EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARISON OF MALAYSIA AND GHANA

by

Osei Agyeman Kwame
B. S.C., Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, 2012

PROJECT IS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
APRIL 2020

© Osei Agyeman Kwame, 2020

Abstract

Malaysia and Ghana are two countries that both experienced European colonial rule and shared
similar socio-political settings prior to independence. Both inherited underdeveloped economic
and political systems from the exploitative colonial administrations. For both countries, the postindependence era saw the implementation of ambitious programs for national development,
mainly through the adoption of the Developmental State model, which involves state-led
macroeconomic planning for economic development. Currently, however, the two countries
present contrasting levels of economic development, with Malaysia outpacing Ghana on several
economic indicators. This study explains the differential levels of development by using the
Applied Thematic Analysis Approach and concludes that Malaysia’s economic success has its
basis in a relatively conducive socio-political setting, stable political environment, viable
institutional and bureaucratic structures that engendered efficient harnessing of resources, and
continuity in implementing development plans.
Keywords: Developmental State, Applied Thematic Analysis

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………….i
Table of Content…………………………………………………………………………………..ii
List of Tables……………………………………………………………………………………..iv
List of Figures……………………………………………………………………………………..v
Acknowledgement………………………………………………………………………………..vi
Dedication………………………………………………………………………………………..vii
1.0 Chapter One: Introduction and Statement of Problem…………………………………...1
1.1Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………1
1.1.2Statement of the Problem……………………………………………………………………7
1.1.3Research Methodology…………………………………………………………………….10
1.1.4 Organization of the Study…………………………………………………………………11
2.0 Chapter Two: Methodology and Discussion of Developmental State Model…………...13
2.1 Methodology…..…………………………………………………………………………….13
2.1.2 Applied Thematic Analysis ……………………………………………………………….13
2.1.3 ATA Procedure…………………………………………………………………………….14
2.1.4 Data Sources……………………………………………………………………………….16
2.1.5 Developmental State……………………………………………………………………….17
2.1.6 Characteristics of a Developmental State………………………………………………….19
3.0 Chapter Three: Background of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).29
3.1 Geographical Background of SEA and SSA ……………………………………………….29
3.1.2 Historical Background of SEA and SSA …………………………………………………30
3.1.3. A. An overview of SEA in Post-Independence………………………………………….33
3.1.3. B. An overview of SSA in Post-Independence…………………………………………..35
3.1.4 Malaysia’s Political Profile………………………………………………………………..38
3.1.5 Malaysia’s Economic Profile……………………………………………………………...41
3.1.6 Developmental State Characteristics in Malaysia’s Development Undertaking………….42
3.1.7 Ghana’s Political Profile…………………………………………………………………..48
3.1.8. Ghana’s Economic Profile………………………………………………………………..51
3.1.9. Developmental State Characteristics in Ghana’s Development Undertaking……………53
4.0 Chapter Four: Thematic Analysis of Malaysia and Ghana……………………………..64
4.1 Theme 1……………………………………………………………………………………..64
4.1.2 Theme 2…………………………………………………………………………………...73
4.1.3 Theme 3…………………………………………………………………………………...82
4.1.4 Theme 4…………………………………………………………………………………...91
4.1.5 Theme 5…………………………………………………………………………………...97
4.1.6 Theme 6…………………………………………………………………………………...99
ii

4.1.7 Theme 7………………………………………………………………………………….107
5.0 Chapter Five: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………115
Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………...118
Appendix……………………………………………………………………………………….153

iii

List of Tables
Table 1: Economic Indicators of Southeast Asia ………………………………………………155
Table 1A: Economic Indicators of Sub-Saharan Africa ……………………………….............157
Table 2: Social Profile of Southeast Asia………………………………………………………158
Table 2A: Social Profile of Sub-Saharan Africa………………………………………………..159
Table 3: Frequency of Insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa………………160
Table 4: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Southeast Asia…………..161
Table 4A: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Sub-Saharan Africa…...163
Table 5: Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP): Malaysia and Ghana…………………………..165
Table 6: School enrollment; Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Vocational: Malaysia and
Ghana…………………………………………………………………………………………...166
Table 7: Inputs Value added in Manufacturing: Malaysia and Ghana…………………………167
Table 8: Macroeconomic Indicators in Malaysia………………………………………………..82
Table 8A: Macroeconomic Indicators in Ghana…………………………………………………86
Table 9: Malaysia’s National Development Plans since 1950………………………………….168
Table 9A: Ghana’s National Development Plans since 1950…………………………………..169
Table 10: Average size of total Natural Resource Production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014….....170
Table 10A: Average size of Tin production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014……………………….171
Table 11: Average size of Total Natural Resource Production for Ghana 1971 to 2014………172
Table 11A: Average size of Gold production for Ghana 1971 to 2014………………………...173

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1: Geographical location of Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa…………………..153
Figure 1A: GDP per Capita (constant 2005 US$) Malaysia and Ghana………………………..154
Figure 2: Agricultural value added (% of GDP): Southeast Asia………………………………174
Figure 2A: Agricultural value added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa ………………………175
Figure 3: Manufacturing value added (% of GDP): Southeast Asia……………………………176
Figure 3A: Manufacturing value added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa ……………………177
Figure 4: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP): Southeast Asia ……………………………178
Figure 4A: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP): Sub-Saharan Africa……………………..179

v

Acknowledgement
Foremost, I am grateful to Dr. Paul Bowles for supervising this project and also for his steadfast
support of my academic work in this University. This research benefitted immensely from his
patience, motivation, and special knowledge in this field of study. His constructive comments
and guidance greatly enlightened me about the subject of the research. The fact that I could count
on him at a time of some personal difficulties enabled me to push on to complete my studies.
My sincere thanks also go to Dr. Fiona MacPhail, and Dr. Gary Wilson, for serving on my
Supervisory Committee. I benefitted considerably from their suggestions and advice, which were
very insightful to me.
I am thankful to the Department of Economics for making me a better student now than when I
first enrolled.

vi

Dedication
This project is dedicated to my parents. My parents taught me that the best kind of knowledge to
have is that which is learned for its own sake. Through interactions with and the advice of family
and friends, I learned that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at a
time.

vii

Chapter One: Introduction and Statement of Problem
1.1. Introduction
In the post-WWII period, there was a wave of agitation for political and economic
independence in Third World countries, which eventually marked a series of decolonization in
East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Starting from a similar
position of colonial background in more than a half century since then, some regions and
countries have done substantially better than others. For instance, Japan 1became the world's
second largest economy after the United States from the post-World War II era to the end of the
Cold War (1947-1991) (Johnson 1995). The economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea
and Taiwan underwent rapid industrialization and maintained average growth rates of 7%
annually between the early 1960s and 1990s to earn the accolades “Newly-Industrialized
Countries (NICs)”, “The Four Asian Tigers or Four Asian Dragons” for their success (World
Bank 1993). Since the early 21st century, China (also known as factory of the world), India,
Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have developed into the NICs socioeconomic
classification with their high-income economies specializing in areas of comparative and
competitive advantage (Chang 2010). Despite the ending of the commodities boom2 which
reduced export revenues of resource dependent economies of Latin America and plunged many
into economic crisis, GDP per capita in Chile averaged US$7,602 from 1960 until 2017, reaching

1

Japan as a colonizer itself was not formally colonized by Western powers but experienced formal semi colonial
situations in the mid-sixteenth century when the Portuguese brought Catholicism, and new technology of gun and
gunpowder into the country. See Miyoshi and Harootunian (1993) for further discussion.
2

For instance, the 2000s commodities boom was the rise, and fall, of many physical commodity prices (such as
those of food, oil, metals, chemicals, fuels and the like) during the early 21st century (2000–2014). The boom was
largely due to the rising demand from emerging markets such as the BRIC countries, particularly China during the
period from 1992 to 2013 (World Atlas 2018).

1

an all time high of US$15,059 in 2017 to become the richest economy in South America3, an
impressive growth since the end of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy from the
1940s to end of the 1970s4 (World Atlas 2018; Trading Economics 2018). Also, Brazil’s US$
3,146 GDP per capita in 2001 earned it a membership of BRICs (an acronym for emerging
markets Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in 2001, and was noted as one of the
largest emerging markets economies expected to grow faster than the developed countries
(Guriev 2015).5 Table 1A in the Appendix shows that the resource and extractive production
economies of Sub-Saharan Africa doubled their GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) from US$
940 in 1960 to US$1,841 in 2010, but have remained in a least developed region, according to
the United Nation’s indicators of socioeconomic development.
This project attempts to explain why there have been differences in the levels of development
in the newly industrialising regions of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA),
represented by Malaysia and Ghana, respectively. Why are those two countries that had similar
economic and political profiles at the onset of their developmental endeavors experiencing
unequal outcomes, with the former faring better than the latter? The former is generally faring
better than the latter on various economic indicators. The average per capita gross domestic
product (constant 2005 US$) in SEA increased from $1,167 in 1960 to $9,993 in 2014 (Table 1,
Appendix). Within the same period, the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP)
The arrival of Chile’s Chicago boys (a group of Chilean economists who studied at the University of Chicago in
the 1950s) in 1973, whom were enthusiastic converts of Friedman’s free-market economic philosophies, and were
then given free rein to implement on an unprecedented scale during Augusto Pinochet’s dictatorship (1973 to 1990),
changed Chilean society forever and made it one of the richest countries in Latin America. See Opazo (2016) for
further discussion.
4
As of 2012, the largest economic sectors by GDP in Chile was mining, business and personal services, wholesale,
retail trade, and manufacturing. Only 4.9% of the GDP was contributed by the agricultural and allied sectors (World
Atlas 2018).
3

5

In the last 15 years, Brazil, Russia, and India have caught up with the smallest G7 economy (Italy) in terms of
nominal GDP, while China has overtaken Japan and become the second largest economy in the world. Together,
BRIC’s nominal GDP is similar to that of the EU or US and is likely to overtake both in the coming few years.
(Guriev 2015).

2

decreased from 34.6% in 1960 to 10.5% in 2014, while the manufacturing share of the GDP
increased from 13.8% in 1960 to 25.3% in 2014 (Figures 2 and 3, Appendix). Over the years,
SEA has become highly industrialized. The total agricultural raw material exports decreased
from 39.6% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 2.8% in 2010, while manufacturing exports
increased from 10% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 65.6% in 2010 (Table 1, Appendix).
In contrast, the average per capita GDP (constant 2005 US$) in SSA increased from $940 in
1960 to $1,841 in 2014 (Table 1A, Appendix). The agricultural share of GDP decreased from
28.9% in 1960 to 7.5% in 2010 6 and manufacturing’s share of GDP decreased from 10.6% in
1960 to 5.6% in 20137 (Figures 2A and 3A, Appendix). During that period, total agricultural raw
material exports decreased from 23.3% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 4.7% in 2010,
while total manufacturing exports increased from 4.2% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to
10.3% in 2010 (Table 1A, Appendix).
While the data shows the existence of better economic conditions in SEA than in SSA in
1960, the changes in the former appear more persistent and dramatic. Such disparities between
two the regions, which have many similarities in their social, political, and economic histories,
set out as a puzzle among development economists. Socially, the nations in the two regions are
multiethnic in their composition, a phenomenon that was largely imposed by European
colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). Politically, both
regions endured European colonial domination and economic exploitation (Stuchtey 2011). At
the time of independence, both regions faced a dearth of domestic private capital and indigenous
entrepreneurial capacities for economic development within their populations. The post-

6

Last accessible data available from the World Bank’s databank.

7

Last accessible data available from the World Bank’s databank.

3

independence educated elites were, however, determined to develop national pride and end their
political and economic dependency on the colonial masters by embarking upon ambitious
programs for national development. In that endeavor, most of the nations adopted the
developmental state model for pragmatic reasons (Harrison 2002). The rapid rates of economic
growth in the Soviet Union, without private capitalism, where the state assumed the leadership
and preeminent role in macroeconomic planning became an attractive path forward under the
existing circumstances (Chubarov 2012).
The key issue in this discussion, is the explanation of why the developmental state model has
apparently been more successful in SEA than in SSA, two regions that inherited similar sociopolitical situations and concurrently adopted the same model of development. It is contended that
the efficacy of the developmental state model depends on a nation’s ability to closely adhere to
and implement the principles and instrumentalities of the model. Stubbs (2012:92) has presented
a summary of the historical overview of the experiences and main characteristics of successful
developmental states as:
1. A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental ideology rooted in
rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing
2. A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy
3. A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over planning, energy,
production, finance and trade
4. A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development
5. Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line between public and
private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development.

4

Various empirical and authoritative reports tend to buttress Stubbs’ characterizations above.
The World Bank (1993) has noted that successful developmental states (e.g., in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) are the ones that implemented right industrial polices in regards
to their historical, political, sociological, and economic profiles. Dadzie (2013) has noted that the
right industrial strategy was employed in Malaysia to mobilize the diverse racial groups together
for national development. Similarly, in Singapore, Siddiqui (2015) observed that a better
industrial strategy was implemented to develop both physical and human capital to complement
the very few natural resources in the country to facilitate economic development. Subira (2011)
mentioned an absence of similar appropriate industrial strategy in South Africa, based on its
historical, political and economic profile, to build a strong links between the bureaucracy and
business to guide industrial development. The implementation of such appropriate policies in
terms of a country’s profile is what Stubbs (2012) has described as rational industrial strategy for
development (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Wade (1990) has also observed from his
study on Taiwan, that successful developmental states have transcended both socialist and
capitalist ideologies among the political elite in building domestic private capital. In Ethiopia,
the political elites have been noted to lack a consensual development ideology (i.e., what entails
a developmental state, and whether to accept neoliberalism or not) to enable the bureaucracy
guide their industrialization attempt (Woldegiyorgis 2014). Sen (2017) observed a strong link
between the bureaucracy and business in Indonesia (similar to Japan and South Korea in East
Asia) that enables the bureaucracy to guide industrial development. The existence of successful
ideologies among the political elites is an important factor that Stubbs (2012) credited for rapid
industrialization and export manufacturing (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Amsden
(1989) also in her study on South Korea observed that a sound macroeconomic environment was

5

present in the successful implementation of its developmental states. According to Stubbs
(2012), such a sound macroeconomic environment enabled the nation’s pilot agency to control
industrial policies through its influence over finance and trade (see Chapter Two for further
discussion). Edigheji (2005) in his study on South Africa has noted that a strong and uncorrupted
political leadership was present in successful developmental states. Stubbs (2012) has described
a strong and uncorrupted political leadership as relatively autonomous and well-trained
bureaucracy that is essential for national development (see Chapter Two for further discussion).
In general, while successful application of the developmental state model has been
recorded in East Asia (i.e., where the developmental state originally started), Latin American has
produced a different approach which takes place at a city (or municipal) level for rapid economic
development (Petras and Veltmeyer 2009). However, a review of national development attempts
in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa which adopted the developmental state model at the
end of European colonialism, beginning from the late 19th Century through the 20th Century, has
shown different outcomes. It appears that the pilot agencies in SEA and SSA have committed
differently to the basic principles of the developmental state that may account for their different
levels of outcome in industrialization and export-manufacturing. As already indicated above, this
phenomenon influenced the selection of the two regions for the current study. But given that the
countries in the two regions are varied in terms of their political and economic arrangements as
noted in Chapter Three, Malaysia and Ghana from SEA and SSA, respectively are the main
focus of this project. Malaysia and Ghana are roughly similar at their starting point, and also
have comparable country profile (e.g., 63 years politically independent from British indirect rule
and economic arrangement of resource extraction) as noted in Chapter Three for the purpose of
analysis.

