are continuing to work together where it makes sense” (Interview 23). This sentiment was supported by another participant: “WED put out a proposal call which did not fit within the parameters of C-CBAC’s mandate. So, the technical staff from the EDWG from the region got together some joint proposals to apply to WED” (Interview 06). That some members of the EDWG continued to work together, but not as the formal C-CBAC EDWG, demonstrates the development of successful working relationships amongst those individuals. However, this was in contrast to how the Board members viewed the ‘success’ of the EDWG: “We are still trying to continue the EDWG, but we have not met since [the CEDI funding was announced], so we are not being very successful” (Interview 26). Most participants who discussed the ‘informal’ technical group were associated with municipal economic development (4/5) and one was from a First Nation group (1/5). Although the program did not necessarily work against the formation of C-CBAC, it was not well aligned with C-CBAC’s goals and intentions. This despite the fact they were calling for federal investment in the MPB epidemic affected regions to address development. CEDI, as an example of the ‘one size fits all’ program-based funding approach, is not an effective initiative because it lacks sensitivity to the needs of the given place (Bradford 2005). This approach is effective for administration, but does not produce regions which are pursuing their own development trajectories.

5.4.3.2 Provincial Jurisdiction

Many participants (21/47) spoke of the provincial government when asked about the role of higher levels of government in the formation of C-CBAC. No policies were associated directly with C-CBAC’s formation; however, most (17/21) identified at least one
specific piece of legislation, program, or general policy direction which they felt had impacted the region. In total, 12 different pieces of legislation, programs, or general policy directions were raised by 17 people (Table 5.5). Most again (15/17) expressed that the impact was negative.

Across the sampling frame, those who addressed the provincial government (21/47) included all municipal government staff (5/5), and nearly all who were associated with forestry (5/6). Conversely, the provincial government was rarely raised by First Nation participants (1/5) or municipally elected participants (1/7). Those who raised specific actions by the provincial government were generally associated with forestry (5/6) or municipal staff (4/6). Negative impacts were raised by most minor licensees (2/3), but not by major licensees (0/2).

Table 5.5 Provincial Impacts in the Region, as identified by participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provincial Policy or Program Challenge</th>
<th># of Participants Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Removal of appurtenancy clauses</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Big business-oriented policies</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry office closures/cutbacks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of investment in MPB related issues</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced regional economic development function</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of interest in community development</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of investment in small business</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offloading of costs/responsibilities to lower levels of government (e.g. homelessness initiatives)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offloading of costs/responsibilities to industry</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privatization of natural resources</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Removal of private lands from TFLs</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Charter s.226</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Some participants raised more than one policy or program challenge.

The removal of appurtenancy clauses from timber tenures was the most commonly noted policy change which has impacted the region (6/17). Part of timber tenures,
appurtenancy clauses linked harvesting rights with requirements to process timber close to the point of extraction (Harshaw 2000). These clauses were considered social provisions within BC forest policy to foster employment stability in forest-dependent places (Markey et al. 2005; Young and Matthews 2007). The removal of these clauses contributes to vulnerable economic futures in forest-dependant places in BC. As one participant explained:

*The removal of appurtenancy clauses has caused a lot of uncertainty in some communities. This has allowed major licensees to close down a mill and the wood is taken to a more profitable mill at the expense of the economy of the local community.* (Interview 37)

The removal of appurtenancy clauses led to concerns about the provincial government’s commitment to the social lives of those who live in forest-dependent places. As one participant commented: “*with the loss of appurtenancy, there is no social contract any more for rural BC*” (Interview 23). This complements the perception of a few (2/17) participants that the provincial government was focused on the well-being of big businesses. As stated by another participant:

*...it seems like the changes that they [the provincial government] have brought in are more of a benefit to big licensees – like the changes to appurtenancy clauses. They seem to make it easier for major licensees to do business.* (Interview 30)

The removal of appurtenancy clauses was raised by half of those associated with the forest industry (3/6), especially minor licensees (2/3).

### 5.4.4 Summary

Participants highlighted a number of limiting factors in the formation, and maintenance, of C-CBAC. First, the well-lubricated social networks which facilitated the formation of C-CBAC has also limited the organization. Exclusion was observed in the Board and supported by the perceptions of there being ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the decision-
making processes. Second, an historical pattern of a lack of collaboration exists in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region. This pattern is defined by collaboration only for crisis response. Finally, funding programs by more senior levels of government are a hindrance to the continuation of regional collaboration in the Cariboo-Chilcotin because they do not support place-specific needs. In the case of C-CBAC, funding programs by more senior levels of government could have supported a regional application by C-CBAC to help them meet their goals. These programs take on a 'one size fits all' approach which leave no flexibility for the intricacies of place.

5.5 Sampling Framework Analysis

Further to this summary of the research findings, analysis across the sampling frame reveals a set of patterns. First, across most findings, there are patterns relative to 'insiders' and 'outsiders' in regional development planning in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. Based on this study, insider groups included those who have been involved in regional discussions over time, those who have been involved in multiple organizations and processes, those who were aware of C-CBAC's process, those who were involved with C-CBAC's three working groups, and those who had been involved with the Board (founding and/or current). Outsider groups included those involved with tourism, small forestry licensees, and those who had been involved with groups who have not experienced success with regional collaboration in the past (e.g. the conservation side of the debate in the C-CLUP process). This pattern emerged as insider groups had similar responses to one another and their commentary regularly opposed that of the outsider groups. One nuance within this pattern is the position of First Nations. Their commentary seemed to align with that of the
‘outsiders’, but, in this sample, their expressed opinions positioned them as extreme outsiders to C-CBAC.

In addition to the insider/outsider groupings noted above, there is also the case of those associated with (local) government, including staff and elected officials. They seemed to raise issues which other groups did not raise. They also addressed issues uniquely, particularly with reference to factors which hindered C-CBAC’s formation (e.g. government policies and programs). This is likely due to their somewhat unique relationship with senior governments, as compared to other groups (e.g. industry or not-for-profits).

5.6 Conclusion
Data from the interviews and other documentation help us to understand the intersections of complex factors in the governing of rural regional development. Forces from above, such as the roles of, and assistance from, more senior levels of government, and forces from below, such as legacies from historical approaches to regional development and the social dynamics of a small group of dedicated people, intersect with the physical characteristics of place, such as the occurrence of the MPB epidemic, to create unique challenges and opportunities for regional development.

This case study demonstrates that C-CBAC may be a new approach to rural regional development in Canada. In contrast to previous approaches, C-CBAC, as a governance organization which is ‘closer to the ground’, has been provided with the opportunity and responsibility of developing regional development plans. However, similar to previous processes, the organization has not been provided with authority over the implementation of such plans. Factors which assisted this regionally-based organization’s governance
include having an impetus to bring regional decision-makers together. A history of working
together among a small group provided the vital social lubricants for the organization to
respond quickly based on a previous model of collaboration. Finally, more senior levels of
government provided financial and some non-financial supports to facilitate the formation
of C-CBAC. However, factors which hindered C-CBAC include the tight social cohesion and
social capital of the group which initiated the organization. Exclusion in this group hindered
the development of trust which local residents and more senior levels of government
needed in the organization. Funding provided by more senior levels of government, such as
the CEDI program, hinder the ability of regionally-based organizations to pursue place-
based development trajectories.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter links my research results to key concepts from the literature to discuss responses to the central research questions (Table 6.1). In response to my first research question, to what extent is C-CBAC representative of dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development?, I compare the scale and structure of decision-making in C-CBAC to that of more dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development. The effectiveness of C-CBAC's model of development decision-making is critically analyzed. In response to my second research question, what factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC?, I assess the role of three factors: the history of regional activity, the emergence of the MPB epidemic, and a transition towards neoliberal policies by more senior levels of government.
### Table 6.1 Discussion Guide: Relationship of Themes/Literatures to Research Questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Section Heading</th>
<th>Theme(s)/Literature(s) Addressed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent is C-CBAC representative of dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development?</td>
<td>Scale and Structure of Decision-Making</td>
<td>• Senior governments devolved decision-making to more local levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• C-CBAC is not autonomous because no jurisdiction/authority was devolved</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Recommendations not implemented; abandonment?</td>
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<td>What factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC?</td>
<td>The Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic</td>
<td>• Economic crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>History of Regional Activity</td>
<td>• Impetus for regional collective action</td>
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<td>• Common rural response</td>
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<td>Transition Towards Neoliberal Policies by Senior Governments</td>
<td>• Past provided opportunity for development of social cohesion and social capital; small group of regional leaders; ‘winners’ of past</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• High social capital among group resulted in exclusion of ‘outsiders’ in C-CBAC</td>
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<td>• Coordinated public policy approach abandoned (‘roll-back neoliberalism’)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Decision-making devolved to more local levels; senior governments provide funding (‘roll-out neoliberalism’)</td>
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<td>• Funding does not meet place-based needs</td>
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### 6.2 Scale and Structure of Decision-Making: Then and Now

