FRAMING ENVIRONMENTAL CRISSES: CORRELATING ACTION TO OUTCOMES FOR THE 1969 SANTA BARBARA AND 2010 DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILLS

by

Jeremy D. Schmidt

BA, University of Northern British Columbia, 2003

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Abstract

The 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill was relatively small, yet generated significant societal reverberations; the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill was unambiguously large, but resulted in only a few societal rumblings. Both were often labelled crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes (CDCs). Utilizing frame theory, this thesis analyzed whether a relationship existed between the use of strong rhetoric (i.e., CDCs) and action taken to respond to the spills, by establishing what various actors meant when they framed them as CDCs, and by ascertaining how their action-oriented CDC frames correlated with the actual outcomes. This thesis found that the actors meant a great number and variety of things by framing the spills as CDCs, and that only the term disaster had a significant number of correlations with the spills’ outcomes. The results help explain why global environmental problems (e.g., climate change), despite being labelled crises, disasters, and catastrophes, are not receiving greater action.
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Abbreviations and Glossary

ACaS  action catastrophe summary; phrase summarizing the content of the action catastrophe frame.
ACC  anthropogenic climate change
ACS  action crisis summary; phrase summarizing the content of the action crisis frame.
ADS  action disaster summary; phrase summarizing the content of the action disaster frame.
AGETs  anthropogenic global environmental transformations
Aud  Audubon.
BAU  business-as-usual.
BCaT  basic catastrophe topic; a one to four word statement summarizing the catastrophe frame.
BCT  basic crisis topic; a one to four word statement summarizing the crisis frame.
BDT  basic disaster topic; a one to four word statement summarizing the disaster frame.
BOEMs  Bureau of Ocean Energy Management.
BPHT  BP/Halliburton/Transocean.
BSEE  Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
CA  California.
CDC  crisis, disaster, catastrophe.
CE  clean energy.
CEQA  California Environmental Quality Act.
CWA  Clean Water Act.
Dem  US Democratic Senator.
DHOS  Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
DoI  Department of the Interior.
EPA  Environmental Protection Agency.
FA  Frame Analysis
FG  federal government.
FS(s)  frame sponsor(s).
FT  Frame Theory
GC  Gulf Coast.
GCaF  generalized catastrophe frame.
GCF  generalized crisis frame.
GDF  generalized disaster frame.
GoM  Gulf of Mexico.
Goo!  Get Oil Out!
Gov  Governor.
GR  Government Report(s).
MMS  Minerals Management Service.
NEPA  National Environmental Protection Act.
NFWF  US National Fish and Wildlife Foundation.
OCS   Outer Continental Shelf.
OD    oil development.
OI    oil industry.
OPA   Other Political Actors.
OSIC  Oil Spill Information Centre.
Prez  President (US).
RCAC  regional community advisory council.
REAs  Regional Environmental Actors.
Rep   US Republican Senator.
SA    State Actors
SB    Santa Barbara.
SBC   Santa Barbara Channel; a.k.a., the Channel.
SBOS  Santa Barbara oil spill.
SC    Sierra Club.
Sci   Scientists.
SoI   Secretary of the Interior.
UCSB  University of California, Santa Barbara.
UO    Union Oil.

Action-oriented frames/topics – frames and/or topics that pertain only to present/future frames with a positive orientation.

Basic (unique) CDC frames – generalized CDC frames that have been lumped together based on similar characteristics, and then stripped down to a one to four word summary.

Basic generalized action-oriented CDC topics – action-oriented generalized CDC frames that have stripped down to a one to four word summary.

Basic generalized non-action-oriented CDC topics – non-action-oriented generalized CDC frames that have stripped down to a one to four word summary.

Basic topics – generalized CDC frames that have been lumped together based on similar characteristics, and then stripped down to a one to four word summary.

Generalized frame – a frame consisting of separate, related frames derived from individual extracts; see Chapter 4.

Sensitizing concept – an inductive definition consisting of a set of general characteristics.
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Introduction

Introducing Environmental Crises, Disasters, and Catastrophes

Crisis, disaster, and catastrophe represent strong, potent rhetoric. They call up images of threat, destruction, death, and devastation. They describe times and events when the very foundations of society, culture, and even survival appear to be teetering on the brink of collapse; and declare that urgent, overwhelming response is needed to regain normality and re-establish the status-quo. Consequently, they are—or should be—invoked only during Very Serious Occasions, and when only swift, comprehensive, and adaptive/mitigative/preventative action can deal with or solve the problem.

Not a day seems to go by when the mass media does not assert that some aspect of the global environment is in crisis, undergoing disaster, or facing catastrophe. Whether these terms/concepts are aimed at anthropogenic climate change (ACC), biodiversity loss, or population growth (to name a few of the many environmental problems threatening civilization’s continued survival), those utilizing them are trying to convey to certain and/or various audiences the seriousness of the situations. More importantly, they are working from the assumption, even expectation, that declaring these environmental problems (transformations) crises, disasters, and catastrophes (CDCs) will result in appropriate action that will ‘save the world.’ Unfortunately, social reality does not operate according to such simple declaration-response principles; action to address the causes and consequences of anthropogenic global environmental transformations (AGETs) seems so far scant and inadequate despite the whirlwind of CDCs enveloping them. I wish to understand why this is the case.

During the closing days of April 2010, whilst searching for an anchor that would ground my research into why the application of CDC terminology and conceptualizations has
apparently failed to induce concerted action against AGETs, a blowout preventer failed to work, causing 757 million litres of oil to spew into an ocean laying atop one of the most heavily drilled offshore expanses in the world, entangling thousands of kilometres of coastline in ropes of orange crude, and inspiring many to declare it a CDC. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (DHOS) became my sought-after anchor. Although oil spills are not global in the same sense that ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth are, many and various actors nevertheless use CDC terms/concepts to describe them and to justify action to mitigate their outcomes and/or to prevent future occurrences. I reasoned that whatever results came from examining oil spill CDCs might then be used to help explain the ‘broken’ AGETs CDC-action dyad (Wilkening 2013).

What is more, examining oil spill CDCs confers two advantages over delving straight into the more all-encompassing environmental problems. The first is that while AGETs began decades ago, and will likely continue for decades more (at least), oil spills are often perceived as temporally circumscribed; in other words, the lifespan of an oil spill-as-CDC is relatively short, often no more than a year or so. It is much easier, therefore, to analyze the entire ‘CDC life-time’ of a spill than it is to analyze, for example, that of ACC, which is burdened with a ‘fuzzy’ beginning, is still in progress, and has no determinable end. The second advantage oil spills have over AGETs is that multiple instances exist; in other words, there have been many oil spill incidents over the years, and those that managed to pierce public consciousness were invariably labelled/declared CDCs. Conversely, ACC, biodiversity loss, and population growth are, by their very nature, wholly unique phenomena; there are no other examples of their happening in recorded history, and thus cannot be compared against anything. The comparability of oil spill CDC-usage can not only generate more robust results, but also provide greater insights into the CDC-action link. My search for
a suitable candidate to complement DHOS (i.e., an offshore oil rig spill in US waters) did not last long: I soon discovered Santa Barbara and what happened there during the opening weeks of 1969 when a blowout preventer failed to protect 240 kilometres of hitherto unfouled beach from being inundated by 11 million litres of black tides.

Having narrowed the scope of my research to a more manageable pair of oil spill case studies, I was ready to embark on my journey towards answering the overarching question that informs this thesis: Does labelling/interpreting a global environmental problem as a CDC help bring about decisive, concerted action to deal with it? Why or why not? This question can be easily reconfigured for application to oil spills: Does labelling/interpreting an oil spill a CDC help bring about decisive, concerted action to deal with it? Why or why not? Either way, there are many ways to go about answering this query. I chose one that would do so by analyzing a) the meanings that various actors attached to the terms crisis, disaster, and catastrophe, and b) the correlation(s) between these meaning-laden CDCs and each spills' actual outcomes. (For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘correlation,’ and its various grammatical derivations, is used in the vernacular sense—to mean that a mutual relationship exists between two or more things, but not necessarily a casual one—rather than the statistical.) By exploring this meaning-action dyad (Wilkening 2013), I am essentially investigating whether a relationship exists between CDC terminology and action. To this end, I decided that the best methodology available to find this relationship was frame analysis; by doing so, I added the final component to this thesis's two research questions.

Research Questions

This thesis attempts to answer the following two questions:
1. What did the actors (frame sponsors) mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs?

2. How did the frame sponsors’ action-oriented CDCs correlate with the spills’ actual outcomes?

Developing a Methodology

The primary methodology used by this thesis was frame analysis (FA). However, FA does not really have a formalized, universally accepted technique or approach, especially one that can be taken off the shelf and used step-by-step to yield robust results. Therefore, I had to formulate my own.

I began with Blumer’s notion of the sensitizing concept, which is an inductive means of defining ideas or contested terminology predicated on a “general sense of what is relevant” (1954, 7; see Chapter 2 for elaboration). By utilizing this idea, I was able to organize my approach not only for the frame concept, but also for the crisis, disaster, and catastrophe ones, as well.

Relative to frames, the process of constructing a sensitizing concept entailed collecting as many definitions of frame(s) and framing as I could find, and then siphoning from them those elements best suited to answering my research questions. In the end, four elements were chosen, made up of a combination of those that enjoy wide acceptance throughout frame scholarship and those I deemed most conducive for the purposes of this thesis (see Chapter 3.2 for elaboration).

Relative to the CDC terms, various definitions for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe—supplied by their respective literatures—were synthesized to derive a sensitizing concept for each term/concept (see Chapter 2 for elaboration). These were then applied to the over 1000 extracts collected from SBOS and DHOS, each featuring at least one of the above-mentioned CDC words, in order to draw out in as ‘pure’ a form as possible the basis any given actor had
for calling/labelling each spill a crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe. The resulting data was then compiled and condensed to form the *CDC extracts* that the frame analysis could then be applied against.

This FA entailed using my frame/framing sensitizing concept to filter the several hundred CDC extracts in order to distill each one’s *CDC frame*. Subsequently, I analyzed each of these frames for their meaning, and then for any correlations with SBOS’s and DHOS’s actual outcomes.

**A Brief Guide to the Research Questions’ Answers**

From the above analysis, the answer to my first research question appears to be that the various actors meant a great number and a wide variety of things when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs. On the other hand, a fundamental, yet rudimentary, CDC frame meaning does seem to underlie both spills: that the spills required response because of the economic damages they are causing. However, if only the action-oriented CDC frames are considered, then the economic meaning all but disappears, replaced by one calling for systemic management reform. For DHOS the FSs appeared to mean that response should focus on systemic management problems; for SBOS the FSs seemed to mean that a) response should focus on systemic management problems to repair and maintain economic well-being and b) politics, for the sake of the environment, should work to help affected communities by passing (more and better) legislation and regulations, allowing public consultations on environmental resource decisions, and removing oil development from the Santa Barbara Channel.

The answer to my second research question, meanwhile, contends that whereas during SBOS there appeared to be few correlations between framing action in terms of crisis...
or catastrophe and the actual outcomes—but a moderate amount when using disaster—during DHOS there seemed to be a moderate number of correlations between action frames utilizing all three CDCs and that spill’s actual outcomes. In other words, while both SBOS and DHOS FSs achieved some success using disaster as a means of advocating for action, they accrued little or none utilizing crisis or catastrophe. The primary reason for this appears to be that FSs from both spills largely perceived their spills as disasters, not crises or catastrophes, and therefore used the former term more often, increasing the chances that any action attached to it would correlate with the actual outcomes.

Importance of the Research

The research featured in this thesis appears to represent the only extant body of work that attempts to explore and analyze the relationship between specific examples of strong, potent language usage (i.e., CDCs) and things happening on the ground (i.e., action). Such research is important because language is the bridge linking perception and action, and the assumption is that potent language would build an even stronger one for action because it denotes something of overriding significance that must be dealt with immediately and by mobilizing all available resources. I could find no prior research examining if and/or how CDCs help, neutralize, or hinder the execution of subsequent action. In addition, my research appears to complicate frame theory’s (FT) assumption that framing simplifies the world out there; my findings show that each time an actor put forth another CDC frame, it invariably added new elements to the message they were trying to convey.

Summary of the Remaining Chapters

This thesis consists of six additional chapters. Chapter 1 provides a brief before, during, and after overview of the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, and
includes a snapshot of the kinds of academic research conducted to date on each. It is subdivided according to spill, and then temporal focus. Chapter 2 consists of a literature review for each of the terms/concepts crisis, disaster, and catastrophe. It concludes that although crisis and disaster are the subjects and objects of intense scholarship generating innumerable studies, nobody has been able to formulate a universally accepted definition for either term/concept. Catastrophe, meanwhile, has yet to be recognized as a separate category worthy of study. The primary aim for conducting this review was to derive a sensitizing concept for each term/concept for the purposes analyzing the data. Chapter 3 presents a literature review of frame theory and analysis; despite the copious amount of scholarship available, both theory and methodology remain a patchwork quilt of conflicting sub-fields unable to coalesce into a consensus. Nevertheless, I was able to formulate a sensitizing concept for frame, and apply it to my data. Chapter 4 explains in step-by-step detail the methodology I undertook to convert thousands of pages of raw, primary data into a few hundred CDC frames from which to then ascertain what the FSs meant when they framed the two oil spills as CDCs, and what (if any) correlations exist between their action-oriented CDC frames and SBOS’s and DHOS’s actual outcomes. Chapter 5 unveils the results of my analysis, attempts to explain them, and answers my two research questions. And finally, Chapter 6 summarizes my results and conclusion, admits to my thesis’s limitations, suggests routes for further research, and attempts to extrapolate what my findings may mean for AGETs, such as ACC, biodiversity loss, and population growth, all of which have been (at one time or another, by one actor or another) framed as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes.
Chapter 1: Fraternal Oil Spills – Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon

1.1 – The Little Spill That Could: The Santa Barbara Oil Spill (SBOS)

1.1.1 – Before the Spill

Santa Barbara is a seaside community located along the California coastline that has been associated with oil since its founding. In 1898, the world’s first offshore platform was erected near the city, less than a hundred metres from the shoreline, and began pumping oil from beneath the ocean floor; today, the “breakthrough is commemorated by little more than a small bronze plaque” (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 91; Cavnar 2010; Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). The following year, another derrick was constructed, sparking the world’s first offshore oil controversy and protest (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 124; Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Beginning in 1902, Union Oil (UO) either bought or leased from the California and federal governments much of the surface and offshore lands throughout the Santa Barbara County region; large-scale production commenced in 1920 (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). However, a series of legislative actions by the California government in 1929 effectively prohibited the oil industry (OI) from engaging in (new) offshore operations along the entirety of the state’s coastline. The impasse between state and OI continued until 1966, when the Carpinteria offshore field was discovered along the federally controlled Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), and “led to the first sale of a federal lease beyond the three-mile [4.8 kilometre] limit in the Santa Barbara Channel” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 29). Despite a “storm of protest” from Santa Barbarians (Easton 1972, 5), the Bureau of Land Management granted UO 5400 acres of tract 402 under federal OCS P-0241 in exchange for $61,418,000, a “royalty of one-sixth market price per barrel of oil produced, and an annual rental fee of $16,200 for the tract” (Easton 1972, 5; Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).
Platform A in September of 1968, at a cost of $5 million (Easton 1972). Santa Barbarians grew especially incensed about the presence of this platform (and its sister, Platform B), rising 20 stories above the Channel surface nine kilometres away, because they saw it as a threat to holiday-making and recreation, as well as a potential hazard to the SBC’s abundant ecology, which was proving increasingly attractive to tourists (Easton 1972). Matters were not helped when UO’s future vision for the Channel leaked to the community: 70 additional platforms pumping from 4000 wells (Easton 1972). In early January 1969, construction of Platform A—designed to have access to 56 potential wells—was completed; drilling began immediately, and at a breakneck pace (Easton 1972). On the morning of the 28th, the fifth well, A-21, was nearing completion when the crew began to withdraw the drill in order to replace the bit (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; Easton 1972).

1.1.2 — During the Spill

The day appeared to be like any other: one hole was nearly complete, another soon to commence. By 0900, the drilling crew on Platform A had drilled to a depth of 1060 metres, and were “beg[inning] to circulate drilling ‘mud’ in the well, in preparation for the removal of the drill pipe;” if all went well, A-21 would be ready for production by the following day (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). The Daily Drilling Report for that morning “indicate[d] that conditions were stable and [that] there was no sign of impending trouble” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 2). But at 1045, as the eighth 27.4 metre stand of drill pipe was being removed from the bore-hole, “mud began to flow out of the top of the pipe and splash down onto the rig floor;” in other words, a ‘kick’ had occurred, portending a more catastrophic blowout (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 2). Over the next hour, the crew tried everything within their power to bring the situation under control, but were finally forced to
abandon rig when "large boils of explosive, poisonous natural gas began to roll towards the platform (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 3). Shortly afterwards, following a "moment of strange calm, enormous volumes of sepia-coloured oil [began] float[ing] up to engulf the area[; t]he Santa Barbara oil spill ha[d] begun” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 3).

Over the next few days, UO continued to expect standard procedure to solve the problem. It never did. By the 30th, winds had finally risen, and although it carried away the gas, it also pushed the oil within a couple of kilometres of Carpinteria’s “glistening beaches” and “threaten[ed] to leave heavy deposits between Santa Barbara and Ventura” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 5). On the 31st, Rincon and Pitas Points became the first recorded victims of oilfall, with nearly a kilometre of shoreline fouled between them (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Over the next two to three weeks, oil continued to inundate the Channel’s shoreline.

At its peak, as much as 673,520 litres of oil per day had been pouring into the SBC (Easton 1972).\textsuperscript{13} By the 100th day (the 7th of May), it was estimated\textsuperscript{14} that over 12 million litres of oil had emptied into the Channel (Easton 1972). At its greatest extent, the oil stretched to between 2000 and 3100 square kilometres (Easton 1972). When the one year anniversary rolled around, the spill had still not been staunched; although it no longer drowned beaches and shorelines in thick, ebony-emerald blankets requiring thousands of tonnes of straw\textsuperscript{15} and hundreds of people to clean up, an average of 10 to 15 barrels per day continued to leak from the seabed adjacent to Platform A (OSIC 1969-73).

Throughout the winter and early spring of 1969, SBOS captured the attention of the United States, and even the world. A local anti-oil-in-SBC grassroots organization, Get Oil Out! (GOO!), formed three days after the spill started, and before the six-month mark, would collected 100,000 signatures in support of its goal of shutting down and removing all oil development from the Channel; at least 13 separate organizations/institutions got involved
with cleanup and recovery; Secretary of the Interior (Sol) Hickel arrived on the scene, ordered a complete review of all laws and regulations pertaining to offshore oil development, requested that all oil companies operating in the SBC cease their activities until that review was completed, vacillated between stopping all drilling in the Channel and permitting its resumption, and finally proposed nine recommendations for new regulations to make offshore oil production safer and less prone to oil spills; and President Nixon appointed a scientific panel to investigate SBOS, in particular, and offshore oil development, in general, which would produce two (slim) reports that Santa Barbarians would denounce because a) they recommended and endorsed the idea that the only way to stop the leak was to deplete the reservoir by increasing oil production and b) the panel was closed to the public and its expert testimony was drawn solely from the ranks of the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the OI (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; Easton 1972; OSIC 1969-73).

1.1.3 — After the Spill

The loudest chord struck during SBOS was the environmental one, largely because the media fixated on the goo-blackened bird corpses that began washing up two days after the spill began (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). The effects on all other marine life, and even the ecology itself, however, were at best ambiguous and at worst contested. For example, reports of distressed whales and dead sea lion pups were contradictory and finally debunked (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Overall, it appeared that the ecological damage had been “negligible—nothing like what previous experience with oil spills [had] led people to fear” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 87).

While scientific expert testimony appeared to conclude that nothing much happened ecologically at Santa Barbara, legislatively, the “crisis” unleashed a “train of environmental
reform steaming down the Congressional tracks” (Manheim 2009). The first environmental law enacted following the spill was the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA); although only “six pages long, [its] scope and boldness [was] breathtaking,” proclaiming that “‘the Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and administered according with the policies set forth in this Act’” (Manheim 2009, 44). In the next few years, an entire corpus of new environmental laws would be churned out, including the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, the 1972 Clean Water Act Amendments, the 1972 Federal Environmental Pesticides Control Act, the 1972 Marine Mammals Protection Act, the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act, the 1973 Endangered Species Act, and the 1973 Safe Drinking Water Act (Manheim 2009). In addition, SBOS “reinforced the aversion to offshore drilling in most regions, leading to a moratorium on offshore development on the US Outer Continental Shelf outside of the Gulf of Mexico”; in fact, for the next five years, no leases were allowed anywhere (except in the Gulf), but this came to an end with the OPEC oil shocks of 1973 and 1974 (Freudenburg and Gramling 2002, 28; italics added).

Outside of Washington, especially in California, and along the SBC, “opposition to offshore oil development became stronger and more permanently organized,” with groups such as GOO! and Sierra Club “focus[ing] more...on attempts to block oil industry activities along the coast” (Michaud 2008, 22). At a local/regional level, these efforts appear to have been successful: as of 2005—contrary to UO’s vision of 70 platforms and 4000 wells—only 21 rigs operate off the entirety of the California coast (compared to the 3500 in the Gulf of Mexico) (Gramling and Freudenburg 2006). More broadly, SBOS continues to be a ‘legacy moment,’ one that is credited with not only serving as midwife to NEPA and inspiring the inaugural Earth Day, but also increasing general environmental awareness throughout the
United States and the world (Freudenburg and Gramling 1993; Grabosky and Shover 2010; Miller 1991).

From a research point-of-view, scholarship on SBOS has been relatively fallow. Researchers have theorized that UO’s poor handling of the spill kick-started the ethos of corporate social responsibility by providing an example of what not to do and say during an incident (Brown 2008). They have also examined the media interest in, and influence over, the spill (Molotch and Lester 1974, 1975; Miller 1991); analyzed the opinions and feelings of the local population to oil development (Molotch and Freudenburg 1996); presented the legal ramifications of the spill (Baldwin 1970-1); reviewed the regulatory fallout (Manheim 2009); measured the NIMBYism present in Santa Barbara (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2008); and produced numerous scientific articles detailing the ecological impact of the spill and oil pollution in general (Foster, Neushul, and Zingwork 1971; Blumer et al. 1971; Carter 2003; Carter et al. 2000; Squire 1992).

1.2 - The Giant Spill That Couldn’t: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (DHOS)

1.2.1 - Before the Spill

Some forty years after the inaugural offshore well was punched through the submerged strata of the Santa Barbara Channel, the first of the Gulf of Mexico’s (GoM) many, many holes was sunk into its silt bottom (Cavnar 2010). Nowadays, the GoM contains the most extensive and densest concentration of offshore oil platforms, both in the US and in the world. As of 2008, 152 companies were operating 4000 producing rigs off the coasts of the five Gulf States, of which 1962 are major platforms (Brooke and Schroeder 2008); recent estimates suggest that there are over 27,000 abandoned wells in the Gulf (Down 2010).21,22 Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the depletion of shallow water
reservoirs began to affect OI profit-margins, behooving it to invest colossal amounts of money into the development of deepwater production to maintain profitability and thus industry survival. Between 1992 and 2002, this subset of the offshore oil machine had grown 840%, and as of 2013 accounted for over 54% of the 7800 active leases, and two-thirds of the oil produced, in the Gulf from the 2000 wells located at depths of 305 metres or greater (Boehm et al. 2001; Brooke and Schroeder 2008; Fannin et al. 2008). Production now exceeds that of shallow water, "despite the fact that only 4% of all producing wells in the Gulf of Mexico are in deep water" (Boehm et al. 2001, xxv).

One of these wells, located in Mississippi Canyon block 252, was code-named 'Macondo,' after the city in Gabriel García Márquez's One Hundred Years of Solitude (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; Cavnar 2010). A kilometre and a half of water separated the surface from the seabed, and the oil reservoir itself was located four kilometres beneath that. Drilling began on the 7th of October, 2009, by the mobile platform, Marianas; the following month, it sustained enough damage during Hurricane Ike that BP had to call in a replacement (Cavnar 2010; Freudenburg and Gramling 2011). They chose the Transocean-owned Deepwater Horizon. In September 2009, it had "set an all-time record for deepwater drilling, completing a well nearly six miles deep [over nine kilometres]" (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, ix); reaching the Macondo reservoir, therefore, would not pose a problem. But by February 2010, the "well was behind schedule and over budget" (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 33). And unfortunately, all the parties directly involved with Macondo—BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and the Minerals Management Service (MMS)—were obsessed with keeping costs low and profits high, and therefore had no qualms about skipping and violating safety and maintenance procedures in the name of saving time and money.
This confluence of factors came to a head during the week leading up to the 20th of April, 2010. A few days before, the MMS had given the platform a clean bill of health after only a couple of hours of ‘inspection,’ even though the rig was not operating with the safety documentation the agency itself ‘demanded’ it should (Freudenberg and Gramling 2011; National Commission 2011). The day before, Halliburton “had finished cementing the…well’s final casing, a key step in the process of getting the platform ready to move to a new location,” but skipped conducting the acoustical cement bond log test (which ascertains the integrity of the cementing) in order to save 12 hours and $128,000 of work (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, ix; Cavnar 2010). That morning, the 16.5 metre tall blowout preventer rising up from the seafloor 1500 metres below was declared ‘fail-safe’ (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; National Commission 2011). And just hours before, “important corporate bigwigs had come on board [to] celebrat[e] the fact that the Deepwater Horizon had just completed seven full years without a single lost-time accident—the first such rig to ever do so” (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, ix).

1.2.2 – During the Spill

The kick hit between 2140 and 2143 on the 20th of April 2010. A roaring gusher of sea water and drilling mud fired into the air from the rotary (the pipe leading to the bore hole), dousing the rig floor and the dozens of men working there (National Commission 2011; Cavnar 2010). As per standard procedure, the crew attempted to re-route the mud from the rotary nozzle, then to close the top-side blowout preventer, but it was too late. Event after event cascaded into the next, culminating in a maelstrom of burning oil and gas (Cavnar 2010). The fire was far beyond the fighting capabilities available on the rig (Cavnar 2010, 7; National Commission 2011).26 The captain gave the order to abandon ship.
On the 40th anniversary of Earth Day—the 22nd of April—the nine-year old, record-holding Deepwater Horizon collapsed in upon itself from fire damage and heat-stress and plunged to the bottom of the Gulf, where it will be slowly interred over the coming centuries by the outwash of the Mississippi River (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; Cavnar 2010). During its descent, it destroyed the pipe connecting reservoir and surface, initiating the oil spill that would consume the nation for the next 86 days, stoked in no small part by the continuous failure of BP to staunch the flow, and by the installation of a real-time underwater camera that provided the internet with a 24/7 vigil of the greyish orange plumes rocketing from the broken riser. But instead of inspiring all relevant parties involved to engage in concerted, efficient action, it set them to squabbling—over the flow rate, over how to respond, over how to kill the well (Cavnar 2010; Times Topic 2010).

It took over two weeks for substantial amounts of orange sludge to begin washing up “on the beaches and wetlands of Louisiana’s fragile coastline”; beneath the surface, however, even greater quantities had been coalescing into gargantuan plumes—some as long as 35 kilometres—and snaking out in several directions, such as toward the Gulf loop current that could sweep them beyond the GoM (Cavnar 2010, 13, Camilli et al. 2010). Along with the oilfall, “several hundred sea turtles, all of them officially threatened and endangered, washed up dead…joined by hundreds of porpoises and other sea mammals, thousands of sea birds, and an unknowable number of fish,” all killed by either the oil, the dispersants used to break up the oil, or both (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, xi). Over the course of 54 days and 74 separate occasions, BP dumped 5.7 to 7.6 million litres of dispersant into the GoM, “by far the largest use of such chemicals in history” (Cavnar 2010; Levitt and Edmison 2010).
As for the responsible parties, the Obama Administration convinced BP to set up a $20 billion escrow account to compensate Gulf Coast businesses and residents harmed by the spill (Times Topic 2010); but it is questionable if this money helped in the long-run. The MMS was disbanded and replaced with three separate bureaucracies to appease criticisms that the MMS had had a contradictory mandate (regulating an industry from which it collected billions of dollars per year); but all three agencies are still under the purview of the Department of the Interior (Cavnar 2010). And a six-month moratorium on new OCS oil activities was issued, but it ultimately only affected 33 deepwater operations, and was lifted a month early (Times Topic 2010).

1.2.3 – After the Spill

Three years after DHOS, the aftermath continues, largely in the forms of environmental problems, litigation, and an already vast body of academic research. Over the course of three months, 779 million litres of oil poured into the GoM; the ecological and social harm inflicted by this sudden en masse introduction of toxic material to the environment will affect the Gulf region for years, perhaps decades, to come. For example, oil mats continue to be discovered washed-up on many shores; in late June 2013, an 18,000 kilogram tar mat was discovered washed-up near Isle Grand Terre, Louisiana, prompting the closure of nearby waters until it was dismembered and removed (Smith 2013). Meanwhile, the oil (and dispersant) particulates lacing the waters of the inter-tidal zones continue to cause problems for the seafood industry: oysterers, shrimp harvesters, fin fishers, and crab catchers are reporting that significant portions of their post-DHOS catches lack eyes (and even eye sockets), are riddled with lesions, and have missing claws (Strasser 2012).
Meanwhile, unlike in the aftermath of SBOS, Congress appears to be taking little action in response to DHOS. With the exception of the RESTORE Act of 2012—which dictates that 80% of Deepwater Horizon-related Clean Water Act fines will go directly to the five Gulf states for the purpose of funding coastal restoration—neither the House nor the Senate have provided leadership to make “offshore drilling safer,” to “improve the nation’s ability to respond to oil spills,” or to ensure that oil development is performed in an environmentally sound way (Oil Spill Commission 2012). Many, however, consider even RESTORE to be flawed because the “monies coming to the Gulf coast will be controlled by [the] Gulf state’s governors (all five are Republican)…and other elected leaders, [with] Gulf residents…having little say in how or where the billions of dollars will be spent” (Mastrototaro 2012). On the other hand, the judiciary branch of the FG has been diligent in extracting as much financial compensation and restitution from the three responsible parties as the law will allow. Halliburton was fined $200,000 (the statuary maximum) for “destroying the results of a computer simulation of the cement seal that it provided to [BP]” that proved the inadequacy of the cementing (Leroux 2013). Transocean reached a settlement with the FG: in exchange for pleading guilty to violating the Clean Water Act, it paid $1.4 billion in penalties and fines (Malakoff 2013). Finally, BP has (so far) paid out $14 billion to the Gulf residents and businesses impacted by the spill (above and beyond what it has paid through the now depleted $20 billion escrow fund), and also reached a settlement with the FG: in exchange for pleading guilty to criminal charges, it paid $4.5 billion in fines and penalties, which is the “largest total criminal resolution in the history of the United States” (Holder, as quoted in Kunzelman 2012). Its civil Clean Water Act fines—which could be as low as $4-5 billion and as high as $18-20—are still being fought and contested in the courts; a ruling is not expected until sometime in 2014.
Finally, while Santa Barbara helped midwife into existence an unprecedented degree of environmental concern, *Deepwater Horizon* has not been able to capitalize on, nor even maintain, the widespread anger and protest it inspired from virtually all corners during its initial 86 days. Although the National Oil Spill Commission recommended that a GoM Regional Citizen's Advisory Council (RCAC) be established to improve and expand citizen oversight of offshore development by granting them an *active* voice in decisions concerning “exploration, production, pipelines, tankers, terminals, spill prevention, response planning, and environmental monitoring,” the FG did not act upon it, and the OI showed zero interest in it (Steiner 2013).  

On the academic front, a massive corpus of research has accumulated since the *Deepwater Horizon* oil spill came to an ‘end.’ This scholarly deluge encompasses such topics and subjects as the effects of the oil on microbial life (e.g., Mason et al. 2012); the composition and fate of the oil plumes (e.g., Reddy et al. 2012); the consequences of the spill on the wetlands (e.g., Silliman et al. 2012; Mendelssohn et al. 2012); assessments on the dissemination of seafood safety claims (e.g., Geiner et al. 2013); the psychological responses of Gulf residents (e.g., Morris et al. 2013); and the impacts of DHOS on the institution of management (e.g., Hoffman and Jennings 2011). A single study examines how the spill was framed as a social event (Hope 2011).
Chapter 2: A Literature Review of Crisis, Disaster, and Catastrophe

The purpose of this thesis is to determine what the frame sponsors (FSs) of the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills meant when they utilized crisis, disaster, and catastrophe (CDC) terms, and whether these meanings had any correlation with the spills' actual outcomes. In order to accomplish this, I need to know what these words, themselves, mean. This requires that each term be furnished with a denotation. Working from the belief that "definitions are tools that serve a purpose, nothing more, nothing less," but keeping in mind that they also reveal "information about the motives and purposes" of the researcher (Mitroff, Alpaslan, and Green 2004, 176), I decided that instead of picking one denotation for each term from the innumerable ones available, or composing my own based upon them, I would construct a sensitizing concept for each of the words and use those to ascertain/identify how and why the FSs perceived the spills as CDCs in their various texts. According to Herbert Blumer” (1954, 7), who first proposed/identified them, sensitizing concepts “lack precise reference and clean-cut identification of a specific instance and of its content”; instead, their ability to 'define' “rest[s] on a general sense of what is relevant,” and by simply “suggest[ing] directions along which to look.” In other words, they are inductive 'definitions' that act as umbrellas sheltering ideas and concepts, and allow for a far greater range of “openness or ambiguity” (Perry 2007, 2).

In practice, formulating these sensitizing concepts entailed a) collecting as many definitions of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe as I could find; b) picking out any and all repeating ideas; c) collating them into descending order from most referenced to least; and d) choosing the half-dozen (where applicable) most cited to become my sensitizing concept for each CDC. In addition, by assembling these references into coherent accounts, I was able to ascertain a consensual 'sense' of what the extant research, as a whole, means by each term,
regardless of how well it matches with any of the separate nominal definitions or definitive concepts. Taken all together, not only do the sensitizing concepts minimize the influences and biases of research agendas not my own, but they are also appropriate since there exists no universally accepted definitions for crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. Consequently, I believe I have been able to excise as much arbitrariness from the meanings of the three CDCs as possible, freeing me from the cage of any particular denotation/connotation that may cause me to leave out important and invaluable elements present in my data. And by extension, I may also have—paradoxically—compiled a consensus definition of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe.

2.1 – Framing Crisis

2.1.1 – Introducing Crisis

Crisis is a “popular—some say ‘sexy’—term,” one that has “instant appeal[,] and as a result is used frequently and in a wide variety of contexts” (Boin 2004, 166). According to Academic Search Premier, for example, 539 articles utilizing crisis have been published in English-language scholarly periodicals in the past six months; a LexisNexis search found that since May 2013, over 3000 English-language newswires, press releases, newspapers, and magazines (among other sources) have mentioned crisis; and Google Scholar retrieved approximately 63,500 articles and books containing the word crisis for 2013, alone. If these otherwise cursory results are anything to go by, crisis appears to have “immense lay, media, and academic currency” (Hay 1999, 318),

For all its ubiquity and potential power, however, not only is there “no one, universally accepted definition of crisis” (Coombs 2010, 18), but there is also
"little that connects the multiplicity of uses to which the term has been put. Unless prefixed with the adjective ‘permanent,’ crises are generally temporary moments or phases; unless prefixed with the adjective ‘cyclical,’ generally deviations from the normal (or ‘natural’) course of events; [and] unless prefixed with the adjective ‘terminal,’ generally capable of resolution.” (Hay 1999, 318; italics in original)

The “enormous quantitative expansion in the variety of meanings attached to the concept” beginning in the 19th Century has resulted in “few corresponding gains in either clarity or precision” (Koselleck 2006, 397). In a very real sense, the crisis concept, “which once had the power to pose unavoidable, harsh, and non-negotiable alternatives, has been transformed to fit the uncertainties of whatever might be favoured at a given moment” (Koselleck 2006, 399).

2.1.2 – Deriving A Sensitizing Concept of Crisis

From a batch of approximately 50 crisis definitions collected from the crisis literature, I distilled a sensitizing concept containing seven primary elements: 1) threat, 2) urgency/decisions in a short time, 3) negativity, 4) bigness, 5) uncertainty, 6) unexpectedness, and 7) turning point. According to a preponderance of contemporary minds—whether academic or lay—the central defining characteristic of a crisis is that it poses a clear and present threat, be it to an institution, organization, or individual; 27 definitions advocate it as such, ranging from physical events incurring “death or damage” upon “life-sustaining systems” to “invisible and intangible perils” disrupting and/or destroying a community’s “core values”—safety, security, welfare, health, integrity, fairness, and/or organizational support (Erikson 1994, 168; Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 43). The second most cited crisis characteristic is urgency/decision in a short time, with 17 references.
While "time compression is a defining element of crisis [because] the threat is here, it is real, and it must be dealt with as soon as possible," scholars are quick to point out that this is oftentimes the "perception of decision-makers rather than some... predefined condition[]" (Boin and 't Hart 2007, 44; italics added; Boin 2005b, 168; see also: Boin and 't Hart 2007; Boin, Kofman-Bos, and Overdijk 2004; Koselleck 2006; Pearson and Clair 1998). Meanwhile, 13 definitions describe crises as negative occasions, the notion predicated on the (potential) damage they can inflict physically, organizationally, financially, and/or reputationally. Ten definitions each consider crises to be big and rife with uncertainty because a) if it is not large or significant, then it cannot rightly be called a crisis and b) not only are the causes and effects of the occasion unknown, but so too are the consequences of any decisions and actions required to deal with it. And finally, eight definitions depict crises both as unexpected and as turning points, based on the idea that they are largely unanticipated and unpredictable (Barton 2001; Coombs 2009), and that they can sometimes result in good (Sturm and Mülberger 2011; Friedman 2002).

2.1.3 — Communicating Crisis

Of all the disciplines that have tackled crisis (sociology, economics, business, psychology, et cetera), communication studies is the most relevant to my thesis because it revolves around the power of 'mere' language and semantics to create and manipulate meaning, often for the purpose of achieving some goal. The communication field recognizes that "crisis is a label, a semantic construction people use to characterize situations or epochs that they somehow regard as extraordinary, volatile, and potentially far-reaching in their negative implications" (Boin and 't Hart 2007, 53). More specifically, it understands that crises are "subjectively defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with
them, or report on them” as “constructed threats,” and as such, the “language in which each crisis is discussed is selective in what it highlights and in what it masks” (Boin 2005a, 282; Boin et al. 2005, 2; italics added). In other words, “to call a set of events a ‘crisis’ implies certain beliefs that are also stressed” (Edelman 1977, 44). These beliefs can have profound effects on how the crisis is managed, who manages it, and who is blamed for having permitted the crisis to happen in the first place or for letting it escalate; they can even determine if something is considered a crisis or not. These effects, in turn, usually revolve around the distribution of prestige, power, and resources (i.e., money). It therefore “makes a…difference whether one labels events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a ‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’” because each of “these terms convey different assessments of the situation in terms of seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources] for it” (Boin et al. 2005, 83).

The communications field’s theorizing on crisis appears substantive. It has, for example, differentiated crisis-talk into a) contents, b) dimensions, and c) the “function the idea of crisis ha[s] for those engaged in crisis discussions” (Sturm and Mülberger 2011, 6). The contents of crisis-talk generally emphasize the cause of the crisis, which can be either concrete or theoretical, while the dimensions concern whether a crisis is “permanent or temporary, constructive…or fatal” (Sturm and Mülberger 2011, 6). The “function [of] the idea of crisis,” finally, echoes the tendency of political science (and crisis prevention and management) to view such occasions through a functionalist lens, where crisis (potentially) signifies that some system or sub-system is not functioning properly and that action is required to restore normality; specifically, it seeks to identify what the actors utilizing crisis-talk hope to accomplish and/or get by doing so (Sturm and Mülberger 2011). An actor’s crisis-talk—or, more accurately, their crisis narrative—can overtake and even subsume
whatever actual basis the crisis may have had and influence what should be done. In effect, the perception of crisis creates the perception of action and/or response without either necessarily having any grounding in ‘objective’ reality.

However, for all of the communications field’s crisis theorizing, there appears to be little research into the actual specifics; in short, the field is heavily inductive with little deductive evidence to confirm or deny its scholarship, especially in regard to the actual use of the term crisis and its effects (if any). This is not to say that there is a lack of on-the-ground research examining crisis in the communications field; there is, but a) it seems to have a largely cursory relationship with the purely theoretical work just overviewed, b) the research focuses almost exclusively on crisis narratives, as opposed to the word crisis and its meanings, and c) the sub-field of crisis communication, where much of this scholarly endeavour is based, has strong ties to crisis management, and often works to supply corporations, managers, and public relations people with pre- and proscriptive strategies to help manage crises (Fuller 2010; White 2009; Benoit 1997, 2004, Coombs 1999, 2006).

According to Benoit (1997, 2004), “crisis communication is discourse [designed] to protect and restore the image and reputation of organizations” through the deployment of strategies like “denial, evasion of responsibility, corrective actions, and apology” (White 2009, 177). Research into it “centres on examinations of [the] strategic responses during [all the] different phases of crisis situations, primarily from the organization-as-sender perspective” (White 2009, 177; Benoit 1997, 2004, Coombs 1999, 2006). Due to the instrumental nature and demand of crisis management, much of this work is funnelled into crisis communication’s stakeholder reaction management stream, which seeks to develop strategies to improve the “communicative efforts (words and actions) [that] influence how
stakeholders perceive the crisis, the organization in crisis, and the organization’s crisis response” (Coombs 2010, 25).

However, as already pointed out, this research and development is predicated on crisis narratives, not the actual use and meanings (intended or accidental) of the word crisis and its attendant concept.\(^{53}\) In other words, crisis communication focuses on how people talk about a crisis, not about what people mean when they literally use the word crisis in their texts or what meanings they (try to) affix onto it. This void in the literature is all the more puzzling since—as was indicated above—the “very act of labelling a particular set of social conditions a ‘crisis’ is in itself a major communicative act with potentially far-reaching political consequences” (Boin et al. 2005, 83; italics added). Labels have the power to “invoke ‘archetypical narratives’ that shape people’s expectations about what is to follow” (Boin et al. 2005, 83); labels such as ‘incident,’ ‘accident,’ ‘tragedy,’ ‘disaster,’ or ‘crisis’ “convey very different assessments of the situation in terms of its seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources] for it” (Boin et al. 2005, 83). My thesis attempts to fill this gap by analyzing how the word crisis was used by various actors during the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills, and by ascertaining if using it to advocate for action had any correlations with the spills’ actual outcomes. However, this research will not simply examine crisis. It will also analyze its cousin: disaster.

2.2 – Framing Disaster

2.2.1 – Introducing Disaster

Crisis is often used interchangeably (i.e., as a mere synonym) with other high-impact, potent terminology; one of the most frequent is disaster.\(^ {54}\) This exchangeability is enabled and perpetuated by the fact that in both the academic and layman domains, crises and
disasters are perceived as “interlinked,” stemming from the notion that a “disaster, by virtue of the scale of its destruction, will generate crises for those organizations that are directly ‘affected’ by the consequences of the ‘event[,]’...[and] may also serve as a trigger for ‘crisis’ elsewhere” (Smith 2005b, 299; Boin 2005b). In fact, while some scholars have argued that one “cannot formulate a useful definition of disaster without a proper definition of crisis” (Boin 2005b, 155), others have concluded that the “word ‘cris[i]s is...better” than disaster and would serve as disaster researchers’ “own choice of [label] if the field were to be miraculously restarted” (Quarantelli 1986, 13). As a consequence, many disaster researchers contend that disaster should be examined as a sub-set of crisis (Smith 2005b; Stallings 1997, 1998b, 1998c, 2001, 2005) because while “not every crisis turns into a disaster...every disaster does fit the crisis definition” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 42; italics added).

In spite of such reasoning, disaster continues to exert a powerful hold on the minds of both academic and layman alike. According to Academic Search Premier, 431 articles utilizing disaster have been published in English-language scholarly periodicals in the past six months; a LexisNexis search found that since May 2013, over 3000 English-language newswires, press releases, newspapers, and magazines (among other sources) have mentioned disaster; and Google Scholar retrieved approximately 54,900 articles and books containing the word disaster for 2013 alone. As a term and a concept, then, disaster—like crisis—“appears to be applied to [almost] every conceivable individual and collective happening [that] someone might see in an unfavorable light” (Perry 2007, 12). It is little wonder that—also like crisis—there is a “substantial lack of consensus about the meaning of the term disaster” (Perry 2007, 12; Quarantelli 1986; Turner and Pedgeon 1997; Quarantelli 2005; Buckle 2005; Oliver-Smith 1999; Koselleck 2006).
Disaster, then, is an “extremely complex and emotive term,” and as such “[can] not [be] easily reduced to a simple definition” (Smith 2005a, 205). This is puzzling. On the one hand, there appears to be a “semantic heart to ‘disaster’ that [both] disaster professionals and lay people understand”—it is an occasion that inflicts “unwanted loss, often but not necessarily death, injury, bereavement, and trauma”; it “is rapid onset so opportunities for self-protection, evacuation, and warning are constrained”; it “may affect a single family, a community, [a] region, or a nation” (Buckle 2005, 177-8). On the other hand, not even this so-called “semantic heart” is necessarily universal: decisions and actions about how to respond to disaster, and/or expectations about what the response should entail, may be “predicated on an understanding that is not accepted by other agents,” leading to further “grief and suffering” (Buckle 2005, 178).

2.2.2 — Deriving a Sensitizing Concept of Disaster

Enrico Quarantelli—a pioneer in disaster research, and one of its most prominent and cited scholars—once declared that “there is no basis in logic and little hope in practice that a single definition [of disaster] can be devised that meets and is universally accepted and useful [sic]” (Perry 2007, 2; Quarantelli 1987; Quarantelli 1986). He argued that “what is important is not consensus on one definition…but clarity of the term and its referent on the part of various users” (Quarantelli 1986, 13-4). As a consequence, Quarantelli has advocated that the “word disaster should be thought of as a sensitizing concept…giv[ing] us general guidance” by “call[ing] attention to…the characteristics related to [the] phenomenon” (Quarantelli 1986, 14; Kreps 1984, 311; italics in original).

From a batch of approximately 30 disaster definitions pulled from the eponymous literature, I distilled a sensitizing concept that contains these seven primary elements: 1)
Reflecting the social turn that has reoriented disaster research in recent decades, the central defining characteristic of a disaster is that it causes social disruption, and even if by chance it does not, it is nevertheless a social phenomenon.\textsuperscript{65} Twenty definitions cite the social disturbance/phenomenon aspect to one degree or another, ranging from the assertion that disasters result in the “failure of the social system to deliver reasonable conditions of life,” to the observation that during such occasions “people adopt new behaviour patterns,” and to the generalization that disasters are any “basic disruption of the social context” (Perry 2007, 5; Moore 1958, 310; Fritz 1961, 655). The second most cited disaster characteristic, at 18, depicts them as events that happen within a circumscribed space/time.\textsuperscript{66} Whether their “concentrat[ion] in time and space” (Fritz 1961, 655; see also: Kreps 1984; Smith 2005a) is explicitly mentioned or not, the wide-spread acceptance of disasters as events has created a bias in which only “rapid on-set” occasions are considered disasters, “leaving unclear the categorical status of very diffuse events, such as famines and epidemics”—and AGETs like ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 24).\textsuperscript{67}

Meanwhile, 10 definitions identify disasters by the presence of physical destruction/damage, largely because of traditional or etymological precedent, or because of ‘common sense’—people hear ‘disaster’ and the first images that come to mind are of things demolished.\textsuperscript{68} Seven describe them as bad/negative occasions, based on the pain, suffering, death, and devastation they seem to invariably cause.\textsuperscript{69} Five definitions each associate disasters with death, and consider them unexpected/uncontrollable—the latter hearkening to the idea that disasters are caused by ill-favoured celestial alignments or the whim of the gods.\textsuperscript{70} And
finally, three definitions depict disasters as originating (solely) from *natural* forces, with little or no prior anthropogenic connection.\textsuperscript{71}

2.2.3 – *Communicating Disaster*

Most of the extant disaster research implicitly assumes that “disasters are subjectively defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with them, or report on them” (Boin 2005a, 282; Aguirre 2002), with “each group or individual creat[ing] a definition [to suit] different ends” (Perry 1998, 214). The relevancy of this notion has only grown in recent years as “modern disaster…becom[es] more a product of collective sense-making processes than of some exogenous agent” (Boin 2005b, 157), where actors “impose [their] narrative and ideological order on” such occasions, making it so they are no longer “what they seem,” and are often “not what people want and need them to be” (Stein 2002, 155).

However, very little work appears to have been done to actually examine and analyze these recognition and designation components of disaster, and even less into the actual employment of the *term* by actors other than academics; what little there is is largely theoretical and revolves around disaster *narratives* (where the word ‘disaster’ may or may not be present) rather than the real world utilization of the term and concept, what is meant by it, and how these meanings correlate with the actual outcomes. According to the sub-field of disaster communication, “reaction to a disaster is not entirely determined by the disaster type or magnitude,” but is “heavily influenced by the public’s interpretation of the disaster, which in turn is influenced by public relations and media framing” (Yearly 2002, 269; de Vries 2004).\textsuperscript{72} During such occasions, public relations actors (in concert and/or conflict with the media) attempt to construct a *disaster narrative*, which “names an incident and reassures the public in [the disaster’s] initial stages” (Daley and O’Neill 1991, 45). These things are
done, for example, by a) naturalizing the occasion, b) "plac[ing] it outside human control," thus "deflect[ing] attention from" the responsible parties (Daley and O'Neill 1991, 47), and/or c) "defin[ing] the proper role for ordinary members of the public to be that of [the] victim" (Farrel and Goodnight 1981, 284). But although public relations actors and the media exert a powerful influence, the creation of a disaster narrative is a "complex process that is affected by multiple factors including diverse counter frames offered by emergency managers, special interest groups, and the public" (Yearly 2002, 270; Edy and Merick 2007; Glascock 2000; Luther and Zhou 2005).

Unfortunately, while "often covert or taken-for-granted" in their literature, the social (and political) construction of disaster represents one of the main problematics affecting the dominant social approach to disaster research (Hewitt 1998, 76). Not only is it unable to figure out "how to study the mysterious processes through which people label a certain time frame or collective experience as a disaster" (Boin 2005b, 157), but it also seems uninterested in doing so. The sociology-weighted research agenda "drives...[researchers] towards objectifying the subjective...[and] want[ing] to know when and under what conditions a certain percentage of people agree on labelling some condition, event, or time period a disaster" (Boin 2005b, 157). Such scholars are "simply not interested in reconstructing the collective sense-making processes" that fabricate the perception of disaster and/or analyzing why certain actors frame occasions (or not) as disasters (Boin 2005b, 157). Rightly or wrongly, they consider such work a "political science activity"—explaining why what little work done in this area has been conducted by such researchers, or those practicing its agenda (see: Edelman 1971; 't Hart 1993; Bovens and 't Hart 1996; Olson 2000; Landis 1999)—who they assume are comfortable with the fact that "disaster interpretations shift across time and space" (Boin 2005b, 158).
By shying away from the slipperiness of the real-world use and assignation of meaning to disaster, however, the social approach potentially overlooks the fact that language—no matter what kind, or in what context it is used—cannot help but generate meanings. In other words, the very language used to tell of it can alter people’s perception of the disaster, transforming it from one kind of occasion to another (Stein 2002, 157). Disaster, then, is not merely an event or social occasion that suddenly comes into existence; rather, “disaster is [also] a language” (Stein 2002, 157) that creates itself through the generation or silencing of particular meanings, and exerts very real consequences on response and recovery. With my thesis, I hope to reverse—if only a little bit—this near-total lack of focus on the language and meaning of disaster in the same way I hope to do with crisis. But there is one more term and concept that will be analyzed, and that is catastrophe, perhaps the most neglected of the CDC triptych.

2.3 – Framing Catastrophe: Deriving a Sensitizing Concept

For all intents and purposes, there is no literature examining, investigating, and/or analyzing catastrophe as a separate, quantitatively and/or qualitatively distinct concept in the way that crisis and disaster are, be it sociologically, psychologically, managerially, or linguistically. At best, catastrophe—in the form of catastrophic/apocalyptic discourse, or the catastrophic vision—is used as a handy catch-all term describing an entire syndrome of conceptual/ideational language (which includes also apocalypse, crisis, disaster, and tragedy) that is employed by their wielders to boost the “drama and novelty” of an occasion by evoking dread, fear, and overwhelming threat (Nerlich and James 2009; Hulme 2006; Edelman 1977, 489; Nerlich 2009; Marriner and Morhange 2013); more often, it is treated as a synonym for disaster and occasionally crisis (see FEMA 2003; Prince 1920; Nerlich and
James 2009). *Catastrophe* is neither recognized as a sub-field in any academic or theoretical endeavour (unlike disaster), nor is it studied across a broad spectrum of disciplines (like crisis). According to Academic Search Premier, only 25 articles utilizing *catastrophe* in any way were published during a six-month window; the majority of these concern the mathematical theory, called catastrophe, while most of the rest concerned geology, where it appears to mean nothing more than a (relatively) sudden change in the physical environment. In contrast to academia’s apparent reluctance to investigate it, or to even invoke the word, the world-at-large appears to perceive itself as inundated by catastrophe: according to LexisNexis, over 3000 English-language newswires, press releases, newspapers, and magazines (among other sources) have mentioned *catastrophe* since May 2013, and a Google Scholar search retrieved approximately 18,400 articles and books containing the word for 2013 alone. There appears to be no research attempting to explain this dichotomy between academia’s disinclination to use and/or perceive catastrophe and the world-at-large’s enthusiasm for doing so.

Periodically since the mid-1960s, however, attempts have been made to distinguish *catastrophe* as a unique term, concept, and typology; many of these have been initiated by Enrico Quarantelli, one of the elder statesmen of disaster research, with the remainder simply reiterating his work (Quarantelli 2006; Quarantelli 1986; Quarantelli 2008; Olson 2000; Rodríguez, Trainor, and Quarantelli 2006). The rationale for these efforts has been the observation “that there [are] ‘disasters’” and then “there [are] ‘disasters that [are] beyond typical disasters,’” which have “come to be called ‘catastrophes’” (Quarantelli 2006, 2). Recent mega-occasions—beginning with Hurricane Katrina and followed by the Indonesian Tsunami, the Tohoku Earthquake, Tsunami, and Nuclear Meltdown, and the recent Hurricane Taiyan—have further “reinforced the view…that the scale of any collective crisis has to be
taken into account in any analysis,” and that “just as ‘disasters’ are qualitatively different from everyday community emergencies, so are ‘catastrophes’ a qualitative jump over ‘disasters’” (Quarantelli 2006, 1).  

From this extremely meagre data from the ‘literature,’ I managed to distill a sensitizing concept for catastrophe that consists of three elements: 1) require outside/whole new organizations/institutions for response; 2) distinguished by what institutions are required for response; and 3) perceived as huge/incurring total devastation. Each element is connected to each other by the idea that something—more often than not, perceived order—has been overturned or subverted by an event. This notion will likely become more important in the future because it appears—or more accurately, people perceive—that catastrophes are increasing in number and occurring with shorter intervening intervals, particularly since the dawn of the 21st Century, fueling the dread that this will be an age “when the term catastrophe, not simply disaster, will be increasingly employed” (Olson and Gawronski 2010, 206).

2.4 – The Takeaway: Summarizing CDCs

For the purposes of this thesis, there are two important outcomes that the preceding overviews of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe have provided. The first is that despite the recognition by various researchers that “the very act of labelling a particular set of social conditions a ‘crisis’ [or a ‘disaster’ or a ‘catastrophe’] is itself a major…act with potentially far-reaching… consequences,” including “whether or not that event [even] becomes a [CDC]” (Boin et al. 2005, 83; Coombs 2010, 19), there appears to be a dearth of work examining crisis, disaster, and catastrophe as terms (much less establishing if there are any correlations between the use of these words—and the meanings and desired actions that
actors attach to them—and the actual outcomes of CDC occasions, such as SBOS and DHOS). As a consequence of this lack, I am filling a gap in the literature. The second important outcome is that by delving into the literature each term has accumulated over the years, I was able to collect an entire host of definitions—denotative and connotative—that I was then able to distil into three sets of sensitizing concepts:

- For crisis: threat, urgency/decisions in a short time, negativity, bigness, uncertainty, unexpectedness, and turning point;
- For disaster: social disruption/phenomenon, event in space/time, physical destruction/damage, badness/negativity, death, unexpectedness/uncontrollableness, and natural;
- And for catastrophe: require outside/whole new organizations/institutions for response; distinguished by what institutions are required for response; and perceived as huge/incurring total devastation.

These concepts will be used to help me analyze how the various actors from both SBOS and DHOS framed the spills as CDCs, and whether the action-oriented CDC frames correlate with the outcomes following each spill. But before that operation can be detailed (see Chapter 4), a brief discussion of frames and framing must be offered.
Chapter 3: Framing: A Literature Review

3.1 – The Foundations of Frame Theory and Analysis

Humans are defined just as much by the social world they have constructed around themselves as by the natural, objective world they exist within—perhaps even more so. As social creatures, it is impossible for people to be wholly a part of empirical, impartial reality because they have an innate need to understand and shape the universe around them, doing so by sharing, editing, and creating ideas, stories, and histories. Since the dawn of the genus Homo, the various permutations of the human species have been re-forging the world around them to better suit their needs; humans are “reality constructionists” (Berger and Luchmann 1966, 367; Burningham 1999).