6

1.1.2. Statement of Problem
How is it that two countries with similar starting point of development have recorded
different outcomes after applying the same development model (i.e., developmental state)? The
developmental state is a controversial reading and interpretation because during much of the
period neoliberalism, which support non interference of the state in economic development, has
been the dominant economic orthodoxy. And yet, my project is arguing that the developmental
state is the key concept for rapid development, especially for developing countries with
European colonial experience (mainly because of the sociological, political and economic
arrangement inherited after independence).
One of the starting points of neoliberal economic orthodox has been Ricardo’s (1817)
theory of comparative advantage, which encourages countries to engage in international trade
even when one country's workers are more efficient at producing every single good than workers
in other countries. This theory advances an increased role of the private sector in an economy to
maintain comparative advantage, as well as to ensure efficiency in production. In regards, the
intent for a limited role of the state in allocating national resources for the invisible hand of the
market to optimize economic development. On that account, “good governance” (mainly
democratic government) which protects property rights is the main stance in terms of the
political arrangement. Those neoliberal development ideologies (or orthodoxy) have influenced a
reconsideration of international rules: for example, a stronger advocacy for standardized foreign
policies (e.g., for national governance and international trade rules), and have been championed
by global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the
United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

7

The IMF with its austerity measures (or policies) for sound macroeconomic
environment, which support privatization and deregulation to increase trade and investment, has
succeeded in shrinking governments budget deficits, eliminate hyperinflation, and maintained
debt payment schedules for developing countries (e.g., the structural adjustment program in SubSaharan Africa and Latin America during the early 1980s) (Williamson 2002; Welch 2005). The
WB with its political agenda, which primarily focuses on “good governance” (mainly adopting
democratic government) has recorded a stable political environment, especially in high growth
rate countries8 (Tidy and Mazui 1984; World Bank 2018). The United Nations with its social
programs such as, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) has reduced extreme poverty and inequality in developing countries
9

(United Nations Development Programme 2018). The WTO has succeeded in organizing

ground rules (i.e., standardized rules) for international trade leading to an increase in regional, biand multilateral trade agreements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement
(APTAA) (WTO 2018).
And yet, in spite of the successes recorded in the world under the neoliberal development
ideologies, supporters of the developmental state are arguing it is a biased development ideology
leaving some regions (e.g., least developed countries) and countries (e.g., resource-rich
countries) behind. According to Chang (2010), the neoliberal development ideologies are similar
8

The Tables 2A, 3, and 9A in Appendix show Ghana has recorded a stable political environment after 1983, and
recorded a higher growth that countries in SSA with higher frequency of insurgencies.
9
As many as 111 million more people completed primary school and 471 million extra people have been lifted out
of extreme poverty as of 2013, compared to 1990s trends under the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs). See the Brookings Institution (2018).
Also, the primary school enrolment rate in developing regions reached 91% in 2015, up from 83% in 2000.
Moreover, about two-thirds of developing countries achieved gender parity in primary education. Progress has been
particularly strong in Southern Asia. Only 74 girls were enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys in 1990.
Today, 103 girls are enrolled for every 100 boys. See World Vision (2017)

8

to European colonial economic arrangement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as discussed
in Chapter Three, propagated by developed countries (mainly, Europe and the United States),
through global institutions such as the IMF and the WTO for less developed countries. For
instance, diamonds in it’s raw stage mined in Jwaneng, Botswana (Sub-Saharan Africa), has to
meet the WTO’s standardized trade rules before it can be exported at a market determined rate
(i.e., price determine by the forces of demand and supply hence the tendency of price fluctuation)
to be refined in a manufacturing industry at Surat, India (South Asia), and sold as a luxury
commodity (at a highly inflated price) in an auction in New York, United States (North
America)10. Also, in her study of the market, power and politics of world trade in todays’
globalized economy, Rivoli (2005) observed cotton cultivated in Mali (with cheap labour from
women and rural poor), has to meet the WTO’s standardized trade rules before it can be exported
and processed into a T-Shirt by one of the global apparel brands’ (e.g., Nike) supply chains in
China (with labour price and working conditions below International Labour Organization
requirements), and with a celebrity endorsement sold as a luxury good in North America. Such
inequalities associated with the neoliberal development orthodoxy echoes Wallerstein’s (1974)
remarks of international division and specialization of labour at the height of European (e.g.,
Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium) industrialization. Thus, Wallerstein (1974) identified a
three-level hierarchy in the global economy as the core, periphery, and semi-periphery in the
global economy, where the core countries (i.e., more industrialized countries) exploit peripheral
countries (less industrialized countries) for labor and raw materials. On that account, scholars
such as Wade (1990) has indicated the role of state in national development is essential in the
10

The Economist Times (2013) has reported that Nirav Modi (Firestar Diamonds) begun buying yellow diamonds
from Sierra Leone, white stones from Russia and Armenia, and pink Diamonds from India. In 2007, he acquired
Sandberg and Sikorski in New York, and since 2010 sends few pieces to each of the 16 auctions held annually by
Christies and Sotheby in Geneva, Hong Kong and New York.

9

volatile globalized economy to adjust and implement appropriate policies, as well as direct the
operations of the private sector to maintain comparative advantage and optimize resources for
rapid economic growth. In regards, an appropriate and a pragmatic governance, based on a
country’s profile have been the main stance in terms of the political arrangement (World Bank
1993). This project supports the critic’s view that the developmental state is a relevant policy for
development, and Malaysia and Ghana are used as a case study to contribute to the debate (or
literature). The rationale for a case study on Malaysia and Ghana was based on the ability to
easily access secondary data to suit the research methodology, thus, Applied Thematic Analysis.
There were limitations of resources (e.g., comparable and quantitative data) to pursue a more
holistic understanding of a developmental state in the two countries.
1.1.3. Research Methodology
This project will explain the difference in development in Malaysia and Ghana, by
utilising the concept of the Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA), which involves both quantitative
and qualitative analysis. As already indicated in the previous section, the primary goal of this
project is to test the hypothesis that Malaysia has attained better economic outcomes than Ghana
due to a more effective implementation of the developmental state model in the former by
employing a comparative analysis of secondary data and empirical textual information from
scholarly research, government, and private sources. In this analytical approach, the organization
of data will be done thematically, guided by the five characteristics of the developmental state
model identified by Stubbs (2012). The analysis will disclose the respects in which the two
nations have either conformed to or deviated from the basic principles of the developmental state
model.

10

1.1.4. Organization of the Study
The rest of the paper is organized into the chapters described below:
Chapter Two: Methodology and Discussion of Developmental State Model.
Methodology: The Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA) methodological approach is
described. The method of data collection, the definition of key concepts, the form of data
analysis employed, and what informed the themes are also discussed. Thus, the chapter sets out
the method and how the empirical research findings and textual documents on the development
undertaking in Malaysia and Ghana are compared to the themes identified from the literature
review of the developmental state. In all, seven themes are identified following the ATA process.
Discussion of Developmental State Model: The theoretical and empirical research literature on
the developmental state is reviewed and the main characteristics, as outlined by Stubbs (2012),
will constitute the themes for the comparative analysis and evaluation of the respective
performances of Malaysia and Ghana on their implementation. The chapter describes the
characteristics of the developmental state, both strengths and weaknesses, and requirements for
its successful application.
Chapter Three: Background review of SEA and SSA. This chapter presents information on the
geographical, historical, political, and economic background of SEA and SSA. The background
information of SEA and SSA are intended to paint a picture of the regions, pre- and postindependence. Also included is a detailed discussion on development approaches and plans in
Malaysia and Ghana since independence.
Chapter Four: Analysis. The chapter uses both quantitative and qualitative data on Malaysia
and Ghana to explain the differences in their respective levels of development. The two countries

11

are assessed to see how the developmental state model has been applied and if the differences in
development is due to a better application of the model in Malaysia than Ghana.
Chapter Five: Conclusion. In this chapter, the findings, limitations, and suggestions for further
studies are discussed. The chapter includes a summary of the findings and policy implication
about development in Malaysia and Ghana, and concludes with some recommendations.

12

Chapter Two: Methodology and Discussion of the Developmental State Model
In this chapter, the main principles or characteristics of the developmental state model are
outlined from the review. Those will constitute the themes for the comparative analysis and
evaluation of how Malaysia and Ghana have performed in their implementations of a
developmental state. It is reiterated that this research is guided by the proposition that the
disparities in economic development between Malaysia and Ghana employing the same
development model (i.e., a developmental state) can be a function of the efficiency in
implementing the principles of the model.
2.1.

Methodology
As previously mentioned, this research will utilize both qualitative and quantitative

information in a comparative analysis of Malaysia and Ghana, for which the ATA has been
identified as a suitable methodology.
2.1.2 Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA)
ATA involves the utilization of both quantitative and qualitative data in an applied
research context. The ATA, according to Guest, Namey and MacQueen (2012:15) “is a rigorous
set of procedures designed to identify and examine themes from documented data or theories and
incorporate them into interpretive analysis”, and is best suited to questions of understanding and
representation that are not easily quantifiable. It involves inductive analysis and conclusions
from textual information and is appropriate for this project, which utilizes both statistical and
qualitative textual data from various academic and non-academic sources. Thus, the semantic
and latent attributes of ATA are appropriate for this project to assess characteristics of a
developmental state such as a developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and a
rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development as indicated by Stubbs (2012),
which are not easily quantifiable. In that respect, the coded or adverse effects of the
13

characteristics of a developmental state which are not easily quantifiable but essential for
economic development are explained with the ATA. Consequently, the themes for the analysis,
based on the five major characteristics of a developmental state model identified by Stubbs
(2012), and other themes that emerged from the literature review, are used in assessing various
empirical data on Malaysia and Ghana to gain an understanding of the contrast between the two
countries.
2.1.3. The ATA Procedure
The following three procedures were used for this project:
1. Review the literature on developmental state and identify variables as yardstick for the
themes
This involved a review of the literature on developmental state, including the works of
Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), World Bank (1993), Chang (2010) and Stubbs
(2012), to identify the salient themes and variables of the model for comparing the
developmental approaches and histories of Malaysia and Ghana. In that endeavor, the selection
of variables was guided by experts’ reports on the core principles and best practices on the
developmental state. Specifically, the variables involved the factors which define a successful
developmental state (i.e., expert’s reports on main factors that stand out in the empirical
experiences of successful developmental states). In all, seven themes were identified for the
analysis.
2. Identify thematic data on development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana from 1957
Scholarly reports on the development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana were
reviewed and factors contributing to the growth and declines in their economic development
were identified. The pertinent empirical information for the analysis was obtained from the

14

economic development planning reports of Malaysia and Ghana, international and intergovernmental agencies including the Atlas of Economic Complexity, the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning, the National Development Planning Commission, the Trade Map, the
Transparency International, the African Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asia
Nation, the Central Intelligent Agency World Fact Book, the Economic Planning Unit, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. The private
agencies and publications include the International Tin Research Institute, the Center for
Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) Anglophone Africa, the Global Economy, the
Index Mundi, and academic and expert sources, on the bases of the identified themes.
3. Compare Malaysia and Ghana on their respective performances on the themes
A comparative analysis was done on how the respective empirical data on developmental
undertakings for Malaysia and Ghana:
a) reflected the core principles and best practices of developmental state, and
b) have been similar or different between the two countries since 1957.
For this study, the two countries were compared on the empirical data on their developmental
practices and outcomes assembled from scholarly, governmental, and private agencies. In
determining the efficient implementation of the principles of the developmental state model, the
presence or absence of the identified key variables or features, the consistency of their use, and
general recognition in the empirical literature were used. Ideally, either having the presence of all
the identified variables or same sets of variables in both countries will be perfect to conclude
better implementation of a developmental state for national development. However, lack of
comparable data and differences in the application of the variables base on each country’s profile
requires contextualized justification. In recognition that the comparison of respective

15

performance (i.e., similarities or differences in indicators) cannot be effectively studied (e.g.,
measured) using standardized gaps, subjective judgement, which is supported by explaining with
either qualitative data (e.g., expert’s observation of the effect of such variable) or quantitative
data (e.g., statistics) was used. The lack of comparable data for all variables is the primary
limitation to the analysis.
2.1.4 Data Sources
As noted above, the data for analysis was obtained from scholarly literature and other
secondary sources, including academic journals, textbooks, and the internet. The information
obtained from the various sources are described below.
·

The Atlas of Economic Complexity and the Trade Map provided data on

trade volumes and trade commodities to assess the nature of trade in the two regions (see
Table 4 and 4A, Appendix).
·

The Ministry of Finance and Economic planning provided data on natural

resources revenue and contribution in Ghana (see Tables 11 and 11A, Appendix).
·

The National Development Planning Commission provided economic

development planning reports in Ghana (see Table 9A, Appendix).
·

The Transparency International provided data on corruption in Malaysia

and Ghana to determine institutional autonomy in the two countries.
·

The African Development Bank (ADB) and the Association of Southeast

Asia Nation (ASEAN) provided data on industrial and trade policies in Malaysia and
Ghana.

16

·

The Central Intelligent Agency World Fact Book provided data on

political climate in Malaysia and Ghana to assess governance and the degree of
insurgency in the two countries (see Tables 2, 2A, and 3, Appendix).
·

The Economic Planning Unit provided reports on economic development

planning in Malaysia (see Table 9, Appendix).
·

The Global Economy, the International Monetary Fund, and the World

Bank provided key country statistics for indicators grouped under the following topics:
economic policy, education, infrastructure, and trade. For instance, information on
macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, gross domestic product, and balance
accounts to assess the health of the economy in Malaysia and Ghana were provided by
these agencies (see Tables 1, 1A, 8, and 8A; Figures 2, 2A, 3,3A, 4, and 4A, Appendix).
·

The International Tin Research Institute and the Index Mundi provided

statistical data on commodities prices and production in Malaysia and Ghana to assess
revenue from resource production (see Tables 10, 10A, 11, and 11A).
·

The Center for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) Anglophone

Africa provided reports on monitoring and evaluation of institutional agents in Ghana.
·

The World Trade Organization provided data on global trade volumes and

policies for members in the global trade.
2.1.5. Developmental State
The idea of a developmental state as a model for economic development gained credence
as theorists sought to explain the impressive rates at which East Asian states were developing
during the 1960s and 1970s (Subira 2011). The proponents based their arguments on the

17

observation that contrary to the prevailing free-market 11 model for development, the late
industrializers12 of East Asia owed much more of their developmental success to a high level of
state intervention (Bishop and Payne 2017). Johnson (1982) demonstrated with a case study on
Japan’s economic growth that active state involvement in planning and oversight of national
development was a significant factor in their development success, and concluded that a
developmental state has an essential role in a country’s effort to industrialize. He noted further
that an elite state bureaucracy with the best managerial talent and highly educated or skilled
individuals in government are essential for a developmental state (Johnson 1995). Leftwich’s
(1995) subsequent conceptualization of the term “developmental state” gained currency among
international political economists in his analysis of state-led macroeconomic planning. Johnson
(1995) and Stubbs (2012) identified the key features of a developmental state as encompassing
carefully calibrated industrial policies spear-headed by the state to achieve economic growth by
establishing competent rationalized state agencies or bureaucracies characterized by meritocracy.
The state attempts to socially, politically, and economically guide the country in its industrial
efforts, mainly in the long-run (Marwala 2006). For instance, the state politically guided the
country’s industrial efforts by establishing a political system in which the bureaucracy is given
sufficient autonomy (but under the guidance of the state) to take initiative and operate effectively

11

The free market model for development share the laissez-faire ideology (i.e., support non-intervention of the
government in the working of a given economic environment), which is consistence with neoliberal economic
policies. The neoliberal economic policies advocate the abstention by governments from interference in the
workings of the market forces and enhancement of the role of the private sector in the economy. See Friedman
(1962); Wade (1990) for further discussion.
12

According to Amsden (1989) the late industrializers are subset of developing countries such as South Korea,
Taiwan and Japan that began the twentieth century in an economically backward state, but raised their national
income per capita on the basis of learning. They learned using either borrowed technology or through similar
institutions, especially those associated with industrial policies.

18

to maintain focus and ensure better organization in the processes of the development agenda
(Subira 2011).
In his elaboration of the developmental state, Mkandawire (2010) has identified the two
main features as the ideological component and the structural component, both of which must be
coherently supportive of each other in the developmental effort. The ideological component
consists of the philosophy or vision, plans, and strategies, with specific goals and targets for
either the political elite or industrial minded bureaucracy to operate. It involves stimulating civic
awareness and to politically mobilize the nation to support the vision and goals of development
(Julius 2006). The structural component, on the other hand, entails the development of
institutions and bureaucratic arrangements necessary for implementing and carrying out the roles
outlined in the industrial policies and plans, and whose success depends on the presence of
competent teams of public officials with the requisite training and skills to engineer and finance
the economy to promote national development (John 1998; Stiglitz 2001)
2.1.6. Characteristics of a Developmental State
In view of experts’ reports that the requisite features for successful developmental states
were uniquely or innovatively applied, based on a country’s profile, Stubbs’ (2012) summary of
the historical experiences presents a generalized characterization for the purpose of analysis.
Those characteristics are discussed below, and have been adopted as the themes for data analysis
in this project.
1.

