LOOKING DEEPER INTO SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC POLICY OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FROM 2006 TO 2011

by

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RESEARCH PROJECT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA

January 2014

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Abstract

The Federal Government of Canada from 2006 to 2011 presented a security discourse and policy regarding the Arctic region. In order to understand the government’s use of security language this project adopted the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. Using this theory’s approach, this project dissects the relevant government discourses and policies, pertaining to the Arctic, to determine which sectors the government attempted to securitize. It will be demonstrated that the government has attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006 to 2011, particularly in the traditional political and military sectors, while societal, economic, and environmental sectors were not securitized but rather their possible threats were framed as opportunities. These conclusions resulted from this government’s political worldview around conducting foreign policy and how it wanted to position Arctic security for Canada in its growing Northern region.
Acknowledgements

First I need to give a big thank you to my supervisor Dr. Heather Smith; she made me work through my research. When she told me a section had been completed to her standards, I knew I had done good work. Her willingness to be involved in my research was invaluable. Dr. Gary Wilson allowed me to really tackle the political issues of northern policy and in his quiet way he redirected me when I went astray. Finally thank you to Dr. Ken Wilkening who stepped in at the latter part of my research and added the needed additional critical eye to my research. Also my thanks to the Department of International Studies, without them, I would not have gained the financial support needed to avoid stress over finances during my time researching in their beautiful graduate office.

Another big thank you needs to go to my father who helped advise me when I encountered obstacles and was part of my inspiration for completing this degree. Finally I need to thank my wife, Laura who now knows my graduate work inside and out. Her silent encouragement and patience allowed me to complete this journey.
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<tr>
<td>AAND</td>
<td>Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development</td>
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<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade</td>
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Introduction

The Arctic region has experienced increased international attention in the last two decades due to the effects of climate change, perceived untapped natural resources, and a possible, faster shipping route to Asia (Huebert 2009). As the region grew in international importance, governments of the Arctic states began to dedicate time and resources towards asserting security for their respective northern territories. Aware of the increased international interest in the Arctic, the Chretien government attempted to bring the region out of the long-standing Cold War rivalry that existed between the Russians, the Americans and their allies. In 1996, the Arctic Council was created as a partnership of the Arctic states and the northern indigenous peoples to better foster discussion on how to manage the region (Huebert 1999; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2013). The initial enthusiasm of working together as a northern community to provide stability for the Arctic region dissipated quickly after the 9/11 attacks (Koivurova 2009), causing a dramatic change in priorities for Canadian foreign policy. The security of the Arctic was given low priority in favour of combating international terrorism and supporting Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan. These changes in priorities were evident from the government’s legislation, speeches, and media coverage from 2001 to 2005 (CBC News Politics Sept. 6, 2011; Chase 2003; Chretien 2001; Clark 2001; Fyffe 2011, 1-17; McCarthy and Clark 2001; Parliament of Canada 2002-2005; Sallot 2004).

In the 2006 federal election, the Conservative Party’s Stand Up for Canada platform promised to make the Arctic a priority for foreign affairs and national defence (Conservative Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006). Once elected, this new federal government continued to push ahead with an aggressive Arctic policy that was referenced in the 2007
Speech from the Throne (Government of Canada 2007), and detailed in the 2009 publication, *Canada’s Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future* (Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians 2009). This document identified four pillars for the government’s new policy: exercising Canadian Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development, protecting the north’s environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern governance (Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009, 4).

*Canada’s Northern Strategy* was the most aggressive Canadian Arctic plan since the Cold War (Byers 2009; Coates and Poelzer 2010; Huebert 2006; Lajeunesse 2008).

In 2010, the federal government released an international policy platform for its *Northern Strategy* plan (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010). The four pillars of the government’s Arctic policy remained intact, but there were additions and changes in its approach to certain environmental and economic challenges, especially in light of the *Deepwater Horizon* oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the economic crisis of 2008\(^1\). In 2011, with its policy for the Arctic established, the federal government continued to use security language and to promote actions intended to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty.

This policy of the Canadian government appeared to focus a lot on security. With the memory of the Cold War still fresh in many people’s mind, the many security measures of both of these policies could be translated in heightened security or securitization. To attempt to securitize, someone with authority labels an issue or environment as a security problem and tries to convince its audience that additional security measures are needed to counter it.

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\(^1\) The *Deepwater Horizon* oil spill happened in 2010 and gave the international community reason to re-evaluate offshore oil drilling and the economic crisis saw governments try to rebuild their capitalist systems in a variety of ways.
In order for a democratic state to move forward with a heightened level of security measures, it is important that it incorporates language and actions that will appeal to its national population. This population includes distinct, smaller audiences such as the northern communities. So while the government’s discourses demonstrated a firm commitment to using language that tried to identify policy as needed for the state’s security, the question that needs to be asked is “did they attempt to securitize”? To answer this question, this project will apply the Copenhagen School’s approach to securitization as a means to better understand if the federal government attempted to securitize its Arctic policy from 2006 to 2011.

Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde are three theorists who specialize in analyzing government security discourse, especially in situations with heightened security interaction (Buzan et al. 1998, vii-viii). Their collective theoretical work contributes to what is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization (Buzan et al. 1998, 21-26). The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory provides a framework for identifying securitizing attempts, and to determine if the actor, through a speech act, has been successful in heightening security. For example, if the government used language to facilitate a perceived needed action to protect against an identified threat and its national populace accepted it, then this situation has been securitized. In this environment, the securitizing actor makes security its top priority in a particular area (Buzan et al. 1998, 24-27).

To better understand a government’s efforts to construct existential threats through its language, the Copenhagen School separates security language into five sectors: political, military, societal, economic, and environmental. Structured in this manner, the Copenhagen School provides a practical theoretical tool that can be used to analyze how politicians and
policy makers communicate the rationale for different heightened securities (Buzan et al. 1998, 7-8). This project will use the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework of securitization as a means to answer the following question: has the Canadian federal government attempted to securitize the Arctic? It will be demonstrated that the government has attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006 to 2011, particularly in the traditional political and military sectors, while societal, economic, and environmental sectors were not securitized but rather their possible threats were framed as opportunities.

This project will review the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory to explain how it will be used to analyze the data sector by sector. After which this project’s methodology will be explained and then applied to analyze government speeches and media releases from 2006 to 2011. With the completion of the case study, the analysis chapter will ask how do these findings matter and assess their theoretical and practical value. Finally, this project will end with suggestions of further research regarding primary data collection and then a final comment on the Arctic region’s value to the study of international security.
Chapter 1: Securitization Theory

In 1995, Ole Waever proposed the idea of securitization as a means of redefining and broadening the use of the word “security” (Waever 1995, 47). His concern was that governments were using more and more speech acts to justify heightened military and political actions to a fearfully accepting populace. This process, if successful, he labeled securitization (Waever 1995, 57). The goal of securitization theory is to investigate the successful “move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). As Waever states “a major focus of security studies should be the strong processes of securitization: [...] when, why and how elites label issues and developments as security problems” (Waever 1995, 57).

This first chapter identifies the key elements of the Copenhagen School’s framework. The securitizing actor is the body that tries to securitize the issue area. Second, the existential threat is the constructed danger that needs to be securitized against. Third, the referent object is what needs protection against this threat. This framework uses sectors to separate the particular language into certain securities so these elements can be properly identified. There are five sectors: a) political b) military c) societal d) economic e) environmental.

These are four of the framework’s components but this theory’s process begins with the identification of a securitizing actor. The Copenhagen School describes this element as a unit that has “the position of authority ... thereby [increasing] the likelihood of the audience accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt” (Buzan et al. 1998, 33). The ruling elite

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2 In Canada, the ruling elite is the federal politicians because these individuals make a lot of money and are not troubled with the issues of the rest of society.
occupy this position because they hold the power to make use of security terminology. This actor is in charge of presenting the “speech act” which is when a “state representative moves a particular development into specific areas and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Waever 1995, 55).

The securitizing actor, however, does not decide whether an action is a successful securitizing attempt. Only the fourth element, the intended audience, has the power and legitimacy to accept or reject the government’s effort to securitize (Buzan et al. 1998, 31). The audience is the most important element of the securitizing process. Government speech acts use language that is designed to appeal to the national populace. The Copenhagen School argues that for a government to deliver a successful securitization, it does not need to “push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). From this platform securitizing actors must deliver a speech act that is constructed to gain audience acceptance and therefore securitize the threatened environment (Buzan et al. 1998, 33-42).

Academics (Haacke & Williams 2008; Roe 2008) however take issue with this theory’s process. The main limitation that they brought up about the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization is that it cannot confirm the acceptance of a successful speech act by the securitizing actor. The Copenhagen School claims that “by labeling something a security issue...it becomes one” (Waever 2004, 13). Jurgen Haacke and Paul Williams disagree. They contend that dealing with the threat is what is required for it to be a successful security action (Haacke & Williams 2008, 781-782). Paul Roe also problematized the actual process of securitization as part of this limitation. He views securitization as a two-stage process, which
consists of identification (rhetorical securitization) whereby the securitizing actor tries to highlight the threat (Roe 2008, 620-623), and mobilization (active securitization), where the security action is implemented with the acceptance of the audience. Roe maintains that the success or failure of security policy rests firmly in the mobilization of securitizing language against the threat (Roe 2008, 622-632). The second main limitation to the Copenhagen School’s theory is the abstract nature of the language that is used in securitizing discourses. As Roe argues, analysts need to recognize that securitization is audience-centered. In order for the securitizing actor to be successful, Roe states that the government needs to configure its speech acts so that the audience understands and accepts them (Roe 2008, 622).

The introduction of a framework that would address these two limitations and identify all the security considerations is crucial for developing audience accepted Arctic policy. This proposed modified framework would also allow for deeper research into the federal government’s securitization of the Arctic and a more comprehensive analysis of audience reactions to the government’s discourse regarding the Arctic. This project will however use the Copenhagen School’s original securitization framework to review securitizing attempts by the government in its current Arctic policy, because it provides insight for a gap analysis. The suggested modification of this theory is outside the goal of this project because there is no available data to show if securitization was successful in the Arctic from 2006 to 2011.

To do this review of security language, there are five sectors where securitizing attempts can be observed. The first security sector is political. It covers the institutionalization of rule and the stability of authority. Threats to the political sector are aimed at the organizational stability of the state, its national identity, and organizing ideology (Buzan et al. 1998, 142). Referent objects that actors attempt to protect include the territorial
state, emerging quasi-super states,\(^3\) and self-organized stateless societal groups\(^4\) (Buzan et al. 1998, 145). Securitizing actors are clear, authoritative leaders within the state system of power (Buzan et al. 1998, 146). In this project’s case study, the securitizing actor will be the Prime Minister and the rest of the executive branch, which includes the cabinet ministers. The threats that the executive branch addresses take the form of “subversion of legitimacy or denial of recognition” (Buzan et al. 1998, 150), and threaten state sovereignty because a state’s legitimacy stems from power recognition by other states (Buzan et al. 1998, 150).

The second sector is military security. In this sector, the state is the most important referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 49) and it considers the use of force as its primary means of protecting the exclusive governing right of sovereign administrations. For the military sector, there are defined securitizing actors who deliver speech acts to the general public (Buzan et al. 1998, 51). For this project, these actors are: the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister. Existential threats are defined as intentional and direct action backed with force aimed at the state (Buzan et al. 1998, 57). The threats for this sector would be foreign announcements of force allocation or new northern forces or even military exercises. For both of the traditional sectors of political and military security,\(^5\) the securitizing actors’ speech acts are directed at the national populace and the international community. These two groups are labeled the audience.