3.1.1 – Social Constructionism

Since its inception in the mid-1960s (Elder-Voss 2012), and its conceptual development and transformation throughout the 1980s (in part by the infusion of Foucauldian thought) (Lock and Strong 2010), the paradigm of social constructionism has managed to touch almost every endeavour of knowledge-gathering and understanding to one degree or another. Social constructionism is “concerned with the creation and institutionalisation of reality in social interaction” (van Gorp 2007, 62); in other words, it assumes that “reality is created and constructed by beliefs and behaviours,” whether consciously or not, and is guided by choice(s) (Vasquez 1995, 221). In short, it is predicated on the notion that social reality, and the human behaviour from which it springs, “result[s] from how people interact and [from] their use of symbols to create meaning” (Hallahan 1999, 206). More importantly, social constructionism “contends that representations of objects or problems in people’s minds vary from the corresponding actual objects or conditions on which they are based.”
and that in the end, "people act based on these perceptions," not on what the objective environment is telling them (Hallahan 1999, 206; italics added).83

Furthermore, social construction "reject[s] the belief that actors work solely towards given material interests," or that their actions simply reflect such interests; instead, it argues that actions are "guided by [actors'] perceptions of their material interests," the resultant "'ideas'...produc[ing] and constitut[ing] the norms, narratives, discourses, and frames of reference that (re)create [their] perception of their context and material interests, and produce preferences and strategies [for] their actions" (Fuller 2010, 1123; italics added). In short, the way people "define a situation is[/becomes] the reality for them," influencing how they shape their "attitudes, behaviours, and actions" to reflect and suit that reality (Britton 2005, 68). As Weick summed it up, "‘believing is seeing’ is a much more accurate description about human thought processes than ‘seeing is believing’ (1979, 155).84

The most common and ubiquitous medium through which this process takes place is discourse/language. Constructionists regard discourse/language in "post-structuralist and Foucauldian terms as generally constitutive of social reality" (Moore 2011, 10). In other words, they assert that "language is not neutral," but instead "create[s] representations of the world that reflect as well as actively construct reality by ascribing meanings...[,] identities, and social relations" to it (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 592). Consciously or unconsciously, actors—seeking to make sense of an occasion—implant perceptions into their discourses that "represent a ‘structured set of ideas’ which provide a cognitive filter or frame” to help guide their (target) audience(s) towards the actor’s preferred understanding of the situation or occasion" (Fuller 2010, 1123; italics added). Crises, disasters, and catastrophes (CDCs) often represent the pinnacle of occasions requiring that sense be made of them, and as a consequence, they become almost instantly ensnared within intertangled webs of discourse
trying to establish what the CDC is, why it is, and what should (or should not) be done in response.

3.1.2 – The Social Construction of CDCs

Although CDC scholars have acknowledged that “both crises and disasters are subjectively defined by those who experience them, hear about them, deal with them, or report[] on them” (Boin 2005a, 282), and that during such occasions “many interlocutors may intervene and (re)construct[] further the disaster[, crisis, or catastrophe]” (Moore 2011, 9), they appear to have spent little time examining/analyzing how actors make sense of or define CDC occasions,\(^8\)
\(^5\) in general, and even less about the actual language they use to speak of or about them, in particular.\(^8\)
\(^6\) As the previous chapter attempted to make clear, crisis theory, disaster research, and what little catastrophe scholarship exists have all devoted the majority of their time and energy to the “question of the nature of the crisis[/disaster/catastrophe],” and/or to figuring out a system of classification to demarcate CDCs from other high-stress occasions, rather than to “why the word crisis[/disaster/catastrophe] is used...[or] the effects of [their] usage” (Thorpe 2003, 133; italics in original).\(^8\)

Examining why/how CDC terms are used and what effects they may have, however, deserves greater scrutiny because language can and does exert a powerful and material influence on action, with CDC language potentially exerting even more (Snow and Benford 1988; Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). While researchers seem to acknowledge this only conceptually and theoretically (see: Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Hallahan 1999; Schön and Rein 1994; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Schneider 1985; Hay 1999), real world actors appear to be actively and proactively aware of language’s power and ability to establish and fix definitions and narratives: whenever a CDC occasion occurs, “different
political, bureaucratic, [and] societal...stakeholders will not only form their own picture of the situation and classify it in terms of threats and opportunities, but many of them will actively seek to influence the public perception of the situation" because they know that “those who successfully ‘frame’ what a crisis[/disaster/catastrophe] is all about hold the key to defining the appropriate strategies for resolution” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 53; italics added; Reese 2007; Snow et al. 1986, 82; italics added).

Therefore, in order to explain and understand what various actors mean when they call, describe, or refer to an occasion as a CDC, and the (possible) political, policy, and action impacts/correlations of doing so, it is vital to “recognize the...diverging frames of interpretation” that are often constructed during and after a CDC, and the subsequent contests they can unleash—“contests between frames and counter-frames regarding crisis[/disaster/catastrophe] severity, causes, responsibility, and implications, which in return affects [sic]...public policy” (Entman 2007, 6; Nohrstedt and Weible 2010, 6; Boin, ‘t Hart and McConnell 2009; Widmair, Blyth, and Seabrooke 2007). These “frames of interpretation” signifying CDCs are “‘constructed’ as representational discourses,” in which the “individual and collective actors attempt to exert social power by telling one particular story of the crisis[/disaster/catastrophe]” (Rocheleau, Steinberg, and Benjamin 1995, 1038).

One of the most promising ways to examine and understand these “representational discourses” is by utilizing frame theory (FT) and frame analysis (FA).

3.2 – The Many Ways to Frame the Theory and Analysis of Framing

I chose FT/FA as the basis for this thesis’s methodology because it a) “recognizes the ability of the text...to define a situation, to define the issues, and to set the terms of the debate,” and b) allows for an examination of the “subtle differences that are possible when a
specific topic is presented in different ways” (Tankard 2001, 96-7). CDC occasions, such as
SBOS and DHOS, are “inherently multidimensional,” and FT/FA, with its focus on how
social phenomena are made sense of, offered the clearest route toward ascertaining “how
people think about” social phenomena, thereby providing insight into the “symbolic contests
over the social meaning of...[CDCs], where meaning implies not only what is at issue, but
what is to be done” (Callaghan and Schnell 2001, 18; Edy and Meirick 2007, 122; Schön and
Rein 1994, 29; italics added).

3.2.1 – Framing Frame Theory and Analysis

FT and FA achieved renown beginning in 1974 with the publication of what many
scholars consider the ur-text for the theory and its methodology, Erving Goffman’s Frame
Analysis. According to Goffman, frames are “principles of organization which govern
events—at least social ones—and [people’s] subjective involvement in them” (Goffman
1974, 10-1). More specifically, “when individuals attend to any current situation, they face
the question: What is it that is going on here?” (Goffman 1974, 8; italics added). Whether
this query is “asked explicitly, as in times of confusion and doubt, or tacitly, during occasions
of usual certitude, the question is put and the answer to it presumed by the way the
individuals then proceed to get on with the affairs at hand” (Goffman 1974, 8; italics added).

While Goffman’s take on frames appears relatively straight-forward, looks are
deceiving: in contrast to the intent of most social science research, his formulation
“complicates, rather than simplifies” (Scheff 2005, 368). For all its esteem and influence,
Frame Analysis is a vast, difficult, and frequently misunderstood tome (Scheff 2005). From a
procedural point of view, the entire book consists of a series of (exhaustive and hyper-
detailed) explanations and demonstrations of FA-in-action, but at no point does it summarize or spell out a methodology for others to follow, elaborate upon, or improve (Scheff 2005; see also Giles and Shaw 2009; Hertog and McLeod 2001). And from a conceptual perspective, Goffman never (explicitly) elaborates on his otherwise exceedingly vague and general definition (Scheff 2005). The end result is that although scholars are convinced that framing is a “theoretically rich and useful concept” (Hallahan 1999, 209), they are in the dark about what frames are, exactly, and how they should be examined.

Therefore, most researchers end up “ignoring or misconstruing Goffman’s approach” by taking only the basic premise—or even less: just the terminology—jettisoning everything else, and forging ahead with whatever it is they wish to frame analyze (Scheff 2005, 369); as a consequence, the “meaning of framing varies based on the research question, the level of analysis, or the underlying...processes of interest” (Hallahan 1999, 209). On the one hand, this practice has generated an “enormous prevalence of framing research” (Giles and Shaw 2009, 377); but on the other, many frame scholars have had to conclude that not only has FT/FA not been able to “settle[] on a core theory,” a “basic set of propositions,” or even a “widely accepted methodological approach,” but that also the “term ‘framing’ has itself managed to escape precise and consistent definition” (Hertog and McLeod 2001, 139; Giles and Shaw 2009, 377; see also: Cappella and Jamieson 1997; Scheff 2005; Weaver 2007; Benford 1997; Moore 2011).

Regardless of their assessment about the state of FT, all researches who conduct a literature review of framing invariably come away with the same result: thousands of citations throughout the academic literature showing that it is “used in different ways in several different disciplines to mean different things...[resulting in different] outcomes”
Hallahan 1999; Cappella and Jamieson 1997, 39). My own review, for example, found that frames have been defined as follows:

- "interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there'” (Robinson 2002; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994; Benford 1997; Mooney and Hunt 1996);
- “package[s] of several components[] telling the actor what the situation is about and what to do” in response to it (Esser 2001, 262; Kotzian 2007);
- versions of reality and visions of solutions (Krogman 1996);
- a means of “ordering information into a coherent story” (Ryan 1991, 53; Straus 2011);
- “intersubjective constructs” that “must be maintained through actors[] constant[ly] monitoring and adjusting their behaviour” (Diehl and McFarland 2010, 1717);
- issue constructs (Nelson and Kinder 1996);
- definitions of policy problems and solutions corresponding to beliefs, perceptions, and arguments (Fuller 2010);
- alternative means of definition (de Vreese 2005); and
- “structures of meaning,” which can itself be subdivided into
  a) the “concepts and the relationships among [them]” (Reese 2007, 140),
  b) their underlying beliefs, perceptions, and appreciations (Schön and Rein 1994),
  c) those boundaries and categories that “define some ideas as out and others in, and generally operate to snag related ideas in their net” (Reese 2007, 150), and/or
  d) “cultural structures with central ideas and more peripheral concepts” (Hertog and McLeod 2001).

In addition to these more conceptual, metaphorical formulations, frames/framing have also been defined in more methodologically friendly ways:

- as patterns in text (Matthes and Kohring 2008; de Vreese 2005);
- as effects contained within texts, or those caused by an individual’s mind (Druckman 2001); and
- as devices “embedded in political discourse” and/or as “individual structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990; Scheufele 1999).

And finally, several researchers have made it clear what frames are not: narrative formats (such as the inverted pyramid style of the basic news story) (Hertog and Kohring 2001); topics or themes (Carragee and Roefs 2004); issues (Hertog and Kohring 2001); and positions (Steensland 2008).
If there is one definition of frame/framing that comes the closest to being unanimously accepted, however, it would be Robert Entman’s, which has been described as “seminal” and a “classic[]” (Giles and Shaw 2009, 379; Kastenhofer 2009, 78). According to Entman (1993, 52; italics in original), to “frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” In other words, framing is a “process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman 2007, 164). Entman’s take possesses three primary virtues that have made it attractive to many frame researchers, especially those new to the paradigm. First, his definition assumes that framing is a verb, an action, rather than a noun, a thing; framing as an action invests the concept with purpose—it is done for a reason, which is to construct a particular version of reality for whatever reason—and with agency, in the form of frame sponsors (FSs), making people the centre of the framing process. And where there is one sponsor, there will likely be others, imbuing framing with an interactive component that puts the social in social construction. Second, Entman’s formulation does not dictate who can and cannot frame, implying that anybody, any actor or group, has the ability to frame an occasion, which can potentially disempower elites—who are usually perceived as holding hegemonic control over the ability to frame (Entman 2007; Hallahan 1999; Nelson and Kinder 1996)—and empower ordinary people, especially during CDC occasions when societal contradictions may be laid bare (Misra, Muller, and Karides 2003; Straus 2011; Entman 1993). Finally—and perhaps most importantly—Entman’s definition doubles as a precise, functional, and ready-to-use methodology, providing a check-list of items that can be easily applied to any discourse or
text. This complements/reinforces the idea that frames are utilized for a very specific purpose, which is to "introduce or raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that encourage target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way" (Entman 2007, 164).

Recently, another definition of frames/framing has been attracting support in the literature (Schön and Rein 1994; Moore 2011; Hall 1982), one that offers an antidote to Entman and works to restore FT/FA to more Goffmanian parameters. According to Stephen Reese (2001, 11; italics added), frames are "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the world." By organizing, he highlights that “framing varies in how successfully, comprehensively, and completely it organizes information”; and it is by this criteria that they should be analyzed (as opposed to judged), not by their ability to fulfill ‘their purpose’ (Reese 2001, 11). By principles, Reese emphasizes that the “frame is based on an abstract principle and is not the same as the texts through which it manifests itself” (Reese 2001, 13; italics added); in other words, frames are not—as there is a habit of treating them in many frame studies—vocabulary choices, metaphors, visual images, keywords, stock phrases, or any other so called ‘framing devices’ (Gamson and Modigliani 1989, 3; van Gorp 2007; Weaver 2007; de Vrees 2005; Scheff 2005). In order to ascertain these principle(s), researchers must either infer it from the discourse or “ask what principles are held by...[the] frame sponsors that give rise to certain ways of expressing them” (Reese 2001, 13).

By shared, meanwhile, Reese simply means that a “frame must be shared on some level for it to be significant and communicable” in order for it to be a “useful and noteworthy organizing device[]” (2001, 14); an un(socially)shared frame is not a frame. By persistent, he argues that the “significance of frames lies in their durability, their persistent and routine use
over time" (Reese 2001, 14); the less time a frame exists for, the less point there is in analyzing it for importance. By symbolically, Reese points out that frames are revealed through non-concrete forms of expression (this ties back to principles) (2001). And by structure, he argues that frames "impose a pattern on the social world...[which] the ‘frame’ metaphor draws [scholars’] attention to,” so they can figure out “how the principles or organization create a coherent ‘package’ by combining symbols, gives them relative emphasis, and attaches them to larger cultural ideas” (Reese 2001, 16). Taken all together, Reese’s definition of frames/framing “do[es] not so much limit experience and perception” (as Entman-esque denotations often seem to do through their reliance on such things as emphasis and exclusion) as “provide a powerful means for coordinated interaction by supplying the structure that allows actors to become aware of, and attend to, the same situational variables” (Diehl and McFarland 2010, 1717; italics added).

3.2.2 – Framing A Sensitizing Concept for Frames

For the purposes of this thesis, Entman and Reese served as the conceptual foundations upon which I built my sensitizing concept of frames/framing. As I have tried to illustrate, FT/FA is a jumble of multiple definitions and assumptions, and settling on anything approaching a consensual (specific) theoretical framework (pun both intended and not)—to say nothing of excavating a methodology—is both impossible at this point in time and possibly detrimental to the present research. It is little wonder why most scholars who utilize FT/FA take only the basic premise, jettison everything else, and forge ahead with whatever it is they wish to frame analyze; via my sensitizing concept, I will, for all intents and purposes, be doing the same thing. On the other hand, three main virtues underlie my construction and use of a sensitizing concept of frame/framing for my thesis: a) the selection
process for the sensitizing concept elements (similar to that used to derive each of the CDC ones; see Chapter 2) brings some order to the definitional/characteristic chaos of FT; b) it minimizes the influences and biases of research agendas not my own; and c) because the raw data I am working with is already partisan in nature, I did not want to compound things by applying to them a definition of framing that can, itself, be construed as biased and/or ideologically laced.

Based on Entman's definition, the sensitizing concept will consist of discrete elements that can be immediately applied to any given text, and when the results are combined together will result in a frame; based on Reese's conceptualization, the elements will be loose and open to any meaning, allowing whatever dynamism is contained within the text to flourish, with the resulting CDC frame based less on what is explicitly stated in the text (i.e., the “symbolic manifestation[s]” (Reese 2001, 7)) and more on what is “behind [the] surface features,” on what can be “infer[red]” from the discourse (Reese 2001, 7; see Chapter 4 for elaboration). Unlike the sensitizing concepts for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe, however, the elements making up the one for framing will not be as rigidly derived, i.e., collecting as many definitions as possible, tallying the number of components making up each one, and taking the half-dozen most oft-referenced. Instead, the elements (mined from this chapter's literature review) will be comprised of a mixture of those that are broadly accepted and those that I reasoned best-suited to answering my two research questions. To that end, those elements are: 1) context, 2) meaning, 3) values, and 4) responsibility. 100

The first two—context and meaning—enjoy broad acceptance throughout the framing literature. 101 Many scholars agree that “framing puts information into context” or “provide[s] the widely understood context for understanding new phenomena,” 102 and that they “construct particular meanings concerning issues” or are “struggle[s] over the production of
mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings” (Hallahan 1999, 224; Hertog and McLeod 2001, 147; Carragee and Roefs 2004, 217; Benford and Snow 2000, 613). As a consequence, providing context and producing meaning are “active, processual phenomenon that imply agency and contention at the level of reality construction,” allowing frames to be examined “from a variety of perspectives and to be construed as having implications for multiple values or considerations” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614; Chong and Druckman 2007, 104).

While the values element does not have nearly the support that either of the previous two elements enjoy, those who argue on its behalf are adamant that frames “bring to the forefront a whole set of strongly held values” (Tankard 2001, 96) that “inform the multiple realities held by [FSs] and the frames they construct to interpret the world” (Norris-Raynbird 2008, 27). Its inclusion in the sensitizing concept is based on the fact that CDCs, regardless of the presence of physical impacts, almost always inflict some degree of social disruption, often as a (perceived) disturbance to the affected society’s “core values” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 43; italics added); crisis research, in particular, has not only suggested that the mere threat to a community’s core values—such as safety, security, health, and fairness (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007)—posed by a crisis is enough to inflict disorder, but has also proposed that the “more lives are governed by th[os]e value(s) under threat, the deeper the crisis goes” (Snow et al. 1986, 3).

Likewise, responsibility also lacks a copious amount of support in the framing literature, but those who offer it are certain that frames are “fundamental to the issues of...blame/causality...[and] resource acquisition” on account of how they “seem to influence the attribution of causal and treatment responsibility” (Benford 1997, 410; van Gorp 2007, 62). As this suggests, responsibility has a dual meaning: not only does it encompass who
should be blamed for the occasion, or for its poor handling, but also who should act, who should accept the burden of restoring society to its pre-CDC conditions, regardless of culpability; my sensitizing concept incorporates both connotations. It has been included as one of the four elements because how CDCs are framed “starts the process of policy development that leads to the...[allocation of] tasks, resources, and activities” meant to facilitate response and recovery, and this often initiates a political struggle over the “possibility of control and the assignment of responsibility, which is only a short step to a much more loaded term: blame” (Britton 2005, 69; Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994, 162, 277). Post-CDC “debates are...contests between frames and counter-frames regarding [CDC]...responsibility,” with each frame sponsor trying to “persuade citizens that their resolution is the most appropriate one available” (Entman 2007, 6; Boin et al. 2009; Widmaier et al. 2007; Reese 2007, 345).108

This four-element sensitizing concept should not be construed as an attempt to resolve either the definitional confusion burdening the frame/framing concept or the debate about how frames ‘should’ be examined and analyzed; it has been formulated for the sole purpose of helping me to answer my research questions, and therefore has no pretensions toward contributing to frame scholarship. More broadly, however, my use of FT/FA does seek to accomplish three things that appear lacking in the scholarship: a) analyzing how three words—crisis, disaster, and catastrophe—are framed into contextual, value-laden, and responsibility-seeking meanings; b) eschewing the use of media frames in favour of those put forth by the original frame sponsors; and c) attempting to understand how two ostensible environmental CDCs—SBOS and DHOS—were framed and what correlations (if any) might exist between these framings (and, in particular, the action-oriented ones) and the actual outcomes.109 The following chapter explains how it will do this.
Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 – From Raw Data to Analyzable CDC Extracts

The crux of this comparative analysis lies with acquiring action-oriented and non-action-oriented CDC frames that various actors put forth while the spills were in progress, predicated on the assumption that not only would people be more likely to frame SBOS and DHOS as CDCs while they were still occurring (providing a potentially richer pool of relevant data\textsuperscript{10}), but also that actions stated or advocated during the heat of the moment may generate greater impact—and thus, a more robust chance of operationalization—than those put forth after the fact (to say nothing of before). With this in mind, I defined ‘present’ and/or ‘in progress’ as each spill’s first 365 days: for SBOS, I collected raw data from the 28\textsuperscript{th} of January, 1969 to the 28\textsuperscript{th} of January, 1970, and for DHOS from the 20\textsuperscript{th} of April, 2010 to the 20\textsuperscript{th} of April, 2011. By analyzing only ‘present’ and/or ‘in-progress’ CDC frames, I hoped to be able to draw clearer inferences between CDC usage during (seemingly) perceptually unambiguous environmental problems (i.e., the two oil spills) and perceptually ambiguous ones, such as anthropocentric climate change (ACC), biodiversity loss, or population growth.

While collecting such data was easy for DHOS, because it happened in an age of ubiquitous information technology,\textsuperscript{11} it presented a potential challenge for SBOS, which occurred when the mass dissemination of information was limited to radio, television, and newspapers. Fortunately, a treasure-trove of raw data existed in the Special Collections Department at the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB), in the form of an aborted attempt to create an Oil Spill Information Centre (OSIC) from 1969 to 1973.\textsuperscript{12} This cache was especially rich in print-resources (i.e., newspaper and magazine articles, transcribed
speeches and subcommittee testimony, reports, et cetera); this justified my initial decision to limit any and all raw data collected to written text.\textsuperscript{113}

None of the OSIC information was digitized, however,\textsuperscript{114} necessitating a two week research trip to UCSB to collect the raw data I needed.\textsuperscript{115} This data was collected in two ways: partly by photocopying any pages featuring the use of crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe between the 28\textsuperscript{th} of January, 1969 and the 28\textsuperscript{th} of January 1970, but mostly by photographing the said pages with a digital camera within the prescribed time frame.\textsuperscript{116} In contrast, all of DHOS’s raw data was digitized; in many cases, the Web was the only place where any of it existed, in part or whole. The bulk of it was downloaded between August of 2011 and September of 2011, with additional materials gathered in the months preceding and following it.\textsuperscript{117}

Newspaper articles served as the primary source for SBOS raw data, mostly because this is what makes up much of the OSIC’s repository. A large number of these articles were published by the Santa Barbara News-Press (SBNP)—the media outlet closest to the front line.\textsuperscript{118,119} In addition to newspaper stories, material was mined from correspondence, actor literature (i.e., brochures, newsletters), subcommittee transcripts, personal written statements intended for subcommittee meeting oration, speeches, and reports (both governmental and academic). Meanwhile, the primary source for DHOS raw data were actor websites, which contained their official, non-truncated, words on and about the spill. Additional material was gathered from government reports, subcommittee transcripts, and correspondence.

Raw data were selected on the basis of whether or not any given written text featured the word(s) crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe; if even one of these terms was present in an article or a segment of testimony, the entire surrounding document was photographed or cut-and-pasted for later refinement.\textsuperscript{120} Once all the available and pertinent raw data had been
collected (see Appendix A for a sample of the raw data), it was organized into three tiers, each working from the results of the previous: by spill (SBOS or DHOS); by actor (for example, local environmental group(s), state governors, national political actors, et cetera); and by crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. Documents that featured two or all three of the CDCs were broken up and the segments of text collated under the appropriate term. While tiers one and three were self-evident as organizing principles prior to raw data collection, tier two came about during the course of it.

Both common sense and preliminary DHOS data-mining suggested that the 2010 spill would attract far greater numbers and, more importantly, varieties of actors calling it a CDC than SBOS; many of these actors would not have (appropriate) 1969 counterparts because of factors such as not existing at the time. While sifting through the SBOS raw data, it became apparent that the same types of actors were repeatedly coming forward to declare the spill a CDC; and since these actors were either themselves prominent and established, or represented institutions that were, I predicted that their 2010 counterparts would a) still exist and b) describe DHOS as a CDC. Initial DHOS work corroborated this hypothesis. Therefore, to maintain comparability, I decided that the actors who framed the Santa Barbara spill as a CDC would dictate who among those doing the same to Deepwater Horizon should be included in the study, and therefore join its band of frame sponsors (FS). In other words, if an actor in 1969 called SBOS a CDC and has a(n appropriate) counterpart in 2010 doing the same towards DHOS, both became FSs; if an actor in 1969 called the spill a CDC, but did not have a(n appropriate) counterpart in 2010—or vice versa—they were discarded.

In the end, I selected 26 actors from the SBOS and DHOS raw data, resulting in 13 FS pairs. These FS represent eight levels of society:
the Administration (the Presidents and the Secretaries of the Interior);
the federal government (Government Reports and Other Political Actors);
the state governments (various officials whose powers do not extend beyond the borders of California or Louisiana);
the oil industry (as represented by Union Oil and the triumvirate of BP, Halliburton, and Transocean);
scientists (more often than not, physical scientists unaffiliated with either the IO or the FG);
national environmental groups (Audubon and Sierra Club);
non-national environmental groups (GOO! and the RE As); and
the US Senators for California and Louisiana, who straddle the federal-state divide (Mr. Cranston and Mr. Murphy, and Ms. Landrieu and Mr. Vitter, respectively).

Appendix B provides a brief description of each one.

After organizing the raw data according to spill and FS, the CDC-laden documents underwent further selection and refinement in order to convert them into analysis-ready CDC extracts. This process entailed three steps. The first dictated that only CDCs from direct quotations, or those whose connection with direct speech is without reasonable doubt (for example, transcribed subcommittee testimony), were chosen for analysis. The overwhelming majority of SBOS’s raw data came from newspaper articles, which were a mixture of direct and indirect speech (i.e., reporters construct their story through a combination of quotes from the actors and the journalist’s own words). As a consequence, not all CDC statements in a news article came from a FS, even if the wording and flow implied otherwise; I therefore had to assume that any CDCs not contained within quotations were the journalist’s, not the relevant FS’s, and had to be discarded.125 Most of DHOS’s raw data, meanwhile, came from press releases, which suffer from the same problem as news pieces; the only caveat is that the press release writer is ostensibly on the side of the FS, simultaneously conveying what they said and speaking on their behalf. I decided, however, that only CDCs from FSs with a presumed interest in the spill—as opposed to those with a vested interest in their employer—
should be included; in other words, I restricted CDC-use to those put forth by an actual FS, disqualifying any from (their) media representatives.\textsuperscript{126, 127}

The second step demanded that all quoted CDCs had to be attributable to an identifiable individual.\textsuperscript{128} This was done to maintain consistency and compatibility. While much of SBOS's raw data came from newspaper accounts, which clearly state who said what, much of DHOS's came from press releases, which feature a mixture of statements from the FS and their media representatives—the latter of whom are almost always anonymous.\textsuperscript{129} For the purpose of this comparative analysis, I only wanted CDCs put forth by people with names.

The third step, finally, decreed that only the noun-forms of crisis, disaster, and catastrophe be included. This was done partly for consistency (crisis does not have an adjective-form, unlike disaster and catastrophe); partly in recognition that the adjective-forms were haphazardly used in the first place, unlike the noun-forms (only ‘catastrophic’ approached regularity); but mostly because nouns describe by identifying things, which either are or are not—the spill is a crisis or is not a crisis—whereas adjectives describe by conferring some quality (e.g., terrible, unprecedented), meaning that a single thing can have any number of attributes. What is more, because nouns identify things right off the bat—the spill is a catastrophe!—the question of what can and/or should be done about it can be asked immediately; with adjectives, the question of action is delayed by having to ask why something is so—why is the spill catastrophic?

This three-step selection and refinement procedure condensed over 2000 pages of various documents into approximately 200 SBOS and 800 DHOS CDC extracts. The number of DHOS ones was further reduced by lumping many of them together into super-extracts—collections of extracts made up of two or more extracts that either a) were identical, or nearly
so, to another or b) shared such strong topical or thematic similarities that they could be judged as talking about the same subject. The process was only done within any given FS, not across them; for example, like frames were super-extracted within Sierra Club 2010 only—they were not linked with those from, say, Audubon. Super-extracting was done because not only would analyzing 800 extracts have taken a prohibitive amount of time, but it also would have resulted in innumerable redundancies: the perceived need to supply constant updates, coupled with the fear that another FS’s frame could dominate the collective consciousness through more frequent messaging, meant that many of those 800 either repeated one another verbatim or subject-wise. Therefore, it was not only desirable, but also appropriate to lump extracts together. However, this process was only done with DHOS’s extracts. SBOS’s were not condensed into super-extracts because a) none of the extracts could be on account of each one being unique enough to resist the process, and b) there were not a sufficiently high enough number of them to warrant the procedure. Appendix C provides a sample of the super-extract process.

4.2 - From Sensitizing Concept Analysis to Generalized CDC Frames

With the raw data collected; organized according to spill, FS, and CDC; and condensed into (super-)extracts, the analyses finally began. The first of these entailed conducting a sensitizing concept analysis, where each (super-)extract was brought into contact with its appropriate CDC sensitizing concept—derived from their respective literature reviews (see Chapter 2.1.2, 2.2.2, and 2.3)—so that those aspects illustrating why the FSs used crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe could be isolated and separated from whatever other meanings may have been present. In essence, the sensitizing concept analysis answered the (non-research) question, why is the FS calling the spill a CDC? Appendix D
provides samples from both SBOS and DHOS showing the sensitizing concept analysis and the results that came of it.

Having isolated the CDC aspects of each (super-)extract, I then subjected the results to a *frame analysis* methodology of my own devising using my sensitizing concept for frames/framing (see Chapter 3). This entailed filtering the CDC aspects through the following elements: *context provided, values tapped or revealed, who or what is responsible,* and *meaning produced.* The results from each element were then ‘tallied-up’ to produce the (super-)extract’s crisis, disaster, or catastrophe frame—in other words, its *CDC frame.*

During the course of this work, however, I discovered that there was no appreciable difference between *meaning produced* and the CDC frame, so the summation heading labelled ‘Frame’ was eventually dropped, the frame becoming whatever *meaning produced* stated. Appendix E provides a sample of the FA process.

Finally, the CDC frames were condensed and combined to form *generalized CDC frames*—a process not dissimilar to how the super-extracts were produced. However, while super-extract formation entailed lumping together identical or similar extracts within any given FS’s repertoire of CDC-talk, forging the generalized CDC frames involved taking chunks of material from one CDC frame and combining it with like-chunks from others (albeit, still within a single FS; for example, chunks from within Scientists 2010’s clutch of frames could be re-combined with each other, but not with State Actors 2010).\(^{133,134}\) As with the super-extracts, the purpose of the generalized CDC frames was to eliminate repetition: instead of Senator Vitter (R-La), for example, having three crisis frames about how the federal government is making a mess of DHOS response, there is only one because the original trio all shared the same topics and/or themes.\(^{135}\) But the primary reason for engaging in this process was to forge as ‘pure’ a CDC frame as possible about any given subject. The
CDC frames derived from the FA often contained more than one idea or theme; this was especially the case for those deriving from super-extracts, and even lengthy individual ones. To both simplify my thesis (analyzing unitary frames is easier and less time-consuming than multifaceted ones) and to delineate better the number and, more importantly, the variety of CDC meanings SBOS and DHOS attracted, I deemed it necessary and appropriate to separate and streamline the original CDC frames into their (albeit, context-laden) ‘distillates.’ Appendix F provides a full list of all the generalized CDC frames from SBOS and DHOS.

4.3 – And Onward Towards Analyzing the Results

The list of generalized CDC frames is the foundation upon which all attempts to answer this thesis’s research questions were made. From it, I proceeded to code each generalized CDC frame by assigning it a number corresponding to a brief, one-to-four-word explanation, which was composed in such a way as to answer the Goffman-inspired question, *what kind of crisis/disaster/catastrophe is going on here?*\(^{136}\) The ‘answers’ to this question are hereafter known collectively as basic CDC topics. The basic topic formation and the coding were done simultaneously and inductively. The resultant basic CDC topic headings (such as *Environment* or *Remove OD from SBC*) were my summarizing reactions to any given generalized frame after (re-)reading it, not *a priori* constructs. Each generalized frame was coded according to the CDC it was associated with; these codes did not crossover with either spill’s other CDCs, nor their temporal counterpart’s.\(^{137}\) Successive re-checkings refined the coding by further collecting together similar generalized frames under the same basic CDC topics, and by eliminating redundancies (thus explaining the absence of code numbers in certain of Chapter 5.1’s charts). The answer to research question one was based on the subsequent results.
Answering research question two, on the other hand, required that all the *action-oriented generalized frames* be separated from the non-action-oriented ones. The difference between the two was determined by defining ‘action-oriented’ as *action that is either taking place in the present, or will/should/must take place in the future, and that is positive in nature.* This definition is based on the idea that action in, or utilizing, a CDC context is about constructive advocacy, not about complaining that something is not happening or about recalling what has been done before. Each action-oriented generalized frame was then assigned a number corresponding to a brief summary composed in such a way that it answered the question, *what kind of action does the FS say is happening or it wants?* These ‘answer’ summaries are collectively known as *action CDC summaries.* The codes denoting them did not distinguish amongst crisis, disaster, or catastrophe, nor between SBOS and DHOS; the list was refined by eliminating action-oriented generalized frames that were later determined not to be such, and by collapsing similar ones under one action CDC summary (thus explaining why some of the numbers are missing in 5.2’s charts). The results were then compared with a list of the known, significant outcomes that have emerged from either spill, compiled from retrospectives (in the case of SBOS) and current news updates (in the case of DHOS). The results from this process are detailed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5: Results

Chapter 4 described how I transformed a deluge of raw data into a streamlined and organized collection of generalized CDC frames that were then coded and subdivided into packets/units of information suitable for answering the two research questions posed by this thesis: 1) what did the FSs mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs and 2) how did the FSs’ action-oriented CDCs correlate with the spills’ actual outcomes? Throughout the remainder of this chapter, I answer these questions, provide details, and—within the bounds of this thesis’s research and data—propose possible explanations for the answers.

5.1 — What Did the FSs Mean When They Framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs?

5.1.1 — The Meaning Underlying the Cumulative Collection of Generalized CDC Frames

Instead of producing a small number of CDC frames containing a limited repertoire of meanings in their attempt to frame the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills as CDCs, the various FSs ended up generating a great many covering a wide diversity. Chart 1 shows the results of assigning each generalized frame a basic generalized CDC topic (hereafter referred to as basic CDC topic) and then listing only one instance of each, regardless of spill, FS, or CDC. From a total of 347 generalized CDC frames, there are 72 unique basic CDC topics; or, in other words, when all three CDCs put forth by every FS from both spills are combined, 72 unique CDC meanings appear to emerge.

Chart 1: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basic Generalized CDC Topic</th>
<th>Basic Generalized CDC Topic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>Unprecedented</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If framing the oil spills as CDCs was ‘supposed’ to simplify their complexity into packets of context, meaning, and action for easy audience and/or public understanding, then it appears that the FSs from both SBOS and DHOS failed (relatively speaking). This apparent failure is further demonstrated in Chart 1 by the absence of any overarching pattern linking...
together all 72 basic CDC topics beyond their association with the terms/concepts crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe.\textsuperscript{141}

Perhaps equally as interesting as the sheer extent of the spills’ CDC meaning-horde is the fact that for CDC occasions that were ostensibly environmental, very few basic topics refer to them as such. Based on the visual frames each spill produced,\textsuperscript{142} which dwelled on coastlines drowning in black tarmac or choking on orange tendrils, and on wildlife (usually birds) enveloped in globs of oil, SBOS and DHOS were CDCs because of the ecological impact. In fact, retrospectives on Santa Barbara credit a photo story by Life magazine, which depicted in full colour the black tide that had inundated beach and rock, and had killed birds and (baby) seals,\textsuperscript{143} as a seminal moment that helped increase American and global attention to (the effects of) environmental pollution (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972). Yet the list of basic CDC topics (based solely upon written-text frames) shows a dearth of environmental summaries.\textsuperscript{144}

While the results from Chart 1 provide the broadest possible overview of the quantity and range of CDC meanings attached to both spills, they necessarily lack detail, especially in the form of a comparison between SBOS and DHOS CDC framings. Chart 2 begins to reveal this deeper level by showing the number and variety of unique basic CDC topics per spill: whereas SBOS’s FSs managed to generate 35 particular meanings, DHOS’s produced 51. The most likely explanation for this differential is rooted in the fact that the amount of DHOS raw data dwarfed that of SBOS, resulting in almost double the number of generalized CDC frames.\textsuperscript{145}
## Chart 2: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC Topics According to Spill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a disaster</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forethought ignored</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Unprecedented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable future spills</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Continued disaster suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Human, economic, environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/global survival</td>
<td>Economic/human-ecosystem link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
<td>Mental health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
<td>Faith in 01, FG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing environmental awareness</td>
<td>OI operational culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover-up/non-disclosure</td>
<td>Reputational/leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
<td>Human personal input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Louisianans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgotten</td>
<td>Accountability/responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reputational</td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misplaced blame</td>
<td>BP behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad idea</td>
<td>Capturing world attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actor involvement</td>
<td>Forgotten/no action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealized</td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>Expressing sorrow, regret</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comparative</th>
<th>Comparative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>Unanswered questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human suffering</td>
<td>National damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed wake-up call</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

61
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about what Chart 2 reveals is just how many CDC frames SBOS FSs produced despite the double handicap of fewer avenues for frame dissemination and of the lack of experience framing offshore oil spills; only a sixteen topic differential exists between the two spills. This result suggests two things. One, that the outpouring of many and various CDC meanings has been an inherent element of the social construction experience of oil spills since the beginning, and that the acquisition of more awareness, knowledge, and experience (either about spills or about the context[s] within which they occur) has only accentuated this ‘fundamental’ element. The second suggestion is that the increase in the number and range of meanings has not been as swift or dramatic as the advance in knowledge and/or awareness about oil spills and their many impacts—or the decrease in the tolerance for disruption (Beck 1992)—might otherwise suggest. Taken together, these two points imply that FSs nowadays are no closer to narrowing-down what an oil spill means as a CDC than they were 40 years ago despite the increase in facts and data; and that this same increase has only somewhat enlarged the amount of CDC frames despite a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>History's worst envi'tal disaster</th>
<th>Human-caused</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prior action</td>
<td>BAU resumption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dirty, dangerous, deadly</td>
<td>Second catastrophe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Food safety</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Liability/accountability          | }
the ability of FSs nowadays to be more vocal and more omnipresent, and b) the fact that people perceive that more is now at stake when a spill occurs.\textsuperscript{146}

Chart 3 shows that of the 72 unique basic topics, only 14 are shared by both spills; and that, unsurprisingly, the DHOS-only topics outnumber the SBOS-only ones—though again, not by as great a margin as might have been guessed.\textsuperscript{147} These 14 reveal that a handful of basic CDC meanings have remained constant despite differences and changes in temporal, cultural, and economic contexts (among others), culminating in what is probably the closest thing possible to a definitive, succinct answer to my first research question. \textit{What did the FSs mean when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs?} They meant these 14 things, the only real connections tying them together being that a) they are associated with crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe and b) they are used in reference to both SBOS and DHOS.\textsuperscript{148}

\textbf{Chart 3: Total Unique Basic Generalized CDC Topics Divided According to SBOS-only, DHOS-only, or Shared By Both\textsuperscript{C}}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SBOS-only</th>
<th>DHOS-only</th>
<th>Shared By Both</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a disaster</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Technological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forethought ignored</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable future spills</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Unprecedented</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Continued disaster suffering</td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
<td>Human</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td>Human, economic, environmental</td>
<td>Forgotten(/no action)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Economic/human-ecosystem link</td>
<td>Reputational (/leadership)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National/global survival</td>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>Political</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing envi’tal awareness</td>
<td>Faith in OI, FG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover-up/non-disclosure</td>
<td>OI operational culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misplaced blame</td>
<td>Human personal input</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad idea</td>
<td>Louisianaans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actor involvement</td>
<td>Accountability/responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealized</td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>BP behaviour</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Capturing world attention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Hope</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expressing sorrow, regret</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unanswered questions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human suffering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failed wake-up call</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National damage</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>History’s worst envi’tal disaster</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human-caused</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prior action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BAU resumption</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirty, dangerous, deadly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Second catastrophe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Food safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Liability/accountability</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart makes use of the exact same data as inputted into Chart 2; the only alteration is that the basic CDC topics have been rearranged according to whether they were used for SBOS only, DHOS only, or were used for both. 'No.' means number; the numbers do not represent codes, but simply numerals attached to any given basic CDC topic for the sole purpose of tallying, i.e., arriving at a grand total for each spill (21, 37, and 14). The basic CDC topics are not arranged in any order other than how they were divvied-up according to the number-schemes from Chart 2.

There is little to no question as to why these 14 basic CDC topics were used by the FSs of both 1969 and 2010. Each spill was perceived and framed as a Response CDC because both demanded that something be done (even if there seemed to be little agreement on what); as an Economic one because of the negative impacts to Santa Barbara and the Gulf Coast; as a Systemic management one because the OCS system was portrayed by several FSs as a
den of corruption, collusion, and/or inadequacy; as a *Technological* one because the spills provoked questions and criticisms about the ideology of technological prowess; as a *Knowledge/expertise* one because each spill tested (and often broke) the limits of human intellect and ingenuity; as a *Responsibility* one because the spills became battlegrounds full of recrimination and claims regarding responsibility; as an *Environmental* one because of the blatant incompatibility of oil and wildlife; as a *Legislative/regulatory* one because many concluded that the laws and regulations meant to prevent spills either failed, or needed to be enacted and/or enforced; as a *Moratorium justification* one because proponents in both 1969 and 2010 considered the spills proof that oil development could not be conducted safely; as a *Public consultancy* one because environmental NGOs claimed that future spills could be averted by allowing local communities to have a say in natural resource mining decisions; as a *Human* one because of the mental, livelihood, and/or physical toll SBOS and DHOS exacted; as a *Forgotten/no action* one because once the spills were considered officially over, actors such as the FG and the OI became amnesiacs and failed to implement the lessons of the spills; as a *Reputational/leadership* one because various institutions and individuals suffered a dip in their legitimacy based on their spill response; and as a *Political* CDC because resources (including money) and culpability were on the line. Each one of the 14 basic topics is—at face-value, anyway—sufficiently general and context-free enough to escape pigeon-holing within SBOS or DHOS.

The cumulative list of basic CDC topics used during both spills, their division based on spill, and their exclusivity or inclusivity to either SBOS or DHOS, have so far generated the following results: a) the various FSs attached a great many and variety of meanings to crisis, disaster, and catastrophe, creating a cacophony of different framings; b) the relatively small margin of difference between the number of SBOS topics and DHOS ones suggests
that the former set up a lot of the general ground that the latter would tread 40 years later; and
c) most of the topics are pertinent only to one spill or the other, with just a small number
straddling both (which, upon deeper examination prove to have few if any commonalities).
Each result leads ever closer to a more compact answer to the first research question. Charts
4 and 5 demonstrate what happens when the topics are partitioned according to CDC and by
doing so, how they result in an even closer, more concise, definitive answer to this thesis’s
first research question.

**Chart 4: Basic Generalized SBOS CDC Topics According to Crisis, Disaster, and
Catastrophe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BCT</th>
<th>CDC</th>
<th>ESC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Not a disaster</td>
<td>World importance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological</td>
<td>Forethought ignored</td>
<td>Other actor involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td>Inevitable future spills</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Technological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>Unrealized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Comparative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natural</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nat’l/global survival</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sowing envi’tal awareness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chart organizes basic CDC topics for SBOS according to crisis, disaster, and catastrophe; topics are unique to each individual CDC, i.e., *Response* is listed only once for crisis, even though it may have more than one instance, and then is added once to disaster and catastrophe (if applicable). *Cde* stands for code; *BCT, BDT*, and *BcAT* for basic crisis topic, basic disaster topic, and basic catastrophe topic, respectively. The numbers represent the numeric equivalent—or code—for the basic topic to the immediate right of it, and are exclusive to each CDC (and spill—that DHOS BCT’s *Response* is 1 is a coincidence); that is why 1 is *Response* for crisis, *Technological* for disaster, and *Remove OD from SBC* for catastrophe. Topics were coded according to what came first in the list of generalized CDC frames; for example, *Response* was the first basic topic encountered, then *Community*, then *Economic*, earning the codes 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Missing codes are the result of the coding process being refined, in which some topics were either eliminated as false or folded into others due to similarity.

**Chart 5: Basic Generalized DHOS CDC Topics According to Crisis, Disaster, and Catastrophe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Systemic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restitution</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
<td>management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Financial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>regulatory</td>
<td></td>
<td>restitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Continued disaster</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
<td>Values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Human, economic, environmental</td>
<td>Second</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>catastrophe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Economic/human-ecosystem link</td>
<td>Liability/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and</td>
<td></td>
<td>accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>human environment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unprecedented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Reputational/leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The explanation for this chart is almost identical to that of Chart 4; the only difference is that the data belongs to DHOS.

Charts 4 and 5 show that the SBOS and DHOS FSs framed their respective spills, first and foremost, as disasters; after that, those from 1969 perceived Santa Barbara as a catastrophe second and a crisis third, while the 2010 ones regarded Deepwater Horizon the other way around—as a crisis, then a catastrophe. That both groups would frame their spills predominantly as disasters is not surprising. All the results so far, official (Charts 4 and 5, the
generalized disaster frames) and unofficial (the raw data, the disaster extracts), have consistently demonstrated that it was the FSs' CDC of choice—based on the number of basic topics, the gross quantity of generalized disaster frames, and the variety of FSs referring to it (all 13 of each spill's clutch of FSs invoked disaster at least once; only half that number did so with crisis or catastrophe). It is the FSs' choice of runners-up, however, where the results of Charts 4 and 5 become interesting.

One of the most surprising findings is how little DHOS, despite its scope and scale, was framed as a catastrophe in comparison to SBOS. It is not surprising, however, that DHOS would be perceived as a crisis so much more than SBOS. As implied by its sensitizing concept, crisis is an in-progress occasion where opportunities for decisions and actions to mitigate, reverse, or even sidestep negative fallout can still be made; the meanings underlying the BCTs from DHOS tend to conform to this sense that something can still be done to dampen the impact, rather than to an acceptance that the impacts cannot be ameliorated or even mitigated, only recovered from and repaired. My results, unfortunately, cannot provide any clues or hypotheses explaining why a spill that blatantly continued longer than it 'should' have was not framed as an ongoing crisis, while the one that continued in 'secret' was.

Perhaps the most surprising finding, overall, from Charts 4 and 5 is the revelation that the basic CDC topics are so (potentially) interchangeable. While the underlying generalized CDC frames provide the contextual details that explain or suggest why the FSs attached any given meaning to crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe, the broader, more rudimentary basic topics lack these cues justifying why most of them are or should be exclusive to one CDC or another. As can been seen in Charts 4 and 5, many of the topics from either spill are often attached to two CDCs, but not all three. For example, during SBOS, FSs framed Response in
terms of crisis and disaster, but not catastrophe, and Environmental in terms of disaster and catastrophe, but not crisis. During DHOS, FSs framed Oil dependency as a crisis and a disaster, but not a catastrophe; Moratorium justification as a disaster and a catastrophe, but not a crisis; and Jobs as a crisis and a catastrophe, but not a disaster. In each case, based solely on an examination of the basic topics, there is no face-value reason why the FSs associated them with the CDCs that they do and not the others. The situation is scarcely improved after determining which topics from each spill are unique to only one CDC.154,155

One thing that the interchangeability of basic topics does contribute with regard to answering this thesis's first research question, however, is the revelation that not only are a select few common to all three CDCs (per spill), but also that an even smaller number are shared by both SBOS and DHOS. By examining these commonalities, it is possible to ascertain a quasi-/rudimentary156 consensus about what was ultimately meant when the FSs framed the spills as CDCs, and to discover what overriding concern(s) link the CDC-framing of Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon. SBOS has four basic topics shared by all three CDCs: Response, Economic, Technological, and Ongoing;157 and DHOS has six: Response, Financial restitution, Economic, Environmental, Systemic management, and Values.158 Each spill's set of topics is disparate, lacking any patterns interlinking them. But if their face-value meanings are strung together to form coherent accounts, then what SBOS FSs seem to have meant by framing the spill as a CDC is that it was an ongoing spill, caused by the ill-considered use of exploitive technology, that inflicted economic harm to SB, and demanded (federal) response; and what DHOS FSs appear to have meant by doing the same to their spill is that it was an environmental calamity, borne from a combination of mismatched values and systemic management failures, that imposed (further) distress on the region's
economy (fishing, tourism, and oil production), and demanded not only response, but financial restitution for the victims.

As can be seen, aside from the identified causal agent, and DHOS's additional need to compensate victims, the meanings are identical. This result complements that derived/inferred from Chart 2—namely, that much of the groundwork for Deepwater Horizon's CDC-framings had been laid during Santa Barbara—by reinforcing and accentuating the conclusion that despite the contextual differences of time, geography, politics, and environmental consciousness, there is little fundamental difference in framing the spills as CDCs. The result is further bolstered when the only two basic topics shared by every CDC from both spills—Response and Economic—are compiled into a single account: the spills require response because of the economic damages they are causing. Ultimately, then, it appears that the most fundamental CDC meaning underlying two spills separated by 40 years has remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{159}

5.1.2 - The Meaning Underlying the Action-Oriented Generalized CDC Frames

While all the meanings from the previous section provide a workable answer to my first research question, they are broad and general, in large part because they were distilled from all available CDC frames, regardless of whether they were descriptive in nature, querulous, pessimistic, tangential, or action-oriented. If a narrower, more specific meaning representing each spill exists, then the best way to discover it is to examine only the action-oriented generalized CDC frames (by way of their basic topics) because, as pointed out in the literature review, how an occasion is defined—as a CDC, an accident, an incident—can exert a profound influence (perhaps even effect?) on what is done to mitigate it, recover from it, and prevent future occurrences of it.
Charts 6 and 7 show the 72 basic generalized CDC topics separated into two groups: non-action-oriented topics and action-oriented ones. Based on what CDC-usage can potentially do, the purpose underlying their use can be interpreted as giving impetus to (a certain) action, or lending justification or emphasis for why action should or must be initiated; common sense, therefore, suggests that the majority of the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon CDC frames should be action-oriented.

Chart 6: Total Unique Basic Generalized Non-Action-Oriented CDC Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ongoing</th>
<th>Human, economic, environmental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Categorical</td>
<td>Economic/human-ecosystem link</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not a disaster</td>
<td>Faith in OI, FG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forethought ignored</td>
<td>OI operational culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inevitable future spills</td>
<td>Human personal input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional</td>
<td>Louisiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation</td>
<td>BP behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict of interest</td>
<td>Capturing world attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural</td>
<td>Liability/accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l/global survival</td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover-up/non-disclosure</td>
<td>Expressing sorrow, regret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human</td>
<td>Unanswered questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgotten/no action</td>
<td>Human suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misplaced blame</td>
<td>Failed wake-up call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad idea</td>
<td>National damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrealized</td>
<td>Worst envi'tal disaster in history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparative</td>
<td>Human-caused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>Prior action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unprecedented</td>
<td>Second catastrophe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consequences</td>
<td>Food safety</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continued disaster suffering</td>
<td>BAU resumption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart lists all the unique basic generalized CDC topics that are non-action-oriented—i.e., they do not propose present or future action that is positive in purpose. NAO means non-action-oriented. The non-action-oriented basic frames are taken directly from Chart 1, and aside from the non-action-oriented limitation, Chart 6 adheres to all of Chart 1’s selection, abbreviation, and organization criteria.
Chart 7: Total Unique Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Other actor involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Mental health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Reputational/leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td>Accountability/responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
<td>Technological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing envi'tal awareness</td>
<td>Guarantee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Dirty, dangerous, deadly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This chart lists all the unique basic generalized CDC topics that are action-oriented—i.e., they propose present or future action that is positive in purpose. AO means action-oriented. The action-oriented basic topics are taken directly from Chart 1, and other than for the action-oriented stipulation, Chart 7 adheres to all of Chart 1’s selection, abbreviation, and organization criteria.

As the breakdown of basic topics in Charts 6 and 7 make clear, however, the SBOS and DHOS FSs did not put forth the majority of their CDC frames to advocate for present/future positive action, but rather to articulate a multiplicity of other objectives (description, explanation, comparison, criticism, and accusation, to name the most common). Although the discrepancy between action- and non-action-oriented topics is significant, it is not startling; the 12-topic difference confers an otherwise rough equality. On the one hand, this disparity suggests that both spill’s FSs were more interested in, or only capable of, talking about Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon as CDCs, rather than declaring them as such for the purpose of pushing for mitigative or preventative action; the results, however, cannot offer reasons as to why. On the other hand, the rough parity between action- and non-action-oriented topics reinforces the finding that the spills were not, and could not be,
perceived by the FSs—as a whole—as anything less than multi-dimensional occasions (see Chart 2 and its explanation). The complexity and unprecedented natures of SBOS and DHOS defied rigid and exclusive compartmentalization, resulting in CDC frames that might have been more expansive and multi-purposive than if they had been generated in reaction to some other occasion (e.g., a tornado, a terrorist attack).

Chart 8, showing only the action-oriented basic topics separated according to spill (with SBOS’s clutch totalling 16 and DHOS’s 24), offers three primary results. The first is that compared with the total number of topics for each spill (see Chart 2), the totals from SBOS and DHOS indicate that half of the CDC frames put forth by the 1969 FSs, and slightly less than half by the 2010 ones, were action-oriented; this finding contradicts to some extent what Charts 6 and 7 showed (i.e., that the difference between the number of action- and non-action-oriented topics, while pronounced, was relatively small). Chart 8 suggests, instead, that the ratio between the two kinds of CDC frames, within each spill, was even (or very near to it). The conclusion here is that the FSs framing the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes spent as much time using the CDCs to advocate for action as they did to fulfill other purposes.

Chart 8: Unique Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Frames According to Spill

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SBOS</th>
<th>CDC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Coastal restoration
Remedial action
Economic
Mental health
Reputational/leadership
Accountability/responsibility
Moratorium
Public consultancy
Political
Technological
Guarantee
Moratorium justification
Bureaucratic
Dirty, dangerous, deadly

This chart is cumulative on a per-spill basis; the data was taken from Chart 7. Only one instance of each basic action-oriented CDC topic was included per spill, regardless of how many times it was used per CDC or FS. Aside from the action-oriented bias, Chart 8 adheres to all of Chart 2's selection, abbreviation, and organization criteria.

The second result is that the difference between the number of SBOS and DHOS action-oriented topics is simultaneously smaller and more or less even with the total number of basic topics for each spill (see Chart 2)—smaller in terms of gross numbers, but largely even proportionately.\(^{163}\) The final result is that despite the novelty of oil spills in 1969 (or because of it), SBOS FSs proposed a wider variety of actions to stop, mitigate, and/or prevent (future) spills than their DHOS counterparts, who confined themselves to a more limited staple. Although a cursory examination of Chart 8 indicates that 2010's pool of action-oriented topics appears more varied (reflecting the fact that it has more of them) than 1969's, this is a misrepresentation caused by basic topic nomenclature; a brief examination of the actual frames uncovers something different (see Appendix G).\(^ {164}\)

A significant number of the action-oriented topics advocated for during SBOS ended up being picked up again during DHOS.\(^ {165}\) As Chart 9 shows, 10 of the topics are shared by both spills, meaning that approximately 63% of the action frames from Santa Barbara were referenced during Deepwater Horizon, making up nearly half of the latter spill's clutch of
basic action topics. While this result shrinks the number of topics exclusive to SBOS considerably, reinstating DHOS's otherwise unrivalled supremacy in the number and variety of action-oriented topics (and frames), it also reinforces the idea that the available or imaginable options for action against oil spills has not advanced as much as the passage of almost half a century would seem to imply.

Chart 9: Total Unique Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics Divided According to SBOS-only, DHOS-only, or Shared By Both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Financial restitution</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing envi'tal awareness</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other actor involvement</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reputational/leadership</td>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accountability/Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirty, dangerous, deadly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart makes use of the exact same data as inputted into Chart 8; the only alteration is that the basic action-oriented CDC topics have been rearranged according to whether they were used for SBOS only, for DHOS only, or for both. 'No.' means number; the numbers do not represent codes, but simply numerals attached to any given basic CDC topic for the sole purpose of tallying, i.e., arriving at a grand total for each spill (six, 14, and 10, respectively). The basic CDC topics are not arranged in any order other than how they were divvied-up according to the number-schemes from Chart 8.

On the other hand, SBOS's overall greater variety of action-oriented basic topics does not distribute itself across a variety of CDCs. As Chart 10 shows, most of the action topics
put forth by the 1969 FSs were used to frame the spill in terms of disaster; the overwhelming majority of those offered by the 2010 ones did likewise, as demonstrated by Chart 11. This is unsurprising because the general population of CDC topics from both spills ‘concluded’ that each spill was, first and foremost, a disaster (see Charts 4 and 5); it is only logical that the action-oriented ones would follow the same trajectory. Also like the results from Charts 4 and 5, SBOS FSs action-framed their spill as a catastrophe second and a crisis third, while DHOS ones did the opposite; the surprises and possible reasons why are unlikely to be significantly different from those for the generalized topic distribution. Taken all together, the results appear to lend support to the idea that how an oil spill occasion is perceived in general dictates from what perspective the action to deal with it will be framed.

Chart 10: SBOS Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics According To Crisis, Disaster, and Catastrophe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crisis</th>
<th>Disaster</th>
<th>Catastrophe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Political</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Other actor involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Remove OD from SBC</td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World importance</td>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OD resuming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/regulatory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/expertise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowing envi’tal awareness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgotten</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1This chart organizes the basic action-oriented CDC topics for SBOS according to crisis, disaster, and catastrophe; topics are unique to each individual CDC, i.e., Response is listed only once for crisis, even though it may have more than one instance, but can be included in disaster and catastrophe, if applicable. Cde stand for
code; and \textit{BAOCT}, \textit{BAODT}, and \textit{BAOCaT} for basic action-oriented crisis topic, basic action-oriented disaster topic, and basic action-oriented catastrophe topic, respectively. The numbers represent the numeric equivalent—or code—for the basic topic to the immediate left of it, and are exclusive to \textit{CDC} (and spill); that is why 1 is \textit{Response} for crisis, \textit{Technological} for disaster, and \textit{Remove OD from SBC} for catastrophe. Topics were coded according to what came first in the list of generalized \textit{CDC} frames; for example, \textit{Response} was the first basic topic encountered, then Community, then Economic, earning then the codes 1, 2, and 3, respectively.

**Chart 11: DHOS Basic Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Topics According to Crisis, Disaster, and Catastrophe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
<td>Coastal restoration</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative/ regulatory</td>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Economic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>Remedial action</td>
<td>Moratorium justification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural and human environment</td>
<td>Economic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic management</td>
<td>Mental health</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td>Reputational/leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge/ expertise</td>
<td>Accountability/</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Responsibility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Financial restitution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oil dependency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public consultancy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Technological</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guarantee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moratorium</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>justification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dirty, dangerous,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deadly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart is essentially the same as Chart 10; the only difference is that the date pertains to DHOS.