“A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental

ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing” (Stubbs 2012:92).
This requires the state to identify vital institutions and markets to capacitate and
galvanize the productive forces to achieve the industrial goals. Castelles (1992) has noted that

19

the state’s main priority is to attain high rates of accumulation through simultaneous promotion
of both agriculture and manufacturing. In most cases, the underlying vision is to attain a
diversified economy to reduce the dependency on production of agricultural and other raw
materials (Reinert 2010). In that respect, the state builds and holds most sensitive and essential
enterprises such as natural resources and potential global demanded industries, and often apply
more strategic interventions including; - a) selectivity i.e., supports progressively shifting
competitive advantages instead of just adapting to existing comparative advantages, - b).
flexibility i.e., ensure high adjustment capacity of policies to the dynamic world market, - c).
coherence i.e., the policies’ impacts are cumulative, and - d). competitive i.e., adopt policies that
promote competitive production in enterprises to achieve an export manufacturing economy
(Laurisen 1993). Because of the strategic interventions, the state invests in both human and
physical capital to harness national resources in its policy-making process (Charlotte 2008). For
instance, institutions such as banks and credit unions are develop to build the financial sector in
support of both primary and secondary level production (Stiglitz and Uy 1996).
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) industrial policies; developing institutions
such as banks and state owned enterprises to support agricultural (primary) and manufacturing
(secondary) production, b) sectorial development; developing global demanded goods and
industries to promote export manufacturing, c) human capital development; developing
vocational, technical agencies and programs (e.g., skill development centers) to train labour for
industries, d) physical capital development; developing roads, power, harbours for easy
movement of goods and to enhance trade.

20

2.

“A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy” (Stubbs 2012: 92).

Ideally, state departments and agencies must have the capacity to promote economic
growth without being influenced by interest groups, such as those from business and labour
unions. In that respect, a highly developed and industrial minded bureaucracy with intervention
capacity is required (Sibira 2011). The highly developed and industrial minded bureaucracy is
necessary to ensure the state institutions are able to bridge the gap between the market and social
goods13 necessary for development (Subira, 2011). The expectation is that public authorities
would be able to intervene to adjust economic activities in line with national development plans
and targets. In that endeavor, Evans (2008) has emphasized the importance of the state’s
responsiveness to the demands and needs of the people. Meeting that expectation is supposed to
create an ‘embedded autonomy’ in which the state can develop binding social ties with the
citizens. For instance, the ability of state institutions (or structures) to link the market (e.g.,
private sector) to benefits the citizens (e.g., provide employment to the population even at lower
wages), and at the same time ensure industrial growth and development. Edigheji (2005) has
noted that a strong, committed, and uncorrupted political leadership is required to inspire selfless
devotion and commitment in the general population to efficiently and effectively control the
nation’s resources..
A well-trained bureaucracy is attainable if the institutions managing state structures are
knowledgeable on economic planning. In that regard, institutions such as universities, research,
and skill development agencies, are developed to produce knowledgeable and competent public
servants with the capability and political will to carry-out the vision (and ideology) of the state in
the long-run (Stubbs 2012). Also, anti-corruption agencies are developed to ensure state

13

Social good is an action or policies by the state that provides some sort of benefit to the general public. Examples
are education and healthcare. See Boolkin (2015) for further discussion

21

institutions hold no allegiances, and to be autonomous in carry-out their mandated duties
(Mkandawire 2010).
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) anti-corruption institutions; anti-corruption
agencies, recruitment and expert training programs are develop to control dominance of interest
groups, b) research and development institutions; universities, think-tanks, research agencies are
develop to ensure the bureaucracy is able to read data and inform policy makers, c) branches of
government; the judiciary, executive, and legislature are develop (or design) to build the political
will to administer national development (i.e., ensure the structures laid down share the state’s
vision and ideology, e.g., promote meritocracy in public administration).
3.

“A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over

planning, energy, production, finance and trade” (Stubbs 2012: 92).
In that effort, the state promulgates and utilizes a variety of instruments and policies to
regulate industry and trade. Onis (1991) has noted that the state institutions must play the
strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to national
ends. The restructuring of incomes and assets, fiscal and monetary policies, and direct state
ownership of key industries are some of the structural developments undertaken by the state for
industrial growth (John 1998; Stiglitz 2001). According to Amsden (1989), getting the price
wrong, for instance, where the state intervenes in the market system to control the exchange rate,
wage level, and the interest rate to lower production cost for industries are also often employed
to enhance business-government relationships. Thus, by encouraging export-led economic
strategies, tariffs are reduced and floating exchange rate regimes, where national currencies are
often devalued, are promoted to enhance competitiveness in exports (Amsden 1989). The state
focuses on the necessary balance of the five macroeconomic prices – the profit rate, the interest

22

rate, the exchange rate, the wage rate, and the inflation rate – that the market is unable to make
right (Bresser-Pereira 2016).The expectation is that the state would be able to mobilize funds to
effectively finance and control its programs for development (Mackenzie 2008).
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) macroeconomic regulatory policies; the use
of direct government intervention by the central government to control exchange rates, inflation,
savings, general level of wages, and debts managements to avoid overheated economy (e.g.,
manipulating figures to attract investors, scrutinize information accessible to the public by
controlling media).
4.

“A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development”

(Stubbs 2012:92).
The state departments and agencies must engage in frequent negotiations and
renegotiations of goals and policies to effectively implement both medium-term and long-term
policies, independent of specific political figures or leaders (Mkandawire 2010; Cerna 2013).
This is possible if the vision or strategies of the state can propagate civic awareness and
politically mobilize the nation to support the development agenda (Julius 2006). Thus, a more
conducive political environment, which transcends both socialist and capitalist ideologies, is
required to ensure implementation of long-term national development plans (Wade 1990). The
desire for a more conducive political environment is necessary to ensure policies by the state (or
public administration) are coherent and supportive to legitimize actions of the developmentallyminded bureaucracy (Bresser-Pereira 2016).
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) political environment; presence of political
stability and long-term development plans to ensure continuity (i.e., provide supportive political

23

economy), b) rationalized bureaucracy; effective leadership to control cabals, factions, or interest
groups.
5.

“Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line

between public and private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development”
(Stubbs 2012:92).
The developmental state aims to build indigenous private capital (i.e., domestic private
capital) for long-term economic growth and national development. Most often, a developmental
state sidelines and builds the capacity of indigenous private capital before it is allow to freely
operate in the economy. In that regard, indigenous private capital is restricted and rigidly guided
into the most promising industries for long-term national interest. Thus, the goal of a
developmental state is to build the capacity of indigenous private capital (for autonomous
national development), however, deliberately distort them to serve specific national development
objectives.
In that endeavour, the state must be able to discipline both capital and labour. With
regards to capital, direct control (e.g., export targets) and licensing arrangements, which are not
captured by business interests, are used to increase capital accumulation and stimulate private
investments (Bruton 1994). Entrepreneurs must meet set productive targets and be competitive
globally to continue receiving assistance in the guarantee of loan by the state from banks (Wade
2003). The state can nudge firms to produce more value-added products by requiring
multinationals to merge with domestic firms (Wade 2005). Also, patents and tariff protection are
used to spread new knowledge and new practices to upgrade the technological skills of industries
(Chang 2010). Thus, investors wishing to set up production in a country are given temporary
monopolies, such as patents or tariff protection to decrease cost of production for industrial

24

growth (Wade 2010). The approach by a developmental state to discipline capital (to ensure
efficiency in production) is not about rejecting markets, but rather recognising that, left to their
own forces, they can have an adverse effects, including loosing comparative advantage in the
dynamic global economy (Bresser-Pereira 2016).
With regard to labour, harsh adversarial relationships may occur (or are often promoted
by the state) between trade unions and business groups, especially at the early stage of
development to maintain comparative advantage in production (Amsden 1989). Labour laws are
often tightened to control trade unions as a way of reducing the cost of labour for firms to be
competitive in the global market (Jomo 1990). In this way, the cost of doing business is
minimized and new industries spread to new areas from where they had first been set up.
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) guiding the capital market; discipline capital
by setting targets to produce, b) guiding the labour market; discipline labour by managing
agreements or controlling trade union to dodge labour agitation for better remuneration (e.g.,
wage control), c) protectionism; offering incentives such as tax holidays, decrease tariffs, restrict
licensing to decrease cost of production or to attract investors such as public-private partnership.
As already indicated in the methodology section of this chapter, the themes for the
analysis were primarily based on the five major characteristics of a developmental state
identified by Stubbs (2012: 92). However, by following the ATA process to review literature on
a developmental state and scholarly reports on development undertakings in Malaysia and
Ghana, two additional themes emerged. It has been noted that Stubbs (2012) five main
characteristics of a developmental state are based on historical experiences of successful
developmental states. In that respect, the historical experiences indicate that the developmental
states have been more successful applied in East and Southeast Asia (see for instance Asmden

25

1989; Wade 1990; World Bank 1993; Stiglitz 2001; Chang 2010). In that regard, the region or
geographical location in which a developmental state is located was considered as a theme to
assess if it enables better application of the model.
In regards to the development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana, both countries have
abundant natural resources which attracted the colonial domination and economic exploitation
(see Chapter Three for further discussion). As already indicated in Chapter One, an example of
the reasons for adopting a developmental state for national development after independence was
to end the colonial economic exploitation. In that respect, the management and utilization of
natural resources by a developmental state was considered as a theme to assess if the abundant
resources in the two countries harnessed better application of the model.
6. Impact of socio-political settings to national development.
Although developmental states are national development projects, the regional context
matters as it provides externalities for a better application of the model. Socio-political settings
involve the social and political factors that contribute to economic development (World Bank
2006). It is concern with factors such as trade and market access (i.e., where economic activities
take place), geographical location (e.g., great cities to emerge where there are good harbours),
and geopolitics (e.g., foreign policies influenced by geographical factors) that provides the
environment for industrial development (Krugman 1999; Spencer-Oatey 2012; Beer and Lester
2015).
Historically, the developmental state has been more successful in East and Southeast
Asia, especially among the Newly Industrialized Countries14 (NICs) (Amsden 1989; World Bank
1993; Wade 2005; Stubbs 2012). The inductive characteristic of the ATA methodological

14

Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples of NICs in the 1970s and 1980s. Examples in the
late 2000s included China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

26

approach informed the choice to assess the impact of socio-political settings in the two regions
(i.e., SEA and SSA) of this project.
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) geopolitical factors; concentration of market
and regional trade to attract investors and provide positive externalities for rapid development, b)
geographical location: climate conditions such as occurrence of natural disasters, distance from
the equator (e.g., seasons in a year to influence planning and innovation), closeness to big
harbour to influence trade and investment, c) geopolitics; relationships with international
organizations base on the global stratification or global social hierarchy, political climate (e.g.,
stability or instability) to attract trade and investment.
7. Management and utilization of natural resources for national development.
Natural resources are part of the real wealth of nations that provide revenue to the
government, raw materials, and employment for industrial development. As such, the use of
natural resources for industrial development can either enhance or hinder economic growth. The
way resources have been managed and utilized, especially resource rents, by most states in Third
World countries, after independence, has been noted by development economists among the
factors contributing to the level of economic development (Robinson et al. 2006; OECD 2011).
Sachs and Warner (2001) have observed that resource rents in most Third World countries
attempting to industrialize after independence have been captured by predatory states. There
have been issues of overdependence on resources by the state as a source of revenue, which have
either increased corruption or affected economic planning through commodity price fluctuations,
dubbed the resource curse (Robinson et al. 2006). Those pave an alternative way for former
colonial masters to infiltrate economic activities, especially in their former colonies through
foreign aid and multinational investments (Barrett and Whyte 1982). As a result, the countries

27

are indirectly exploited and they may be unable to protect their domestic industries or domestic
private capital from competition (Barrett and Whyte 1982). The inductive characteristic of the
ATA methodological approach informed the choice to assess the management and utilization of
natural resources in the two countries for this project.
Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) political factors; effective institutions or
bureaucratic arrangement to manage and control resource rents and corruption, b) economic
factors; diversification of the economy, or primacy of and dependence on agriculture and
extractive industries to overcome resource curse, c) geopolitics; relationships with international
organizations base on the global stratification or global social hierarchy to influence the nature of
international trade and investment.
From the analysis of characteristics of a developmental state, it can be concluded that
there is a possibility that the characteristics or themes interact and have joint impact. For
instance, a better application or function of Theme 5, depends on a better application of the
identified variables in Theme 1, Theme 2 and Theme 3. Also, a better application of Theme 7,
depends on a better application of the identified variables in Theme 2. In the analysis chapter,
examples of the interaction and joint impacts of the themes are elaborated.
In conclusion, the developmental state requires active state intervention in the economy
to guide economic plans and programs for national development. The state requires autonomy
and oversight, strategically designed policies, and guidance for long-term national development.
In all, efficient bureaucratic arrangement is involved to overcome internal and external demands
from interest groups to do things for their short-term gain, in directing the nation’s long-term
plans and development programs.

28

Chapter Three: Background of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
This chapter presents the regional profiles of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), and demonstrates how Malaysia and Ghana are comparable in terms of starting
points to provide a case study in explaining the differences in their economic development. In
addition to the need for regional overview of SEA and SSA, the extent to which the development
undertaking in Malaysia and Ghana exhibit characteristics of a developmental state are
described.
3.1. Geographical Background of SEA and SSA
Geographically, SEA is bordered in the north by China, west by India, and south by
Australia. SEA was previously known as “Further India,” “Indo-China,” “East Indies,” and
“Malay Peninsula” before World War II (Savage, Kong and Yeoh 1994). The SEA region is an
archipelago divided into two geographic settings: mainland and maritime region. The mainland
section consists of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. The maritime section
consists of Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore (see Figure 1,
Appendix).
In SSA, the conceptual separation line is located at the southern edge of the Sahara
Desert (see Figure 1, Appendix). The region covers areas where there are extremely dry
conditions in the northern part and substantial precipitation in the southern humid forest. These
consist of Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and

29

Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (The Library of Congress 2010).
3.1.2. Historical Background of SEA and SSA
From the beginning of the19th century, European powers colonized much of SEA and
SSA (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). For instance, Malaysia was a British colony from 1800 to 1957,
Singapore a British colony from 1819 to 1957, and Indonesia a Dutch colony from 1816 to 1975
(World Facts US 2008; Rijksmuseum 2017). Ghana was a British colony from 1867 to 1957,
Nigeria a British colony from 1885 to 1960, and Côte d'Ivoire a French colony from 1893 to
1960 (Handloff 1988; Berry 1994; American Historical Association 2017). The imperial powers
of Europe viewed their colonies as a source of raw materials and labour. Davis (1964) and
Stuchtey (2011) have noted that from the beginning of the 1500s, colonial expansion was part of
the economic development strategy of the colonial powers, who increased their wealth by
imposing restrictive regulations on the colonies. In most cases, the colonial powers had no
interest in developing manufacturing industries in the colonies, which rather served as dumping
grounds for European industrial products in furtherance of the prevailing mercantilist
arrangements. In that arrangement, the European powers were able to expand their empires and
wealth through international trade (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 1989; Rankin 2011). The
prevailing political arrangement allowed the colonies to be easily exploited for their precious
metals, such as gold and silver, and other raw materials, such as palm oil, which fuelled the 19 th
century industrial machine (Austin 2010). In the process, the colonies were exploited and
oppressed, sometimes violently, for material and human resources (Crowder 1964). The demand
for industrial raw materials led to fierce competition among the imperial powers in the

30

establishment of trade routes and trade networks, a greater European presence, and the sabotage
or elimination of many local economic arrangements (Tracy 1990; Koponen 1993).
The European scramble for SEA and SSA, and the eventual partitioning of the regions
among the key contestants, resulted in artificial national boundaries that defied existing ethnic or
tribal alignments (Iyer 2008). The new colonial economic and political arrangements were
designed to undermine any sense of indigenous control and autonomy. In some situations, a
system of direct rule was introduced where the home government of the colonizing country made
all of the political and economic decisions about how the colony was run (Hancock 2014). In this
system, the indigenous local elites were removed from power and replaced by officials and
administrators who had been brought in from the mother country to control the colonial political
economy. The goal was to assimilate the colonies with foreign culture rather than preserve native
traditions (Lewis 1962; Bleich 2005). Where indirect rule was introduced as the administrative
strategy, the central authority and power over a colony resided with the colonizers, however, the
indigenous local authorities were allowed some degree of autonomy in local governance
(Gerring et al. 2011). Through this process, the military, taxes, and natural resources were
controlled by the foreign officials, while almost every other aspect of life was left to the local
elites (mainly traditional rulers) who sided with their foreign diplomats (Rudolph and Rudolph
1966; Okafour 1973). An indirect colonial administration used existing tribal structures and
traditions as channels for establishing their rules and regulations. Consequently, the colonies
became largely dependent upon the mother country for military, economic, and political support
(Mazrui and Tidy 1984).
The introduction of Western education as part of the colonial activities facilitated the
assimilation of the colonized peoples into Western culture. Religious leaders, social and political