The third sector—societal security—is the most recent addition to the theory, and its inclusion has expanded the scope of security considerably. The Copenhagen School argues that identity is the core concept of the societal security sector (Buzan et al. 1998, 119). They

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\(^3\)These types of organizations are a collection of states such as the European Union (Buzan et al. 1998, 145).

\(^4\)These types of groups are tribes, minorities and clans that have stable political institutions but are not recognized by international society (Buzan et al. 1998, 145).

\(^5\)These securities are narrow, state-centric defined use of protection and power.
state that, “societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a
development as a potential threat to their survival as a community” (Buzan et al. 1998, 119).
The societal security sector includes four threats: migration, depopulation, horizontal, and vertical competition. Horizontal competition implies a rivalry of identity between societies within a state while vertical competition refers to different levels of government seeking jurisdiction (Buzan et al. 1998, 121). Examples of referent objects in this sector are tribes, clans, nations, nation-like ethnic units, and races (Buzan et al. 1998, 123).

The fourth security sector is the economic sector. There are three main contending positions to consider in this sector (Buzan et al. 1998, 95). The first is the neo-mercantilist position that prioritizes the state. The second position is liberal, which prioritizes the economy. The third position is socialist in orientation. This position has the role of the state as “tam[ing] economics toward social and political goals of justice and equity” (Buzan et al. 1998, 96). What all three positions have in common is that the state is the securitizing actor and the referent object is the financial market (Buzan et al. 1998, 100-101). To determine existential threats in this sector, it is important to focus on interactions between the different actors and the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 103-109). For this project, the Canadian federal government is seen as concerned with the economic activity of international companies and federal financial transfers to the territories. For these last two non-traditional sectors, the securitizing actors deliver discourses intended for the national populace and the northern communities.

The final security sector is the environment, and it is the most difficult sector to securitize for two reasons (Buzan et al. 1998, 74-77). The first reason is because it is difficult.

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6 This term makes a distinction between the distinctly state-centric and other definitions of security that were not traditionally taken up by states.
to provide substantive security to the natural environment because human interference usually results in environmental destruction, not protection. The second reason is that there are two different and competing agendas within this sector: the scientific and the political. These agendas overlap and shape each other because the securitizing actor, the state, is involved in both camps and follows a specific political and partisan direction. The environmental scientific agenda is the information used for securitizing moves and it determines the threats. The political agenda concentrates on three areas: 1) state and public awareness of the scientific issues, 2) the acceptance of political responsibility to deal with these issues, 3) and the political management of questions that arise.

There are several kinds of threats to the environmental sector but the one that is relevant to this project is “the threat from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when changes made do seem to pose existential threats to parts of civilization” (Buzan et al. 1998, 80). The prediction of environmental disasters is what typically leads to securitizing moves. However, there is not a recognized securitization model for this sector because the scientific and political camps cannot agree on what security action should take priority. Which agenda takes priority between political or scientific within a speech act is dependent on scientific authority (Buzan et al. 1998, 71-72). There are numerous securitizing and counter-securitizing moves in this sector because everything from the disruption of ecosystems, to economic problems related to the environment, are considered possible disasters (Buzan et al. 1998, 72-75). For the environmental sector, the securitizing actor directs its discourses to two audiences: the national populace and the international community.
The table below captures the elements of the framework adopted here. It is divided into the five security sectors. Each security sector is broken down into the four key elements that create a framework used to identify securitizing attempts. All the elements listed were derived from the Copenhagen School’s *Security: a New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998). Throughout this project, it is important to refer back to this Copenhagen School framework to understand how the following speech acts were analyzed.

*Chart 1: The sectors and their elements*

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<tr>
<td>State - Ruling Elite</td>
<td>State - Ruling Elite</td>
<td>State - Ruling Elite</td>
<td>State or nation like ethnic unit</td>
<td>State and Financial Market</td>
<td>The environment with human enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referent Object</td>
<td>Territorial state</td>
<td>State sovereignty</td>
<td>Threats aimed at the survival of the community</td>
<td>To determine threats in this sector, it is important to focus on different interactions between units and the referent object</td>
<td>The environmental threat identified for this project is from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when changes made do seem to pose existential threats to parts of civilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Threats</td>
<td>Threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state, its national identity and organizing ideology. All threats are non violent.</td>
<td>In terms of threats there is a wide spectrum of possible security issues, but they are all intentional and directed.</td>
<td>Threats aimed at the survival of the community</td>
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The adoption of this framework for the project is valuable for four reasons. First, the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization is used in this project because this theory provides an established framework, which has certain elements and/or sectors that can be used to analyze the Conservative government’s security discourse. Second, it is a framework that identifies the language that governments use to present, announce, or argue the need for better or heightened security to its audiences. Third, it also does not grapple with the definition of security, but rather just accepts how governments use this term and embraces its fluid nature. Fourth, it categorizes this language into the appropriate sector to limit possible variables. This theory has already been applicable to help analyze real security situations. It explored the 1971 Bangladesh War (Hayes 2012), dissected Latin American security before and after 9/11 (Oelsner 2009), and examined cyber security and its use in the Estonian cyber war in 2007 (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).

The Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization has not yet been broadly applied to the Arctic and therefore this is the first case study of this region using this theory. This case study will analyze the relevant government discourses through the lens of the Copenhagen School’s five security sectors. These sectors help to analyze both traditional and non-traditional speech acts. The separation of language allowed there to be findings regarding if the Canadian federal government attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006 to 2011.
Chapter 2: Case Study

Methodology and Context

From the beginning of this research the goal of this project was to study security in the Arctic. The first methodological consideration was how this investigation could be done. A review was conducted of different approaches and theories that could help to draw out issues of security interaction in the Arctic. From prior research it was known that the federal government from 2006 to 2011 had been aggressively pursuing security policy for the Arctic region but there was a need to identify a set of tools that could help determine how they were framing this effort and what aspect of security they were focused on.

The Copenhagen School’s securitization theory and its framework were decided as the approach needed to conduct this research. The concept that an authoritative body would try to present speech acts to legitimize heighten security measures in a particular environment was the perfect description of what happened in the Canadian Arctic from 2006 to 2011. The argument that security should be divided into five different sectors so security language investigation could be more focused was sought after since the research reviewed a five year period of government action. Finally, the fact that the theory established different framework elements that were needed to identify a complete speech act allowed for the creation of a methodology.

The next step was to determine what materials this research should review. There are a lot of different perspectives on what this federal government did with security language from 2006 to 2011 (Clark 2010; Huebert 2005-2006; 2009). The goal was to hopefully review the language of this government afresh. Its northern policy was the initial focus but
there was a realization that this policy was not the only aspect of this government’s speech acts. After conducting some online searches on the AAND, DND, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister archives, 400 ministers’ speeches and 50 press releases were initially collected as it was determined that they were the authoritative body that presented elite speech acts in this environment.

Multiple steps were taken to narrow down the speeches and press releases that were reviewed for the case study. First, in order to identify the right collection of speeches and press materials, there was a need to analyze the collected data using previous research and then the Copenhagen School’s framework’s requirements. Once this primary data had been sorted into the different security sectors 115 speeches and 31 press releases from 2006 to 2011 were determined to have portions of the needed security language that fit with the elements of the Copenhagen’s theoretical framework. From this data set, some key government ideas were drawn out in each area. Upon further review, these ideas were identified to be the dominant themes for each sector. Next, using these dominant themes as guides, another review of the all the ministers’ speeches was conducted. Finally these speeches were again filtered through a search of the four theoretical framework elements by identifying: the actions of the securitizing actor, the highlighting of the referent object, the presented danger of the existential threat, and a targeted audience.

The case study below is divided into the five security sectors of political, military, societal, economic and environmental. The introduction of each sector begins with a listing of the four framework elements and the four to five themes that were used to identify the

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7 There were several speeches analyzed which were delivered members of Parliament or higher department officials on behalf of Ministers.
securitizing attempts in each sector. After this introduction each sector’s data will be used to address each of these themes from 2006 to 2011 in a standard timeline. Within each sector there are also some observations as to whether the government tried to securitize the sector. The first sector of the case study is the one which had the most government speech acts, political security.

**Political Sector**

The political sector is commonly accepted as the primary traditional security sector because it is the security that governments have historically sought to protect. Based on the Copenhagen School’s theory, this sector’s securitizing actor is the federal government and the referent object that it is trying to protect is the territorial state. The existential threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state and its national identity such as: political agreements to reduce a state’s sovereign territory and foreign intentional disassociation of a section of territory with a state’s national identity. The government’s audience is the national and international community. The themes identified in the government speeches that relate to the political sector are sovereignty, the importance of the north to Canada, the bilateral relationship with the US, partnerships and international cooperation, and international leadership.\(^8\)

First, sovereignty was the most often used theme in the federal government’s discourse from 2006 to 2011. This theme was first introduced against a portrayed dangerous world where Canada’s objective was to develop the independent capacity to defend its

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\(^8\) This theme was derived from the constant language of the government emphasizing their leadership on the international stage.
Throughout these six years, the other four political themes were also used to support sovereignty.

In his first year in office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper used strong language to present the need for stronger Canadian sovereignty, stating that his government would establish uncontested authority over the entire Canadian Arctic region (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b; 2006c). In his northern addresses, Harper spoke about Arctic sovereignty. He listed different security measures from: the deep water port to extend the Navy’s Arctic reach to aerial surveillance throughout the Arctic to underwater surveillance capacity (Office of the Prime Minister; 2006e; 2006f). The biggest existential threat to Canadian territory was foreign incursion which could lead to the instability of the region. Harper spoke very candidly about how Canada should operate in its northern territories, declaring, “use it or lose it. And we have no intention of losing it” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). The 2007 Throne Speech stated that one of Parliament’s five priorities for that year would include “strengthening Canada’s sovereignty and place in the world” (Government of Canada 2007).

The sovereignty theme was also evident in several of the speeches delivered by Chuck Strahl, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AAND) wherein he reiterated the message of the Prime Minister and the measures outlined in the 2007 Throne Speech (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007f; 2007h). In 2008, the government announced that they were rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces and adding a larger Arctic component that would focus on measures to protect Canadian sovereignty in this region. The federal government also focused specific speeches on an upcoming amendment to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act that extended the protected Canadian Arctic internal waters (Office of the Prime Minister 2008b; 2008).
In 2009, sovereignty remained the most prevalent theme, repeatedly cited in speeches by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DEFAIT) Minister Lawrence Cannon, as one of the main reasons for proposed heightened government security. When Minister Cannon addressed sovereignty in the Arctic, his language was calm and firmly established multiple existential threats to the region but focused on the international interest in Canadian Arctic territory. In his words: “my government has invested significantly...to ensure that Canada secures recognition...in the Arctic” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a). Despite this possible threat to Canada’s northern political recognition, he was confident that the federal government had been working effectively to defend Canadian territory from the rise of this foreign interest (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e). Cannon, Strahl, and National Defence Minister Peter MacKay all articulated a similar discourse regarding sovereignty enforcement and how Canada was working with its Arctic neighbours to make sure that national borders were respected (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009e; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; National Defence 2009c).

With the launch of the *Northern Strategy* in 2009, the theme of Arctic sovereignty was strongly represented and given high visibility. The language that the government used declared that Canada’s Arctic sovereignty was non-negotiable and that asserting it was the top priority for the government. It backed this up by declaring that Canada now had the resources to defend its claims (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009f; 2009g; 2010a; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a, 2010b; 2010c; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i; National Defence 2009g; 2009h; 2009k). In April of 2010, Cannon was very direct with this message. In his words: “this government
is dedicated to fulfilling the north’s true potential as a healthy, prosperous and secure region within a strong and sovereign Canada” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010c).