Unlike the results from Charts 4 and 5, however, not one basic topic was shared by every \textit{CDC} from both spills; nonetheless, they do share a single, fundamental \textit{CDC} meaning, which is systemic management reform.\cite{166} All three of DHOS's \textit{CDCs} appear to agree\cite{167} that what its FSs meant when they action-framed it was that \textit{response should focus on systemic...}
management problems. No such unitary summation could be distilled from SBOS’s FSs. Instead, as a crisis-disaster, its FSs seemed to mean\textsuperscript{168} that response should focus on systemic management problems for the repair and maintenance of economic well-being; and as a disaster-catastrophe,\textsuperscript{169} they appeared to mean that politics, for the sake of the environment, should work to help affected communities by passing (more and better) legislation and regulations, allowing public consultation in environmental resource decisions, and removing oil development from the SBC.\textsuperscript{170,171} The 1969 spill’s greater variety of action—especially in comparison to the number of action frames offered—could not translate into a consensus amongst crisis, disaster, and catastrophe about what can or should be done about or against it, or how to prevent its like from happening again; nevertheless, it produced two fundamental meanings, both of which (partially and/or by roundabout ways) became actual outcomes. Although DHOS did achieve a consensus, it involved only two topics from a total of 24 action-oriented ones culled from 74 CDC frames, indicating that despite antecedent spills and advances in knowledge and expertise, framing action against oil spill CDCs has all but failed to achieve a robust meaning that can result in true mitigative and/or preventative action.

Summary

This examination of the generalized action-oriented CDC topics/frames, by and large, confirms and reinforces the results gained from analyzing the generalized CDC ones. The only significant differences are that the number of action topics/frames is a little less than half that of the general population, and that SBOS FSs managed to generate a more diverse range of actions to stop, mitigate, and/or prevent the (or another) spill—especially in comparison to the total number of generalized action-oriented frames—than their DHOS counterparts; this, in turn, carries through into SBOS’s inability to achieve a possible fundamental consensus meaning of the spill as an actionable CDC. Other than that, the action
analysis reinforced the finding that there is a small margin of difference between the number of SBOS basic action topics and DHOS ones, indicating that the number and range of available and/or imaginable action has not increased substantially in 40 years. What the SBOS and DHOS FSs seemed to have meant by action-framing their spills as CDCs, however, is different from what they meant when all the frames were examined. Instead of economics reigning supreme, systemic management repair/reform held sway. The following section will attempt to discover if any of the(se) positive present/future generalized action-oriented CDC frames put forth by each spill’s cadre of FSs correlate with any of the significant and/or unique actual outcomes deriving from them, thus answering my second research question.

5.2 – How Do the FSs’ Action-Oriented CDC Frames Correlate With the Spills’ Actual Outcomes?

No cause is without effect, and neither the Santa Barbara nor the Deepwater Horizon oil spills are exceptions to this law. Each spill not only inspired various FSs to frame many of their perceived meanings as CDCs, but also several actors to undertake action intended to either stop the spills, mitigate their impacts, and/or prevent futures ones from erupting. Several of these actions—particularly those speaking of present and/or future action that were positive in orientation—were advocated for by invoking crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe. Charts 12 and 13 provide a list of each spill’s significant and/or unique outcomes, denoting their societal strata of origin and their primary target(s).\(^{172}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spill</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Frame Type</th>
<th>Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S1</td>
<td>NEPA (1969)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S2</td>
<td>EPA (1970)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S3</td>
<td>State Oil Moratorium (1969-1973)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S4</td>
<td>CEQA (1970)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S5</td>
<td>Improved/Updated Offshore Regulations (1969)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S6</td>
<td>Unofficial Quasi-moratorium in CA OCS (1969-2008)</td>
<td>Top-down/Middle-outwards/Bottom-up</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S7</td>
<td>UCSB Environmental Studies Programme (1970)</td>
<td>Middle-outwards</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S9</td>
<td>Enhanced American Environmental Movement</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S10</td>
<td>Contributing Factor to Inaugural Earth Day (1970)</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S11</td>
<td>GOO! Collects 100,000 Signatures In Favour of Removing Oil Development from SBC (1969)</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S12</td>
<td>Other outcomes</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Various</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 This chart lists the significant and/or unique outcomes of SBOS. Cde is the alphanumeric cipher representing the outcome, located immediately right, used to determine which generalized action-oriented CDC frame correlated with what actual outcome (where applicable). The years located in SBOS Outcomes denote when the outcome was operationalized. Origin refers to what or who an action came from, i.e., was the outcome initiated by the government, an educational institution, a grassroots organization. Terminus pertains to the target of the action, i.e., did the outcome effect the general environment, something specific to oil development, et cetera. Other outcomes include any kind of actual outcome whatsoever, regardless of significance, uniqueness, origin, or terminus. The outcomes are arranged according to societal strata of origin. The absence of S8 is because I discovered too late that that actual outcome was false.

**Chart 13: Actual Outcomes of DHOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D1</th>
<th>$20 Billion Escrow Account (2010-2013)</th>
<th>Top-down</th>
<th>Economic/Financial Compensation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D2</td>
<td>Rescinding Go-ahead for Exploratory Drilling Off Other Coasts (2010)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D3</td>
<td>MMS Broken Up Into Three BOEMs (2010)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D4</td>
<td>Six-Month Moratorium On New Deepwater Drilling (2010)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D5</td>
<td>FG Passes RESTORE Act (2012)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D6</td>
<td>BSEE Implements New Safety Rules Based on DHOS Lessons (2012)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Oil Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D7</td>
<td>BP Pleads Guilty to 11 Counts of Manslaughter, Two Misdemeanors, A Felony Count of Lying to Congress – Fined $4.5 Billion (2012)</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Corporate Accountability; Financial Restitution; General Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D8</td>
<td>GoM RCAC Holds Meeting to Work Out How to Implement GoM RCAC</td>
<td>Bottom-up</td>
<td>General Environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
D9 | BSEE Recommends Periodic 3rd Party Experts to Audit Rigs (2013) | Top-down | Oil Specific
---|---|---|---
D10 | Haliburton Pleads Guilty to Destroying Evidence, Fined $200,000, Donates $55 Million to NFWF (2013) | Top-down | Corporate Accountability; Financial Restitution; General Environment
D11 | Transocean Settles in Exchange for Paying $1.4 Billion in Criminal and Civil Fines (2013) | Top-down | Corporate Accountability; Financial Restitution; General Environment
D12 | Other outcomes | Various | Various

This chart is essentially the same as Chart 12; the only difference is that it lists DHOS’s actual outcomes, and they are arranged in chronological order.

Perhaps the most noticeable pattern revealed by the charts is that whereas SBOS’s outcomes originated from various strata of society—top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up—but only targeted one of two things (the general environment or oil production), DHOS’s came almost exclusively from the top—specifically, the federal government—but aimed at a wider variety of objectives (seeking economic/financial compensation/restitution and corporate accountability, in addition to dealing with the general environment and oil production). In other words, while SBOS’s outcomes were inclusive in terms of where they came from, but exclusive in what they impacted, DHOS’s were the opposite.

Four additional striking differences between the two spills revolve around the outcomes, themselves, which are often mirror opposites of each other. First, whereas SBOS resulted in many environmentally focused initiatives, DHOS produced only one. What is more, SBOS’s environmental initiatives reached into multiple realms: education, in the form of UCSB establishing one of the first Environmental Studies programmes in the US; legislation, in the form of helping CA formulate and pass new drilling moratoria; and activism, in the forms of solidifying the American environmental movement, in general, and...
of helping GOO! collect 100,000 signatures in favour of removing oil development entirely from the SBC, specifically. The only environment-focused outcome to emerge from DHOS was the (tentative) establishment of a GoM RCAC (modeled after the ones in Alaska, formed in the wake of the Exxon Valdez spill), meant to bring multiple stakeholders together to better manage resource mining.\textsuperscript{176,177} Second, whereas SBOS resulted in several pieces of legislation that were either outcomes, in and of themselves (for example, CA’s four-year ban on new offshore oil production), or led to institutions that generated outcomes (i.e., NEPA, which led to the EPA), DHOS only produced one piece of legislation, the RESTORE Act, which dictates only that a minimum of 80% of the Clean Water Act fines collected from BP, Halliburton, and Transocean must be given directly to the Gulf States to fund coastal restoration. Third, whereas SBOS forced the FG to do little more than improve and update its offshore drilling regulations, DHOS behooved it to a) rescind a plan to allow exploratory drilling along America’s three other coasts; b) break up the dysfunctional MMS into the three, separate BOEMs; c) enact a six-month moratorium on new deepwater drilling projects; d) implement new safety rules based on the lessons of DHOS; and e) recommend periodic third-party audits of oil platforms. And finally, whereas none of SBOS’s outcomes mentioned economic or financial compensation/restitution, DHOS’s are full of them, beginning with the President compelling BP to set up a $20 billion escrow account to compensate DHOS victims, continuing with the courts judging BP, Halliburton, and Transocean guilty of various criminal offenses and ordering them to pay millions and billions in fines, and to be concluded (sometime soon) with a verdict on BP’s civil liability, which could result in an additional $5 to 20 billion in fines (Malakoff 2013).\textsuperscript{178}

If the actual outcomes and the various CDC frames (action-oriented or otherwise) have one thing in common, it is the lack of commonalities shared between the two spills; any
similarities gained through examining the basic topics are lost upon scrutinizing the
generalized frames, and whatever outcomes resulted from SBOS did not happen in the wake
of DHOS (and vice versa). But what of the relationship(s) between the FSs’ crisis, disaster,
and catastrophe frames and what the spills actually produced? Are there any, and if so how
strong are they? Although it is nearly impossible to establish direct causal connections
between CDC frames and outcomes, it was possible to discover if any correlating ones exist.
The following analysis seeks to discover these by comparing the generalized action-oriented
CDC frames against the spills’ outcomes, both from a macro point-of-view (i.e., does the use
of crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe, in general, correlate to any of the actions that
happened/are happening? If so, which CDC has the most correlations?) and a micro one (i.e.,
does the action frame advocated by a FS correlate to one of the spill’s outcomes? If so, to
which one and to what degree?).

5.2.1 – Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and Their
Respective Outcomes

During the first year of the Santa Barbara oil spill, six FSs put forth 13 generalized
crisis frames; five of them offered one action-oriented frame a piece. Chart 14 shows that
none of the action crisis frames correlated with any of the spill’s outcomes, while only one
half-correlated; the remainder are evenly divided between indeterminate and no correlation
(see Appendix H). The absence of correlative crisis frames is consistent with Chapter 5.1’s
conclusion that SBOS FSs did not really consider the spill a crisis, but rather a disaster and a
catastrophe. With the lack of crisis-perception came a disinclination to invoke it to
support/justify any action sought. Table 1 provides details about the lone half-correlate.
Chart 14: Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the Spill's Outcomes

This chart shows whether SBOS's generalized action-oriented crisis frames correlate with the spill's outcomes, and if so, which one(s). ACS means action crisis summary, and refers to the distilled summary of the action frame (see: Chapter 4.3); the numbers are codes representing each ACS (see Appendix I). BCT means basic crisis topic (see: Chapters 4.3 and 5.1); they have been included to contextualize the ACSs. C means correlation; H means half-correlation; / means indeterminate (i.e., the action frame contained insufficient information to determine if it correlated or not with any outcome); and N means no correlation. The alphanumeric cipher (example: S3) corresponds to one or another of the outcomes (see Charts 12 and 13). N/A means non-applicable, and refers to the fact that the FS did not put forth even one action-oriented crisis frame despite offering (a) generalized crisis frame(s).

Table 1: SBOS Crisis Action-Oriented Frames-to-Outcomes Correlation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FS</th>
<th>ACS</th>
<th>Action-Oriented Frame</th>
<th>CO</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Drilling in SBC should remain subject to a moratorium until the results of public, participatory decision-making come in</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>S3</td>
<td>The CA government enacted a four-year drilling ban on new oil development in state waters following SBOS; although the ban was lifted in 1973, the State Lands Commission has not granted any new leases for the past 40 years. Although the FG continued to grant leases in OCS off CA after 1969, it did so at minimal levels, until the US Congress enacted a blanket moratorium on new OCS leasing (and thus oil production) along the entirety of the Western and Eastern Seaboards, and most of Alaska's, in 1981 (which would be continuously renewed until 2008); what little new production took place in CA—including in SBC—occurred on pre-1969 leases.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table identifies who put forth the action-oriented crisis frame (FS), displays the generalized crisis frame that the FS put forth (Action-Oriented Frame), and explains how it (half-)correlates with one or more of the spill's outcomes (Details). ACS means action crisis summary; see Chapter 4 for explanation, and Appendix I for
what each number stands for. $CtO$ means correlation to outcome; see Chart 14 explanation to decode the letter cipher. $Ocm$ means outcome; see Charts 12 and 13 to decode the alphanumeric cipher.

Sierra Club’s action frame achieves only half-correlation status because although various federal and state government institutions either ended drilling in the SBC altogether, or slowed it to a near-standstill, this was not the NGO’s primary objective, per se. Instead, they sought to end the business-as-usual (BAU) paradigm of leaving natural resource decision-making to the sole discretion of government and industry officials—neither of whom had roots more than profit-deep in places like Santa Barbara, and therefore little vested interest in taking into account the ecological and aesthetic risks of offshore oil development—by demanding that the public participate in such determinations (presumably as equal partners).

Like Sierra Club’s crisis action frame, those put forth by the other four FSs are also top-down oriented, each one targeting $Oil$ Specific matters, none the $General$ Environment. President Nixon and Sol Hickel attempted to assure the American public that the FG was doing all it could to deal with SBOS, by either saying just that or by appointing an investigatory panel; OPA urged the President to declare Santa Barbara a disaster area to prevent any further harm to the community’s future economic well-being; and Science demanded an end to the unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the OI. Based on what little evidence exists, then, it would appear that when SBOS FSs framed their action proposals in terms of crisis, they meant to convey a need for top-down initiatives aimed at almost everything except the general environment. This is in contrast to not only what happened—with over half the actual outcomes targeting the general environment, and coming from a mixture of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up initiatives—but also to what SBOS is best remembered for today: namely, giving further impetus to the then-nascent
American environmental movement. On the other hand, however, the preponderance of top-down action crisis frames, with their largely technocratic solutions and programmes, aligns with the crisis concept, which assumes that such occasions are the domain of leaders, administrators, and officials who have been tasked by society or the circumstances of the situation to solve the problem before it gets worse. Each of the indeterminates and non-correlates state or propose action(s) that conform to this paradigm.

Meanwhile, during DHOS's first year, six FSs put forth 38 generalized crisis frames, 15 of which were action-oriented. Chart 15 shows that unlike its 1969 counterpart, all six participating Deepwater Horizon FSs offered at least one action crisis frame: REAs had four; OPA two; President Obama five; Scientists two; and Sierra Club and Sol Salazar one each. Of these 15, five correlated with the actual outcomes, and two half-correlated; the remainder are a mixture of indeterminates (five) and non-correlations (three) (see Appendix H). REAs had the highest number of correlatives, with two and a half, followed by the President, with two; REAs also had the most diverse mix of frame-outcomes, with two correlates, a half-correlate, an indeterminate, and a non-correlate. The high number of action crisis frames—both in total and those paralleling, to one degree or another, the spills' outcomes (relative to SBOS, anyway)—is consistent with Chapter 5.1's conclusion that DHOS was perceived as a major crisis, second only to it being seen a disaster. Table 2 takes the five correlates and two half-correlates and blows them up into their generalized crisis frames, and provides contextual details about how they relate to the spill's actual outcomes.

Chart 15: Correlations Between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the Spill's Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAs</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>TOS</th>
<th>OMP</th>
<th>2C, 1H, D12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented crisis frames.

Table 2: DHOS Crisis-to-Outcomes Correlations

<p>| REAs | 8 | Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ fails to capture it—it is Exxon Valdez several times over, and will require years of response → DHOS-1 | C | D12 | Over three years after the spill, response continues, especially in Louisiana (in July of 2013, clean up operations along Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama ended). |
| REAs | 9 | Sound response holds the promise of creating RCACs, just as Exxon Valdez did in Alaska → DHOS-2 | C | D8 | While the National Commission recommended the creation of a GoM RCAC, neither the RESTORE Act, nor any other Congressional legislation, has followed through on this. Taking matters into their own hands, Gulf residents from a wide range of differing groups took part in the first official meeting to try and formally establish, from the ground up, a GoM RCAC in May 2013 in New Orleans—albeit with the conspicuous and pointed absence of any oil industry representatives, in spite of their having been invited. ConocoPhillips, the only OI that deigned to even respond, justified its non-appearance on the grounds that |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAs</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>BP liability money should be invested into existing, but under-resourced coastal restoration initiatives → DHOS-3</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>D5</th>
<th>Although the RESTORE Act stipulates that 80% of BP's eventual CWA fines will be deposited into Gulf state coffers, not the federal Treasury's (as per custom), it is entirely up to state governors how to spend/distribute the money. SC, based on the strong Republican majorities in all five Gulf states, thinks this bodes ill.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>President's only priority should be stopping the oil flow—thinking about anything else will lead to hasty decisions that will cost jobs → DHOS-3</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>D12</td>
<td>Under federal auspices, the well was capped on 15, July, and the well officially killed almost exactly two months later. Whether Mr. Obama's 'thinking about anything else' cost jobs is entirely in the eyes of the beholder—Republicans, especially Gulfers, tended to think so based on the fishing closures and the six-month moratorium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Federal government using every resource in its arsenal to respond to DHOS; it will hold BP responsible → DHOS-4</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D1, D7</td>
<td>In addition to apparently using every resource in its arsenal, FG also forced BP to set up a $20 billion escrow account to compensate Gulf residents for DHOS-related losses, and is currently seeking a verdict of gross negligence in relation to the Clean Water Act.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Prez will make BP pay; Prez will relentlessly pursue responsible parties for full compensation, and hold federal fully accountable for its part → DHOS-2, 9</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D1, D7, D10, D11, D12</td>
<td>President Obama appeared instrumental in forcing BP to set up a $20 billion escrow account to compensate Gulf residents of DHOS losses; and through the Justice Department, is currently pursuing a verdict of gross negligence in violation of CWA to be awarded a further $20 billion ($5 billion if the verdict is mere negligence).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>DHOS revealing how inadequate, broken, and unenforced OCS system is, hurting an already injured region, and</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D3, D6, D9</td>
<td>MMS was broken up into three, independent regulatory bodies to eradicate the collusion and conflict-of-interest that has plagued OCS management since 1954 (when OCS...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
therefore calls for systemic overhaul of OCS; how oil industry and federal conducted offshore will be overhauled to root out flaws; \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-5, 10

| Approaches | Act was enacted), and especially since MMS was formed in 1981. According to the regulatory enforcement body, regulations have been strengthened, enforcement increased, and proper, more frequent inspections conducted. Environmental groups and industry watch-dogs, however, claim that nothing has fundamentally changed; judging from the frequency of lease-granting since 2011, the criticism may not be unfounded. |

| "This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented crisis frames." |

Of the five correlates, only President Obama’s call to overhaul the OCS system (ACS 17) exhibits a correlation between both the frame and outcome origin and the frame and outcome terminus; the other four feature only one or the other—either the frame and outcome origins correlate, but not the terminuses, or vice versa. The reason for the President’s complete correlation is not clear from the data, but the most likely possibility is that his action frame represented a ‘perfect storm’ of various factors that permitted it to pass from frame to outcome intact—no additions, no subtractions, no alterations.  

As for the other four correlates, an even split exists between those with frame and outcome origin correlations and those with frame and outcome terminus ones: REAs’ ASCs 8 and 9 (see Appendix I) each have correlating frame and outcome terminuses, but not origins, and OPA’s ACS 13 and President’s ACS 16 each have correlating origins, but not terminuses. The primary reason for REAs’ lack of correlation between frame and outcome origins is due not to a disagreement about what strata of society should be responsible for implementing their actions, but instead to neither crisis frame mentioning an origin; they only state or recommend an action. The data provides no clues indicating why they neglected to
nominate an actor to carry out what they wanted done. In the end, however, the NGOs’ call for long-term response became the responsibility of BP and the FG (i.e., top-down actors/institutions), reflecting the perception that only these upper-echelon actors possessed the expertise and resources to implement long-term response. The formation of the GoM RCAC, meanwhile, has largely fallen upon the shoulders of the various environmental organizations operating along the Gulf Coast because both the OI (claiming that satisfactory forums for industry-public interface already exist) and the FG (forgetting that its non-partisan National Commission recommending their formation) have declined to take part.¹⁸³

The two half-correlates, in contrast, exhibit a correlation between each of their frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses. At first, this may seem surprising, on account of them being half-correlates, but their inability to attain complete correlation has nothing to do with what the frames stated, and what the outcomes delivered, and everything to do with a lack of information about the implications that accompanied the action frames. In other words, although REAs’ demand that BP liability money be invested into (existing) coastal restoration projects (ACS 10) appears to have been granted by the RESTORE Act stipulating that at least 80% of BP’s fines bypass the federal treasury and be deposited directly into the coffers of the Gulf states, earmarked for coastal restoration, the Governors of those states ultimately have full discretion over how the money is spent; some actors, such as Sierra Club, are worried the money will not be used for its intended purpose, citing the Republican majorities in all five Gulf states and the lack of public input (Mastrototaro 2012). And while OPA wanted the President to concentrate on stopping the spill (ACS 12), which he did, they also contended that if he thought about anything else, job-losses would surely follow; however, while President Obama did think of other things, such as pushing for a six-
month moratorium on new deepwater drilling and giving his blessing to SoI Salazar's overhaul of the MMS, it is unknown if any jobs were lost as a result.\textsuperscript{184}

Summary

Based on what little data is available, it seems that during SBOS, FSs framing action in terms of crisis resulted in virtually no correlations with the actual outcomes, while those doing so during DHOS appeared to achieve a moderate amount (i.e., a little less than half the action frames manifested to some degree as actual outcomes). In SBOS's case, the crux of the matter is that its FSs did not really perceive—and thus frame—the spill as a crisis; as a consequence, they only put forth five action frames, which produced no correlations and just a single half-correlate (plus two indeterminates and non-correlates each). Although DHOS FSs did not suffer (to the same extent) from their counterpart's perceptual problem, their 15 action frames resulted in a mere seven correlates and half-correlates (plus five indeterminates and three non-correlates). Whether their action frames correlated or not, DHOS FSs almost always advocated for top-down action, and the actual outcomes predominately reflected this; and although SBOS is best remembered for its bottom-up initiatives, and while its half-correlative sought to bring top and bottom together, the actual outcome its FS wanted was accomplished almost entirely by top-down processes. What is more, while the Deepwater Horizon's frames (again, correlative or not) focused on financial compensation, visceral response, and oil dependency, Santa Barbara's failed to demonstrate any pattern(s)—each frame existed in its own world, never concurring with any other. Finally, although the legacy of SBOS's half-correlate action is well into its fifth decade, it appears that none of DHOS's correlatives or half-correlates will enjoy such longevity and impact: the clean up in Florida, Mississippi, and Alabama has already ended (Platt 2013), and Louisiana's will probably wrap-up soon; the money exacted (or donated) by the responsible parties will be used up, one
way or the other; and the BOEMs have not significantly slowed the expansion of offshore exploration and production (Wethe 2013).

5.2.2 – Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and Their Respective Outcomes

If there is one thing that the SBOS and DHOS FSs ‘agreed’ upon it was that first and foremost they perceived their respective spills as disasters (see Chapter 5.1). Even though only ten of SBOS’s 13 FSs framed the spill as a disaster, they nevertheless managed to generate 92 disaster frames; of those, however, only 25 were action-oriented (representing 27.5% of the total number), encompassing 17 unique ADSs. Chart 16 shows that six of the action frames correlated with the spill’s outcomes and six half-correlated; and while there was only one indeterminate, there were 12 no correlations (see Appendix H). Sierra Club proffered the most action disaster frames (five), but despite their troubles failed to achieve any degree of correlation, instead earning the highest number of non-correlates (four); State Actors, on the other hand, generated the second greatest number of action frames (alongside OPA), and by doing so won the greatest number of correlations, with a single full one and two halves (OPA secured two half-correlates); and finally, GOO! attained two full correlates, more than any other FS. Of all the outcomes, State Oil Moratorium (S3) accrued the most correlations and half-correlations, two and three, respectively, for a total of five; Enhanced American Environmental Movement (S9) came in second, with three, all of which were full correlates. Table 3 attempts to account for these results, and explain how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
Table 3: SBOS Disaster-to-Outcomes Correlations

<p>| SBOS | Gov | 23 | Even though SBOS took place on OCS operating under federal regulations, the state Commerce Secretary did suspend new state offshore oil operations; this suspension has continued for new offshore production for the past 44 years and counting. Whether the ... | C | S3 | Commerce Secretary did suspend new state offshore oil operations; this suspension has continued for new offshore production for the past 44 years and counting. Whether the... | 17 | 16 | 6 | 6 | 1 | 12 |</p>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Citation</th>
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<td><strong>will suspend state oil operations until a review has been completed</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>SBOS-2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>review found something fundamentally disquieting, or public opinion informed by the growing environmental movement, caused this to happen cannot be determined.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>GOO! 25</strong></td>
<td>Even though GOO! only sought to remove oil development from SBC, their efforts have piqued the nation—they do not want to see another SBOS; GOO! is supported by people across the country and world</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S9, S11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not only did GOO! collect 10,000 signatures in support of removing OD from SBC, SBOS in general helped to increase environmental awareness throughout the US and the world.</td>
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<td><strong>GOO! 27</strong></td>
<td>Even though Sol admits oil development in SBC a mistake, he is nevertheless trying to continue it by talking tougher regulations and clarifying cleanup responsibilities; Sol has resumed oil development in SBC; Hickel guilty of resuming oil development in SBC; resumption of oil development in SBC unsurprising because of &quot;weight of tradition&quot;</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>S5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Almost from the beginning, Mr. Hickel cited the weakness, or lack, of regulations as the prime culprit for SBOS, and stronger, newer regulations were made and implemented. Oil production did continue in SBC, albeit in federal waters, but the rate of its increase was undoubtedly blunted by the force of negative public opinion, and from 1981 to 2008, a federal moratorium on new offshore development anywhere that was not GoM or certain areas of Alaska.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OPA 28</strong></td>
<td>For pro-legislation for oil and water pollution, SBOS is proof-positive why more federal powers are required to ensure clean water, no oil pollution, and &quot;careful site selection and effective [clean up] authorization&quot;; provisions, such as depletion allowances,</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>S1, S12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Although SBOS did provide the final push for Senate to provide President with some of the above mentioned powers, and although it did help pass NEPA, which presumably aided in &quot;careful site selection,&quot; that is about where the spill's influence ended. Although a Clean Water Act would be passed in 1972, there is no evidence that SBOS was a major contributing factor to it; judging by later spills</td>
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should be discontinued so as to make oil companies pay their fair share of income tax; took SBOS to alert Congress to need for conservation legislation; thanks to SBOS, Senate has finally passed legislation (after three years of effort) that give President power to impose financial liability on oil companies for their oil pollution, and authority to clean up spills → SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8

| OPA | 5   | SBOS has reaped a few certainties, but many uncertainties, and because of the latter, a moratorium should be enacted until "all reasonable precautions" are in place → SBOS-1 | H | S3 |
|     |     | A moratorium/ban, in one form or another, on new offshore production has been in effect in state waters since 1969 as a direct consequence of SBOS; a federal one was in effect for new leases from 1981 to 2008; and in between, very few leases were granted and very little new production was initiated. |

| Sci | 30  | Sol is allowing the resumption of drilling in SBC even though he does not understand tectonic data → SBOS-3 | H | S12 |
|     |     | Mr. Hickel did permit drilling to resume in SBC. On the other hand, in the end it resulted in almost nought due to the lack of new oil production that would result in the wake of the spill. |

| Sci | 25  | Tide of conservationism driving the oil industry into a corner; many Americans inspired to pay attention/notice environmental destruction and come to aid → SBOS-4, 9 | C | S9 |
|     |     | SBOS is often cited as a significant milestone in raising awareness about the environment, and consequently as helping to build the American environmental movement. Judging from the lack of oil development that has occurred in SBC and CA coast, both state and federally, it would appear that that awareness (if not the movement) succeeded in making OI's offshore footprint small. |
Sol 36 Future oil disasters will be prevented by the federal government and the oil industry working together to draft the best regulations possible; SBOS is so bad because current offshore regulations are inferior or non-existent, and by rectifying this, disasters like SBOS will not happen again → SBOS-1, 3, 4

H S5 Mr. Hickel, almost from the beginning, blamed SBOS on poor or non-existent regulations; during the DuBridge panel, and presumably other meetings, FG and OI did collaborate to draft regulations, which Mr. Hickel was satisfied with and which caused controversy because a) those who caused the spill were the only actors allowed to provide input and b) the information upon which the regulations were based were not made publically available. Although there have been oil spills in US waters since SBOS, they have either been a) small, b) involved oil tankers, or c) not publicized; DHOS was only the second significant offshore platform spill in US waters in American history to gain public attention.

SA 37 Despite lack of spills in state waters, State Lands Commission reviewing its own house, in addition to federal’s, anyway to make sure → DHOS-4

C S3 CA’s State Lands Commission did review its own house; whatever was found soon enough led to Sacramento instating a four-year ban on new leases/oil development in state waters. Whether the results of SLC’s review influenced/cause this to happen, or representatives listening to their constituents, is unknown.

SA 40 State government doing all it can to learn everything about SBOS to prevent another; legislation required to ensure that spills are better contained and mitigated; SBOS requires state to "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" only bipartisan support can prevent future SBOs → SBOS-11, 12, 13, 14

H S3 CA did act to prevent another SBOS, albeit by enacting a four-year ban on new leases in state waters; this ban has continued, in one form or another, ever since. Whether the ban(s) were instituted with bipartisan support is unknown. Due to the outright ban on oil development in state waters, however, it does not appear that CA had any incentive to craft legislation that would ensure better containment. Since SBOS, CA has suffered at least one other oil spill, in SF Bay from a tanker.
| SA | 40 | State must “take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;” in response to worst oil pollution disaster in continental US history, and to protect Californians, Attorney General speaking out in favour of Cranston’s bill | H | S3, S6 | CA did “take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters” by instituting a four-year ban on new state leases. On the other hand, Mr. Cranston’s bill aimed to ban oil development in FG-controlled areas, which would fail. Eventually, though, there would be a federal moratorium, lasting from 1981 to 2008; in the mean time, the rate of new oil production along CA slowed to a crawl. |
| Dem | 25 | Because of the despoliation, people across US and world are asking why SBOS happened, and what Congress can do to prevent another; spill is raising questions about FG’s ability to prevent future spills and whether oil production in SBC is “truly...in the national interest” | C | S9, S11 | In the wake of SBOS, environmental awareness increased; GOO! was able to procure 100,000 signatures in favour of removing OD from SBC. |

This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized action-oriented disaster frames.

Of the six correlating action disaster frames, four exhibit correlations between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the other two feature only a correlation between the origins of the frames and outcomes, but not the terminuses. The four correlates—ADS 23, by Governor Reagan; ADS 27, by GOO!; ADS 30, by Scientists; and ADS 37, by State Actors (see Appendix I)—reveal two major patterns. The first is that three of them (ADSs 23, 27, and 37) are top-down in orientation, while only one is bottom-up (ADS 30), a ratio that contrasts with the overall balanced distribution of the origins among the actual outcomes. From a frame point-of-view, this suggests that initially, at least (i.e., during the first 365 days), FSs stated or argued that the burden of action does or should fall
upon the shoulders of upper-echelon actors—namely, federal and state governments—because preventing the next SBOS disaster is the only thing that can be done,\(^{187}\) and only those at the top have the possible wherewithal to accomplish such deterrence, i.e., by exercising their authority and purview to shut down offshore operations along the CA coast, conducting a full review of how it works, and ordering flaws fixed and changes made.\(^{188}\) The second pattern is that all four correlated actions have *Oil Specific* objectives (and eventual accomplishments) to them.\(^{189}\) On the one hand, this contrasts significantly with the dominant *General Environment* theme of the actual outcomes, but on the other, it indicates simpatico amongst the FSs and the top-down action initiators: each perceived that the primary target of any action should be the prevention of any and all future oil spill disasters, predicated on the idea that doing so is the only thing that can be done.

The two frame and outcome origin-only correlates (by GOOl and Senator Cranston), meanwhile, are bottom-up in orientation, with the actual outcomes—specifically, ADS 25—*Rising environmental/oil awareness*—manifesting because of the work of ordinary people taking action. Both FSs’ frame terminuses, however, were *Oil Specific* in target, seeking to remove oil development from the SBC. The explanation for the disparity between the FSs’ oil-centric goals and the actual outcomes likely lies with the fact that the NIMBYism overlaying both GOOl’s and Mr. Cranston’s frames was soon subsumed by the explosion of *general* environmental awareness (and eventually action) that SBOS would spawn; why this happened, my research cannot answer.\(^{190}\)

Like the full correlates, four of the six half-correlating action disaster frames exhibit correlations between frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; of the remaining two, one features a frame and outcome origin half-correlation, but not a terminus one, and the other highlights the opposite. The four complete half-correlates—ADS 28, by
OPA; ADS 30, by Scientists; ADS 36, by Sol Hickel; and ADS 40, by State Actors (see Appendix I)—are all top-down in orientation and *Oil Specific* in target, reflecting the FSs’ contention that only upper-echelon actors could enact sweeping environmental legislation, prevent future spills, and operationalize academic knowledge and skills. Although the actual outcomes concurred with these advocations, they ended up meeting the frames half-way because only some of the a) environmental legislation (namely, NEPA), b) “effective [clean up] authorization” (OSIC 1969-73), and c) Presidential powers to impose financial liability on offending oil companies came to pass as a probable direct result of SBOS. Although Mr. Hickel did resume drilling in SBC despite the tectonic risk, the predicted earthquakes did not happened, much less induce even more terrible SBOSs; the new rules and regulations the Interior Secretary was so proud of did not prevent future spills; and although the CA government did succeed in preventing oil spills along its coast, it did so by way of a moratorium, therefore dampening the need for legislation to develop better oil spill containment measures (OSIC 1969-73).

As Chart 16 showed, SBOS featured a high number of non-correlations and only a single indeterminate. The near total absence of the latter is attributable to the fact that after 40 years, much of the uncertainty obscuring the existence of correlations between action disaster frames and actual outcomes has been erased. The large number of non-correlates, meanwhile, can be explained by the fact that two-thirds of them either advocate for the prevention of future oil spills or for the termination of all oil development in the SBC. In short, these FSs sabotaged the chances of their actions manifesting any degree of correlation by demanding action that a) would not happen (ending oil development in the SBC), b) could not happen (the only way to prevent oil spills is to shut down the oil
economy), or c) were accomplished through alternative means (i.e., new regulations, courtesy of Mr. Hickel).

Just as the predominant pattern among the correlates and half-correlations was for top-down _Oil Specific_ action, so too was it for the non-correlates. Eight frames cite or imply that an upper-echelon actor—almost always the government, usually the federal one—should be responsible for initiating the proffered action, and seven target some aspect of the oil situation, either in the form of prevention or complete excision (see above). This near-total obsession with calling on the government to remedy the spill, and the fixation on spill-related targets, may have contributed to the number of non-correlations by way of expecting far too much of government, and being blind to the other issues SBOS brought, or could have brought, to the fore and deserved greater attention.

As pointed out above, the outcomes _State Oil Moratorium_ (S3) and _Enhanced American Environmental Movement_ (S9) garnered the most correlations from the various FSs’ action disaster frames (five and three, respectively), because CA was in a position to ‘reject’ offshore oil since its economy did not depend upon it, and because environmentalism had been steadily building throughout the decade, fuelled by the work of Rachael Carson and the spontaneous combustion of the Cuyahoga River. They are also mirror images of each other—while S3 is top-down oriented and _Oil Specific_ in target, S9 is bottom-up and impacts the _General Environment_. Not only does this partially reflect the divide characterizing SBOS’s actual outcomes, but it also reveals a complete lack of vision about the role middle-outwards actors could play in the spill’s aftermath (while one and a third of the actual outcomes involved the middle, only one FS—Senator Murphy—put forth an action frame origin suggesting they instigate action, albeit in conjunction with a top-down actor).
Meanwhile, 13 DHOS FSs produced 166 generalized disaster frames during the spill’s first year, but only 54 of those were action-oriented (representing 32.5% of the total number), encompassing 43 unique ADSs. Chart 17 shows that 12 of those 54 are correlates, while eight are half-correlates; the remainder are divided amongst 10 non-correlates, two indeterminate-non-correlations,198 and an astounding 22 indeterminates (see Appendix H). As they did in 1969, Sierra Club 2010 put forth the most action disaster frames (10), but unlike then, they managed to score four correlations, which not only represents the highest number of full-correlates of any FS, but also the highest number of correlations of any degree; on the other hand, the NGO also incurred four non-correlates—the most of any DHOS FS.199 OPA generated the second-greatest number of disaster frames (eight), getting five indeterminates for their efforts,200 more than any other single FS. Senator Landrieu, meanwhile, proffered the third-highest number, at six (a correlate, two indeterminates, and an indeterminate-non-correlation). And while REAs are only one of three fourth-place finishers, they achieved the greatest variety of results—a correlate, an indeterminate, an indeterminate-non-correlation, and two non-correlates.201 From the clutch of twelve actual outcomes, Other Outcomes (D12) accrued the most correlates and half-correlations with 14, of which 10 are correlates and four half-correlations;202 $20 Billion Escrow Account (D1) comes in second, with seven (four correlates and three half-ones);203 and BP Pleads Guilty to 11 Counts of Manslaughter, Two Misdemeanors, and A Felony Count of Lying to Congress – Fined $4.5 Billion (D7) is third, with four (three correlates and single half-one).204 Table 4 attempts to account for these results, as well as to explain how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
Chart 17: Correlations Between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and Their Outcomes

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<th>And</th>
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<th>X</th>
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</tr>
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<td>74</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
This chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented disaster frames.

Table 4: DHOS Disaster-to-Outcomes Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aud</th>
<th>44</th>
<th>DHOS inspiring ordinary people to take responsibility by coming out to help with response effort → DHOS-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>DHOS is a complex disaster causing widespread mental health issues, leading to medical, social, and economic problems, and this requires complex solutions, from BP paying claims to public service ads stressing the importance of staying connected to ensuring seafood safety to monitoring caregiver states of mind; many Gulfers are stricken with health ailments, but oil spills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>C D12 Thousands of people did, indeed, come out to help in whatever way they could during DHOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H D1 BP, primarily through its $20 billion escrow account, paid out claims for three years (the account was empty by around July 2013); whether BP is paying for claims by other means is difficult to determine. Whether BP is actually helping with the medical, social, and economic problems induced by DHOS is unknown.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Due to the scale of DHOS, non-profits have been vital to response/recovery, and will continue to as short-term segues into long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental groups have been busy putting forth suggestions about how to go about restoring the Gulf, and criticizing what has already been suggested or has not been suggested. In May, the preliminary meeting of GoM RCAC met to work out how to bring the organization into being (in lieu of federal mandate, as had happened in the case of Alaska’s RCACs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAs</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>DHOS so bad that only federal and responsible parties have the resources to respond, and they should provide them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>For the most part, only FG and OI/BP responded to DHOS: FG declined international aid, and although thousands of ordinary people came out to help with the response, plus the monitoring efforts of NGOs, the primary work was done by the government and the industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPHT</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>BP committing to pay all legitimate claims in “simple [and] fair” way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Primarily through the $20 billion escrow account, BP paid out claims; recently, it has gone to court to stop future claims payouts on account of incidents of fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>America must not tolerate BP’s profits over safety behaviour, but make sure BP pays for any/all damages and decide whether they should be allowed back in GoM; nation must take the opportunity to rethink its energy policy (&quot;this mad rush to drill&quot;) in a depoliticized way, bring those responsible forward, prevent another, and make the oil industry upgrade its</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Although FG has pursued BP to pay for any and all damages related to DHOS, continues to do so via CWA, and has brought the responsible parties forward, it has allowed BP back into GoM. What is more, nation has not taken the opportunity to rethink its energy policy, in a depoliticized or politicized way, and it seems unlikely that it has forced OI to upgrade its cleanup technology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>OI and FG working together and using massive amounts of resources to end DHOS quickly and satisfactorily → DHOS-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Of DHOS’s many lessons, one is that oil production should only be allowed if there are assurances that another DHOS cannot/will not happened, oil industry not allowed back into GoM until this provided; deepwater drilling in GoM should only continue if oil industry can supply assurances of no more DHOSs → DHOS-4, 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>President considers BP financially and legally responsible for DHOS and therefore is obligated to repair damages to families, communities, and environment in addition to following federal’s directives → DHOS-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>To spare other America’s other coasts from spills, oceans afire, and oil-threatened habitat, President should issue moratorium; leaders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
must prove they get the oil-is-unwise message by reinstating national moratorium; DHOS proves that offshore is inherently unsafe, thus justifying a blanket moratorium on new offshore; only way to prevent another DHOS is to keep Eastern GoM and Atlantic Coast out of 5-year drilling plan

| SC | 16 | BP cheated; BP’s spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of 1000s, and they should be prosecuted; DHOS is BP’s fault because they did not purchase equipment that could have prevented the spill, and because they mishandled the response; BP is failing to staunch the oil flow |
| DHO | C | D1, D7, D12 |

BP has been and is in the process of being prosecuted, the punishment always being financial compensation: for the cleanup and to victims. Their recently depleted $20 billion escrow account, among other compensatory sources has been used to pay for damages and harm. They are apparently footing the bill for the cleanup (which has recently ended in Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi). On the other hand, BP did manage to staunch the oil flow, on 15 July, 2010.

| SC | 47 | BP should be made to pay compensation for their willful negligence; DHOS is BP’s fault and they should pay for the entire cleanup, compensate every victim, and pay for every destroyed national treasure; leaders must keep holding BP responsible for DHOS |
| DHO | C | D1, D7, D12 |

In 2012, BP was found guilty of errors and omissions leading up to DHOS, and fined $4.5 billion (a record); in 2010, they were forced to set up a $20 billion escrow account; and they are now in the process of a civil trial to determine how negligent they were under CWA rules, the verdict leading to additional fines of $5 billion to $20 billion.

| SC | 73 | Oil industry’s influence continues to be powerful, blocking Gulf |
| DHO | C | D12 |

Oil is as plugged into the political zeitgeist as before.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sol</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Because of DHOS, DoI is increasing inspections, investigating the root causes of the spill, more thoroughly examining exploration plans, and reforming MMS to make offshore safe; DoI doing everything within its power to respond and protect/restore what's been damaged, even changing its plans; DoI has been aggressive in its response, even at Day 11 mark; DoI is helping people harmed by DHOS and learning lessons to prevent another → DHOS-2, 4, 6, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>DHOS requires a) a massive response and b) a &quot;cautious approach&quot; to boost safety and oversight → DHOS-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>DHOS reaction must be calm and measured to</td>
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<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>D3, D6, D9</td>
<td>It appears that DoI has done everything it says it was doing or planned on doing, especially in regard to reforming MMS; whether this has made offshore safe is unknown, though spokespersons have (predictably) confirmed that it has. On the other hand, it is not known if DoI really is helping restore/protect what has been damaged by the spill.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>D12</td>
<td>While DHOS did receive a massive response, it is not known if a &quot;cautious approach&quot; was and continues to be used in regard to safety and oversight.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>D12</td>
<td>Judging from the fact that no truly radical outcomes came out of DHOS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Comment</td>
<td>Rationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>BP is responsible for all economic and psych damages caused by DHOS, and should be using local know-how and motivation; BP's compensation.</td>
<td>DHOS-7, 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dem</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Need a balance between improving safety and oil industry's importance to Louisiana's economy and America's energy security.</td>
<td>DHOS-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Small Business Administration should be allowing deferred payments and not denying so many loan applications; Dept of Commerce Secretary should declare a fisheries disaster because of the importance of Gulf fishing to national economy; BP should/must provide.</td>
<td>DHOS-1, 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(i.e., a complete moratorium on all or new offshore everywhere for greater than six months; unambiguous, uncompromising, and public commitment to achieving CE backed up with substantial investment), but rather an almost complete reinstatement of BAU—save for reforming MMS, increasing inspections, tightening regulations, etc.—it would appear that the calm and measured approach was indeed taken, resulting in the “right lesson[s]” that went on to inform the “wisest decisions.” Rigs that apparently took off during DHOS are returning to GoM.

BP is/has paid billions in compensation, though whether this also included psychological damages is unknown. It is also unknown if BP is using local know-how in the post-spill phase; they did hire local boats during the actual spill, but besides/after that?

The definition of ‘balance’ is not given; however, judging from Ms. Landrieu’s pro-drilling credentials, it would appear that she has gotten her balance: drilling continues, BOEMRE says safety has been improved.

It is unknown if Small Business Administration and the Gulf banks relaxed their rules. However, I believe BP did give written assurance that they would pay for all costs associated with DHOS (whether they are Honouring this is not known); and according to the RESTORE Act, the majority of BP’s CWA fines will go to the Gulf states for the purpose of coastal restoration (whether the states will use every penny for this is unknown).
written assurance that they will pay for all costs caused by DHOS, and federal should give majority of this money to Gulf states so they can invest in coastal restoration; the interface between decision makers and spill-effected people should continue; Gulf banks should be helping Gulf/Louisiana people by relaxing their rules (restructure loans, waive late-fees, hasten loan decisions) so repayment not required now, but when BP money starts arriving → DHOS-1, 2, 4, 6, 8

Rep 87 Need to "educate environmental groups" and other stakeholders to make sure that facts dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas → DHOS-6 H D12 However, based on the fact that Mr. Vitter is a staunch Republican, it appears that the “facts” did “dominate” in that offshore production has continued in GoM.

4This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented disaster frames.

Of the 12 correlating disaster frames, 10 exhibit correlations between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the remaining two each feature correlations between the frame and outcome origins, but not the terminuses. All but one of the 10 full-correlates205 are top-down in orientation, accurately reflecting the distribution of origins among the actual outcomes. Unlike during SBOS, where the preponderance of top-down origins suggested that virtually all the FSs shared the perception that only upper-echelon actors had the ability to prevent future spills, DHOS’s near-unanimity indicates that
its FSs believed that only the FG and the OI had the capabilities to *take (any) action* against the spill on account of its scope and scale; as one of the REAs pointed out, *Deepwater Horizon* was so vast and terrible that only government and industry had the resources to respond (Cresson 2010).206

If the near-universal consensus among the full-correlates was that action against DHOS should come from the top-down, and that the actors belonging to this category seemingly agreed by accepting the burden of responsibility, then no such commonality can be found amongst the correlating outcomes, which are a hodgepodge of different suggestions/demands and manifestations. This result accords well, in general, with the distribution of terminuses among the outcomes, which offer a similar medley. While three of the correlates (by Sierra Club and Ms. Landrieu) are *Oil Specific*, three others fall under *Various Outcomes*—two (by REAs and OPA) pertain to *response* and one (by President Obama) to *guarantee*;207 of the remaining four, two (by BP/Halliburton/Transocean and Sierra Club) are allocated to *Economic/Financial Compensation*, one (by Mr. Obama) to *Corporate Accountability-Economic/Financial Compensation-General Environment (CA-E/FC-GE)*, and one (by Audubon) to *General Environment*.208 This melange of terminuses (and eventual outcomes) suggests that unlike SBOS FSs, with their binary view of the spill, DHOS FSs recognized that oil spill response was and must be holistic, tackling the health, economic, and livelihood consequences, as well. This, in turn, offers further justification for the predominance of the top-down orientation of the frame and outcome origins and terminuses: only vast institutions/organizations that can touch multiple facets of society, like government and industry, can render aid and response to an occurrence that is equally multi-faceted.
As mentioned above, *Other Outcomes* received the most correlations, with 14 (of which 10 are full-correlates): nine of those cite only D12, while five refer to it in combination with at least one other outcome (seven of the 10 only cite *Other Outcomes*, while three appear in association with others). Two major themes link many of the full-correlation D12s. The first revolves around people and/or institutions coming together for common purpose to affect mutually-beneficial results. It is less surprising that these actions—such as a) ordinary people coming out to help with the response (Audubon), b) the FG and the OI being the only actors capable of responding to something of DHOS’s scale (REAs), and c) government and industry working hard together to end the spill—happened at all than it is that some FSs felt the need to point out that these actions (should have) happened in the first place. The second major theme concerns BP’s civil liability under the Clean Water Act, the pending verdict of which will determine whether the multinational will pay an additional $4-5 billion in fines or $18-20 billion; both President Obama and Sierra Club refer to this. Almost three years after litigation began, a ruling has yet to be reached, though one is expected in 2014.

Meanwhile, four of the eight half-correlating action disaster frames exhibit half-correlations between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the remaining four consist of three that have a half-correlation between the frame and outcome origins, but not the terminuses, and one featuring the opposite. Unlike the full-correlations, all four complete half-correlates are top-down in orientation; also, unlike their counterparts, there is a clear predominance among the terminuses, i.e., three of them are *Oil Specific* (the forth is *Economic/Financial Compensation*). The former result is entirely in keeping with the preponderance of top-down origins among DHOS’s crisis and disaster action frames, and likely has the same explanation. The *Oil Specific* majority of the outcome origins and
terminuses are, on the one hand, reflective of the tendency of the actual outcomes to have affected one aspect of oil development or another, but on the other, contradictory of the plurality of actual outcomes that distinguishes DHOS’s aftermath from SBOS’s. The primary reason for this lack of variety among the half-correlated outcomes is because only two FSs—Sol Salazar and Senator Landrieu—put forth all four of those action disaster frames; with so few contributors, it is little wonder that the pool of terminuses is so shallow, especially when these FSs have an interest in continuing oil production in the GoM.  

As for the three frame and outcome origins-only half-correlates, all are top-down in orientation and supplied by only two FSs (Government Reports and Senator Vitter); the actual outcomes they anticipated were initiated by upper-echelon actors; and Other Outcomes claimed two of the three. These findings are consistent with DHOS’s other action-oriented disaster frames, and what explains them probably applies to these, as well. The most likely reason for Government Report’s and Mr. Vitter’s lack of half-correlations between frame and outcome terminuses is that it is all but impossible to determine if they have or have not been accomplished, to say nothing of to what degree—this is just like with the full half-correlates. As for the remaining partial half-correlate frame and outcome terminus, meanwhile, its incompleteness is due to the fact that while OPA’s call for Economic/Financial Compensation and Corporate Responsibility manifested as an actual outcome, it was achieved through strictly top-down measures (the President, the courts), contradicting OPA’s desire that “America”/“the Nation” ensure they were done—in other words, they tried to rally the combined might of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up actors to censure BP, rethink the country’s energy policy, and make the OI upgrade its clean-up technology. What is more, this half-correlate is the only one where it is not unknown or indeterminable whether some of the advocated actions actually happened. Rather, the US has clearly not
rethought its energy policy (in a non-politicized way, or even a politicized one), and it is unlikely that the OI has upgraded its clean-up technology (judging from the fact that it has not advanced much since 1969).

In addition to DHOS-disaster acquiring the most action-oriented frame-to-outcome (half-)correlates of any CDC (including those of SBOS), it also has the second-highest number of non-correlates (after SBOS-disaster) and—by far—the greatest number of indeterminates. Over half the non-correlations were incurred because the FSs (mostly REAs and Sierra Club) demanded that the nation’s addiction to oil end and its commitment to achieving a CE economy begin, which, considering how dependent the American economy is on fossil fuels, was just never going to happen. As for the indeterminates, the reason for their existence is the same as the one explaining why most of the half-correlates are indeterminate: it is next to impossible to find out whether the proffered actions happened or not, and to what degree.

Taken together, the indeterminates and non-correlates offer an accurate reflection of the distribution of the 20 (half-)correlate frame origins and outcomes. Twenty-four of the indeterminates are top-down in orientation, replicating the consensus that upper-echelon actors should and/or must take action against DHOS, and reinforcing the conclusion that the FSs perceived that only government and industry could and should respond to the spill. Furthermore, not only did the outcomes those FSs seek cover a wide range of different targets, echoing the diversity of the actual outcomes, but Oil Specific is also the leading action, just as it is amongst the correlates and actual outcomes, lending credence to the idea that for the FSs, the problems Deepwater Horizon exposed were limited to the means and ways of oil development, and did not involve such factors as oil dependence, poor response capabilities, or environmental destruction. In addition, many of these potential
terminuses would have fallen under the *Other Outcomes* heading had they found (half-)correlation, echoing the fact that these types of actual outcomes dominated the correlations and had a strong presence among the half-correlates, and buttressing the suggestion that DHOS's outcomes are/would have been dominated by the smaller, less spectacular and long-standing ones, unlike SBOS.

**Summary**

Overall, these results suggest that nearly half the action-oriented frames put forth during Santa Barbara, and almost 40% during *Deepwater Horizon*, resulted in correlations or half-correlates. FSs from both spills tended to favour top-down action (regardless of whether or not their disaster frames correlated with the actual outcomes); but whereas DHOS frame outcomes accurately reflected this orientation, SBOS's contradicted it by having middle-outwards and bottom-up actors step up to become prominent action-originators. As for the terminuses, SBOS FSs usually sought *Oil Specific* outcomes and DHOS ones overwhelmingly aimed for either *Financial/Economic* ones or miscellaneous results (i.e., D12 – *Other Outcomes*); but whereas DHOS frame outcomes successfully previewed what would be done (e.g., virtually every action the FG initiated concerned exacting monies from the responsible parties to punish them for their culpability, or to compensate victims), SBOS's failed to anticipate that the action initiated would have significant *General Environment* co-benefits. What is more, the (largely unanimous) opinion that government and/or industry should/must take active responsibility put forth by both spills' FSs resulted in half the SBOS action frames, and a fifth of the DHOS ones, not correlating with any outcome whatsoever because they advocated for things that such upper-echelon actors either could not, or would not, execute.\textsuperscript{224} Meanwhile, the passage of time has eroded SBOS of all but one of its indeterminates (whose lingering existence can be attributed to the fact that its
determination is dependent on interpretation, which in this case cannot be proved one way or the other), but has yet to do so for DHOS, explaining why nearly half of its disaster frames remain stuck in limbo.

Finally, SBOS’s top two outcomes—State Oil Moratorium and Enhanced American Environmental Movement—are mirror images of each other (i.e., top-down and Oil Specific versus bottom-up and General Environment), encapsulating what the spill has since come to represent: a (general environmental) legislative triumph that curtailed SBC oil production, and a national, even global, poster-child for humanity’s impact on the environment that inspired tens of thousands to take up environmentalism. DHOS’s top three, on the other hand—Other Outcomes, $20 Billion Escrow Account, and BP Pleads Guilty...Fined $4.5 Billion—while all top-down in origin, all stop at completely different terminuses (various, Economic/Financial Compensation, and Oil Specific, respectively), which echoes the scope and scale of the spill, and signifies both the plurality of impacts oil spills are now more fully recognized as inflicting and the relatively limited inventory of tools available to mitigate them (e.g., throw money at the problem; promise better regulatory due-diligence). What is more, SBOS’s outcomes have stood the test of time—a moratorium on new offshore drilling in CA waters (and in the adjacent federal ones) continues to this day, and environmentalism in America remains a force—but it is unlikely DHOS’s will enjoy similar longevity, because they focused on extracting money (which either has been or will be accomplished) and carrying out transitory tasks, such as cleaning up oilfall (which will, and mostly has, come to an end).
5.2.3 – Correlations between SBOS and DHOS Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and Their Respective Outcomes

According to the FSs of 1969, SBOS was second of all a catastrophe (see Chapter 5.1), despite only five of them framing it as one. Of the 20 generalized catastrophe frames they put forth, just seven revolved around action (representing 35% of the total number), encompassing a mere five unique ACaSs. Chart 18 shows that only one of those seven correlated with any of the actual outcomes, and only one half-correlated; the remainder consist of one indeterminate and four non-correlates (see Appendix H). It also indicates that both Sierra Club and State Actors put forth the most action frames (two each), but while the latter achieved a mixture of results—the single half-correlation, and a non-correlate—both of the former’s frames ended in naught. And finally, it reveals that only four of the twelve actual outcomes received any kind of correlation, each one referenced but once. Table 5 attempts to account for these results, as well as to expand upon them by explaining how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.

Chart 18: Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and Their Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GOO!</th>
<th>OPA</th>
<th>SC</th>
<th>SC</th>
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This chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized action-oriented catastrophe frames.
Table 5: SBOS Catastrophe-to-Outcomes Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>36</th>
<th>New laws and provisions needed to prevent oil spills because they are becoming common → SBOS-1</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S5</th>
<th>New laws and provisions were, indeed, enacted in the wake of SBOS (though whether they have prevented oil spills is up for debate).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Both the state and federal government, for the sake of Californians, must act quickly and decisively to protect the marine environment from SBOSs → SBOS-4</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>S3, S4, S6</td>
<td>Although the state and FG did not really work together to protect the marine environment (of SBC), their individual efforts have helped keep oil development in the Channel to a minimum: the state enacted a four year ban on new leases, which was subsequently continued in one form or another; and beginning in 1982, FG instituted a moratorium on new leases all along the CA coast.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to SBOS generalized action-oriented catastrophe frames.

The single full-correlate action catastrophe frame exhibits a correlation between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses, and it is top-down in orientation and *Oil Specific* in target. Since Senator Murphy framed SBOS as a catastrophe, and since such are distinguished by their enormity and heights of devastation,\(^{226}\) it is only natural that he would suggest that the FG be the primary actor in charge of ensuring that another oil spill did not happen again; what is more, his call for new laws and provisions was a common one, most often advocated by Sol Hickel and the Government Report (OSIC 1969-73). Likewise, oil development as the target of action was fully in keeping with the perception that the ecological environment would ultimately be fine, that the crux of the matter was preventing such spills from happening again, especially in the SBC.\(^{227}\)
Meanwhile, the single half-correlate also features a correlation between both the frame and outcome origins and the frame and outcome terminuses; both are top-down in orientation and *Oil Specific* in target. That State Actors would frame SBOS as a catastrophe was a given considering how close to home the spill hit, and based on their (outsized? exaggerated?) perception of it. Furthermore, it was natural that they would call on the combined might of the federal and CA governments to protect their coastline against future spills; they were not alone in doing this (see GOO!, Senator Cranston, and Sierra Club). But while their choice of *who* should act did not distinguish them from their contemporaries, what they identified as the *object* of that action did, especially in combination with *who*: they were only the actors during SBOS to declare (within a CDC frame) that one of the duties of government was to protect the (ecological) environment from oil spills.²²⁸ No other FS did this, not GOO!, not even Sierra Club, who either only implied governmental responsibility for the environment, or tasked it with ending *general* pollution and/or economic exploitation. Although the FG would not really begin taking up its half of the duty until the early 1980s (explaining why the correlate is only a half), CA immediately enacted a four-year *State Oil Moratorium* (S3), in the process initiating the *Unofficial Quasi-moratorium in CA’s Waters and OCS* (S6) and the passage of *CEQA* (S4) in 1970.