31

radicals, and militants rose to resist colonial exploitation. The decades after World War II
therefore saw considerable political assertiveness among the educated and indigenous elite in the
colonized nations in SEA and SSA (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). The emergence of political
agitations by the colonized elites culminated in the push for political independence.
Successively, the independence of Indonesia, Cambodia, and Malaysia occurred in 1945, 1953
and 1957, respectively (see Table 2, Appendix). Ghana’s independence in 1957 was followed by
Niger and Nigeria’s independence in 1960, and Lesotho’s in 1966 (see Table 2A, Appendix).
Almost all the nationalist movements and agitations in SEA and SSA were aimed at the
attainment of political and economic independence from colonial hegemony. In return, most of
the leaders of the nationalist movements became Prime Ministers or Presidents of their
respective countries after independence. Malaysia and Ghana, which are the main focus of this
project, witnessed members of their nationalist movements who served as prime ministers under
the colonial administration become their new leaders after independence in 1957 (Jeburun 2008;
Saraceno 2014).
Both SEA and SSA under the independent administrations envisioned that the
deployment of the developmental state model would address the sociological challenges they
inherited from the colonial administration. The challenges included the factionalism created by
the artificial colonial national boundaries for direct and indirect rule by the colonial
administrators. Because of the potential appeal of a developmental state to both socialist and
capitalist tendencies, it became very appealing to the political elite in their pursuit of flexible
modes of production and political arrangements. The SEA region has consequently seen
communism, monarchies, and dictatorial rule as their typical governing ideologies in the postindependence era. For instance, Vietnam after independence in 1945 adopted a communist state,

32

Malaysia after 1957 adopted a constitutional monarchy, and Myanmar after 1967 adopted a
military authoritarian approach to government (see Table 2, Appendix). In SSA, liberal
democracy, which allows free and competitive multi-party elections was introduced after
independence. Table 2A in the Appendix shows that Nigeria after independence in 1960 became
a federal republic, Malawi after 1964 adopted a multiparty democracy, and Botswana after 1966
embraced a parliamentary republic. However, state authoritarianism as an approach to
government has been the dominant political arrangement in SSA. The state authoritarianism
were seen in the actions and advocacy of a one-party state by most of the leaders in SSA after
independence (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). Goldery and Wantchekon (2004:1) have reported that
“there have only been 189 country-years15 of democracy in SSA compared to 1823 country-years
of dictatorship between 1946 and 2000”. The states in SEA and SSA were permitted the
autonomy to implement a governing ideology that would politically mobilize the population in
support of the national development agenda. Remarkably, the leaders of the newly independent
nations embarked on ambitious programs of economic development and modernization, as were
represented in their economic development plans. The next subsection presents an overview of
SEA and SSA in post independence.
3.1.3. A. An overview of SEA in post independence
The countries in SEA have recorded political instabilities in their development attempts,
but the management and occurrences of such instabilities have contributed to their level of
economic development (see Table 3, Appendix). The 2016 corruption perceptions index reported
by the Transparency International showed corruption to be high in SEA, but higher in countries
like Cambodia and Vietnam. Some countries on the contrary recorded improvement on the
corruption index. Singapore and Brunei have enjoyed an extended period of political stability
15

Total number of years that countries in SSA have been independent.

33

after independence and have been ranked 7th and 41st out of 175 countries on the corruption
index, respectively, an indication that stability has enabled the states to execute their plans to
improve their institutions. The institutions in turn have been able to effectively guide the
implementation of the principles of the developmental state model in SEA to develop
manufacturing exports for rapid economic growth (see Table 4, Appendix). With the growth in
manufacturing exports, the countries in SEA, with the exception of Cambodia, have increased
the income level (see Table 2, Appendix). The growth in income has been maintained by sound
macroeconomic policies, such as a balanced budget law in Indonesia (Indonesian Investments
2017). According to the Trading Economic (2017), Indonesia’s inflation average was 10.42%
from 1997 to 2017, with its highest point at 82.40% in 1998 and it’s lowest at -1.17% in 2000.
In terms of natural resource management, a study by Sovacool (2010) concluded that the
resource curse was absent in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand. The five
countries together have the largest endowment of combined per capita and total oil and natural
gas reserves in SEA. However, Myanmar had the worst economic performance among the five
countries in terms of per capita GDP (constant 2010 US$ at $1,420 in 2016), because of its
weaker institutional structure (ranked 136 out of 176 on corruption index 2016), and its higher
degree of political instability.
In addition, the socio-political setting in SEA has presented positive externalities, such as
mentorship in industrial leadership, trade, and investment. There have been similarities and
consistencies in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand for their economic management with the
state’s intervention policies for SOEs and restrictions on labour unions (Hill 2013). All this
serves as an indication of how prudent policies disseminate in the SEA region for better
economic management. SEA’s geographical location in an area of trade and market

34

concentration has also provided positive externalities, such as the developed infrastructures in
Singapore and Thailand, attracting trade and investment in Vietnam and Cambodia
(Bhattacharyay 2009). The geographical location has made SEA “the roller coaster of
globalization interpreted as the accelerated integration of national economy into the global
economy” (Bello 2007: 169). Thus, Vietnam and Cambodia have been able to develop
manufacturing exports despite the weak institutions and political instabilities because of the
positive externalities from their geographical location.
3.1.3. B. An overview of SSA in post independence
The countries in SSA, except for Botswana, have recorded an extended period of political
instabilities after independence (see Table 3, Appendix). The prolonged political instabilities in
the region have been characterized by a crippling state of political and economic lethargy and
uncertainties in their macroeconomic climate. The African Capacity Building Foundation (2002)
reported that between 1960 and 1975, an estimated 27,000 high-level Africans left the continent
for the West, and that increased to 40,000 between 1975 and 1984, which then almost doubled
by 1987, representing 30% of the highly skilled manpower stock. Additionally, a total of 60,000
professionals including doctors, university lecturers, and engineers left the region between 1985
and 1990, and they have been losing an average of 20,000 annually since (The African Capacity
Building Foundation 2002). The increases in brain drain have weakened the institutional order
for a pervasive degree of systemic corruption and inefficiencies in the implementation of the
principles of the developmental state model. This is a reason why Africa’s dictators could not
successfully guide economic development, that is, they were deprived of a well-trained
bureaucracy.

35

The 2016 corruption perceptions index reported by the Transparency International
showed corruption is high in SSA, with countries like Nigeria and Angola, ranked 136th and
164th out of 175, respectively. Botswana has enjoyed an extended period of political stability
after independence and was ranked 35th out of 175 countries on the corruption index in 2016, an
indication that the stability has enabled the state to execute plans to improve its institutions. In
all, the weaker institutions in SSA have been unable to effectively and consistently guide the
implementation of the principles of the developmental state model to develop manufacturing
exports and, hence, remained raw material exporters (see Table 4A, Appendix). Table 2A in the
Appendix shows that, with the increase in raw material exports, the countries in SSA have
recorded either low or lower income levels, apart from Botswana, Gabon, and South Africa. The
sluggish growth in income levels are partly due to the weak macroeconomic environment in the
region. Gross financial mismanagement has been a common practice in the countries of SSA. For
instance, a total of 2.4 and 5 million of Togo and Mali’s population, respectively, live on less
than $2 per a day, yet their delegates for the August 2017 United Nations summit in New York
spent from $8000 to $18,000 a day on hotel suites (National Broadcasting Corporation 2017).
With respect to natural resource management, the World Bank (2016) has reported the
resource curse is present in countries like Angola, Burundi, Nigeria, Congo, Gabon, Sierra
Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Zambia. The political elites in Gabon, Congo, and Equatorial
Guinea have been reported to use natural resource revenue to acquire luxurious properties
overseas at the expense of national development. The Transparency International (2017) reported
Congo’s Nguesso owned 24 estates and operated 112 bank accounts in France, while Gabon’s
Bongo and his relatives owned 30 luxurious estates on the French Riviera, in Paris and its
suburbs. Those are examples of how recent leadership in SSA is going to the doors of their

36

former colonial masters to be colonized instead of committing to national development. Angola's
central bank could not account for $4.2 billion in oil revenues from 1997 to 2002 even though
the country over depends on its natural resource revenues for national development (Bekele
2017). These actions attract resource seeking investors with little or no interest in manufacturing
and institutional development (see Theme 6 in Chapter Four for examples to this).
In caveat, a country like Botswana has controlled corruption to manage its natural
resource revenues for economic growth. For instance, the World Bank (2017) and the
Transparency International (2017) data show disparities in economic growth in Nigeria (one of
the rich economies) and Botswana (one of the rich governments) in SSA. The economies of
Nigeria and Botswana are defined by a single luxury export: oil and diamonds, respectively.
Nigeria’s GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) was $2,457 in 2016 and ranked 136th on the
corruption index, while Botswana’s GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) was $7,383 in 2016 and
ranked 35th on corruption index. An indication of how Botswana’s institutions have controlled
corruption to increase their wealth.
In terms of socio-political settings, Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Liberia, among
others, have witnessed a number of natural disasters, such as famine, flooding, and disease
outbreak (e.g., HIV\AIDS, Ebola) in their development attempts (World Bank 2017). Production
and trade to increase economic output in SSA are hampered by natural disasters, which produce
negative externalities, such as infrastructural deficits that cost the region 2% in GDP growth
annually (Okonjo-Iweala 2007). South Africa has been noted as the largest and most developed
country in SSA because of its infrastructure (Johannes and Garlick 2008). That indicates the
extent to which infrastructural deficits in SSA have impeded economic growth. The remaining
sections in this chapter attempt to establish how Malaysia and Ghana present comparable country

37

profiles for a case study, as well as how their development undertaking exhibit characteristics of
a developmental state. Specifically, the sections begin with Malaysia’s country profile, and is
followed by Ghana’s.
3.1.4 Malaysia’s Political Profile
Before the introduction of British colonial rule in 1800, Malaysia was controlled by a
number of Malay rulers and powerful chiefs who resided in well-defined territories, and Islam
was the dominant religion (Ahmad et al. 2014). With the dominance of Islam in the country, the
British promoted a professional religious hierarchy by forming an alliance with the monarchs,
who were responsible for both religious and traditional establishments (Husin 2011). Such an
alliance between the British and the monarchs is a typical example of how indirect rule was
applied during the colonial administration.
The development of tin and rubber plantations in the late 19th century was successful in
increasing demand for the commodities, which expanded the economy. The economic growth
attracted immigrants, including a massive influx of Chinese, into the country (Reid 2010). The
latter created political problems for the indigenous Malay rulers, because the indigenes had to
compete with the immigrants for their resources (Gillen 1994). The British, therefore, proposed
the formation of the Federated Malay State (FMS) in 1895, which standardized rules among its
members to allow greater efficiency in administration and business. The FMS members agreed to
seek the advice of the British on economic and military matters, except those relating to Islam,
but restricted the authority of each ruler to his own state (Husin 2011). Such an arrangement is an
example of how the British were primarily concerned with the economic and political business
under their indirect rule, but not interested in other matters of the state. The benefits of joining
FMS included centralized administration and the development of amenities, such as swimming

38

pools, dance halls, cinemas, private schools, and clubs (Teik 2005). This development, however,
was either absent from or less present in the Unfederated Malay State (i.e., non-members of
FMS) (Suwannathat-Pian 2009).
Beginning in the early 1950s, the Malays elite group felt they were prepared to manage
an independent country and, therefore, pushed for an end to colonial rule (Hutchinson 2015).
Initially, Malaysia’s plural society16 was an obstacle for uniting under a common flag. The major
ethnic groups represented in the population were Malay (51%), Chinese (24%), and Indian (8%)
(Dadzie 2011). The mixed races prompted the formation of several racial political parties to
protect ethnic interests. United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) were the main racial political parties
(Yusoff and Awang 2009).
In 1952, UMNO and MCA formed the UMNO-MCA alliance and contested in the local
government and town council elections (Ahmad 2009). MIC later joined UMNO-MCA to run in
the general elections of 1955 (Ahmad 2009). Following that, UMNO-MCA and MIC became the
governing coalition. Shuib et al. (2010) have mentioned that UMNO leader, Tunku Abdul
Rahman, was elected the first chief minister and 10 members from the alliance were elected
ministers. After the general election in 1955, the executive council was still dominated by British
officials in furtherance of the indirect rule.
Tunku Abdul Rahman began his famous “Merdeka”17 Mission to London in January
1955 to negotiate with the British for independence (Jeburun 2008). The British agreed and
proposed 31st August 1957 as the day of Malaysian independence. According to Thomas (2007),

16

A society made up of different ethnic groups or cultural traditions where, in the political structure, ethnic or
cultural differences are reflected. See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) for more details on a plural society.
17

Merdeka is a word in the Indonesian and Malay language meaning independent or free.

39

the British drafted a new constitution that maintained the monarchs and granted special
privileges to the Malays (e.g., the British maintained the authority of the Malays rulers to be
responsible for both religious and traditional establishments). The special privileges to the
Malays are examples of the channels the British used to propagate an inferiority complex among
some ethnic groups to advance the divide and rule agenda (i.e., part of the artificial national
boundaries created by the British). Those were among the sociological challenges inherited from
the colonial administration at independence in 1957, which required Stubbs (2012)
developmental state characteristics of a rational strategy to address for national development.
The MIC and the MCA agreed to keep Malay as the national language, and the UMNO, in
return, agreed to allow Chinese and Indians to participate in politics and be awarded citizenship
(Fernando 2011).18 That formed the basis for addressing the sociological challenges for national
development. The ethnic allegiances intensified and resulted in bloody inter-communal riots
between Malays and Chinese in 1969, which prompted UMNO, MCA, and MIC to unite under a
common flag called the National Front (Brown 2005).
Tunku Abdul Rahman, on 27th May 1961, proposed a merger among Malaysia,
Singapore, and the Borneo territories of Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei (Oh 1967). That was an
attempt by Malaysia to economically benefit from Singapore’s large number of industrial firms
and its recognition as a major trading port in the SEA. Also, the Borneo territories were attractive
to Malaysia because of their abundant natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, fertile
agricultural land (that produced peppers), rubber, and timber. Malaysia, Singapore, Sabah, and
Sarawak became one nation on 16th September 1963 (United Nation 1970). Two years later,

18

The first general election of Malaysia was held in 1959, in which the Alliance won 74 seats out of the 104 seats
contested.