In August of that year, the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy was introduced and contained similar discourses about Arctic sovereignty being a top priority for Canadian foreign policy (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010). In 2011, there were four speeches that embodied the idea of enlightened sovereignty while still maintaining the importance of a state to hold political authority to protect its own territory. (Office of the Prime Minister 2011; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b; National Defence 2011a; 2011d). This message was needed in order to defend against an existential threat on the country’s national identity and stability. As new DEFAIT Minister John Baird announced to the UN General Assembly, “Multilateral institutions and multilateral action result from a collection of sovereign decisions based on individual states’ own interests…Canada calls this ‘enlightened sovereignty’” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b).

The second most prevalent theme for the political sector was the northern connection to the rest of Canada. Harper initially introduced this northern theme by stating a need for better sovereignty protection from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b). Constructing the Arctic as an equally important region of Canada was a constant refrain throughout this six-year period. While on his 2006 northern tour, Harper connected the Arctic to Canada’s national identity (Office of the Prime Minister 2006c; 2006f). In his words: “‘Our Land’ – just as Yukon and the Northwest Territories and the entire Arctic Archipelago are ‘Our Land”’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). AAND Minister Jim Prentice and Conservative MP Bob Mills, acting on the minister’s behalf also

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9 This term implies a nation makes changes to its own policy for the global good (Clark 2010)
addressed this northern linkage throughout 2006 (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a; 2006c; 2006d).

In 2007, Harper took the lead by referring to Canada as a ‘northern nation’ of ‘northern people’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e). The northern connection theme was used to promote sovereignty, but it also helped legitimize other government action in the north. Four separate AAND speeches by Minister Chuck Strahl contained messages that the potential and prosperity of the north translated into success for the whole country because Canada was a ‘northern nation’ (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007f; 2007h). In 2008, Harper again spoke of the Arctic’s connection to Canada in two speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2008a; 2008c).

With the government’s release of its core Arctic policy, the 2009 Northern Strategy document, the connection between the north and the whole of Canada was cemented to protect against the existential threat of foreign interest. By linking Canadian national identity to the north, the government gave reason for its whole populace to care about possible northern foreign incursion. AAND Minister Strahl reaffirmed the north as part of Canada’s identity. In his words: “Canada is a Northern nation, an Arctic nation. The North is a fundamental part of our Canadian heritage and our sense of who we are” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g). Throughout 2009, this theme of northern connection was embedded in the government’s speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009f; National Defence 2009k). DFAIT Minister Cannon continued to highlight Canada’s northern connection (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010f; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i). Then in 2011, after
two years of consistently focusing on the Arctic, there was only one mention of the north’s connection to Canada (Environment Canada 2011a).

Canada’s bilateral relationship with the United States was the third key theme used frequently in the Prime Minister’s northern speeches. The importance of the bilateral relationship was highlighted as being essential for Canada’s trade and foreign policy. In a northern speech, Harper connected the importance of Canada’s friendship with the United States to the proposed 2006 Arctic action plan and future Arctic resource trade (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). This same theme was used to suggest that if the Americans were to impede on Canadian Arctic borders, Canada would be ready. In Harper’s words: “as I tell everyone, including our American friends, our jurisdiction, just as it does on the Atlantic and the Pacific, extends 200 miles out into the Arctic Ocean. No more, and no less. Our government has already begun to back our words with action” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). This relationship in the Arctic was both a security measure and a possible existential threat. When reviewing this sector’s theme connections this theme supported the main sovereignty theme.

Throughout 2007, this bilateral relationship was not emphasized because in 2007 the federal government was trying to stand firm on its primary theme of sovereignty by highlighting its international leadership position. These two themes would be eclipsed if the American government was brought into these speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e). The reason for this was due to the difference of opinion that Canada and the US have concerning the status of the Northwest Passage: the Americans claim it is an international strait, while Canada asserts that it is its internal waters (Charron 2005; Griffiths 2003; 2004; Huebert 2003; 2009, 8-9; Lajeunesse 2008, 1039-1040). In 2008, the bilateral
relationship was only briefly mentioned when Harper discussed past work done in partnership with the Americans in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2008b).

In contrast, the bilateral relationship with the United States was highlighted frequently in 2009, with whole sections of speeches dedicated to and focused on this connection (Environment Canada 2009d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; National Defence 2009c). DEFAIT Minister Lawrence Cannon was usually straightforward; “the United States is our premier partner in the Arctic [...] I also intend to explore ways to pursue a common agenda, starting in 2013, as Canada, and then the United States, chair the Arctic Council” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a). In 2010, however, the bilateral relationship was mostly put aside with only one mention of Canada’s past bilateral efforts with the United States and the War on Terror (National Defence 2010i). Harper ended 2011 with an address he made alongside President Barack Obama, where the two leaders spoke about their strong partnership regarding North American security (Office of the Prime Minister 2011).

DEFAIT Minister John Baird and Environment Minister Peter Kent also conveyed this more intimate connection in speeches where they discussed the possibility of establishing foreign policies and environmental initiatives. In Baird’s words: “what is needed is a common approach, with bilateral commitments driven by our mutual interests in both energy security and climate change” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011a). The language got even more American focused by the end of 2011 with Kent stating, “our commitment to reduce this country’s emissions by 17 per cent over 2005 levels by 2020 was deliberately harmonized with the targets set by the United States, our largest trading partner and closest neighbor. It makes sense given the integrated nature of our respective economies and
environments” (Environment Canada 2011c). This changing nature of the bilateral relationship was relevant to the Arctic speech act because within these speeches the potential of the northern economy and the fragility of the Arctic environment were at risk. The concern was if this new, closer partnership did not work the government’s Arctic policy would suffer in its support of the northern communities (Environment Canada 2011c).

The fourth theme of Canada’s international policy, relating to the Arctic, tended to shift between 2006 and 2011. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2006, Harper praised the work done by the broader international community while highlighting Canada’s past international efforts around the world (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). Harper emphasized that Canada was not an island, so international cooperation was needed to promote Canadian values. The fourth theme of cooperation was continued in 2007, but the focus had changed. Instead of addressing cooperation across the world, the government discourse now focused on intergovernmental and private partnerships in acknowledgement of International Polar Year 2007-200810 (Environment Canada 2007; International Polar Year 2012; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007c; 2007h).

In 2008, the theme of international cooperation was included in speeches by the Prime Minister and AAND, in reference to current international activities of the Canadian Armed Forces and the International Polar Year (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a; Office of the Prime Minister 2008b; 2008c). In 2009 and 2010, international cooperation themed language centered on how Canada was working with Arctic states to ensure that all countries’ sovereignty were respected (Environment Canada 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2010a; 2010b; 2010d; 2010e; 2010f; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i; National Defence

10 An international research initiative focused on the Arctic and Antarctic regions
Cannon’s discourse around the United Nations’ Law of the Sea best reflected this language. In his words: “The process to delineate the extended continental shelf is orderly and lengthy; it is not adversarial and it is not a race. It is a collaborative process based on a shared commitment to international law” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d). In 2011, the theme of international cooperation was promoted through Canada’s continued participation in traditional Western partnerships\(^{11}\) (Environment Canada 2011b; 2011d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b; National Defence 2011a; 2011d).

In 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper emphasized the fifth political theme of international leadership in a speech that recalled the past threats of the World Wars and the continuation of the War on Terror (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b). Harper stated that his government would strengthen Arctic sovereignty to ensure Canada’s place in world leadership (March 28, 2006, Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). But in 2008, government discourse made no mention of Canadian international leadership and in 2009, Canada’s role as international leader was fairly neglected, except for slight reference in speeches by the Prime Minister and three of his ministers (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009f; National Defence 2009c). DEFAIT Minister Lawrence Cannon voiced this selective discourse best stating that, “Canada is an Arctic nation, an Arctic power” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009f).

In 2010, there was enhanced language about how Canada was leading by example with its economic agenda, Arctic Council initiatives, and its contributions to International Polar Year (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010c; 2010f; 2010h). Minister

\(^{11}\) Organizations such as the UN, NATO, NORAD and the World Bank
Cannon's language regarding Arctic resolutions promoted bold international leadership. In his words: "we are confident that we will soon be able to resolve these differences in a peaceful and orderly way, in accordance with international law" (Foreign Affairs and International Affairs 2010f). In 2011, both the DEFAIT Minister and the Minister of the Environment promoted Canada’s international leadership through enlightened sovereignty and Arctic environmental measures (Environment Canada 2011a; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b). Sovereignty as will be seen is also central to the military sector.

**Military Sector**

Military security is the most common type of security used to ensure power. In the government’s Arctic speech acts from 2006 to 2011, this type of security was invoked frequently. As with the political sector, the securitizing actor in the military sector is the federal government and the audience is the national and international community. The referent object and the existential threat, however, are distinctly different from the political sector. In the military sector, the referent object is sovereignty and it is different because it correlates directly to protecting the territorial state from forceful action versus projected sovereignty in the political sector. The existential threat is actions with the implication of force by domestic or external forces such as: foreign buildup of regional forces, regional foreign military exercises and even international incursions into internal waters.

To understand how the government used military security language to try to securitize these framework elements, there were five prevalent themes identified. They were: sovereignty, security\textsuperscript{12}, protection, Canadian power, and force. Although the first two themes

\textsuperscript{12} This theme although labeled security, refers to physical defence actions or the announcement of such actions by the government.
seem very similar in nature, the sovereignty theme in this sector was used to rationalize security measures, whereas the security theme pointed out action being done to protect the state. The theme of protection looks at the government language that is intentionally used to connect government action or policy with a sense of protecting Canadians and their territory. Finally, the theme of force is used to highlight government action or policy that insinuates that it can use force if it needs to act. Each of these key themes will be addressed below, beginning with sovereignty\textsuperscript{13}.

Similar to the political sector, the speeches and press material associated with this sector highlight a larger number of the government’s securitizing attempts. In the 2006 Speech from the Throne, Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced the theme of sovereignty in the Arctic. Under the subheading, “Rebuilding our Influence Abroad,” he declared that the government would strengthen sovereignty at home and then immediately announced the \textit{Canada First Defence Strategy}. This policy was designed to repair the perceived weaknesses of the Canadian Armed Forces. Harper stated that strengthened armed forces would help protect Canada “from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b) from the existential threat of a foreign force.

In his northern addresses, he made strong connections between well-trained Armed Forces and Arctic sovereignty, and discussed a northern Armed Forces exercise\textsuperscript{14} (Office of the Prime Minister 2006d). He also stressed the government’s ability to physically protect its northern borders with new Armed Forces infrastructure\textsuperscript{15} (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). In Harper’s words: “you can’t defend Arctic sovereignty with words alone. It takes a

\textsuperscript{13} Sovereign is defined as the supremacy of authority as exercised by a sovereign state.

\textsuperscript{14} This exercise was called Operation Lancaster and it was part of the federal government’s measures to protect Northern sovereignty.

\textsuperscript{15} A deep water port, an Arctic training centre, and aerial surveillance
Canadian presence on the ground, in the air and on the sea” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). In support of the Prime Minister's claims, National Defence Minister Gordon O'Connell discussed the need to strengthen the Forces and to defend sovereignty at home, bringing up the urgent need to act in the Arctic against the existential threat of a foreign force (National Defence 2006a; 2006d). Although he stated that he was concerned with the condition of the Canadian Armed Forces O’Connor said, he would “put Canada first by strengthening our national sovereignty and by increasing Canada's self-reliance in matters of defence” (National Defence 2006a).