In traditional Canadian rural regional development, decision-making was the jurisdiction of the central state (Savoie 1992). Decisions were made in economic and political centres by senior government officials. Given their lack of involvement in the decision-making process, the given region is treated as an “empty vessel” (Markey et al. 2005, 111) – a spatial unit where money is provided and private investment is encouraged so as to propel the region down the path to self-sustaining wealth generation. However, traditional approaches to rural regional development were not successful in producing the desired results (Fairbairn 1998).
The ineffectiveness of traditional regional development initiatives was influenced by the government’s lack of knowledge and experience with the issues (Paquet et al. 2000). As Markey et al. (2005) argue, the federal government was driven by abstract and weak deficiency-based theories which did not consider the intricacies of place. Since the 1980s, the tradition of ‘top-down’ government intervention in regional development has not continued and “the failure of regional development strategies in Canada ... is a contributing factor to the rising interest in community-based ... development [initiatives]” (Markey et al. 2005, 116). Others argue that the change in scale occurs because the central state is no longer equipped to address rural regional development (Polèse 1999; Keating 2003). The result is that rural regional development decision-making is now assumed by local actors.

In BC, a number of voluntary governance organizations have formed to address issues of rural regional development (Table 6.2). The emergence of more localized, voluntary governance organizations to address rural regional development signals a change from traditional approaches in Canadian rural regional development decision-making. The differences which define this trend of devolution are the scale at which decisions are made and who is involved in the decision-making structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formed</th>
<th>Organization Name</th>
<th>Geography</th>
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<tr>
<td>February 2005</td>
<td>C-CBAC</td>
<td>Central Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2005</td>
<td>OBAC</td>
<td>North-Central Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>16-97 Economic Alliance</td>
<td>North-Central Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>SIBAC</td>
<td>South Interior</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the case of C-CBAC, decision-making occurs within the region by an organization comprised of regional residents. This is in contrast to traditional approaches where
decisions were made by individuals and organizations which were external to the region (Savoie 1992). Moreover, C-CBAC’s decision-making structure includes public, private, and not-for-profit sectors. This more participatory model may recognize the complex system of local governing and community politics. As Edge and McAllister (2009, 280) note, “local government ... [is] only one of a number of actors involved in overall system of governance that includes a network of public and private organizations and members of civil society.” This more participatory model is in contrast to traditional approaches where senior level public officials were the only actors involved (Fairbairn 1998).

At first glance, C-CBAC seems to be a ‘bottom-up’ organization that is provided the opportunity to take control of their future regional development. As Bruce (1997) notes, a ‘bottom-up’ organization is driven by local vision, leadership, commitment, and strives for self-help. C-CBAC self-organized in the region by the initiative of leadership from within and the final report reflects the vision and commitment of those involved with the process. Moreover, the use of phrases in promotion of the organization, such as “Creating Local Solutions to the Mountain Pine Beetle Challenge” (C-CBAC 2006c, 1), demonstrates C-CBAC’s self-help initiative. As such, C-CBAC can be considered a ‘bottom-up’ organization. However, this research challenges the assumption that C-CBAC was provided the opportunity to take control of their future.

‘Bottom-up’ organizations are challenged by a lack of control, or when jurisdiction is retained ‘from above’ (House 1999). For example, as Lockwood et al. (2009, 174) note in the Australian context, “governments appear to have responded to pressures for assistance and action on ... [local] problems by distributing funding and responsibilities to regional bodies
without devolving the necessary degree of power and autonomy they need to be successful.” In the BC context, Markey et al. (2006, 35) note, there is a “gap between regional aspirations and the region’s ability to actually control the levers of development.”

In the example of C-CBAC, financial control was not devolved. C-CBAC received incremental funding to develop regional development plans. Between 2005 and 2009, C-CBAC was provided with over $3,000,000 in many smaller installments. Each installment supported a disparate part of the region’s larger diversification plan. However, when significant funds were made available to assist community development in areas affected by the MPB epidemic, they were provided to a separate regional organization – one enacted by legislation.

Policy control was not devolved. Participants note that the implementation of C-CBAC’s regional diversification plan hinges on funding provided by the provincial government, indicating that the success of their plan is out of their direct control. As Markey et al. (2006, 35) note, “economic development priorities and strategies developed for rural and remote regions that ... hinge on the decisions of distant and urban political ... elites are likely to fail.” As such, C-CBAC, as a ‘bottom-up’, governance organization, is challenged by their lack of jurisdiction to fulfill their plans for regional development.

Given that financial and policy control were not devolved, C-CBAC is a regional governance organization without authority or jurisdiction. The members of C-CBAC perceived themselves to be in the driver’s seat as they directed their future development trajectories, but the provincial government systematically kept them in an advisory capacity. Thus, this research suggests that the situation of C-CBAC as a ‘top-down’ and
‘bottom-up’ process is a façade; the province has not genuinely supported the beetle action coalitions.

Some question why such regional organizations form if the intent is not to empower local residents:

“... considerable shift has occurred towards strategies of local community development and rural ‘self-help’ ... [However] many suspect that this movement towards ‘bottom-up’ processes is as yet more rhetorical than real, since they continue to be absorbed within existing institutional and organisational structures, and may, therefore amount to little more than an additional mechanism for top-down intervention” (Day 1998, 99, as quoted in Little 2001, 100).

In his investigation of C-CBAC’s governance, Parkins (2008) argues that the provincial and federal governments retain a central role in funding and designing the MPB epidemic response in BC, concluding that C-CBAC is an extension of provincial ‘top-down’ regulation.

However, the model adopted by C-CBAC – a ‘bottom-up’ approach to regional development – is preferred by participants. The model is preferred because participants feel they are in control and have autonomy in the situation. ‘Bottom-up’ models ideally represent a provision of “the means and opportunities for communities to solve their own problems” (Bruce 1997, 40).

However, as the literature warns, ‘bottom-up’ models may not be effective unless they work in concert with supports from more senior levels of government (Bruce 1997; Martin and Ritchie 1999; Markey et al. 2005). As Uphoff (1992, 273, as quoted in Woolcock and Narayan 2000, 238) notes,

“... ‘top-down’ efforts are usually needed to introduce, sustain, and institutionalize ‘bottom-up’ development. We are commonly constrained to think in ‘either-or’ terms – the more of one the less of the other – when both are needed in a positive-sum way to achieve our purposes.”
The case of C-CBAC supports the notion that ‘bottom-up’ models may not be effective when acting in isolation.

C-CBAC’s complete and final report was submitted to the provincial government in October 2008. However, the provincial government has not acted on any recommendations contained in that final report. Moreover, the three successfully funded positions that stemmed from C-CBAC’s preliminary recommendations were terminated after their initial one-year contract. As such, the C-CBAC process has not yet been able to achieve its mandate: “to ensure that our communities are economically stable, that there are jobs in all sectors, and support the entrepreneurial spirit that is fundamental to the Cariboo-Chilcotin lifestyle” (C-CBAC 2005b, 3). Provincial inactivity on the final report’s recommendations and the presently unfulfilled mandate suggest that C-CBAC’s ‘bottom-up’ approach may not be an effective alternative to traditional Canadian approaches.

However, using Putnam’s (2000) concept of bridging social capital, there may be other ways for C-CBAC’s final recommendations to be implemented. The individuals involved with C-CBAC’s Board, working groups, and strategy development groups, are involved with many other organizations (Appendix E). This demonstrates that C-CBAC, as a regional development group, is embedded in the networks of hundreds of other groups – which operate within and beyond the Cariboo-Chilcotin. As the individuals are bridged into these other groups, there may be alternate opportunities for C-CBAC’s recommendations to be operationalized through other avenues.
6.3  The Formation of C-CBAC: Assisting and Hindering Factors

This research also considers the role of three variables in the formation of C-CBAC: the MPB epidemic, the history of regional activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, and the contemporary adoption of neoliberal policies by the Canadian federal and British Columbian provincial governments. Research results confirm that each variable impacted C-CBAC’s formation to varying degrees. Each, and how it impacted C-CBAC’s formation, is discussed below.