As for SBOS’s collection of non-correlates, three of the four are top-down in orientation and *Oil Specific* in target, albeit with *General Environment* co-benefits; these same three all pertain to the same demand: *Remove offshore OD from SBC* (see Appendix I). Despite the amount and degree of local outrage and petitioning in Santa Barbara, and despite the (inter)national coverage the spill received, along with the accompanying bad press both the FG and the OI (albeit, primarily UO) suffered, instituting a ban on *all* offshore activity in the Channel—in state and federal waters—and removing every extant rig was not going to
happen. Although some FSs argued that paying the one billion dollars to buy back all SBC leases would be cheaper than risking coastal CA becoming a “dead sea” (OSIC 1969-73), it was obvious that neither the federal nor state governments would do such a thing, thus dooming all action frames advocating the contrary to non-correlative status. The remaining non-correlate—Sierra Club backing Need public participation—was bottom-up in orientation and primarily sought to benefit the General Environment. Its failure to achieve any degree of correlation can be attributed to the fact that government and industry were (and for the most part, continue to be) unwilling to share or extend decision-making authority over offshore natural resources to communities who could very well scuttle their attempts to make billions. The lone indeterminate, meanwhile, sought a middle-outwards/bottom-up origin and a response target, but suffered from Scientists not explaining who the non-FG, non-OI actors are lending their expertise.

The FSs framing DHOS, on the other hand, did not really consider their spill a catastrophe, as demonstrated by the fact that only four of them produced a mere 18 generalized catastrophe frames, of which just five were action-oriented (representing less than 28% of the total number), encompassing five ACaSs. As Chart 19 shows, only one of those five correlated with any of the actual outcomes, although two managed to half-correlate; the remaining two are divided evenly between indeterminates and non-correlates (see Appendix H). OPA put forth the most action frames, and in so doing scored two of the three (half-)correlations (a full and a half). From the clutch of 12 outcomes, only three managed to capture any degree of correlation: all of them were top-down in orientation, and two were Oil Specific in target (the remainder concerns Economic/Financial Compensation). Table 5 attempts to account for these results, as well as to expand upon them by explaining how they correlate with the SBOS’s actual outcomes.
Chart 19: Correlations Between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and Their Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAL</th>
<th>91</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>1N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1C, 1H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
<td>4/5</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rep.</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>1I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This chart is essentially the same as Chart 14; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented catastrophe frames.

Table 6: DHOS Catastrophe-to-Outcomes Correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S</th>
<th>ACS</th>
<th>Actual-Catastrophe Frames</th>
<th>OCS</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>MMS's flaws makes it necessary to completely review how OCS managed → DHOS-1</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>D3</td>
<td>MMS was not only reviewed, but reformed right out of existence, becoming three new, independent-of-each-other bureaucracies.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>DHOS damaging/jeopardizing the $700 billion per year GoM fishing industry and its 185,000 jobs; people need compensation and restoration of faith → DHOS-3</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>D1</td>
<td>Although fishers were provided compensation, there appear to be questions about whether it was sufficient and issues with it being one-time only; it is unknown if faith has ever been restored.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>DHOS has killed people and destroyed the environment, and the economy therefore, President should place a moratorium on new offshore drilling → DHOS-3</td>
<td>H</td>
<td>D4</td>
<td>Mr. Obama did, indeed, place a moratorium on new offshore drilling, but only the deepwater variety, and only for six months.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is essentially the same as Figure 1; the only difference is that the data pertains to DHOS generalized action-oriented catastrophe frames.
The single full-correlate action-oriented catastrophe frame exhibits a correlation between both the frame and outcome origins and the frame and outcome terminuses; it is top-down in orientation and Oil Specific in target, which accords well with both the crisis and disaster frames before it, and with the origins and terminuses of the majority of the actual outcomes. Meanwhile, only one of the half-correlates features a correlation between both frame and outcome origins and frame and outcome terminuses; the other has a correlation between the origins, but not the outcomes. The complete half-correlate is top-down in orientation and Economic/Financial Compensation in target, which is unsurprising because in 2010 America was still suffering from the effects of the Global Recession that began in 2007. The partial half-correlate is also top-down in orientation, but while Sierra Club’s frame (apparently) sought a moratorium on all new offshore production to help the General Environment (and to prevent more deaths, and economic damage), the FG enacted only a six-month one on new deepwater drilling. If Sierra Club’s desire to stop offshore development in 1969 was guaranteed to fail, then it was even more so in 2010 when the issues of jobs, economic growth, and national security were framed as hinging on America’s ability to produce as much of its own oil as possible; it makes one wonder why they bothered to suggest it in the first place.

As for the indeterminate and the non-correlate, the former appears to argue that all levels of society should contribute resources to repair the fishing industry, while its terminus revolves around economic repair (Senator Vitter, ACaS 95); the latter does not actually specify who should be conducting the independent monitoring (the implication might be middle-outwards or bottom-up), focusing instead on what, which is response. REAs’ broaching a role for lower-echelon actors is almost unprecedented among the DHOS CDC frames, whether action-oriented or not. Nonetheless, the scope and scale of the spill seemed
to work against FSs perceiving that action against it might be undertaken by anyone other than the government and the industry that caused it.\textsuperscript{233}

Summary

Based on the small amount of data available, it appears that during SBOS, FSs framing action in terms of catastrophe resulted in few correlations (just one and a half), while during DHOS the situation was scarcely better (one correlation and two half-ones) (meanwhile, SBOS earned one indeterminate, but four non-correlates, while DHOS also got one indeterminate, but only one non-correlation). Although the removal of oil development from the SBC is commiserate with catastrophe’s sensitizing concept, such an outcome was all but guaranteed not to materialize; according to one State Actor, this was because SBOS had not been catastrophic enough—if it had been, then Channel oil production would have been finished (OSIC 1969-73). Indeed, based on subsequent oil spills—whether from tanker (most common) or platform (rare)—the Santa Barbara spill was small; its inability to initiate (specific, SBC-related) action much beyond the state-level, then, was unsurprising. Although DHOS FSs, on the other hand, achieved marginally better success in their use of catastrophe—in fact, one of the actual outcomes exceeded what FSs had advocated—that might only be attributable to the fact that most of the actions sought were at least hypothetically possible (only one FS called for an end to all oil development; during SBOS, three did). While DHOS seemed to be fully deserving of the catastrophe frame, FSs appeared to have thought differently, rarely invoking the term/concept, and utilizing it to call for action even less. As a consequence, they failed to take advantage of catastrophe’s hypothetical power to imbue their desired actions with greater weight.
Chapter 6: Conclusions

6.1 – Summary of Results and Conclusions

6.1.1 – On Research Question 1: What Did the FSs Mean When They Framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs?

The answer to this question depends on the strata of data and analysis examined. The one simply lying on the surface (so to speak; and in other words, the broadest), is that the various FSs meant a great number and a wide variety of things when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs. This may sound facile, and perhaps even obvious, but this result was unexpected, from both a common sense perspective and an academic one. Based on the academic literature, not only is the underlying purpose of framing to make sense of the clutter of reality by providing context, bestowing values, and asserting responsibility to produce meaning—in other words, by focusing on whatever is (or, more accurately, what a FS considers) ‘important’ during any given situation to mollify the Goffmanian query, ‘what is it that is going on here?’—but the primary reason actors utilize CDC terms and concepts is to assert that the occasion so labelled is extraordinary, thereby circumscribing the scope and diversity of possible meanings and, by extension, the options and procedures available to contend with it. Common sense, meanwhile, assumes that the meaning of CDC occasions is ‘self-evident’ and ‘obvious,’ as is/should the response.

I expected, therefore, to find only a relatively small number and limited range of meanings attached to the words/concepts crisis, disaster, and catastrophe by the FSs. Instead, I uncovered a cumulative total of 347 generalized CDC frames (125 for SBOS and 222 for DHOS); even when distilled into unique basic topics, there were still a grand total of 72 separate meanings. For occasions that were ostensibly ‘straight-forward,’ this seems to be an excessive number. It is only accentuated by the fact that few patterns—definitive or
otherwise—can be discerned from them (other than their association with crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe). From this quantity and diversity, I can offer the following conclusion: rather than being ‘focusing events’—in the sense of occasions that concentrate perception, and thus meaning-making, on only a handful of possibilities—SBOS and DHOS, despite being framed as CDCs, were just as multi-faceted and interpretation-rich as any other aspect of social reality. Perhaps even more so, for my result lends further evidence to the idea that occasions framed as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes often quickly become sites of frame competition between actors trying to influence the definition and designation of such social phenomena. As Boin et al. (2005, 83) pointed out, “it makes a...difference whether one labels events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a ‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’” because these words “convey different assessments of the situation in terms of [its] seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources]” to deal with it. Both spills inspired various FSs to unleash a cacophony of frames, which tried—whether through description (i.e., the non-action-oriented frames) or advocation (i.e., the action-oriented frames)—to persuade/convince the public, influential actors, or both that the spills were or were not (a certain kind of) CDC(s) for the purpose of pushing for a certain outcome.

Digging one stratum beneath this surface answer, to the level examining the action- and non-action-oriented topics/frames shared by all three CDCs from both spills, the resolution to the first research question’s query appears to be that the spills required response because of the economic damages they were causing. In other words, because Response and Economic were the only two topics framed in terms of crisis and disaster and catastrophe during both spills, responding to economic turmoil seems to be the ultimate CDC frame for both Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon. This answer appears to be substantiated by those unearthed from the strata analyzing the action- and non-action-oriented topics/frames
shared by all three CDCs, albeit with SBOS and DHOS as separate entities. As a CDC, Santa Barbara was an ongoing spill, caused by the ill-considered use of exploitive technology, that inflicted economic harm to SB, and demanded (federal) response; and according to its own, while DHOS was an environmental calamity, borne from a combination of mismatched values and systemic management failures, that imposed (further) distress on the region’s economy (fishing, tourism, and oil production), and demanded not only response, but financial restitution for the victims. Both of these topic-derived ‘overall’ CDC frames are essentially the same, particularly in what they highlight: both spills caused economic harm to a local area and response (implied as federal) should/must be provided. From this point of view (and in contrast with the implications from the ‘surface’ answer), the topic-derived CDC frames did succeed in making sense of the clutter of reality: they fixated on only one of the probable myriad of dilemmas sparked by SBOS and DHOS and ‘restricted’ its effects to a single corner of the human endeavour. This focus on local economic harm—to the city and adjacent environs of Santa Barbara, and to the Gulf Coast, respectively—simultaneously brings the ‘real’ problem into sharper relief (it is easier for people to sympathize/empathize with a local area suffering economic turmoil than it is with, say, a nation) and confines it to that place (i.e., although bad for the local area, the negative economic consequences do not extend beyond it).

Where they differ, however, is in regard to each spill’s identified causal agent: exploitive technology for SBOS and mismatched values and systemic management failures for DHOS. Neither appears to have significantly altered the ‘intent’ of the topics/frames, but they may have made some small influence on what was done in the wake of each spill. Whereas DHOS’s actual outcomes (dealing largely with seeking and/or distributing financial compensation/restitution) more or less followed the spirit of the spill’s ‘overall’ topic/frame,
SBOS’s did not: rather than redressing Santa Barbara’s economic wounds, they instead revolved around passing environmental legislation, imposing moratoria on (new) offshore drilling, and boosting overall environmental awareness. The part the stated causal agent may have played in these outcomes centres on the fact that while *exploitive technology* is external, visible, and can be specifically targeted for action by actors other than industry or the FG (e.g., people can go out and protest the installation of an offshore platform), *mismatched values and systemic management failures* are internal, invisible, and are the sole province of government and industry regulators and regulatees. In other words, the former provides a physical target—a symbol—for people outside the conclave of offshore production to rally against and exert some degree of agency over; the latter is ephemeral and complex, and closed to the public.\(^{244}\)

However, the strata beneath these answers—concentrating on only the action-oriented topics/frames shared by all three CDCs from SBOS and DHOS—largely fail to support the primacy of restoring economic well-being; they instead advocate the need to correct systemic management problems. Both spills do not share a common action topic CDC frame; in other words, not one topic was used by each CDC term/concept for both spills. The consensus action topic/frame for *Deepwater Horizon*—whose ‘overall’ action- and non-action-oriented CDC topic/frame enshrined financial redistribution—makes no mention of economics. Rather, the FSs focus on what they had previously identified as the spill’s causal agent by seeming to assert that *response should focus on systemic management problems*. Santa Barbara, meanwhile, has *two* possible ‘overall’ action CDC topics/frames (because no one topic was referenced by crisis and disaster and catastrophe). As a crisis-disaster, the SBOS’s FSs appeared to argue that *response should focus on systemic management problems for the repair and maintenance of economic well-being*; and as a disaster-catastrophe, they seemed
to contend that politics, for the sake of the environment, should help affected communities by passing (more and better) legislation and regulations, allowing public consultation in environmental resource decisions, and removing oil development from the SBC.

The data can neither explain nor offer any clues as to why the removal of the non-action-oriented topics/frames should end the dominance of the economic frame/theme. However, based purely on what these three ‘overall’ action-oriented topics/frames proffer—and judging them against the actual outcomes—it appears that systemic management action was not carried out. Although the FG not only reformed, but replaced MMS in the aftermath of DHOS, there is a dearth of independent evidence proving that offshore oil production is safer and better managed under the BOEMs than it was under MMS before the spill. Similarly, following SBOS, it cannot be determined if addressing the systemic management problems made a positive contribution to economic well-being; on the other hand, it can be shown that oil development was not removed from the SBC and that the public (along the Channel or almost anywhere else) has rarely been consulted in any meaningful manner about environmental resource decisions. While more and better general environmental legislation and regulations were passed, their impact on affected communities is unknown.

6.1.2 – On Research Question 2: How Did the FSs’ Action-Oriented CDCs Correlate with the Spills’ Actual Outcomes?

Unlike with research question one, the answer to this query is far more straightforward. According to my results, whereas during SBOS there appeared to be few correlations between framing action in terms of crisis and catastrophe—but a moderate amount when using disaster—during DHOS there seemed to be a moderate number of correlations between action frames utilizing all three CDCs and the spill’s actual outcomes.
Although SBOS suffered from a deficit of relevant data, what exists suggests that there were virtually no correlations between the FSs framing action in terms of crisis and the spill’s actual outcomes. The reason appears to be simply because its FSs did not really perceive—and thus frame—the spill as a crisis; as a consequence, they only put forth five action frames, producing just a single half-correlate (plus two indeterminates and non-correlates each). Although DHOS FSs did not suffer (to the same extent) their counterpart’s perceptual problem, their 15 action crisis frames resulted in a mere seven correlates and half-correlates (plus five indeterminates and three non-correlates). Whether their action frames correlated or not, DHOS FSs almost always advocated for top-down action, and the actual outcomes predominantly reflected this; and although SBOS is best remembered for its bottom-up initiatives, and while its half-correlative sought to bring top and bottom together, the actual outcome it wanted was accomplished almost entirely by top-down processes. What is more, while the Deepwater Horizon’s frames (again, correlative or not) focused on financial compensation, visceral response, and oil dependency, Santa Barbara’s failed to demonstrate any pattern(s)—each frame existed in its own world, never concurring with any other. Finally, although the legacy of SBOS’s half-correlative action is well into its fifth decade, it appears that none of DHOS’s correlatives and half-correlates will enjoy such longevity and impact: clean up is/was transitory, money is finite, and offshore development continues to expand (Wethe 2013).

As for framing action in terms of catastrophe, it appears that for both spills there were few correlations between the FSs’ frames and the actual outcomes. Each spill managed to capture only one correlation, with SBOS acquiring an additional half-correlate and DHOS two (meanwhile, the former earned one indeterminate, but four non-correlates, while DHOS also got one indeterminate, but only one non-correlation). Although the removal of oil
development from the SBC is commiserate with catastrophe’s sensitizing concept, such an outcome was all but guaranteed not to materialize; according to one State Actor, this was because SBOS had not been catastrophic enough—if it had been, then Channel oil production would have been finished (OSIC 1969-73). Indeed, based on subsequent oil spills—whether from tanker (most common) or platform (rare)—the Santa Barbara spill was small; its inability to initiate (specific, SBC-related) action much beyond the state-level, then, is unsurprising, and made even more so by the fact that California had already demonstrated environmental sympathies before the spill. Although DHOS FSs, on the other hand, achieved marginally better success in their use of catastrophe—in fact, one of the actual outcomes exceeded what FSs had advocated—that might only be attributable to the fact that most of the actions sought were at least hypothetically possible (only one FS called for an end to all oil development; during SBOS, three did). While DHOS seemed to be fully deserving of catastrophe frames, FSs appeared to have thought differently, rarely invoking the term/concept, and utilizing it to call for action even less. As a consequence, they failed to take advantage of catastrophe’s hypothetical power to imbue their desired actions with greater weight.

And finally, there was sufficient data from both spills to ascertain that there appeared to be a moderate number of correlations between the FSs framing action in terms of disaster and SBOS’s and DHOS’s actual outcomes. Nearly half the action disaster frames put forth during Santa Barbara, and almost 40% during Deepwater Horizon, resulted in correlations or half-correlates. FSs from both spills tended to favour top-down action (regardless of whether or not their disaster frames correlated with the actual outcomes); however, whereas SBOS’s usually sought Oil Specific outcomes, DHOS’s overwhelmingly aimed for either financial/economic results or miscellaneous ones (i.e., D12 – Other Outcomes). Although
SBOS FSs’ frame origins and terminuses technically reflected those of the actual outcomes, they did not anticipate a) the significant role middle-outwards and bottom-up actors would have securing those outcomes, or b) that most of the outcomes achieved had considerable General Environment co-benefits that ended up eclipsing the Oil Specific ones. DHOS FSs, however, successfully previewed what would be done to deal with their spill (e.g., virtually every action the FG initiated concerned exacting monies from the responsible parties to punish them for their culpability, or to compensate victims). What is more, the (largely unanimous) opinion put forth by both spill’s FSs that government and/or industry should/must take active responsibility resulted in half the SBOS action frames, and a fifth of the DHOS ones, not correlating with any outcome whatsoever because they advocated for deeds that such upper-echelon actors either could not, or would not, execute. For example, Santa Barbara FSs wanted preventative measures more robust than mere regulations (e.g., public participation in natural resource harvesting decisions) and/or called for the complete removal of all oil development from the SBC; Deepwater Horizon’s called for the end to the nation’s addiction to oil and the construction of a CE economy, pushed for better response capabilities, and/or demanded compensation for fishers and tourism operators.

SBOS’s top two outcomes—State Oil Moratorium and Enhanced American Environmental Movement—are mirror images of each other (i.e., top-down and Oil Specific versus bottom-up and General Environment), encapsulating what the spill has since come to represent: a (general environmental) legislative triumph that curtailed SBC oil production and a national, even global, poster-child for humanity’s impact on the environment that inspired tens of thousands to take up environmentalism. DHOS’s top three, on the other hand—Other Outcomes, $20 Billion Escrow Account, and BP Pleads Guilty...Fined $4.5 Billion—while all top-down in origin, all stop at completely different terminuses (various,
Economic/Financial Compensation, and Oil Specific, respectively); this state of affairs
echoes the scope and scale of the spill, and signifies both the plurality of impacts oil spills are
now more fully recognized as inflicting and the relatively limited inventory of tools available
to mitigate them (e.g., throw money at the problem; promise better regulatory due-diligence).
What is more, SBOS’s outcomes have stood the test of time—a moratorium on new offshore
drilling in CA waters (and in the adjacent federal ones) continues to this day, and
environmentalism in America remains a force—but it is unlikely DHOS’s will enjoy similar
longevity because of their focus on extracting money (which either has been or will be
accomplished) and carrying out transitory tasks, such as responding to oilfall (which will, and
mostly has, come to an end).

From a practical perspective, these results suggest four things a prospective FS should
keep in mind when deciding whether or not to use CDCs to describe a negative
environmental occasion, be it something relatively circumscribed, like an oil spill, or
something global, like anthropogenic climate change, biodiversity loss, or population growth.
Firstly, they should always be aware that a) crisis, disaster, and catastrophe have meanings,
and that they are very distinct from one another (i.e., they are not synonymous), and b)
people possess a broad pre-conceived idea of what each CDC means and, more importantly,
a general sense of what constitutes appropriate action to respond to each one (see Chapter 6.4
for elaboration). Therefore, care must be taken ensure that the CDC used is the meaning
desired, and that that meaning accords well with others’ pre-conceptions. Secondly, FSs
should make sure that their CDC term/concept is a suitable match with the negative
environmental occasion; a crisis is not a disaster, and neither are a catastrophe. Any
mismatch may result in the FS diluting their frame and sought-after action. Thirdly, FSs must
be consistent with their CDC-usage: they should choose one CDC and stick with it, refraining
from the use of 'synonymous' terms/concepts (see Chapter 6.4 for elaboration). And lastly, FSs should explain why a negative environmental occasion is a CDC in order to better illustrate why (their preferred) action should be taken to mitigate it; CDC terms/concepts should not be used as one-word short-hand to justify action because of the possible misunderstandings this might cause.

6.2 – Limitations and Further Research

Although this research was humbled by several limitations, they should be taken to represent avenues for further research. Perhaps the most serious limitation concerns replicability. Although I feel confident that if another researcher tried to reproduce my work, the general results would be similar to what I generated, the specifics would undoubtedly be different. The primary reason for this is because of the inductive manner in which the analyses were carried out; inductive methodology does not lend itself well to replicability.\(^{245}\)

While there is merit in this notion, and while there are many aspects of the social sciences that can/do lend themselves to a scientific method-like approach, the examination of the social construction of meaning is not one of them, especially when the focus of the research revolves around language and ends up discovering that an occasion as seemingly denotatively and connotatively straight-forward as a crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe is anything but.

Another limitation—albeit, one imposed on purpose—includes my not including CDC frames generated by the media. The rationale behind this was two-fold: to focus on frames produced by the original FSs (which goes against the grain of most frame research), and to reduce the amount of data I would have to work with. If this thesis were to have a sequel, it would utilize my methodology to ascertain what the media meant when they framed
SBOS and DHOS as CDCs, and to find out how their action-oriented CDC frames correlated with the spills’ actual outcomes; this would be followed by a concluding installment, which would compare the results from part one and two. Alternatively, researchers might also want to examine how much, and to what degree, the media used SBOS and DHOS FSs’ frames and analyze how the media may have changed them; and/or they may seek to determine which FSs the media appeared to ‘side’ with (i.e., via repetition in subsequent articles) and why.

A third limitation is one that formed as a by-product (albeit, unintended) of this thesis’s methodology: the super-extracting process erased any sense of the temporal evolution of the CDC frames. Future scholars could do well to analyze how any given FS’s—and/or the general tenor of all the FSs’—CDC frames changed (or failed to change) between Day 1 and Day 365, thereby drawing a map of the perceptual development of SBOS and DHOS as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes. Such a map could show such things as a) when did acute response frames morph into recovery ones (e.g., before or after the spill was declared over?), b) when did any given FS begin to use their dominant CDC frame(s) (e.g., from the outset, or later on?), and c) what actual events (may have) provoked a CDC frame-shift, and how was this change reflected in the subsequent frames?

While not a limitation, per se, but rather a methodological improvement, my CDC analysis approach would be better utilized if applied against paragraphs and/or whole articles, instead of extracts. The primary reason is that the latter data-sets tend to be short and their meaning easily apprehended; this became readily apparent while analyzing the Santa Barbara data. My procedure only came into its own when used to ascertain the CDC qualities of the DHOS data because much it had been sewn together into super-extracts, where the copious amount of information made it invaluable for separating the relevant from the irrelevant.
Finally, the results from this thesis lack solid explanatory power: they can neither provide reasons for the volume and variety of CDC frames, nor can they shed light on why FSs framing action in terms of all three CDCs during DHOS resulted in correlations with the spill's actual outcomes, but only FSs framing action in terms of disaster during SBOS did. In terms of framing, furthermore, my results cannot explain why the most ‘effective’ CDC—disaster—was also the most complex (i.e., having the most meanings attached to it, thus contradicting the assumption that framing simplifies the world). The closest my thesis can manage is that disaster was ‘effective’ and complex for the same reason: it was utilized so many times. If crisis or catastrophe had been used as frequently, and had been as varied, they would probably have been equally ‘effective’ and complex. However, this paucity of explanations is not so much a limitation—because my thesis did not set out to explain such phenomena—as it is a starting-point for further research.

6.3 – Benefits and Contributions

The research that went into this thesis produced five primary benefits and contributions. One of these is that this study appears to be the first to not only comparatively analyze the use of CDC terms/concepts between SBOS and DHOS, but also the first to conduct such an analysis between any two oil spills, offshore or otherwise. What is more, this thesis appears to be first of its kind to comparatively analyse anything between a) the Santa Barbara and Deepwater Horizon oil spills and b) any two offshore platform oil spills. The second benefit this research has made is producing two relatively neutral sensitizing concepts—one for crisis and the other for disaster—that can be utilized by future researchers to better define these terms/concepts should they wish to avoid the baggage of disciplinary assumptions. According to my literature review (and those of others), there is no universally
accepted definition of crisis or disaster, but instead an entire ‘rogue’s gallery’ of denotations, most of which are weighted in favour of the discipline utilizing them. The inductive one that I constructed, based on a “general sense of what is relevant” (Blumer 1954, 7), and representing a consensus borne from the many definitions out there in the scholarship, perhaps comes the closest to achieving the sought-after generalized definition. As for catastrophe, the underdevelopment of the literature relegates its sensitizing concept to a strictly provisional status; however, by attempting to generate one at all, I hope I have contributed something to this still nascent sub-field of research—one that may only grow in relevance as the consequences of AGETs become more pronounced.

In addition, this thesis has made two benefits and contributions to FT/FA. The first involves suggesting that the sensitizing concept idea might/can be used by FT to clear up some of the confusion plaguing it. The one I generated can be used as a model to derive a more generalized one that might finally bestow upon FT a solid enough core to facilitate the development of a coherent and more widely accepted theory and methodology. The second contribution concerns my finding that framing an occasion as a CDC apparently does not conform to FT’s assumption that frames simplify the world out there. According to my results, the more FSs framed the spills as CDCs, the more complex the spill’s CDC meaning became because each new frame almost invariably added new ideas and viewpoints to what had already been established.

Finally, by demonstrating that what FSs mean when they label/frame an occasion a CDC is not as straight-forward and ‘obvious’ as common sense assumes, this thesis hopes to encourage further study of this particular aspect of the social construction of reality. Despite the fact that language, in general, has been recognized as constitutive of social reality, and despite the fact that crisis and disaster narratives have been studied for their effects on policy
and/or public perception, the specific CDC terms (and the meanings they provoke) have
received virtually no attention. This is unfortunate and puzzling in light of the fact that their
potency—their ability to call-up (as it turns out) so many meanings—can have potentially
concrete impacts on action. As this thesis found, the fact that the FSs from both SBOS and
DHOS predominately framed the spills as disasters may have influenced certain actions to be
taken because it was perceived as a disaster, therefore suggesting some kinds of actions (e.g.,
clean up and recovery), but not others (e.g., the wholesale rearrangement of BAU); had the
spills been seen and framed as crises or catastrophes, different actions might have been taken,
resulting in different actual outcomes.

6.4 - The Bigger Picture: CDCs and Anthropogenic Global Environmental Transformations

A small body of literature suggests that using the terms/concepts crisis, disaster,
and/or catastrophe (or, more generally, apocalyptic discourse, or the language of fear and
terror) is counterproductive to the goal of convincing upper-echelon actors and the public to
act against AGETs, such as ACC, biodiversity loss, and population growth. According to
these scholars, the “language of fear and terror operates as an ever-weakening vehicle for
effective communication or inducement for behavioural change” because “such appeals often
lead to denial, paralysis, apathy, or even perverse reactive behaviour” (Hulme 2006, 2007;
Moser and Dilling 2007). In other words, “framing issues in catastrophic terms ends up
paralyzing [people] instead of motivating” them (Goodman 2007) to do whatever the FSs
contend is the right thing to do because “when people are confronted with an overwhelming
threat and don’t see a [doable] solution, it makes them feel impotent,” causing them to “shrug
it off or go into deliberate denial” (Gelbspan, as quoted in Goodman 2007). In the case of
ACC, for example, the “dominant narrative…has been that we’re responsible and have to
make changes or we're all going to die,” a story “tailor-made to ensure inaction” (Shellenberger, as quoted in Goodman 2007; italics in original). What is more, to state that something like “climate change will be ‘catastrophic’ hides a cascade of value-laden assumptions which do not emerge from empirical or theoretical science” (Hulme 2006), adding fuel to the deniers’ charges of conspiracy. All of this has led to the recommendation that proponents for the existence of, and the need to act against, AGETs “try[] to leave behind [such]…‘discursive overbidding’” (Nerlich and James 2009, 584).246

On the one hand, my results lend some support to this position—in that during both spills, crisis and catastrophe were rarely used, and when they were, few correlations between frame and actual outcomes were achieved—but on the other, they seem to conclude that although CDC-usage does not appear to help FSs achieve their desired action(s), neither does it hinder or neutralize. For example, although the SBOS FS’s CDC frames, as a whole, only sometimes correlated with the actual outcomes, they also sometimes did correlate with them—even if only partially: GOO! may have failed to remove oil development from the SBC entirely, but the surge in general environmental awareness sparked by the spill did result in a series of moratoria that have slowed its expansion to a crawl. During DHOS, meanwhile, any CDC frames calling for the pay-out of financial compensation/restitution more or less came about; as for all the frames that did not materialize in reality, their failure likely had less to do with the CDCs, themselves, and more to do with the social, political, and economic climate of Louisiana, the Gulf Coast, and the United States at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st Century.247 As a consequence, I am not convinced that the problem of inaction against AGETs is because of the use of CDCs (although I do acknowledge that the notion has some merit); instead, my results suggest to me that the crux of the matter concerns the meanings attached to the CDCs.
As this thesis demonstrated, the various FSs meant a great many things when they framed SBOS and DHOS as CDCs; this number and diversity, naturally enough, extended to, and was reflected by, the action-oriented CDC frames. If something as seemingly ‘concrete’ and ‘unambiguous’ as an oil spill can spawn such a multiplicity of meanings and actions, then the situation is likely as (and probably even more) complicated and chaotic for the diffuse, ambiguous, and contentious AGETs. Part of the reason for the spill’s cacophony of CDC-meanings was that the FSs—most of whom were laymen—did not subscribe to academia’s definitional rigour, resulting in the CDCs (and, therefore, their meanings) often being used synonymously. As a consequence, there were several instances where, for example, crisis (which connotates threat and the hope of stopping it) took on a catastrophe meaning (which suggests total devastation and that the wholesale construction of a new status-quo); in terms of action, this meant that there were crisis frames calling for catastrophe actions (one does not normally respond to a threat by completely revamping society).

Similarly, when ACC, biodiversity loss, or population growth are referred to as, say, crises, but are followed by calls for action requiring even ordinary people to radically change their ways of life, a cognitive dissonance is generated that (at best) confuses people and (at worst) disillusion and angers them. Either way, the FS’s action is unlikely to be initiated.

However, my results also suggest that it is not just the specific meanings FSs attach to CDCs that help explain the lack of decisive, concerted action being taken to deal with AGETs; it could also be the general meaning—complete with ‘standard’ action—that each CDC, itself, embodies. Based on both their literatures and my sensitizing concepts,

- A crisis is perceived as a potentially dire occasion, but one in which something can (still) be done to either stop it or to mitigate the consequences;
• A disaster is perceived as an occasion where the disruption and/or destruction has already happened, and the best that can be done is to clean up, recover, and perhaps prevent the next occurrence; and
• A catastrophe is perceived as an occasion of complete and total devastation that requires nothing less than the wholesale creation of a new status-quo.

According to my research, both SBOS and DHOS FSs overwhelmingly considered and framed their spills as disasters, because a) they represented environmental problems in which it was ‘too late’ for arresting, or even mitigative, action—the oil was already in the water and on the shore—leaving no other recourse but to clean up and seek ways to prevent future such occasions; and b) they did not produce the kind of across-the-board annihilation that would convince both upper-echelon actors and the public that an entirely new system was required. As a result, calls for action using disaster frames were more likely to be heeded (the only question was what action should be taken). AGETs, on the other hand, are often framed as crises—as in something currently in progress that action can mitigate or off-set—or having (future) catastrophic effects (i.e., they will lay waste to human civilization and/or irreparably disrupt human social systems). Both types of framing fail to inspire action: crises are rife with uncertainty—not only about the AGET, itself, but also about the consequences of any action(s) to alleviate or mitigate the problem—leading to paralysis; and catastrophes are too terrible (or impossible) to contemplate, also leading to paralysis. This state-of-affairs encapsulates AGETs to perfection.

In fact, based on my results, I am tempted to offer a hypothesis: that of the three CDCs, human beings are primed—perceptually ‘programmed,’ so to speak—to perceive disasters and act in response to them more than they are to crises or catastrophes. Disasters seem to be the ‘Goldilocks’ of CDCs: they neither present ambiguous ‘threats,’ nor are they
riddled with uncertainty, like crises; and their impacts are neither total, nor entail the need to completely dismantle BAU, like catastrophes. Instead, they demonstrate clear and present disruption and/or destruction; are seen as ‘over;’ and recovery requires ‘only’ clean up and reconstruction. From this point of view, AGETs—in addition to not being perceived and acted against as crises or catastrophes—are not disasters. The disruption, destruction, and/or death that population growth is inflicting are not perceived as being caused by burgeoning numbers of people, but are explained as symptoms of poverty, poor governance and rule of law, or the intrusion of fundamentalist ideologies on otherwise content societies. The havoc biodiversity loss is reaping is both invisible to human social systems and perceived as having no effect upon them. And the vast nebulosity of ACC is beyond most people’s perception because of the non-linear connections between increasing levels of greenhouse gases and tangible environmental effects. Even when the connection is more linear—such as a warming atmosphere generating stronger, more frequent hurricanes; melting polar ice caps; and thawing methane-engorged permafrost—their implications are either not understood by decision makers and/or the public or actively denied and framed as anti-capitalist/freedom/common sense ravings. If this hypothesis contains any veracity, then it seems that there is little hope that decisive and concerted action to mitigate and adapt to the consequences of AGETs will be happening soon because the ability of decision-makers and the public to perceive environmental crises before they become disasters or catastrophes is limited, as demonstrated by the outbreaks of two of America’s most notorious offshore oil platform spills.
Endnotes

Introduction Endnotes

1 This mass media includes the daily newspapers, weekly newsmagazines, and the 24/7 news network machine, and the specialist media of interests groups and peer-reviewed periodicals.

Chapter 1 Endnotes

2 Or 1896, according to Bob Cavnar (2010). My research has been unable to resolve the confusion.

3 Actually, the world’s first ‘offshore oil platform’ was neither technically offshore nor a platform; instead, it was an otherwise normal (for the time) on-shore oil derrick that had been erected in water, and was attached to shore by a pier (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011; Cavnar 2010).

4 This protest, led by a “party of the best known society men of Santa Barbara[,] armed to meet any resistance, and with workmen employed for the purpose, utterly demolished [the] new oil derrick” as a message to the oil companies that no such things would be permitted to “disfigure the beautiful views of [the] land and sea” (as quoted in Molotch 2000, 804).

5 UO was originally a company native to Santa Barbara County; it eventually expanded into Louisiana, Alaska, and what was formally Indochina (among other places). By the late 1960s, it possessed over $2.4 billion in assets (Easton 1972).

6 UO was the majority partner representing a group that also included the Gulf Oil Corporation, Mobile Oil Corporation, and Texaco Incorporated (Easton 1972).

7 This would be the most expensive lease until the following year, 1969, when the Alaskan North Slope was leased for $900 million (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).
By the beginning of 1969, “twenty-six companies had paid the US Treasury a [then] record total of $602,719,261.60 for drilling rights in the Channel; in addition they...paid the one-sixth market price royalty on each of the Channel’s estimated 4 billion barrels of oil, each [one then] worth about $3.50,” giving the FG a likely royalty of $2.5 billion” (Easton 1972, 25-6). What is more, the OI had “spent more than $100 million in exploratory and other development” activities, which not only “established certain rights,” but also “represented a major contribution to the welfare of the nation and the region: as everyone knew, oil was vital to national defense and the national economy” (Easton 1972, 25-6).

In addition, each well dug from Platform A cost in excess of a quarter million dollars to drill out (Easton 1972).

By this time, there were already 12 other platforms scattered throughout the SBC (Easton 1972).

This does not count the 1066 metres of water separating the ocean surface and the seabed (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972).

Drilling mud is a complicated mixture of clay and industrial chemicals poured into oil wells during drilling. It has three primary functions: to cool the drill bit; to carry away the rock debris created by the drilling; and—most importantly—to maintain pressure so that the oil and gas hitherto locked into the crust by the sedimentary rock does not explosively escape (or, blowout) from its reservoir (Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). The viscosity and weight of the mud varies depending on depth and pressure measurements, and as these variables change, so too must the consistency of the mud to maintain the pressure seal. The application of drilling mud is by far the most critical component in the drilling process.
UO declared that ‘only’ 79,493 litres had been leaking into the SBC at the spill’s peak; some have suggested that as much as 1.5 million litres per day had been vomiting forth (Easton 1972).

This was unofficially confirmed by measurements taken from U-2 flights and spy satellites, and relayed through an anonymous whistleblower (Easton 1972).

Straw was the only material that appeared to soak up the oil.

These 13 were: the Weather Bureau, the Coast Guard, Federal Water Pollution Control Act personnel, the Geological Survey, the US Army Corp of Engineers, the Public Health Service, the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the local Humane Society, the California Department of Fish and Game, the US Forest Service (for some reason), the Santa Barbara campus of the University of California, and UO.

Sol Hickel had been on the job only four days when SBOS began.

These nine are: 1) requiring new and improved specifications for drive casing; 2) increasing the “depth to which surface casing is required”; 3) specifying the “proper density [of mud]”; 4) requiring that a “plan of action for emergencies...be submitted to the USGS headquarters for approval”; 5) mandating “tests to ensure isolation of zones of oil, gas, and fresh water from each other...be witnessed by USGS representatives”; 6) making “blowout prevention requirements [more] stringent”; 7) calling for the installation of “warning devices...to indicate whether the drilling mud in the hole is adequate”; 8) requiring “safety and antipollution devices...on platforms...includ[ing] gas detector and alarm systems, firefighting systems, shutdown devices for the wells and equipment on the platform, pipeline alarm, and auxiliary power equipment for safety[, and p]ollution control equipment including booms, skimmers, and approved chemical dispersants, must be on hand during all mobile
platform and drilling operations”; and 9) implementing “additional scheduled inspections of all operations...[to] be conducted by the USGS” (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972. 50-1).

Both actors were seen as the villains of the whole affair, and as those who would benefit the most from increased oil production.

A thorough ecological study conducted and published within three years of the spill noted only that 90% of the barnacle population had died from oil suffocation, with the survivors exhibiting inhibited reproduction and development; and that although sand fleas, crabs, and mussels also appeared impacted, sea flora seemed unaffected (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972; Easton 1972). This study was “greeted with feelings ranging from skepticism to disapproval” because a) the study had been funded by the Western Oil and Gas Association, leading to accusations of conflict-of-interest; b) it flew in the face of accepted wisdom—“everyone knew intuitively that the oil spill had been an ecological disaster, yet scientists were saying otherwise[,] and so t]he results must therefore be wrong;” and c) lay people were unable to distinguish between sound present results and the availability of comparative background data, which in the case of the SBC was lacking (Steinhart and Steinhart 1972, 100; italics added). The only comprehensive pre-1969 study of SBC’s ecology had been conducted in 1959; although comparisons showed that there had been an overall decline in species diversity and populations, it was attributed to a decade’s worth of general water pollution, not to the effects of the SBOS deluge.

They have been abandoned because they either a) failed to strike any oil or gas at all or b) became depleted through round-the-clock production.

Between 1937 and 1977, approximately 6300 exploratory, and 21,000 developmental, wells were drilled off the shores of Louisiana’s eight coastal parishes alone.
Deepwater is generally considered to be any offshore oil and gas exploration and production that takes place through 305 metres or more of intervening water.

Gas production, meanwhile, has jumped an astounding 1600% during the same ten year period (Fannin et al 2008).

BP, for example, had a long history of refusing to follow safety rules and regulations: following the 2005 Texas City refinery explosion, which killed 17 and injured 170, investigators “determined that the company had ignored its own protocols on operating a refinery tower that was filled with gasoline, and...that a key warning system had been disabled;” and after the 2006 Alaska pipeline spill, which “spew[ed] nearly 200,000 gallons [757,000 litres] of crude oil across the snow,” investigators revealed that the “company had been warned to check the pipeline four years earlier, but had failed do so” (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 42; emphasis mine). Transocean, meanwhile, was fully aware of the myriad of safety and equipment issues afflicting not only its fleet, in general, but the Deepwater Horizon, in particular: in May 2008, for instance, more than 70 employees had to be evacuated from the platform because of a ballast system malfunction the company had known about for years, but did nothing to rectify (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011). As for the MMS, a “2008 Inspector General report concluded that the agency’s relationships with oil companies were even worse than most critics had claimed” when it revealed that the agency “was...in bed with the industry, literally, in a pattern of sex, drugs, and the wrong kind of role,” becoming the OI’s enabler, instead of its enforcer, permitting it do whatever it wanted and giving passes to even the most egregious safety and environmental violations (Freudenburg and Gramling 2011, 51).
a. What is more, Transocean—with the support of BP—engaged in the cost-cutting move of “officially registering [the Deepwater Horizon] as a ship under the flag of the Marshall Islands [to] limit[] the potential ability of the US government to regulate its operations” (Freudenburg and Gramling, 15; italics mine).

26 On the bridge, chaos reigned: the captain hesitated to order the well killed by activating the main blowout preventer, forcing the technical personnel to take the initiative—to no avail: the blind-shear rams that should have severed the pipe and sealed the oil and gas forever failed, as indicated by a) the Deepwater Horizon not floating free of its position and b) the inferno spewing from the rotary not choking to death on lack of fuel (Cavnar 2010; National Commission 2011).

27 On the seabed, NOAA expeditions found “dead and dying coral reefs...an ecosystem in collapse,” which surprised many scientists because they only “expected to see some subtle effects from the oil,” based on earlier preliminary surveys that indicated things were fine (Rudolf 2010).

28 The spill coincided with the height of the Atlantic blue fin tuna spawning season; with the help of satellite data from the European Space Agency, it is estimated that 20 percent of tuna larvae perished, likely as a result of ingesting oil-contaminated plankton (Anonymous 2010).

29 Dispersants, however, do nothing more than just that—disperse. They “neither eliminate[] nor decrease[ the oil’s] toxicity[, but]...create[] a much more toxic cocktail” that can “begin a slow but sure degradation of the ecosystem from the bottom up” (Levitt and Edmison 2010). For example, miniscule droplets of oil-dispersant adhere to plankton which are then consumed by plankton-eaters, which are then devoured by small fish, and so on, up the food
chain, bioaccumulating in the fatty tissue of each successive organism, eventually ending up in commercial fish species (Cavnar 2010; Levitt and Edmison 2010).

30 These agencies are the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (in charge of planning, permitting, and leasing); the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (responsible for enforcing safety and environmental regulations for offshore oil production); and the Office of Natural Resources Revenues (tasked with collecting the royalties from leasees) (Cavnar 2010).

31 To get a better idea of how much oil this actually is, picture a two-litre milk jug. Imagine it filled with orange crude. If one jug is placed right after the next in a rumba-line, it would require 397,468,237 jugs to contain the Gulf Oil Spill, stretching 795 kilometres; that is the distance from Prince George to Nanaimo. Conversely, another way to think about it is like this: the US uses about 20 million barrels of oil per day (EIA 2006); that is 833,333 barrels per hour. Therefore, over the course of 86 days, the US lost a little over six hours of oil consumption.

32 The FDA has found DHOS-linked contaminants in various commercial fish stocks, “but at levels well below any threat to human health and safety” (as quoted in Biello 2011; BP 2012); however, not only is most of the agency’s testing being paid for by BP, but its mandates and standards are relatively low when compared with, for example, the EPA’s (Biello 2011).

33 In addition, Halliburton has voluntarily donated $55 million to the National Fish and Wildlife foundation.

34 One billion of this was punishment for the civil Clean Water Act violations—setting a liability record—and is thus subject to the RESTORE Act; $100 million goes toward
appeasing the criminal Clean Water Act violations; and the remaining $300 million is for criminal recoveries, and will be evenly divvied out to the National Academy of Sciences and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation to support oil spill-related research) (Malakoff 2013).

35 This has not dissuaded various individuals and groups throughout the Gulf Coast from trying to form one, anyway. In May 2013, the members of the hoped-for GoM RCAC at last held their first meeting. Although they had invited representatives from all the principle oil companies and associations operating in the Gulf, such as BP, ExxonMobile, the American Petroleum Institute, and the Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, each and every one declined to attend. According to the reply sent by ConocoPhillips’ Vice President, William Bullock, it was because “strong...avenues [already existed] to meet with stakeholders to understand their concerns and incorporate input into our business plans and actions...participation in a...RCAC is not [required]” (Anonymous 2013).

Chapter 2 Endnotes

36 I conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 12th of November, 2013. By using the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English-language texts published in the past six months. Crisis was queried as a subject term.

37 I conducted the LexisNexis search on the 12th of November, 2013. I limited the query to English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was crisis.

38 I conducted the Google Scholar search on the 12th of November, 2013. Results were limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was crisis.

39 Koselleck (2006, 397) claims that ‘crisis’ ‘remains a catchword, used rigorously in only a few scholarly or scientific contexts.”
I decided to combine urgency and decisions in a short time together because a) many of the definitions often explained that a crisis is urgent because of the temporal pressure to make decisions (or to act; but in order to act, one must first make a decision about how to act) about how to counter or respond to it and b) the few definitions that made reference only to crises being urgent affairs nevertheless appeared to imply that swift decision or action was required by referring to the existence of a narrow window of time in which to decide or act.

Each element’s summarizing word was chosen because it was the one literally featured in the definition; occasionally, the summarizing word was inferred from an alternative one actually used, or from the obvious implications. The seven elements are listed in descending order of how many times each word was referenced (and in the case of big, implied or conveyed through alternative means—e.g., “an emergency people must face together” (Edelman 1977, 45; italics added); an occasion “so severe as to propel an issue onto the national agenda” (Kurtz 2004, 204; italics added); an “event that affects or has the potential to affect the whole of an organization” (Coombs 1998, 177; italics added)).


45 For Big, see: Mitroff and Anagnos 2001; Barton 2001; Coombs 1999; Fink 1987; Edelman 1977; Kurtz 2004; Boin 2005b; Boin and 't Hart 2003; Boin et al. 2005.


For turning point, see: Friedman 2002; Regester 1989; Fink 1986; Reus-Smit 2007; Davies and Walters 1998; Darling 1994; Stallings 2005; Sturm and Müllerberg 2011.

47 Perhaps three of the most common beliefs informing crisis (management) are 1) the "event is different from the political and social issues we routinely confront, different from other crises, and it occurs rarely;" 2), "it came about for reasons outside the control of political and
industrial leaders, who are coping with it as best they can;” and 3), “the crisis requires sacrifices to surmount it” (Edelman 1977, 44; italics added).

48 What is more, the longevity and/or success of a crisis is dependent on how the “mass media, politics, and the general public... framed and interpret... these events as crises”—perhaps even more so than the physical circumstances (if any) causing them—as it “expand[s] and contract[s] depending on which themes and issues command attention at different points in time” (Boin and ’t Hart 2003, 545-6; italics added; Porfiriev 1996).

49 In terms of this thesis’s case studies, examples can include Union Oil (UO) not using enough casing to secure the well (SBOS) or BP not taking adequate safety precautions (DHOS).

50 In terms of this thesis’s case studies, examples can include arguments favouring the elimination of all oil production from the Santa Barbara Channel (SBOS) or statements framing the spill as a consequence of America’s over-dependence on oil (DHOS).

51 Crisis narratives, according to Fuller, are “created and mediated by political agents and the media,” and are “central to existing institutional configurations being challenged and changed” (2010, 1125) The notion is “firmly embedded with recent social constructivist accounts of ‘narratives’, which typically encompass a clear sequence of selected, organised, and connected events and consequences, based on the experience, desires, and beliefs of actors” (Fuller 2010, 1125). Through the careful use of “stories, metaphors, and frames,” crisis narratives are “deployed as political strategies to enact change by appealing to shared experience and understanding,” and are not an “objective reflection of reality”; instead, they are “embedded in the contingent and reflexive situation of those constructing, conveying, and
receiving narratives” (Fuller 2010, 1125). The similarity of this to framing is uncanny, and might simply be a case of the same phenomenon being given a different name; see Chapter 3.

The other major stream of crisis communication research focuses on crisis knowledge management (CKM), which “involves identifying sources, collecting information, analyzing information (knowledge creation), sharing knowledge, and decision making”; as a consequence, it examines what is going on “behind the scene[s],” examining the “work the crisis team does to create public responses to crisis” (Coombs 2010, 25). In other words, CKM concerns the actual generation of knowledge, materials, and even actions before their debut into the public sphere; as such, it is beyond the purview of this thesis, which instead examines and analyzes the CDC portion of this knowledge once it enters the public domain. This thesis does not involve itself with CKM, largely because it was deemed infeasible to attempt a reconstruction of the internal knowledge management processes of DHOS and, especially SBOS.

Crisis narratives need not feature the use of ‘crisis;’ all that is required is that they convey a sense of anxiety, threat, and urgency, if not a greater sense or implication of doom, even apocalypse.

Some examples of this interchangeability include a) “disaster situations tend to be peopled by emergent groups [and] entities that had no existence prior to the crisis” (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 10); and b) “sociologists looking at disaster situations could not avoid such situations; both kinds of behaviour abound in such crises” (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 33). As can be seen, these authors do not distinguish between disaster and crisis, instead using them synonymously.
Such opinions are based on findings suggesting that whereas a “crisis involves an urgent threat to the core functions of a social system,” a disaster is what happens when that crisis is left unattended (Quarantelli, Lagadec, and Boin 2007, 23; italics added; Boin 2005a); in other words, a disaster is a “crisis with a devastating ending” (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007, 42; Boin 2005a; Boin 2005b).

For example, crisis can cover occasions that do “not meet conventional disaster definitions,” such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; AIDS and BSE; Waco, Texas, and Oklahoma City; Wall Street’s Black Monday; Challenger and Koersk; Y2K; or the “coming water crisis” (Boin 2005b, 154; italics added). In other words, the crisis concept can “appl[y] to all processes of disruption that seem to require remedial action,” thus “meriting the attention of disaster students” (Boin 2005b161; italics added).

I conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 21\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2013. By using the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English-language texts published in the past six months. Disaster was queried as a subject term.

I conducted the LexisNexis search on the 21\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2013. I limited the query to English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was disaster.

I conducted the Google Scholar search on the 21\textsuperscript{th} of November, 2013. Results were limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was disaster.

Additionally, there is no “good sense of what governments, organizations, communities, and so on mean when they use the term” (Buckle 2005, 177).

The author adds that this applies even to “slow onset disasters such as droughts and famines [that] may approach imperceptibly and inexorably” (Buckle 2005, 177-8). However,
he does not explain why even gradual disasters, (presumably) long foreseeable, would also face “constrained” warning, evacuation, and self-protection (Buckle 2005, 177-8).

62 This is based on the notion that the “concept of disaster is not a matter of empirical determination, but a logical and definitional matter...[where t]he label is something that preceeds [sic] rather than reflects the empirical world” (Quarantelli 1986, 13-14; italics in original).

63 It was Quarantelli’s work that originally informed me about Blumer’s idea about sensitizing concepts.

64 The summarizing word for each element of the sensitizing concept was chosen because it was often the one literally featured in the definition; sometimes, the word was inferred from the alternative one actually used. In the case of bad/negative, however, I decided to limit its tally to either literal use or utmost obviousness because virtually every definition implied that a disaster in a bad and/or negative thing. The seven elements are listed in descending order of frequency of reference.


Some scholars, however, have accused disaster research’s event-centrism as a “pro-Western, pro-technology, pro-capitalism bias unsuitable for distinguishing disasters in underdeveloped societies” (Quarantelli and Dynes 1977, 24; Westgate and O’Keefe 1976) where they are more frequent—and will become more so if (and when) the predicted outcomes of the aforementioned AGETs—especially ACC—come to pass.


For bad/negative, see: Perry 2007; Wallace 1956; Killian 1954; Fitz 1961, 1968; Buckle 2005; Sjoberg 1962; Smith 2005a.

For death, see: Moore 1958; Smith 2005b; Fritz 1961; Turner and Pedgeon 1997; Richardson 1994.


For natural, see: Stallings 2005; FEMA 2003.

In addition, “cultural resonance and moral values also influence whether the public adopts public relations and media frames about [a] disaster” (Yearly 2002, 269; Edy and Merick 2007). For example, during DHOS, it appeared that the United States was split in its reaction to the spill: from a cultural point-of-view, the image of oil spill recalled Exxon Valdez, inspiring anger, especially from those who lived far from the Gulf of Mexico; but from a moral point-of-view, the Gulf Coast was valorized as “America’s working coast” (Landrieu 2010) and a part of America’s attempt to achieve energy security, engendering a moderate reaction, especially from those who lived near/along the Gulf, or are patriotic.
As sociologists, they are more “interested [in] learn[ing] about how people [i.e., plural] and organizations behave[] in times of collective stress” (Boin 2005b, 157; italics added).

For example, the story that DHOS was an environmental disaster was gradually superseded by the story that it was a management, regulatory, and safety disaster; as a consequence, government and industry devoted much more time to improving these aspects of the spill (or appearing to) and less to the environmental, ones which would have potentially required far higher financial compensation, even tougher regulations, and/or a reassessment of the entire offshore oil endeavour.

At the same time, however, disaster is also a story or narrative that “precedes an event,” one that actors “use to say how a story—and its event—should go,” where the language used can influence that story, and therefore its meaning (Stein 2002, 157; italics added). During SBOS, for example, the unprecedented nature of the spill resulted in several different outcomes, ranging from governments passing laws to people gaining increased environmental awareness; but despite DHOS’s shocking size, its ‘oil spill narrative’ had been pre-written (by, for instance, Exxon Valdez), helping to ensure that its outcomes would be confined to financial penalties.

I conducted the Academic Search Premier search on the 29th of November, 2013. By using the advanced search function, I limited the results to those written in peer-reviewed English-language texts published in the past six months. Catastrophe was queried as a subject term.

I conducted the LexisNexis search on the 29th of November, 2013. I limited the query to English-language publications from the past six months. The subject term was catastrophe.
I conducted the Google Scholar search on the 29th of November, 2013. Results were limited to the year 2013, and did not include patents or citations. The queried term was catastrophe.

Except, perhaps, by Beck (1992) and his theory of risk society, which states that as a society becomes more advanced and insulated from the calamities that were once a routine part of life, the people within that society will become increasingly intolerant of any disruption or disturbance to their daily lives, describing anything annoying or inconvenient in conceptual language that ‘should’ be reserved for large-scale occasions that negatively impact a large number of people.

But while Katrina, Tohoku, and Taiyan have convinced a few scholars to take “more seriously” the need for a catastrophe concept and category, only a few “have spent time trying to describe the characteristics of catastrophes, maybe because most researchers are more interested in doing empirical studies rather than clarifying the conceptual distinctions” (Quarantelli 2006, 2).

Unlike for crisis and disaster, the sensitizing concept elements for catastrophe are not nice, neat terms taken directly from the various texts, but rather conceptual summaries based on the ideas that kept appearing.

Chapter 3 Endnotes

I prefer the term ‘constuctionism’ to ‘constructivism’ because the latter sounds positivistic in nature, implying that a given social circumstance is being constructed in order to build something, to achieve some goal or ideal. The former, on the other hand, has no such connotations or implications; it merely suggests that a social circumstance is being assembled regardless of whether the result will be boon, bane, or indifference.
To put it another way, the social constructionist perspective reveals that perceptions of such seemingly 'impartial' occasions as hurricanes and tsunami are "not totally—or even necessarily—determined by the[ir]...objective characteristics," but rather "by a number of factors, among the most important being the symbolic contexts within which [the occasions] are located" (Coln and Gallagher 1984, 83). People act upon these perceptions as if they are objective—because they have become so through the perceptual process.

The rationale behind Weick’s summation is that people’s “stories are largely self-fulfilling and self-validating interpretations”; humans often “come to ‘see’ that which they ‘believe’ will be seen” (1979, 155).

Academics, on the other hand, as Chapter 2 indicated, have expended a lot of ink and pixels attempting to denotate each CDC term, albeit often for instrumental purposes, i.e., providing criteria to crisis managers so they can determine if the occasion truly is a crisis, or is something else.

The exception to this is public relations research specializing in crisis and disaster. However, virtually all of the work done within this sub-field is pre- and pro-scriptive in nature (Kotzian 2007; Snow et al. 1986; Reese 2007; Schultz, Utz, and Göritz 2011; Graber 2003)—i.e., crisis managers should use language that emphasizes positive, ameliorative action, not language that describes or passes judgement on the incident or its participants.

The reason is not difficult to understand. CDCs represent moments when time is of the essence and immediate action is required; therefore, CDCs are (or should be) about managing the occasion, alleviating any pain and suffering, and initiating the processes of mitigation, recovery, reconstruction (if required), and perhaps even prevention—and that is where most
of the research has gone. Analyzing vocabulary-choice and what—if any—effect(s) it may cause appears to hold little interest or importance.