In 2007, the federal government announced that protecting sovereignty was one of its highest priorities (Office of Prime Minister 2007d; 2007g; 2007h; National Defence Feb 16; Dec 3). The Prime Minister stated that the government would “react... strongly when other countries show[ed] disrespect for our sovereignty over the Arctic” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007e). The Throne Speech in 2007 outlined the different ways that the federal government would act to defend sovereignty. It outlined a comprehensive mapping plan of the Arctic seabed¹⁶, the purchase of new patrol ships, and the enhancement of surveillance, stating that sovereignty was at the core of why they were going to rebuild the Canadian Armed Forces (Government of Canada 2007). AAND Minister Chuck Strahl and his Assistant Deputy Minister reiterated the language that Arctic sovereignty needed to be strengthened, with most of their discourse repeating the listed measures from the Throne Speech (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007c; 2007f; 2007h).

Throughout 2007, the Canadian Armed Forces conducted three large military exercises¹⁷ to

¹⁶ This mapping detail was to recognize their cooperative work with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which was working to determine legal status of the territorial sea in the Arctic.

¹⁷ The operations were Nunalivut, Narwhal, and Nanook.
showcase its ability to patrol and effectively defend Canadian Arctic sovereignty from the existential threat of a foreign force (National Defence 2007b; 2007c; 2007f; 2007h).

In 2008, Harper linked the need for military security to the threat of international smuggling. In his words: “the proliferation of international shipping in the North raises the potential for shipwrecks, smuggling, illegal immigration, and even threats to national security” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). Minister Strahl pointed out that northerners had expressed similar concerns when Harper visited the north that year (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a). The Department of National Defence (DND) presented press material that stressed that they were protecting Canadian sovereignty with military exercises, the purchase of new equipment, and the expansion of the Junior Canadian Rangers (National Defence 2007h; 2007i).

In 2009, the federal government used language from the Northern Strategy policy document. Consistent with the Northern Strategy, the Prime Minister emphasized two key messages: that action to defend northern sovereignty had protected Canadian borders and that threats warranting urgent action had all been identified (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2009d). The government stressed that it was taking international action in order to assert Arctic sovereignty. Minister Cannon stated that Canada was “an Arctic nation and an Arctic power...[that] occupies a major portion of the Arctic” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a). DND’s press officials discussed military action to defend Arctic sovereignty listed in the Northern Strategy blueprint. These releases included two successful military exercises for sovereignty patrols, recognition of Arctic military units, and Arctic ship and port construction (National Defence 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g; 2009h; 2009i; 2009j).
All speeches that occurred in 2009 focused on present action and how it needed to happen right away to protect from the existential threat of a foreign force. The reinforcement of immediate sovereignty was tied in directly to the current northern military exercises. The federal government made sure to focus their speeches on the government’s new military assets when emphasizing their sovereignty theme. In DEFAIT Minister Cannon’s own words they had: “committed new resources to protect and patrol the land, the sea and the sky” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009e) In 2010, the theme of sovereignty was still used frequently, but in a more subdued fashion. Federal government officials became an advocate for national sovereignty for all states and pointed out it had already completed actions to protect its own territory. That said, in 2010, the government’s security discourses were less urgently worded when it came to asserting sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010f; 2010i;) In an address where he also quoted the United Nations’ ability to promote peace and development, Harper stated: “we attend to our own affairs, in, for example, the protection of our Arctic” (Office of the Prime Minister 2010b). Sovereignty also provided the rational for certain military exercises and security purchases in 2010. (National Defence 2010a; 2010c; 2010e; 2010h).

In 2011, the federal government aggressively promoted the theme of sovereignty. The recently appointed DEFAIT Minister, John Baird, spoke to the international community about the concept of enlightened sovereignty and how “multiateral institutions exist and derive legitimacy from the independent decisions of sovereign states” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b). The announcements of the three annual Arctic military exercises and corresponding speeches regarding a strengthened Canadian Armed Forces presence,
especially in the Arctic, reinforced in this new angle of sovereignty presented by Minister Baird (National Defence 2011a; 2011d; 2011e; 2011h).

The second key theme that arose in the discourse related to the military sector is security. The first time that the government used the theme of security was the announcement of Operation Ardent Sentry 2006. This theme differed from sovereignty because its discourse focused solely on the tangible measures put in place to secure Canadian territory. Ardent Sentry 2006 was created so that the Canadian and American Commands could coordinate responses to national threats (National Defence April 26 2006c). The theme of security was also integrated into a speech dealing with the Canada First Defence Strategy. This speech implied that the government had trained soldiers in how to quickly deploy in the Arctic to fight against any threat (National Defence 2006d).

Consistent with the theme of security in 2007, the federal government proudly announced all its completed 2006 security measures. The Prime Minister emphasized security when he highlighted Arctic policy (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f; 2007g). The same year, National Defence used this theme when it described two military exercises that demonstrated Canada’s ability to deal with threats of direct force, and highlighted the meeting of the Arctic Security Working Group (National Defence 2007b; 2007c; 2007g). On several occasions in 2008, the federal government reiterated that it was establishing an expanded, more extensive, and better equipped Canadian Armed Forces. This better equipped and expanded force would be able to react to any situation (Office of the Prime Minister 2008b; 2008e; National Defence 2008b; 2008c; 2008e).

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18 This military exercise was conducted with Canada Command and Northern Command in the United States to prepare both for national disasters and emergencies.

19 An organization to improve security for the region through national and provincial partnerships.
A year later, in 2009, DEFAIT Minister Cannon addressed foreign diplomats at the Diplomatic Forum in Whistler, British Columbia, and spoke about Canada’s international security efforts. The government announced that security in Canada’s Arctic was being strengthened because this region made up 40 per cent of the nation’s landmass (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009f). DND Minister McKay and departmental media releases stated that security would be better and more effective since there were more Canadian military assets in the field (National Defence 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2009i). This language again protects against this sector’s existential threat of a foreign force. In MacKay’s words: “the Canadian Forces play an important role in achieving our goals in the North… the Government of Canada is making sure they have the tools they need to carry out a full range of tasks in the Arctic” (National Defence 2009d).

In 2010, Cannon, McKay and DND releases continued with the theme of security by announcing Canadian military actions that had secured several important events and areas around the world (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010d; 2010e; National Defence 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d; 2010f; 2010i). In MacKay’s words: “the Canadian Forces successfully achieved their aim of demonstrating and improving upon their capabilities to respond to safety and security challenges in our Arctic” (National Defence 2010c) The language suggested that without sovereignty and security being promoted and constantly improved, Canada would not be able to defend itself against foreign threats (National Defence 2011a; 2011d; Office of the Prime Minister 2011). In a joint US-Canada announcement Harper announced: “Naturally, in this area as in all others, no loss of sovereignty is contemplated by either of our governments” (Office of the Prime Minister 2011).
These two themes of sovereignty and security provide the rationale for the third military theme, which is protection. Governments use the concept of protection to present the referent object as in need of being defended from the intentional threat of a foreign force. The protection theme was introduced by the Prime Minister in 2006 when he outlined the different measures his government would take to protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2006a; 2006b). The Prime Minister reinforced the theme of protection by announcing counterterrorism measures nation-wide (Office of the Prime Minister 2006c). DND Minister O’Connor continually unveiled measures that the Canadian Armed Forces would use to ‘protect’ the security of the nation (National Defence 2006a; 2006d; 2006c; 2006b).

In 2007, defence officials highlighted the theme of protection through numerous media releases. Military exercises and major meetings were presented as needed to protect Canadians from any hostile intentional threat that could use force (National Defence 2007b; 2007d; 2007e; 2007i; 2007g). The Prime Minister also spoke to this theme. In his words: “it is no exaggeration to say that the need to assert our sovereignty and protect our territorial integrity in the Arctic – on our terms – has never been more urgent” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d). In 2009, both the Office of the Prime Minister and National Defense speeches and releases stated that more effective protection would only benefit Canadians and there was no downside to increased protective action (National Defence 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g; 2009h; Office of the Prime Minister 2009c). This language is a case of the government dealing with the military’s existential threat which calls for the protection of territory from an intentional foreign force. In MacKay’s words: “a primary reserve unit based in the North clearly serves the interests of Canada and the Canadian Forces but I’d like to
also point out how the Yellowknife Company\textsuperscript{20} benefits you and your city” (National Defence 2009d).

In 2010, the theme of protection was highlighted in DND press releases. This theme was promoted as the reason for military activity in both the Arctic and elsewhere (National Defence 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010e; 2010f; 2010h). In 2011, protection was implied to be the driving force for agreements with foreign states, especially in the Arctic region (National Defence 2011b), and rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces (National Defence 2011d). The Defence Minister went through a list of domestic defence operations that had saved Canadian lives and trained southern Canadian soldiers to survive in the northern environment (National Defence 2011d).

The fourth theme, Canadian power\textsuperscript{21} stressed the military power of Canada in the north. In his first year in power, the Prime Minister aggressively promoted the need for physical assets that it would put in place to protect the Arctic region such as annual military exercises, military infrastructure and an expanded Canadian Rangers force (Office of the Prime Minister 2006d; 2006e). DND Minister O’Connor’s language in a speech in 2006 emphasized the federal government’s strong desire to rebuild and revitalize the Canadian Forces so they could answer any national threat. He listed the adjustments that would be made to Canadian power in the north. O’Connor remarked that: “it's our intention to devote more people, more equipment and more money to the defence of our great Northern areas” (National Defence 2006a). Throughout 2007, the federal government used the theme of Canadian power to dissuade any intentional and physical threats from a foreign force. With the announcement of the upcoming Northern Strategy, it stressed the current and future

\textsuperscript{20} A reserve company based in Canada’s North, established in 2009 (CBC News 2009).

\textsuperscript{21} This theme is focused on announced government strength within a military context.
purchase of new assets such as ice breakers for initiating sovereignty and security in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e; National Defence 2007a; 2007i; 2007j).

As Harper proudly stated: “the steel-reinforced hulls will be able to crunch through ice up to a metre thick, meaning the ships will be able to patrol the length of the Northwest Passage during the months a Canadian naval presence is necessary” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d).

This theme of Canadian power was heavily used in 2008. DND announced that it was increasing Canada’s physical military assets, and emphasized how the Canadian Armed Forces were effectively patrolling the north (National Defence 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008f; 2008g). In 2009, the communication of new military measures and increased military activity allowed the federal government to proclaim Canada’s new military power to both the Canadian populace and the international community. The Prime Minister showcased all of the Canadian northern military action (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b), and the DEFATT Minister stressed that strengthening Canadian Arctic power would be a priority (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009d; 2009f). Defence officials constantly showcased their new physical assets and the Arctic military exercises (National Defence 2009a; 2009d; 2009e; 2009j; 2009l). In 2010, the federal government continued to promote the country’s new military power in the north by linking past Canadian action in UN war prevention to the need for Canadian power in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2010b).

In addition, the federal government launched the Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy, which highlighted additional measures designed to strengthen Canadian power in the Arctic internationally. It also gave prominence to the actions that were being
that same year, the Armed Forces promoted Canada’s renewed national military strength (National Defence 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011e). In 2011, the federal government’s formal address to the United Nations General Assembly ultimately defined this independent Canadian power message perfectly. Defence Minister John Baird boldly stated that Canada did not “go along in order to ‘get along’” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011b). What he meant was that in terms of international initiatives, Canada would stand for what it thought was right and it now had the power to do so.