6.3.1  The Mountain Pine Beetle Epidemic

Research participants overwhelmingly identified the MPB epidemic as the primary impetus in C-CBAC’s formation. Despite other variables, participants expressed that there would not be initiative for regional activity without the ‘beetle.’ The visual impact of maps showing the expanse of the MPB epidemic in the region (C-CBAC 2005b), the impact of seeing red-attack pine trees in forests as people drive or fly in the region, C-CBAC’s newsletter distribution which emphasized the economic impact of the MPB epidemic, and the prominent use of the term ‘beetle’ in most of C-CBAC’s public communication (Figure 6.1) all contributed to the explicit and constant reminders about the immediacy of the threat that the MPB epidemic posed to the region’s predominantly pine forest-based economy. As such, most participants attribute the formation of C-CBAC directly to the emergence of the MPB epidemic and the threat to the regional economy. It was expressed that a regional threat required a regional response. As such, the MPB epidemic, and the corresponding economic threat, is a variable which assisted C-CBAC’s formation.
Various sources document how rural places respond to threats or crises by forming a committee or group to address the issue (Fitchen 1991; O'Toole and Burdess 2004). This rural collective response is attributed to small population size and patterns of daily living in rural and small town places. First, given the relatively low population numbers in many rural and small town places, residents are more likely to have greater interaction with one another on a more frequent basis. Thus, residents can become familiar one another in various dimensions of daily life (Martinez-Brawley 2000). Moreover, the lack of formal service provision in many rural and small town places results in residents collaborating to provide for the community (Saarinen 1999). As such, when faced with a threat or crisis, residents organize amongst themselves to provide support and cope with the stress of change (Fitchen 1991). Particularly when faced with an economic threat, rural and small town places organize to respond (Martin 1997; Griffin 2008).

In the case of C-CBAC, a physical environmental factor – the MPB epidemic – posed a threat to the region’s social and economic way of life. The MPB epidemic has the potential
for serious negative impacts to the region’s pine forests, which provide for the region’s primary industrial base. As such, C-CBAC formed to address the threat posed by the MPB epidemic.

### 6.3.2 The History of Regional Activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin

A small group of regional ‘leaders’ has emerged from the experience of regional collective action in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. The group has variably addressed regional issues of land use planning and economic development in the Cariboo-Chilcotin for over 20 years. When faced with a new regional issue such as the MPB epidemic, some of the same individuals came together to address its impacts, including land use planning and economic development. Some were involved with the initiation of C-CBAC and others were called on as the organization developed.

Concepts of social cohesion and social capital can be used to understand how and why these specific individuals came together to address the MPB epidemic. Social cohesion is the extent to which a group of people achieves a shared sense of values and cooperation (Beckley 1994); it is developed through interactions based on similarities (Davidson and Cotter 1986). Portes (1998, 7) notes that, “by being thrown together in a common situation, [participants] learn to identify with each other and support each other’s initiatives.” Thus, those continually involved in past regional processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin are similar in that they have the tendency to get involved in regional issues and have learned to develop a shared sense of the issues. Moreover, “social ties can ... provide privileged access to resources” (Portes 1998, 21). Particularly given the political nature of many of the regional processes in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, these individuals have a certain level of influence over
others. Thus, a network of regional ‘leaders’ exists in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. When the MPB epidemic arose, and it was realized that the issue required a regional response, the network was lubricated by existing social cohesion. This facilitated C-CBAC’s relatively quick formation.

When goals were achieved in the past, individuals developed trust amongst one another. However, trust was not developed homogenously by all participants. As Jaffe and Quark (2006, 219) note, “success demands focusing on some goals as opposed to others and privileging some interests at the expense of others.” Thus, the ‘winners’ of past processes saw their collective efforts positively reinforced.

Trust within a group is a positive measure of the existence of ‘social capital’ – the norms and networks vital to facilitating collective action (Woolcock 2001; Beckley et al. 2008). Social capital can lend to social control, support, and benefit a group of people (Portes 1998). In the case of C-CBAC, those who had worked together and developed trust in one another in previous regional processes knew that they could trust those people in another regional exercise. Thus, these relationships were a source of capital to be drawn upon to achieve productive ends (Beckley et al. 2008). Because of the social capital, C-CBAC members have confidence in one another to follow-through on the issue. The existence of trust among some individuals prior to the MPB epidemic also facilitated C-CBAC’s formation.

However, social capital must be maintained through iterative processes of interaction (Miller 1997). The subsequent commitment of the same people to the next endeavour reinforces the trusting relationship. Unlike other forms of capital, if social capital
is not maintained, it can degrade (Miller 1997). Maintaining social capital is challenging in such a large region. Participants noted that, for example, personal meetings were preferred over phone calls or emails. Thus, to ‘be a part of the loop’, one must attend meetings. Personal attendance is a challenge for those who live in more remote areas. Moreover, these people generally noted that their participation was not funded (e.g. it was not part of their paid job). Personal costs are associated with overcoming challenges, such as fuel, vehicle maintenance, accommodations, meals, time away from their paid position, and, sometimes, multiple days away from home. Those who are unable to afford these costs are unable to participate in the iterative interactions required to maintain social capital. Thus, the process can be systematically exclusionary.

However, social capital also hindered C-CBAC. As the literature notes, if social capital becomes too strong within one group, then others can be excluded (Portes 1998). The dimensions of bridging and bonding social capital can be used to explore this issue in greater depth (Putnam 2000).

The regional ‘leaders’ who formed C-CBAC began with no social capital in the CORE process. In the CORE process, disparate interest sectors worked together to address regional planning and future developments, but they did not know or trust one another. Through the CORE and C-CLUP processes, they formed bridging social capital. These intergroup ties were strengthened through subsequent opportunities for regional interaction (e.g. C-CLUP, CEAF, and CRRB) to the point where, by the time the MPB epidemic arose, bridging social capital had transformed to bonding social capital – they were becoming a more cohesive network group. Bonding social capital are the strong ties which exclude
others, and this was seen in the self-identification of C-CBAC and the exclusion that others feel from the group. However, the group was challenged because they no longer knew how to bridge to ‘outside’ groups when the new issue emerged.

My results demonstrate that there are clear distinctions between who was inside and outside of C-CBAC. ‘Outsiders’ to the process felt excluded for different reasons. First, some participants expressed that they were interested in being involved with the Board, but that their participation was directed to the working groups or strategy development. Second, some participants were not aware of the progress of C-CBAC’s initiatives because they had not heard anything lately; they expected that those who were ‘inside’ the process knew the progress. Thus, the Board communication caused some to feel outside of the process. Exclusion, which resulted from social capital existing amongst a small group, reduced C-CBAC’s ability to develop beyond its initial membership – a negative consequence of social capital (Portes 1998).

First Nations have been largely absent from previous regional processes and their involvement with C-CBAC has been limited. Beginning with the CORE process, First Nations were invited to the process as a stakeholder, but they have not participated to the extent that others have for various reasons. To start, the region has a long history of colonialism which has not been meaningfully addressed (Skelton 1980; Furniss 1999). This history carries into today’s unsettled rights and title over land and resources (Furniss 1999). There are also concerns about the internal capacity among First Nations to participate in such a process and, finally, there are concerns with First Nations being invited to the table as a
stakeholder equivalent to industry or conservation and not as a governmental body (BC CORE 1994a; Furniss 1999).

However, concepts of social cohesion and social capital can also be used to partly understand the (dis-)connection between First Nations and the C-CBAC Board. As the literature states, social cohesion and social capital are developed through processes of interaction (Davidson and Cotter 1986). The lack of participation by First Nation representatives in past regional collaborative efforts limited opportunities for regional ‘leaders’ to engage with First Nations to the extent that they have with one another. As such, there are no established channels of communication. Networks and trust have not developed because the social ties are not present (Woolcock 2001). This is demonstrated in how C-CBAC Directors invited First Nations to join the Board. Existing Directors established that First Nations could be represented by one individual per language group within the Cariboo-Chilcotin region. This was decided upon without input from First Nations. This arrangement did not work for First Nations because language groups are not culturally, politically, socially, or economically homogenous. Thus, from the beginning, it is evident that there was not a shared sense of values and cooperation, and that the opportunity to develop social cohesion or social capital was diminished.

As such, while social cohesion and social capital among a group of regional ‘leaders’ facilitated C-CBAC’s quick formation, the process by which social capital is maintained and the tight-knit (bonded) group that resulted from calling on the ‘old boys’ club excluded others from participating in C-CBAC’s decision-making Board. Bridging social capital may be an avenue by which some of C-CBAC’s recommendations may be implemented if not
directly and formally supported by senior governments. As such, the case of C-CBAC demonstrates how social cohesion and social capital can facilitate and limit an organization.