88 As mentioned in the preceding chapter, “it makes quite a difference whether one labels events in terms of an ‘incident,’ an ‘accident,’ a ‘tragedy,’ a ‘disaster,’ or a ‘crisis’ [because t]hese terms convey different assessments of the situation in terms of its seriousness and the allocation of responsibility [and resources] for it” (Snow et al. 1986, 83; italics added).

89 While social construction offers rich and insightful perspectives through which to understand the world and what happens in it, it can serve only as a theoretical platform upon which to formulate assumptions and research agendas; it neither constitutes, nor outlines, nor even suggests practical analytical procedures. FT is one of several sub-theories that attempt to ‘compartmentalize,’ to a degree, the vast potentialities offered by social construction, and FA is among the many methodologies devised to mine quantitative and qualitative data from the discursive texts constructing the social world.

90 By the same token, it is “this very subtlety [that] makes framing difficult to define” because the “specifics of measurement will differ for each topic of discourse” (Tankard 2001, 96-7).

91 In other words, frames help people to figure out what is happening, with both the question and the answer(s) emanating from what people do (which includes what they say). Later commentators have tried to elaborate on this idea by noting that frames are “schemata of interpretation” enabling individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large…[for the purpose of] organiz[ing] experience and guid[ing] action, whether individual or collective” (Snow and Benford 1988, 214).
So much so, in fact, that framing is all but "omnipresent across the social sciences and humanities" (Entman 1993, 51; van Gorp 2007). 

In fact, it is probably because of its "imprecise conceptual/theoretical development" that framing has gained its present ubiquity (Benford 1997, 413; Giles and Shaw 2009).

Entman (1993, 51), especially, is disconcerted about the fact that "nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in text."

While some scholars are comfortable with FT serving as "more of a research programme than a unified paradigm"—because it has fostered "creative analysis," and/or because the "theoretical diversity has been beneficial in developing a comprehensive understanding of the [framing] process (if not a consistent terminology)" (Hertog and McLeod 2001, 140; Reese 2007, 148)—many others lament that framing is a "broken paradigm," one that is devoid of continuity, rendering the "cumulative learning that is supposed to accompany normal science...[impossible]" (Entman 1993, 51; Giles and Shaw 2009; Hertog and McLeod 2001, 140).

See also Matthes and Koring 2008; Steensland 2008; Nelson and Kinder 1996; Straus 2011; Brunken 2006; Callaghan and Schnell 2001; van Gorp 2007; Carragee and Roefs 2004; de Vreese 2005).

Since FT "assumes that individuals are the definers of reality" (Krogman 1996, 374), frames are therefore presumed to be put forth by actors, a.k.a. frame sponsors. Although "frames [can be] sponsored by multiple societal actors, including politicians, organizations, and social movements" (Entman 1993; Beckett 1996; Gamson and Modigliani 1989), most frame research focuses on elites (Entman 2007; Nelson and Kinder 1996) or the media.
(Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007) on account of their money, power, and access to communications, which researchers assume bestows them with greater societal influence.

Several researchers have focused more narrowly, even exclusively, on the ability/characteristic of frames to select, emphasize, interpret, and include/exclude (Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigall-Brown 2007; Anderson 2009; Chong and Druckman 2007; Entman 1993; Durham 2001).

Entman’s offering is not without criticism, however. Reese (2007, 151-2), for example, complains that what is gained in “precisely locating the unit of analysis is traded off in restricted interpretive ability”; what is more, Entman’s definition “begs the question of how [frames] are organized in such a way to promote their effects” (Reese 2007, 152; italics added). Others, meanwhile, take issue with Entman’s underlying assumptions about how knowledge and understanding should best be acquired. According to D’Angelo, Entman’s (1993) lament about the fractured nature of FT, and his contention that all effort should be made to streamline it into a codified paradigm, “does not take into account that various, even competing, theories may be required to understand framing” (2002, 872); he fails, also, to comprehend that “theories are supposed to generate inconsistencies, which, in turn, provide new directions for future research” (2002, 873). D’Angelo implies that Entman is trying to circumscribe FT into the narrow confines of problem-solving theory, where attention is fixed on a given problem-focus, which is then dissected so its variables can be accounted for and labelled according to positivistic convention (Cox 1986). Entman’s formulation, therefore, has fallen victim to the same trap that has snared so many scholars: it focuses too much on the purposeful use of frames, i.e., every frame a FS puts forth seeks to accomplish something concrete. One of the main problems with such a fixation is that “what is potentially lost...
n] understanding [about] how...actors create the shared experience that makes frame contests meaningful and understandable in the first place” (Diehl and McFarland 2010, 1717; italics added).

100 The element headings are, for the most part, derived from their explicit reference in any given definition/characteristic of frames/framing.

101 Those concurring that frames/framing provide context include Hallahan 1999; Brunken 2006; Hertog and McLeod 2001; van Gorp 2007; Benford 1997; and Scheff 2005.

Those who contend that frames/framing impart meaning include Benford and Snow 2000; Carragee and Roefs 2004; Ryan 1991; Hertog and McLeod 2001; Boettcher 2004; Chong and Druckman 2007; Snow et al. 1986; Anderson 2009; Benford and Snow 2000; Benford 1997; Snow and Benford 1988; Reese 2001; and Entman 1993.

102 In fact, after conducting a careful reading of Goffman’s entire corpus, Scheff concluded that what Goffman had meant all along by frame was context; he goes so far as to hazard that if Frame Analysis had been subtitled, Defining Context, then it “would have been better understood,” possibly erasing much of the confusion that now characterizes frame research (Scheff 2005, 374).

103 It is “active in the sense that something is being done,” and “processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process”; it “entails agency in the sense that what is evolving is the work of social [actors, a]nd...is contentious in the sense that it involves the generation of interpretive frames that not only differ from existing ones but that may also challenge them” (Benford and Snow 2000, 614).

104 Since frames are “invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues...efficiently and in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences” (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007,
12), thus “mak[ing] the world more knowable and understandable” (Druckman 2001, 100), it is important that the two keystones for achieving this—context and meaning—be included in my sensitizing concept.

105 Those who argue that values are an important aspect of frames/framing include Nelson 1997; Scheufele 1999; Fuller 2010; Huckin 2002; Norris-Raynbird 2008; Stolte and Fender 2007; and Tankard 2001.

106 What is more, the perceptual nature of most CDCs (Boin and ‘t Hart 2007; Hallahan 1999) means that they often only “become [such occasions] as a result of being perceived as nonroutine, unstable, less-understood, and time-urgent” (Druckman 2001, 188); these are determinations that “impl[y] certain beliefs” (Ungar 1992, 44) about how things should be that are informed by holding certain values. The fact that CDCs are usually a “matter of perspective [to] each key public” (Heath 2004, 176; italics added)—all of whom may hold subtly or radically different values—only accentuates the role of values in the framing of occasions as CDCs.

107 Those who believe frames/framing entails responsibility include Robinson 2002; van Gorp 2007; Hertog and McLeod 2001; and Benford 1997.

108 This may help explain why so many occasions that seem to be crises, disasters, and catastrophes are not framed as such, but rather as accidents or natural disasters, which are “to a large extent still seen as a-political,” and thus “serve as prox[ies] for blamelessness” (Moore 2011, 3; Landis 1999, 264).

109 As far as I can determine, there is only one paper that examines how an environmental CDC (DHOS, in this case) was framed, Matt Hope’s (2011) “Framing the ‘Greatest Environmental Disaster in Our History:’” The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill as a Social
Event.” Although he shows that contrary to the rhetoric, DHOS was framed as a social event, and not an environmental one, his work does not really treat crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe—as terms and concepts—as objects of analysis. What is more, he only examines the statements of three actor types over the course of six months during this one occasion. Finally, he does not seek to discover if there were any correlations between frames and actual outcomes; instead, he concludes that the framing of the spill as a social event may further contribute to the overall philosophical milieu of ecological modernisation and its attendant policy discourse.

Chapter 4 Endnotes

110 This assumption was based on another, which posited that the first year of each spill would be when the greatest number and variety of actors would most likely frame them as CDCs. Virtually nobody would frame a spill a CDC before the fact, and as time wore on and each spill faded from prominence and immediacy, there would be less and less reason for them to refer to them as CDCs afterwards. This assumption proved correct: not only did the use of CDCs begin immediately after word of SBOS and DHOS got out, but after a few months, the quantity and frequency of CDC-usage dropped-off significantly. What is more, both spills had wildly different durations: while SBOS was still leaking oil a year later—although the worst of it had come to an end three weeks after the initial blowout—DHOS was capped after 86 days with no detectable infusions of new oil spilled into the GoM. However, this elicits a question (one that is beyond the parameters of this thesis to explore): how does one define a spill as over? Is it when a well is no longer releasing oil in an uncontrolled manner? When all obvious signs of oil and its damage have been removed from
the social environment? When all traces of oil have been removed from the environment and
the sociopolitical consequences have been remedied?

111 Most of the DHOS raw data was procured from the websites of various, relevant actors,
usually from sections entitled ‘Newsroom’ or ‘Press Releases’; the remainder was acquired
from transcribed subcommittee meetings, publically available letters, and a smattering of
newspaper articles, all located online. As of September 2013, these websites still exist, are
free to visit by anybody with an internet connection, and continue to cache the raw data I
drew upon.

112 Due primarily to the fact that SBOS occurred in 1969, the OSIC stored at UCSB is
probably the only significant, organized source for on-the-ground and as-it-happened
information about SBOS in the world (whether from a CDC point of view or any other). It
chronicles four years of Santa Barbara’s—and to a certain extent, the nation’s, and the
world’s—relationship with oil spills. The collection’s materials range from journalism to in-
house reports (i.e., Union Oil’s [UO], the Presidential advisory panels) to various actors’
correspondences with other actors. Consequently, I did not consult any other source for raw
data utilizing crisis, disaster, or catastrophe pertaining to SBOS.

113 Although the OSIC also contained audio-visual material—and could have provided
something of a complement to the vast repositories of DHOS video and audio from DHOS
available on the Internet—it appeared too piecemeal to provide a representative enough
overview of the 365 day period serving as the time frame of my study. As a consequence, the
written-text restriction was imposed upon DHOS raw data collection, as well, to retain
comparability. This deliberate limitation did not pose a problem in the end because both
spills (especially DHOS) had accumulated more than enough material to base a study on.
Instead, it exists as thousands of pages of hardcopy (most of it original) contained in hundreds of binders stored in seventy-plus boxes (fifty-plus of which I requested, having determined from an inventory list what I wished to consult) residing in a storage facility, and had to be delivered to UCSB's Special Collections office at the Davidson Library so that I could go through them.

This trip took place from the 12th of July, 2011 to the 24th of July, 2011.

This resulted in approximately 200 pages of single-sided photocopies and about 2300 photographs stored on a data card (and were then uploaded to my computer). The tactic of photographing the pages was suggested by both Dr. Wilkening, my supervisor, and Mr. Ed Fields, head of Special Collections at the Davidson Library, UCSB.

The collection of DHOS data was further streamlined by my experiences at UCSB, where I ended up finalizing the number and types of actors that my thesis would focus on; this, in tandem with the virtues of the World Wide Web, allowed me to target the chosen actors, access their websites, sift through their press releases, and cut-and-paste any relevant documents into actor-assigned Word files, as opposed to visiting the electronic archives of various newspapers and wading through their myriads of stories. This would have proven untenable, anyway: whereas in 1969, the interested newspapers only published a dozen stories per day in total on SBOS, by 2010, virtually all newspapers were publishing a dozen stories per hour each on DHOS during its height.

As a left-of-centre, somewhat activist newspaper, SBNP sided not with government and industry, but with the people of Santa Barbara, most of whom were dismayed and horrified at the black tides staining their beaches and killing or driving away the Santa Barbara Channel's (SBC) plentiful birdlife; it sided, especially, with those seeking to remove all oil development
from the Channel. As a consequence, it published scores of articles on SBOS, in particular, and oil, in general. Almost all of them had a get oil out (pun both intended and not) implication and/or verdict; long after the national, and even state media, had left Santa Barbara for other stories, SBNP continued to report on the spill, going so far as to include a daily count: “Day [Such-and-Such] and Counting—When Will It End?” (OSIC 1969-73). As of the 28th of January, 1970, SBNP reported the spill as still ongoing.

Several news stories came from such organs as the *New York Times*, the *Los Angeles Times*, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the *Washington Post*, and even the *Wall Street Journal*. However, not all documents with these words were collected. If the terms appeared only in the title of an article, report, or press release, the document was disregarded because the lack of context would have made conducting a meaningful analysis impossible (frames are explanatory in nature, while titles are designed to pique reader interest, not to sate their curiosity). In addition, if the words appeared in a letter whose signatory does not have a 1969/2010 counterpart, it was not collected; the same applies to letters with multiple signatories: if even one of them does not have a counterpart, the entire text was ignored. For example, if a letter of indignation was signed by both Sierra Club and Greenpeace, it was disqualified on the grounds that the latter environmental NGO did not exist in 1969. This limitation was imposed for the purpose of maintaining comparability between the two spills.

For better or worse, the Internet—and more specifically, its subsidiary components the World Wide Web, Twitter, et cetera—has provided anybody with access to a computer and a wifi hotspot the opportunity to disseminate their views on any topic conceivable, sans editorial authority/gate keeping, at little to no financial cost. In contrast, the only forms of mass communication available in 1969 were print media, radio, and television, where access
was limited by physical space, scheduling, costs (to both producer and broadcaster), perceptions of public interest, and content gatekeepers/enforcers (i.e., editors; moral censors; the dictates of informative journalism).

122 An example of a pair of temporal counterparts would be Audubon 1969 and Audubon 2010: the ornithological/environmental NGO existed in 1969 to call the Santa Barbara spill a CDC, and it existed in 2010 to do the same to the *Deepwater Horizon*. An example of an *appropriate* pair of temporal counterparts would be President Nixon and President Obama: although they are two different individuals from two different political parties, the office and position they represent are common to both 1969 and 2010, therefore making them corresponding FSs. Meanwhile, neither Greenpeace nor MMS could be included because they did not exist in 1969 (MMS has the added distinction of ceasing to exist part-way through the *Deepwater Horizon* spill; its successor, the BOEMs, was disregarded for obvious reasons).

123 Although municipal and county actors often condemned SBOS as a CDC, they could not be included as FSs, despite the frequency of their potential contributions (aided and abetted by the fact that *SBNP*—the source from which the majority of my raw data came from—gave these actors considerable print-space on account of it being a local/regional organ). There are two reasons for this. The first is that although Louisiana has the appropriate municipal and parish (the Louisiana version of counties) counterparts, a cursory examination of their websites indicated that not only did they rarely mention DHOS, but they also refrained from referring to it as a CDC. The second reason is that whereas SBOS more or less had a single epicentre—Santa Barbara—DHOS did not; even if I limited my inquiry to Louisiana, no single parish, city, or town stands out as the poster child for DHOS’s devastation, by my own
judgement or anybody else's. I could not in good conscience, therefore, arbitrarily choose a single place to act as a synecdoche for the rest, nor conglomerate them into a single voice, because doing so would have robbed the others of their (potentially) unique CDC voices. That, and there appeared to be nothing to work with, anyway.

124 A slight caveat to the rule stated in endnote 124 pertains to non-national environmental groups. While SBOS literally resulted in the formation of a specialist anti-oil group—Get Oil Out! (GOO!), dedicated to the complete removal of all oil exploration and production in the SBC—a—DHOS does not appear to have inspired the same. What is more, although there are several environmental NGOs based along the GoM, in general, and in Louisiana, in particular, they a) do not subscribe to a goal as radical and rigid as GOO's and b) have networked themselves together into a community so that no one is necessarily predominant over any other. As a consequence, and because the non-national environmental group voice is critical to the integrity of my comparative analysis, I decided to gather together all Louisiana-based environmental NGOs under one umbrella, which I called Regional Environmental Actors (REAs), to provide GOO! with an appropriate temporal counterpart. This caveat extends to those actors grouped under Scientists, as well, albeit for a somewhat different reason: what the scientists said about either SBOS or DHOS did not radically differ among them; they appeared to agree that the spills were, in general, potentially deleterious for the SBC and the GoM. In light of these two things, I felt comfortable collecting all extracts made by scientists under the heading of Scientists.

a. GOO! continues to exist and operate to this day, its primary mission unchanged.

According to its website, though they had little to say about DHOS; in fact, they did not even refer to it as a CDC, at least not during the designated timeframe.
b. Although DHOS impacted all five Gulf states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida), not only was Louisiana considered the most impacted state, but it was also judged by common opinion to have been the epicentre of the spill and its response: the Macondo well is/was located 66 kilometers south-west of the state; the National Command tasked with ending the spill was based out of first Robert, Louisiana, then New Orleans; fishing closures effected Louisianans the most; the state has the most extensive coastal wetlands along the Gulf; and most of BP’s eventual Clean Water Act fines will be going to Louisiana.

c. In the end, three Louisiana-based non-national environmental NGOs made up the REAs: the Gulf Restoration Network (GRN); the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB); and Coastal Conservation Association (CCA). How do I justify putting all three of these actors under one FS heading, something I refused to do with Louisiana’s municipalities and parishes? By the fact that the individual content of the each actor’s statements survived the refining and condensing process (to be described later in the chapter) intact; in other words, although all three are huddled under one umbrella, their unique CDC perspectives remained separate from each other.

As Chapter 3 pointed out, most framing research examines, in one way or another, how the media frames something and/or what effects media framing has. I decided very early on that I would not do this, so that my research might stand out from the pack. It was also for the sake of reigning in the potential scope of the study. At the very beginning of my research, I conducted a LexisNexis search of newspapers using the keywords “Deepwater Horizon,” “crisis,” “disaster,” and “catastrophe” and came up with thousands of hits. Even assuming

125
that only half of them were not FS quotations, that still meant that the media is by far the largest user and purveyor of DHOS-as-CDC.

126 For example, statements from then White House Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs, were not included even though he served as the official voice of the Obama Administration whenever the President, Vice-president, or any of the cabinet members did not personally issue statements.

127 This was also done in an effort to reign in the number of CDCs.

128 Government reports are an exception to this rule. While on the one hand these reports have identifiable authors, on the other, those bylined authors did not actually write what is contained within them save the foreword. Rather, they were written by staffers working under the ‘author.’ I decided to include them, anyway, for two reasons: a) the reports, written after the spill but still within the one-year time frame, serve as summaries for the ways in which various actors perceived the spills as CDCs and therefore can be compared and contrasted with all the other FS’s CDC-framings to see if the summary matches with what was reality; and b) the DHOS reports used CDCs a lot—so many times, in fact, that not including them would have prevented a fuller picture from forming of the federal government’s perception of what made the spill a CDC.

129 Although press releases often feature the contact information of the media representative, it cannot be proven whether this individual actually wrote the release or acted as editor to whoever did, strengthening my assertion that media representatives are fundamentally anonymous.

130 DHOS FS media representatives often recycled chunks of text from their press releases into succeeding ones for the purpose of either rounding-out and/or reiterating a point the FS
presumably wanted repeated. One of the diseases of the information age is the need for constant updates, even when there is nothing to update: silence is anathema because it perceived as being filled by some other FS whose frame(s) might be critical or contrary to the first’s, and/or because it is assumed to be potentially winning hearts and minds.

For example, under DHOS – Sol – Disaster, four of the 27 individual extracts could be combined into a single super-extract because the general topic/theme of each one of those four revolved around how DHOS proved the importance of continuing to reform the offshore oil system.

While the sensitizing analysis was largely superfluous for the short and individual extracts, where the distinguishing CDC features were often a matter of what-you-see-is-what-you-get, it proved very advantageous for the lengthy ones and the super-extracts, where it distilled volumes of locution into more succinct and plainer packets of text illustrating at a glance what and/or why the spills were perceived as CDCs. By so doing, I acquired relevant raw materials for the frame analysis—i.e., potential CDC frames and/or meanings framed in the context of CDCs, not political or environmental frames.

As will become apparent in Chapter 5, the resulting CDC frames do have political and environmental meanings to them; I was not trying to strip such meanings from the frames. Rather, I wanted the politics and environmentalism to be in service to the CDC, not the other way around, as is often the case in other framing research (i.e., Hay 1999; Hope 2011; Millar and Beck 2004). In essence, that is what I interpret framing to entail: what meanings are being used to serve, strengthen, and propagate another meaning. This thesis could well have been about the political or environmental framing of the spills, where CDCs are one of several meanings recruited to build the political or environmental frame (see Hope 2011).
Whereas making super-extracts always reduced the amount of material, the process of assembling generalized CDC frames sometimes resulted in reduction, but at other times led to an increase in information, or to no change at all; usually, though, there was either a decrease or no change, and rarely an increase.

Example 1 of the process of converting CDC frames into generalized CDC frames (GDFs):

- **SBOS was not a disaster—and therefore should not be made such a big deal of—because no people were killed.**
- **Although SBOS was a terrible thing, nobody was killed, the damage can be cleaned/repaired, and another spill can be prevented by following "good procedures."**

Both of these disaster frames are from Union Oil, and they contain the same idea/theme: that SBOS was not a disaster because nobody was killed, the damage is mitigatable, and prevention is relatively easy. Therefore, they can be combined into a single GDF:

- **SBOS was not a disaster because nobody was killed, the damage is repairable, and future spills can be prevented through procedural improvements.**

Example 2:

- **BP cheated and MMS let them, resulting in DHOS, but fixing this by adding stronger safeguards will not get to the root of the problem, which is America's addiction to oil; it is unacceptable, and the President should deliver a plan to get the nation off oil within 20 years.**
This disaster frame is from Sierra Club 2010, and it contains several ideas/themes: a) BP cheated, resulting in DHOS; b) MMS let BP cheat, resulting in DHOS; c) the root of the problem (i.e., DHOS; spills, in general) is America’s addiction to oil; and d) the President should deliver a plan to get the nation off oil within 20 years. The result is that this single disaster frame can become/help contribute to three GDFs:

- **DHOS is BP’s fault; hence why they should take full responsibility;**
- **MMS failed to do its job because it colluded with oil industry; and**
- **America is too dependent on oil and should therefore kick the habit by rethinking its energy policy and realizing a CE economy.**

Ideas/themes c) and d) could be combined to form the third CDC frame because for Sierra Club, *oil addiction/dependence* and *getting off oil* are always intimately related; during DHOS, the two frames/framings were almost never separate, as was the case for other FSs who mentioned one or the other or both.

Example 3:

- **America is at a turning point because DHOS proves that the oil industry has a “stranglehold on our economy, our health, and our environment,” and the nation needs assurances that DHOS will not happen again.**

- **Big Oil is so obsessed with securing oil that it refuses to learn the lessons from its failures, putting the nation at greater risk for spills.**

These two crisis frames are from Sierra Club 2010, and while they share several ideas/themes (i.e., the oil industry has too strong a hold over the economy, health,
and environment of the US; the oil industry is too fixated on getting more oil to learn from its mistakes), they also have differences (the former states that America is at a turning point, requiring certainty of no more spills and a commitment to getting off oil, while the latter merely complains about Big Oil). As a consequence, these two disaster frames become two GDFs:

- **DHOS proves that the oil industry has a "stranglehold" on the economy, health, and environment via oil; the oil industry is too obsessed with acquiring more oil to learn from its mistakes, thus putting nation at risk for more spills and**

- **America is at a turning point where it simultaneously needs assurances of no more spills and kicking oil within 20 years.**

135 This thesis was not interested in determining how many times a FS utilized a frame, but rather in how many different frames did a FS put forth. That being said, however, the number of instances of any given frame (i.e., how many times the FS referred to it) has been preserved. After each generalized CDC frame in the eponymous list (see Appendix F), there is a sequence of numbers (following either ‘SBOS’ or ‘DHOS’); these represent how many (super-)extracts made mention of the generalized frame.

136 Although most of the time I was successful at generating a more or less logical answer to the question (i.e., what kind of crisis is going on here? A response/community/economic crisis), sometimes I was not (for example, what kind of catastrophe is going on here? A remove oil development from SBC catastrophe). Nevertheless, all basic CDC topics accurately, if abbreviatedly, reflect the main idea of each generalized CDC frame.
For example, the crisis code, '3,' for *Economic*, applied only to SBOS's generalized crisis frames, not to the same spill’s generalized disaster or catastrophe spills (for them, the code for *Economic* was '21' and '5,' respectively). In addition, these codes did not pertain to any of DHOS’s generalized CDC frames (for them, *Economic* was '5' for crisis, '9' for disaster, and '4' for catastrophe). Instances where code numbers appear to be same—such as ‘1’ being the crisis code for *Response* for both SBOS and DHOS—were coincidences; in each spill’s clutch of crisis frames, *Response* was the first encountered.

In other words, generalized frames referring to past action, to action not taken, or to negative action were not included.

Chapter 5 Endnotes

While my methodology succeeded in reducing the amount of *material* (i.e., the volume of text into extracts, the number of extracts into generalized CDC frames), it did not appear to decrease the quantity and range/variety of *meanings* attached to crisis, disaster, and catastrophe; in other words, stripping out extraneous and irrelevant text, collapsing CDC extracts into one another, and coalescing the frame extracts into generalized ones only partially dampened the cacophony that characterizes, as a whole, the various FSs’ framing of the spills as CDCs. Over the course of 365 days, SBOS generated 13 GCFs, 92 GDFs, and 20 GCaFs, for a total of 125 generalized CDC frames; and DHOS produced 38 GCFs, 166 GDFs, and 18 GCaFs, for a total of 222 generalized CDC frames. Even when the cumulative 347 generalized frames are boiled down to unique, *basic CDC frames*—see Chapter 5.1.1 below—there are still over 70 CDC meanings for both spills.

While at face value this represents a remarkable reduction of material to meaning, it is offset by the fact that the majority of these basic CDC topics encompass at least two (often
several) different perspectives pertaining to a) what it is, represents, or means depending on which spill it comes from; b) what FS is putting forth the topic; or c) even what CDC is being utilized. For example, *Response* acquired over half a dozen perspectives from DHOS alone because most FSs who referenced the topic meant something different by it—from the Audubon and President Obama pointing out that the spill inspired ordinary citizens in the thousands to help with the response (Saville 2010; Obama 2010) to OPA demanding that spill response be based on facts, evidence, and truth, not emotion, recrimination, and political opportunism (Cassidy 2010; Lamborn 2010; McClintock 2011) to Sol Salazar declaring that the response must be massive and adhere to the “cautionary approach” (Salazar 2010g). OPA, by itself, has at least three: in addition to the aforementioned one, they 1) report that the FG and the OI are working together to respond to DHOS, each investing massive quantities of resources (McNutt 2010), and 2) contend that only large-scale, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate the spill’s ecological impact, a good model to follow being ACC work (Lyder 2010). By taking into account the basic CDC topics’ multiple perspectives, the number of meanings quickly re-approaches the original number of generalized CDC frames.\(^3\) But even if this problematization was disregarded, 72 meanings for crisis, disaster, and catastrophe seems excessive.

a. It would not fully equal—or exceed—the original number of generalized CDC frames, however, because not all of the basic CDC topics had multiple perspectives; some had only one. For example, DHOS — *Oil dependency— Disaster* has four contributing GDFs, but they all add up to a single perspective: oil dependency—and/or more broadly, fossil fuel addiction—is bad (for America) and should come to an end, preferably through the development of a CE economy.
There is also a scarcity of patterns tying together groups of basic CDC topics within the 72; little more than perhaps three are readily apparent. One revolves around economics and money, consisting of five topics: Economic; Financial restitution; Jobs; Human, economic, environment; and Economic/human-ecosystem link. Another concerns the apportioning of blame, and encompasses three topics: Responsibility; Accountability/ responsibility; and Liability/accountability. However, topics from either of these sub-groups are not mutually exclusive; Financial restitution is just as much about blame as it is money and Liability/accountability is just as much about money as it is blame. Meanwhile, a third potential group centres on management, which includes six topics: Systemic management; Legislative/regulatory; Public consultancy; OI operating culture; BP behaviour; and BAU resumption.

In the end, however, attempting to find patterns amongst the 72 basic CDC topics is extremely vexing for two reasons. The first is that, as the first two examples demonstrate, the topics do not lend themselves exclusively to any one potential sub-group heading; one could spend endless hours arranging and rearranging the topics into one series of groups or another, and struggling over whether topics should belong to only one sub-grouping or be permitted to straddle. But to what end, especially in the context of this thesis? In addition to contributing little to nothing towards answering either of my two research questions, it also does a disservice to the actual frames—the actual meanings—summarized by the topics; what is gained in (over?)simplification and (possible) empiricism is lost in nuance and of the peculiar CDC-view(s) put forth by the individual FS. The second reason, meanwhile, is that the basic CDC topics were not designed so they could be slotted into patterns, but merely a means of condensing the otherwise unwieldy number of generalized CDC frames into a much more
compact form demonstrating at a glance the surprising number and diversity of meanings the various FSs attached to CDCs during SBOS and DHOS.

142 Although, as Chapter 4 stated, only written-text frames were included, I nevertheless ended up absorbing a large number of each spills’ visual frames while collecting the raw data, usually in the form of photographs accompanying newspaper or magazine articles (SBOS) and by witnessing DHOS via newscasts. More often than not, these photographs depicted aspects of nature inundated by waves of black or ensnared in tendrils of orange. An example of iconography common to both spills was the portrait of the oiled bird.

143 Allegedly. No proof has ever been found that SBOS’s oil—or any oil—caused the death of any seal (baby or otherwise) in the SBC. Investigations carried out soon after the publication of the *Life* article determined that the supposed dead seals had in fact been sleeping, and what looked like oil was some other kind of gunk harmless to the mammals (OCIS 1969-73).

144 On the one hand, this can be chalked up to *how* the environment was framed, and subsequently summarized into topics: whenever a FS mentioned the environment, they tended to talk about the same subjects (i.e., ruined coastline, oiled wildlife, unknown long-term ecological consequences), which ended up being categorized under only one CDC topic, as opposed to something like economics that encompassed many different subjects (i.e., jobs, compensation, moratoriums), thus requiring several specialized topics to properly represent them. On the other hand, the lack can also be attributed to the difference between *explicitly* and *directly* framing the environment and doing so *implicitly* and *indirectly*. For example, basic CDC topics like *Exploitation* or *Oil dependency* put subjects such as unchecked technology and fossil fuel addiction front and centre, but the underlying purpose for speaking
out about such things is to decry the environmental damage they wreak; in that sense, these
topics are about the environment, and therefore make up for the apparent deficiency.

Not only did *Deepwater Horizon* (officially) last longer than Santa Barbara—three
months versus two weeks—extending the zenith during which the majority of the CDC
framings could be made, but the existence in 2010 of a voracious 24/7 news machine and the
ubiquity of information technology ensured that FSs had plenty of opportunities and
mediums by which to disseminate as many CDC frames as they wished, whenever they
wished, and as often as they wished. However, the disparity can also be attributed to how
framing oil spills (as CDCs), and to how the socio-econo-political and environmental
contexts within which the spills and the framings occur, have changed during the 40 years
separating SBOS and DHOS. Santa Barbara was only the second oil spill in history to receive
intense media attention, and the first to effect the shores of a populated and socially
significant (American, tourist) city. When the black tides began inundating the beaches, the
spill’s various FSs lacked a precedent to guide how they should frame SBOS as a CDC (or as
anything else, for that matter); they were making up the oil spill CDC framework as they
went along, referring to topics as they came up instead of working from an established list of
impacts, consequences, and responses. What is more, the world of 1969 was less complex in
several respects—or, to be more accurate, complex in different ways—than that of 2010,
especially in regard to mass industrial pollution occasions. Since something like SBOS had
never before exploded into mass awareness with such abruptness and haste, few if any actors
had any pre-conceived notion of how to respond, at all or even appropriately (both the FG
and the OI, for example, denied that the spill was a CDC [OSIC 1969-73]).
As with the results in Chart 1, no overarching pattern can be found that connects all or most of the basic CDC topics, at least not without incurring enough significant ambiguity to render the exercise unhelpful; nor can smaller sub-groups be discerned from matching topics together. The reasons for this are the same as those given above for Chart 1. However, if the basic topics as presented in Chart 2 are divided according whether they were exclusive to one spill or the other, or were inclusive of both, a different (albeit, broad) kind of pattern does emerge: those basic CDC topics that SBOS and DHOS have in common (see Chart 3).

The 14 shared topics constitute about 40% of SBOS’s total number of unique basic CDC ones and approximately 27% of DHOS’s.

On the other hand, the 14 also represent only a broad pattern because in addition to being a disparate lot, offering even fewer potential linkages than the per-spill or cumulative lists, the actual perspectives explaining the meaning of the topic are, more often than not, very different from each other, reflecting and feeding off the contexts of 1969 California and the 2010 Gulf Coast.

For Santa Barbara, the economic turmoil was restricted to the vital tourism industry, which was built upon the perception that the city’s beaches were especially beautiful and pristine (OSIC 1969-73). The Gulf Coast not only suffered from a tourism drop-off, but also from fishing grounds closures, loss of consumer confidence in the safety of GoM seafood, and (purportedly) lost of OI jobs because of the (six-month) moratorium on (new) deepwater production; all of these exacerbated the impacts caused by the Great Recession.

These ‘summaries’ are only broad distillations of the actual content of the generalized CDC frames and are not meant to definitively reflect and/or suggest correspondence between SBOS and DHOS CDC frames; most of the time, the spills and the FSs sharing a common
basic CDC topic had significantly different perspectives on that topic, therefore lacking the equivalence and/or comparability that my ‘summaries’ otherwise imply. What is more, several of the 14 common topics were rarely used throughout each spills’ 365 days; in other words, while *Response* and *Economic* were often-referenced topics/frames, most of the others (such as *Technological, Human, and Reputational/leadership*) were referenced only once or twice by one or two FSs from each spill.

It is not immediately obvious, however, why most of the SBOS-only and DHOS-only basic CDC topics are relegated to one spill or the other. While the reasons for sequestering *Remove OD from SBC* and *BP behaviour* are obvious, why are *Ongoing* and *Sowing* *environmental awareness* the sole province of SBOS’s FSs even though DHOS lasted far longer than it ‘should’ have, and even though it caused a flood of environmental concern in the form of protests and thousands of ordinary people volunteering to help oiled wildlife (Obama 2010; Saville 2010)? Why are *Financial restitution* and *Unprecedented* the sole province of DHOS even though the Santa Barbara spill *did* cause property damage, thus making it (hypothetically, at least) eligible for compensation from either the FG or the OI, and even though it was the first of its kind while DHOS was ‘merely’ the biggest? The answers to such questions are not within the purview of this thesis, but they are likely to be had in the geographic, social, economic, political, and environmental contexts of not only the time periods, but also the very different regions each spill occurred in (see Freudenberg and Gramling 1993).

*Deepwater Horizon* FSs may have produced 14 GCaTs to Santa Barbara’s 13, but this is belied not only by the fact that it did so from 18 GCaFs (as opposed to SBOS’s 20), but also by such physical facts as the amount of oil spilled (DHOS: 795 million litres; SBOS: 14
million) and the area of the impact-zone (DHOS: thousands of kilometres of wetlands and beaches across five states; SBOS: a couple hundred kilometres of beach bordering the SBC).

Common sense would seem to dictate that DHOS should have attracted far more catastrophe frames than it did; reality indicates, however, that these wildly unequal spills resulted in a roughly equal number of generalized CDC frames and BCaTs. How to account for this?

Judging by the BCaTs, it appears the reason is because of the tenor of the catastrophe frames. According to SBOS FSs, the spill was seen from both an insular and an expansive point-of-view; in other words, they catastrophe-framed in terms of the spill happening in the SBC and the fact that it was happening anywhere at all. Each of the BCaTs revolve around either local calamity and/or solutions (Remove OD from SBC; Response; Economic) or a larger—national, even global—perception of the danger posed by oil spills/industrial pollution, and/or the need for spill prevention and environmental protection (Other actor involvement; Environmental; World importance). DHOS’s BCaTs, on the other hand, tend to be far more insular, focusing almost exclusively on the harm inflicted on impacted communities along the GC, and on what can/should be done to alleviate it (Remedial action; Food safety; Human); four of the BCaTs, alone, concern regional economics in some fashion (Financial restitution; Economic; Jobs; and Second catastrophe). Based on this, it is possible to infer that the perception of catastrophe surrounding SBOS was perhaps more acute than DHOS—from a framing perspective—because the FSs at the time could see how a spill despoiling beaches routinely described as “beautiful” and “world renowned” (OSIC 1969-73) synecdochically fits into the ‘bigger picture’ of the decade’s growing environmental awareness and concern. FSs in 2010, however, could not see much beyond the economic distress both spill and response (Federal, read: moratorium) was causing to
“America’s working coast” (Landrieu 2010aa). Why the FSs from each spill saw it these ways, though, is beyond the ability of this thesis to determine.

a. On the other hand, the catastrophe-perception of both spills can be debated from a sensitizing concept point-of-view. While SBOS required outside organizations (Red Adair’s blowout crew; prisoners) to help staunch the spill and/or clean it up, it was not huge (in comparison to subsequent spills); and while DHOS was certainly gargantuan, no outside institutions were required to help end or clean it up (in fact, both the FG and BP/the OI declined outside assistance).

b. What the generalized CDC frame(s) contributing to the BCaT, Second catastrophe, mean is that the FG’s response to DHOS—namely, the (six-month) moratorium on (new) deepwater oil production—is causing a second, economic catastrophe to the Gulf region (in general) and to Louisiana (in particular) in the form of job losses.

c. My findings appear to lend further corroboration to Freudenberg and Gramling’s (1993) research examining the social, political, economic, and even geographic contexts distinguishing coastal California and Louisiana and how they contribute to the regions’ vastly different opinions and attitudes towards offshore oil production.

153 In other words, the Deepwater Horizon crisis frames state or imply that something can still be done—as long as it is done soon—to prevent the spill from becoming any worse.

What is more, DHOS lasted for 86 continuous, high-profile days, and the number and variety of BCTs reflects this fact; the longer the height of the spill, the more time the FSs had to attach crisis meanings to it. Finally, and strangely, none of the FSs crisis-framed the spill as ongoing or continuous. SBOS, on the other hand, was crisis-framed as Ongoing. Although
Santa Barbara was officially declared over within three weeks of its eruption, the fissure beneath Platform A serving as the point-source continued to seep, on average, approximately five to 10 barrels of oil per day for over a year (OSIC 1969-73); each new (albeit, small) patch of surface sheen or oil landfall duly noted in the SBNP. (In fact, not only did SBOS FSs associate *Ongoing* with crisis, but also disaster and catastrophe.)

154 SBOS has only one unique BCT: *Categorical*; three unique BCaTs: *Other actor involvement*, *Unrealized*, and *Comparative*; and 18 unique BDTs: *Not a disaster*, *Responsibility*, *Forethought ignored*, *Inevitable future spills*, *Emotional*, *Exploitation*, *Conflict of interest*, *OD resuming*, *Natural*, *National/global survival*, *Sowing environmental awareness*, *Cover-up/non-disclosure*, *Human*, *Forgotten*, *Reputational*, *Misplaced blame*, and *Bad idea*.


155 From a sensitizing concept point-of-view, few of the topics offer any explanation as to why the FSs might have kept them exclusive to crisis, disaster, or catastrophe. For example,
during DHOS, why was *Natural and human environment* only framed in terms of a crisis when it would be just as appropriate to frame it in terms of disaster or catastrophe? Why was the spill a *Human* catastrophe, but not a *Human* disaster? And why was *OI operating culture* framed as a disaster and not a crisis despite most accounts implying (if not out-right stating) that the OI has done little to nothing to change how it manages and conducts oil production? Meanwhile, several topics that *should* be exclusive to one CDC or another are not. During SBOS, for instance, the *Ongoing* nature of the spill was framed as a *crisis*, *and* a disaster, *and* a *catastrophe*, despite neither of the latter two’s sensitizing concepts defining themselves in terms of continuation. The suggestion/demand to *Remove OD from SBC* was not only framed in terms of *catastrophe*, where it fits with the eponymous concept, but also in terms of *disaster*, whose concept does not hint at such drastic actions/solutions. And finally, the spill was not only *catastrophe*-framed as being of *World importance*, but also *disaster*-framed as such, despite the former being a more ‘proper’ home for such ‘hyperbole.’ Results such as these appear to lead to the conclusion that what FSs meant by framing the spills as CDCs cannot be answered by examining only the basic CDC topics.

156 Quasi-/Rudimentary because even though a certain basic topic may have been framed as each CDC, it should not be taken to mean, or even to imply, that all the FSs CDC-framed their respective spills as that topic; some might have framed it as a disaster, but not a crisis or a *catastrophe*, or they might not even have framed the spills as that topic.

157 Disregarding the sensitizing concepts, the reasons why SBOS FSs would frame these topics as CDCs appear to make sense. Whether perceived as a crisis, a disaster, or a *catastrophe*, an oil spill happening near a socially significant place demands *Response*; steps must be taken to stop it, fix it, and put in place measures that will at least theoretically
prevent another such occasion from happening again. Meanwhile, when CDCs erupt, the only barometer that seems to count is that measuring the Economic consequences; if an occasion negatively affects the economy in some way, it is bad, and if it does not, it is not. During the late 1960s, due in part to exposés like Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, the Technological utopianism of the 1950s was coming to an end; occasions such as SBOS demonstrated that the technologies purportedly benefiting Americans had a dark side, one with grave environmental consequences. And, finally, the fact that oil continued to pollute the waters and coastline of the SBC long after UO and the FG declared SBOS over behooved various FSs to complain about its *Ongoing* nature.

Disregarding the sensitizing concepts, the reasons why DHOS FSs framed these topics as CDCs appear to make sense. As with SBOS, DHOS demanded *Response*, not only to dampen the potential ire of the citizenry, but to prove that various actors could competently deal with a CDC (especially federal agencies, whose last major CDC was Hurricane Katrina, a response debacle). In the United States, at least, any CDC quickly becomes a battleground echoing with demands for *Financial restitution*: people have been harmed in some way by an outside force (be it nature, government, or industry) and they need/want money to help them alleviate some of the distress. Like in 1969, the world of the 21st Century appears to measure phenomena according to the Economic consequences. But at the same time, the world of today is much more aware and concerned about the Environmental effects of human activity, especially when said activity unleashes a CDC like DHOS; the situation along the GC, and especially Louisiana, accentuated this because several FSs linked the spill with wetland deterioration and (the need for) coastal restoration to call attention to the threatened multi-billion dollar GoM seafood industry and to the need to rebuild the coast's natural hurricane
buffers. Meanwhile, if there was one thing that virtually all DHOS FSs could agree upon, it was that offshore oil management was riven with *Systemic management* problems, and that these (in part, at least) contributed to the spill. And, finally, a couple of FSs questioned the *Values* feeding into issues associated with offshore energy production, primarily the profit-at-any-cost mentality of the OI at the expense of safety and technological prudence (i.e., flying in the face of *should* because *can* is beckoning with possibilities).

There are two very glaring caveats to this, however. The first is that the basic CDC topics are riven with fundamental deficiencies as a result of not only trying to stuff the rich-text of the generalized CDC frames into one-to four-word summaries, but also from crowding them under ‘like’ umbrellas. And the second is that despite any similarities implied by the basic topics, the generalized CDC frames invariably end up shattering them by illustrating the differences through the details. On the other hand, if the overall purpose of the topics is kept in mind—i.e., to get a *general* idea of what the SBOS and DHOS FSs *very broadly* meant by framing them as CDCs—then these results should serve well enough.

There were certain individual FSs whose CDC frames were narrow and limited. Perhaps the most extreme examples of such frames were put forth by Government Reports 1969 and UO during SBOS: they both denied that the spill was a CDC.

SBOS was unprecedented because it was pretty much the first oil spill to impact a socially significant community and environment, *and* generate intense media and public interest. DHOS was unprecedented because it steadily became the largest accidental oil spill in history.

As with Chart 1, there seems no practical purpose in picking out patterns amongst the action- and non-action-oriented topics, and for the same reasons; and although there is also
no overriding commonality linking them together in either list, there does appear to be three significant themes coursing through the non-action-oriented topics. They revolve around humans, their emotions and/or cognition, and the negative behaviours of certain members of them; taken together, they are referenced 19 times. While these themes are present in the list of 72, the division into action- and non-action-oriented topics not only makes them more prominent and noticeable, but also reveals something interesting about the way the FSs conveyed what they meant when they framed the spills as CDCs, especially when compared with the action-oriented topics—namely, that a division of labour appears to exist in how CDCs were used. Whereas non-action-oriented CDCs are illustrated with the spills’ human and emotional/cognitive toll, and the deleterious effects of certain behaviours, the action-oriented ones used them as single-word short-hand to emphasize, justify, and/or give impetus to a needed, desired, or sought-after action. In other words, if the FSs did not call for action, the motivation for perceiving the spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes was explained; if they did call for action, they used them as self-explanatory rationales underscoring the need to act. Neither the results, nor the research as a whole, can offer a substantial reason as to why such a distribution exists within the topics, and by extension the generalized CDC frames. For whatever reason, both the SBOS and DHOS FSs used CDCs in two very distinct ways when they framed the spills as crises, disasters, and/or catastrophes; and the objectives of this thesis demand that it turn its attention towards an exclusive focus on the action-oriented frames.

a. The basic topics making explicit mention of humans are Human; Human, economic, environmental; Economic/human-ecosystem link; Human personal input; Louisianans
(although not explicitly referred to as human, Louisianans nevertheless are, thus justifying their inclusion); Human suffering; and Human-caused.

The basic topics referencing emotion/cognition are Bad idea; Values; Faith in OI, FG; Hope; Expressing sorrow, regret.

The basic topics mentioning (negative) behaviour are: Forethought ignored; Conflict of interest; Cover-up/non-disclosure; Misplaced blame; BP behaviour; and Failed wake-up call.

b. An all-important caveat to remember, however, is that this finding is essentially limited to the basic topics; the details and contexts provided by the generalized CDC frames may, can, and do sabotage this result to one degree or another. For example, there are generalized action-oriented CDC frames that not only describe human suffering or bad behaviour, but also call for action to end it; and there are non-action-oriented ones that state that the situation is a CDC and stop there. On the other hand, this finding does appear robust: an examination of the generalized action-oriented CDC frames (see Appendix G) seems to substantiate that they devote little to no attention to explaining or describing why the spills are perceived as CDCs, instead using the words/concepts as one-word short-hand to strengthen/justify their cases for action. The crisis and catastrophe frames of both spills feature little to no human, emotional/cognitive, and/or behavioural details; a moderate number of them accompany SBOS’s action-oriented disaster frames. Only DHOS disaster frames include a notable enough quantity of such details.

163 Both perspectives, however, not only reinforce the conclusion reached by Chart 2—that oil spills have become only somewhat more complex and multifarious during the intervening
years between Santa Barbara and *Deepwater Horizon*—but also augment it by showing through the marginal increase in the number and variety of action-oriented topics between SBOS and DHOS that oil spill CDC action advocacy has undergone barely any intensification and complexification. This, in turn, suggests that the cache of potential actions, or the imagination to think them up, has advanced little since 2010, too. This appears to be substantiated, for example, by the state of oil spill clean-up techniques. In 2010, as in 1969, clean-up relied on (ineffectual) booms, skimmers, and dispersant (Cavnar 2010; OSIC 1969-73).

164 As Chapter 5.2 will show, SBOS FSs generated 37 action-oriented CDC frames during the first year of the spill, whereas DHOS FSs produced 74; comparing these figures with the number of unique action topics (i.e., Chart 8) reveals that while nearly half of Santa Barbara’s action frames are unique, only about a third of *Deepwater Horizon*’s are such. This suggests that the earlier oil spill, despite taking place during a time when the world had less knowledge and experience dealing with them, managed to inspire an entire host of proposals and demands that (as will be shown in Chapter 5.2) covered a wide palette, from pure NIMBYism to global environmental consciousness, and involved various levels of society. The later spill, meanwhile, occurring in the wake of several high-profile spill occasions, resulted in a relatively meagre number of actions, many revolving around financial compensation and/or restitution, and focusing almost exclusively on what the upper echelons of society could/should do.

165 However, as has been pointed out before, just because the spills share the same basic topic does not mean that any commonalities exist between the actual frames they represent; often, they do not.
Although DHOS managed to retain two of the six topics held in common by all three of its CDCs during the conversion to an action-oriented focus, SBOS was unable to hold on to any.

Condensed from *Response* and *Systemic management*.

By way of *Response, Economic, and Systemic management*.

Via *Remove OD from SBC, Legislative/regulatory, Environmental, Political, and Public Consultancy*.

These two SBOS summations, and the preceding DHOS one, are based solely upon the face-value of the basic action-oriented topics (and the background knowledge acquired from selecting, organizing, and manipulating the data); see Chapter 5 Endnote 160.

On the other hand, though, each CDC's clutch of leftover topics—i.e., those exclusive to only one CDC—provides insight into whether they are 'appropriate' to their CDC. While crisis's *Community* and catastrophe's *Other actor involvement* do fit their respective sensitizing concepts (because while a community cannot be destroyed or annihilated by an oil spill, it can be threatened by one; and because catastrophes are partly characterized by requiring non-indigenous responders), three of disaster's six do not: *World importance* sounds too 'grand,' according to disaster's sensitizing concept (it would match better with catastrophe); and *Moratorium justification* and *Sowing environmental awareness* sound drastic enough to qualify for catastrophe, not so much disaster, because while the latter is distinguished by what the occasion *wreaks*, the former is by how it is *responded to*. The remaining three (*Responsibility, OD resuming, and Knowledge/expertise*), however, cannot be determined (i.e., based solely on the topic, there appears to be no reason why they should be exclusive to disaster, as opposed to crisis or catastrophe). Meanwhile, their 2010
counterparts show that whereas crisis has four exclusive topics (*Legislative/regulatory; Natural, human, environmental; Responsibility; and Knowledge/expertise*), catastrophe has none, and disaster has thirteen (*Environmental; Coastal restoration; Remedial action; Mental health; Reputational/leadership; Accountability/responsibility; Moratorium; Public consultancy; Political; Technological; Guarantee; Bureaucratic; and Dirty, dangerous, deadly*).

172 Whereas the SBOS one was compiled primarily from retrospective analyses of the spill, the DHOS list is the result of paying attention to the spill’s aftermath as reported by the news media.

173 If an actual outcome benefitted the *General environment*, that means the law, regulation, provision, money, or increased/enhanced awareness had—or was intended to have—a concrete effect on the health of the broader environment. For example, NEPA was one of the first pieces of comprehensive federal legislation aimed at improving the overall health of the environment; it mandated environmental impact assessments and justified the enactment of regulations to mitigate or prevent environmental pollution regardless of their being a specific law targeted at doing so.

174 If an outcome was *Oil specific* (a.k.a., targeted at oil production), that means the law, regulation, provision, money, and/or increased/enhanced environmental awareness did—or was intended to—curb OI behaviours and operational cultural practices perceived to be detrimental to the environment and/or (coastal) community well-being. For example, the dissolution of the MMS into the three BOEMs was/is supposed to restore citizen confidence in the FG’s ability to oversee OCS oil operations by reining in oil industry zeal, act as a
bulwark against its influence, and basically perform as if it is not a rubber-stamp institution for the OI.

175 A partial explanation for this result can be found in how the spills were framed as CDCs. Overall, DHOS FSs generated the most CDC frames, both of the general and action-oriented variety; and as pointed out in Chapter 5.1, this reflected that the gargantuan size of the spill, which effected five states and impacted, in one way or another, the millions of people whose well-being depends on the GoM. As a consequence, many FSs perceived that only the FG had the organizational structure, resources, and—frankly—responsibility to deal with something so vast in scope and scale, and these notions infused the CDC frames with which they called on the President, or Congress, or the courts, or any relevant FG organ to do something to stop and/or mitigate the damage (and prevent more) and to ameliorate the suffering. What is more, the combination of the sheer number of (potential) victims, the extent of the damages, and the broader sensitivity/awareness to the complexity of oil spills (as CDCs) had, by 2010, expanded the roster of targets for action. The relatively small and circumscribed extent of the SBOS, meanwhile, echoed by its more modest cache of CDC frames, was seen only to have harmed the ecology of the SBC, and to have been caused by a woefully inadequate regulatory and oversight system, thus accounting for why these two kinds of terminuses dominate the outcomes to the exclusion of all others. Conversely, the spill’s size—in conjunction with it taking place in a decade noted for the rise of non-‘Establishment’ actors (i.e., women, African-Americans, youth) fighting for their political, economic, and social voice and place inspired actors from the middle and lower strata of society could, themselves, become (part of) the solution, thereby increasing the odds that their calls would be heeded.
It has, however, received little support from the federal or state governments, and none from the oil industry, who have all declined to participate because there already exist appropriate forums for stakeholders to air their views (Schumaker and Steiner 2013).

On the other hand, the RESTORE Act stipulates that the majority of the fines collected from BP, Halliburton, and Transocean for CWA violations are supposed to be used for coastal restoration projects, endowing the economic/financial compensation/restitution-based outcomes with an environmental focus. In addition, these three responsible parties have been providing money (in the form of donations or plea agreements) to the National Institutes of Health (BP 2010) and to environmental science organizations (Shen 2013), such as NFWF, to study the effects and impacts of oil on the Gulf environment, and to develop more effective means of rebuilding the wetlands (which have been devastated by the activities of the OI, in particular their pipelines).

None of these differences is out of the ordinary. SBOS’s high degree of environmental action was a concoction brewed from the decade’s growing environmental awareness, the shock of the new (i.e., a large pollution event effecting a community), the location of the spill (an affluent, socially conscious vacation city), and the media attention surrounding it; although DHOS became the largest accidental offshore oil spill in US and world history, it had the misfortune—from an environmentalist perspective—to happen along “America’s working coast” (Landrieu 2010aa), where the political, economic, and social contexts do not lend themselves to the kind of environmentalist action that became one of SBOS’s enduring legacies (Freudenberg and Gramling 1993). Meanwhile, DHOS’s flurry of governmental action was entirely in keeping with a spill whose scope and scale had compelled many to perceive that only the FG could contend with it; but in 1969 Santa Barbara, government
officials saw that because the spill was neither killing people nor destroying infrastructure, the FG need not step in (OSIC 1969-73). Likewise, the amount of physical and livelihood damage wreaked by Deepwater Horizon made it a natural lightning rod for parties seeking restitution and compensation, which SBOS’s scant destruction could not. And finally, while the amount of legislative action in the wake of SBOS is somewhat surprising, considering the relatively small number of top-down outcomes it produced compared to DHOS, most of it sought either to prevent another oil spill or to goad the FG into taking a more active role in environmental protection (as per the will of several FSs), unlike Deepwater Horizon’s cavalcade of top-down actions (sans legislation), which was of an immediate and/or retributinal nature, intended to provide quick-fixes and to make the responsible parties pay.

a. In actual fact, a class-action lawsuit was launched at UO by various aggrieved parties in Santa Barbara; however, no references to this lawsuit were framed as a crisis, disaster, and/or catastrophe, explaining its absence from the results and this thesis.

179 Sierra Club considered the lack of public participation in matters such as leasing decisions to be one of the prime causal factors contributing to SBOS (OSIC 1969-73).

180 Since communities, like Santa Barbara, bear the brunt of any oil production-related CDC, Sierra Club believed the public ought to have a voice about where and how oil development should proceed in the Channel, or if it should at all. Although the NGO achieved its ultimate aim in the end, it appears it did not obtain its stated one: the all but total cessation of (new) oil development in the SBC was, for the most part, a top-down initiative with minimal public
input (though citizen influence likely played an important part in nudging politicians towards supporting at least some of the moratoria).

Interestingly, in spite of Sierra Club being a national environmental group, their action crisis frame is decidedly NIMBY in scope, failing to take into account offshore development elsewhere in the country; this contrasts sharply with the largely national perspective they would take during DHOS 40 years later. What is more, despite being an environmental organization, the reason/justification underlying the NGO’s crisis frame is not explicitly environmental (i.e., to benefit the General Environment)—a trend that runs not only throughout many of the organization’s SBOS CDC framings, but also its future DHOS ones, as well. Unfortunately, the nature of my results cannot explain their crisis frame’s lack of explicit environmental reference; however, it seems that in this case, Sierra Club was betting that public participation would lead to the downfall of oil production in the SBC, thus achieving environmental protection as a co-benefit.

The first of these factors is that the crisis frame came from Mr. Obama, a president (at the time) not yet two years into his first term (and still riding high on the popularity and good will that swept him into Office), who took an immediate interest in the situation (in contrast with President Bush’s tardy handling of Hurricane Katrina); the other FSs lacked this cachet. Second, of all the action crisis frames the FSs put forth (correlative or not), his is the only one that specifies both a cause and a remedy: DHOS was caused by a broken OCS management system, and could be fixed by overhauling it. The other FSs speak in broad generalizations (for example, ending oil dependence; holding BP responsible) or are vague about cause or cure (for example, the President should focus only on stopping the spill; spill response will take years). Third, Mr. Obama’s action frame is the only one that can be
accomplished quickly, which conforms to the limited time aspect of the crisis concept; solutions such as ending America’s addiction to oil, cleaning up the spill, or even suing BP, Halliburton, and Transocean for damages can take years (and have, and are). And finally, his frame is possibly the only feasible one: cleaning up after the spill or converting the nation’s economy to clean energy may be impossible, and defeating the OI in the courts cannot be assured.

Meanwhile, there is less an absence of correlation between both OPA’s and the President’s frame and outcome terminuses as there is an incompleteness; in other words, their frames only explain or predict some of the things that the actual outcomes would (eventually) fulfill. For example, while Mr. Obama vowed to exact financial compensation from BP and the other responsible parties, accomplishing that goal also resulted in enforcing corporate accountability; and in the case of both the President and OPA, the financial compensation did/will (or was/is intended to) benefit the general environment by facilitating coastal recovery, not only from the effects of DHOS, but the decades of wetland deterioration jeopardizing people’s livelihoods and lives.

Finally, there does not appear to be a pattern amongst DHOS’s clutch of indeterminate action crisis frames (beyond a lack of information linking frame and outcome), but a very clear one does course through the non-correlates (see Appendix H). While two of the indeterminates are top-down in orientation (President, ACS 14; Science, ACS 20), two others are unspecified (President, ASCs 15 and 18), and one implies a potpourri of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up (Scientists, ACS 21); and while all five revolve around response, the specifics are all over the map, ranging from explaining what is happening in the moment to making promises about what should be done in or for the future, and from
identifying what is derailing response to suggesting what can enhance it. On the other hand, two of the three non-correlates—Sierra Club, ACS 11 and SoI Salazar, ACS 22—have unspecified origins (the third—REAs, ACS 11—cites the FG, i.e., top-down). But where the pattern emerges most unambiguously is with the single outcome all three FS advocated for: ending America’s dependence on oil.