The last theme of the military sector is force, and it was often used in conjunction with the theme of Canadian power. Force as a theme is identifiable when actors use aggressive language and declare the need for action. Having announced its power, the federal government now made sure to show its intention to use this strength, if needed. The federal government announced that with a proposed, larger presence in the Arctic it would protect Canadians (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e; 2006f). In 2006, Prime Minister Harper announced a 12-day military exercise in the Arctic labeled Operation Lancaster, to assert Canadian sovereignty in the north (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). After announcing that he had witnessed the military action of Operation Lancaster, the Prime Minister bluntly stated: “Operation Lancaster is a very important exercise. Because it demonstrates our new Government’s commitment to asserting Canada’s sovereignty over our Arctic territory” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). He continued this language by pointing out that “if you want to be taken seriously by other countries, you have to say what you mean and mean what you say” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). The federal government did not hide its intention to use force in the Canadian Arctic if threatened. It announced completed and future
military exercises that were organized to showcase this position (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e; National Defence 2007b; 2007d 2007f).

The fifth theme of force was not heavily used in 2008 speeches, but physical assets from the Canadian First Defence Strategy were still referenced in language discussing the defence of Canada (National Defence 2008g; Office of the Prime Minister 2008b). The Prime Minister clearly presented the need for force with the unveiling of the Canada First Defence Strategy to his national audience. He announced: “if a country wants to be taken seriously in the world, it must have the capacity to act. It’s that simple” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008b). Looking at the government security discourse for 2009 through the lens of force, the government communications plan aimed to highlight that Canada was not afraid to use force by acquiring military equipment, highlighting recent military exercises, and even the further development of military assets in the future (National Defence 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009g; 2009h; 2009h; Office of the Prime Minister 2009b). As the leader of this securitizing attempt, the Prime Minister stated, “as I’ve said before, we understand the first principle of Arctic sovereignty is ‘use it or lose it’. And we will continue to strive to provide the tools you need to do just that, including new helicopters, ships, and planes for the Forces, and a new icebreaker for the Coast Guard” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b). In 2010, the federal government only presented the theme of force through military exercise announcements, which stated that DND had completed these exercises and was now trained to act effectively, if provoked (National Defence 2010a; 2010f; 2010g). This type of messaging continued the following year, and focused on the effectiveness of northern military assets (National Defence 2011a; 2011d). All of these themes highlight the need to protect Canada from the existential threat of a foreign force.
Societal Sector

The societal sector is the most recent addition to the framework's security sectors that governments are trying to champion. Upon reviewing Canadian Arctic speeches and policies, it became clear that the current federal government has not really promoted a discourse or measures that identify an existential threat in this sector. Rather it chose to highlight opportunities instead of threats. In terms of identifying the securitizing actor, there is only one possibility to choose from within this case study: the federal government. The referent objects here are the northern communities and the existential threats are aimed at their survival such as: insignificant social infrastructure, a lack of employment and in the case of the north, protection against the environmental elements. The audience for this sector is the national populace and northern communities. The dominant themes in the government’s discourse are governance, northern control, job creation, social development, and community stewardship.

The theme of governance was used to point out that better government standards would help the north be sustainably successful. Social development was used to highlight government investment into social programs, whereas community stewardship was brought out when ministers actually began to speak the cooperative language the Inuit were looking to be used. For community stewardship, it was mixed with other more government oriented themes so it will be addressed throughout the societal sector's review. For the three non-traditional sectors, the themes will not always be presented systematically or separately because the government speeches reflected an interwoven importance of these topics. Often times, one or two themes were used to support one another in even a single government speech.
The first theme in the societal sector is governance. In April of 2006, the Harper government discussed devolution for the north and the self-government agreements for its inhabitants. The Harper government went through the different methods that it would use to engage in northern development, stating this region needed to pursue appropriate governance avenues. AAND Minister Jim Prentice stated, “transparent, accountable and effective governance not only guarantees a voice for Northerners, but also ensures that voice is heard clearly” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a). The government also discussed water, housing, and education, and how it would address them through its efforts to change the current federal-territory infrastructure agreement.

The federal government discourse promoted the advantages of devolution as a means to help northern communities control more aspects of their own societies. The key message was that money alone could not solve all the societal issues afflicting Aboriginal peoples but that good governance was a critical step (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006b). On behalf of the AAND Minister, the Member of Parliament for Red Deer, Bob Mills, delivered a societal security speech linking job creation through resource development with effective governance (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). In 2007, the language targeted the northern audience with the announcement of funding for infrastructure development. Governance would continue to be strengthened through land claims and self-government negotiations (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007d; 2007c; 2007f; 2007g).

In 2009, in reference to the successful devolution of Nunavut, the federal government used language to promote the fact that better governance, more northern control, and more effective social development, such as funding for economic development projects in the

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22 “The passing of the power or authority of one person or body to another” (Oxford English Dictionary 2013).
north, were all linked to the federal government’s effective assistance in management of the territories (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b). The federal government insisted that efforts towards better governance were progressing, but it still tended to focus more on promoting the traditional security elements. At the launch of its Northern Strategy policy, Cannon announced, “northerners are at the heart of our strategy” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009e).

In his last speech as the Minister of AAND, Chuck Strahl used community-connected language to promote his view of effective northern governance. This showed his desire to connect with the northern audience on their level. In his words: “what we are looking for is a structure that will meet your needs, respect the land claims and look after our priorities” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). In a speech delivered by the AAND Minister in 2011, entitled Honouring the North West Territories Devolution in Principle, the Minister used language that underscored the role of devolution in effective governance. He stated that, “it will...ensure...decisions being made in the North by Northerners there will be more local control of decisions and more local accountability” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2011a). All the language within the theme of governance spoke of bettering the community, the people and the land. This government was laying out clear language of opportunities.

The second theme in the societal sector is northern control, which focused on the increased ability of the north to have the resources they needed for effective devolution. This theme also saw the intermixing of several other themes to make its speech acts more powerful. The federal government first used the theme of northern control in 2006 as part of a discussion on the growing potential of the northern communities. Then AAND Minister
Jim Prentice, when discussing next steps stated, “[I] cannot stress enough the importance of strong working relationships among Aboriginal and other northern governments…it is imperative that we work together” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a).

That same year, northern control was referenced once again when the federal government announced the Mackenzie Pipeline project, which Harper argued was the key to future prosperity in the north. He stated that this initiative was the avenue to northern job creation. In his words: “without them, no amount of transfer payments will give the North the future it deserves” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f).

In 2007, Chuck Strahl was appointed as the Minister of AAND and in his first speech he used much more community-focused language, indicating a shift in language from the previous minister. Strahl's first three speeches included all five societal language themes.

It was at this point in time that the federal government seemed to realize that resource development for job creation was important to the communities when it was considered alongside the two other themes of northern control and community stewardship of the environment (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007f; 2007g). In 2008, the federal government put in place initiatives that allowed for social development and job creation through northern control (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a).

Regarding Nunavut's devolution, they used the northern control themed language to promote the view that there was now better governance and more effective social development (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b). As Minister Strahl's words stated: “This protocol also demonstrates that the Prime Minister and our government means it when we say we want Northerners to have more decision-making power over their territory” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b).
In August of 2009, the Prime Minister delivered three speeches and connected all three themes of northern control while also highlighting social development and job creation. These speeches steered away from traditional security and emphasized the need to focus on the northern communities and economic development, as these actions were the identified measures to protect the communities (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2009d). In one of his August speeches Harper announced a labour agreement that would create new jobs because it would in part train northern people who wanted the education. In his words: "Northerners want to succeed, but many do not have the skills or training they need to achieve their dreams" (Office of the Prime Minister 2009d). The federal government’s language became a lot more targeted on community stewardship. In speeches and communiqués, the federal government began to consistently reference the northern people (especially the Inuit) and linked their well-being to the government’s policies and programs (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g). This type of language pointed out the opportunities that the federal government was bringing to the north.

In his last speech as AAND Minister, Strahl used community-connected language to promote that governance, social development, and community stewardship were best utilized through northern control (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). After his departure, this type of language continued to be delivered by other senior members of the government, including his successor John Duncan, as the Harper government continued to target the themes of social development and job creation through northern control (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). This language again emphasized opportunities instead of threats to the community. In 2011, the government
formally acknowledged the Canadian Rangers and their contribution to northern security and sovereignty. However, the language used focused on the Canadian Rangers’ ability to foster northern control and governance in the Arctic region through their position in the community (National Defence 2011d). Their position as protectors also strengthened their northern control role.

The third theme in the societal sector speeches was job creation. In 2006, Harper touched on job creation through the Mackenzie Pipeline, as it was key to future prosperity in the north (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). Conservative MP Bob Mills’ speech on behalf of AAND also spoke to job creation through resource development (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). In 2007, the Minister continued to link resource development and job creation by stating that agreements were underway to make the societal environment better (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a). Throughout the year, he made several announcements about successful job creation initiatives due to resource and energy development (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007c; 2007d; 2007g; 2007h). In 2008, the federal government represented by AAND Minister Strahl presented a message that “northerners, too, must play a meaningful role in these projects and be able to benefit directly from their growing economy” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a).

In August of 2009, the Prime Minister delivered speeches that regularly incorporated the theme of job creation. In these speeches, he addressed the need to focus more on community and economic development (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2009d). He presented a speech that addressed a possible local job creation initiative. He observed, “the local fishermen are missing...a safe, efficient harbour to tie up their boats and offload..."
their catch” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009c). When the federal government promoted
the Northern Strategy, it repeatedly referenced the northern people, especially the Inuit, and
linked their well-being, in part, to job creation, stating that the government would work with
the Inuit in its implementation (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009a; 2009b;
2009c; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g). In 2010, the AAND Minister continued the theme of job
creation in his speeches (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010b, 2010c,
2010d). The theme of job creation spoke directly to the bettering of northerners’ lives, again
fitting into language of opportunity.

The fourth theme in the societal sector is social development. AAND Minister
Prentice first communicated the government’s excitement for this type of development, in
2006 in a speech to the Circle of Northern Leaders (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2006a). Any effective social development protected the fragile survival of the
northern communities. He discussed social development through infrastructure concerns and
outlined how the government would address these issues in an effort to change the federal
support framework. Then northern communities would control more aspects of their own
society. In Prentice’s words: “ideas must be generated first from Aboriginal leaders not
imposed by Ottawa” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006b).

In 2007, there were government communications that social development initiatives
were progressing, and that agreements were underway to make the northern societal
environment better. Patrick Borbey on behalf of the AAND Minister spoke about
recognizing that “northerners [were] taking the lead” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2007a). Elizabeth Hansen, on behalf of the AAND Minister, claimed that
climate change adaptation was needed for social development and that the International Polar
Year's research would help in this regard. She emphasized that Polar Year would be focused on traditional knowledge and offering specific science training to community members (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007d).

In 2008, Harper also pointed out that social development was now possible because of devolution negotiations. These devolution negotiations meant that community stewardship was being attempted. In Harper’s words, “it will give all Nunavik people 23 a say” (Office of the Prime Minister 2008a). In an AAND speech regarding Nunavut’s devolution, several themes, including social development, were drawn out as being key for economic development projects in the north. As AAND Minister Strahl stated, “Nunavut is truly a way of life” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b). In August of 2009, even the Prime Minister weighed in on social development. The Prime Minister spoke of the need to focus more on the community and economic development in the north and steered away from traditional security (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d).