6.3.3 Transition Towards Neoliberal Policies by Senior Governments

Historically successful rural regional development in BC (of the WAC Bennett era) was characterized by long-term commitments to hinterland development, policy which coordinated economic and social development, and large investment strategies (Loo 2004; Markey et al. 2008). As Young and Matthews (2007, 178) note, “rural development [under the Bennett government] involved the simultaneous expansion of rural industry and settlement.” Thus, places had much support from the provincial government through this period of growth. However, since the 1980s, the provincial government has increasingly removed itself from rural regional development. As Polèse (1999) notes, more senior levels of government are abandoning rural regional development responsibilities because their efforts have not resolved regional inequities.

The vacation of this role by the provincial government, and subsequent abandonment of rural and small town places, is linked to broader neoliberal policy movements (Young and Matthews 2007). In the framework of neoliberalism, the provincial government has “rolled-back” their involvement; they have actively deconstructed and discredited institutions developed in a Keynesian framework (Peck and Tickell 2002, 384). As the provincial government has removed itself, voluntary groups formed in some places to address issues of rural regional development. This supports work by MacKinnon et al. (2002) and others (Portes 1998; Whittaker and Banwell 2002) who suggest that ‘governing through community’ is a neoliberal strategy, whereby the state has drawn on notions of
rural self-help and assumed social characteristics which can substitute for economic
intervention as a way to ‘offload’ or reduce their services. Thus, the provincial government
facilitated the formation of C-CBAC by creating the ‘space’ for them to self-organize.

Also within the neoliberal framework, Peck and Tickell (2002, 384) note that the
converse side to ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ is ‘roll-out neoliberalism’, “an emergent phase of
active state-building ... focused on the purposeful construction and consolidation of
neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations.” In the case of C-
CBAC, the provincial government ‘rolled-out’ a number of supports to help the organization
get off the ground. The provincial and federal governments provided operational funding
for the group to organize itself and to develop a regional diversification plan. The provincial
government also provided some expertise and support through the inter-Ministry MPB
Emergency Response Team (BC ILMB 2007). Thus, the provincial government ‘rolled-out’
supports to C-CBAC which kept them at a distance from the central state and these supports
facilitated C-CBAC’s formation.

Moreover, the provincial government removed itself from rural regional
development and instituted non-state supports for voluntary organizations to address these
issues with very little resistance from rural areas (Young and Matthews 2007). In fact,
participants expressed great appreciation to the provincial government for letting regional
residents address regional development. They felt that they were provided with the
autonomy to address issues which affected them. However, the provincial government also
hindered the effectiveness of the organization. Jurisdiction – financial and policy control
over the decisions made – was not provided to C-CBAC. Their role in developing an
expansive regional development plan was more in the capacity of an advisory committee, rather than a decision-making committee. After the final Regional Diversification Plan was complete, no funding or supports were provided by the provincial government to implement the plan.

This research also concludes that some regions are going to be better equipped to cope in the same situation. As Massey (1984, 9) notes, “each region was distinct (unique) before the process took place, and in each place the local conditions/characteristics operated on the general process to produce a specific outcome.” This research demonstrates that regional governance organizations may form in response to more macro-political or economic forces, but given the presence of unique local characteristics, the outcome in each place will differ. In the case of C-CBAC, the presence of social cohesion and social capital impacted their ability to come together to address the issues collectively. As such, some regions are going to be better prepared with levels of social cohesion and social capital to address a crisis through regional collaboration.

6.4 Conclusion

This case study of C-CBAC provides insight and understanding about new regional efforts in a larger political-economic framework. Given senior government abandonment of initiating and executing rural regional development planning, the ‘space’ was provided to another organization to assume this role. As such, rural regional development in the Cariboo-Chilcotin was assumed by a place-based voluntary regional governance group. Thus, the scale and structure of C-CBAC is representative of dominant Canadian trends of
devolution. However, despite the preference for a ‘bottom-up’ approach by participants, this alternative may similarly not be effective.

C-CBAC was motivated explicitly by the MPB epidemic, but drew on stocks of existing social cohesion and social capital to self-organize quickly. However, high social capital among a small group of individuals hindered the expansion of the Board. As a result of self-organizing, the non-governmental status of the organization hindered its ability to gain funding control when it was devolved by the provincial government. Policy control is still retained by the provincial government. As such, C-CBAC is a governance organization without authority or jurisdiction. Particularly with the impact of an immediate crisis, the organization had a hard time enduring attention and motivation to the issue beyond the crisis.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

7.1 Introduction
Following international trends towards neoliberalism, the BC provincial government has removed itself from many of its more traditional roles, including their direct participation in rural regional development planning. Coincidentally, non-governmental, locally-based organizations have emerged in many regions to address rural regional development. Drawing primarily on Australian and Canadian examples, recent research suggests that rural regional development decision-making is changing. Conducting a case study of C-CBAC within the concepts of neoliberalism and new regionalism, this thesis has examined the changing governance of rural regional development.

7.2 Research Questions
Two research questions are central to this thesis. First, given the devolution of governing rural regional development to local levels, to what extent does C-CBAC represent dominant trends in Canadian rural regional development? Traditional Canadian decision-making, with respect to rural regional development, was carried out by senior government officials in economic and political centres. However, the relinquishment of this role with the adoption of a more neoliberal agenda and the subsequent assumption of these roles by more local actors defines the current trend in rural regional development decision-making. C-CBAC is a place-based regional governance organization which has assumed regional development planning – a role traditionally held by senior governments. Thus, the formation of C-CBAC follows dominant trends of devolution. Moreover, the governance
structure of C-CBAC and their inclusion of the local public, private, and not-for-profit sectors, is representative of contemporary regional development decision-making, as explained in the new regionalism literatures. However, C-CBAC has not been effective in achieving their goals of regional development. Thus, contemporary rural regional development is similar to traditional models in that it is not able to achieve desired results. This indicates that we have not yet achieved the appropriate level of ‘top-down’ support for ‘bottom-up’ organizations to mobilize the types of development best suited for that place. The current situation feigns a ‘mix’, but much of the local efforts are constrained by central governments retaining control.

The second research question, against the background of a history of regional activity in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, a transition towards neoliberal policies, and the emergence of the MPB epidemic, what factors have assisted or impeded the formation of C-CBAC? The MPB epidemic provided a crisis around which local residents could rally. As such, most participants felt that the MPB epidemic was the primary factor contributing to C-CBAC’s formation. However, the MPB epidemic alone did not result in C-CBAC. The region’s history of working together facilitated the organization’s initial formation. A small group of regional decision-makers, familiar to working with one another in regional development decision-making, came together to meet about the MPB epidemic. As such, existing networks (stocks of social cohesion) and trust (social capital) facilitated C-CBAC’s formation. However, the investment of social cohesion and social capital in a small group of individuals has worked to limit the development of the C-CBAC Board beyond its initial membership. As such, the strong trust among a small group helped but also hindered the Board’s development.
Finally, the transition towards neoliberal policies facilitated C-CBAC’s formation. As the provincial government ‘rolled-back’ its involvement in BC’s rural regional development initiatives, the space was created for C-CBAC to address these issues. Conversely, neoliberal policies have hindered C-CBAC because jurisdiction, authority, and budget control were not provided to C-CBAC to allow it to implement its plans. Elements of regional development jurisdiction were devolved to another regional organization in BC, thus hindering the effectiveness of C-CBAC.

Neoliberalism and new regionalism are useful literatures in which to frame C-CBAC’s formation. Neoliberalism provides a way to conceptually understand federal and provincial government actions in their withdrawal, or ‘roll-back’, of programs and services. Neoliberalism also helps to understand how the private sector is provided, or ‘rolled-out’, responsibilities. However, neoliberalism also highlights a fundamental concern about the situation. The private sector can deliver services by performing activities, but cannot assume responsibility for the public because their primary motive is profit. Given this, new regionalism provides a way to conceptually understand local response to current governmental decisions. Given that many local places know that past ways of organizing have not been effective, new regional organization is structured differently in response to the failure of past regional organization. The new regional organization is energized from the bottom up (in the case of C-CBAC because senior governments had abandoned the region) with an emphasis on flexible structures and membership based more on social qualities, such as trust (social capital). Having a flexible structure, which can be altered
locally without bureaucratic overhead, allows the organization to be more responsive to challenges.