The indeterminates’ lack of pattern can ultimately be chalked up to the absence of hard, non-partisan information to conduct a proper comparison. But the data suggests there could be another possibility: for the most part, the action frames do not conform to the crisis concept. Crisis implies a sense of immediacy and that something can still be done to either stop the occasion or at least prevent it from doing further damage; virtually everything the FSs put forth, however, could not be accomplished immediately (if at all) and assumed that the battle was already lost, that it was time to repair the damage (which corresponds with disaster). In other words, the inability to determine any degree of correlation might be the result of the FSs not crisis-framing their desired action according to what is ‘required’ for a crisis to mean crisis, and therefore more effectively propel its message.

If this is the case, then, the non-correlations for REAs’, Sierra Club’s, and SoI Salazar’s end-oil, begin-CE make even more sense. From a logical point-of-view, the reason why their action frames did not correlate with any of the outcomes was because what they demanded was too radical, too costly, and too economically, politically, and socially disruptive to even attempt, especially as a response to DHOS, in particular, and for the sake of preventing future oil spills, in general. From a more narrow framing perspective, their solution did not fit within the crisis concept paradigm; if it belonged to anything, it was to catastrophe. All three FSs took it for granted that their audience understood why oil
dependence is a crisis—that it can even be perceived as a crisis—and therefore did not explain why it is one; and none of them did an adequate job of linking an oil spill (an infrequent occasion) with oil dependence (a ubiquitous fact-of-life).

GOO! and Senator Cranston offered the third largest number of action disaster frames, at three apiece (with the grassroots NGO achieving two correlates and a non-correlation, and Mr. Cranston the exact opposite). Scientists produced the fourth most, attaining one correlate and a single half-correlation. Governor Reagan, President Nixon, Sol Hickel, and Mr. Murphy put forth only one action frame each, earning a correlate, a non-correlation, a half-correlate, and a non-correlation, respectively.

Improved/Updated Offshore Regulations (S5), GOO! Collects 100,000 Signatures In Favour of Removing Oil Development from SBC (S11), and Other Outcomes (S12) all came third, each earning two hits each. NEPA (S1) and Unofficial Quasi-Moratorium in CA Waters (S6) achieved only one (half-)correlation each.

Because, as implied by the disaster sensitizing concept, the SBOS 'genie' has already escaped from the bottle and cannot be put back; the only thing that can be done is to clean up after it and try to make sure that another does not happen.

From an outcome point of view, the preponderance of top-down action may be connected to the fact that a) two of them involved shutting down state offshore operations and reviewing how they work (despite state waters having never suffered an oil spill), and b) they were averred by CA actors as already happening (i.e., the suspension and review occurred shortly after SBOS began). (The third top-down correlate is also a present-tense action—GOO! sounding the alarm that Sol Hickel is resuming oil drilling in SBC in spite of his own admission that oil development in the SBC was a mistake.) These points, in turn, suggest that
the government of CA was far less encumbered by the OI's "weight of tradition" than its federal counterpart (OSIC 1969-73)—which is interesting, since offshore oil production began in California (see Chapter 1.1).

189 In addition to its Oil Specific component, Scientists included a General Environment one to their action disaster frame, which manifested in the correlating outcome.

190 What is more, the environmental damage the spill caused was unknown and/or contentious, as was its extent (both spatially and temporally), and therefore would have made a problematic justification for action; and two, SBOS had already wreaked its environmental damage—nobody could stop what it had done—but people could prevent future spills from happening by invoking the spectre of the Santa Barbara disaster.

191 Depending on how one looks at (frames) it, the non-correlates either outnumber the correlates and half-correlates, separately, by half, or are equal to the combined total of the correlates and half-correlates.

192 The sole hold-out—whether or not SoI Hickel did "review [the] fundamental issues" about the continuing SBOS (OSIC 1969-73), as Sierra Club demanded—can never be settled because it ultimately rests on opinion: according to Mr. Hickel, he did, as evidenced by his enacting new rules and regulations governing offshore oil production; however, according to Sierra Club, he did not because the public was not called to participate in leasing and development decisions, and because he permitted drilling to resume in the SBC despite the uncertainties of geology and technology (OSIC 1969-73).

193 To be specific, five frames (by Sierra Club, Senator Cranston, and Senator Murphy) sought to prevent future spills, and three (by GOO!, OPA, and Senator Cranston) to end oil production in the SBC. The remaining four frames are divvied out as follows: two wanted the
President to declare Santa Barbara a disaster area (OPA and President Nixon), one predicted that Sol Hickel’s decision to resume drilling the Channel would cause another SBOS (Sierra Club), and one demanded that the OI confront the possibilities of oil spills and make the appropriate contingency plans (State Actors).

Three of Sierra Club’s four non-correlations, alone, argued for the initiation of various strategies to thwart another SBOS, accounting for the NGO’s lack of ‘success.’

And for its single indeterminate.

Three of the remaining four frame origins also contend that top-down actors should be responsible for implementing the action, but in conjunction with either middle-outwards actors (Senator Murphy) or bottom-up ones (GOO! and one of Sierra Club’s); the final one did not specify who should conduct the action. Two of the remaining five frame terminuses argued that their action could be both Oil Specific and beneficial to the General Environment (OPA and Sierra Club); one would spare Santa Barbara’s economy further distress (OPA); one would boost response (President Nixon); and one would contribute to greater public participation in natural resource decision-making (Sierra Club).

In other words, FSs viewed who should take action in SBOS's wake from a dichotomous perspective: either the government or the OI does something, or the people do. It occurred to (almost) nobody that something could or should be done by those in the middle. This binary view of things remained true from frame to outcome, as all the outcomes either targeted oil production/spills, or the environment.

‘Indeterminate-non-correlate’ means that the comparison between frame and outcomes resulted in a mixture of the two statuses, making categorization as one or the other both difficult and potentially inaccurate; in addition, this category surmises that whatever doubt
(indeterminate) may exist will likely tend towards the negative (non-correlation). For example, REAs argue that in order for offshore production to be made safe (again), a) the entire region must be included, b) RCACs should be created, and c) local communities must have input into the full ecosystem damages assessments. The outcomes, however, indicate that despite the (nascent) establishment of a GoM RCAC, the entire region will not be included due to the refusal of the OI to participate or to allow the region/communities access to its decision-making conclaves; meanwhile, it is unknown if a) full ecosystem damages assessments have been made and/or b) local communities have had any input into them (though it seems unlikely).

199 And lastly, Sierra Club acquired two indeterminates. It did not earn any half-correlates.

200 On the other hand, OPA scored a correlate and a half-correlation, and suffered only one non-correlate.

201 The two other fourth-place FSs, at five action disaster frames each, are Government Reports (with a correlation, a half-correlate, two indeterminates, and a non-correlation) and President Obama (two correlates, two indeterminates, and a non-correlation). Governor Jindal takes sixth-place with four action frames (three indeterminates and a non-correlate); Audubon, Sol Salazar, and Senator Vitter all share seventh with three each (a correlate and two indeterminates; a correlation, a half-correlate, and an indeterminate; and two half-correlates and an indeterminate, respectively); and BP/Halliburton/Transocean and State Actors come last with only one frame a piece (a correlate and an indeterminate, respectively). Scientists did not put forth any action disaster frames.
Six of these correlations—and three of the half-correlates—refer only to a D12; the other four—and the remaining half—refer to D12 in addition to at least one other outcome (for example: Government Reports ADS 50's correlation encompasses D8 and D12).

One of these correlations—and two of the half-correlates—refers only to D1; the other three—and the remaining half—one—refer to D1 in addition to at least one other outcome.

All three of these correlations—and the one half-correlate—always refer to D7 in combination with at least one other outcome; one of these is always D1. D12 joins all three correlates, and D10 and D11 is associated with the half-correlation.

The 10 are: ADS 44 (Audubon); ADS 59 (REAs); ADS 60 (BPHT); ADS 62 (OPA); ADS 70 (President); ADS 47 (President; Sierra Club); ADS 5 (Sierra Club); ADS 73 (Sierra Club); ADS 83 (Senator Landrieu) (see Appendix H).

The two with correlations between frame and outcome origins, but not terminuses, are ADS 50 (Government Reports) and ADS 16 (Sierra Club) (see Appendix H).

As a consequence, the majority of the full-correlate frame origins refer to things that only the FG, the OI, or both can provide in quantities commiserate with the spill's enormity: money, resources, and the reassertion of general calm and reasonableness. What is more, even though Audubon put forth a bottom-up origin, their reasoning is likewise provoked by the magnitude of the spill: their mention of (the thousands of) ordinary people coming out to help with the spill (Saville 2010) signified the not uncommon perception that not even the combined might of the FG and OI could respond to something so titanic in extent. The fact that each of these origins manifested correlating outcomes seemed to indicate that the government and the oil industry agreed with the assessment that only they could do something. This agreement, however, may also reflect the fact that DHOS's enormity made it
impossible for either the FG or the OI (specifically, BP) to 'wiggle' their way out of accepting responsibility; while Union Oil and the 1969 FG could deny that SBOS was a disaster, and deflect much of the material responsibility for it, due to the spill’s brief, small, and circumscribed dimensions, neither BP nor the 2010 FG could do likewise in the face of 86 days and five million barrels of oil poured into the GoM.\textsuperscript{b}

a. President Obama, Sierra Club, and even BP, itself, argue that BP should and will pay for any and all aspects of the DHOS response; REAs point out that only the government and industry have the resources to tackle a spill of Deepwater Horizon’s enormity; and Senator Landrieu (2010) calls for a calm and measured reaction so that the “right lesson” is reached and the “wisest decisions” made. Furthermore, OPA highlights that government and industry are working together to bring the spill to a satisfactory end; Mr. Obama demands assurances that another spill cannot happen before BP, or any oil company, is allowed to drill in the GoM again; and Sierra Club wants the President to enact a blanket moratorium across all of the US’s coasts because DHOS proves that oil production is dirty, dangerous, and deadly. Only Sierra Club’s contention that OI influence continues to be strong and felt in all corners of government does not match the FG/OI-taking responsibility bandwagon.

b. Though according to REAs, BP attempted to do so anyway by blocking independent monitoring of the response and forcing responders to sign non-disclosure agreements to prevent them from disseminating any information about the long-term impacts of the oil (Sarthou 2010; Viles 2010, b).
These two outcomes, _guarantee_ and _response_, are not capitalized because a) they are not a part of the list of DHOS's actual outcomes, but instead are associated with _Various Outcomes_, and b) I wished to distinguish them from the basic disaster topics of the same names.

The closest things to discrepancies are a) the poor showing for _CA-E/FC-GE_, which has a more robust presence in the actual outcomes, and b) the number of _Various Outcomes_, explainable by it representing a potpourri of different and varied aims/conclusions, as opposed to the unitary ones of the others.

The only full-correlations to escape any association with D12 are a) BP's commitment to pay all (legitimate) claims (D1) and b) Sierra Club calling on the President to enact a moratorium on all offshore drilling along American shores (D2, D4).

Common sense would seem to dictate that such responses are a given, and that action disaster-framing would be better spent on either _details_ (i.e., _what_ are ordinary people actually doing that formal organizations cannot? _How_ should the FG and the OI use their vast pools of resources to best deal with DHOS? _How_ can the government-industry interface be improved?) and/or advocating for more exotic action, like converting the Nation to a CE economy (e.g., Brune 2010e, f, q, t, u, hh, ll; Kordick 2010; Manuel 2010c; Pope 2010). On the one hand, perhaps these FSs realized that the only action frames that had a chance of being carried out _were_ such elementary ones; anything more ambitious was doomed to failure, as the CE economy and even the fully supported GoM RCAC ones proved. Another possibility is that such concord really _is_ remarkable due to the sociopolitical climate of the previous decade, where unity had previously only been achieved through fear (of terrorists), and where the still recent election-cycle had exposed bitter divides.
211 As of the 14th of January, 2014.

212 The three remaining D12 full-correlates are Mr. Obama demanding that BP and the OI provide guarantees that another spill will not happen as a condition of being allowed back into the GoM; Sierra Club warning that OI influence continues to infiltrate government; and Ms. Landrieu calling for a calm reaction to DHOS, to ensure that the right lessons are learned and the best decisions are made.

213 The four complete half-correlates are ADS 80 (Sol Salazar); ADS 82 (Mr. Salazar); ADS 47 (Senator Landrieu); and ADS 85 (Ms. Landrieu).

The three frame and outcome origins are ADS 47 (Government Reports); ADS 52 (Senator Vitter); and ADS 87 (Mr. Vitter).

The single frame and outcome terminus half-correlate is ADS 16 (OPA).

214 I.e., the scope and scale of the spill provoked FSs to perceive that only upper-echelon actors could do something, thus impacting their frames; this same enormity probably goaded the FG and the OI to act (with a degree of concertedness that might have been lacking had Deepwater Horizon been smaller and more circumscribed, like SBOS), resulting in the top-down initiation of many of the actual outcomes.

215 Five of the 12 actual outcomes are Oil Specific.

216 As noted in Appendix B, Sol Salazar had (continues to have?) strong ties to the mining industry, especially in his native Colorado; and although he is purportedly in favour of converting the nation to a CE economy (Salazar 2010p), as the head of the Interior Department, he was in charge of making sure that a significant source of federal dollars ran smoothly. Also as noted in Appendix B, Senator Landrieu is among the most conservative
Democrats in the Senate, and is a staunch supporter of oil production because of its importance to Louisiana’s economy and America’s energy security (Landrieu 2010m).

One other way that DHOS’s quartet of full half-correlates is unlike SBOS’s revolves around why the 2010 frames manifested only half-correlations with the actual outcomes: not because certain actions the FSs wanted did not come to pass, but because it is unknown whether or not they did, have, or will do so. Although the DoI has apparently done everything Sol Salazar said or vowed would be done (see Table 4 – Sol, ADS 80)—and in some respects, more, i.e., reforming MMS—it is unknown if any of these actions have truly made offshore production safer, or if the Interior Department really is helping to restore and protect what the spill damaged. While DHOS did receive a massive response, it is unknown if Mr. Salazar’s “cautious approach” (2010g) strategy to guide safety and oversight was and/or continues to be utilized. And even though BP has paid billions in compensation and damages—and will pay billions more—it is unknown if any of this money is going towards psychological rehabilitation, or if local know-how was and continues to be used in the post-spill phase, as Senator Landrieu wanted. These unknowns owe their existence largely to the paucity of data that would otherwise verify what has or has not happened, and to what degree. At the present time, obtaining such information is a) beyond the parameters of this thesis, b) does not exist in published, or reasonably locatable, form, or c) does not exist at all on account that it has yet to be created. What are available are partisan claims. While Mr. Salazar and Ms. Landrieu may say that safety has improved, that the DoI is repairing and protecting the Gulf, that the “cautious approach” is being used, and that balance has been struck between precautions and economics, their lack of impartiality renders their ‘facts’ frames.
a. During the actual spill, BP hired local fishing boats, idled by the federal fishing closures, for various tasks related to the response.

b. Senator Landrieu’s call for a balance between the need to improve safety and the OI’s importance to Louisiana’s economy, and the nation’s energy security, is a peculiar full half-correlate because although Ms. Landrieu has seemingly gotten what she wanted—the BOEMs instituted a new safety regimen, and drilling continues as always in the GoM—(and therefore should be a full correlate), she never defined ‘balance,’ nor suggested what such should/would look like; this absence caused me to classify it as a half-correlate.

Like Senator Landrieu’s full half-correlate (see Chapter 5 Endnote 79b), Senator Vitter’s (2010f) demand that environmentalists need to be “educate[d]...to make sure that facts dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas” is strange in that although it appears to have happened—evidenced by the fact that oil production in the Gulf continues apace—he neglected to identify a reason for his mandate, leaving the reader to infer (albeit, probably correctly) that it is because he does not want environmentalists in any way interfering with the continuance and expansion of oil development in the Gulf. What is more, he leaves vague who should be doing the “educat[ing],” though again, the implication is an upper-echelon actor of some sort, likely one who is in favour of economic growth. Consequently, I categorized this action disaster frame as a half-correlate on the basis that although environmentalists probably did not receive an “educat[ion],” a top-down actor (i.e., the BOEMs) did ensure that the “facts dominate[d]” in the sense that oil continues to be pumped out of the GoM.
An additional explanation may lie with the fact that both FS’s enumerated a long list of recommendations and/or demands; the lack of succinctness and priority perhaps doomed some (most?) to failure. In both cases, the only aspects of their ‘laundry lists’ to manifest correlations with the actual outcomes are those pertaining to Economic/Financial Compensation.

Other action frames receiving no correlations include, but are not limited, to the following: demanding the OI to fundamentally change how they operate vis-à-vis safety, environmental practices, clean up preparation, and management behaviour, and to fundamentally reform the OCS system (Government Reports – ADS 17); calling on the FG to stop assigning blame (BP’s continuing legal battles in regard to the CWA belie this) and creating bureaucracies (MMS was dismantled and reformed into the three BOEMs) (OPA – ADS 52); and advocating for response capabilities to be set up before drilling can resume (REAs – ADS 57).

The problem appears to be two-fold. First, actions—such as acquiring the maximum amount of money out of BP, commencing with coastal restoration, and ascertaining if replacing the MMS with the BOEMs will increase safety—are taking, and will take, more than three years to play out; and second, what information exists testifying to how a certain action has improved things or made them worse is far too partisan for this thesis to use as a means of determining a correlation between CDC frame and actual outcome. For example, while the RESTORE Act dictates that at least 80% of BP’s (eventual) civil Clean Water Act violation fines are to be used for coastal restoration, it is unknown how much of this money will be used for that purpose. The potential (anticipated?) problems include the following: a) each Gulf State has full discretionary power over how to use the money, and—as Sierra Club
points out—all five are Republican-controlled (SC 2010), and b) despite pro-restoration rhetoric from Senators Landrieu and Vitter (Landrieu 2010; Vitter 2011), it is not known if any or all of the money will be used for its intended purpose. Also, although the environment of the Gulf has not been completely cleansed of oil, it is unknown if every effected industry (fishing and tourism, especially) are operating at 100%. And finally, it is unknown if the thorough investigation DHOS received (by the National Commission on the spill) will prevent future spills.

Of the ‘leftover’ indeterminates/non-correlates, five advocated for a coalition of top-down, middle-outwards, and bottom-up actions to remedy the effects of the spill; one cut out the middle-man by suggesting that top-down and bottom-up act; and four neglected, declined, or otherwise did not state who or what should take active responsibility.

From the pool of 34 indeterminates and non-correlates, eight are Oil Specific; five are Economic/Financial Compensation; four are clean energy-only; three are economic and General Environment, respectively; and two are response. The rest—response/General Environment, Oil Specific/General Environment, response/moratorium, public participation, Oil Specific/clean energy, Economic/Financial Compensation-Corporate Accountability, money, bureaucracy, and seafood—are referenced only once. (Note: the non-capitalized actual outcomes refer to ones under the Other outcomes heading)

The (unsuccessful) Santa Barbara FSs wanted preventative measures more robust than mere regulations (for example, public participation in natural resource harvesting decisions) and/or called for the complete removal of all oil development from the SBC; Deepwater Horizon’s called for the end to the nation’s addiction to oil and for the construction of a CE
economy, pushed for better response capabilities, and/or demanded compensation for fishers and tourism operators.

DHOS's recognition of plurality is strengthened by the fact that every one of its actual outcomes had at least one (half-)correlation, in contrast to SBOS, where only six of its actual outcomes demonstrated any variety of correlates.

Although the amount of damage to human infrastructure was scant, and that to the ecological environment for the most part unknown—albeit perceived by several as transitory—photographs of bright beaches enveloped, and birds drowning, in thick layers of black, crude oil helped paint a picture of complete devastation (OSIC 1969-73).

Perhaps the only surprising thing about this correlated action frame is that it was put forth by Mr. Murphy, the Republican US senator for CA; but this is only so if seen with a contemporary political outlook. In the past 40 years, the Republican Party has changed considerably in its ideological stance, or to be more precise, in how zealously it holds to it: it has gone from being a party with a conservative outlook on oil (i.e., oil production makes a positive contribution to the Nation) to a fundamentalist one (i.e., oil production is a God-given right, and anybody who tries to interfere is un-American). On the other hand, it was probably not Mr. Murphy’s intention that all new oil development in SBC, and along the entire coast of CA, come to an end (as is what happened), but rather to provide the endeavour with a much-needed updating, as per Mr. Hickel’s intention. As a consequence, while Mr. Murphy got his wish for Improved/Updated Offshore Regulations (S5), they were soon superseded by the first in a chain of successive moratoriums that would help keep the SBC, and the entire CA coastline, virtually free from oil spills.
State Actors said/implied the same thing during a couple of their action-oriented disaster frames.

In 1976, however, CA citizens would get a say in how their coast was managed via the California Coastal Act, which in turn led to the California Coastal Commission; but there appears to be no connection between its creation and SBOS. Following the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, federal and state governments, the OI, and the Alaskan people (native and non-native) would participate in RCACs to help determine how best to utilize the state’s natural resources. And presently, Gulf Coast environmental organizations and others are attempting to get their own version of a RCAC off the ground, but unfortunately, government involvement (federal or state) appears negligible (despite the National Commission’s recommendation), and the OI has outright refused to participate, citing the sufficiency of other industry-public forums (Bullock 2013).

Just as certain 1969 FSs established at the outset that the ‘official’ cause of SBOS was a lack of rules and regulations, so, too, did 2010 FSs quickly ascertain that the ‘official’ instigating agent behind DHOS was the MMS’s failure to do its job. Therefore, the only actor(s) who could do something about offshore oil’s primary governing agency was the FG, to which the MMS was nominally answerable. However, whereas OPA only sought an agency-wide review, the DoI ended up reforming it to such an extent that the MMS ceased to exist, becoming the three BOEMs; regardless, whatever General Environment co-benefits may result from this reformulation, they are tertiary to the supreme goals of increasing safety and installing stronger governance over OCS activities to ensure its continuance into the foreseeable future.
The FG had already bailed out financial firms and portions of the automotive industry, so several OPA considered it even more appropriate that it provide compensation to the 185,000 fishers of the Gulf—"America’s working coast" (Landrieu 2010aa)—who contribute $700 billion a year to the national economy; and until the fishing grounds were eventually reopened, and the commercial fish stocks were found to be uncontaminated, giving money was the only thing that could be done to alleviate their distress. However, while the fishers did receive compensation (from the $20 billion escrow account President Obama compelled BP to set up), there were questions about the sufficiency of the pay-outs; and it cannot be determined if the influx of cash restored their faith (in what? OPA does not specify).

More broadly, the actual outcome is consistent with the relative poverty of General Environment initiatives in the wake of DHOS, and the abundance of those that were Oil Specific, implying that like SBOS, it was perceived from a mostly oil-centric point-of-view, rather than as something threatening the environment and/or awakening people to the plight of the environment. The difference, however, is that before too long, SBOS became primarily remembered not for the actions attempted to curb oil spills, but for the environmental awareness it helped foster in people; it is unlikely, however, that the same legacy will radiate from DHOS. The uptick in environmental consciousness had been building for a decade before SBOS, and within three years of it, the signs of the environmental renaissance were already in full-force (Earth Day, environmental sciences departments at several universities, the Oil Shocks alerting people to the need to conserve resources); with the economic recession at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century came a retraction in environmental initiative, and three years after DHOS, there does not appear to be any great outpouring of environmental awareness.
Mr. Vitter's invocation of *everybody* having a role/responsibility for repairing Louisiana's fishing industry was also highly unusual; the only other times DHOS CDC frames called on (or implied that) all levels must/should do something as a consequence of the spill were to argue for a) breaking the nation's addiction to oil and b) building a CE economy. Just as those actions failed, so did Mr. Vitter's, suggesting that during *Deepwater Horizon* arguing for societal action guaranteed that it would not happen. On the other hand, if either the indeterminate or non-correlate had achieved some degree of correlation, then their terminuses would have been folded into *Other Outcomes*, which was the spill's number one actual outcome.

Chapter 6 Endnotes

In part, this expectation/assumption was fed by a) the legacy of SBOS, which paints the spill and its aftermath as a watershed moment in the development of broad environmental awareness (implying that the spill was described/framed with environmental words and images) and b) the media coverage of the DHOS while it was happening, which focused on BP's and the FG's inability to stop the well, the economic fallout upon fishers, and the environmental toll.

There are two major caveats to this conclusion, however. The first is that the basic topics do not lend themselves exclusively to any one potential pattern: one could spend endless hours arranging and rearranging the topics into one series of groups or another, and struggling over whether topics should belong to only one pattern or be permitted to straddle two or more. What is more, trying to find patterns a) contributes little to nothing towards answering either of my two research questions and b) does a disservice to the *actual* frames—the *actual* meanings—summarized by the topics; what is gained in
(over?)simplification and (possible) empiricism is lost in terms of nuance and the peculiar
CDC-view(s) put forth by the individual FSs. The second caveat is that the basic CDC topics
were not designed so they could be slotted into patterns, but merely to condense the
otherwise unwieldy number of generalized CDC frames into a much more compact form to
demonstrate at a glance the surprising number and diversity of meanings the various FSs
attached to CDCs during SBOS and DHOS.

236 My definition of focusing events should not be confused with Birkland’s (1997), which
has a more formal and (governmentally) procedural slant to it; I merely appropriated and
redefined his term for the sake of convenience.

237 This does not mean, however, that every participating FS CDC-framed the spills in terms
of Response and Economic; in fact, several/most did not. The result seeks only to point out
that those two topics are the only ones that each of the CDC terms/concepts from both spills
had in common, regardless of how many FSs contributed to them.

238 Again, this is not to imply that all the SBOS FSs contributed to this meaning; as many as
half did not. The result/answer only contends that the topics contributing to it were shared by
all three CDCs.

239 See Chapter 6 Endnote 239.

240 Although the DHOS answer points out that the spill was an environmental calamity, the
overwhelming weight of the consensus favours systemic management, economic distress, and
financial restitution.

241 This despite the fact that the reverberations of SBOS ended up touching both the entirety
of the US and the whole world in the form of enhanced environmental awareness,
culminating in the 1970s becoming the ‘decade of the environment;’ and despite the fact that
DHOS brought (some) attention to the dangers and possible consequences of the international push to seek oil in ever more inaccessible and risky places, such as in waters exceeding 305 metres, and in the Arctic.

242 The broader, multi-spill consensus topic CDC frame (that the spills require response because of the economic damages they are causing) only accentuates this phenomenon, which essentially says that the spills are economically onerous, send (federal) help.

243 The mostly likely explanation for why the (participating) FSs framed the spills this way is probably to reign in any potential alterations or changes to BAU that might result. The focus on economics can help ensure that, for example, the environmental aspects of the oil spills do not become dominant—which could lead to onerous regulations on industries whose profits depend on ecological exploitation—while the stress on local consequences can distract people from considering the broader implications of the spills, such as America’s economic, political, and social dependence on oil, and possibly doing something about them. In the end, despite the passage of 40 years, it appears that the meaning underlying the CDC framing of offshore oil spills has remained unchanged: response for the sake of mitigating economic harm.

244 The remaining differences between the two topic CDC frames, meanwhile, are relatively minor: SBOS points out that the spill has yet to be stopped, while DHOS notes that the calamity is environmental (this nod to the ecological, however, is to its instrumental value—as signified by subsequent references to fishing, tourism, and oil production—as opposed to its intrinsic value); in addition, DHOS specifies the need for financial restitution.

245 This can be problematic in today’s climate where duplication and triplication are required to convince people of the veracity of something. Rightly or wrongly, there is a notion that
social science should follow the lead of the physical sciences and produce data, results, and conclusions that can be independently verified down to last decimal place; the rationale is that doing so validates the knowledge, empiricizes it, and makes it more authoritative.

And some cursory evidence, by way of conducting a search using Academic Search Premier, appears to confirm that this is/has been happening. Confining my search to English-language periodicals published between July 2013 and January 2014, the search terms ‘crisis’ and ‘climate change’ brought back only one result (using ‘title’ as a field; ‘subject’ retrieved no results); those of ‘disaster’ and ‘climate change’ resulted in four (via ‘title;’ ‘subject’ brought back one); and ‘catastrophe’ and ‘climate change’ retrieved just one (via ‘title;’ ‘subject’ came up zero). Meanwhile, a search matching each of the CDCs with ‘biodiversity loss’ all came back zero (regardless of ‘title’ or ‘subject’). And querying each CDC with ‘population growth’ also resulted in nothing. Google Scholar, on the other hand, produced more positive results: confining the search to works published since the beginning of 2013 (and excluding patents and citations), the terms ‘crisis,’ ‘disaster,’ and ‘catastrophe’ added to ‘climate change’ came back with 18,500, 11,900, and 6770 hits, respectively; matching them with ‘biodiversity loss’ resulted in 1460, 892, and 691, respectively; and querying them with ‘population growth’ retrieved 8190, 4090, and 3120, respectively. However, in comparison to what each CDC word individually came back with (see Chapter 2 Endnotes 37, 38, and 39; 58, 59, and 60; and 77, 78, and 79), these represent only a fraction; what is more, there is some doubt as to whether all of the results really are conjoining the CDC with the AGET. The general media, meanwhile, appears to be also downplaying the association between AGETs and CDCs. Utilizing LexisNexis, a search of the past six months’ worth of newspapers came back with only 35 results for ‘crisis’ and ‘climate change,’ 69 for ‘disaster’
and ‘climate change,’ and 10 for ‘catastrophe’ and ‘climate change;' no hits were returned for each of the CDCs and ‘biodiversity loss;’ and ‘crisis’ and ‘population growth’ and ‘disaster’ and ‘population growth’ came back with four results and one, respectively, while ‘catastrophe’ and ‘population growth’ retrieved nothing. (All three database searches were conducted on the 20th of January, 2014).

247 The economy of the Gulf Coast—and Louisiana, in particular—is dependent on oil development; all five Gulf states have Republican governors, and most have Republican congressmen and senators in Washington, DC; and (as Chapter 1.2.1 pointed out), oil production has been a social fact-of-life in the GoM since the 1930s/1940s.
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Appendix A – Sample of Raw Data

The following are samples of raw data from SBOS and DHOS. The sample does not represent original sources, but transcriptions/cut-and-pastes from those sources into Word files; the reason I did not include samples of the original documents is simply because of the difficulty and cost of reproducing photographic data. The text, on the other hand, is original; the only alterations I have made to it is to a) remove irrelevant surrounding data and b) provide citation information.

SBOS Raw Data Transcribed – Crisis, Audubon

- “Santa Barbara’s oil disaster has pated up for the world the fact that our techno can get us into serious trouble—trouble we can hardly repair.”
  o Dr. Elvis Stahr, president of the Nat’l Audubon Society, in response to touring the SB’s beaches and expecting only a little bit of staining and not oil rolling up the beaches \textit{\textquoteleft Audubon Society President ‘Appalled’ by Pollution\textquoteright} SBNP 19/03/69
- “Santa Barbara’s voice has been heard more loudly than any voice of protest in years. The fact that this disaster was manmade gives it a special impact.”
  o Dr. Elvis Stahr, president of the Nat’l Audubon Society, talking about how FG people are gaining increased awareness of conservation issues b/c of the SBOS \textit{\textquoteleft Audubon Society President ‘Appalled’ by Pollution\textquoteright} SBNP 19/03/69

DHOS Raw Data Transcribed – Disaster, BP/Halliburton/Transocean

- “Although it is premature to reach definitive conclusions about what caused the April 20 explosion, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster. The most significant clue is that the events occurred after the well construction process was essentially finished.”
  o From Steve Newman, CEO Transocean, testimony, 3 Transocean Testimony - May 18 2010.
- “We are absolutely committed to a simple, fair claims process that gets funds to people who have been hurt by this disaster as quickly as possible,” said BP Chief Executive Tony Hayward. “We have opened claims offices across the region, and will make every effort to reach everyone who has a legitimate claim. And we will appoint an independent mediator so that we have as fair a process as possible for everyone in the Gulf region.”
  o From Hayward, Update On Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill Response, 26/05/10
- “our team is working side by side w/ others include BP and governmental agencies and these investigative efforts will con’t until we have satisfactory As. While it is still too early to know exactly what hap on Apr 20th, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster.”
  o From Steven L Newman, Transocean Ltd President and CEO before Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Strategy and Implications of the Deepwater Horizon Rig Explosion: Parts 1 and 2, Oversight Hearing before the Committee on Natural Resources US House of Rep, 111 Congress 26-27/05/10, Serial No. 111-54 http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html Or Committee address: http://resourcescommittee.house.gov
"While it is still too early to know exactly what happened on April 20, we do have some clues about the cause of the disaster. The most significant clue is that the events occurred after the well construction process was essentially finished."

- From Steve Newman, CEO Transocean, testimony, 5 Transocean Testimony - May 27 2010a.

- The explosion and sinking of the BP-operated Deepwater Horizon rig "never should have happened -- and I am deeply sorry that they did," he said in testimony to be delivered to a House panel Thursday. "My sadness has only grown as the disaster continues."

  - From Tony Hayward, at House Panel, “Gulf of Mexico oil spill left BP CEO Tony Hayward ‘personally devastated,’ he says” Times-Picayune, 16/06/10
Appendix B – Frame Sponsor Information

The following provides a brief description of each FS, separated into their 1969 and 2010 counterparts. The overviews provide a smattering of background, endeavouring to concentrate on their opinions and actions concerning oil development and/or environmental stewardship. Whenever possible, I attempted to acquire the information from ‘the horse’s mouth’ (for example, the websites of the actual actor).

Audubon (The National Audubon Society)

The National Audubon Society, named after naturalist and ornithologist, John James Audubon, was founded in the late 1880s (later incorporated in 1905), making it one of the oldest environmental organizations not only in the US, but the world (Audubon 2013). It is a non-profit organization that uses science and grassroots advocacy to educate people and conserve the environment, especially as it pertains to birdlife and habitat (Audubon 2013). Its stated mission is to “conserve and restore the natural ecosystems, focusing on birds, other wildlife, and their habitats for the benefit of humanity and earth’s biological diversity” (Audubon 2013). Based in New York City and Washington, DC, it has offices in 24 states; is affiliated with over 500 independent chapters; and owns and operates several nature centres and bird refuges (Audubon 2013).

Government Reports

When something extraordinary happens that impacts the national interest in some (usually negative) way, one of the standard reactive procedures undertaken by government is to order an official investigation, culminating with a report that assigns a cause, details the consequences, and suggests measures to prevent the occasion from ever happening again; both the Nixon and Obama Administrations followed this procedure, the Presidents commissioning investigations and receiving reports in the wakes of the SBOS and DHOS, respectively.

SBOS resulted in two reports. The first was The Oil Spill Problem, First Report of the President’s Panel on Oil Spills, published in 1969 and credited to the Executive Office of the
President, Office of Science and Technology. This report did not utilize any CDCs (and therefore was not included in this study). The second was *Offshore Mineral Resources: A Challenge and an Opportunity, Second Report of the President’s Panel on Oil Spills*, also published in 1969, and also credited to the Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology. The report focused on what could be done to prevent oil spills and improve offshore oil extraction in general; very little of its content pertained to SBOS or the SBC, specifically. These two reports were the only two contemporary SBOS reports I could find; both were less than 30 pages long.

DHOS also produced two (primary) reports. The first was entitled, *Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the President*, published in January of 2011 and credited to the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling. It is an exhaustive tome, basing its findings on everything from expert technical investigation to layman eyewitness testimony, and emphasizing causes, consequences, prevention, and safety improvements. The second is *America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill*, published in September of 2010 and credited to the United States Coast Guard (USCG). While thorough, it focuses more on what can be done to recover from DHOS on a societal-, cultural-, and environmental-level by examining what went wrong (and right) during the response. These two reports were the two highest-profile contemporary DHOS reports produced; both are multi-hundred page documents.

**Governors**

Ronald Reagan (R-Ca) was the 33rd Governor of the State of California, from 1967-1975, and was eventually elected the 40th President of the United States for two full terms (1980-1988). His first term as Governor (during which SBOS occurred) was notable for two things: his hard-line approach to war-protesters—in May 1969, he sent first the California Highway Patrol, then 2200 National Guardsmen to occupy Berkley for two weeks to quell protests (Cannon 2001)—and his environmental stewardship, in which he contributed 145,000 acres of land to the state park system, established the Air Resources Board to combat smog, and blocked the (federal) construction of dams along the Eel
and Feather Rivers (Hayward 2009). By the time he became President, however, his modest environmentalism had been all but subsumed by the economic policies for which he is most remembered today, whether in praise or condemnation, and these in turn impacted his Administration’s environmental policies. Although he continued with the phasing-out of leaded gasoline, and signed the Montreal Protocol, he or his cabinet appointees also denied that acid rain was a problem (paradoxically), slashed EPA budgets, and vetoed the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act (a decision later overturned by Congress) (Cannon 2009; Gristadmin 2004); perhaps his most pertinent act in regard to DHOS was appointing James Watt, a fierce advocate for corporate rights to exploit the environment, as Interior Secretary, and authorizing the creation of Minerals Management Service (MMS)—ostensibly to oversee and streamline how America harvested its mining assets, but became for all intents and purposes a rubber-stamp bureaucracy favouring the interests of the oil industry over those of environmentalists and local communities.

Bobby Jindal (R-La) has been the 55th Governor of the State of Louisiana since 2008, and is currently serving his second consecutive term as of the first quarter of 2014. He is a staunch political, economic, and social conservative; despite his support for offshore oil development, however, he opposes oil cartels (namely, OPEC, going so far as to vote in favour of its criminalization); signed an executive order to increase office recycling programmes, reduce waste, and promote paperlessness; offered tax credits to encourage hybrid vehicle-use; and increased Louisiana’s energy efficiency goals and standards (Jindal 2008; OnTheIssues 2008).

Non-national Environmental Groups

For SBOS, these is represented by GOO!, a grassroots organisation that spontaneously formed mere days after SBOS began with the primary objective of ending and removing all oil exploration and production from the SBC. They are still in operation to this day. Their mission has been, and is, to “protect the Santa Barbara Channel and coastline from all environmental, economic, and aesthetic encroachments by petroleum development” (Get Oil Out 2013).
DHOS is not represented by any single, premier environmental group—spontaneously formed in the wake of the spill or not—because the environmental situation along the Gulf has not produced one. Instead, Louisiana is the base of operations for a series of regional (i.e., Gulf Coast-concerned) groups. The ones used in this analysis are: the Gulf Restoration Network (GRN; the primary one), the Louisiana Bucket Brigade (LBB), and the Coastal Conservation Association (CCA).

GRN was formed in 1995 by representatives from the various conservation organizations operating throughout the GoM; it became an independent corporation in 1998 after receiving funding for this purpose from Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund (formerly the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund) (Gulf Restoration Network 2013). GRN is based in New Orleans, Louisiana. Its mission is to “unit[e] and empower[] people to protect and restore the natural resources of the Gulf Region” (Gulf Restoration Network 2013).

The LBB was formed in 2000 through a $50,000 gift from the Beldon Fund (Louisiana Bucket Brigade 2013). LBB specializes in helping so-called fenceline communities (people living near or next to dumps or places of industrial pollution), and was inspired by the people of the Niger Delta, Nigeria, and their efforts to stand up against industrial pollution (Louisiana Bucket Brigade 2013). It is an environmental health and justice organization, which “support[s] communities’ use of grassroots action to become informed, sustainable neighbourhoods free from industrial pollution (Louisiana Bucket Brigade 2013).

The CCA was formed in 1977 in the wake of the “drastic commercial overfishing along the Texas coast decimated redfish and speckled trout populations” by “14 concerned recreational anglers” (Coastal Conservation Association 2014). It has 206 chapters in 17 states, some as far away as New England and Washington State, and has an estimated membership of 100,000. Its stated purpose is “to advise and educate the public on conservation of marine resources” in order to fulfill its objective of “conserv[ing], promot[ing], and enhanc[ing] the present and future availability of those coastal resources for the benefit and enjoyment of the general public” (Coastal Conservation Association 2014).
Oil Companies

Union Oil, or the Union Oil Company of California (Unocal) was the sole owner and operator of Platform A in 1969 (the lease on the offshore tract was shared with half a dozen other oil companies); it was headquartered in El Segundo, California. It was founded in 1890, incorporated in 1919, and was fully absorbed by Chevron Corporation in 2005, becoming a mere subsidiary of the multinational (Wikipedia 2013). In addition to their culpability for the SBOS, they were also responsible for oil pipe leaks beneath Avila Beach, California from the 1950s to 1996, and the leaking of 18 million US gallons of dilutent under the Guadalupe-Nipomo Dunes and nearby oceanfront, from the mid-1950s to 1994—which Unocal tried to deny any involvement with, but records proved their knowledge and complicity (Wikipedia 2013). In 1969, Unocal was headed by Fred Hartley.

BP, formerly British Petroleum, is the owner of the lease that included the Macondo Prospect into which the Deepwater Horizon was drilling its exploratory well when it blew out. It is headquartered in London, England. It is the fifth largest company in the world (as of 2012) and the sixth largest oil and gas company (as of 2012) (Wikipedia 2013). It began life as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, a subsidiary of Burmah Oil Company, and was tasked with exploiting Iran’s oil deposits; in 1935, it became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company; and finally in 1954, British Petroleum (Wikipedia 2013). Between 1979 and 1987, it transitioned from state ownership to private (as part of PM Margaret Thatcher’s privatisation spree); after a merger with Amoco, it became BP Amoco, or just BP (Wikipedia 2013). BP’s egregious environmental record includes, but is not limited to: the 1967 Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill, the 2005 Texas Refinery Explosion, and the 2006 Prudhoe Bay (Alaska) pipeline spill (Wikipedia 2013). In 2010, BP’s CEO was Tony Hayward, who upon assuming his new position decided the company should focus on safety, not alternative energies (as had been the emphasis of the previous CEO) (Wikipedia 2013).

Halliburton is one of the world’s largest oilfield services companies, headquartered in Houston, Texas and Dubai, United Arab Emirates (Wikipedia 2013). It provided cement and cementing personnel for the Deepwater Horizon (Cavnar 2010; Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). It
operates in over 80 countries, employs over 100,000 people, and owns hundreds of subsidiaries, affiliates, and brands, several of which are not involved in petroleum mining (Wikipedia 2013). It was founded in 1919 by Erle Halliburton as the New Method Oil Well Cementing Company; by 1922, it had become the Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Company; finally becoming Halliburton in 1961 (Wikipedia 2013). It began foreign ventures in 1926 (Wikipedia 2013). Among its numerous controversies, two environmental ones include a very high Toxics Release Inventory score for a Harris County, Texas facility, and the creation of toxic cloud in Farmington, New Mexico that forced people to evacuate their homes (Wikipedia 2013).

Transocean, one of the world’s largest offshore drilling contractors, is headquartered in Venier, Switzerland (to minimize tax costs) (Wikipedia 2013). It was the owner and operator of the Deepwater Horizon exploratory drilling platform (C~ 2010; Freudenberg and Gramling 2011). It has offices in 20 countries, has a fleet of 135 offshore drilling units, and owns nearly 50% of the world’s deep water platforms (Wikipedia 2013). It began life in 1953 when Alabama-based Southern Natural Gas Company formed The Offshore Company to take advantage of the growing offshore presence in the GoM (Wikipedia 2013). It went public in 1967; became a full subsidiary in 1978; and changed to Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc. in 1982 (Wikipedia 2013). In 1996, it acquired Norwegian Transocean, which had begun life as a whaling company in the 1970s before transitioning into the oil business through a series of mergers to become Transocean Offshore, then eventually just Transocean by 2003 (Wikipedia 2013). It has been involved in several fatal accidents, including the 2003 Galveston Bay explosion and the 2007 Bourbon Dolphin/Transocean Rather accident; in 2011, it was involved in an offshore leak off the coast of Brazil (Wikipedia 2013).

Other Political Actors

For both SBOS and DHOS, OPA are any actors working for or in service of the federal government who are not the President, the Secretary of the Interior, or the US Senators of California (1969) or Louisiana (2010). They can include Administration officials, US Senators representing other states, and US Representatives of any state district.
Presidents

Richard Milhous Nixon was elected the 37th President of the United States in 1968, serving one and half consecutive terms; he oversaw the transition of the US from the socially turbulent 1960s to the environmentally conscious early 1970s, and managed to end the US’s involvement in what was then its longest war, Vietnam. SBOS was pretty much the first thing Mr. Nixon had to deal with upon assuming the Office of the President, occurring a week after he was inaugurated. Despite coming late to conservationism—it had not been even an issue in the 1968 election campaign—Mr. Nixon would nevertheless, in the years after SBOS, form the EPA; discuss environmental policy in his subsequent State of the Union Addresses; and support the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the National Environmental Policy Act (requiring environmental impact statements for federal projects) (Wikipedia 2013). In 1972, he vetoed the Clean Water Act of 1972, but only because of its excessive costs; subsequently, he settled for withholding money for any part of the Act that he found unjustifiable (Wikipedia 2013).

Mr. Obama was elected the 44th President of the United States in 2008, and is currently serving the second of his two consecutive terms as of the first quarter of 2014. He is attempting to guide the US out of the Great Recession, that began in 2007, instigated by two wars-paid-on-credit, a collapsed housing bubble, and rampant derivatives trading (itself largely caused by the breakdown of the separation between banking and finance), and is overseeing the US’s gradual withdraw from its longest war to date, Afghanistan. In addition, Mr. Obama is continuing to wage the so-called “war on terror;” eleven days after DHOS began—a couple of weeks before anybody realized just how serious the spill was—Faisal Shahzad attempted to car-bomb Times Square, New York City in retaliation for repeated US drone attacks in his birth-country of Pakistan (Wikipedia 2013). Mr. Obama has stated that the “issue of climate change is one that we ignore at our own peril” (Obama 2006; note: he made this statement before being elected President) and has pledged to cut US GHG emissions by 80% by 2050 via cap-and-trade (Wikipedia 2013). A mere month before DHOS erupted, however, he rescinded an executive order on, and unveiled plans for, new OCS oil development along the US’s
other three coasts—an order that had been in effect since 1990 (as a direct result of Exxon Valdez; it had been lifted by President George W. Bush in mid-2008, but could not gain traction against the at-the-time still extant Congressional ban, which expired a few months later), and was the only thing preventing expansion of offshore development outside the Gulf since the 1981 Congressional ban expired in September 2008 (Wikipedia 2013). To his credit, however, Mr. Obama reinstated the moratorium along the other three coasts in December 2010.

*Scientists*

For both SBOS and DHOS, scientists are individuals who hold a doctorate and/or are employed by an academic or governmental institution. These accredited experts are generally of the environmental sciences type, though this study contains a smattering of general biologists and chemists; there is also a historian. SBOS broke out virtually on UCSB’s doorstep, resulting in many of its faculty speaking out against not only the spill, but also the lack of consultancy during the clean up (OSIC 1969-73). During DHOS, scientists were heard during Committee and Sub-committee hearings, but otherwise suffered from tardy, or absent, funding.

*Sierra Club*

The Sierra Club is one of the oldest grassroots environmental organizations in the United States. It was founded in 1882, in San Francisco, California, by John Muir (Sierra Club 2013). It has hundreds of thousands of chapters across the nation (Sierra Club 2013). Its mission is “to explore, enjoy, and protect the wild places of the earth; to practice and promote the responsible use of the earth’s ecosystems and resources; to educate and enlist humanity to protect and restore the quality of the natural and human environment; and to use all lawful means to carry out these objectives” (Sierra Club 2013). The four pillars of its 21st Century priority campaign are to: go beyond coal, go beyond oil, go beyond natural gas, and protect “our wild America” (Sierra Club 2013).

For this comparative analysis, I did not include any data from any of Sierra Club’s many chapters, not even California’s or Louisiana’s; I only included CDC framings that came from its national leaders.
Secretaries of the Interior

The Interior Secretary of the US oversees the mining of mineral, metal, and energy resources on federal lands, as well as looking after federal forests and anything above or below the water surface extending 370 kilometres beyond the 5.5 kilometres that are under the jurisdiction of coastal states.

Walter Hickel was elected as the second (1966-1969) and eighth (1990-1994) Governor of Alaska, and was confirmed to the position of Secretary of the Interior in January 1969; five days later, SBOS happened. His confirmation hearings were among the most contested and acrimonious in recent history (OSIC 1969-73). Many considered him unfit for the job because of his decidedly pro-development, anti-environmental attitudes, as demonstrated by his performance as Alaska’s governor and his former careers in construction and real estate (Wikipedia 2013). He turned out to be something of an environmentalist, however, imposing liabilities against offshore oil companies and demanding environmental safeguards against the expansion of oil development in his native Alaska (OSIC 1969-73; Wikipedia 2013). A centrist-leftist, he was eventually fired by Nixon over opposition to the President’s Vietnam War Policy and aggressive attitude against war protestors, which garnered much media attention. He died during week three of DHOS (Wikipedia 2013).

Ken Salazar was Sol from 2009-2013, after serving as US Senator for Colorado from 2005-2009. Environmentalists were leery of Mr. Salazar because of his significant involvement with the coal and mining industries, and his tendency to favour industry and agribusiness in debates revolving around ACC, fuel efficiency, and endangered species (Wikipedia 2013). In 2009, despite declaring melting ice the greatest threat to polar bears, he opposed using the Endangered Species Act to regulate GHG emissions, calling such a proposal an “inappropriate tool...to deal with what is a global issue” (Wikipedia 2013). On the other hand, seven days after DHOS began, he approved the Cape Wind offshore wind farm (Wikipedia 2013).

State Actors
For both SBOS and DHOS, these are represented by those whose authority and concern do not and cannot extend beyond the borders of California and Louisiana, respectively, and who are not Governors. These can include Attorney Generals and various state senators and representatives, as well as actors working for any of these states’ various departments, such as those overseeing the environment and natural resources.

**Democratic US Senators**

Alan Cranston was elected US Senator for California in 1968, serving for four consecutive six-year terms, having previously served as state controller from 1959 to 1967 (Wikipedia 2013). His interests included nuclear disarmament, civil rights, and environmental issues (Wikipedia 2013). He died on the 31st of December, 2000

Mary Landrieu was elected US Senator for Louisiana in 1996, and has so far served three consecutive six-year terms as of the first quarter of 2014. She is amongst the most conservative Democrats in the US Senate (Wikipedia 2013). She is a member of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, and on the Subcommittee for Energy (Landrieu 2013). She supports increased drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, one of the few Democrats to do so (Wikipedia 2013).

**Republican US Senators**

George Murphy was elected US Senator for California in 1965 for one six-year term. He was the first significant former actor to achieve state/federal public office (Wikipedia 2013). He died on the 3rd of May, 1992.

David Vitter was elected US Senator for Louisiana in 2004, and is currently serving his second consecutive six-year term as of the first quarter of 2014, after previously serving as US Representative for suburban Louisiana’s 1st congressional district (Wikipedia 2013). Although he supported efforts to make BP pay as much as humanly possible for DHOS, his environmental record appears to otherwise favour BAU economic expansion; many of his CDC frames have a decidedly pro-business slant to them.
Appendix C – Sample of the Super-extract Process

The following is a sample of the super-extracting process that was applicable only to DHOS raw data; the example comes from Governor Jindal. As mentioned in the main text of Chapter 4.1, CDC extracts featuring subject or verbatim repetitions were grouped together according to similarity; the italicized sentence preceding each extract provides a summation of the similar idea.

- **Who are the heroes of the DHOS?**
- “Today – along our coast, we have new heroes – our coastal parish presidents, the fishermen who are laying our boom, the National Guardsmen who are help to contain the oil and the communities that are banding together to help each other out in their time of need. These are the heroes in this oil spill disaster response. “To see this team overcome many challenges, even when the odds were against them, the Saints give our people the confidence that we will be successful despite the odds. We too will dig down deep yet again and we will win this fight to protect our coast. Even when other people may count us out or may count us as underdogs – we’re going to prevail. That’s the perseverance of the people of Louisiana.
  o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Super Bowl Champion New Orleans Saints for Rally to Support Coastal Louisiana, 08/06/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=2237&navID=12>

- “You all know about our frustrations with the response to the spill last year and the economic effects that rippled through our coastal communities, but one of the most important things I want to talk to you about today are the heroes that stepped forward in response to this disaster. I want this one-year anniversary event to be about honoring the men and women who stepped forward to protect coastal Louisiana.
  o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Leaders to Honor Disaster Heroes and Invite Country to Visit Coastal LA on One Year Anniversary of BP Oil Spill, 20/04/11 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=2787&navID=1>

- “Of course, the biggest heroes in this disaster by far were the people of coastal Louisiana. The people whose resilience and determination brought us through another time of disaster. Our Louisiana people are truly the heart of what makes this state great.”
  o From Jindal, Governor Jindal Joins Leaders to Honor Disaster Heroes and Invite Country to Visit Coastal LA on One Year Anniversary of BP Oil Spill, 20/04/11 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&catID=2&articleID=2787&navID=1>

- **The claims process is broken, needs fixing;**
- “DSS Secretary Kristy Nichols sent a letter this morning following up on the President’s announcement that he is bringing in a third party organization to ensure all claims from this disaster are paid. This announcement seems like a good step forward in a process that has been very frustrating to date. The state has requested access to BP’s claims database and procedures for weeks now and we have received only drips and drabs of information from BP. Their claims system absolutely needs to be reformed and whatever the final system is, the state must be assured full and complete access to the claims system in order to ensure our
people’s claims are being handled fairly and quickly. We are also concerned that around 75 percent of small business claims being turned into the SBA are being rejected and we are asking the SBA to improve their process so our people are getting the help they need while their businesses are suffering from this spill.

- From Jindal, Governor Jindal: We Are in a War Against This Oil, Need Real Results, 16/06/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&amp;tmp=detail&amp;catID=2&amp;articleID=2245&amp;navID=12>

- "BP and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility must ensure that the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill claims administration process works efficiently and meets the needs of citizens, businesses, and public entities affected by this disaster. First and foremost, the new system must be fully transparent to the state and our citizens. Claims protocols must be clear and understandable to our coastal communities so that they can effectively access the system. We must understand how the new claims system will be administered and who will evaluate the claims.

- From Jindal, Gov. Jindal Announces "Agenda For Revitalizing Coastal Louisiana", 14/07/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&amp;tmp=detail&amp;catID=2&amp;articleID=2332&amp;navID=1>

- The hurting of small businesses;

- "We are here at Gulf Stream Marina today and this is a recreational fishing marina that now sits empty because of the BP oil spill that caused the loss of recreational and commercial fishing activity that would usually be bustling at this time of year. This marina employs three people – and this is just one story of the many businesses here in Grand Isle that are struggling to deal with the very personal effects of this disaster on coastal Louisiana.

- From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&amp;tmp=detail&amp;catID=2&amp;articleID=2255&amp;navID=12>

- "On day 64 of this disaster, Gulf Stream Marina has a claim into BP for $113,000 in losses – but they haven’t received any payment for their business claim, only three checks for $5,000 each for personal payments. Last week, BP told the marina they would call in three days, but the marina still hasn’t received a call. Meanwhile, these folks are fighting to keep their business open. The owner is struggling to stay in the black while once again the help that was promised is still not here.

- From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&amp;tmp=detail&amp;catID=2&amp;articleID=2255&amp;navID=12>

- "Also here in Grand Isle is the Sand Dollar Marina, owned by Butch Gaspard. Butch has operated the Marina there for 13 years and he has been in business for 45 years. He employs 15 people and told us he generated around $2 million in revenue last year. This time of year is when most of his profits come in, but because of the spill, he instead is incurring serious losses this year. Butch has a total of six claims outstanding with BP, representing his various related businesses. He just got another call yesterday telling him that the earlier paperwork he submitted would have to be filled out again because it was ‘lost.’ This morning, he was told they ‘may’ have found it. In 2005, after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, it cost Butch around $1.4 million to rebuild. Now – he faces the disaster of this BP oil spill.

- From Jindal, Governor Jindal: BP Claims System is Broken, 22/06/10 <http://gov.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&amp;tmp=detail&amp;catID=2&amp;articleID=2255&amp;navID=12>
Appendix D – Sample of Sensitizing Concept Analysis

The following is a sample of the sensitizing concept analysis. The first section is from SBOS – Crisis – OPA and the second is from DHOS – Disaster – Government Reports. The SBOS CDC extracts consist of a series of individual extracts, while the DHOS ones are made up of two super-extracts. The analysis is indicated in italics; it was originally conducted using the Comments tool in Word’s track changes function, which were cut-and-pasted into the main document for this sample. The reason why some of the extract analyses do not, for example, use all seven elements of crisis’s sensitizing concept is because the extract did not contain any data pertaining to the missing elements.

SBOS – Crisis – OPA

- “My initial action was personally to visit Secretary Hickel before his trip to Santa Barbara to express my concern and the feeling of a vast majority of my constituents about the poll crisis.”
  - From US Congressman Teague, Re: what actions Teague took during SBOS \(\rightarrow\) from newsletter Jan-Feb 1969
    - **Threat**: oil poll from SBOS and/or constituents’ feelings about SBOS oil poll.
      - **Big**: the “vast majority” of Teague’s constituents are none too happy.
      - **Negative**: Santa Barbarans are angry about SBOS oil poll.

- “I also asked President Nixon, while I was visiting with him, to declare Ventura and Santa Barbara Counties a disaster area b/c of the severe direct and indirect econ injury resulting from the oil crisis. In addition, I requested the President to order the use of fed troops and equip wherever necessary to clean up the oil.”
  - From US Congressman Teague, Re: what actions Teague took during SBOS \(\rightarrow\) from newsletter Jan-Feb 1969
    - **Threat**: the direct, indirect econ problems resulting from SBOS.
      - **Big**: Teague asked President to a) declare SB, Ventura D areas and b) send out troops to clean up oil.
      - **Negative**: SBOS could have direct, indirect econ consequences.
      - **Uncertain**: don’t know what the indirect econ effects wills be.