The Statement on Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy did a much better job addressing all the different societal themes. One of this policy’s most significant societal measures was the partnership with the Inuit Circumpolar Council. 24 This partnership was established to determine future social development and community stewardship (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010). In his last speech as AAND Minister, Strahl again emphasized community connections. He framed the government’s work as, “informed by Northern life and driven to help you 25 fulfill your economic needs: job training, skills development, community infrastructure” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). He showed his willingness to include Inuit in the planning of social development. By

23 The Nunavik people are Inuit people that live in the Northern part of the province of Quebec.
24 This international Inuit organization lobbies on behalf of its people around the world.
25 The italics were the author’s emphasis.
2011, though, there was only slight mention of social development through devolution (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2011a). Throughout this sector the government did not frame any existential threats but rather positioned its language to highlight opportunities such as community development and devolution (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a; 2011a).

**Economic Sector**

When looking at the economic sector for securitizing attempts during this time period, the securitizing actor is the federal government. The referent object is both the state and the financial markets. The existential threats come out of interactions with those markets, both domestic and international such as badly managed international resource projects and the promise of new forms of government employment. The audience is the national and northern community. In order to see how all these elements interact, the next section will examine four themes that arose in the speeches: economic potential, resource management, energy superpower, and economic crisis. For this sector the theme of resource management was used to promote the natural resource programs and funding the government was initiating to help the northern economy.

The speeches and press materials related to this sector showed that the government was worried about the northern economy but they did not frame it as an existential threat. During his 2006 northern tour, Prime Minister Harper’s speech included the economic sector’s first theme, economic potential for the north. In his address, Harper referenced the north’s natural gas and oil reserves and highlighted the fact that there were now more accessible routes for exploration and development (Office of the Prime Minister 2006d). In a speech at the United Nations he went so far as to refer to Canada as an ‘energy superpower’
That same year, the Member of Parliament for Red Deer, Bob Mills, speaking on behalf of the AAND Minister, cited a list of measures that needed to be done so that barriers could be torn down and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline could become a reality in the north (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a). As 2006 came to an end, AAND Minister Jim Prentice continued to highlight the north’s economic potential in conjunction with resource management. (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006c; 2006d). In his words: “resource-development projects also stimulate other activity and help to diversify local economies” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). This language highlighted opportunities moving forward.

In 2007, Harper continued to advance the message about Canada’s economic potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b). He used Canada Day to profile the country’s economic potential in the north (Office of the Prime Minister 2007c), specifically linking northern economic potential to natural resource development (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d). In the fall of 2007, Canada’s economic future was given a much higher profile when Harper stated “we are building an energy superpower, with the largest potential for market-based supplies of oil and gas in the entire world” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f). In all of its speeches in 2007, AAND stressed that the north’s economic potential would be realized through resource management. These speeches also affirmed that the north had many natural resources, which could be in part accessed through the Mackenzie Gas Project. In 2007 another underlying government message was that the strongest economic asset in the north was its people (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2007g; 2007h).
In 2008, in the midst of the global financial crisis, Harper argued that Canada was strong and still had economic potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). In 2009, the global crisis threatened northern economic potential. Harper pointed out that this crisis was a reason to focus on the Arctic’s economic potential with words like “its full economic potential”, “strong northern economy” and “a future of unprecedented opportunity” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). With the launch of the Northern Strategy, AAND Minister Chuck Strahl discussed how the presented policy measures would still bring out the Arctic’s economic potential and opportunities (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009c; 2009e; 2009f). In 2010, Minister Strahl introduced deregulation and economic funding that would help with the Arctic’s economic potential (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). By 2011, the government indicated that there was a need to have a healthy balance between environmental regulations and development leading to economic potential (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011a; 2011b; Environment Canada 2011c).

Resource management was the second economic theme in the government’s Arctic speeches. In his government’s inaugural year, Harper regularly delivered speeches with messages about economic potential and better resource management (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f; 2006g) and was already referring to Canada as an “energy superpower” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006d; 2006f). There were several references to the north’s economic potential in conjunction with resource management (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Dec. 2006c; 2006d). Looking at the economic discourse by AAND, the government stressed resource management as the path to realizing the north’s economic potential. AAND repeatedly mentioned the Mackenzie Gas Project and its economic value to
the north because it would help advance resource management and the opportunities that would come with that (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2007g; 2007h).

In 2008, Harper referred to the ‘cold rush’ for northern resources as a driving force of future northern economic potential, but it would only be possible with careful management of its resources (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). The following year, resource management became the reason cited for foreign interest in the Canadian Arctic region. The global demand for the immense deposits of valuable natural resources drew this interest because as Harper stated “[f]ew regions of the world are so richly endowed with natural resources” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). The implication was that if these natural resources were not secured by Canadian interests someone else would come in and take the north’s economic potential away. The political sector framed foreign interest as a threat. In the economic sector foreign interest gave reason for possible prosperity in the northern economy. This government seemed to emphasize language of opportunity in its northern economic speeches again and again. An example of this hope was the federal government announcing the creation of the Northern Economic Development Agency. Its creation was framed as a federal move towards better education and responsible, local handling of resource management (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). In 2010, AAND addressed how the region was developing in terms of economic potential through better resource management (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a).

The third economic theme of the federal government’s Arctic policy was that Canada was an energy superpower. This theme further strengthened the importance of profitable resource management. In its first year in office, the federal government started to refer to
Canada as an ‘energy superpower’, citing key natural resources to supplement this claim (Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). In 2007, Harper continued to popularize Canada’s new title of ‘energy superpower’ (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b). Even during a small address on Canada Day, Harper presented this theme with the statement that Canada was “an emerging energy superpower” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007c). In another instance, while giving a general overview of Canada's activity internationally to the Council on Foreign Relations, the Prime Minister publicly affirmed Canada’s new energy title. In his words: “we are building an energy superpower, with the largest potential for market-based supplies of oil and gas in the entire world” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f). This language spoke to limitless opportunities.

The fourth theme for economic security was identified in the government’s Arctic policy as economic crisis. In 2008, the Prime Minister stated that this economic crisis would cause states to come together for a common solution. He declared that he wanted to work with all states to discover solutions for the financial crisis while affirming Canadian economic strength (Office of the Prime Minister 2008e). In 2009, he portrayed the economic crisis as an issue that needed to be dealt with by the government to grow northern economic potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). He argued that his government was taking action “to counter the effects of the global recession” (Office of the Prime Minister 2009d). The northern economy was intimately linked to the global economy because the Canadian federal government’s ability for financial transfers to the north was affected. The government therefore acted quickly to change a possible issue into an opportunity.
The federal government touched on the severity of the economic crisis in more detail when it officially launched its *Northern Strategy* policy (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009f; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009e), stressing how the policy measures in that document would “hold...the key... to [Canada’s] economic prosperity” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009f). AAND pointed out that all the measures being undertaken were designed to strengthen the northern economic development efforts (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009b; 2009c; 2009f). In Strahl’s words, “the future prospects of the North continue to be bright despite the influence of the world-wide economic downturn” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009b).

In 2010, the Prime Minister again addressed the problem of how the federal government would improve Canada’s ability to overcome the crisis and prosper (Office of the Prime Minister 2010a; 2010b). He stated that political ideology needed to be put aside and quick short-term initiatives ignored (Office of the Prime Minister 2010a). The government touched on the economic crisis while addressing Canada’s ability to weather the storm, and actually see recovery and growth through its Arctic plan (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010d; 2010h; 2010i). Finally, in 2011, as the crisis started to lessen, the government balanced concerns regarding proper environmental regulations with strong economic growth (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011a; 2011b; Environment Canada 2011c). This government did not frame an existential threat in this sector but rather used the possible threat of economic crisis to promote avenues for economic opportunity.
Environment Sector

Just like the last two non-traditional sectors, this government did not attempt to frame an existential threat in the environmental sector. Similar to other sectors, the securitizing actor is the federal government, and the audience is the national population of Canada and the international community. The referent object is the natural environment with human habitation. The existential threat is “human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet when changes made do seem to pose existential threats to parts of civilization” (Buzan et al. 1998, 80). These threats included quick changes in the environment that were not predicted in the process of the extraction of natural resources. In order to see how all these elements interact, this section will examine five themes that arose in the speeches: environmental protection, resources management, energy superpower, climate change, and environmental research. The government framed much of its environmental efforts in the Arctic as a theme of environmental protection. Unlike the economic sector, the government used the theme of resource management in this sector to profile its efforts of being environmentally conscious when moving forward with resource development. Finally, the energy superpower theme for this sector shows the government’s efforts of being a clean energy superpower.

From the beginning of its administration, this government’s language highlighted the first theme of environmental protection. A key message was that the government needed to do a better job because environmental threats affected all Canadians (Environment Canada 2006a; 2006c; 2006d). Environment Minister Rona Ambrose initially presented the government’s frustration with the lack of environmental work being done in the past.
Adopting a partisan position she attacked the Liberal Party’s previous policy as she declared: “‘environmental do-goodism’ [and] [w]ell, that is not good enough for our government. Canadians deserve better, our environment deserves better” (Environment Canada 2006c).

The following year, on both the national and international stage, the federal government insisted that environmental protection was a top priority for Canada. The Prime Minister, AAND Minister Chuck Strahl, Assistant Deputy Minister Patrick Borbey and Director General Elizabeth Hansen stressed that they were in favour of a realistic plan that was balanced against economic initiatives (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007b, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g; Office of the Prime Minister 2007f; 2007g). In the words of the Prime Minister: “we are reconciling effective environmental action with the reality that Canada has a growing population and growing economic output” (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f).

In 2008, the federal government maintained this discourse in reference to the Canadian Arctic and outlined a three-prong action plan to protect, preserve, and clean up the north (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a; Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). In 2009, the federal government released its Northern Strategy policy document. One of its pillars was environmental protection (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d; 2009f).

One year after the release of this policy document, the government’s discourses went through an interesting shift from protection to stewardship. There was discussion about environmental stewardship, especially from outgoing AAND Minister Chuck Strahl when addressing regulation. In his words: “we will strengthen environmental stewardship to ensure the North’s precious environment is protected” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
There was also language implying responsible management of marine life (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010b; Environment Canada 2010a) and other environmental funding initiatives (Environment Canada 2011a). This shift in the approach continued in 2011, with a call for stricter environmental regulations (Environment Canada 2011b). This type of announcement suggested the government was serious about its opportunity to be an environmental steward.

The second theme of the environmental sector is resource management. The importance of searching for natural resources in the north has always been a priority for the government of Canada. In this federal government’s inaugural year, there were no themes in its discourse promoting resource management of the north. The Prime Minister’s message at the time was simple, “I want… to encourage northerners to embrace the jobs and prosperity that will come with private sector energy resource development” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). But in 2007, the government introduced an additional resource message. It focused its messaging on the potential resource development that the northern region offered, stating that it was essential to the future of the Canadian economy (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007d, 2007h).

The federal government speeches also emphasized the need for substantive resource management when addressing the importance of northern natural resources (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007g; Office of the Prime Minister 2007b; 2007f). The next year, due in part to the international economic crisis, the government’s discourse discarded the notion of management and focused on profitable northern resource development (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a). To focus on development they used the phrase ‘cold rush’ (Office of
the Prime Minister 2008c). With the launch of the *Northern Strategy* and the government’s support for environmental protection, the Arctic’s regional importance was recognized due to its abundant natural resources (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g). In 2010, there were dual messages with two of the three speeches highlighting the resource potential of the region and the third promoting the need for effective guidelines for its proper use (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010b; 2010h; 2010i). Again this government seemed to try to highlight the opportunity to strengthen environmental regulation.