C-CBAC will be faced with many challenges in the near future. The global economic recession compounds economic challenges in the region caused by other factors, such as the MPB epidemic and ongoing softwood lumber disputes. Moreover, the organization has to negotiate the change of municipal leadership in all member municipalities in the May 2008 elections. As this thesis argues, one of the forces which facilitated C-CBAC’s decision-making ability was the presence of existing networks and trust that were built over many years of working together. The dynamics of the new Board membership without this experience remains to be seen. C-CBAC will also be faced with determining the best governing structure for the future of regional development: a legislated or non-legislated organization and potential overlap with the CRD. Also, this thesis argues that C-CBAC will have to negotiate its relationship and responsibilities with other regional organizations and more senior levels of government. Despite current and future challenges, residents of the Cariboo-Chilcotin have a demonstrated ability to persist through some of the hardest times – a reflection of the pioneering ‘Cariboo spirit.’

7.3 Lessons Learned

This thesis demonstrates how patterns of regional governing can persist over time. From the experiences of regional leadership in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, lessons can be extracted about collaboration and governance in rural regions. The first lesson pertains to networks and governance. This thesis shows the connection between existing networks and how they may impact governance in the event of a crisis. If the goal of rural regional
development is to make governance more inclusive in the future, then it follows that expanding networks and developing working relationships in advance of a crisis may result in more inclusive governance. It is important to work to develop networks (social cohesion) in advance of crisis situations because, when faced with a crisis, you then know who to call. Broader networks in daily working relationships may also seek to address issues of having a small, ‘tight-knit’ group with high social capital and the resulting exclusion of newcomers. The inclusion of newcomers may prevent an organization from becoming ‘stuck in their ways.’

The second lesson relates to networks, but is not one that can be learned from C-CBAC. It is more a word of caution. Succession planning is missing from C-CBAC and has been missing from the region’s history of working together. Newcomers must be brought into the circle of regional decision-makers so as to pass on the hard-learned lessons of regional collaboration in the Cariboo-Chilcotin. Much literature demonstrates the benefits of succession planning and I argue that this needs to be done by the region’s existing ‘leaders’ to contribute to institutionalized knowledge.

7.4 Policy Recommendations

Given that traditional approaches to rural regional development did not produce the desired results and current approaches are not producing the desired results, it is evident that, to effectively solve challenges of regional disparities, public policy approaches need to be reconsidered. The solution is not ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’, but somewhere in the middle, whereby some level of authority and jurisdiction are devolved with responsibilities.
As much current literature notes, public policy needs to be responsive to place (Drabenstott et al. 2004; Bradford 2005; Markey 2005, 2008). A ‘one size fits all’ approach is not supporting development which is locally sustainable. Thus, the ways in which supports are provided requires a repositioning of senior governments and a new framework that respects local variations. This new framework will have to consider development infrastructure beyond physical and economic means. This will work to promote local quality of life and regional prosperity (Dawe 2004).

Although this approach may seem new, its application has been effective in other places (e.g. EU). In terms of implementation, we can draw from the example of C-CBAC to support some recommendations with respect to governance structure, preparations (capacity building), and funding to support place-based development.

**Rec. #1: Regional board responsible for development planning**

The example of C-CBAC demonstrates the benefits of having a regionally-based board invested with the responsibility of determining future development (e.g. plans reflect local assets, resources, and aspirations). The size of this regional board will vary depending on the region. Membership guidelines would be established by senior governments with respect to the specific actors who must be involved, but should broadly represent a variety of sectors/constituencies, including: local government, First Nations, private sector (e.g. industry), and the not-for-profit sector (e.g. social development organizations). Required members ensure a minimum level of regional representation to improve the organization’s legitimacy and accountability to local residents and senior governments alike. It is also
recommended that membership be geographically diverse to ensure region-wide representation.

Membership space should also be made available for interest groups specific to that region; this is to ensure that the interests unique to that region are represented. To become involved, special interest groups should apply or submit an expression of interest to the provincial government. This ensures that the exclusion of any group is not based on personal preference or bias among the regional board.

A regional board should have a specific succession plan in place with staggered term lengths and limited opportunities for renewal. To avoid having the skill set of regional decision-making concentrated only among a handful of people, succession planning ensures that regional decision-making capacity is continually built among a pool of 'regional leaders.'

Rec. #2: Regional board to work closely with senior governments

The regional board should work closely with provincial ministries on an ongoing basis. In a manner similar to the MPB Emergency Response Team, an inter-ministry team linking the regional board to the provincial government is ideal because rural regional development issues transcend the jurisdictional boundaries of any single ministry. However, the MPB Emergency Response Team was only for emergency response and only for the MPB epidemic. A similar inter-ministry team needs to be established to address specific and ongoing rural regional development issues within the province.

The primary role of the inter-ministry team is to provide support, expertise, and guidance to the regional board. This support ensures that plans are examined in a broader
perspective. The inter-ministry team brings a wider knowledge of the opportunities and limitations of the state and an understanding of how development projects ‘fit’ with a broader provincial vision. Restructuring to an inter-ministry team will not be easy. It will involve a repositioning of traditional jurisdictional boundaries between, and within, government departments and in terms of local actor involvement. However, not all functions can be addressed in this method. Some policy arenas will remain the primary jurisdiction of specific ministries (e.g. housing policy to remain the sole jurisdiction of that ministry).

Rec. #3: Regional board to form external relationships

Regional boards should be mandated to network and form relationships outside of their region. Drawing on the EU LEADER program, this type of networking can facilitate the exchange of experiences, successes, failures, and knowledge between groups which may be faced with similar challenges. Networking in this manner can also help to overcome feelings of isolation faced by some regions and can stimulate potential areas of partnerships, collaboration, or other synergies. While networking would remain primarily the role of regional boards, the inter-ministry team can also work with the regional board to assist relationship development with government and other regions.

Similar to the EU LEADER program, it is recommended that funding be contingent on this exercise. This external contact may counteract personal preferences or biases within one group and ensure that decisions have access to outside knowledge and experience. Communication with those external to the regional board can build internal capacity as the group may be exposed to different ideas and methods.
Rec. #4: Long-term funding authority provided to regional board

The regional board should be provided with authority over funding. Contingent on requirements outlined above (e.g. minimum representation, working with an inter-ministry team on an ongoing basis, and external networking), the regional board should be provided with decision-making authority over a moderate budget to support place-based development trajectories.

Once the Board has met these basic requirements, it is recommended that budget-terms are increased. For example, the initial budget may be a two-year term, but over time it is recommended that term lengths increase. This provides financial security for regions to implement long-term plans which supersede existing and intensifying economic booms and busts.

The concept of providing large and long-term budgets to support regional initiatives overseen by an organization of elected leaders and regional stakeholders is not new to BC. As mentioned before in the context of regional Trusts (e.g. NDI Trust), the practice is already part of BC’s contemporary rural policy.

7.5 Future Research Directions

The process of examining macro-scale processes of neoliberalism and new regionalism, and their expression in the Cariboo-Chilcotin, has raised many potential future research directions stemming from this research. The complexity and interplay of social and cultural factors in macropolitical and economic regimes indicates that the entire web of issues cannot be fully understood. However, elements of this complex situation can be isolated and investigated further. By doing this, greater understanding of the issues and
insight can be brought to the entire situation. As such, possible future research directions which arise from this study include:

1. The sample used in this study demonstrated relative overrepresentation of the Central Cariboo and government (elected and staff). This left some groups underrepresented, including the South Cariboo, Chilcotin, and First Nations. As a starting point for future research directions, another study could supplement this sample to round out the voices and perspectives that were included. This could provide variances on the findings of this study.

2. This research examines the formation of one voluntary rural regional development governance organization. However, other organizations – voluntary and non-voluntary – have formed in other places. As such, future research could examine the structure, mandate, and expected outcome of other groups. Are the structures, mandates, and expected outcomes linked to factors which motivated the organization to form? And, how effective are the other organizations at achieving their desired outcomes? The study of this could illuminate differences between voluntary and non-voluntary organizations and this could be linked to the success of the organization to determine a potential model for rural regional development organizations.

3. This thesis also argues that the current group of regional ‘leaders’ is exclusive. Given that these individuals have addressed regional issues in the Cariboo-Chilcotin for, in some cases, nearly 30 years, there should be concern about the aging of this group. As such, future research could explore the issue of succession planning and how the next generation of regional ‘leaders’ in the Cariboo-Chilcotin will be cultivated or nurtured, if at all. This will
lend insight to if there will be a new cohort of regional leaders and how their organization may be more or less inclusive.

4. The framework of adaptive capacity is commonly used to evaluate the responsiveness of (social) systems to stressors (Wall and Marzall 2006). Given this, self-organizing voluntary development organizations may be a good case to evaluate within this framework. For example, to what extent is the Cariboo-Chilcotin demonstrating adaptive capacity in the formation of C-CBAC? Such an analysis could provide insight to the region’s assets, social and otherwise, which can be drawn out as strengths to respond to future crises.