40

however, on 9th August 1965, Singapore broke away from Malaysia and formed its own
government. Malaysia, today, comprises Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak.
3.1.5. Malaysia’s Economic Profile
Malaysia is rich in mineral resources and was a major supplier of primary products such
as rubber, tin, copper and palm oil to the industrialized countries prior to independence in 1957
(Whah and Guan 2015). Malaysia was the world’s largest producer of natural rubber and tin at
the time of independence (Yusof and Bhattasali 2008). Copper and tin accounted for 55% of
exports and about 30% of Malaysia’s Gross National Product (GNP) in 1965 (Economic
Planning Unit 2015). TED Case Studies (2015) reported that in 1979, Malaysia produced almost
63,000 tonnes of tin, representing 31% of world’s output. At that time, more than 40,000 people
were employed in tin production. The agriculture share of GDP decreased from 34.32% in 1960
to 9.06% in 2014, while agricultural raw material exports decreased from 51.83% of total
merchandise exports in 1960 to 2.64% in 2014 (Figure 2, Appendix). These figures indicate that
Malaysia was primarily a raw-materials producing economy at independence in 1957 and the
years immediately after. Palm oil production became a prominent economic activity when the
European colonists returned from a visit to Ghana with seeds and knowledge on the techniques
of cultivation and processing in 1917 (Fold and Whitfield, 2012). Since independence, Malaysia
continuously expanded its palm oil business. There has been large scale cultivation, production
and harnessing of palm oil. The improvement in the palm oil industry is an example of how
Malaysia has transitioned from a primary to a manufacturing economy after independence in
1957.
Malaysia was the third largest economy in SEA (behind Indonesia and Thailand) and 35 th
in the world in 2015 (Foo 2015). Table 1 and Figure 3 in Appendix show the manufacturing

41

share of GDP increased from 8.05% in 1960 to 23.95% in 2014, while manufacturing exports
increased from 5.18% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 67.20% in 2014. The chemical
industry, which involves petrochemicals and oleo chemicals, is a major contributor to the
Malaysian economy. Foo (2015) has reported that, Malaysia’s exports and imports in 2015 were
dominated by fuels (22% of exports and 16% of imports), chemicals (5% exports and 7%
imports), plastics and rubber (7% exports and 5% imports), and vegetable by-products —
primarily palm oil (8% exports and 3% imports). The development plans in Malaysia are
discussed below to assess how it became an industrialized economy and meet the characteristics
of a developmental state as identified by Stubbs (2012).
3.1.6. Developmental State Characteristics in Malaysia’s Development Undertaking
Because the political elite of a developmental state is not specific to a particular political
arrangement, the separation of powers between the three main arms of government — the
legislature, executive, and judiciary — have been maintained under Malaysia’s constitutional
monarchy. The legislature is made up of the king, senate, and House of Representatives. The
cabinet ministers make up the executive, while the judiciary consists of the courts (United
Nations 2005). The sovereign is the head of state, his royal highness the king of Malaysia (or
Yang di-Pertuan Agong), who is elected for a term of five-years by nine sultans of the Malay
states (Dzulkifli and Zameri 2010). Thus, nine of the states in Malaysia are constitutionally
headed by traditional Malay rulers, four appointed governors, and three federal territories sharing
one ministry of federal territories. All the states are led by chief ministers who are nominated by
state assemblies to advise their respective sultans or governors (Rajeev 2015). Also, on the
advice of the council of elders (i.e., sultans and governors), his royal highness the king of
Malaysia selects a prime minister as head of government (Muslim et al. 2013). The king is given

42

the authority on the advice of the council of elders to select the prime minister but does not have
the power to remove him.
Malaysia has a multi-party political system for electing representatives into parliament.
Members of the House of Representatives are elected to serve a five-year term in government
under a democratic political system (Noor 2016). The Prime Minister, as the head of state,
together with the elected officials are responsible for running the activities of the government.
The passing of legislation resides on the elected parliament, while the Prime Minister informs the
king about parliamentary deliberations on matters of state (Parliament of Malaysia 2017). The
legislative power of the government is divided into the federal level with parliament and the state
level with the monarchy (United Nations 2005).
The judiciary contains the courts and is headed by the chief justice. The king, as the head
of state, is not involved in law making but has the right to appoint the chief justice with advice
from the prime minister in consultation with the sultans to deliver justice at the federal and state
courts (Noordin and Keng 2008). To maintain the judiciary as an independent body, the chief
justice cannot be replaced by the king without a vote passed by a majority of the House of
Parliament. Both the monarchy and the parliament have been engaged in governance in the postindependence era, similar to the indirect rule under the British colonial administration.
Malaysia’s political arrangement to maintain and avoid power struggle between the monarchy
and the parliament in the post-independence era is consistent with what Stubbs (2012) has
indicated as a rational industrial strategy to facilitate economic development.
Also, prior to independence in 1956, Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA)
schemes were launched to help the landless poor, mainly rural Malays (Leng 2014). FELDA was
both a state-controlled and self-funded program (with some early World Bank loans) that helped

43

almost 120,000 families between 1959 and 1990 to develop 470,998 hectares of settler
smallholdings and 340,142 hectares of commercial plantations (Leng 2014). Large areas (an
estimated 100,000 acres or 40 000 hectares) were subdivided into 10 acre/4 hectare blocks and
distributed to small farmers to boost agricultural production (Hamid 2000). Post-independent
Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, introduced its first
national development plan for 1966 to 1970. This plan replaced the first draft for development in
Malaya (now peninsular Malaysia) from 1950 (Economic Planning Unit 2015). Both the preindependence era under the British indirect rule through the monarchy, who were Malay royals,
and the post-independence developmental state in Malaysia have used agriculture to meet
fractional demands for national development.
In view of the dearth of domestic private capital and the state’s vision to be economically
independent from the inherited colonial economic arrangement, the Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI) strategy became the basis to achieve rapid industrialization and export
manufacturing in Malaysia. The vision for rapid industrialization and export manufacturing
exemplifies what Stubbs (2012) has described as the ideological component of a developmental
state as indicated in Chapter Two. Malaysia adopted the ISI strategy to build and develop the
capacity of its local industries to meet future demand and supply of manufacturing exports (Jomo
1990). With the enactment of the Pioneer Industrial Ordinance in 1957, incentives such as import
tariffs were imposed to protect the domestic industry’s production (Snodgrass 1995). At the same
time, incentives, such as a five-year tax holiday, were offered to attract foreign investors into the
country as a way to benefit from technological transfer, especially to promote labour-intensive19
domestic manufacturing industries (Rashid and Elameer 1999). The intent was to match the
19

Mainly electronics, textiles, and other labor-intensive industries were promoted.

44

supply of the raw materials from the country’s natural resource producers of such raw materials,
and also match the demand of the refined or manufactured goods from those raw materials. Also,
by building the capacity of local industries under the ISI strategy, the state has anticipated an
increase in government revenue (e.g., from tax) to be financially autonomous (i.e., to provide
steady flow of funds) for the state’s development plans. The autonomy in financing is what
Stubbs (2012) has indicated enabled successful developmental states to control industrial
policies.
Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) strategy was adopted in 1968 with the decline in
the local industrial sector, which was a result of distortion in locally-price and low-value-added
products (Rani and Haflan 1990). The EOI became necessary after minimal successes were
recorded under the ISI strategy. In that regard, the Investment Incentives Act (IIA) replaced the
Pioneer Industrial Ordinance in 1968 (Kong 1969; Kadir 2005). During that period, the New
Economic Policy (NEP) was used by the state to reclaim foreign enterprises in strategic sectors
of the economy without affecting foreign private investment, especially the gross national
investment (Jomo and Hui 2009). The nationalization of foreign controlled companies marked
the first phase of the corporate restructuring. The state held the most essential and sensitive
enterprises, especially large foreign companies in the plantation, agriculture, and commercial
business sectors, such as Sime Darby, Guthrie Corporation, Highlands and Lowlands, London
Tin, and Harrisons Malaysian Estates were nationalized (Whah and Guan 2015). To ensure the
restructuring did not offset foreign private investment, joint ventures with foreign investors
under an institutionalized “genuine partnerships”20 were established between different industries

20

In this type of partnership, the public partner has the power to influence the performance of the structures either
by demanding readjustments or by redesigning processes whenever errors in the development of the mission for
which they have been created are detected (see Cordeiro et al. 2011 for further discussion).

45

with the support from various government ministries, a consortium of banks, and ethnic-based
business chambers (Whah 2010). Such partnerships between the state and foreign investors
transcends the capitalist ideology, which has been dubbed by Wade (1990) as “governing the
market,” a characteristic Stubbs (2012) said depends on the links between the bureaucracy and
business in a successful developmental state. Those developments, however, affected the share
of capital by Malays and other indigenes. Hart (1994) has reported that Bumiputera (Malays and
other indigenes) jointly owned only 1.9% of the share of capital of listed companies, whilst
foreigners (mainly British) had 60.7% and the Chinese 22.5% by 1970.
Malaysia maintained its vision to move from the inherited colonial economic
arrangement of raw material exports to manufacturing exports, which was consistent with
Stubbs’ (2012) identified export manufacturing characteristics for a successful developmental
state. In that regard, Malaysia stepped up its palm oil production to avoid overdependence on its
natural resources (e.g., copper, rubber and tin) when the world market was flooded by cheap
synthetic rubber in the 1970s (Dadzie 2011). Palm oil was expanded by establishing agroprocessing plants between the state and the private sector (Economic Planning Unit 2015). Such
expansion in palm oil is another example of the capitalist version of a developmental state whose
success depends on the link between bureaucracy and business, as indicated by Stubbs (2012).
The Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) was launched in 2010 to enhance
manufacturing exports (Economic Transformation Programme 2016). The ETP considered
private investment-led growth with the government acting as a facilitator to raise total Gross
National Income (GNI), which is consistent with the “governing the market” mantra for a
successful developmental state by Wade (1990). The private sector assumed the lead role in
making investment and employment decisions. Kemubu Agricultural and Development

46

Authority (KADA) (2016) has reported that this contributed to 92% (RM1.3 trillion) of the
overall investment in the 24 targeted high-growth National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) by
the state to be competitive in the global market.21 The twelve main NKEAs are: Greater Kuala
Lumpur/ Klang Valley; financial services; oil, gas, and energy; rubber and palm oil; wholesale
and retail; tourism; electronics and electrical; business services; education; communications
content and infrastructure; healthcare; and agriculture (Kemubu Agricultural and Development
Authority 2016). Those are examples of sectorial development, a characteristic of successful
developmental state as noted by Stubbs (2012).
Table 9 in the Appendix shows that Malaysia has developed several quinquennia plans
since 1950, and each plan emphasized education and the development of skilled labour. The
provision of primary and secondary education played a significant role in economic
development, particularly in small towns, after independence in 1957 (Jomo and Hui 2009). In
1971, 84.83% and 35.22% of total Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER)22 had enrolled in primary and
secondary school, respectively. By 2011, the enrolment was 101.41% 23 for primary and 67.24%
for secondary, respectively (Table 6, Appendix). The total number of pupils enrolled in
vocational education increased by eight-fold between 1971 and 2011. It increased by 789.8%
from 20,058 in 1971 to 178,480 in 2011 (Table 6, Appendix). During that period, total

21

NKEA is defined as an important driver of economic activities that potentially and directly contributes towards
the Malaysian Economic Growth measurable by the National Gross Income (GNI) indicator. NKEAs receive
prioritized government support, including funding, top talent, and Prime Ministerial attention. See Kemubu
Agricultural and Development Authority (2016).
22
Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) is a statistical measure used in the education sector to determine the number of
students enrolled in school at several different levels (e.g., primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational school), and it
is use to show the ratio of the number of students who live in that country to those who qualify for the particular
level (World Bank 2015)
23

Gross enrollment ratio for primary school is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary
education, regardless of age, by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to primary education, and
multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015). Therefore, it is obvious a 2.84% increase in total population will be a factor
in 101.41% enrolment given that not all school going age will be enrolled and population growth is influenced by
increase in birth rate which add to the age group

47

population recorded a 2.59% increase from 11.06 million in 1971 to 28.64 million in 2011
(World Bank 2017). Those developments were intended to ensure Stubbs’ (2012) well-trained
bureaucracy for successful developmental state application.
Table 4 in the Appendix shows that Malaysia’s economic development has exchanged
dependence on a limited range of primary products (e.g., tin and rubber) in 1957, for dependence
on an equally limited range of manufactured goods (e.g., electronics and electronic components)
at present. The remaining sections of this chapter elaborate on Ghana’s country profile.
3.1.7. Ghana’s Political Profile
Ghana is a very diverse country with over 100 different ethnic groups (Commisceo
Global 2016). The major groups consist of Akan (45%), Mole-Dagbon (15%), and Ewe (12%)
(Dadzie 2011). The British under the indirect rule granted leadership roles to minority ethnic
groups24, and also tended to favour cooperation with conservative chiefs (Popa 2010). That gave
Ghana’s elites experience with a modern representative government to such a degree where they
felt prepared to manage an independent country and, therefore, pushed for an end to colonial rule
(Thiboutot 2006). The initiative for independence began under the umbrellas of the United Gold
Coast Convention (whose members were dominated by people from the majority ethnic groups)
and the Convention People's Party (Saraceno 2014). The latter was founded by Kwame Nkrumah
who became Ghana’s first Prime Minister in 1957 and President on July 1st, 1960.
Nkrumah’s advocacy for political and economic autonomy for Ghana and SSA made him
influential in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of world states that
adopted policies independent of Western ideology (i.e., noted critics of developmental state

24

For instance, Nkrumah (first president of Ghana, and from a minority ethnic group) was prime minister in 1950
before independence in 1957. See Adriana Popa (2010) for further discussion.

48

ideology) (Gerits 2015). 25A number of prominent intellectuals and heads of state in SSA, such as
Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Julius Nyerere of Kenya, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kenneth Kaunda
of Zambia, Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Muammar Gaddafi
of Libya (in North Africa) took up the cause to advance the Pan-Africanism ideologies which
shared similar characteristics of a developmental state (South African History Online 2011). On
that account, Ghana as the first independent country in SSA became attractive for supporters of
the Pan-Africanism, such as African American political figures, artists, professionals, and
business people 26 to advance those ideologies (Moreno 2012; Azikiwe 2016).
Three years after independence, a new constitution created the Republic of Ghana.
Nkrumah declared himself president for life. Ghana, at that time, had become a one-party state
under a powerful president (Fuller 2010). Because the developmental state is not limited to a
particular political arrangement, Nkrumah ruled under an authoritarian governance to address the
inherited sociological challenges among the diverse ethnic groups from the colonial
administration (Ayitey 1990). However, Nkrumah's authoritarian rule, combined with a collapse
in the nation's economy, prompted a coup when he was away in China in 1966 (Ayitey 1990).
The pan-Africanism ideologies and quest for a one-party state have also been noted to have
fueled the military coup d’etat in 1966 (Biney 2008).27 His critics cited human rights abuse,
corruption, oppression, and a declining economy as the cause for their actions.

25

Nkrumah was an influential 20th-century advocator of Pan-Africanism. He was a founding member of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and won the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962. The OAU advocated for the
independence of the African continent, unification of Africa through regional blocs, neutrality or non-interference
on security matters, rejection of colonialism and exploitation, and the importance of economic regeneration to
replace colonial economic arrangement geared towards primary resource extraction. See South African History
Online (2011) for a discussion.
26
Maya Angelou and W. E. B. Du Bois are among the few known activists who visited and repatriated from the
United State to support Nkrumah’s ideology in Ghana.
27
Nkrumah escaped 5 assassination attempts before he was overthrown in the military coup d’etat in 1966. The
frequency of assassination attempts on Nkrumah influenced the decision to train and recruit Chinese nationals in

49

After Nkrumah’s government was overthrown in 1966, Ghana experienced a succession
of military coups and prolonged economic decline. Three successive short-lived civilian
governments were overthrown in coup d’états. The continuous decline in the price of Ghana’s
main exports of gold and cocoa after Nkrumah was overthrown, forced then president Busia and
his administration to devalue the country’s currency in December 1971 (Adom and Zogbator
2015). But because the government was unable to control inflation after the devaluation, internal
pressures prompted military officers to seized power in a bloodless coup on January 13, 1972
(Adom and Zogbator 2015). The coup leaders, led by Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, formed
the National Redemption Council (NRC) which attempted to improve the economic condition by
adopting policies which shared Nkrumah’s pan Africanism ideologies (Bhasin and Annim 2005).
To begin, all political parties were disbanded in an attempt to address the underlying ethnic and
regional divisions within the society (Adom and Zogbator 2015). However, widespread
corruption and the attempted non-party state (i.e., no multi-party system for non-partisan
politics) in 1977 resulted in a violent coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
on June 4, 197928 led by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings (Bhasin and Annim 2005).
Following that, the AFRC attempted to end corruption in Ghana. They established secret
special tribunals that tried dozens of military officers, government officials, and private
individuals (Africa Watch 1992). Properties believed to be wrongfully acquired were
confiscated. A number of indigenous entrepreneurs (mostly southerners who comprised the
majority ethnic groups) had their businesses shut down or lost to the state on the accusation of
hoarding, overpricing, and smuggling (Shillington1994). Those attempts were considered

Ghana’s special security service for the president. See the New York Times (1964), Frimpong (2013) and Bah
(2016) for further discussion.
28

Rawlings took over power from Akuffo's government that held office after the arrest of Achempong.