From the beginning of its time in office, the Harper government promoted the third environmental theme of Canada being an energy superpower, with the Prime Minister stating that Alberta must become a world leader in environmentally responsible energy production (Office of the Prime Minister 2006h). In 2006 the discourse was focused on clean energy. Then just one year later, in 2007, the government proclaimed to the world that Canada was now an energy superpower and that they had an energy plan that justified this status. The Prime Minister supported this claim by referencing Canada’s significant oil and gas reserves. (Office of the Prime Minister 2007a; 2007f). However, one year later the federal government shifted its discourse back again to the idea of Canada becoming a leader in clean energy (Office of the Prime Minister 2008e).

In 2009, with the launch of the *Northern Strategy*, the government’s message focused on “the potential for exploitation of energy” (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d) and that Canada was an energy supplier, not a superpower (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d; Environment Canada 2009e). In 2010, it resurrected the energy superpower theme, but modified the language considerably to more accurately reflect its position in the energy sector (Environment Canada 2010b). In 2011, it continued with this language, by
pointing out that Canada was the main energy supplier to the United States (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011a).

The fourth theme of climate change has been used in a variety of ways in government discourse over these five years. Environment Minister Rona Ambrose stated that this particular issue was complex and the government had difficulty addressing it, especially internationally. In her words: "The situation that each country faces is unique. Each country's stage of development, levels and sources of emissions, vulnerabilities, adaptation needs and the makeup of their economies all differ" (Environment Canada 2006b). By the end of the year, the government used this messaging in reference to the Canadian Arctic, stating, that the changing climate effects were already being felt, but with proper research it hoped to provide the northern communities with adaptation measures (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). In MP Bob Mills' words: "The impacts of climate change are already apparent in the North. We must find ways to improve energy efficiency and adapt to the impacts we cannot avoid" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). This language of opportunity seemed to indicate that this government wanted to highlight all possible opportunities in the changing climate.

In 2007, the Prime Minister refined the government's language, stating that although it would take a global effort to deal with climate change, Canada had a plan that was realistic. The stated plan was not one size fits all. At the same time, however, the Prime Minister announced that other states could not just argue that climate change was not their responsibility (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b; 2007f). The following year, the federal government pointed out that it was providing direct assistance to territorial governments for adaptation to climate change, but not for direct solutions to reduce their effects. It also stated
that Canadians needed to become more resilient to the changing climate (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c, Environment Canada 2008). Coinciding with the launch of the Northern Strategy in 2009, the government committed itself to the goals of the Copenhagen Accord. That year the government discourse supported this commitment and its opportunities to better the environment.

Supporting the Copenhagen Accord allowed the government to promote itself as taking action that was internationally approved (Environment Canada 2009a; 2009b; 2009d; 2009e; 2010a; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d). When the Northern Strategy policy document was launched, it was heralded as a commitment by the government to deal with the impacts of climate change in the Arctic (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d). In 2010, Environment Canada insisted that Canada was serious about climate change (Environment Canada 2010b). In 2011, though, Environment Canada continued with the language of working with international partners to combat climate change and promoted its continuation of funding and works towards adaptation (Environment Canada 2011b; 2011c; 2011d).

The final theme of the environmental sector is environmental research. At the end of this government’s first year in office, MP Bob Mills delivered a speech announcing that additional research would lead to better environmental solutions (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). Throughout the next year, the federal government’s discourse was aimed at trying to convince the national populace that federal research would help the north. For example, the federal government provided financial funding and physical support for the International Polar Year, a set of research initiatives that, among other things, were designed to provide insights on the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. By 2009 and

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26 This accord was the result of the 15th international conference in December 2009 to address climate change.
2010, the federal government’s discourse focused on the other themes of environmental protection, resources management, energy superpower and climate change, while the promotion of the fifth theme, federal research, was not highlighted.

The two speeches that were delivered in these years, however, were aimed at convincing Canadians that Canada was still working on federal, environmental research (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010i). The Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy was released using this language and, despite some changes in how the federal government would proceed to protect the natural environment with human habitation, the document did not indicate a drastic change in environmental research (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010f).

Throughout this sector, the government chose to highlight opportunities rather than threats just as it did in the speeches and releases identified for the societal and economic sectors. With all the sectors’ themes and framework elements reviewed there is now a need to analyze what these findings say about the federal government and its security priorities in its Arctic policy.
Chapter 3: Analysis

This project reviewed the federal government's speeches from 2006 to 2011 and showed that the government's security discourse was focused primarily on trying to securitize traditional security sectors. In the more non-traditional securities of social, economic and environmental, the government spoke of opportunities and did not address existential threats. In the speeches examined from 2006 to 2011, the executive branch of the government, represented by the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers, seemed to base its need for security in the Arctic solely on the protection of sovereignty and accessing the region's natural resources. Over this five-year period, this preference was demonstrated through the consistent use of familiar themes by this government to address the particular existential threats of the organizational stability of the state, and the intentional actions by a foreign force. This threat framing meant there was a focus on traditional Arctic security, which consists solely of political and military objectives.

To understand the findings of this project, this analysis will be divided into four sections. First, it will show how the federal government framed existential threats in its securitizing attempts in the traditional sectors while only focusing on the opportunities and not threats in the non-traditional sectors. Second, the question of why this government focused on traditional securities will be explored. Third, this project's research will be analyzed to determine its value. There will be a review of the project's research and its findings on: Canadian international affairs, Canada's Arctic policy, this government's treatment of certain people. It will also discuss the practical and theoretical use of the Copenhagen School's securitization framework in investigating the current Canadian Arctic
policy. Finally, there will be a review of the practical and theoretical value of this project, followed by a short discussion of the collection of primary data for further research and a concluding note on the Arctic region’s value to international security.

First, the government’s securitizing attempts will be reviewed sector by sector. In the political sector the federal government seemed to follow a structured, deliberate plan. Starting in 2006 and continuing through 2011, the federal government attempted to securitize by framing Canadian Arctic sovereignty as being threatened by foreign and international interests. If Canada did not defend its sovereignty in the Arctic, it could lose this part of its territory, an outcome which was deemed unacceptable. The Prime Minister lead the securitizing attempt with language stating that Canada needed to strengthen its Arctic territory or it would lose it to the existential threat of foreign political interests. The government framed Canada as a northern nation over and over again. This discourse is now very familiar to Canadians. They are constantly reminded in the media that Canada is the true north strong and free. From the reviewed speeches’ discourse this government initially portrayed the Arctic as its untamed frontier that it needed to amass resources to defend. In order not to lose the interest of the southern, more populated areas of Canada, the government’s speech acts seemed to make an effort to highlight the importance of the high north to the whole of Canada.

The Prime Minister in particular stressed that Canada was a northern nation and that this is a fundamental part of Canadian heritage and identity (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e). This language, however, dissipated by 2011 with only one speech referencing this connection. Also the government used the always turbulent, sometimes dependent relationship with the United States to present a discourse of a possible threat or partner in
moving forward on Arctic sovereignty measures. The government also emphasized the need to move forward with the acquisition of certain military assets and other measures.

With the release of the *Northern Strategy* document, the government tried to push the theme of Canada being an international leader in the Arctic, along with Denmark, Russia and United States. However, it had to be selective with its language to not offend its major Arctic state partners, such as the United States. Some of the discourse of the political sector, especially around sovereignty, was strongly emphasized by the government and addressed the existential threats with urgency. Other themes of its Arctic political discourse were not as strong, so this government used the military existential threat of the foreign buildup of forces to back up the urgency for why Canadians should accept traditional security in the Arctic.

In the military sector, there was an emphasis on a threat to Canadian sovereignty from an actual force. The government was blunt with their securitizing attempts in this sector. The Prime Minister presented the ability for Canada to use its newly acquired Arctic power through the ‘use it or lose it’ themed discourse and direct lines such as “react...strongly when other countries show disrespect for our sovereignty over the Arctic” (Officer of the Prime Minister 2007e). National Defence’s discourse focused on the fact that they were becoming more effective in the region because of their promised military assets and yearly northern training. This type of language reinforced the speech act that Canada was preparing for a real, possible threat of force, and the promised action in the speeches was occurring. For this sector, this government was acting on its language. Sovereignty was a theme used in both traditional sectors and it order to emphasize its intentions to protect their territory from foreign interests they would have military exercises to point out its commitment.
Right from the beginning, the federal government discussed the need for the Canadian Forces as imperative for sovereignty for all three corners of Canada “from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic” (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b). The Defence Minister and departmental documents promoted this need for visible protection against a force by constantly highlighting military exercises being done in the Arctic. This intentional use of security language in attempting to securitize also resulted with some of the themes in these two sectors being emphasized in some years and not seen as necessary in others. With regards to its bi-lateral relationship with the United States, in 2008 this government did not focus its speeches on this relationship, but the year after, it decided it needed to bring this issue to the forefront of its speeches. Another example of this government’s focus changing over the five years was its northern connection theme. Initially used to call attention to the need for sovereignty in the Arctic, by 2011 it seemed as if this government believed that it had firmly connected the Arctic to national sovereignty and so there was only one mention to this theme in this final year.

While the traditional sectors showed strong securitizing attempts with the framing of existential threat speeches in the other three sectors referred more to opportunities and did not even try to frame a threat. In the societal sector the reason for a lack of government securitizing attempts was two-fold. First, all the themes spoke to opportunities to help stabilize the community. Second, there was an overlap of securities by this government in the use of its themes and promoting economic initiatives to deal with social issues. The theme of northern control was central to many government speeches. The interesting overlap with the northern control theme was that northern resource projects were also promoted to provide opportunities for this type of control by northerners. The government handled
speeches with the theme of job creation by implying that because of new business interest, good, long-term appropriate jobs would just develop throughout this sector. This type of language framed opportunities rather than threats.

Another interesting example of the government's overlap of security language played out in the speeches referring to the Canadian Rangers. This group of national reservists served political and military security objectives in protecting northern sovereignty while also enriching societal objectives such as community education and northern control. The review of government speeches determined that this federal government did not see a need for security in the societal sector. Rather this government saw a need to ensure opportunities for northerners to better take control of their region, as communicated in the speeches of AAND Minister Chuck Strahl, the Prime Minister and the properly readjusted partnership with the Inuit Circumpolar Council.

In the economic sector, between 2008 and 2011, this government saw a need to try and securitize the national economy against the threat of unsure international investors and a failing international economic system (Flaherty 2009, 7). In the north however they spoke more of opportunities instead of focusing on the framing of this national existential threat of the international economic crisis. Most of the themes that were identified as prevalent, such as regional economic potential, resource management and energy superpower, spoke of a government trying to handle economic security differently in the north. The economic crisis did play a part in the language of this sector however it was mostly used to point out the reason for these northern opportunities. There was also an overlap of economic language into the other two non-traditional sectors. This government’s ability to point out social benefits with economic development and the strengthening of environmental regulation because of
economic projects would suggest that they did have the ability to make a securitizing attempt in this sector if they had chosen to do so. The best example of this intended language of opportunity was the government initially framing foreign interest and activities in the traditional sectors as existential threats, while in the economic sector this interaction was linked to prosperity for the northern economy. This sector’s language of opportunity also painted the theme of energy superpower solely as strength for the country and never spoke of any of its weaknesses for this region.