5. Specifically regarding First Nation involvement (or lack thereof) in rural regional development decision-making, future research could examine the role of history and conflict between First Nations and non-Aboriginal communities in the region. There has been a long history of colonialism in BC and Canada and this continues to manifest itself in regional planning processes (Furniss 1999). As such, there needs to be a greater understanding of the unique history, circumstances, and resulting concerns and positions of First Nations for regional development. Future research could focus on regional governance participation from a First Nations perspective. From such a study, we could gain greater insight to ‘best practices’ and fair participation for future rural regional development planning, and work to overcome reproduced colonial approaches to rural regional development governance and planning participation.

6. This thesis argues that the existence of networks and trust among a small group of regional ‘leaders’ facilitated the formation of C-CBAC. By extension, future research could
map where and how such networks and trust are formed in and for other development organizations. This would involve an exploration of where ‘leaders’ have opportunities to develop social cohesion and social capital. For example, to what extent do municipal organizations facilitate social cohesion and, if they do, how does this exclude other potential actors? This may have implications for who is involved in future decision-making. This research could inform other groups who do not have the same stocks of social cohesion and social capital, given their demonstrated importance in contemporary rural development planning.

7. Self-appointed organizations need to be analyzed through the lens of political science. The political science study should consider the democratic participation, legitimacy, and accountability of a self-appointed organization, and assess the extent such an organization is representative of the larger population. This is particularly important for the effectiveness of a non-governmental group, given that the provincial government has provided substantial funding to organizations which are “established and governed by individuals who have accountabilities to an electorate” (BC Legislative Assembly 2005, 890).

8. This thesis demonstrates that some level of neoliberalism, characterized by devolution, appears to be preferred in this specific place. Further to a political analysis, it is important to consider to what extent devolution is preferred in different places, as local/regional attributes and assets vary. Unique histories and characteristics define, among other things, unique political cultures and the level of public support for a place-based approach must be assessed with this in consideration. For example, neoliberal approaches may be more conducive to western Canada than Atlantic Canada given its unique political
culture. Thus, a final future research direction of this thesis concerns the need for compliance studies.
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--. 1994c. CEAF Meeting Minutes, 1 September. D [photocopy].
--. 1994d. CEAF Internal Memorandum, 26 October 1994. D [photocopy].
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MEMORANDUM

To: Chelan Hoffman
CC: Greg Halseth
From: Michael Murphy, Acting Chair
Research Ethics Board
Date: March 31, 2008
Re: E2008.0319.047
Emerging governance structures for regional development in BC: A case study of the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition

Thank you for submitting the above-noted research proposal and requested amendments to the Research Ethics Board. The committee has asked that you include (on the information sheet) a finite date for the destruction of the data. Your proposal has been approved with this minor modification.

We are pleased to issue approval for the above named study for a period of 12 months from the date of this letter. Continuation beyond that date will require further review and renewal of REB approval. Any changes or amendments to the protocol or consent form must be approved by the Research Ethics Board.

Good luck with your research.

Sincerely,

Michael Murphy
Appendix B  Interview Consent Form

Emerging Regional Governance for Economic Development in BC
Interview Consent Form

**Purpose** – This project is part of my master’s thesis work to examine emerging governance issues to address regional development. The goal is to understand reasons for, and processes of, governance and contemporary regional development. Upon completion of this research, I will provide decision-makers and community groups with information to help inform future governance, collaboration, and regional development.

**How Respondents Were Chosen** – Research participants have been selected from publicly available lists. As a participant, you have been selected because you are active, or have been active in the past, in regional governance and development planning. You are asked to participate based on your personal life experiences with governance and regional development exercises. You are not asked to participate as representatives of organizations, nor will you be asked to speak on behalf of any organization.

**Anonymity And Confidentiality** – Participant names or other forms of identifying information will not be used in reporting. All information shared in the interview will be held in strict confidence by the researcher. All records will be kept locked in a research office at UNBC and will be accessible only to the researcher and research supervisor. The information will be kept until the final thesis is complete. After this time, shredding will destroy all information related to the interview.

**Potential Risks And Benefits** - This project has been assessed by the UNBC Research Ethics Board. I do not consider there to be any risks to your participation. I hope that by participating you will have a chance to provide input into issues relevant to regional governance and regional development so as to guide future planning and investments.

**Voluntary Participation** - Your participation in the interview is entirely voluntary and, as such, you may chose not to participate. If you participate, you may choose to not answer any questions that make you uncomfortable, and you have the right to end the interview at any time and have all the information you provided withdrawn from the study.

**Research Results** - If you would like more information or have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact myself, Chelan Hoffman, at UNBC at (250) 960-5672, or by email at hoffmanc@unbc.ca, or my supervisor, Greg Halseth, at UNBC at (250) 960-5826, or by email at halseth@unbc.ca. Community giveback reports will be made available at local libraries and local municipal offices. Copies will also be provided to the Cariboo-Chilcotin Beetle Action Coalition.

**Complaints** - Any complaints about this project should be directed to the Office of Research at UNBC at (250) 960-5820, or by email at reb@unbc.ca.

I have read the above description of the study and I understand the conditions of my participation. My signature indicates that I agree to participate in this study.

(Name - please print)  (Signature)  (Date)
Appendix C  Interview Guide

Emerging Governance for Regional Development in BC
[Final DRAFT]
INTERVIEW GUIDE

Interviewee Name: ____________________________________________________________

Connection/Role in the Community: ____________________________________________

Mailing address: ____________________________________________________________

E-mail: ____________________________________________________________________

Phone: ___________________________ Fax: _______________________________________

Preferred method of written communication: □ Mail □ E-mail □ Fax
(material transmitted may be confidential)

Interviewer: Chelan Hoffman

Date: ___________________________ Place: _______________________________________

Interview Time: Start: __________ Finish: __________

Notes:
Section A: Background. In this section, I would like to learn more about your background in the Cariboo-Chilcotin region.

A1: How long have you lived in the Cariboo-Chilcotin?

A2: Where do you live?
   o Municipality? If so, which one?
   o Rural?

A3: What regional development groups are you now involved with?

A4: What regional development groups have you been involved with in the past?

Section B: Working Together in the Past. In this section, I would like to learn more about your experiences working on regional development in the past.

Cariboo Regional District

B1: Have you been involved with the Cariboo Regional District?
   [If no, go to question B2.]
   If yes, in what capacity?

B1a: Has this organization provided an opportunity for interaction across the region? Please explain.
   o Positive impact?
   o Negative impact?

B1b: Has this organization provided opportunities for groups to work together? Please explain.
   o Positive impact?
   o Negative impact?

B1c: How has this past experience impacted current regional development cooperation? Please explain.
   o Who?
   o How?

Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE Process

B2: Were you involved with the Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE Process?
   [If no, go to question B3.]
   If yes, in what capacity?

B2a: Had this process provided an opportunity for interaction across the region? Please explain.
   o Positive impact?
   o Negative impact?
B2b: Has this provided opportunities for groups to work together? Please explain.
   - Positive impact?
   - Negative impact?

B2c: How has this past experience impacted current regional development cooperation? Please explain.
   - Who?
   - How?

Other Regional Development Group
Follow up on any other groups mentioned in A4.
B3: Have you been, or are you currently, involved with another regional development group?
   - If no, go to section D.
   - If C-CBAC, go to section C.
   - If yes, what group?
   - If yes, what was your capacity in this group?

B3a: Had this process provided an opportunity for interaction across the region? Please explain.
   - Positive impact?
   - Negative impact?

B3b: Has this provided opportunities for groups to work together? Please explain.
   - Positive impact?
   - Negative impact?

B3c: How has this past experience impacted current regional development cooperation? Please explain.
   - Who?
   - How?

Section C: C-CBAC Formation. In this section, I would like to learn more about how you feel that C-CBAC has come together.

C1: Do you feel that working together in the past has contributed to the formation of the C-CBAC? Please explain.
   - Which groups in particular?
   - Specific individuals?

C2: How has the provincial government impacted the formation of the C-CBAC? Please explain.
   - Specific policies?
   - Positive impact? Negative impact?
   - Supported? Not supported?

C3: Do you think that this group would have come together to address regional development had the mountain pine beetle epidemic not occurred? Please explain.
C4: What do you feel has been the most important factor in bringing the C-CBAC together?
   o Region’s history of working together?
   o Contemporary provincial policy?
   o Emergence of mountain pine beetle epidemic?
   o Other?

Section D: **Looking Forward.** In this section, I would like to learn more about what you think the future holds for regional collaboration in the Cariboo-Chilcotin.