50

targeted at the southerners who were mostly entrepreneurs and had a larger proportion of the
nation’s resources (e.g., minerals, agricultural land, both human and physical infrastructures).
The increase in trials on the southerners reinforced ethnic alignments and factionalism. The
AFRC accepted a new constitution with few amendments and scheduled a presidential and
parliamentary election, which handed over power to the People's National Party (PNP), the third
republic, on September 24, 1979 (Adedeji 2001).
The 1979 constitution was modeled after Western democracies (Zagel 2010). In that
regard, it provided for separation of powers between an elected president, parliament, and an
independent judiciary. The PNP administration’s failure to end the declining economy increased
corruption and inequality. For instance, policies implemented for exchange rate and trade
controls in an attempt to address the balance of payment problem in the economy, as well as
shield domestic industries from competition increased corruption among the bureaucracy who
turned to favour cronies through channels such as import license for importer (see Chapter Four
for further discussion). This resulted in another coup led by Flight Lt. Rawlings on December 31,
1981. Rawlings and his colleagues established the Provisional National Defense Council
(PNDC), which took over power from the PNP administration (Handley and Mills 2001). In the
late 1980s, after nearly a decade of quasi–military rule under the PNDC, strong internal and
external pressures on the government led to the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 1992
and the inauguration of a multi-party democracy in 1993 (Abdulai 2009). Since then, Ghana has
held six successful multi-party elections.
3.1.8. Ghana’s Economic Profile
Ghana is rich in mineral resources, and it was a major supplier of primary products such
as cocoa, gold, and palm oil to the industrialized countries prior to independence in 1957

51

(Kolavalli and Vigneri 2013). It was the world’s leading producer and exporter of cocoa and
exported about 10% of the world’s gold, at the time of independence (Konadu-Agyemang 2000).
The dominance of bullion trade during the colonial era influenced Ghana’s macroeconomic
environment at independence. In 1957, the country inherited from the colonial administration
£200 million (US$270 million) of foreign reserves, a relatively high per capita income, and a low
national debt (Berry 1994). These macroeconomic indicators meant Ghana had a good
foundation for adopting the developmental state for national development, especially in terms of
the state’s ability to fund its plans for such things as human and physical capital development.
Palm oil plantation received more investment as part of the colonial economic
arrangement to extract raw materials to feed its manufacturing industries. Fold and Whitfield
(2012:7) have noted that “palm oil plantations and mills were first established in the early 1900s
by Alexander Cecil Goff in then Gold Coast (now Ghana)”. Since then, palm oil production has
remained part of agricultural development, but has recorded a declining rate of growth in postindependence Ghana to sustain and develop manufacturing industries of the crop (Fold and
Whitfield 2012). The declining rate in palm oil production has increased Ghana’s dependence on
its main raw material exports of cocoa and, especially, gold in post-independence era. In regards,
the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 45.22% in 1960 to 30.83% in 2010, while
agricultural raw material exports decreased from 12.30% in total merchandise exports in 1960 to
6.95% in 2010 (see Table 1A and 2A in Appendix). Also, the share of manufacturing GDP
decreased from 11.19% in 1960 to 5.45% in 2013, whilst manufacturing exports increased from
0.95% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 20.68% in 2010. Table 4A in the Appendix shows
exports are still dominated by raw materials, which indicate that Ghana has remained a primary
producing economy pre- and post-independence. Ghana’s development undertaking is discussed

52

below to assess how it applied the developmental state and met the characteristics identified by
Stubbs (2012).
3.1.9. Developmental State Characteristics in Ghana’s Development Undertaking
Ghana’s political arrangement after independence allows citizens who are eighteen years
and above, to vote every four years to choose the government under the constitutional
democracy. The president is elected as the head of state, while a member is elected from each
constituency in Ghana in a multi-party election to represent their people in parliament
(Government of Ghana 2017).29 The country implemented a concept for separation of powers
between the three main arms of government, which are the legislature, executive, and judiciary.
The parliament, led by the speaker of parliament, is assigned the legislative power to
make the laws of the state within the limit set by the constitution, and the political party with the
most seats forms the majority group and is led by majority leader in parliament (Friedrich EbertStiftung 2011). The political party with the most seats won after the majority becomes the
minority group and, is led by minority leader in parliament (GOG 2017). The executive power,
led by the president, consists of cabinet ministers who work within the constitution and the laws
made by the parliament. The chief justice leads the judicial power to enforce the constitution and
laws made by parliament. Apart from the members of parliament who are elected by the people
in a general election every four years, the president is assigned the power to appoint and remove
the leader of parliament, the chief justice, and people to fill the various ministries (GOG 2017).
When under the colonial administration, the abundance of resources (e.g., minerals and
fertile agriculture land for raw materials) in southern Ghana (which also made up the major
ethnic groups) received disproportionate human and physical infrastructural development
29

Ghana currently has 275 constituencies and only Ghanaian citizens and residents of a constituency who have
attained twenty-one years are eligible to stands as a candidate to be elected as Member of Parliament. See
Government of Ghana (2017) for further discussion.

53

(Amenyo 2008). The inequalities in capital projects under the colonial administration created
fear among the northern and Trans Volta Togo land30 tribes of southern domination (Amenyo
2008). To avoid factionalism and promote political participation of the developmental state
model after independence, the state abolished competing political parties (which were primarily
formed along ethnic lines) to mobilize the diverse ethnic and geo-political forces under a oneparty state government. Free and compulsory universal education was introduced in northern
Ghana after independence to build the human capital as part of the state’s strategies to bridge the
inequality gap between the north and the south (Asare-Bediako 2014). That is a typical example
of the socialist variance of a developmental state, which reinforced the state’s view that free
education in the north was the key to power and wealth. Human capital development was
considered as a rational policy to ensure the educated elites from the north become part of the
government (i.e., be part of the bureaucracy to compensate for the deficit in natural resources,
human and physical capital), and were able to guide the industrial agenda, which Stubbs (2012)
has identified as a requirement for a successful developmental state.
On March 4, 1959, two years after Ghana’s independence, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah
introduced a five-year development plan for 1959 to 1964 as part of the ambitious programs for
national development (Mensah1998). The first plan was replaced by a seven-year development
plan that was designed to accelerate the pace of economic development and to kick start
industrialization from 1964 to 1970. The seven-year development plan was inspired by President
Nkrumah’s visits to and affinity with China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe (Mensah
1998). The primary aim of the seven-year development plan was to turn Ghana into an industrial
hub and serve as a role model for other countries in SSA (Serra 2013). In view of the scarcity of
30

Trans Volta Togo land was a German protectorate along the border between Ghana and Togo, which was later
divided between the British and the French in 1916. They voted in 1956 to be part of Ghana prior to independence
and currently make up the Volta and northern Ghana. See Amenyo (2008) for further discussion.

54

domestic private capital and manufacturing industries in 1957, the ISI strategy was the basis for
promoting Stubbs (2012) developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization. Hess (2000)
has argued that the path to economic development pursued by Nkrumah was a combination of
socialism and free market tendencies, which are consistent with the characteristics of the socialist
and capitalist variances of a developmental state. The National Commission on Culture (2009:2)
identified the primary objectives of Nkrumah’s seven-year development plan.
(a) “Setting up industries wherever practicable to provide domestic substitutes for the
manufactured staples of consumer demand, the supply of which has at present to be imported”.
The aim was to develop domestic private capital and entrepreneurs and to build the capacity of
the local industries to meet the demand and supply of the country, a basis for achieving Stubbs’
(2012) autonomous bureaucracy and manufacturing exports for successful developmental states.
(b) “Processing wherever economically feasible, those agricultural and mining
commodities that are now exported as primary products, such as cocoa, timber and gold”. The
aim was to develop manufacturing exports for rapid industrialization as indicated by Stubbs
(2012).
(c) “Setting up industries to provide materials for the building industry, in order to
conserve foreign exchange, and to lower costs of construction”. The aim was to develop a
conducive macroeconomic environment to allow the pilot agency to control finance and trade as
indicated by Stubbs (2012).
(d) “Setting up, as appropriate, basic industries in the fields of metals and chemicals”.
(e) “Starting the development of other basic industries which will form part of later stages
of industrialization in subsequent plans”. The aim was to develop industries that could harness
the country’s natural resources for a multi-purpose use in the industrial attempts. For instance,

55

processing bauxite into aluminum for roofing sheets and solar panels and, at the same time, build
a hydro-power dam from the aluminum to facilitate manufacturing exports. These provide
examples of Stubbs’ (2012) rational industrial strategy for national development.
(f) “Planning industrial development in harmony with the development of other African
countries”. The aim was to develop SSA as a stronger regional bloc in the global economy,
another example of the rational industrial strategy to be politically and economically independent
from the inherited exploitative colonial administrative structures.
As indicated above, under Dr. Nkrumah’s seven-year development plans, some of the
factories that were established include a tomato and mango canning plant at Wenchi (which had
the capacity to process 5,000 tons of tomatoes and 7,000 tons of mangoes each year), a chocolate
factory in Tema, a vegetable oil mill, and textile and tobacco factories (Government of Ghana
2015). Those are examples of the National Commission on Culture’s (2009:2) point (a) indicated
above. Also, the creation of a gold processing factory in Prestea, a meat processing factory in
Bologatanga, a shoe factory in Kumasi,31 and a jute factory in Kumasi to manufacture cocoa
sacks for farmers, are examples of point (b) above. A cement factory (Ghacem) was founded by
the Government of Ghana in collaboration with Norcem AS of Norway on August 30, 1967
(GHACEM 2015), which is an example of point (c) from above. Moreover, a tyre factory in
Bonsa and a glass factory in Abosso are examples of point (d) indicated above (Government of
Ghana 2015).
The Volta Aluminum Company Limited (VALCO) was also set up to supply aluminum,
mainly for Ghanaian owned companies, to be processed into cooking utensils, roofing sheets,
and solar panels (VALCO 2016). As part of VALCO’s plan, Akosombo hydro-electric power,
Volta aluminum smelter, and Akosombo township (to house the workers for the accompanying
31

Boots for all security institutions (Military, Police, Fire, etc.) were supplied by the shoe factory.

56

Akosombo hydro-electric dam) were constructed (Miescher 2012). Johnson, Howell and Evered
(2015) have mentioned that the Volta river development was the biggest single step that had
been taken in the economic and industrial development in Ghana. It involved an investment of
£70 million in the hydro project, £57.6 million in the aluminum smelter project, and £7 million
in ancillary development (Adarkwa 2012). Also, Government of Ghana (1964) indicated that
building a second deep-water harbour at Tema was an attempt to push an export-led development
and, at the same time, make Tema a port and industrial city. A total budget of £27 million was
used to build the harbour, which became Africa’s largest artificial harbour at that time
(Adarkwarh 2012). Those were examples of the National Commission on Culture’s (2009:2)
point (e) above.
In respect to planning development with other countries in SSA, as indicated by the
National Commission on Culture’s (2009:2) point (f), the pan-Africanism movement in SSA
after 1957 evolved into an ideology called the ‘African socialism’ (i.e., a socialism that emerged
and evolved out of African experience and perceptions) (Mills 2017). The African socialism
shared the central planning ideology of a developmental state, and considered the state to be
effective in providing the resources (e.g., labour and capital) for developing domestic private
capital and industries, a reason Ghana and other independent countries in SSA set up a number
of state-owned industries in the immediate years of post-independence era (Mills 2017).
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere was a strong advocator of the African socialism, which contributed to
the University of Dar es Salaam becoming a major centre, defining African socialism in theory
and in practice (Mills 2017). By the mid-1960s, over 30 African countries were independent, and
many had leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, and Kenneth
Kaunda in Zambia, whose economic views shared the African socialism ideology (Mills 2017).

57

In Ghana, an ideological school under the young pioneer movement was introduced in the 1960s
to advance African socialism (Annor 2009). To ensure SSA mobilize together as a stronger
regional bloc in the global economy, President Nkrumah assisted Guinea with £10 million (US$
14 million) when France withdrew its financial assistance to Guinea after independence in the
1960s (Annor 2009).
Thus, under Ghana’s seven-year development plan, which was primarily based on ISI
strategy and formed the basis for rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing in a
developmental state, Nkrumah channeled investments into agricultural projects and new
industrial enterprises, nationalized most foreign-owned enterprises, and, wherever possible,
"Ghanaianized"32 the public and private sectors (Berry 1994). Additionally, both physical and
human capital were developed. Those were all attempts to preserve the ISI strategy as well as to
transcend the socialist ideology for the successful application of the developmental state model.
With respect to the agricultural projects, Nkrumah identified agricultural development as
a core economic sector for industrialization, mainly as source of raw materials to supply the
industries and employment for a large section of the population (i.e., rural population). From the
cocoa revenues, industries that would support import substitution processes were established.
The Ghana Academy of Sciences and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR)
were set up in 1959 to work in collaboration with the universities to increase cocoa production
(Bridges 2016). In addition, the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission was tasked to research the
use of nuclear energy in food and seed preservation, insect control, and to find out an alternative
way to increase Ghana’s manufacturing sector (Ghana Districts 2006). The Cocoa Research

32

Advocated for use and consumption of made in Ghana goods, mainly by setting up industries to process and
produce in Ghana.

58

Institute was established at Tafo, in the eastern region,33 to encourage innovation to market and
process cocoa. The tasks for the research institutions were intended to improve agriculture
production to meet the demand and supply of the established industries and convert the country’s
raw material exports into manufacturing exports.
As part of human capital development, a minimum of “3,000 Ghanaians had been offered
scholarships in academic work in western Europe alone to study engineering, medical and
veterinary sciences by 1959” (Ghana District 2006). In October 1962, the University College of
Cape Coast (now University of Cape Coast) was established to encourage research in education
and train graduate teachers for second cycle institutions. The aim was to ensure trained
bureaucracy to control, better interpret, and understand the impact of both investments and
policies implemented in the national development agenda. As a result, a total of 67.19% and
43.09% of the population had enrolled in primary and secondary schools, respectively, in 1971.
The enrolment increased to 106.74%34and 57.09% in 2011 for primary and secondary schools,
respectively (Table 6 Appendix). The total number of pupils enrolled in tertiary education
increased from 0.69% in 1971 to 12.08% in 2011 (Table 6 Appendix). Also, Nkrumah identified
technical labour as a core variable for industrial growth and invested heavily in vocational
training. The total number of pupils enrolled in vocational education almost doubled between
1971 and 2011. It increased by 81.3% from 39,630 in 1971 to 71,848 in 2011 (Table 5
Appendix). During that period, total population almost tripled, from 8.83 million in 1971 to
25.12 million in 2011 (World Bank 2017).

33

Eastern region is one of the predominantly cocoa producing regions in Ghana.
Gross enrollment ratios for primary school is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary
education (regardless of age) by the population of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education,
and multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015). In that regard, it is obvious a 2.84% increase in total population will be
a factor in 106.74% enrolment given that not all school going age will be enrolled and population growth is
influenced by increase in birth rate which add to the age group.
34

59

In addition to the human capital were policies for physical capital development. Nkrumah
made the state machinery the primary agent that was responsible for building social and
economic infrastructures (Buah 1998). In that regard, the connections and dealings between
cities and towns were to be enhanced through the construction of roads along the country’s
spatial economy (Buah 1998). The purpose was to promote equal economic progress in all
regions and eliminate the north-south gap created by the colonial administration. Adarkwa
(2012:7) has reported that during the construction of roads along the country’s spatial economy,
main cities in Ghana, “Accra-Tema accounted for 59.5%, Kumasi had 16.5%, Sekondi-Takoradi
10.2% and other parts of the country accounted for 13.8% of all industrial establishments”.
Industries were built near sources of raw materials and along cities to ensure efficiency and
decrease the cost of production (e.g., decrease transportation cost). Processing industries and
marketing boards were set up to oversee trade of Ghana’s major exports: gold and cocoa
(Williams 2009).
According to the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD)
(2015), Ghana was a nation ensnared in debt, rising inflation, and economic mismanagement
beginning in the mid-1960s. An overvalued currency discouraged exports and began the
“kalebule era”35 (Young 1989). Ghana, at that point, lacked sufficient resources to finance the
public-sector projects that Nkrumah envisioned. Foreign currency reserves were exhausted, and
the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign borrowing to pay for essential imports.
The real per capita income fell by 2% annually between 1966 and 1982, while inflation
rose from 6.2% to 123% per annum due to gross mismanagement of the economy by the various
military leaders (Meng 2004). The 1970s were a period of steadily falling agricultural

35

Kalebule means dominance of the black market. This period saw increased smuggling of cocoa to nearby
countries, especially Côte d'Ivoire, for a higher price.