- “Santa Barbara Channel Oil Poll Crisis [title of his statement] The terrible despoliation along Santa Barbara’s majestic channel and coastline has not come to an end, though many people mistakenly think so. One hundred days after the blowout of an oil well, erected on a platform 5 ½ miles out to sea, crude oil, at an estimated rate of 8000 gallons per day, has continue to blacken and blight the waters of the channel from fissures deep in the ocean bottom. Many fear further massive eruptions.”
Hon. Thomas H Kuchel, former US Senator (Cali), statement to Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials, and Fuels of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 19-20/05/69

- **Threat:** oil continue to leak out after 100 days; people think that SBOS is over, this mistake; fear of more SBOSs.
- **Big:** spill still hap after 100 days, continue to oil SBC waters.
- **Negative:** SB’s coastline still being oiled by SBOS after 100 days; there’s fear of more spills.
- **Uncertain:** implied in that since spill has continued for 100 days, don’t know when will end...

**DHOS – Disaster – Government Reports**

- “The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst man-made environmental disasters our country has ever experienced. The oil spill has dramatically affected the lives, jobs, and futures of millions of Gulf Coast residents. The Gulf of Mexico is a natural resource of vital importance which provides immeasurable benefits and services to citizens throughout the United States. The Gulf is also critical to nationwide commerce.” (2)
  - From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

- “By the time the well was capped, it is estimated that the Deepwater Horizon had released more than 4.9 million barrels of oil into the Gulf, resulting in significant impacts on the Gulf’s communities, ecosystem, and economic activity. It is one of the worst man-made environmental disasters in American history. The spill caused the closure of 88,522 square miles of federal waters to fishing, and affected hundreds of miles of shoreline, bayous, and bays.” (5)
  - From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

- “The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst man-made environmental disasters in American history and resulted in severe economic dislocations across the Gulf Coast. It shares features with prior major oil spills like the Exxon Valdez, but is singular in its scope, scale, and effect upon the human and environmental health of the region. It poses similar economic challenges as a natural disaster, yet is distinct in both the absence of extensive infrastructure damage, and the breadth of its geographic impact.” (77)
  - From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

- “The Deepwater Horizon oil spill was one of the worst manmade environmental disasters ever experienced by the United States. Tens of thousands of people mobilized in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Gulf Coast to combat the spill, plug the well, and mitigate the spill’s immediate effects. Early on in the response, President Obama recognized that short-term efforts would not be sufficient to address the spill’s enduring effects. In an address to the nation on June 15, 2010, the President appointed Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to examine the question of what comes after the well has been sealed and the oil is no longer flowing.”
  - From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

- **Social disrupt/phenomenon:** DHOS one of the worst hum-caused environmental Ds in Us history; DHOS “singular in its scope, scale, and effect upon human/environmental health” → the 4.9 million barrels spilled causing significant impact on Gulf communes, econ activity, impacting lives,
The government’s response to this latest disaster is guided primarily by the Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), and related regulations. The CWA has a primary goal of restoration and maintenance of the Nation’s waters and provides several causes of action enforceable by the United States in order to promote these goals.” (6)

- From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

“An important statute guiding the government’s response to this latest disaster is the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) and its related regulations. Passed in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, OPA expanded the scope of the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, more commonly called the National Contingency Plan (NCP), by mandating new contingency planning and response preparedness responsibilities for the federal government and industry, as well as by providing additional guidance on coordinating and directing response and cleanup activities.” (32)

- From America’s Gulf Coast: A Long Term Recovery Plan After the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (aka Mabus Report), 09/10

- Social disrupt/phenomenon: FG response to DHOS guided by CWA 1977 and OPS 1990, which gives FG power to mandate new measures upon Big Oil.
Appendix E – Sample of the Frame Analysis Process

The following are examples of the FA procedure; the first comes from SBOS – Catastrophe – GOO! and the second from DHOS – Crisis – President Obama. Like with Appendix 4, the SBOS CDC extracts consist of a series of individual extracts, while the DHOS ones are made up of two super-extracts. The CDC sensitizing analysis is indicated in italics, and the FA in Arial font; both were originally conducted using the Comments tool in Word’s track changes function, which were cut-and-pasted into the main document for this sample.

SBOS – Catastrophe – GOO!

- “GOO is a rallying pt for those who are frustrated and want to do something. Our objectives are clear: No more oil leases and we want the ops there now to be suspended eternally. There is no evidence whatsoever that a similar catastrophe won’t be repeated. There are no safeguards to protect this community from damage or ultimate destruction.”
  o Alvin Weingand, GOO chairman, about what GOO is and does → “GOO Busy Collecting Names ON Abolish Drilling Petitions” SBNP 10/02/69

  ▪ Requires new institutions: GOO! is a focal pt for those angry at inaction/counteraction by regular channels and want something to be done about oil poll/oil development in SBC.
  ▪ Distinction determines response: SBOS = cat b/c only way to prevent another is to remove oil development from SBC all together.
    - Context provided: GOO! formed so that those who want to remove oil development from SBC forever—but are dissatisfied w/ the ‘usual channels’—can work towards doing just that; evidence has yet to come to light that something similar to SBOS won’t hap again.
    - Meaning prod: there’s no evidence whatsoever that another SBOS won’t happen; therefore oil development in SBC should be stopped forevermore.
    - Values tapped/revealed: all or nothing, do nothing unless there’s 100% certainty that nothing bad will hap; citizen/NGO action can bring about change.
    - Who/what responsible: ordinary citizens taking part in grassroots org, like GOO!
    - CAT-FRAME = citizen power is the fulcrum by which removing oil development from SBC will be achieved.

- “Your [the Senate subcommittee on air and water] presence here demos your cognizance that the oil spill catastrophe on the coast of Southern California is of national import and magnitude. Beyond issues of war and peace, polluting and destroying our environment is perhaps highest on the national agenda.”
  o Hon. Alvin C Weingand, chairman of GOO, statement to Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, SB California, 24/02/69
- **Distinction determines response**: Senate Subcommittee's presence underscores the gravity of SBOS; beside from war and peace, environment destruction top national agenda.

**Total**: claims that SBOS is of "national import and magnitude."

- **Context provided**: Senate Subcommittee on Air, Water Poll has come to SB to hear testimony about SBOS.
- **Meaning prod**: the presence and attention of senators from other parts of the country underscores that SBOS is of "national import and magnitude," so much so that it stands alongside the issues of war and peace.
- **Values tapped/revealed**: environment just as import as war and peace.
- **Who/what responsible**: national Senate subcommittee has come clear-cross country to hear testimony in SB.

**CAT-FRAME** = SBOS is such a big deal that a Senate subcommittee has been convened to look into it.

- "You have heard and will hear representatives of the people of the city and county of Santa Barbara. They capably describe how this area has been grievously injured economically and in many other ways beyond price. Our ox has been sorely and infamously gored! Indeed, the whole nation has been gored. I am now going to show you a photograph by Dick Smith of the Santa Barbara News-Press. It is a sad symbol of this catastrophe depicted in media nationally and around the world. It tells of a national tragedy, of the deep concern of people everywhere. The 50,000 people of ‘Get Oil Out!’—with thousands, perhaps million more, feel strongly that ours is not a local cause but a national moment.”
  - Hon. Alvin C Weingand, chairman of GOO, statement to Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution, SB California, 24/02/69

- **Distinction determines response**: the symbolic power of SBOS has galvanized 50,000, perhaps 1000s, millions more.

**Total**: SBOS has attracted national, world attention; perhaps millions of people feel that SBOS = national moment, not local cause.

- **Context provided**: SBOS has gotten the attention of US, world.
- **Meaning prod**: b/c of all the attention that SBOS has captured, 50,000 people have signed a petition to ban oil development in SBC forevermore; SBOS is not simply a "local cause, but a national moment."
- **Values tapped/revealed**: solidarity; environment, aesthetics are import.
- **Who/what responsible**: indeterminate.

**CAT-FRAME** = there’s a feeling that SBOS is moving beyond being a local problem and into the realm of national, even worldwide import.

**DHOS – Crisis – President Obama**

- **All levels of FG have been doing everything they can, FG has been in point position since beg:**
- We just finished a meeting with Admiral Thad Allen, our National Incident Commander for this spill, as well as Coast Guard personnel who are leading the response to this crisis. And they gave me an update on our efforts to stop the BP oil spill and mitigate the damage.
  - From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10
- That is why since the initial explosion on the drilling rig occurred, the Federal Government has launched and coordinated a unified and relentless response to this crisis.
The day that the rig collapsed and fell to the bottom of the ocean, I had my team in the Oval Office that first day. Those who think that we were either slow on our response or lacked urgency don’t know the facts. This has been our highest priority since this crisis occurred.

I’m briefed every day and have probably had more meetings on this issue than just about any issue since we did our Afghan review. And we understood from day one the potential enormity of this crisis and acted accordingly. So when it comes to the moment this crisis occurred, moving forward, this entire White House and this entire federal government has been singularly focused on how do we stop the leak, and how do we prevent and mitigate the damage to our coastlines.

There has never been a point during this crisis in which this administration, up and down up the line, in all these agencies, hasn’t, number one, understood this was my top priority -- getting this stopped and then mitigating the damage; and number two, understanding that if BP wasn’t doing what our best options were, we were fully empowered and instruct them, to tell them to do something different.

Understandably, the feelings of frustration and anger, the sense that any response is inadequate -- we expect that frustration and anger to continue until we actually solve this problem. But in the meantime, we’ve got to make sure that everybody is working in concert, that everybody is moving in the same direction. And I want everybody to know that everybody here -- at every level -- is working night and day to end this crisis. We’re considering every single idea out there, especially from folks who know these communities best.

Threat: the continuing spill, the damage being caused by it; perceptions, anger, resentment that FG response too slow, not urgent, not enough; the enormity of DHOS; BP not acting in FG’s best interests. 

Urgency: perception floating around that FG response not urgent enough, which FG/President refutes.

Big: FG launched a coordinated, relentless response to DHOS as of Day 1; stopping DHOS consider highest priority of WH, fed; entire WH, fed “singularly focused” on stopping spill, prevent & mitigate coastal damage; everybody working 24/7 to stop DHOS.

Negative: spill continues, damaging coasts; perception floating around that FG not doing enough, fast enough.

Context provided: there’s perception that fed not doing enough to respond to DHOS/response too slow, resulting in resentment, anger → President refutes poor response by fed—rather fed response = coordinated, relentless since Day 1.

Values tapped/revealed: false info won’t be tolerated/will be refuted; crisis requires all-out fed response; if BP doesn’t act on best options for nation, fed will compel them otherwise.

Who/what responsible: fed b/c they are tasked w/ responding to any crisis that can/does harm Am interests; BP b/c it’s their spill, their crisis.

Meaning prod: President refutes the perception that fed response to DHOS is slow and inadequate; fed is, and has been, doing everything it can and beyond, since Day 1, to deal w/ spill.
CR-FRAME = Descriptions of slow and inadequate response on the part of fed are patently untrue.

- *Sparing no efforts, sparing no resources;*
- I also want to stress that we are working closely with the Gulf states and local communities to help every American affected by this crisis. Let me be clear: BP is responsible for this leak; BP will be paying the bill. But as President of the United States, I'm going to spare no effort to respond to this crisis for as long as it continues.
  - From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10
- But every American affected by this spill should know this: Your government will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to stop this crisis.
  - From Obama (speech), Remarks by the President from Venice, Lou, 02/05/10
- I've made clear to Admiral Allen and I did so again today that he should get whatever he needs to deal with this crisis. Whatever he needs, he will get.
  - From Obama, Remarks by President After Briefing On BP Oil Spill, 28/05/10
  - **Threat: affects of DHOS on Gulf residents.**
    - **Big:** everybody affected by DHOS will be helped; FG will make sure BP pays every last bill; FG committed to doing whatever it takes for however long it takes to stop DHOS; no resource will be left unutilized.
  - **Context provided:** President promises that all who've been affected by DHOS will be helped, that BP will pay every last bill, and that fed will do whatever requires, no matter for how long, until spill stopped.
  - **Values tapped/revealed:** sticking w/ victims thru thick and thin; pursuing perpetrators until justice finally done.
  - **Who/what responsible:** BP b/c they caused the spill and therefore should pay for it; fed b/c it has taken it upon itself to make sure victims are helped, that spill stopped.
  - **Meaning prod:** fed will do whatever it takes, use whatever resources required, to help people of Gulf, make BP pay.

CR-FRAME = see Meaning prod.
Appendix F – The List of Generalized CDC Frames Put Forth By SBOS and DHOS FSs

The following are all the generalized CDC frames that the sensitizing concept analysis, frame analysis, and refinement process found. They are divided by spill (i.e., all of SBOS’s first, followed by DHOS’s), then by crisis, disaster, or catastrophe (i.e., all of one, then the next), and finally by FS.

SBOS

GOO! Generalized Crisis Frames
  - Complaining that an incumbent politician did not respond effectively to SBOS → SBOS-1

Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
  - Teague relaying SBn’s anger to Hickel → SBOS-1
  - SBOS jeopardizing SB’s future economic well-being, especially in terms of the unknown indirect economic effects; only by President declaring SB a disaster area can things be stopped from getting worse → SBOS-2
  - After 100 days, SBOS still happening, coastline getting oiled, and SBns fear another eruption is imminent → SBOS-3

President Nixon Generalized Crisis Frames
  - Demonstrating that he is taking SBOS seriously by personally appointing an investigatory panel → SBOS-1

Scientists 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
  - The oil industry and the federal government are perverting science for their own ends, where facts are really just careful selections → SBOS-1
  - The unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the oil industry, and how it does not serve the interests of America; need a system that breaks the federal-oil industry collusion and protects the environment from exploitation → SBOS-2, 3
  - SBOS was caused by a BAU system that no longer works → SBOS-3
  - SBOS is considered a brushfire crisis, as opposed to a long-term, methodical problem → SBOS-4

Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Crisis Frames
  - Drilling in SBC should remain subject to a moratorium until the results of public, participatory decision-making come in → SBOS-1
  - The ill-considered use of technology caused SBOS → SBOS-2
  - Too much is at stake—a liveable environment—to accept Sol’s assurances that everything within his powers is being done → SBOS-2

Sol Hickel Generalized Crisis Frames
  - Assures that the federal government is doing everything in its power to respond to SBOS → SBOS-1

Audubon 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
  - Technology causing problems that cannot be fixed → SBOS-1
- SBns' protest louder than any other recent ones because SBOS was human-caused → SBOS-2

Government Reports 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
- The spill was not a disaster because nobody died and property damage was light...although spill was reminder to use natural resources wisely, and the oiled and dead birds served as a symbol for humanity's capacity to despoil the environment → SBOS-1

Governor Reagan Generalized Disaster Frames
- State of California's declaration of disaster for SB's beaches does not absolve UO of its responsibilities → SBOS-1
- Even though SBOS took place on OCS on federal leases operating under federal regulations, SoC will suspend its state oil operations until a review has been completed → SBOS-2
  - SoC tried to get oil companies and the federal government to acknowledge the possibility of spills by setting up an insurance account; this was ignored → SBOS-3

GOO! Generalized Disaster Frames
- SBOS has caused much destruction already; SBOS has caused death and suffering to countless living creatures; oil pollution still happening → SBOS-1, 6, 9
- Inevitable future spill will be worse; inability to even install a platform proves that another SBOS imminent → SBOS-1, 16
- Future generations will laud those (such as Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution) who put needs of many above the profiteering few by putting an end to oil development in SBC; only way to guarantee another spill does not happen is to follow the will of 50,000 petitioners calling for oil development ban in SBC; only way to guarantee end of threat of pollution is to ban and remove oil development from "esthetically vulnerable" SBC → SBOS-1, 7, 8
- Even though GOO! only seeking to remove oil development from SBC, their efforts have piqued nation, who do not want to see another SBOS; GOO! has gained support from people across the country and world → SBOS-2, 14
- Experts admit there are "no absolute guarantee[s]" that will protect coast and sea against another SBOS; no guarantees that another SBOS will not happen; → SBOS-3, 9
- SBOS should be stirring emotion, contrary to one opinion → SBOS-5
- SBOS death and damage proves "senseless[ness of humanity's]...exploitation and destruction of his own living environment;" SBOS could be "turning point in national policy [against]....ruthless exploitation" → SBOS-6, 14
- SB's CoC accepting oil industry money to pay for false ads saying SB's beaches are clean and oil-free; despite advertisements paid for by UO, oil slick continues to "lurk" in SBC → 7, 10
- SB only clean when oil is out → SBOS-7
- SBOS has brought problem of pollution and environmental destruction to forefront → SBOS-8
- Even though Sol admits oil development in SBC a mistake, he is nevertheless trying to continue it by talking tougher regulations and clarifying cleanup responsibilities; SoI has resumed oil development in SBC; Hickel guilty of resuming oil development in SBC; resumption of oil development in SBC unsurprising because of "weight of tradition" → SBOS-8, 9, 13, 18
- SBOS leak still happening; SBOS leak still stoppered; contrary to Look, SBOS an ongoing disaster → SBOS-9, 10, 15
- SBOS declared a "natural disaster" → SBOS-10
- SBOS has been bad for birds—they are gone → SBOS-11
- Oil pollution threatens not only economy, but survival, and if US fails to protect last-beachhead California's beaches, then not only a defeat for nation, but world; SBOS more than
NIMBY, it symbolizes nation's continued acceleration towards "economic exploitation at any cost"; people throughout nation do not want to see another SBOS; SBOS not only a "regional disaster," but a "grave national disorder" → SBOS-12, 18, 2, 14

- SBOS proves that how US administers its natural resources is flawed and infected by an "unholy, unhealthy, undemocratic alliance between DoI and petroleum industry" → SBOS-13
- SBOS being compounded by President treating SBns wanting oil out like garment workers complaining about tariffs → SBOS-17

Union Oil Generalized Disaster Frames

- It not being a disaster b/c nobody was killed, the damage could be cleaned/repaired, and future spills could be prevented → DHOS-1, 2

Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames

- For pro-legislation for oil and water pollution, SBOS is proof-positive why more federal powers are required to ensure clean water, no oil pollution, and "careful site selection and effective [clean up] authorization;" provisions, such as depletion allowances, should be discontinued so as to make oil companies pay their fair share of income tax; took SBOS to alert Congress to need for conservation legislation; thanks to SBOS, Senate has finally passed legislation (after three years of effort) that give President power to impose financial liability on oil companies for their oil pollution, and authority to clean up spills → SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8
- Federal government paying 1 billion to buy back SBC leases to prevent another SBOS is worth more than having a "dead sea" off SoCal; only way to end the spill is for the federal government to acknowledge that SBns' right to oil pollution free life is greater than oil companies' right to profit-by-leasing, and therefore all oil development should be banned from SBC → SBOS-5, 9
- SBOS has reaped a few certainties, but many uncertainties, and because of the latter, a moratorium should be enacted until "all reasonable precautions" are in place → SBOS-1
- To SBns, SBOS is a threat → SBOS-2
- UO is legally responsible for SBOS → SBOS-3
- SBOS is costing taxpayers millions and that is why it should never happen again → SBOS-4
- Teague wants President to declare SBC a disaster area because of risk of economic damage → SBOS-6
- SBOS happened despite rules and regulations → SBOS-7
- SBOS has been leaking for a year and UO can't stop it → SBOS-9

President Nixon Generalized Disaster Frames

- The spill is serious enough to warrant a disaster declaration, bringing with it the federal government's full attention and resources → SBOS-1

Scientists 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames

- The lack of chain of command is ruining science's ability to learn from SBOS; SBOS could have been mitigated if there had been direct, coordinated technological action, not just plans and systems of notification → SBOS-1, 7
- UCSB's expertise is not being utilized by the federal government or by UO → SBOS-2
- Sol is allowing the resumption of drilling in SBC even though he does not understand tectonic data → SBOS-3
- SBOS has gone from NIMBY to a national and world-wide phenomenon → SBOS-4
- Tide of conservationism driving the oil industry into a corner; many Americans inspired to pay attention/notice environmental destruction and come to aid → SBOS-4, 9
- Officials have (allegedly) covered up the fact that oil had reached San Miguel Island, thus expanding the area and environmental scope of SBOS → SBOS-5

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- Ecological disasters, such as SBOS, prove that humans are ignorant of complex ecosystems, and that countering this will be difficult → SBOS-6
- Dispersants should not be used because they do not cleanse the environment of oil, or even do what they advertise—suspend until eaten → SBOS-8

Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
- Ordinary citizens were not consulted nor allowed to ask questions or appeal decisions re: ocean planning; SBns daily witnessing price of exploitive technology on environmental quality without “adequate public review;” public most likely to suffer if another SBOS happens so they have a right to know → SBOS-1, 8, 14
- Allowing citizens and associations to advise and act as watchdogs in future will give SBOS silver lining; the moratorium in SBC should remain until the results from DoI public hearings are in; public has the right to see the information Hickel based his resumption decision on → SBOS-1, 9, 14
- The federal government lied about SBOS ending on 16 February → the slick is still being fed by the fracture, and federal officials still in SB; SBOS is in its 113th day; SBOS is a "continuing oil disaster" → SBOS-2, 7, 9
- DoI is ultimately to blame for SBOS because they allowed the leasing and broke their promise to keep SBC clean → SBOS-3
- SBns were right about the risk of an oil disaster → SBOS-4
- SBOS not only a human disaster, but a wildlife one (baby seals allegedly killed by oil); SBOS still contaminating shoreline and harming wildlife → SBOS-5, 7
- Hickel's decision to resume oil production in SBC will cause another disaster; Sol has permitted drilling in SBC again; Hickel should rescind his back-to-drill permit; decision to resume drilling a worse idea than granting drilling in first place → SBOS-6, 8, 9, 13
- Despite continued oiling of shores and wildlife harmed, SBOS is being brushed aside, deemed over, and no preventative measures taken → SBOS-7
- SBns seeing daily proof of the consequences of letting exploitive technology run rampant without local community oversight; SBOS has gone from being local to becoming the next phase in the nation’s and the world’s pollution crisis caused by “ill-considered” technology; SBOs proves what happens when humans let themselves be “tyrannized” by waste and pollution causing technology → SBOS-8, 10, 11
- Hickel would not have permitted drilling in SBC in the first place; decision to drill in SBC was terrible to begin with → SBOS-8, 13
- Hickel should “review [the] fundamental issues” about the continuing SBOS; his assurances that everything is being done is not good enough → SBOS-9, 10
- SBOS has gone from a local occurrence to becoming a piece of nation's and world's pollution crisis → SBOS-10
- SBOS can only be resolved with legislation, ones that include a “comprehensive ecological strategy” for protecting balanced use of US’s coasts → SBOS-12

Sol Hickel Generalized Disaster Frames
- Future oil disasters will be prevented by the federal government and the oil industry working together to draft the best regulations possible; SBOS is so bad because current offshore regulations are inferior or non-existence, and by rectifying this, disasters like SBOS will not happen again → SBOS-1, 3, 4
- Hickel will not allow drilling to resume in SBC until he is convinced that another SBOS will not happen → SBOS-2
- The 10 day long SBOS was "more than any sensible American should [have] be[en] expected to take → SBOS-4
State Actors 1969 Generalized Disaster Frames
- People tend to downplay the damage that oil disasters cause marine life; birds are dead or dying because of human oil activity; in fact, weeks-long SBOS wreaking "untold millions of dollars of damages to beaches and ocean wildlife → SBOS-1, 5, 13
- Lack of facts about SBOS is hindering decision-making about preventing future ones; lack of information is making it difficult to determine if better technology and/or rules would have prevented/minimized the spill → SBOS-2, 3
- California's rules, regulations, offshore system is better, proved by lack of accidents; state waters have not suffered a spill → SBOS-3, 4
- Despite lack of spills in state waters, SLC reviewing its own house, in addition to federal's, anyway to make sure → DHOS-4
- SBOS is having an adverse effect on Lagomarsino's reputation; contrary to rumour, he has been active in SBOS response → SBOS-6, 7
- What Lagomarsino has done (helped convince Reagan to declare disaster; co-authored Assembly resolutions for help correct SBOS) → SBOS-7
- Lagomarsino has also been touched by spill → SBOS-8
- Ongoing SBOS exacerbated by state's rush to drill again even though SBns have not cleaned up spill yet → SBOS-9
- Unruh predicts SBOS has angered people so much they will back tax reform against oil industry → SBOS-10
- State government doing all it can to learn everything about SBOS to prevent another; legislation required to ensure that spills are better contained and mitigated; SBOS requires state to "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" only bipartisan support can prevent future SBOSs → SBOS-11, 12, 13, 14
- Oil industry should confront the possibility of spills happening and have final recovery plans → SBOS-12
- UO is responsible for SBOS → SBOS-13
- Weeks long SBOS wreaking "untold millions of dollars of damages" → SBOS -13
- State must "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" in response to worst oil pollution disaster in continental US history, and to protect Californians, Attorney General speaking out in favour of Cranston's bill → SBOS-13, 15
- Action/inactions of others have made SBns innocent victims of a man-made disaster → SBOS-16
- SRC's no-vote against a bill says to SBns that they cannot count on their government to help them when SBOS hits again → SBOS-17

Democratic Senator Cranston Generalized Disaster Frames
- Present technology cannot guarantee against another SBOS → SBOS-1
- Federal regulations amplify, rather than reduce, the chances of spills; SBOS proves that OCS Act is out-of-date and out-of-touch with modern technology and oil operations; federal authorities did not conduct inspections of Platform A, nor insisted on more higher casing requirements (despite $600 million from lease sales); characterizing the oil industry as the villains is unfair because it is the federal government that makes all the final decisions about leasing and regulations; federal "values and priorities" are "out of whack" with those of locals → SBOS-1, 2, 3, 5, 12
- If appropriate, Congress should phase-out oil production from SBC; only way to prevent another SBOS is for federal governments (in partnership with state) to remove all oil development from SBC → SBOS-1, 6
- Oil industry does not care about local communities who are/would be most affected by oil production; the initial leasing decisions were deliberately made without "adequate public
hearings” because decision makers did not want to “stir the natives up;” Subcommittee’s non-
consideration of Cranston bill says that BAU is more important than SBn’s environmental
and spill-ending concerns → SBOS-2, 12, 13
- USGS is not releasing drilling programme information for public oversight; the validity of the
WH report on SBOS (causes, why, recommendations) is questionable because testimony is
being withheld from the public → SBOS-3, 8
- SBOS has made Americans very sensitive to oil spills—another could shutdown the nation’s
oil production along all its coasts → SBOS-4
- Oil industry is not the villain → SBOS-5
- Federal government and state must work together to prevent another SBOS in SBC; there
should be no drilling in SBC until all parties come together to agree on “proper procedures”
to end SBOS and prevent others → SBOS-6, 7
- Validity of WH report on causes of SBOS and recommendations questionable because all the
testimony came from UO and USGS—the responsible parties → SBOS-8
- Because of the despoliation, people across US and world are asking why SBOS happened,
and what Congress can do to prevent another; spill is raising questions about the federal
government’s ability to prevent future spills and whether oil production in SBC is “truly…in
the national interest” → SBOS-9, 10
- SBOS has brought to a fore nation’s policy about natural resource use, and proves that policy
can affect the environment → SBOS-11
- SBOS has been going on for 6 months, smearing beaches and angering property owners →
SBOS-13

Republican Senator Murphy Generalized Disaster Frames
- Human-caused SBOS demonstrates limited ability to deal with disasters → SBOS-1
- More knowledge and procedures can either prevent future spills or at least improve response;
prevention or control and clean up of spills requires greater R&D investment → SBOS-1, 5
- If UO had drilled per state rules, not federal government’s, then SBOS would not have
happened; federal government has not updated, or even reviewed, its regulations in 15 years
→ SBOS-2
- Humans should and need to be protected from environment, but SBOS shows that vice versa
true, too → SBOS-3
- SBOS proves SBn’s misgivings right → SBOS-4
- There should be no drilling in SBC until there is certainty that another SBOS will not happen
→ SBOS-4

GOO! Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- Oil development should be banned and removed from SBC because there’s no evidence that
another SBOS will not happen, and the only way this can happen is through citizen-power →
DHOS-1
- Federal senators in SB underscores how important SBOS to nation, equal to war and peace →
DHOS-2
- SBOS is becoming as much a national and international issue as a local one → DHOS-3
- The President treating the ecological catastrophe no different than a tariff dispute → DHOS-4

Other Political Actors 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- How nothing will be done in the spill’s wake because the oil industry’s money speaks louder
than ordinary people’s letters of protest or their votes → SBOS-1
- The economic hardship of banning oil development between SB and Ventura pales in
comparison to what SBOS portents → SBOS-2
Comparing oil smearing SB's beaches to the 1906 SF earthquake and fire → SBOS-3

Scientists 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- Non-federal and non-oil industry actors getting involved in spill response → SBOS-1

Sierra Club 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- The lack of public consultation about resource use led to SBOS → SBOS-1
- The public should be a partner in decision making about environmental resource use, and not be at the federal government’s sole discretion → SBOS-1
- Oil industry and the federal government do not have the capabilities to deal with oil spills, despite the frequency of blowouts and that such could have happened anytime and could happen again; private business is required to take up the slack → SBOS-2
- SBOS still in progress, oiling beaches → SBOS-3
- New technology and legislation cannot guarantee that another SBOS will not happen, SBC’s geology trumps technology → SBOS-4
- Only solution is to support a bill to remove oil development from SBC completely; only banning all oil development in SBC can guarantee against another SBOS → SBOS-3, 4

State Actors 1969 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- Only by removing oil development from SBC and turning into a federal reserve can another SBOS be prevented → SBOS-1
- SBOS would have been really bad if the oil had reached LA or San Diego → SBOS-2
- SBOS has shaken faith in technological prowess so much that if the cause of the spill is technological, then all offshore must end → SBOS-3
- Both the state and federal government, for the sake of Californians, must act quickly and decisively to protect the marine environment from SBOSs → SBOS-4
- If SBOS had been bigger, more catastrophic, then oil development in SBC would have been banned → SBOS-5

Republican Senator Murphy Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- New laws and provisions needed to prevent oil spills because they are becoming common → SBOS-1

DHOS

REAs Generalized Crisis Frames
- Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ fails to capture it—it is Exxon Valdez several time over, and will require years of response → DHOS-1
- Without sound management, the federal response to DHOS will end up like that for Katrina → DHOS-2
- Sound response holds the promise of creating RCACs, just as Exxon Valdez did in Alaska → DHOS-2
- BP liability money should be invested into existing, but under-resourced coastal restoration initiatives → DHOS-3
- The entire OCS system is “woefully under-regulated” and therefore cannot prevent or respond to spills → DHOS-4
- The federal government should take advantage of DHOS, using it to break America’s fossil fuel addiction → DHOS-5
- Federal government’s response is perceived of as incompetent → DHOS-5
- DHOS’s impact on recreational fishing is still unknown, but businesses associated with it are being hard-hit → DHOS-6

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Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Crisis Frames
- DHOS partly caused by MMS’s systemic dysfunction debilitating its ability to regulate OCS, aided by political partisanship and several Administrations → DHOS-1
- Despite what oil industry says, blowouts are common in GoM; valuing profit over safety and the environment helped cause DHOS → DHOS-2
- President’s only priority should be stopping the oil flow, and thinking about anything else would lead to hasty decisions that will cost jobs → DHOS-3
- Federal government using every resource in its arsenal to respond to DHOS; it will hold BP responsible → DHOS-4

President Obama Generalized Crisis Frames
- Refuting that the federal response to DHOS has been slow and inadequate and assuring that it is “singularly focused” on the spill, doing all that can be done since Day 1; fed is and will do whatever it takes, use whatever resource for as long as it takes to stop crisis and help people of Gulf; federal is in it for the long-term, staying to help Gulfers for as long as DHOS continues to effect → DHOS-1, 2, 4
- The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the spill is so vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again → DHOS-3, 7
- DHOS reveals to America how fragile the Gulf ecosystem is and how dependent local communities and the nation are on its bounty → DHOS-3
- Arguments over resource allocation and red tape are par the course → DHOS-4
- DHOS an "unprecedented crisis;" nature of DHOS is unprecedented → DHOS-4, 8
- President will make BP pay; President will relentlessly pursue responsible parties for full compensation, and hold federal fully accountable for its part → DHOS-2, 9
- DHOS revealing how inadequate, broken, and unenforced OCS system is, hurting an already injured region, and therefore calls for systemic overhaul of OCS; how oil industry and federal conducted offshore will be overhauled to root out flaws; federal now realizes that it should have made rules and regulations that took DW into account, and should have R&Ded containment and cleanup technology → DHOS-5, 10, 11
- DHOS hurting an already injured region → DHOS-5
- How DHOS is threatening small businesses up and down the Gulf Coast → DHOS-6
- Effects of DHOS will not be known for months → DHOS-7
- Praising the thousands of ordinary people who have come out to help 24/7 → DHOS-8
- Gulf Coast will be made better than before → DHOS-10
- DHOS is “serious[] and urgent[]” and complex and ever-changing, making response challenging → DHOS-12, 14
- DHOS only adding to nation’s economic and job problems → DHOS-13

Scientists 2010 Generalized Crisis Frames
- Science’s knowledge and expertise is being underutilized → DHOS-1
- By refusing or dragging its feet on funding requests, the federal government (UC) demonstrated its disinterest in DHOS-related science → DHOS-2
- DHOS is complex and invites no easy answers and defies SOPs, and that is why federal response is poor → DHOS-3
- DHOS response is being derailed by lack of resources, lack of knowledge about ecosystem functionings, and the oil industry withholding vital information; no systems-wide approach to dealing with coastal-ocean ecology → DHOS-4, 5, 1
- DHOS is making Louisiana’s coastal problems worse, thus emphasizing how vulnerable they are → DHOS-6
- Progressive response to DHOS and future spills can only be achieved by using all talent and resources → DHOS-7

Sierra Club 2010 Generalized *Crisis* Frames
- DHOS proves that the oil industry is strangling the economy, health, and environment of the nation by addictsing it to oil; the oil industry is too fixated on more oil to learn from its failures, thus putting America at greater risk of more spills → DHOS-1, 2
- America is addicted to oil, and is at a turning point, needing assurances that another DHOS does not happen and kicking oil over next 20 years → DHOS-1

Sol Salazar Generalized *Crisis* Frames
- DHOS’s oil is causing unanticipated impacts to the nation, requiring the best scientific and engineering minds → DHOS-1
- MMS’s ethical lapses may have contributed to DHOS → DHOS-2
- Making hasty decisions about DHOS response could make things worse → DHOS-3
- DHOS should be a turning point, something descendants can look to and say that is when America changed how it used energy, the creation of CE economy using America → DHOS-4

Audubon 2010’s Generalized *Disaster* Frames
- DHOS has damaged coastal, non-human environment—especially to migrating birds and their habitat → DHOS-1, 2
- For coastal restoration to take place, society must deem it important; only immediate federal money can mitigate and restore the Gulf Coast; America has a responsibility to protect and restore GoM; Gulf has long suffered from disaster, but because of DHOS, America has finally gotten the message that the region needs “long-term restoration;” a “legacy of optimism” is required to restore the Gulf, which itself requires fundamental change about how GoM is used to ensure future generations their bounty → DHOS-1, 2, 4, 5, 8
- DHOS has inspired ordinary people to take responsibility and come out to help with response effort → DHOS-3
- Although the oil has stopped flowing, the damage to, and the fragility of, GoM cannot be forgot → DHOS-4
- Gulf has long suffered from disaster → DHOS-5
- Congress and Administration must enact Commission’s recommendations to improve and fix OCS system to make GoM healthy and productive for both humans and environment → DHOS-6
- Despite DHOS, despite Commission’s findings, Congress has resumed BAU and is not helping Gulf → DHOS-7

Government Reports 2010 Generalized *Disaster* Frames
- DHOS is the worst human-caused environmental disaster in US history because of how much oil was spilled, how many square miles of federal fishing waters was closed, how many hundreds of thousands of people were required to fight it, and how much economic damage was incurred; caused significant human, economic, and environmental suffering, damage, and death to a region already battered by hypoxia and hurricanes; after DH exploded, killing 11, injuring more, America wouldn’t know the full extent of the disaster for several weeks, by which time livelihoods, “precious habitats,” and unique ways of life were under serious threat; would wreak "unknown impacts" on the unique and delicate co-existence of offshore energy, fishing and wildlife, and coastal tourism → DHOS-1, 14, 18, 19
Federal response to DHOS followed precedents/guidelines of two past pieces of legislation; federal began its DHOS immediately by implementing standard procedure: drug-testing → DHOS-2, 20

DHOS proves that health of Gulf's economy and people is "inextricably linked" to Gulf ecosystem's health → DHOS-3

DHOS has caused Gulf's economy to go into a tailspin because of consumer non-confidence, resulting in no tourism, nobody buying Gulf fish → DHOS-3

DHOS is a complex disaster causing widespread mental health issues, leading to medical, social, and economic problems, and this requires complex solutions, from BP paying claims to PSAs stressing the importance of staying connected to ensuring seafood safety to monitoring care-giver states of mind; many Gulfers are stricken with health ailments, but oil spills have long been considered environmental problems, not health, so... → DHOS-4, 25

Administration can improve DHOS response by encouraging the integration of services, federal-state government interface to better utilize local knowledge of local contexts → DHOS-5

Federal's recovery role is by facilitating economic recovery via assessments, analysis, technical assistance, bolstering seafood marketing, and fisheries assistance, which has already begun with dispatch to 21 economic recovery teams → DHOS-6

Due to the scale of DHOS, non-profits have been vital to response/recovery, and will continue to as short-term segues into long-term → DHOS-7

DHOS has broken Americans' faith in oil industry's and federal's ability to effectively respond to disaster and to protect their natural resource inheritance, Gulf-wide and nation-wide → DHOS-8

Oil industry's general lack of sufficient safety culture and sound environmental practices contributed to DHOS; DHOS happened because oil industry actively failed to support, or blocked, legislation that would have expanded regulations, tightened safety, and they did not keep up with latest developments in offshore drilling technology, and were at the centre of a "complex web of decisions, actions, and circumstances" that were decades in the making; DHOS was caused by oil industry (from lack of major spills), drive for profit (thus skirting safety, not preparing for the worst, not developing effective containment/clean up technology (still same as in Exxon's day)), and not coordinating emergency plans with state/local → DHOS-9, 10, 13

Oil industry must fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety and environmental practices (+ cleanup, preparation, management behaviour) to regain public trust and be allowed access to OCS; America must re-examine how it produces and uses energy, and fundamentally reform the OCS system--beyond what has already been done—to ensure safety and prevention → DHOS-9, 11

DHOS happened because members of Congress and several Administrations actively failed to support, or blocked, legislation that would have expanded regulations, tightened safety, did not keep up-to-date with latest developments in offshore drilling technology, and were at the centre of a "complex web of decisions, actions, and circumstances" that were decades in the making; DHOS was caused by federal complacency (from lack of major spills → DHOS-10, 13

DHOS has tarnished America's (self-considered?) reputation as OCS energy safety and effectiveness leader, and the Commission's investigation will be the first step in fixing this via explanation of cause and recommendations of improvement and prevention → DHOS-12

Gulf coast already battered by hypoxia and hurricanes before DHOS; Gulf coast "battered and degraded from years of mismanagement" → DHOS-14, 18

Bright side of DHOS: hypoxia-stricken areas may now be on short-list for restoration, and coastal restoration funding, in general, has speeded up → DHOS-15
- Commission's report includes not only local, those-hurt input, but personal experience input → DHOS-16
- DHOS explosion initiated a human, economic, and environmental disaster; DHOS disaster began when the first person was killed → DHOS-17, 21
- Media coverage resulted in perception that DHOS was a wildlife disaster, prompting 12,000 people to volunteer in a single week to help with wildlife recovery → DHOS-22
- Federal caught between satisfying public demand to end spill now and fear that doing so could make things worse → DHOS-23
- Independent science whilst DHOS still ongoing was only funded by National Science Foundation, and then only very limitedly; there was little R&D for oil spills and health because spills have long been considered an environmental problem, not a health one → DHOS-24, 25

Governor Jindal Generalized Disaster Frames
- Louisianans have endured frustrations and economic upheavals; SBA’s poor job accentuating and prolonging pain; pessimism about the chances of Gulf ever returning to normal; and causing widespread mental health problems → DHOS-1, 2, 5, 11
- BP not being transparent about its claims process by granting access; being unresponsive and stingy after 64 days to fishers and small business; failing to cooperate/do all they can to help DHOS victims by giving answers/plans or resources; and refusing to pay for mental health care → DHOS-2, 3, 7, 11
- Federal government’s 6-month moratorium is causing a second disaster (lost wages, rigs moving elsewhere); its bureaucracies and partisanship getting in the way of local solutions; SBA is doing a poor job → DHOS-4, 14, 2
- Fishers and small businesses have especially been hit hard by DHOS, thereby damaging communities, and this will continue even after the well is capped → DHOS-3, 5, 6
- Natural environment is and will continue to be damaged ever after the well is capped → DHOS-5
- DHOS will not be over until the environment is completely cleaned up and every effected industry is operating at 100% → DHOS-8
- DHOS is exacerbating and renewing damages wrought by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita → F-9, 13
- DHOS jeopardizing years of hard work to stop and reverse decades of coastal deterioration negatively impacting various fishing industries → DHOS-10
- Claims process should be "fair, consistent, and communicated [well] to the public" → DHOS-12
- Federal government should share OCS profits with Louisiana and fund coastal restoration projects it has already authorized; should honour federal court judge’s ruling against moratorium for the sake of Louisiana's economy and employment → DHOS-13, 4

REAs Generalized Disaster Frames
- Federal government acted to prevent another DHOS b/c 11 men died; DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should switch to renewables → DHOS-1, 23
- DHOS rendered oil industry’s no-spill record worthless, and has called into question federal practices; oil industry overconfident and hubristic, operating under certainty that a major spill could never happen, and thus cutting corners to cut costs; BP is not alone—the entire oil industry is to blame for DHOS by having a culture that does not respect safety or the environment → DHOS-2, 5, 15
Changes needed to make offshore safe again must include entire region because of interconnection with oil; DHOS proves the folly of no local input, thus RCACs should be created to guide resource use, balance OC hegemony; local communities must be brought aboard to provide local input into full ecosystem damages assessments → DHOS-2, 9, 7

GRN’s independent monitoring reveals that BP’s and federal response very poor, especially compared to scale of spill...and this does not take into account BP’s lying about its actions; DHOS threatening to undo 15 years of GRN work to restore lost/damaged coastline by despoiling beaches and wetlands, and killing marine life and birds; DHOS has recommitted GRN to fighting for coastal restoration → DHOS-3, 4, 16

DHOS threatening to undo 15 years of GRN work to restore lost/damaged coastline by despoiling beaches and wetlands, and killing marine life and birds; DHOS has caused considerable damage to Gulf’s ecosystem, and the long-term impacts may be significant → DHOS-4, 12

DHOS has called into question federal practices; meanwhile, MMS failed to do its job; federal and state governments are responsible for failed oversight → DHOS-2, 5, 25

BP’s and federal response very poor, especially compared to scale of spill...and this does not take into account BP’s lying about its actions; BP is a bad corporate actor because it blocks independent monitoring (because it would reveal their lies); BP is pouring a million gallons of dispersant into GoM even though the stuff does not help; BP is trying to hide important information about long-term impacts by forcing responders to sign non-disclosure agreements; BP’s response to DHOS making both short- and long-term impacts worse; BP is responsible for DHOS → DHOS-3, 6, 13, 22, 24, 25

Louisiana’s coast already in trouble before DHOS due to wetland erosion and Katrina damage → DHOS-8

The world’s eyes are on Louisiana’s damaged coasts because of DHOS, and local voices should take advantage of this → DHOS-14

Nine months after DHOS began, the President no longer thinks it worth mentioning, except to rescind the helpful moratorium; a year after DHOS and its power to arouse has fizzled—no repair-work done, spill response still lousy; one year after DHOS and the lessons of DHOS are not being enacted → DHOS-10, 11, 17

DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should switch to renewables; DHOS should be an opportunity to get disaster response right and to switch to renewables → DHOS-23, 26

BP is lying about its cleanup/mitigative actions; BP's statements [probably] do not match with reality → DHOS-3, 6

DHOS response “abysmal,” proving that response capabilities must be set up before drilling can resume → DHOS-7

Full ecosystem assessments must be done to guide restoration → DHOS-7

CCA has never encountered such a terrible human-caused disaster—its members may end up giving up on the Gulf → DHOS-18

DHOS so bad that only federal and responsible parties have the resources to respond, and they should provide them → DHOS-19

DHOS may be big, but that will not prevent it from being beaten → DHOS-20

Commercial fishing is not the only fishing industry being damaged by DHOS—recreational fishing being hit, hard, perhaps worse → DHOS-21

BP/Halliburton/Transocean Generalized Disaster Frames

Transocean is thoroughly investigating what caused the spill by working with BP and the government to get “satisfactory answers,” but not “premature...conclusions” → DHOS-1, 3

BP committing to pay all legitimate claims in “simple [and] fair” way → DHOS-2
Expressing sorrow and regret that DHOS happened at all \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4

Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames

- Committee on Natural Resources reviewing OCS because evidence says MMS colluded with oil industry, falsifying reports and committing other infractions, and that MMS pervaded with a culture of "rationalized groupthink" \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-1
- DHOS's scope and scale means that the consequences of oil and dispersant will effect/impact the interconnected systems of nature and humanity for years to come \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2
- DHOS is the culmination of BP's history of accidents stemming from choosing profit over safety, and BP now compounding this by not being forthcoming about spill \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-3
- America must not tolerate BP's history of accidents stemming from choosing profit over safety, but make sure BP pays for any/all damages and decide whether they should be allowed back in GoM; nation must take the opportunity to rethink its energy policy ("this made rush to drill") in a depoliticized way, bring responsible forward, prevent another, and make the oil industry upgrade its cleanup technology \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-3, 10
- Federal response to DHOS inadequate and unacceptable because it relied too much on BP (responsible for spill), made rash decisions not based on facts (moratorium, disbanding MMS, stopping leasing), and failed to uncover technical cause of DH blowout, fire, sinking, and oil escape, jeopardizing organisms and livelihoods; making a hypocrite of itself by not demonstrating the transparency it demands of others (not providing CNR with documents) \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4, 12
- Federal should stop assigning blame and creating more bureaucracies, "indefinitely delaying the production of our Nation's energy reserves," and own-up \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4
- DHOS has reversed decision to open up Atlantic coast to oil development, and this should be made permanent because if GoM cannot even handle a huge spill, what chance elsewhere? \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-5
- DHOS proves that while drilling technology has advanced considerably in the past decades, safety regulations and clean up technology is the same as it was in 1969; OI must upgrade its clean up technology \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-6, 10
- Oil industry and federal working together and using massive amounts of resources to end DHOS quickly and satisfactorily \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-7
- DHOS is devastating GoM's fishing industry and fishers need immediate financial compensation for their losses to ensure that the industry still exists once the spill is over \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-8
- Federal government made rash decisions not based on facts; DHOS response should be based on facts, evidence, and truth to achieve educated reforms, not emotion, knee-jerk blaming, and political opportunism, if to help people, economy, and environment of Gulf thrive again; oil industry and some members of the CNR consider DHOS an "outlier" event that is an exception to the long history of no-spills in GoM \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4, 9, 19
- DHOS has killed people, destroyed resources, and unleashed long-term consequences for Gulf's economy; people all along Gulf Coast who depend on it for their lives have been socially and economically upended by DHOS; DHOS has wrought terrible ecological impacts to Gulf \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-10, 12, 13
- Thoroughly investigating all aspects of DHOS will prevent another \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-11
- Knee-jerk moratorium and calls to end oil production are making DHOS worse in the form of jobs lost, oil and gas production amounts decreased, and rigs departing for foreign waters \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-12
- Only massive, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate ecological hit to Gulf, and a good model would be ACC work \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-13
- DHOS could be "game changer" in how offshore energy is managed because of all the revelations → DHOS-14
- Federal policy and regulators did not push oil industry to implement safeguards; federal enabled oil industry’s complacency, overconfidence, and carelessness → DHOS-14, 16
- DHOS the result of the oil industry’s culture of mismanagement (aided and abetted by federal government)—something it refuses to acknowledge, proved by its push to expand drilling—epitomized by “knowingly” not implementing safeguards (which federal policy and regulators did not push for); DHOS and 11 deaths caused largely by oil industry’s complacency, overconfidence, and carelessness (all enabled by federal); oil industry executives not being honest and transparent with American people → DHOS-14, 16, 17
- DHOS has spawned a host of unanswered questions, such as should federal accept BP's offer to pay all costs, could mandating pre-drilled relief wells have mitigated DHOS, and how can full spectrum of scientific skill be better utilized → DHOS-15
- America is judging oil executives on a) how fast they can stop the spill, b) how well and quick they can mitigate the damages done to the state and local communities, and c) their honesty and transparency to the American people → DHOS-17
- Science has been, is, and will continue to be important to DHOS response → DHOS-18

President Obama Generalized Disaster Frames
- Recovering from DHOS far from over even though oil flow has stopped; Administration will not abandon Gulf, will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to respond/end DHOS and ensure complete recovery, just as it has been doing since Day 1; recovery is necessary, requiring long-term commitment → DHOS-1, 2, 11
- DHOS has thrown Gulfer’s lives into turmoil, threatening not only their livelihoods, but their very ways of life; DHOS unprecedented because it has shaken a region’s economy, damaged its environment, and jeopardized 1000s of livelihoods; DHOS is causing significant economic losses throughout Gulf, especially to fishers and small businesses because of ecological damage, threatening a collapse of the industry and a way of life; DHOS is a human, economic, and environmental disaster; lives lost, businesses damaged, communities forced into greater hardship → DHOS-1, 9, 10, 13, 15
- DHOS is a wake-up call to nation that energy security must include alternative energies and new transport technologies → DHOS-3
- Marine and coasts require constant vigilance → DHOS-3
- Of DHOS’s many lessons, one is that oil production should only be allowed if there are assurances that another DHOS cannot/will not happened, oil industry not allowed back into GoM until this provided; DW drilling in GoM should only continue if oil industry can supply assurances of no more DHOS → DHOS-4, 15
- Purpose of President’s Commission is to find the cause of DHOS that killed 11, and recommend preventions → DHOS-5
- President considers BP financially and legally responsible for DHOS and therefore is obligated to repair damages to families, communities, and environment in addition to following federal’s directives → DHOS-6
- President demands to know why laws were not enforced, what laws worked/did not during response, and what can break regulator-oil industry compact → DHOS-7
- DHOS response is the largest single effort in US history to protect and clean up the environment; is largest response in US history → DHOS-8, 9
- DHOS latest disaster to hit Gulf in recent years, and people will be battling oil for months, perhaps years → DHOS-11
- Thousands of ordinary people have come out to help → DHOS-12
Oil industry has grown so powerful, basing itself on big risks for big profits, that it regulates itself → DHOS-14

BP spending tens of millions to repair its image → DHOS-16

Ninety days into DHOS, and although everybody wants clean water, can’t take short-term action that will cause long-term problems → DHOS-17

Scientists 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames

- DHOS’s impacts are not restricted to the human environment, but will nevertheless end up doing so because of the interconnectivity of nature-humanity → DHOS-1
- The lack of interface between academia and federal agencies is a) hampering DHOS response and b) not reducing the risk of spills anywhere in the world → DHOS-2
- DHOS response poor because of a lack of knowledge, both baseline and current → DHOS-3
- DHOS is impacting livelihoods, and disproportionately those of the disadvantaged → DHOS-4
- DHOS exposes the incompatibility of restoring the coast and increasing offshore production → DHOS-5
- Mississippi River should be used to push oil from Louisiana’s coastline, but years of BAU mismanagement has prevented this → DHOS-6
- Everybody is to blame for DHOS because a) everybody uses energy produced in GoM and b) everybody ignored the ecological situation → DHOS-7
- DHOS may have been caused by how the entire offshore system managed because that system is based on efficiency, not safety → DHOS-8

Sierra Club 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames

- To spare other America’s other coasts for spills, oceans afire, and oil-threatened habitat, President should issue moratorium; leaders must prove they get the oil-is-unwise message by reinstating national moratorium; DHOS proves that offshore is inherently unsafe, thus justifying a blanket moratorium on new offshore; only way to prevent another DHOS is to keep Eastern GoM and Atlantic Coast out of 5-year drilling plan → DHOS-1, 10, 13, 27
- DHOS proves that oil is dirty, deadly, and outdated; spill is a wake-up call for America to “wean [itself] from dirty oil;” DHOS proves that offshore is inherently dangerous; DHOS proves that oil is “dirty, dangerous, and deadly” → DHOS-2, 5, 13, 15
- Because DHOS proves oil is 3Ds, nation must reject oil industry, break addiction, and realize a CE economy; adding stronger safeguards will not get to root of the problem, which is America’s unacceptable oil addiction, and President should deliver a plan to get nation off oil within 20 years; DHOS is a wake-up call for Americans to "wean [it]self[f] from dirty oil," rethink nation’s energy policy, and start achieving a CE future; DHOS has outraged Americans, who demand that leaders end nation’s oil dependence; leaders must deliver a plan to wean America off oil; only way to prevent another DHOS is to reform "outdated energy policy" and end oil addiction; missing family members exemplifies why oil must come to an end; DHOS represents the "rock bottom" of America's oil addiction, going CE would be clean, safe, and good for the economy; as long as offshore exists, there is a DHOS risk, and that is why nation should convert to CE; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills, only ending oil addiction will → DHOS-2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 26
- BP cheated; BP’s spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of 1000s; DHOS is BP’s fault because they did not purchase equipment that could have prevented the spill, and because they mishandled the response; BP is failing to staunch the oil flow → DHOS-3, 4, 8, 21
- MMS let BP cheat; MMS proved to be in oil industry's pocket, and thus cannot do its job → DHOS-3, 13
- Fixes via adding stronger safeguards will not solve problem; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills → DHOS-3, 26
- Fishing and tourism have been especially impacted by DHOS; DHOS is hurting the working families in the fishing and tourism industries the most, both in the short-term via job losses and in the long-term via the economic consequences of the spill on their livelihoods—they should be fully compensated for all financial, legal, and health costs → DHOS-3, 26
- BP should be prosecuted for their malfeasance and made to pay compensation for their wilful negligence/all damages; DHOS is BP's fault and they should pay for the entire cleanup, compensate every victim, and pay for every destroyed national treasure; leaders must keep holding BP responsible for DHOS → DHOS-4, 8, 10
- BP's spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of countless 1000s of people; DHOS continues to inflict suffering on Gulf communities; DHOS disaster continues in the form of job losses; DHOS impacted people regardless of culture or race → DHOS-4, 14, 23, 25
- There are 1000s of rigs off America's coasts, and the oil industry receives millions in subsidies per year, and they get to call the shots; oil industry, as a whole, ultimately to blame for DHOS because for years, in exchange for billions in profits, they fostered a culture of no accountability, poor preparation for DHOS-size spills, and lacking worker and environmental safety; oil industry has been "skirting safety regulations and lobbying against clean energy for years;" DHOS continues to inflict suffering on Gulf communities, yet oil industry is determined to resume drilling, inviting another DHOS; root of the problem is the "lopsided relationship" between oil industry and "hardworking Americans;" → DHOS-5, 7, 8, 14, 17
- Already got CE technology, just need political will; CE solutions already exists, all that is required is for President to know that people are ready to stand up to oil industry → DHOS-5, 20
- Oil industry's influence continues to be powerful, blocking Gulf Coast recovery, prevention of future spills, and imitating CE economy; bills to hold BP accountable, action to reform OCS and prevent future spills blocked because of oil industry influence over a handful of senators; oil industry working hard to prevent America's entry into CE economy → DHOS-6, 12, 18
- DHOS's silver lining is that some energy-smart legislation has passed, an Arctic moratorium has been enacted, and oversight reviews have been initiated; leaders finally getting the message that continued reliance on oil is unwise → DHOS-9, 10
- DHOS supposed to be a wake-up call, but despite toxic pollution, livelihoods ruined, health jeopardized, bills to hold BP accountable being blocked and little action to reform OCS; DHOS is a wake-up call, but leaders are not heeding it → DHOS-12, 26
- Better safety regulations could have prevented DHOS → DHOS-17
- Struggling Oiled Pelican symbolized America's attempt to achieve CE → DHOS-19
- After DHOS, BAU cannot be accepted → DHOS-19
- Federal government is not doing enough to force BP to prepare for and respond to DHOS → DHOS-21
- Even with the oil-flow stopped, the disaster continues via fish kills, and the oil on the shores and ocean bottom → DHOS-23
- Because of the scope/scale of DHOS and the damage it caused, oil industry must be held fully financially accountable with a portion of their profits going towards paying for cleanup, protection, and restoration → DHOS-24

Sol Salazar Generalized Disaster Frames
- DHOS proves how important it is to a) continue with the reforms of past 1.5 years and b) expand on them and ignore oil industry objections → DHOS-1
- Shell denied the go-ahead to drill in Arctic → DHOS-2
  - Because of DHOS, DoI is increasing inspections, investigating the root causes of the spill, more thoroughly examining exploration plans, and reforming MMS to make offshore safe; DoI doing everything within its power to respond and protect/restore what's been damaged, even changing its plans; DoI has been aggressive in its response, even at Day 11 mark; DoI is helping people harmed by DHOS and learning lessons to prevent another → DHOS-2, 4, 6, 7

- BP caused DHOS; BP did not prepare for disaster of DHOS magnitude because of gap between drilling technology and cleanup technology → DHOS-3, 12
  - SoI has been doing his duty for American people by holding BP accountable for all damages and costs; due to the nature of DHOS, and to prevent another, SoI has brought in NAE for independent, science-based investigation of the spill's causes; President has charged SoI to alleviate Americans' lost confidence in offshore safety by evaluating safety and to make improvements → DHOS-3, 5, 8

- DHOS is damaging the nation → DHOS-4

- Americans not confident that offshore is safe or that DHOS will not happen again → DHOS-8

- Preliminary findings from DHOS investigations are good enough to base "initial decisions" on → DHOS-9

- DHOS requires a) a massive response and b) a "cautious approach" to boost safety and oversight → DHOS-10

- DHOS happened despite oil industry's good track record and conducting of inspections because the evidence suggests the prevalence of "industry-wide risks;" oil industry did not prepare for disasters of DHOS's magnitude; DHOS caused by systemic management failure → DHOS-11, 12, 5

- DHOS happened because of the gap between drilling technology and knowledge and cleanup T&K → DHOS-12

State Actors 2010 Generalized Disaster Frames

- DHOS has killed and injured many and they must not be forgotten as Louisiana mobilizes every resource to respond → DHOS-1

- Attorney General will seek legal recourse; he will seek as much financial restitution as possible for Louisianans for the damages they have suffered → DHOS-1, 3

- DHOS is threatening coastal Louisiana’s very way of life; it is wreaking terrible damage to state’s fishing industry because of bad PR → DHOS-2, 4

- DHOS is a hum-caused disaster, and BP making it worse by refusing to test fish until “greater losses” seen → DHOS-4

- BP DHOS is acknowledged as the worst environmental disaster in history → DHOS-5

- All the “emphasis, resources, and energy” are going towards “administrative and legal proceedings arising from DHOS” → DHOS-6

- The “unnecessary use of the toxin Corexit dispersant” is a second disaster for Gulf, and it is not being acknowledged; use of Corexit being ignored; independent science has determined that Corexit is toxifying waters and not evaporating or being digested → DHOS-5, 6, 7

Democratic Senator Landrieu Generalized Disaster Frames

- DHOS reaction must be calm and measured to get the “right lesson” to make the “wisest decisions;” although spill is terrible, and improvements to the system are required, must maintain perspective—most oil is harvested without spills, natural seeps introduce far more oil than even DHOS, America needs oil, should not export potential spills to ill-equipped countries → DHOS-1, 9
- DHOS proves why it is important that Gulf States receive their fair share of Gulf OCS revenues → DHOS-2
- DHOS is a human-caused disaster → DHOS-2, 16
- DHOS proves why it is important that federal bureaucracy be dismantled—inadequate and slow, prevents state efforts to protect and restore their states (barriers); claims process should be free of needless technicalities and complicatedness → DHOS-2, 3
- Federal imposed DW moratorium is a second disaster for Gulf, making 1000s of businesses suffer (making that of wildlife insignificant); Louisiana’s energy production threatened by federal moratorium → DHOS-5, 13
- Fishers are suffering economic and emotional turmoil because of DHOS, and deserve fair, full, and simple compensation for all damages; DHOS has severely impacted Louisiana’s fishing and tourism industries, so no moratorium → DHOS-3, 13
- If federal government does not respond appropriately to DHOS, the consequences will be bad, but if continue to ignore deteriorating coastline, then communities, economy, and ways of life are done for → DHOS-4
- Louisianans proud of energy contribution, but suffer the cost → DHOS-4
- Faultlessly, 1000s of businesses are suffering economic damage, and Congress must not make them pay for that out of pocket or go bankrupt waiting for BP compensation → DHOS-6
- DHOS causing a tax nightmare, but that is no excuse for blocking financial aid → DHOS-15
- BP is responsible for all economic and psych damages caused by DHOS, and should be using local know-how and motivation; BP’s compensation → DHOS-7, 6
- DHOS is an unprecedented spill threatening/causing significant harm to the environment and economy of America’s working coast, hitting nation, too; DHOS a disaster because it has killed and is threatening the economy and environmental sustainability → DHOS-8, 8a, 10
- DHOS another disaster threatening communities, businesses, and families, but with help something can be done; disasters have struck Louisiana before and its people have persevered → DHOS-11, 12
- Before DHOS, Landrieu tried to get everybody together to discuss protecting, restoring, and conserving coastal Louisiana → DHOS-14
- Need a balance between improving safety and oil industry’s importance to Louisiana’s economy and America’s energy security → DHOS-13

Republican Senator Vitter Generalized Disaster Frames
- DHOS has hurt small biz → DHOS-1
- SBA should not be making things worse by demanding payments when consequences of spill make that impossible, but instead should be allowing deferred payments and not denying so many loan applications; Dept of Commerce Secretary should declare a fisheries disaster because of the importance of Gulf fishing to national economy; BP should/must provide written assurance that they will pay for all costs caused by DHOS, and federal should give majority of this money to Gulf states so they can invest in coastal restoration; the interface between decision makers and spill-effected people should continue; Gulf banks should be helping Gulf/Louisiana people by relaxing their rules (restructure loans, waive late-fees, hasten loan decisions) so repayment not required now, but when BP money starts arriving → DHOS-1, 2, 4, 6, 8
- DHOS has severely impacted Gulf’s fishing industry → DHOS-2
- It has been almost a year since DHOS began, yet no money has been invested to restore GoM → DHOS-2a
- DHOS threatening Louisiana’s coastal wetlands; DHOS is/has "environmentally devastated" Gulf; DHOS effecting/oiling wildlife → DHOS-3, 5, 7

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- Plan to mitigate DHOS damage to wetlands being held up by federal environmental review, which breaks President’s promise to be "fully responsive" and to "do whatever it takes to protect [the] marshes;" the "job-killing moratorium" imposed by the President and "his environmental extremist allies...try[ing] to advance their anti-drilling agenda" making disaster worse; Secretary of Navy Mabus is in a position to influence Gulf restoration and recovery, but he is not taking meetings → DHOS-3, 5, 9
- "Job-killing moratorium" is impacting Louisiana’s economy by driving jobs overseas; DHOS is economically devastating people of Gulf/Louisiana → DHOS-5, 8
- Moratorium and making US more dependent on foreign oil → DHOS-5
- Throughout DHOS, decision makers and spill-effected people have been interfacing → DHOS-6
- Need to "educate environmental groups and other stakeholders to make sure that facts dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas → DHOS-6
- Need a robust PR campaign to inform people that GoM seafood is safe → DHOS-6
- Oiled wildlife not being adequately helped during DHOS → DHOS-7

REAs Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- Independent (response) monitoring is essential because DHOS is likely be worst in US history → DHOS-1
- DHOS proves that current system of offshore energy management is broken because there have been many accidents, and permitting is permissive → DHOS-2

Other Political Actors 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- MMS’s flaws makes it necessary to completely review how OCS managed → DHOS-1
- BP not appreciating just how much oil is pouring into GoM even though they are important to determining how much boom and dispersant should be used → DHOS-2
- DHOS damaging/jeopardizing the $700 billion per year GoM fishing industry and its 185,000 jobs; people need compensation and restoration of faith → DHOS-3
- Asking of Transocean whether they will fund scientific analysis that could benefit Gulf’s environment → DHOS-4
- Another DHOS is sure to happen if the Commission’s recommendations are not followed → DHOS-5

Scientists 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- How DHOS is the second catastrophe to hit Louisiana (after Katrina), and that this has the added twist of being caused by BP’s desire for profit over technological prudence → DHOS-1

Sierra Club 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- BP should not be subject to a liability-limit because the spill damages are not limited → DHOS-1
- President should spare no resource responding to DHOS → DHOS-2
- DHOS has killed people and destroyed the environment, and the economy therefore, President should place a moratorium on new offshore drilling → DHOS-3
- DHOS is so big that cleaning it up is impossible, and this is not helped by the fact that the response is inadequate to the scale of the spill → DHOS-4
- DHOS is debilitating the entire Gulf Coast by destroying jobs and causing psychological trauma and environmental destruction → DHOS-5

State Actors 2010 Generalized Catastrophe Frames
- DHOS has wreaked death and suffering upon Louisianans who depend on GoM’s natural resources, which were already in trouble → DHOS-1
- People think fish are not safe to eat → DHOS-2
- BP not honoring commitment to Gulf by testing and publicizing fish as safe to eat → DHOS-2

Republican Senator Vitter Generalized *Catastrophe* Frames
- DHOS has severely damaged Louisiana’s fishing industry, requiring resources from every level to repair → DHOS-1
- Louisiana’s and America’s economic future in peril because some Senators are using DHOS to “let a handful of bureaucrats at the EPA” impose cap and tax → DHOS-2
Appendix G: Action-Oriented Generalized CDC Frames from SBOS and DHOS

The following lists all the action-oriented generalized frames from SBOS and DHOS, taken from the Appendix F.