D1: What opportunities for future regional collaboration are developing within the C-CBAC process?
   • Opportunity to work/interact with others?
     o Outside of the C-CBAC would you have worked/interacted with these people?
     o How are interactions facilitated?
   • Opportunity to get to trust others?
     o How is this trust developed?

D2: Do you think other individuals/groups have trust/confidence in the C-CBAC? *(e.g. to follow through with promised activities/projects?)*

D3a: What do you feel the C-CBAC is doing well?
D3b: What do you feel the C-CBAC could do better?

Section E: **Concluding Questions**

E1. Is there anything you would like to add regarding lessons learned from working with regional development governance in the Cariboo-Chilcotin that we haven’t already touched on?
### Table D.1 Sample Frame, proposed

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>North Cariboo</th>
<th>Central Cariboo</th>
<th>South Cariboo</th>
<th>Chilcotin</th>
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<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
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<td>Tourism</td>
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<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<td>Economic/business dev.&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<td>Environment/conservation</td>
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<td>Labour (organized)</td>
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<td>Financial institution</td>
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<td><strong>Organization Affiliation</strong></td>
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<td>C-CBAC Board – founding</td>
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<td>C-CBAC Board – current</td>
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<td>C-CBAC Board – other</td>
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<td>C-CBAC – strategy</td>
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<td>C-CBAC – EDWG</td>
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<td>C-CBAC – SDWG</td>
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<td>C-CBAC – GWG</td>
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<td>CEAF</td>
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<sup>1</sup>Not on EDWG or SDWG
Table D.2 Sample Frame, as filled during field work

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<tr>
<th>Government</th>
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<th>Central Cariboo</th>
<th>South Cariboo</th>
<th>Chilcotin</th>
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<td>Municipal – elected</td>
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<td>Municipal – staff</td>
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<td>RD – elected</td>
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<td>RD – staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provincial – elected</td>
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<td>FN TC – staff</td>
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| Industry                    |               |               |               |           |
| Forestry – major licensees  | x             | x             |               |           |
| Forestry – minor licensees  | x             | x             |               |           |
| Forestry – other            | x             |               |               |           |
| Agriculture                 | x             | x             | x             |           |
| Tourism                     | xx            | x             | xx            |           |
| Mining                      | x (suppressed)|                |               |           |
| Other                       | x (suppressed)|                |               |           |

| Other                        |               |               |               |           |
| Social²                     | x             | x             | x             | x         |
| Economic/business dev.²      | xx            | xx            |               |           |
| Environment/conservation     | x             | x             |               | x         |
| Labour (organized)           | x             |               | x             |           |
| Financial institution        | x (suppressed)|                |               |           |

| Organization Affiliation     |               |               |               |           |
| C-CBAC Board – founding      | xxxxxxx (suppressed)|               |               |           |
| C-CBAC Board – current       | xxxxxxx (suppressed)|               |               |           |
| C-CBAC Board – other         | xx (suppressed)|                |               |           |
| C-CBAC – strategy development| xx            | xxx           | xx            |           |
| C-CBAC – EDWG                | xx            | xx            | xx            | x         |
| C-CBAC – SDWG                | xx            | x             |               | x         |
| C-CBAC – GWG                 | x             | x             | x             | xx        |
| CORE / C-CLUP                | x             | xxxx          |               | x         |
| CEAf                         | xxx           |               | x             |           |

1First Nations regions do not correspond with these political boundaries
2Not on EDWG or SDWG
Appendix E  Participant Organization Involvement

The 50 participants of this study were active in at least the 150 groups listed below. This indicates that participants were involved with an average of 3 different groups (other than C-CBAC, if they were involved with C-CBAC). However, as the table demonstrates, most are involved in more than 3 different groups, as many participants overlapped in the various groups. The people I spoke with are very active individuals and it indicates that C-CBAC is embedded in the existence of other regional organizations and networks and this provides the opportunity for bridging social capital to these other groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># of organizations involved in/with</th>
<th># of participants</th>
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\(^1\) This count involves organizations that participants are currently involved with, or have been involved with in the past; however, this list does not take into consideration participant involvement with C-CBAC (if they were involved with C-CBAC). The idea is to track how embedded C-CBAC may be in other organizations.

\(^2\) Individuals may be involved in 0 organizations because this table excludes C-CBAC involvement. As such, the two participants noted in the table are only involved with C-CBAC and are not involved with any other regional organizations.

4-H Club
16-97 Economic Alliance
100 Mile and District Historical Society
100 Mile House Development Corporation
100 Mile House Mural Society
Anahim Lake Roundtable
Alex Fraser Park Society
BC Agriculture Council
BC Chamber of Commerce – District 11
BC Community Forest Association
BC Environmental Network
BC Spaces for Nature
BC Wild
Band Council – elected official
Baker Creek Society
Barkerville Heritage Trust Board
Boys and Girls Club
Business Development Bank of Canada
Business Improvement Association of BC
Cariboo Communities Coalition
Cariboo-Chilcotin-Coast Invasive Plant Committee
CCCTA – unspecified
CCCTA – municipal representative
CCCTA – Board of Directors
CCCTA – marketing advisory group
Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE – general
Cariboo-Chilcotin CORE – Sustainable Communities Sector
* C-CBAC – unspecified
* C-CBAC – Board of Directors
* C-CBAC – economic development working group
* C-CBAC – social development working group
* C-CBAC – governance working group
* C-CBAC – participated in strategy development
Cariboo Chilcotin Conservation Society
Cariboo-Chilcotin Land Use Plan
Cariboo-Chilcotin Outdoor Recreation Association
Cariboo-Chilcotin Partners for Literacy
Cariboo-Chilcotin Regional Development Consortium
Cariboo Economic Action Forum
Cariboo Licensees Land Use Strategy Committee
Cariboo Local Advisory Committee
Cariboo Lumber Manufacturers Association
Cariboo Regional District – Board of Directors – electoral area representative
Cariboo Regional District – Board of Directors – municipal representative
Cariboo Regional District – Board of Directors – alternate director
Cariboo Regional District – member municipality
Cariboo Regional District – regional growth strategy committee
Cariboo Regional District – regional governance working group
Cariboo Regional District – electoral area advisory board
Cariboo Regional District – tourism DVD committee
Cariboo Regional Resource Board
Cariboo Woodlot Association
Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council – staff member
Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council – Board of Directors
Cattlemen’s Association – Anahim Lake
Chamber of Commerce – Williams Lake
Chamber of Commerce – Clinton
Chamber of Commerce – Quesnel
Chamber of Commerce – South Cariboo
Child Development Centres (provincial)
Child Development Centres (northern region)
Child Development Centres (interior region)
Child Development Centre – Williams Lake
Chilko Lake Park / Tsil’os Planning Process
Class C Provincial Park Board
Clinton and District Economic Development Society – unspecified
Clinton and District Economic Development Society – Board of Directors
Community Futures Development Corporation
Community Social Planning Network (provincial)
Cottonwood Community Association
Council of Forest Industries
Economic Development Association of BC
Ecosystems Restoration Steering Group
Federal Mountain Pine Beetle Advisory Group
Federation of BC Woodlot Associations
Federation of Canadian Municipalities
Forest Renewal BC
Forestry Caucus (provincial)
Fraser Basin Council – Board of Directors
Gold Country Communities’ Society
Gold Rush Trail Development Corporation
Haida Gwaii Community Planning Forum
Informal economic development group (proposal submitted to WED’s CEDI)
Innovation Resource Centre
Invasive Plant Council of BC
Likely / Xat’sull Community Forest
Lillooet Land and Resource Management Plan
Literacy BC Board
Local health board
Local protection services – fire department
Local protection services – fire safety planning
Local social planning council
Local sporting groups – curling
Local rodeo organization
Local volunteer committees – event planning committee
Measuring up The North
Ministry of Children and Family Development – stakeholder discussions (north region)
Mount Timothy Ski Society
Municipal government – City of Williams Lake – elected official
Municipal government – City of Williams Lake – staff member
Municipal government – City of Quesnel – elected official
Municipal government – City of Quesnel – staff member
Municipal government – District of 100 Mile House – elected official
Municipal government – District of 100 Mile House – staff member
Municipal government – District of Wells – elected official
Municipal government – District of Wells – staff member
Municipal government – Village of Clinton – elected official
Municipal government – Village of Clinton – staff member
New Pathways to Gold Society
North Cariboo Aboriginal Family Program Society (“long name society”)
North Cariboo Marketing Team
North Cariboo Regional Advisory Committee for treaty negotiation – Native Advisory Committee
North Central Municipal Association
Northern Development Council
Northern Development Initiative Trust – unspecified
Northern Development Initiative Trust – Board of Directors
Northern Development Initiative Trust – regional advisory committee
Northern Development Initiatives Trust – MPB review board
Northern Shuswap Tribal Council
Omineca Beetle Action Coalition
Parks and Wilderness Caucus (provincial)
Prince George Regional Development Corporation
Quesnel and Community Economic Development Corporation
Quesnel and District Community Foundation
Quesnel Child, Youth, and Family Network
Quesnel Economic Development Commission
Quesnel Environmental Society
Quesnel Watershed Society
Quesnel Woodlot Association
Rotary
RP Mac – federal First Nations economic development group
School District
SHARE Cariboo/Chilcotin Resources Society
Social Planning and Research Council of BC
South Cariboo Community Planning Council
South Cariboo Historical Society
South Cariboo Liberal Riding Association
South Cariboo Tourism Advisory Committee
South Chilcotin Advisory Group
Teacher’s Association
Thompson Rivers University
Thompson-Nicola Regional District – municipal representative
Timber Supply Review Processes
Treaty Advisory Committee
Tsilhqot’in National Government
Union of BC Municipalities
United Community Services Cooperative – Board of Directors
University of Northern British Columbia – sub-regional advisory committee
Weldwood Public Advisory Group
West Chilcotin Community Resource Association
West Chilcotin Tourism Association
Western Silviculture Contractors Association
Williams Lake and District Credit Union
Williams Lake Environmental Society
Williams Lake Field Naturalists Society
Women in Resource Communities