60

production, manufacturing output, and per capita income (Young 1989). As a result, the
declining cocoa production and exports were accompanied by a rise in smuggling of the crop to
neighbouring countries, especially Côte d'Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2013). Personal
enrichment and corruption became the norm of the day. And for most Ghanaians, the socialist
agenda, by the late 1970s, had become a largely irrelevant construct that had ceased to provide
economic benefits or opportunities for meaningful political participation.
Historically, the developmental state model for national development devolved into
disillusion following the period of economic stagnation in 1975 (Harrison 2002; Chubarov
2012). The economic stagnation for the then Eastern Bloc meant Ghana no longer had enough
support from its mentors to revamp its weakened macroeconomic environment. Alternatively,
the increase in the global waves of globalization with its accompanying neoliberalism 36 led
Ghana, under the leadership of former President Rawlings, 37 to sign on to the Economic
Recovery Program (ERP) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) with the World Bank in 1983 to reduce Ghana’s debt and
provide a sound macroeconomic environment for development (Vondee 2011). There existed
284 pure state-owned enterprises in 1980 (Huq 1989). And the government held the 22 most
essential and sensitive enterprises, such as the utilities, cocoa, and mining industries, as at 1984
(Library of Congress 2010). Privatization of state-owned enterprises became a primary policy
recommendation under both the ERP and the SAP.

36
Neoliberalism shares the capitalist ideologies such as the free market system, and does not support state
intervention in the economy as required of a developmental state. See Kapoor (2011) for further discussion on
neoliberalism.
37

Former president Rawlings had been in office for almost 20 years: 11 years as a military government and 8 years
as a democratic government. See Rosemary Chinery (2000) for further discussion.

61

The Divestiture Implementation Committee, created in 1990 with the aid of the IMF,
gradually auctioned off state enterprises to the highest bidder (Rothchild 1991). Foreign
investors bought the majority of the enterprises, since many domestic entrepreneurs did not have
enough resources to compete with their foreign rivals. This increased dependency at the expense
of long-term self-sustaining development. By December 1990, divestiture of 34 enterprises had
already occurred and, by 1992, initial measures of privatization of national banks had originated
(Library of Congress 2010).
Because of the sale of state enterprises to profit-driven private investors under the ERP
and the SAP, there was success in reversing the declining production of exports, especially in the
cocoa, mining, and timber industries (Odutayo 2015). Following the early 1980s, gross national
product grew at annual rates of 5% per year (Steer 2011). As a result, per capita income slowly
began to rise and inflation decreased. Since then, Nkrumah’s dream of a socialist Ghana has been
replaced by neoliberal economic planning. The neoliberal economic planning has become the
gateway for the US and the former European colonizers of SSA to enter Ghana’s economy with
trade and investment, mainly through multinational corporations (Jedwab and Osei 2012).
Different development plans have been proposed by successive governments, all with mixed
results (Owusu-Amoah 2015).
In summary, Malaysia and Ghana were former British colonies that adopted the
developmental state model for national development after independence in 1957. Both countries
were resource exporters and engaged in primary production at independence. The new leaders
invested in structures for the implementation of the developmental state model to achieve their
aim for economic modernization. However, different results have been observed between the

62

two, which is the main interest under this study. In Chapter Four, the ideologies and principles of
a developmental state as noted in Chapter Two are considered to guide the analysis.
.

63

Chapter Four: Analysis
The analysis will involve a systematic review of comparable empirical data for Malaysia
and Ghana, based on the themes or principles outlined for the developmental state model.
4.1. Theme 1: “A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental ideology
rooted in rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing” (Stubbs 2012:92).
The primary requirements for meeting Theme 1 are policies for economic diversification
in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and also policies for infrastructural and
sectoral development.
4.1A. Agricultural development in Malaysia and Ghana
In Malaysia, the state developed programs for both small- and large-scale agriculture.
The government created the postal savings system through an extensive branch network of post
offices, especially in rural areas to encourage savings and provide financial assistance to farmers
(Stiglitz 1996). Under the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) scheme, small
landholders in particular were supported with financial assistance, while capital intensive
production, such as fertilizer and chemical usage, were promoted among large landholders
(Meyer and Nagarajan 1999). With the innovation in financial assistance, agricultural
development, which is assessed using the share of land area, increased from 12.3% of total
agricultural land in 1971 to 23.2% in 2011. That contributed to an increase in food exports from
9.42% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 11.90% in 2010 (see Table 5, Appendix). As part
of the strategies for promoting the palm oil plantation, the government, in 2015, adopted a policy
that decreased the environmental deterioration of the crop by conserving half of the country’s
naturally forested land, and also encouraged palm oil producers to improve productivity rather
than expand cultivation efforts (Foh 2015). The improvement in productivity ensured a constant

64

supply of the raw material for the industries set up by the state. That is an example of how
Malaysia has transitioned from a primary (agriculture) to a manufacturing economy.
In Ghana, on the other hand, the state invested in state farms to promote large scale
agricultural business, while a greater amount of the population engaged in small-scale
agricultural activities, especially in rural areas. Due (1969) reported that from 1961 to 1966, 125
state farms were established by the State Farms Cooperation, 84 by the Workers Brigade and
Young Farmers League, and 870 by the co-operatives as part of large scale agricultural
development. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1965 to provide
financial assistance, especially for small-scale and rural agricultural development (Agricultural
Development Bank 2014). The African Development Bank (2005) reported that policies, such as
“Operation Feed Yourself /Industries” (enacted in 1972), which provided incentives, such as
scholarships for farmers’ children, contributed to agricultural growth rates from 4.5% in 1972 to
6% in 1973 and 7% by 1974. For instance, in real terms, the quantity of rice produced rose from
11,000 tons in 1971 to 61,000 tons in 1973, while maize recorded an increase from 53,000 tons
in 1971to 430,000 tons in 1973 (African Development Bank 2005). In 1976, the first rural bank 38
was established to provide credit to small-scale farmers and to support rural businesses (World
Bank 2017). Those increased food exports from 72.91% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to
78.42% by 1980 (see Table 1A, Appendix). The agricultural share of GDP in 1980 was 60.06%,
highest growth rate recorded in SSA at the time (see Figure 2A, Appendix). During that period,
agricultural land development, which is assessed using the share of land area, increased from
51.42% in total agricultural land in 1971 to 69.09% in 2011. The steady growth in agriculture

38

Currently, there are over 135 rural banks in the ten regions of Ghana providing micro finance and commercial
banking activities in the rural areas (ADB 2017).

65

supplied raw materials for the industries set up by the state, such as the tomato and sugar cane
factories, under the ISI strategy.
In caveat, between 1966 and 1982, Ghana experienced short-lived agricultural policies
and governments due to a series of coup d’etats (National Development Planning Commission
2015). Both external (e.g., under IMF’s ERP and WB’s SAP) and internal (e.g., military officers,
public servants, and indigenous entrepreneurs tried under the special tribunals on corruption
charges as noted in Chapter Three) interest groups rallied on the instabilities to advocate their
demand (e.g., in terms of liberal economic policies, public goods and national resources
allocation).That affected long-term plans and programs for agricultural development. For
instance, by 1990 the ADB had deviated from its primary focus of assisting rural agricultural
development with loans to include international banking and trade services (ADB 2014). As a
result, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 45.22% in 1960 to 30.83% in 2010 (see
Figure 2A, Appendix). The decline in agriculture from the inadequate supply of raw materials
collapsed the industries built under ISI strategy, especially agricultural industries, such as the
tomato and sugar cane factories.
In summary, the bureaucracy in Malaysia and Ghana designed and implemented right
policies for agricultural development after independence in 1957. However, Malaysia’s
bureaucracy has committed to ensure consistency in its agriculture policies for better application
of developmental state, whereas Ghana’s deviated and recorded inconsistences in their policies
after the first coup d’etat in 1966. That explains why Ghana’s industrial plans after independence
could not grow to transform to become an export manufacturing economy.

66

4.1B. Manufacturing development in Malaysia and Ghana
In Malaysia, export processing zones were established to attract FDI in support of the
EOI and, by 1980, employment in the export processing zones represented 8% of manufacturing,
which was an improvement in employment from ISI39 (Leinbach 1982). Because of the increase
in FDI, the Domestic Investment Initiatives (DII) was launched in 1993 to build indigenous
private capital (Piei and Tan 1999). The DII was designed to promote domestic content in local
output, a policy to strengthen and enhance industrial linkages in the local capital market (Piei and
Tan 1999). As a result, Malaysia in 1995 became one of the largest host countries for FDI in
SEA, and received the biggest share of FDI in the region (Piei and Tan 1999). Multinational
companies,40 such as Intel and Hitachi, set up research units under EOI, which accelerated the
pace of technology transfer for manufacturing development (Sivalingam 1994). Those policies
for industrial development increased the share of manufacturing in GDP from 8.05% in 1960 to
23.95 in 2014 (Figure 3, Appendix).
Ghana, on the other hand, built the largest artificial harbour in Africa and processing
zones in 1962, to import foreign technologies by collaborating with multinationals for a
manufactured export led economy (Government of Ghana 1964). However, the lack of continuity
in the state’s programs during the 17 years of political instability from 1966 to 1983 distorted
manufacturing development. The demands from interest groups (as discussed in Section 4.1A)
weakened the foundation built for the manufactured export led economy. For instance, economic
privatization and deregulation became the main condition for multinationals to invest under the
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Economic Recovery Program (ERP) after 1983. That
39

The aim was to promote labour-intensive manufacturing with the State anticipating 15,000 to 20,000 jobs per
year, but only 6,800 jobs were generated per year. See Sivalingam (1994) for further discussion.
40
Electrical and electronics accounted for 65% of all jobs in the export processing zones. More than 42% of the
firms were from US and accounted for 29% of employment. See Sivalingam, (1994) for further discussion.

67

resulted in the gradual auctioning off of the industries (mostly state-owned industries) to foreign
investors. The premature privatization and deregulation did not help nurture young industries
because of market competition. According to the Ghana statistical service (2014), finance and
insurance, information and communication dominated SAP and ERP investments programs in
Ghana, with little investment in manufacturing industries. Those are among the reasons the share
of manufacturing in GDP decreased from 11.19% in 1960 to 5.45% in 2013, while the share of
services in GDP increased from 28.79% to 48.75% (see Figures 3A and 4A, Appendix). The lack
of diversity in the economy, especially with the decline in both agricultural and manufacturing
sectors did not support better application of developmental state in Ghana.
In summary, Malaysia and Ghana implemented the identified variables for manufacturing
development after independence. However, Malaysia maintained and applied the identified key
variables more effectively than Ghana because of the inefficiencies from the inconsistent use of
the principles of developmental state in the latter. Specifically, Ghana deviated from the
developmental state principles by falling for demands from interest groups (e.g., with the hasty
change to economic liberalization after 1983).
4.1C. Infrastructural development in Malaysia and Ghana
In Malaysia, with most of the production processes in manufacturing, especially in the
export processing zones, being labour-intensive, the state invested in vocational and skills
development to improve its human capital with technical skills. Given that vocational enrolment
increased by eight-fold, with a population increase of 2.84%, there is an indication of
improvement in the total number of technical labour trained for industrial development, even
though inadequate to match the total population. The state tasked firms to levy 1% of their
employee salaries for approved governmental training under the Human Resource Development

68

Corporation (HRDC), enacted in1993 (Ritchie 2004) 41. That ensured labourers had the required
job training to meet industrial requirements and expectations for the growth in manufacturing.
The improvement in human capital was also attractive for business because the investor cost in
recruiting skilled labour was reduced. Additionally, trade and investment were attractive with the
improvements in physical capital, such as roads, ports, and telecommunications, especially under
the Privatization Master Plan of the sixth Malaysia development plan (Economic Planning Unit
2015). Developing physical capital supported the easy flow of goods and services for the
manufacturing industries, such as the established petroleum refiners, breweries, and cement
plants.
With respect to Ghana, polytechnics and vocational institutions were established to train
technical labour for the industrial market (Akyeampong 2010). According to Ampiah et al.
(2013), vocational training has recorded less investment and undermined to become a last option
for failed students that do not get admission into universities. Those are among the reasons for
the increase in primary and secondary school enrolments (Table 6, Appendix). Also, the
programs for technical education were redesigned after 1983 with the new focus of training
pupils in primary and secondary education in anticipation of better job opportunities in the
service sector after graduation (Achempong 2004). It has been noted that some of the
recommendations under SAP were to demand general skills instead of specific training or
apprenticeships, and so encouraged an increase in high school enrolment (Achempong 2010). In
addition, the 17 years of pre-university education in Ghana has become political and keeps
changing with changes in the government, which interrupts long-term plans for human capital
development (Akyeampong 2010). Quantity has been superior to quality education, especially

41

At least five ministries had developed comprehensive vocational and industrial training, each with its own
physical infrastructure, curricula, and teaching staff.

69

when school enrolment increases (e.g., when there is an increase in the number of school years)
without an improvement in school infrastructures to match the change (i.e., proportional increase
in school infrastructures to match enrolment). 42 The dominance of interest groups in Ghana’s
policies for human capital development account for the inadequate technical labour to attract
large-scale capital investment and development, hence the declining growth rate in the
manufacturing sector.
In regard to physical capital, the rapid infrastructural development, which occurred after
independence, halted during the period of political instability from 1966 to 1983. Since 1983,
plans and policies for infrastructure development have been changed and discontinued with the
changes in government (see Table 9A, Appendix). There have been reports of infrastructure
deficits in road, water, and electricity over the years. For instance, a quarter of Ghana’s 3.8
million homes are electrified, and electricity satisfies about 10% of total energy demand, which
is mainly produced from hydro sources (Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research
2008). From the late 2006 to 2007, due to a severe drought and underinvestment in power
capacity, Ghana’s consumers were affected by endemic power cuts (ISSER 2008). The
hydroelectric dam constructed after independence has seen less investment and maintenance over
the years, so it was unable to meet the increased consumption by the growing population. Ghana
still experiences electric power fluctuation, which is not attractive for trade and investment,
especially from foreign investors.
The World Bank (2017) has identified road deficits among the cost of doing business in
Ghana. Though unattractive for investment in manufacturing, services, such as banking and
telecommunication, which are easier to operate with technology, are still an investment option.
The service sector is complemented with the labour trained from the investment and increases in
42

See British Council (2015) /E585 for further discussion on quality and quantity education in Ghana.

70

secondary and tertiary education. The available labour to support the service sector is a factor to
the decline in both agriculture and manufacturing but steady growth in service sector (Figures
2A, 3A and 4A). Thus, the steady growth in the service sector has been attractive for investment
in secondary and tertiary education, but have adversely created a graduate unemployment
problem. According to the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research (ISSER)
(2016), only 10% of the country’s university graduates are employed after school, with some
securing a job after 10 years. The service sector neither employs substantial graduates because of
the increasing use of technology in its operations (e.g., banking with computers) nor creates
proportional jobs to meet the number of graduates.43 While in 1995 only 13.4%, 0.4%, and 1.5%
of jobs requiring a university degree also demanded skills in computers, communication, and
personal attributes, respectively, in 2000 the proportions increased to 45.7%, 38.6%, and 41.8%,
respectively (Boateng and Ofori-Sarpong 2002). Both the continuous increase in the demand for
labour with computer knowledge and improvements in technology, which operates with a small
labour size, indicate that the state is not fully benefitting from the increase in the investment in
secondary and tertiary, to the decrease in vocational education for industrial growth. Rather, the
improvement in the service sector is mainly benefiting foreign private capital (e.g., economic
liberalization to increase FDI and MNC under the IMF and WB recommendation) than building
domestic private capital for better application of development state.
4.1D. Sectoral development in Malaysia and Ghana
One major requirement for sectoral development is carefully selecting potential global
products or industries with the right programs and policies (Chang 2003). In Malaysia, investing
in human and physical capital, as discussed above, helped to maintain a comparative advantage
in labour-intensive manufacturing, such as textiles and electronics for sectoral development.
43

See Boateng and Ofori-Sarpong (2002) for further discussion.