The environmental sector’s language demonstrated this government’s biggest attempt to promote opportunities, rather than threats. There were again multiple securities found in the speeches regarding safe, environmentally regulated resource extracting projects in the north. There was also an interesting theme shift for energy superpower from Canada as the world leader in environmentally responsible energy production to Canada as the main energy supplier to the United States. With its authority to present environmental security language already weakened by its promised traditional and economic security measures, this government chose again to focus on its opportunities to improve the environment. This federal government’s language of “our environment deserves better” (Environment Canada 2006c) and “ensur[ing] the North’s precious environment is protected” (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a) indicates that they saw a threat but it was never framed in its speeches. Rather the threat was minimized and opportunities to improve the environment were emphasized. Even when language of opportunity seemed inappropriate the government presented in the Northern Strategy the discourse lines of “climate change adaptation” partnered with “oil and gas development” (Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009). The language of opportunity became ever more apparent the year after
the launch of this policy document when the government shifted its themed language from environmental protection to environmental stewardship in hopes of better promoting its created opportunities.

**Partisan Influence in Policy**

The reasons that the federal government made securitizing attempts in the traditional sectors and did not try to do so in the non-traditional sectors was suggested from the evidence below that this federal government was driven by its political worldview. Concerning its Arctic policy from 2006 to 2011, this government seemed to focus on framing existential threats for the traditional political and military sectors because they saw these securities as being most valuable to its Arctic strategy. As a Conservative government, this federal government’s executive branch holds to a particular, aggressive and fairly unilateral, at most favoring single partnerships. The Conservative Party of Canada is a coalition of the previous Progressive Conservatives and the Canadian Alliance, whose ideology is different than traditional conservative thinking. The portion of the party’s ideology that matters for this research is its view on foreign policy, which seems to be focused on strengthening Canada.

In *Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy*, Heather Smith and Claire Sjolander state that “Prime Minister Stephen Harper has rejected the long tradition of internationalism, diplomacy, multilateralism and peacekeeping that has defined Canada’s role in the international community since the end of the Second World War” (Smith and Sjolander 2012, xiii). They explained that the goal of their edited volume was to assess the relevance of internationalism and whether it had changed with the election of the Conservative government (Smith and Sjolander 2012). Kim Nossal argues that Canada has moved away from conducting its foreign policy with a liberal internationalism approach, and
instead has embraced a partisan and muscular approach (Nossal 2012). Finally, Justin Massie and Stephane Roussel argue that this neoconservative movement, which is how they describe the new Conservative Party of Canada, focuses on domestic law and order and shows distrust for international organizations. Its specific foreign policy objective is to become the United States’ closest partner and most reliable ally (Massie and Roussel 2012).

This observed foreign policy orientation is interesting, especially when reviewing its Arctic focus. Upon review of this government’s Arctic policy focus, Smith states that “the Conservative discourse about the Arctic emphasizes sovereignty as control and ownership” (Smith 2012, 206). Control translates into a focus on military activities and a securitization of the north. This government’s foreign policy is very state centric excluding, in particular, the Inuit (Smith 2012). Nossal supports Smith’s view of how this government plays its ‘Arctic card’ (Nossal 2012). He focuses in on the aggressive nature that it used to push traditional security discourse and measures; for example, Harper’s ‘use it or lose it’ line and the Arctic foreign policy’s statement that the government would never waiver in its commitment to protect its north to its expansion of military assets. Nossal points out that the apparent disappearance of internationalism has to do with the partisan, Manichaean worldview of the Conservative government (Nossal 2012, 32), and the lack of audience rejection of this government’s recent positioning of Canada in the world (Nossal 2012).

Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp also supports the view that in terms of this government’s Arctic policy, discourse plays a huge part. She states that this government’s construction of Canada as a northern nation, and tying in the importance of Arctic sovereignty into national identity, has shifted its position from co-operative soft power, to military hard power (Dolata-Kreutzkamp 2010). This federal government between 2006 and 2011 was driven by
ideology. This shift caused this government to emphasize its stronger security efforts in the two traditional sectors while focusing on the opportunities, rather than the threats, of the non-traditional sectors.

So What? Why Does All Of this Matter

Now that the material and findings have been reviewed there is a need to examine four questions to determine the value of this work. The first question examines what these findings say about Canada and the world. This government has decided to embrace the realities of the country’s geography and Arctic policy is now part of its primary agenda, allowing Canadians to be more aware about what is happening in their north, which happens to make-up 40 per cent of their country. This new Arctic focus means that Canadian international policy could promote a new regional strength to other states.

As was seen in all five-security sectors, this government is trying to deal with the Arctic’s threats and opportunities. This project argues that although it is at least an important first step, this government’s approach still needs to be reconsidered. On the other side of the argument, a focus on the Arctic could mean that there will be less focus on another region of Canada. It seems that this government sees a need to focus on the Arctic region because of international pressure, a changing climate and an opportunity for natural resource wealth.

Second, the analysis of this government’s speeches and press releases tell us a lot about the current Arctic policy. It shows that this government was very concerned with the traditional political and military security of this region in framing its existential threats and then pointing out the solutions to these threats. On the one hand, the problem with this approach is the traditional existential threats remain hypothetical, except for the American refusal to recognize the North West Passage as internal waters. On the other hand, in the
other three non-traditional sectors, framed opportunities hint at possible threats such as community instability if devolution is not properly achieved. If natural resource projects are not properly realized, there could be multiple issues to the northern community, the environment and the northern economy. Finally if climate change adaptation is not understood, there are several environmental issues centering on climate change that could cause harm to the northern communities.

Third, the review of this government material highlighted the singular approach that the government took in developing this policy and its exclusion of the people who have lived in the Arctic for generations and were its first peoples. Natalia Loukacheva argues that an inclusion of northern regional governments and northerners is crucial to Canadian Arctic foreign policy and the federal government does not actively engage them (Loukacheva 2009). Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer after reviewing the government’s key Arctic document, *Northern Strategy*, found it lacking as a strong Canadian Arctic plan. Their first recommendation was to develop “a long term plan to invest in northern infrastructure” (Coates and Poelzer 2010). They were not suggesting going community to community and getting their desired shopping list, but rather development that would help community, commercial and military needs. They point out that this would actually strengthen Canada’s sovereignty claims (Coates and Poelzer 2010).

In an interview shortly after the 2007 Throne Speech, Mary Simon, the newly elected president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, stated that she was ready to work with the federal government to develop an effective Arctic policy. Simon proclaimed that the Inuit considered themselves to be patriotic Canadians because they helped the government with the ownership of the region, and that the best way for the government to assert sovereignty
was with a presence in the area, and the Inuit were that presence. She then linked the need for this presence with the Inuit’s need for assistance in community and economic development (Reaction to October 2007 Throne Speech). As Simon stated, “huge gaps in health, education and housing between Inuit and the rest of Canada remain a source of shame at home and abroad” (Simon 2009). Simon’s commentary zeroed in on the fact that the government’s policies did not firmly address the sector’s referent object of the survival of the community. Instead this government presented the Arctic with government created opportunities such as devolution and federal decided investments into the communities, such as a training programs and a deep water port.

Fourth, what this review exposed about the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory was that its practical use was not as objective as initially thought and there are some limitations. When all four elements are identified, one can determine if there were securitizing attempts. Yet, how to determine strong enough language that highlights a framing of a subtle threat versus an opportunity? This theory’s pre-constructed elements, which allowed for a given definition of the different securities, provided for an unhindered analysis of security interaction.

Initially when this theory was reviewed for use in this project it was thought to be an easy checklist that would help to determine security interactions without having to create new criteria. As presented in each sector, there is a definition for each element’s identification. The problem is how to apply these definitions to government speeches. The existential threats of each sector are very abstract in nature, as is the referent objects, so a system of prevalent themes to help organize the government speeches into the particular sectors had to be applied. It was realized that Roe’s critique regarding government
Securitizing discourse was correct and it needs to be a lot more focused to gain final traction to audience acceptance (Roe 2008, 622). There was also the needed decision regarding which speeches were to be placed in multiple sectors. Despite the sector’s different definitions, many political speeches also applied to the military sector and many societal speeches also played a huge part in the economic and environmental sectors. The other difficult aspect of analyzing with this theory was the securitization process was hard to identify in primary material.

It became evident that even with the identified themes it was difficult to objectively identify framed threats and protected referent objects. For this reason, after reviewing the results, it was decided to point out exactly what the data said rather than try to create a result. This means that Roe’s critique that securitization is a two-stage process has some real practical value (Roe 2008, 620-623). The idea that researchers would have to show identification and mobilization of security would allow more certainty in the results.

Completing this project using the Copenhagen theory also emphasized some advantages to this theory. The most significant one is that there was no need to identify the qualifiers for the different securities. The Copenhagen School, although abstract with its definitions, did divide security into five sectors and pointed out four different elements that were needed for each sector. This structure allowed the analysis to focus on the security interaction rather than determining if it was a particular security and what the government was attempting to do.

The Theoretical and Practical Value of the Project

This project’s approach to the Copenhagen School’s theory emphasized certain advantages and disadvantages to its use. Looking at the larger context, what is the theoretical
value of this project to the study of security? Its value is twofold. First, the fact that there was a direct application of this theory’s framework to primary government data revealed results that were somewhat mixed.

Trying to adhere to most of the elements laid out in Buzan’s *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan et al. 1998), there was an attempt to objectively frame the primary Arctic data directly through the constructed lens of the framework, identifying the securitizing actor, the audience and even highlighting from the given definitions the framed existential threats and referent objects. These elements created a roadmap to work through, but there was some need for clarification and criteria assistance along the way.

Second, this is the first time that this theory has been broadly applied to the Canadian Arctic region and therefore the results are the first of its kind. This aspect of the research was difficult from the beginning because the government’s speeches were not always designed or delivered to directly address existential threats or referent objects. Also, because the time period being reviewed (2006 and 2011) is still recent, there was not a lot of secondary analysis to compare with this project to get a sense of any gaps in its analysis. This first attempt also made the research very open because there were not a lot of pre-constructed obstacles that needed to be avoided.

The practical value of the project is twofold. First, Canadians can gain an understanding of how their government handles policy development, in particular security policy which will allow them to be more informed on their government’s decisions come next election. By understanding how this government uses security they can decide if this political party is the one they want developing their Arctic policy with its traditional approach come 2015. Second, policy analysts both domestic and international can take these
findings and use them to determine the next steps forward for this government regarding its Arctic plan. Finally with this project’s securitization research analysts could better examine a government’s security language and determine if its focus on traditional versus non-traditional security helped or hurt the nation’s security policy.

Further Research and Conclusion

The value of this project speaks to the desired next steps for further research. The practical and theoretical value sections both address the fact that it is the first time that this theoretical approach has been attempted on this data set during a specific time period. The biggest obstacle that presented itself early on in the research was there was very little data regarding audience acceptance of this government’s speeches and media releases. There is a need for both northern and southern responses to a variety of probing questionnaires and interviews because both groups have very different perspectives on what is needed for the Arctic. This proposed research is important because it will help better determine the effectiveness of the federal government to deliver security language that is readily accepted by various, target audiences. By conducting this research, this project’s case study findings could be better supported, and the different speeches’ language better explained. In so doing, this proposed research would address a major gap in the current analysis by obtaining a deeper understanding of how governments communicate with its citizenry regarding security issues, and to what extent those messages are accepted.

The Arctic region is becoming an increasingly important part of the world. It is where the future of marine transportation and trade could be headed. It is the best indicator of how the international community is doing in terms of combating climate change. It presents an opportunity for governments to support effective and collaborative growth of their nations
and even a possible arena for a devastating international conflict. Despite its low population and lack of infrastructure development because of all these possibilities, this region has the chance to serve as a model for best practices in government security discourse and policy.
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