*This group was not included in the total organization count to determine the linkages between C-CBAC and other groups participants indicated they were involved with.
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<td>Native (s)</td>
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<td>Observer</td>
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<td>Recreation sector</td>
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<td>Regulatory / regulation</td>
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<td>Rights (land)</td>
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<td>Service delivery</td>
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### Words with five occurrences each:
- Aware (ness)
- Chilcotin - West
- Corridor
- Efficiencies
- Experience
- First Nations, non-
- Fix
- Follow-up
- Gold Country
- Mission statement
- Non-profit (sector)
- Outreach
- Periphery / peripheral
- Pride / Proud
- Quality
- Role
- Task
- Transparency / transparent
- Travel
- Unique
- Vested interest
- WED

### Words with four occurrences each:
- Adversarial
- Break-up / Break-out / breakaway Session / group
- Burn / burnt / burned out
- Cariboo-Chilcotin-Coast
- Cohesive
- Community-to-Community Forums (C2C)
- Divide (d)
- Effective (ness)
- Election
- Enemy
- Faith
- Fraser Basin Council
- Friction
- IWA
- Legitimate
- Lessons
- Lifestyle
- OBAC
- Objective (s)
- Opposing / opposite
- Parochial / parochialism
- Practitioner (s)
- Quality of life
- Regional District, Thompson Nicola
- Regionalization
- Responsibility
- Slow / slower
- Telephone
- Title
- UNBC
- Unite (ed)
- University / universities
- Valid (ate) (ation) (ity)
- Youth

### Words with three occurrences each:
- "made in the Cariboo"
- "on the ground"
- Accountable
- Advertised
- Agreement
- Alone
- Authority
- Autonomy / autonomous
- Bias
- Bond / bonding
- CFDC
- Collective (ly)
- Common sense
- Complain / complaint (s)
- Conservative
- Consistency
- Contact list / contacts
- Distance
- Downturn (forestry / forest industry)
- Edge (of territory)
- Equal
- Equity
- Expectation (s)
- Failure
- Familiarization tour
- Fast (er)
- Indian

Words with two occurrences each:
- Afraid
- Animosity / Animosities
- Baggage
- Border (s)
- Bottom-up
- Branding
- Cariboo Lumber Manufacturers Association (CLMA)
- Catastrophes
- Certain people
- Chief Executive Officer
- COFI
- Competitive, (un-) (-non)
- Defend
- Disagree (d) (ment)
- Division
- Do-ers
- Downfall (economic)
- Duplication
- Ecological
- Economic, non-
- Economies of scale
- Face-to-face

- Left-out
- Like-minded
- Lip-service
- Messages
- Native, non-
- Outsider
- Own interests
- Private sector
- Relations
- Risk
- Size
- South Cariboo Tourism Association (SCTA)
- Trust, dis-
- Unify (ier) (ied)
- Unprecedented

- Fair, un-
- Familiar (ity)
- Follow through
- Fought
- Govern
- Hesitant
- Holistic
- Impose
- In-fighting
- Isolated
- Localization
- Neighbour (s)
- Nodes
- Northern Shuswap Tribal Council
- Private investment
- Progressive
- Quesnel & Community Ec Dev Corp (QCEDC)
- Regional Resource Committee (RRC)
- Re-invest
- Resistance
- Reward
- Rival / rivals / rivalry / rivalries
- Salvage - small scale
- Shareholder
- Shuttled diplomacy
- SIBAC
- Stimulus
- Suspicion

Words with one occurrence each:
- "Board on the Road"
- "three big players"
- 16-97 Economic Alliance
- Amalgamation
- Asset (s)
- Attitude (s)
- Baker Creek Society
- Balkanization
- Bella Coola
- Best practices
- Bickering
- Boosterism
- Bragging
- Camaraderie
- Cariboo - East
- Cariboo Tribal Council (CTC)
- Carrier Chilcotin Tribal Council (CCTC)
- Caucus
- CEDI
- Chilcotin - Central
- Chilcotin - East
- Chilcotin Stewardship Council
- Chronic
- City-region
- CLAC
- Close-knit
- CNC
- Coast (al)
- Co-exist
- Columbia Basin Trust
- Community Futures (CFDC)
- Conference calls
- Cooperation, non-
- Democratic

- Time (line) (frame)
- Trouble (s)
- TSA
- Uncomfortable
- Various interests / sectors
- Voluntarily

- Disappointed
- Discomfort
- Disconnect
- Discriminated
- Disgruntle (ment)
- Dishonest
- Dispute
- Dissatisfaction
- Downloading
- Earlier
- Emotional
- Executive coordinator
- External
- Externalities
- Falldown (economic)
- Familiar, un-
- Foresight
- Forest district
- FRBC
- Frightening
- Function (regional)
- Government, non-
- GWG
- Happy
- Health (sector)
- Higher-level
- Inactivity
- Ineffective
- Inter-dependent
- Inter-municipal
- Invitation
- Lion’s Club
- Long range
- Maintain

199
• Manipulation
• Mega-project
• Mill workers
• Myopic
• Neutral
• Non-competitive
• Non-municipal
• Optimistic
• Own solutions
• Ownership
• Pathways to Gold
• Privatization
• Profit
• Public investment
• Public sector
• Reception (s)
• Regional (cross-)
• Regional economy
• Regional thinking
• Revitalization
• Road block
• Roll-back

• Rotary
• Short term
• Skepticism
• Social planning council
• Society
• Status quo
• Stratification
• Suffering
• Sun Country
• Superficial
• Telecommunications
• Territorialism
• Time - short
• Top-down
• Translate
• UBCM
• Uncertainty
• Uplift
• Visible
• Voted
• WCTA
• West Chilcotin Resource Board
Appendix G  Latent Content Analysis Results: List of Themes

Themes after Concept Mapping

(1) Place
   a. History
   b. Cultures
   c. Physical environment
   d. Social history / relationships

(2) Change
   a. Impetus for regional collaboration
   b. Economic / Environmental / Political
   c. Fear, problem, trigger, loss of control
      Does the change have to affect that regional scale? E.g. why not mine closures?

(3) Governance
   a. History
      i. Bonding experiences
      ii. Divisive experiences
   b. Groups / Sectors / Sides
      i. Inclusion
      ii. Exclusion
   c. Relationships
      i. Social cohesion
      ii. Social capital
         1. Maintenance of social capital
   d. Participation
      i. Motivation
   e. Leadership
      i. Experience in regional decision-making
      ii. Trusted
      iii. Sector representation
      iv. Elected
   f. Suspicion
      i. Communication
      ii. Transparency
      iii. Finances
      iv. Appointed membership
   g. Collaboration
      i. Break from tradition
      ii. Recognized benefits
(4) **Challenges**
   a. Resources
      i. **Internal**
         1. Time
         2. Money
         3. Leadership / capacity
         4. Motivation / willingness to continue (burn-out)
      ii. **External**
         1. Abandonment / inconsistent or hesitant government support
         2. Funding “recipes” (e.g. CEDI)

(5) **Supports**
   a. Autonomy
   b. Funding
   c. Resources