SBOS – Crisis – Action-oriented Generalized Frames

- GOO!
  - Null
- Other Political Actors
  - SBOS jeopardizing SB’s future economic well-being, especially in terms of the unknown indirect economic effects; only by President declaring SB a disaster area can things be stopped from getting worse → SBOS-2
- President Nixon
  - Demonstrating that he is taking SBOS seriously by personally appointing an investigatory panel → SBOS-1
- Scientists
  - The unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the oil industry, and how it does not serve the interests of America; need a system that breaks the federal-oil industry collusion and protects the environment from exploitation → SBOS-2, 3
- Sierra Club
  - Drilling in SBC should remain subject to a moratorium until the results of public, participatory decision-making come in → SBOS-1
- Sol Hickel
  - Assures that the federal government is doing everything in its power to respond to SBOS → SBOS-1

DHOS – Crisis – Action-oriented Generalized Frames

- REAs
  - Calling DHOS a ‘spill’ fails to capture it—it is Exxon Valdez several times over, and will require years of response → DHOS-1
  - Sound response holds the promise of creating RCACs, just as Exxon Valdez did in Alaska → DHOS-2
  - BP liability money should be invested into existing, but under-resourced coastal restoration initiatives → DHOS-3
  - The federal government should take advantage of DHOS, using it to break America’s fossil fuel addiction → DHOS-5
- Other Political Actors
  - President’s only priority should be stopping the oil flow, and thinking about anything else would lead to hasty decisions that will cost jobs → DHOS-3
  - Federal government using every resource in its arsenal to respond to DHOS; it will hold BP responsible → DHOS-4
- President Obama
  - Refuting that the federal response to DHOS has been slow and inadequate and assuring that it is “singularly focused” on the spill, doing all that can be done since Day 1; fed is and will do whatever it takes, use whatever resource for as long as it takes to stop crisis and help people of Gulf; federal is in it for the long-term, staying to help Gulfers for as long as DHOS continues to effect → DHOS-1, 2, 4
  - The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the spill is so vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again → DHOS-3, 7
Prez will make BP pay; Prez will relentlessly pursue responsible parties for full compensation, and hold federal fully accountable for its part \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-2, 9

- DHOS revealing how inadequate, broken, and unenforced OCS system is, hurting an already injured region, and therefore calls for systemic overhaul of OCS; how oil industry and federal conducted offshore will be overhauled to root out flaws; \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-5, 10
- Gulf Coast will be made better than before \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-10

- Scientists
  - DHOS response is being derailed by lack of resources, lack of knowledge about ecosystem functionings, and the oil industry withholding vital information; no systems-wide approach to dealing with coastal-ocean ecology \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-4, 5, 1
  - Progressive response to DHOS and future spills can only be achieved by using all talent and resources \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-7

- Sierra Club
  - America is addicted to oil, and is at a turning point, needing assurances that another DHOS does not happen and kicking oil over next 20 years \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-1

- SoI Salazar
  - DHOS should be a turning point, something descendents can look to and say that is when America changed how it used energy, the creation of CE economy using America \(\rightarrow\) DHOS-4

SBOS – Disaster – Action-oriented Generalized Frames

- Audubon
  - Null.

- Government Reports
  - Null.

- Governor Reagan
  - Even though SBOS took place on OCS on federal leases operating under federal regulations, SoC will suspend its state oil operations until a review has been completed \(\rightarrow\) SBOS-2

- GOO!
  - Future generations will laud those (such as Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution) who put needs of many above the profiteering few by putting an end to oil development in SBC; only way to guarantee another spill does not happen is to follow the will of 50,000 petitioners calling for oil development ban in SBC; only way to guarantee end of threat of pollution is to ban and remove oil development from "esthetically vulnerable" SBC \(\rightarrow\) SBOS-1, 7, 8
  - Even though GOO! only seeking to remove oil development from SBC, their efforts have piqued the nation—they do not want to see another SBOS; GOO! is supported by people across the country and world \(\rightarrow\) SBOS-2, 14
  - Even though SoI admits oil development in SBC a mistake, he is nevertheless trying to continue it by talking tougher regulations and clarifying cleanup responsibilities; SoI has resumed oil development in SBC; Hickel guilty of resuming oil development in SBC; resumption of oil development in SBC unsurprising because of "weight of tradition" \(\rightarrow\) SBOS-8, 9, 13, 18

- Union Oil
  - Null.

- Other Political Actors
  - For pro-legislation for oil and water pollution, SBOS is proof-positive why more federal powers are required to ensure clean water, no oil pollution, and "careful site selection and effective [clean up] authorization;" provisions, such as depletion
allowances, should be discontinued so as to make oil companies pay their fair share of income tax; took SBOS to alert Congress to need for conservation legislation; thanks to SBOS, Senate has finally passed legislation (after three years of effort) that give President power to impose financial liability on oil companies for their oil pollution, and authority to clean up spills → SBOS-2, 3, 7, 8
  - Federal government paying 1 billion to buy back SBC leases to prevent another SBOS is worth more than having a "dead sea" off SoCal; only way to end the spill is for the federal government to acknowledge that SBns' right to oil pollution free life is greater than oil companies' right to profit-by-leasing, and therefore all oil development should be banned from SBC → SBOS-5, 9
  - SBOS has reaped a few certainties, but many uncertainties, and because of the latter, a moratorium should be enacted until "all reasonable precautions" are in place → SBOS-1
  - Teague wants President to declare SBC a disaster area because of risk of economic damage → SBOS-6

- President Nixon
  - The spill is serious enough to warrant a disaster declaration, bringing with it the federal government's full attention and resources → SBOS-1

- Scientists
  - Sol is allowing the resumption of drilling in SBC even though he does not understand tectonic data → SBOS-3
  - Tide of conservationism driving the oil industry into a corner; many Americans inspired to pay attention/notice environmental destruction and come to aid → SBOS-4, 9

- Sierra Club
  - Allowing citizens and associations to advise and act as watchdogs in future will give SBOS silver lining; the moratorium in SBC should remain until the results from DoI public hearings are in; public has the right to see the information Hickel based his resumption decision on → SBOS-1, 9, 14
  - Hickel's decision to resume oil production in SBC will cause another disaster; Sol has permitted drilling in SBC again; Hickel should rescind his back-to-drill permit; decision to resume drilling a worse idea than granting drilling in first place → DHOS-6, 8, 9, 13
  - Hickel should "review [the] fundamental issues" about the continuing SBOS; → SBOS-9
  - SBOS can only be resolved with legislation, ones that include a "comprehensive ecological strategy" for protecting balanced use of US's coasts → SBOS-12

- Sol Hickel
  - Future oil disasters will be prevented by the federal government and the oil industry working together to draft the best regulations possible; SBOS is so bad because current offshore regulations are inferior or non-existence, and by rectifying this, disasters like SBOS will not happen again → SBOS-1, 3, 4

- State Actors
  - Despite lack of spills in state waters, SLC reviewing its own house, in addition to federal's, anyway to make sure → DHOS-4
  - State government doing all it can to learn everything about SBOS to prevent another; legislation required to ensure that spills are better contained and mitigated; SBOS requires state to "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" only bipartisan support can prevent future SBOSs → SBOS-11, 12, 13, 14
  - Oil industry should confront the possibility of spills happening and have final recovery plans → SBOS-12
o State must "take decisive action to prevent future oil disasters;" in response to worst oil pollution disaster in continental US history, and to protect Californians, Attorney General speaking out in favour of Cranston's bill → SBOS-13, 15

- Democratic Senator Cranston
  o If appropriate, Congress should phase-out oil production from SBC; only way to prevent another SBOS is for federal governments (in partnership with state) to remove all oil development from SBC → SBOS-1, 6
  o Federal government and state must work together to prevent another SBOS in SBC; there should be no drilling in SBC until all parties come together to agree on "proper procedures" to end SBOS and prevent others → SBOS-6, 7
  o Because of the despoliation, people across US and world are asking why SBOS happened, and what Congress can do to prevent another; spill is raising questions about FG's ability to prevent future spills and whether oil production in SBC is "truly...in the national interest" → SBOS-9, 10

- Republican Senator Murphy
  o More knowledge and procedures can either prevent future spills or at least improve response; prevention or control and clean up of spills requires greater R&D investment → SBOS-1, 5

DHOS – Disaster – Action-oriented Generalized Frames

- Audubon
  o For coastal restoration to take place, society must deem it important; only immediate federal money can mitigate and restore the gulf Coast; America has a responsibility to protect and restore GoM; Gulf has long suffered from disaster, but because of DHOS, America has finally gotten the message that the region needs “long-term restoration;” a “legacy of optimism” is required to restore the Gulf, which itself requires fundamental change about how GoM is used to ensure future generations their bounty → DHOS-1, 2, 4, 5, 8
  o DHOS inspiring ordinary people to take responsibility by coming out to help with response effort → DHOS-3
  o Congress and Administration must enact Commission’s recommendations to improve and fix OCS system to make GoM healthy and productive for both humans and environment → DHOS-6

- Government Reports
  o DHOS is a complex disaster causing widespread mental health issues, leading to medical, social, and economic problems, and this requires complex solutions, from BP paying claims to PSAs stressing the importance of staying connected to ensuring seafood safety to monitoring care-giver states of mind; many Gulfers are stricken with health ailments, but oil spills have long been considered environmental problems, not health, so... → DHOS-4, 25
  o Administration can improve DHOS response by encouraging the integration of services, federal-state government interface to better utilize local knowledge of local contexts → DHOS-5
  o Federal’s recovery role is by facilitating economic recovery via assessments, analysis, technical assistance, bolstering seafood marketing, and fisheries assistance, which has already begun with dispatch to 21 economic recovery teams → DHOS-6
  o Due to the scale of DHOS, non-profits have been vital to response/recovery, and will continue to as short-term segues into long-term → DHOS-7
  o Oil industry must fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety and environmental practices (+ cleanup, preparation, management behaviour) to regain public trust and be allowed access to OCS; America must re-examine how it
produces and uses energy, and fundamentally reform the OCS system—beyond what has already been done—to ensure safety and prevention \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-9, 11

- **Governor Jindal**
  - Federal government’s 6-month moratorium is causing a second disaster (lost wages, rigs moving elsewhere); \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4
  - DHOS will not be over until the environment is completely cleaned up and every effected industry is operating at 100% \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-8
  - Claims process should be “fair, consistent, and communicated [well] to the public” \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-12
  - Federal government should share OCS profits with Louisiana and fund coastal restoration projects it has already authorized; should honour federal court judge’s ruling against moratorium for the sake of Louisiana’s economy and employment \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-13, 4

- **REAs**
  - Changes needed to make offshore safe again must include entire region because of interconnection with oil; DHOS proves the folly of no local input, thus RCACs should be created to guide resource use, balance OC hegemony; local communities must be brought aboard to provide local input into full ecosystem damages assessments; \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2, 9, 7, 44
  - DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should switch to renewables; DHOS should be an opportunity to get disaster response right and to switch to renewables \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-23, 26
  - DHOS response “abysmal,” proving that response capabilities must be set up before drilling can resume \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-7
  - Full ecosystem assessments must be done to guide restoration \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-7
  - DHOS so bad that only federal and responsible parties have the resources to respond, and they should provide them \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-19

- **BP/Halliburton/Transocean**
  - BP committing to pay all *legitimate* claims in “simple [and] fair” way \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2

- **Other Political Actors**
  - America must not tolerate BP’s profits over safety behaviour, but make sure BP pays for any/all damages and decide whether they should be allowed back in GoM; nation must take the opportunity to rethink its energy policy (“this made rush to drill”) in a depoliticized way, bring responsible forward, prevent another, and make the oil industry upgrade its cleanup technology \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-3, 10
  - FG should stop assigning blame and creating more bureaucracies, "indefinitely delaying the production of our Nation's energy reserves," and own-up \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4
  - DHOS has reversed decision to open up Atlantic coast to oil development, and this should be made permanent because if GoM cannot even handle a huge spill, what chance elsewhere? \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-5
  - OI and FG working together and using massive amounts of resources to end DHOS quickly and satisfactorily \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-7
  - DHOS is devastating GoM’s fishing industry and fishers need immediate financial compensation for their losses to ensure that the industry still exists once the spill is over \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-8
  - FG made rash decisions *not* based on facts; DHOS response should be based on facts, evidence, and truth to achieve educated reforms, not emotion, knee-jerk blaming, and political opportunism, if people, economy, and environment of GC are to be helped, made to thrive again; OI and some members of CNR consider DHOS an “outlier” event, an exception to the long history of no spills in GoM \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4, 9, 19
  - Thoroughly investigating all aspects of DHOS will prevent another \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-11
Only massive, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate ecological hit to Gulf, and a good model would be ACC work → DHOS-13

- **President Obama**
  
  - Recovering from DHOS far from over even though oil flow has stopped; Administration will not abandon Gulf, will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to respond/end DHOS and ensure complete recovery, just as it has been doing since Day 1; recovery is necessary, requiring long-term commitment → DHOS-1, 2, 11
  
  - DHOS is a wake-up call to nation that energy security must include alternative energies and new transport technologies → DHOS-3
  
  - Marine and coasts require constant vigilance → DHOS-3
  
  - Of DHOS’s many lessons, one is that oil production should only be allowed if there are assurances that another DHOS cannot/will not happened, oil industry not allowed back into GoM until this provided; DW drilling in GoM should only continue if oil industry can supply assurances of no more DHOSs → DHOS-4, 15
  
  - President considers BP financially and legally responsible for DHOS and therefore is obligated to repair damages to families, communities, and environment in addition to following federal’s directives → DHOS-6

- **Scientists**
  
  - Null

- **Sierra Club**
  
  - To spare other America’s other coasts from spills, oceans afire, and oil-threatened habitat, President should issue moratorium; leaders must prove they get the oil-is-unwise message by reinstating national moratorium; DHOS proves that offshore is inherently unsafe, thus justifying a blanket moratorium on new offshore; only way to prevent another DHOS is to keep Eastern GoM and Atlantic Coast out of 5-year drilling plan → DHOS-1, 10, 13, 27
  
  - DHOS proves that oil is dirty, deadly, and outdated; spill is a wake-up call for America to “wean [itself] from dirty oil;” DHOS proves that offshore is inherently dangerous; DHOS proves that oil is “dirty, dangerous, and deadly” → DHOS-2, 5, 13, 15
  
  - Because DHOS proves oil is 3Ds, nation must reject oil industry, break addiction, and realize a CE economy; adding stronger safeguards will not get to root of the problem, which is America's unacceptable oil addiction, and President should deliver a plan to get nation off oil within 20 years; DHOS is a wake-up call for Americans to "wean [it]self from dirty oil," rethink nation's energy policy, and start achieving a CE future; DHOS has outraged Americans, who demand that leaders end nation's oil dependence; leaders must deliver a plan to wean America off oil; only way to prevent another DHOS is to reform "outdated energy policy" and end oil addiction; missing family members exemplifies why oil must come to an end; DHOS represents the "rock bottom" of America's oil addiction, going CE would be clean, safe, and good for the economy; as long as offshore exists, there is a DHOS risk, and that is why nation should convert to CE; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills, only ending oil addiction will → DHOS-2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 26
  
  - BP cheated; BP's spill has killed people and jeopardized the livelihoods of 1000s, and they should be prosecuted; DHOS is BP’s fault because they did not purchase equipment that could have prevented the spill, and because they mishandled the response; BP is failing to staunch the oil flow → DHOS-3, 4, 8, 21
  
  - Fishing and tourism have been especially impacted by DHOS; DHOS is hurting the working families in the fishing and tourism industries the most, both in the short-term via job losses and in the long-term via the economic consequences of the spill on
their livelihoods—they should be fully compensated for all financial, legal, and health costs \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4, 11

- BP should be made to pay compensation for their willful negligence; DHOS is BP's fault and they should pay for the entire cleanup, compensate every victim, and pay for every destroyed national treasure; leaders must keep holding BP responsible for DHOS \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-4, 8, 10

- Already got CE technology, just need political will; CE solutions already exists, all that is required is for President to know that people are ready to stand up to oil industry \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-5, 20

- Oil industry's influence continues to be powerful, blocking Gulf Coast recovery, prevention of future spills, and initiating CE economy; bills to hold BP accountable, action to reform OCS and prevent future spills blocked because of oil industry influence over a handful of senators; oil industry working hard to prevent America's entry into CE economy \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-6, 12, 18

- Leaders finally getting the message that continued reliance on oil is unwise \( \rightarrow \) DHOS 10

- Because of the scope/scale of DHOS and the damage it caused, oil industry must be held fully financially accountable with a portion of their profits going towards paying for cleanup, protection, and restoration \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-24

- Sol Salazar
  - DHOS proves how important it is to a) continue with the reforms of past 1.5 years and b) expand on them and ignore oil industry objections \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-1
  - Because of DHOS, DoI is increasing inspections, investigating the root causes of the spill, more thoroughly examining exploration plans, and reforming MMS to make offshore safe; DoI doing everything within its power to respond and protect/restore what's been damaged, even changing its plans; DoI has been aggressive in its response, even at Day 11 mark; DoI is helping people harmed by DHOS and learning lessons to prevent another \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2, 4, 6, 7
  - DHOS requires a) a massive response and b) a "cautious approach" to boost safety and oversight \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-10

- State Actors
  - Attorney General will seek legal recourse; he will seek as much financial restitution as possible for Louisianans for the damages they have suffered \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-1, 3

- Democratic Senator Landrieu
  - DHOS reaction must be calm and measured to get the “right lesson” to make the “wisest decisions,” although spill is terrible, and improvements to the system are required, must maintain perspective—most oil is harvested without spills, natural seeps introduce far more oil than even DHOS, America needs oil, should not export potential spills to ill-equipped countries \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-1, 9
  - DHOS proves why it is important that Gulf States receive their fair share of Gulf OCS revenues \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2
  - DHOS proves why it is important that federal bureaucracy be dismantled—inefficient and slow, prevents state efforts to protect and restore their states (barriers); claims process should be free of needless technicalities and complicatedness \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-2, 3
  - Fishers are suffering economic and emotional turmoil because of DHOS, and deserve fair, full, and simple compensation for all damages; DHOS has severely impacted Louisiana's fishing and tourism industries, so no moratorium \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-3, 13
  - BP is responsible for all economic and psych damages caused by DHOS, and should be using local know-how and motivation; BP's compensation \( \rightarrow \) DHOS-7, 6
- Republican Senator Vitter
  - SBA should be allowing deferred payments and not denying so many loan applications; Dept of Commerce Secretary should declare a fisheries disaster because of the importance of Gulf fishing to national economy; BP should/must provide written assurance that they will pay for all costs caused by DHOS, and federal should give majority of this money to Gulf states so they can invest in coastal restoration; the interface between decision makers and spill-effected people should continue; Gulf banks should be helping Gulf/Louisiana people by relaxing their rules (restructure loans, waive late-fees, hasten loan decisions) so repayment not required now, but when BP money starts arriving → DHOS-1, 2, 4, 6, 8
  - Need to "educate environmental groups and other stakeholders to make sure that facts dominate, not theories or political and fundraising agendas → DHOS-6
  - Need a robust PR campaign to inform people that GoM seafood is safe → DHOS-6

SBOS – Catastrophe – Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- GOO!
  - Oil development should be banned and removed from SBC because there’s no evidence that another SBOS will not happen, and the only way this can happen is through citizen-power → DHOS-1
- Other Political Actors
  - Null.
- Scientists
  - Non-federal and non-OI actors getting involved in spill response → SBOS-1
- Sierra Club
  - The public should be a partner in decision making about environmental resource use, and not be at the federal government’s sole discretion → SBOS-1
  - Only solution is to support a bill to remove oil development from SBC completely; only banning all oil development in SBC can guarantee against another SBOS → SBOS-3, 4
- State Actors
  - Only by removing oil development from SBC and turning into a federal reserve can another SBOS be prevented → SBOS-1
  - Both the state and federal government, for the sake of Californians, must act quickly and decisively to protect the marine environment from SBOSs → SBOS-4
- Republican Senator Murphy
  - New laws and provisions needed to prevent oil spills because they are becoming common → SBOS-1

DHOS – Catastrophe – Action-oriented Generalized Frames
- REAs
  - Independent (response) monitoring is essential because DHOS is likely be worst in US history → DHOS-1
- Other Political Actors
  - MMS’s flaws makes it necessary to completely review how OCS managed → DHOS-1
  - DHOS damaging/jeopardizing the $700 billion per year GoM fishing industry and its 185,000 jobs; people need compensation and restoration of faith → DHOS-3
- Scientists
  - Null.
- Sierra Club
  o DHOS has killed people and destroyed the environment, and the economy therefore, President should place a moratorium on new offshore drilling → DHOS-3
- State Actors
  o Null
- Republican Senator Vitter
  o DHOS has severely damaged Louisiana’s fishing industry, requiring resources from every level to repair → DHOS-1
Appendix H: Indeterminate and No Correlation Generalized Action-Oriented CDC Frames

The following Tables present each spill’s and each CDC’s indeterminate and non-correlative results.

Table 1: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prez</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>Demonstrating that he is taking SBOS seriously by personally appointing an investigatory panel → SBOS-1</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sol</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Assures that the federal government is doing everything in its power to respond to SBOS → SBOS-1</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>SBOS jeopardizing SB’s future economic well-being, esp. in terms of the unknown indirect economic effects; only by President declaring SB a disaster area can things be stopped from getting worse → SBOS-2</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sci</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>The unhealthy relationship between DoI/USGS and the oil industry, and how it does not serve the interests of America; need a system that breaks the federal-oil industry collusion and protects the environment from exploitation → SBOS-2, 3</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The investigatory panel’s recommendation for better, stronger regulations had been made by Sol Hickel before the report was published, and the panel convened, and were presumably on the way to being accomplished by the time the panel released its results. At best, the panel clarified what regulations need be strengthened and what kind of new regulations should be drafted.

Not known if FG did all it could.

Mr. Nixon did not declare SB a disaster area.

The “unhealthy relationship” between DoI/USGS and OI continued after SBOS; in fact, it appeared to have strengthened, becoming absolutely intimate with the creation of MMS in 1981.

Table 2: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Crisis Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prez</th>
<th>14</th>
<th>Refutes that the FG response to DHOS has been slow and inadequate and assures that it is “singularly focused” on the spill, doing all that can be done since Day 1; FG is</th>
<th>I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Although it appeared that FG used every resource it had to stop the spill, whether it has followed this up for the cleanup, restoration, and protection phases cannot be definitely settled; FG scorecard is based on who one asks. FG, of course, thinks it has been doing well, but SC, local environmental
and will do whatever it takes, use whatever resource for as long as it takes to stop the crisis and help the people of GC; FG is in it for the long-term, staying to help Gulfers for as long as DHOS continues to effect → DHOS-1, 2, 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prez</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the spill is so vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again → DHOS-3, 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>The cleanup phase is now just ending for Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi (Texas, apparently did not need such an operation); restoration and protection will largely be up to the Gulf States, FG's biggest contribution being the outcome of CWA violations trial currently ongoing. Unknown if is/will make GC better than before.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sci</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>DHOS response is being derailed by lack of resources, lack of knowledge about ecosystem functionings, and the oil industry withholding vital information; no systems-wide approach to dealing with coastal-ocean ecology → DHOS-4, 5, 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sci</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Progressive response to DHOS and future spills can only be achieved by using all talent and resources → DHOS-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>The federal government should take advantage of DHOS, using it to break America's fossil fuel addiction → DHOS-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>America is addicted to oil, and is at a turning point, needing assurances that another DHOS does not happen and kicking oil over next 20 years → DHOS-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>DHOS should be a turning point, something descendents can look to and organizations, and residents are more muted. Determining FG effective action is complicated by the fact that on a gross, macro-level, DHOS did not appear to cause all that much damage—at least not the kind predicted during the spill's height. However, evidence is mounting that at the specific and micro-level, the impact on the Gulf has been profound (mutations; the discovery of vast mats of submerged oil).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although billions of dollars have so far been invested into GC response and recovery, with billions more on the way, it is unknown if any real progress has been made towards making the region whole again; there is the question of how the concept is even defined.

The devastating effect DHOS is having on the natural and human environment; the spill is so vast and terrible that the region must be made whole again → DHOS-3, 7

The cleanup phase is now just ending for Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi (Texas, apparently did not need such an operation); restoration and protection will largely be up to the Gulf States, FG's biggest contribution being the outcome of CWA violations trial currently ongoing. Unknown if is/will make GC better than before.

Although it is unlikely that OI has/will change its mind about sharing what it sees as proprietary information, there have been a number of donations to various science-based organisations and institutions, which will presumably be used to gain knowledge about ecosystem functionings and perhaps develop a systems-wide approach to dealing with coastal-ocean ecology; the most recent was a $55 million donation to NFWF made by Halliburton in the wake of being found guilty of destroying evidence about its faulty cementing (the donation was not a stipulation of the charge). As for resources, cannot say.

FG appears to be operating according to BAU: hoping that there will not be another spill, despite the risk being omnipresent due to continued oil production. No big spills since = cannot prove if did.

After a brief teething period, BOEMRE is granting leases in GoM's OCS at a brisk pace; oil production continues to grow throughout the lower 48 and Alaska, largely through the controversial technique of fracking.

Despite positive rhetoric by BOEMRE, etc., there has been and can be no assurance that another DHOS will not happen. No plan, or even commitment, has been offered to wean America off oil, within in any timeframe; in fact, domestic production, both offshore and onshore, appear to have increased.

Technically, such a determination cannot be made, a mere three years after DHOS, but many long-term outcomes arising/influenced by SBOS emerged.
say that is when America changed how it used energy, the creation of CE economy using America $\rightarrow$ DHOS-4 within three years, so in one way, this verdict can be made. The creation of CE economy does not appear to have advanced post-DHOS (although it does not appear to have retracted, either); and while the spill does not appear to have changed how America uses its energy, it seems that it has altered how it acquires its energy—namely increased domestic production, especially onshore in the form of fracking.

Table 3: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes

| SBOS | Subgroup | Other | SBOS-9 | AC | SBOS-9 | AC |
|------|----------|-------|--------|___|--------|___|
| SC   | 35 Hickel should “review [the] fundamental issues” about the continuing SBOS $\rightarrow$ SBOS-9 | I It largely rests on how one defines this and who is doing the defining: SC wanted oil development out of SBC, and therefore anything less than this constituted not “review[ing] the] fundamental issues” and not doing everything that could be done. Mr. Hickel, on the other hand, blamed the spill on a dearth of regulations, which was then rectified and therefore assuring him that the “fundamental issues” had been reviewed and he had indeed done all within his power. |
| GOO! | 24 Future generations will laud those (such as Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution) who put needs of many above the profiteering few by putting an end to oil development in SBC; only way to guarantee another spill does not happen is to follow the will of 50,000 petitioners calling for oil development ban in SBC; only way to guarantee end of threat of pollution is to ban and remove oil development from "esthetically vulnerable" SBC $\rightarrow$ SBOS-1, 7, 8 | N Although new state offshore production, in SBC and elsewhere along CA coast, has been prohibited since 1969, new federal offshore production, in SBC and elsewhere along CA coast, did not; what is more, oil production from existing platforms or leases has continued. However, the rate at which oil production has increased is almost zero; today, there are only about 25 platforms along the entirety of CA coast, almost half of which were installed pre-1969. |
| OPA  | 24 Federal government paying 1 billion to buy back SBC leases to prevent another SBOS is worth more than having a "dead sea" off SoCal; only way to end the spill is for the federal government to acknowledge that SBns' right to oil pollution free life is greater than oil companies' right to profit-by-leasing, and therefore all oil development | N FG did not buy back the leases or acknowledge that SB’s right to oil pollution free lives takes precedence over OI’s right to seek profit. On the other hand, oil production—at least, new production on new leases—was banned in SBC from 1981-2008 (though SBOS did not appear to loom large in that decision). |

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Column</th>
<th>Row</th>
<th>Text</th>
<th>Noted</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mr. Teague wants the President to declare SBC a disaster area because of risk of economic damage</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mr. Nixon did not declare SBC a disaster area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The spill is serious enough to warrant a disaster declaration, bringing with it the federal government's full attention and resources</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Despite his observation, Mr. Nixon ended up not declaring SBC a disaster area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>Allowing citizens and associations to advise and act as watchdogs in future will give SBSO silver lining; the moratorium in SBC should remain until the results from DoI public hearings are in; public has the right to see the information Hickel based his resumption decision on</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Citizen/association input in natural resource use, especially and including offshore oil, would not materialize until the early 1990s, when Alaska’s RCACs were legislated into being in the wake of Exxon Valdez. The moratorium on federal offshore production was not be renewed by Mr. Hickel; it would not be until 1981 that another federal moratorium would be enacted, and that only pertained to new leases produção. It is unknown if the public ever got to see the information Mr. Hickel used to base his back-to-drill decision on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Hickel's decision to resume oil production in SBC will cause another disaster; SBSO has permitted drilling in SBC again; Hickel should rescind his back-to-drill permit; decision to resume drilling a worse idea than granting drilling in first place</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Not only did Mr. Hickel not rescind his back-to-drill decision, but there has not been another spill of SBSO’S magnitude in SBC despite the continued presence of offshore oil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Despite continued oiling of shores, and wildlife harmed, SBSO is being brushed aside, deemed over, with no preventative measures being taken</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Although officially, SBSO was declared over, the spill continued to cause policy (a four-year, state moratorium; aided NEPA) and social reverberations (increased environmental awareness).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>SBSO can only be resolved with legislation, ones that include a “comprehensive ecological strategy” for protecting balanced use of US’s coasts</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>SBSO, itself, was finally resolved through petering out and fading from immediate memory (except for locals, especially GOO!; and except as a cultural memory of something that happened and fed into something larger). What is more, CA banning new leasing in state waters, the defacto-then-official federal moratorium, the passage of NEPA, and the growing environmental movement all represent an attempt at something like CES, but they failed to achieve critical mass and protect balanced use of US’s coasts: some areas are better protected than others, but for the most part, American coasts are not doing well.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| SA             | 41  | Oil industry should confront the possibility of spills happening and have final | N           | Oil did not, and continues, to not confront the possibility of spills happening and develop final recovery plans, despite claims and assurances to the
recovery plans $\rightarrow$ SBOS-12 contrary; their lack of success in spill mitigation, their use of antiquated techniques and strategies (dispersants, skimmers, burning) appear to prove this.

| Dem | 40 | Federal government and state must work together to prevent another SBOS in SBC; there should be no drilling in SBC until all parties come together to agree on "proper procedures" to end SBOS and prevent others $\rightarrow$ SBOS-6, 7 | N | FG and state did not actually come together to prevent another SBOS, nor did they agree on "proper procedures." What happened was that CA banned new oil leases in state waters (which continues into the present day), and then FG eventually included SBC OCS in its blanket moratorium on new leases for all of US's coasts except for GoM and parts of Alaska. |
| Dem | 24 | If appropriate, Congress should phase-out oil production from SBC; only way to prevent another SBOS is for FG (in partnership with CA) to remove all oil development from SBC $\rightarrow$ SBOS-1, 6 | N | Congress did not deem it appropriate to remove or even phase-out oil production from the SBC; on the other hand, said production has slowed almost to a stand-still because of the ongoing moratorium on new drilling in state waters, and the FG one for OCS waters. |
| Rep | 42 | More knowledge and procedures can either prevent future spills or at least improve response; prevention or control and clean up of spills requires greater R&D investment $\rightarrow$ SBOS-1, 5 | N | As proved by subsequent spills, whether from tankers or offshore, prevention and response procedures and technologies have not advanced much beyond what was available/used during SBOS. |

Table 4: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Disaster Frames and the Spill's Outcomes

<p>| Aud | 43 | For coastal restoration to take place, society must deem it important; only immediate federal money can mitigate and restore the gulf Coast; America has a responsibility to protect and restore GoM; Gulf has long suffered from disaster, but because of DHOS, America has finally gotten the message that the region needs &quot;long-term restoration;&quot; a &quot;legacy of optimism&quot; is required to restore the Gulf, which itself requires fundamental change about how GoM is used to ensure future generations their bounty $\rightarrow$ | I | DHOS brought to the forefront the Gulf Coast's—and in particular, Louisiana's—coastal degradation like nothing else before it: various actors have said that coastal restoration and protection is the primary thing that needs to be done, whether from and environmental, economic, or human POV; and the RESTORE Act dictates that 80% of BP's eventual CWA fines should go directly to the five Gulf states to fund coastal restoration. On the other hand, it is not known how ingenuous some of the actors were being; it is unknown just how much money the states will end up receiving (it depends on whether BP if found negligent ($5 billion) or grossly negligent ($20 billion)); and because the states have full discretionary power over how to use the money, it is unknown if every cent will actually go into coastal restoration. SC, for one, is worried that because all five states are Republican-controlled, what the money will actually be used for is up in the air. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aud</th>
<th>45</th>
<th>Congress and Administration must enact Commission’s recommendations to improve and fix OCS system to make GoM healthy and productive for both humans and environment</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>It is unknown if OCS system has been improved in the wake of DHOS, beyond breaking MMS into the three BOEMs—which was done before the Commission made its recommendations. Judging by the uptick in offshore oil leasing, especially the deepwater variety, it appears OI continues to occupy a favourable position in OCS management.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Administration can improve DHOS response by encouraging the integration of services, federal-state government interface to better utilize local knowledge of local contexts</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if Administration has acted on this Commission recommendation to integrate services and facilitate better FG-state interface to better utilize local knowledge. Perhaps the RESTORE Act is predicated on this, since the eventual CWA fines will go directly to the Gulf states so they can best and most efficiently put the money to use towards coastal restoration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>Federal's recovery role is by facilitating economic recovery via assessments, analysis, technical assistance, bolstering seafood marketing, and fisheries assistance, which has already begun with the dispatch of 21 economic recovery teams</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is not known if FG's economic recovery facilitating tactics outlived the actual spill.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Oil industry must fundamentally change how they operate vis-a-vis safety and environmental practices (+ cleanup, preparation, management behaviour) to regain public trust and be allowed access to OCS; America must re-examine how it produces and uses energy, and fundamentally reform the OCS system—beyond what has already been done—to ensure safety and prevention</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>In spite of OI claims that safety and environmental practices have been proved, past experience predicts that little to nothing has changed, except for them having to endure increased inspections that they can no longer influence (if BOEMRE is to be believed); and OI was allowed to resume operations in OCS regardless of public trust levels. Judging from the increase in onshore fracking and offshore deepwater leasing, it does not appear that America has re-examined how it produces energy (and unlikely not how it uses it, too), nor fundamentally reformed OCS system—unless breaking MMS into the three BOEMs counts as fundamental OCS reform (to FG, and even OI, it might).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Federal government’s 6-month moratorium is causing a second disaster (lost wages, rigs moving elsewhere); its bureaucracies and partisanship getting in the way of local solutions; SBA is doing a poor job</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>FG’s six-month moratorium does not appear to have caused any long-term economic damage; and whatever impact it did make appears to be getting mitigated by the swift pace of new GoM OCS leasing. The RESTORE Act appears to mitigate problems with bureaucracies and partisanship—at least at the federal level—by ensuring that eventual CWA fines go directly to the states so they can figure out how to use them. And whether SBA really did do a bad job, a good job, or was swamped by a sudden disaster and tried to do the best it could is unknown; since SBA is a federal bureaucracy, and since Mr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>DHOS will not be over until the environment is completely cleaned up and every effected industry is operating at 100% → DHOS-8</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Although it is a safe bet to say that the environment is not completely clean up, it is unknown if every effected industry is operating at 100%. Oil appears to be back on its feet, but what of fishing and tourism?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Claims process should be “fair, consistent, and communicated [well] to the public” → DHOS-12</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if the claims process was this; those who complained it was not may or may not have been speaking from a biased POV, or one with a definition of what it should mean being substantially higher than reality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Federal government should share OCS profits with Louisiana and fund coastal restoration projects it has already authorized; should honour federal court judge's ruling against moratorium for the sake of Louisiana's economy and employment → DHOS-13, 4</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if FG will share OCS profits with Louisiana or will/is fund/ing coastal restoration projects it has already authorized; FG did not, however, honour a federal court judge's ruling against a moratorium, instead re-working the brief and putting it before a different judge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAs</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Changes needed to make offshore safe again must include entire region because of interconnection with oil; DHOS proves the folly of no local input, thus RCACs should be created to guide resource use, balance OC hegemony; local communities must be brought aboard to provide local input into full ecosystem damages assessments; the world’s eyes are on Louisiana’s damaged coasts because of DHOS, and local voices should take advantage of this → DHOS-2, 9, 7, 44</td>
<td>I-N</td>
<td>It does not appear that the entire region/local input has been incorporated into making offshore production safe again or help guide resource use. Grassroots efforts to form a GoM RCAC have only recently begun in earnest (May 2013), and so far, OI will work with them (judging by their refusal to send representatives to the preliminary meeting). It is unknown if full ecosystem damages assessments are being made to guide present/future restorative action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAs</td>
<td>11/22</td>
<td>DHOS proves that America’s fossil fuel addiction is costing lives, and therefore nation should switch to renewables; DHOS should be an opportunity to get disaster response right and to switch to renewables → DHOS-23, 26</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>With the increase in fracking, oil shale, and deepwater, leasing/production, it is safe to say that America is not and will not be switching to renewables any time soon. It is unknown if DHOS has been taken as an opportunity to get disaster response ‘right.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|REAs| 57| DHOS response “abysmal,” proving that response capabilities must be set up| N| It is unlikely that in the year of slowdown between the end of the six-month moratorium on new deepwater drilling and the uptick in deepwater...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REAs</th>
<th>58</th>
<th>Full ecosystem assessments must be done to guide restoration → DHOS-7</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>It is unknown if full ecosystem damage assessments are being made to guide present/future restorative action.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>FG should stop assigning blame and creating more bureaucracies, &quot;indefinitely delaying the production of our Nation's energy reserves,&quot; and own-up → DHOS-4</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Although FG has continued to assign blame, and although it created three bureaucracies out of the former MMS, it has not formally 'owned-up' except for Mr. Obama mentioning, off-hand, that FG bore some responsibility for DHOS, and it does not appear to have significantly &quot;delay[ed] the production of [the] Nation's energy reserves&quot;—unless regulations and regulatory bodies of any stripe or kind contributes to a delay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>DHOS has reversed decision to open up Atlantic coast to oil development, and this should be made permanent because if GoM cannot even handle a huge spill, what chance elsewhere? → DHOS-5</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>Although DHOS led to Atlantic coast being made safe from short-term oil development, it is unknown if it will lead to a permanent ban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>DHOS is devastating GoM's fishing industry and fishers need immediate financial compensation for their losses to ensure that the industry still exists once the spill is over → DHOS-8</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if the immediate financial compensation—if indeed any was provided—ensured that the fishing industry remained afloat for the post-spill period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>FG made rash decisions not based on facts; DHOS response should be based on facts, evidence, and truth to achieve educated reforms, not emotion, knee-jerk blaming, and political opportunism, if people, economy, and environment of GC are to be helped, made to thrive again; OI and some members of CNR consider DHOS an &quot;outlier&quot; event, an exception to the long history of no spills in GoM → DHOS-4, 9, 19</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if this OPA's complaint is valid or the product of rabid partisanship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Thoroughly investigating all aspects of DHOS will prevent another → DHOS-11</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if DHOS investigation will prevent future spills. Judging by history, this is unlikely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPA</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Only massive, coordinated cooperation can hope to mitigate ecological hit to Gulf, and a good model would be ACC work → DHOS-13</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if massive, coordinated cooperation can or will mitigate the ecological damage done to the Gulf; it is equally unknown if the ACC model can or will be used—though due to the political climate of US, and especially the deep south, it is unlikely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Recovering from DHOS far from over even though oil flow has stopped; Administration will not abandon Gulf, will do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to respond/end DHOS and ensure complete recovery, just as it has been doing since Day 1; recovery is necessary, requiring long-term commitment → DHOS-1, 2, 11</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is difficult to ascertain the level of FG/Administration commitment to long-term Gulf recovery, especially because it depends on who is asked (who harbour differing opinions about FG action) and what long-term response is supposed to look like. According to the RESTORE Act, FG’s role is to get CWA fines from BP and hand it to the states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>DHOS is a wake-up call to nation that energy security must include alternative energies and new transport technologies → DHOS-3</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>There is no indication that nation has significantly pursued alternative energies and new transport technologies in the wake of DHOS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Marine and coasts require constant vigilance → DHOS-3</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>It is unknown if marine and coastal environments are receiving constant vigilance, largely because there is no definition or model showing what this would entail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>DHOS proves that oil is dirty, deadly, and outdated; spill is a wake-up call for America to “wean [itself] from dirty oil;” DHOS proves that offshore is inherently dangerous; DHOS proves that oil is “dirty, dangerous, and deadly” → DHOS-2, 5, 13, 15</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>With the increase in oil production, both offshore and onshore, it does not appear as if America will be “wean[ing itself] from dirty oil” any time soon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC</td>
<td>11/22</td>
<td>Because DHOS proves oil is 3Ds, nation must reject oil industry, break addiction, and realize a CE economy; adding stronger safeguards will not get to root of the problem, which is America's unacceptable oil addiction, and President should deliver a plan to get nation off oil within 20 years; DHOS is a wake-up call for Americans to &quot;wean [it]self from dirty oil,&quot; rethink nation's energy policy, and start achieving a CE future; DHOS has outraged Americans, who demand that leaders end nation's oil dependence; leaders must deliver a plan to wean America off oil; only way to prevent another</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>With the increase in oil production, both offshore and onshore, it does not appear that America will be ending is oil dependency any time soon, much less convert to a CE economy. Contradicting SC’s assertion, FG has decided that adding stronger safeguards will be able to solve the problem—eliminating the risk of spills.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
DHOS is to reform "outdated energy policy" and end oil addiction; missing family members exemplifies why oil must come to an end; DHOS represents the "rock bottom" of America's oil addiction, going CE would be clean, safe, and good for the economy; as long as offshore exists, there is a DHOS risk, and that is why nation should convert to CE; new regulations will not eliminate the risk of spills, only ending oil addiction will → DHOS-2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 14, 15, 16, 22, 26

| SC  | 72 | Fishing and tourism have been especially impacted by DHOS; DHOS is hurting the working families in the fishing and tourism industries the most, both in the short-term via job losses and in the long-term via the economic consequences of the spill on their livelihoods—they should be fully compensated for all financial, legal, and health costs → DHOS-4, 11 |
| SC  | 96 | Already got CE technology, just need political will; CE solutions already exists, all that is required is for President to know that people are ready to stand up to oil industry → DHOS-5, 20 |
| SC  | 74 | DHOS's silver lining is that some energy-smart legislation has passed, an Arctic moratorium has been enacted, and oversight reviews have been initiated; leaders finally getting the message that continued reliance on oil is unwise → DHOS-9, 10 |
| SC  | 77 | Because of the scope/scale of DHOS and the damage it caused, oil industry must be held fully financially |

It is unknown if BP is/has fully compensated fishers, especially for their legal and health costs; the $20 billion escrow account presumably helped with financial compensation. Some evidence suggests that after the initial lump-sum, fishers have received nothing, and can receive nothing due to agreements.

It does not appear Mr. Obama knows that enough people are willing to stand up to OI and initiate a CE economy.

Leaders apparently did not get the message for they are either not saying anything at all or they are backing more aggressive domestic oil production strategies, such as fracking.

Although BP has been and will be held financially accountable for DHOS, it does not appear that OI, as a whole, is or will share the same fate. It is unlikely that any significant portion of their profits—or any
accountable with a portion of their profits going towards paying for cleanup, protection, and restoration → DHOS-24

portion—are going towards cleanup, restoration, and protection; there is definitely no state or federal legislation stipulating that they must, anyway.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sol</th>
<th>78</th>
<th>DHOS proves how important it is to a) continue with the reforms of past 1.5 years and b) expand on them and ignore oil industry objections → DHOS-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I Although DHOS resulted in much reform within DoI, it is not known if they were expanded upon; it especially unknown if they have really been ignoring OI objections. Shell was denied its go-ahead to drill in the Arctic, but that was within the first year; with the uptick in leasing, it appears that OI is still getting its way.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SA</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>Attorney General will seek legal recourse; he will seek as much financial restitution as possible for Louisianans for the damages they have suffered → DHOS-1, 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I It is unknown if LA’s Attorney General played a significant role in having Louisianans receive financial restitution for the damages they have suffered.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>55</th>
<th>DHOS proves why it is important that Gulf States receive their fair share of Gulf OCS revenues → DHOS-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I It is unknown if under the new BOEMRE regime the Gulf States will receive their fair share of Gulf OCS revenues...whatever ‘fair share’ is supposed to mean.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>52</th>
<th>DHOS proves why it is important that federal bureaucracy be dismantled—inadequate and slow, prevents state efforts to protect and restore their states (barriers); claims process should be free of needless technicalities and complicatedness → DHOS-2, 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I-N Federal bureaucracy has not been dismantled; quite the opposite: the single MMS is now three BOEMs (though this does not seem to have significantly slowed the leasing permitting). It is unknown if the claims process became free of needless technicalities and complicatedness.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem</th>
<th>72</th>
<th>Fishers are suffering economic and emotional turmoil because of DHOS, and deserve fair, full, and simple compensation for all damages; DHOS has severely impacted Louisiana’s fishing and tourism industries, so no moratorium → DHOS-3, 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I It is unknown if fishers received fair, full, and simple compensation for damages; some of the evidence suggests this may not have been the case. Although a moratorium on new deepwater drilling was enacted, it only last six months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rep</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>Need a robust PR campaign to inform people that GoM seafood is safe → DHOS-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>I Although FDA, NOAA, and several marine scientists have certified Gulf seafood safe, it is unknown to what extent an actual PR campaign to inform people of this has reached.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between SBOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes

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301
Sci 89  Non-federal and non-OI actors getting involved in spill response → SBOS-1  I  Science provides no details on who these non-federal, non-OI actors are; on the other hand, based on other CDC frames, in addition to perusing the raw data, these would include private business (i.e., Red Adair).

GOO! 24  Oil development should be banned and removed from SBC because there’s no evidence that another SBOS will not happen, and the only way this can happen is through citizen-power → DHOS-1  N  Oil development has continued in SBC, despite the lack of evidence disfavouring another spill, and despite citizen-power. On the other hand, the rate of growth of oil development in SBC has been extremely slow—virtually at a stand-still—since 1969; part of this could be attributed to citizen-power.

SC 32  The public should be a partner in decision making about environmental resource use, and not be at the federal government’s sole discretion → SBOS-1  N  Although SBOS, itself, did not result in or contribute to providing the public a partnership in decision making about environmental resource use, CA citizens would eventually receive their say, as a result of the CA Coastal Act of 1976, leading to the creation of the CA Coastal Commission, wherein the public is allowed to participate in meetings and provide input.

SC 24  Only solution is to support a bill to remove oil development from SBC completely; only banning all oil development in SBC can guarantee against another SBOS → SBOS-3, 4  N  All bills to ban oil development completely from SBC failed. However, CA did enact a four year ban on new leasing in state waters, which was then continued in one form or another up to the present day; from 1982 through 2008, a federal moratorium was placed on new offshore leasing all along West Coast (and even without the moratorium, new leasing has not yet been able to happen).

SA 24  Only by removing oil development from SBC and turning into a federal reserve can another SBOS be prevented → SBOS-1  N  Oil development has not been removed from SBC, and the closest thing to reserve the Channel received as a result of SBOS is the establishment of the Coal Point ecological preserve in 1970, located all but next door to UCSB. Eventually, in 1980, the Channel Islands National Marine Sanctuary was established.

Table 6: Indeterminate and Non-Correlations between DHOS Generalized Action-Oriented Catastrophe Frames and the Spill’s Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>DHOS Action-Oriented Generalized Frames</th>
<th>GOI</th>
<th>DHOS Outcome</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>DHOS has severely damaged Louisiana’s fishing industry, requiring resources from every level to repair → DHOS-1</td>
<td>I</td>
<td></td>
<td>Although resources from the federal level (in the form of eventual BP CWA fines) and industry level (BP cleaning oiled environment) have been used, it is not known what states and municipalities have been contributing. NGOs have been providing assessments and criticisms; some citizens are trying to form a GoM RCAC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REAs</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Independent (response) monitoring is essential because DHOS is likely be worst in US history → DHOS-1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>Although various environmental NGOs attempted to monitor the response, their efforts were often stymied by blocked access of one kind or another.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I – Action-Oriented CDC Summary Conversion Chart

The chart below shows what the number-codes used from Chapter 5.2.1 through to the end of Chapter 5.2.3 to represent ACS, ADS, and ACaS stand for. The action summaries were composed in such a way that they provide an answer to one of these two questions: what action does the FS say is happening or what action does the FS want to happen? Some codes are missing. The reason for this is that as I refined my definition of/criteria for action, several could no longer be included because they a) actually took place in the past, b) represented conjecture (not statement or advocacy), and/or c) were negative in nature (i.e., they were actually complaints about such-and-such an action not being taken, or would probably not be taken). There is a total of seventy-five action-oriented CDC summaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Action Description</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Declare SB a disaster area</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Encourage integration and interface</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Appoint a panel</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>FG’s recovery role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Break FG, OI collusion</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Include non-profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Enact moratorium</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>Stop FG interference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>FG acting</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Completely clean, 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Requires years of response</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Fair, consistent claims process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Create RCACs</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>Share OCS profits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Invest BP money into restoration</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Need response capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Break oil addiction</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Need full ecosystem assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>President should only stop the oil flow</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>FG, OI should provide response resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Using every resource; hold BP responsible</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>BP will pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>FG responding, focusing on long-term</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Make Atlantic ban permanent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Make region whole again</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>OI, FG working together</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Hold BP responsible</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>Fishers need compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Reform OCS system</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>Response should be fact-based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Make GC better</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Investigation will lead to prevention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>What is derailing response</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Need cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Better spill response</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Need long-term response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Convert to CE</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Coasts need vigilance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Suspend state OD operations</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>Need assurance of no more spills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Remove offshore from SBC</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>End OD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Rising environmental/oil awareness</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Need compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Resume oil development</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>OI influence continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Need environmental legislation</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Leaders getting the message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Academic expertise not being used</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>OI must pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Need public participation</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Need to continue reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Stop SBC drilling</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>Dol’s actions</td>
</tr>
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<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>No preventative measures being taken</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Need safety and oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Review spill facts</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Need calm reaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Need legislation to stop SBOS</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Need to balance safety, economy, security</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>Review state offshore system</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>Need to educate environmentalists</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Prevent more spills</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Need PR</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>OI must confront spill risk</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>Other actors involved</td>
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<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Need more R&amp;D</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>Protect the marine environment</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Restore coasts</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>Need independent monitoring</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Ordinary people are helping</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Fishing needs repair</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Repair OCS system</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>Need political will</td>
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<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>BP should pay</td>
<td></td>
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