71

With the enactment of the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) which promoted the
“Manufacturing Plus Plus” in 1996, global competitiveness and productivity became the primary
requirement for FDI (Piei and Tan 1999). Those were appropriate industrial policy, programs
and products for sectoral development because it provided employment and a chance to build on
the indigenous skill base. Those enhanced local production capacity for economic autonomy.
In Ghana, the textile industry was selected for sectoral development because it had high
demand locally for cultural purposes and potential to become a global product (Adikorley 2013).
Technical education was designed to trained labour in spinning, weaving, dyeing, printing, and
stitching (Bruce-Amartey et al. 2014). Under the ISI strategy, protection was offered to the
textile industrial, which saw dominance in the industry by local firms to build domestic capital
44

(Quartey 2006). Bruce-Amartey et al. (2014) have reported that the textile industry employed

25,000 of the labour force, accounted for 27% of total manufacturing employment and operated
at about 60% of plant capacity by 1977.
However, policies for deregulation and liberalization under SAP and ERP, after the 17
years of political instability, enabled easy market entry into the textile industry after 1983. The
period saw smuggling45 of wax prints into the country to compete with local industries. Even
though manufacturing exports have increased from 0.95% of total merchandise exports in 1960
to 20.68% in 2010, textiles and clothing have decreased from 16.15% of total merchandise
exports in 1970 to 6.44% in 2010 (Table 7 Appendix). The premature economic liberalization
under SAP and ERP were not the right policy, and have impeded the growth in the textile
industry, which was Ghana’s sectoral development.

44

Only 5% were involved in joint ventures with foreign investors and the remaining 95% were locally owned.
Annually, GH¢50 million ($US11, 396,045) in revenue are lost due to smuggling and pirated textiles from
overseas. See Amankwah-Amoah (2015) for further discussion.
45

72

In summary, Malaysia has committed to effectively implement the identified variables for
agricultural, manufacturing, infrastructural, and sectoral development, and has been consistent
with its usage for a more successful application of the developmental state than Ghana. The main
differences between the two countries are the advent of political instability in 1966, with its
accompanying economic liberalization after 1983 in Ghana which did not support the growth of
domestic private capital as required of developmental state. The consistency in implementing the
identified variables explain the growth in manufactured exports in Malaysia and primary exports
in Ghana (see Tables 4 and 4A in Appendix).
4.1.2. Theme 2: “A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy” (Stubbs 2012:92).
Because Malaysia and Ghana inherited under developed institutional structures from the colonial
administration, regulatory and advisory agencies were established and enacted to ensure an
autonomous and well-trained bureaucracy. The design and functioning of those structures to
ensure better application of a developmental state model are discussed below.
4.1.2A. Performance of anti-corruption agencies in Malaysia and Ghana.
In Malaysia, the strategy by the state to monitor corruption in its institutions began after
independence

in

1957,

with

the

establishment

of

the

Malaysian

Anti-Corruption

Commission (MACC) (Met 2000). MACC was designed as a replica of Hong Kong’s and
Australia’s anti-corruption agencies, which are made up of five independent bodies to ensure
transparency in its operations. By 2010, data bases for corruption charges were modelled in
MACC’s set up and are accessible to the general public, in addition to the 14 anti-corruption
courts established to expedite corruption trials within a year (MACC 2016). The database is used
as a reference by both civil servants and business groups before approving financial services,
operating permits, and entry visas (MACC 2016). The Certified Integrity Officer (CeIO)

73

program was also launched in 2010 to train both government and private officers to monitor and
ensure transparency within firms (National Key Results Area 2013). As of 2013, 155 officers
from both the public and the private sectors had been trained as CeIO-certified integrity officers
to monitor corruption within firms (NKRA 2013).
Over the years, MACC has been successful in reducing corruption and gradually weeding
out corrupt practices from the 1.6 million Malaysian civil servants, an estimated 11% of the
country’s labour force (Norton 2010; Ismail 2017). An estimated US$700 million corruption
scandal involving president Najib was exposed by MACC in 2015, which increases public trust
and confidence in the institutions (Guardian 2016). Bribe payers index 46 of Malaysia recorded a
score of 7.6 out of 10 in 2011, which was slightly below the global average of 7.8, an indication
Malaysia is closing the gap (i.e., improving) on institutional corruption (Sajari et al. 2016).
Malaysia was ranked the 54 th least corrupt out of 175 countries in 2015 (GAN Integrity 2018).
During that period, the judiciary was graded medium risk and efficient in settling disputes, while
the police have been recognized for their effectiveness in enforcing law and order in spite of
allegations of abuse of power (GAN Integrity 2018).
In all, the design of Malaysia’s anti-corruption agencies have shown four main
characteristics to ensure autonomy and efficiency in operations.
i)

Five independence bodies in MACC to ensure transparency. That means interest groups
have to go through 5 bodies, which means it is more difficult to influence agencies.

ii)

The corruption data base is accessible to the public. This creates awareness among the
population so as to control the influences of dignitaries or powerful interest groups.

46

First launched in 1999 by the Transparency International to measure the degree of bribe demanded by firms before
service are delivered. The higher the index is, the more unlikely for any firm to engage in bribery. See Sajari et al.
2016 for further discussion

74

iii)

Certified Integrity Officers (CelOs) to train corruption officers. This ensures that officers
are better informed of their mandates in order to meet their job expectations.

iv)

Anti-Corruption courts to expedite corruption trials within a year. This ensures delays in
corruption trails are minimized.
With respect to Ghana, the criminal justice system was charged with the responsibility for

investigating and prosecuting corruption after independence, but the Commission of Human
Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) was sub-contracted under the Anti-Corruption
Agency (ACA) in 1993 to handle institutional corruption (Asibuo 2014). The President of Ghana
appoints the heads of various institutions, including ACA, and has the power to retire their
appointment at any time (Anti-Corruption Authorities 2015). Because of the autonomous power
given to the president in making appointments, public servants have been dependent and held in
allegiance to the ruling government of the day. For instance, the Metropolitan/Municipal/District
Chief Executives (MMDCEs) were ordered to hand over their duties three days after a new
president was sworn in 2017 (Ghanaweb 2017). Those political arrangements have enhanced
corrupt practices among civil servants when in power, and they are gradually eroding any sense
of nationalism.47
The partisan nature of Ghana’s institutions makes it difficult to control corruption,
especially in public administration. As reported by Justice Francis Emile Short, Former
Commissioner of CHRAJ, “the Commission’s attempts to control corruption is faced with a
number of limitations including financial constraints, inadequate trained staff and inability to
prosecute corrupt officials” (Short 2015:9). He mentioned that “CHRAJ can only report corrupt
persons to the attorney general, which the latter may choose not to prosecute, especially if the
47

Frequent change in government officials with change in government have decreased their commitment in line of
duties, creating popular slogan “Aban Adwuma” meaning government work need less commitment to personal or
private work.

75

persons involved are members of the existing political administration” (Short 2015:9). For
instance, a public private partnership between the republic of Ghana and a Ghanaian
businessman in 2008 to construct stadia was used as a channel for public funds to be transferred
into private pockets. In the aforementioned PPP agreement, the government’s budget for the
project was inflated for the additional amount to be paid into cronies’ (i.e., sort of cartel in the
public administration) pocket. The supreme court of Ghana in 2014 ruled that the private
businessman return GH¢51 million (US$11, 850,846) as judgment debt to the state, but is yet to
be refund three years after the ruling (Amidu 2016). The mention of the then attorney general
and minister of justice, as beneficiary of $1 million out of the contentious judgment debt case has
made enforcing the ruling difficult (Amidu 2016). With respect to financial constraints faced by
the anti-corruption agencies, Joseph Whittal, the current CHRAJ boss, noted that only
GH¢450,000 (US$108,449) of the budgeted GH¢15,240,000 (US$3,672,822) was received from
the government in 2015 (Ghana Web 2017). This demonstrates the lack of commitment by the
state to build strong institutions to control corruption.
Public servants have been known to demand tips to expedite services because of the
inadequate remuneration (GAN Integrity 2018). In addition to the demand for tips, the security
agencies have been ranked the highest of corrupt institutions, with 89% of Ghanaians perceiving
corruption among police officers (Afrobarometer 2017). Also, three quarters of the citizens
perceive the courts to suffer from corruption, and the judiciary system has been ranked as high
risk due to its corrupt practices (GAN Integrity 2013). An extortion and bribery case involving
180 judicial officials, 34 judges, and several state attorneys and prosecutors was revealed in 2015
by a private investigative journalist, which corroborates the assumption of judicial corruption in

76

Ghana (Mark 2015). In 2015, Ghana was ranked the 56 th least corrupt out of 175 countries
(Transparency International 2016).
In all, Ghana’s anti-corruption agencies lack the autonomy to operate by showing the
following characteristics.
i). One independent body (i.e., the president in making appointments). As such, it is
easier for interest groups to influence agencies, just as dignitaries can influence anticorruption agencies.
ii) No central data base. A factor that shows little desire and investment by the state to
develop infrastructural structures to control corruption.
iii) No training. There are no special officers trained to prosecute corruption charges.
iv). No special court. This contributes to the delays in prosecuting corruption charges.
In summary, Malaysia and Ghana have had several programs to build their institutions for
national development. The data shows corruption is high in both countries, 54 th and 56th in
Malaysia and Ghana, respectively. This is due to the fact that both countries have trouble
prosecuting high-placed officials. The law does not fully apply to high profile dignitaries, cronies
or the rich as it deals with the poor or vulnerable in the society in their corruption fight. On that
account, it can be seen that the anti-corruption agencies are working hard to expose corruption in
the society, but ensuring that all those accused of corruption are dealt with is often a futile
endeavour. Bribe-taking by the police in enforcement of the law is so rampant that those who
can’t afford to pay are denied justice whilst the rich and powerful are able to avoid prosecution
for corruption and other illegalities. The effects of corruption on each country’s economic
development depends on the difference in its management. While cronies are favorite candidates
to be awarded contracts in Malaysia, the more public awareness from the investments in

77

corruption institutions, together with policies such as clause and targets, leave investors with
little option not to deliver (see Theme 5 for further discussion on clause and targets in
production). In Ghana, there are weaker anti-corruption mechanisms, such that there is the
predominance of dignitaries and political appointees who are awarded contracts with no clause
for investors in production, and who either loot from the state coffers or just produce shoddy
work. Whilst both countries have the agencies to monitor, evaluate, and prosecute corruption in
state institutions and to control abuses by interest groups, Malaysia provides better financing,
training, and infrastructures for its integrity and accountability program. Although there may be
some transparency issues in the management of the national purse, the work ethic and efficiency
in project monitoring appear to have boosted Malaysia’s economic growth. On that account, it is
subjectively concluded that Malaysia anti-corruption institutions are working better based on the
rapid economic growth than Ghana’s.
4.1.2B. Performance of research and development agencies in Malaysia and Ghana.
In Malaysia, research and development in public administration increased to over 80%
from 1957 to 1985 (Brown 1993). The aim was to assist the public sector to make informed
decisions in support of national development. The Action Plan for Industrial Technology
Development (APITD), which involved domestic and foreign researchers, was introduced to
collaborate with existing research agencies under the National Council for Scientific Research
and Development in order to expand and build local research capacity (Brown 1993). In an
attempt to make Malaysia autonomous in research, APTID projected self-financing targets of
30% by 1995 and 60% by 2000 for state-owned research institutions (Brown 1993). The goal
was to enable the state to direct research focusing mainly on addressing challenges in the
country’s development attempt.

78

In general, research and development has received much attention and investment in
Malaysia to assist regulatory and advisory agencies with timely and informative ideas for
national development. As a result, data is accessible and readily available to help policy makers
in making informed economic decisions. There is evidence that the Economic Planning Unit 48
(EPU) has periodically reviewed and recommended plans and policies for economic
development. In all, three main characteristics have been exhibited by the research agencies in
Malaysia to be autonomous.
i). Increase in research in public administration to 80% by 1985. This indicates the state’s
interest in providing scientific evidence to inform its bureaucracy in carrying out their
operations.
ii). APITD. The state has implemented a policy to train expertise in research by
collaborating with foreign researchers. At the same time, the state foresighted selffinancing for each period to control foreign dominance and donor influence.
iii). Periodic review by EPU. Ensuring that the bureaucracy is informed of the new trends
means they are able to adjust and upgrade to meet current demand in their operations.
In Ghana, public universities were equipped and received more funds from the state to
conduct research after independence. However, public universities’ research expenditures fell
from 0.7% of GDP to 0.2% of GDP from 1976 to 1983 (Effah 2003). The interest and funding
for research in public administration reduced until private agencies (mostly donor funded)
increased interest in research 49 (Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone
Africa 2013). Private research agencies are faced with inadequate technical staff and limited
statistical data, so they collaborate with public universities, but tend to dictate the research focus
The main government agency conducting research for planning and policy for the country’s development
attempts.
49
These involve consultants, private universities, think tanks, and professional evaluators.
48

79

with their funding (Owusu-Amoah 2013). The donor-funded research creates bias findings based
on the stance of funders. Also, because public administration lacks the autonomy in research,
outcomes are mostly ignored, especially when they are not beneficial to the donors. For instance,
Theme 1 shows the lack of continuity in the implementation of the agricultural policies are the
cause of the decline in its growth. However, recent donor funded research is advocating for
Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) as the solution to the declined agricultural production
(Gakpo 2017). An advocacy when successfully implemented is likely to create dependence on

donor countries for GMO seeds in furtherance of the colonial economic arrangement. In all, the
following less autonomous characteristics have been exhibited by the research agencies in
Ghana.
i). Research in public administration has decreased. The decrease indicates less scientific
evidence available to inform the bureaucracy in carrying out their operations.
ii). Donor funded research. That indicates the state has less autonomy to control foreign
dominance and donor influence in directing research to focus on addressing the nation’s
challenges.
iii) Financial constraint. This demonstrates less interest by the state to invest in research
agencies, so it is easier for interest groups to influence research focus with their funding.
To conclude, Malaysia has continued to invest in research by providing finance and
infrastructures to be autonomous, whereas Ghana has recorded less investment and become
dependent on donors. The data suggests presence of better scientific evidence to affect policies
in Malaysia than Ghana.

80

4.1.2C. Performance of tertiary education in Malaysia and Ghana.
Table 6 in the Appendix shows the state in Malaysia has continuously invested in
education to train its bureaucracy. By establishing partnerships with foreign researchers, skills
were transferred into the country. Therefore, learning from foreign expertise and investing in
primary, secondary, and tertiary education was easily comprehended. Tertiary education
provides the required training to engage in research activities and serves as a source of labour for
managerial positions. Also, tertiary education trains the bureaucracy to understand and interpret
data from the research agencies for national development.
Similarly, Table 6 in Appendix indicates educational institutions have received more
investments in Ghana to train pupils for admission into universities. The increase in education
indicates investment by the state to train its bureaucracy for managerial positions. That also
means it is easier for the bureaucracy to be able to interpret and comprehend research outcomes
for national development.
In summary, Malaysia has anti-corruption and research agencies, which are not captured
by interest groups, and invested in education simultaneously for a relatively autonomous, welltrained bureaucracy. Tertiary education ensures that the bureaucracy have scientific
understanding of research findings from the research agencies on the challenges of the country,
and are not influenced by interest groups in implementing policies to address them.
On the other hand, Ghana’s anti-corruption and research agencies have shown less
autonomy in their operations. There has been an improvement in education to train the
bureaucracy to manage public administration. However, the lack of autonomy in anti-corruption
and research agencies do not complement the training from education agencies. As a result, the
bureaucracy is not able to enforce and direct research to address national challenges. On that

81

account, business and interest groups can influence the bureaucracy to implement research
findings to their advantage. The better institutions in Malaysia than Ghana, are among the
reasons the 20 years of political leadership under Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, and
President Jerry John Rawlings, in Malaysia and Ghana respectively, recorded higher economic
growth in the former than in the latter.
4.1.3. Theme 3: “A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over
planning, energy, production, finance and trade” (Stubbs 2012:92).
The influence over planning, energy, production, finance, and trade is to ensure that the
economy overcomes challenges associated with macroeconomic management, such as high
inflation and external shocks on the exchange rate (i.e., currency crisis). This section assesses the
macroeconomic environment in Malaysia and Ghana to determine if they followed the identified
variables for a more successful application of the developmental state.
4.1.3A. Macroeconomic Indicators in Malaysia
Macroeconomic indicators are statistics that provide insight into the performance of an
economy. It helps to monitor and measure the growth of an economy and to make a projection.
Table 8, below, is example of macroeconomic indicators in Malaysia since 1961.
Table 8: Macroeconomic Indicators in Malaysia
Year

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

2011

2014

Economic Growth (%)

7.6

5.75

6.94

9.55

0.52

5.29

6.01

Inflation (%)

-0.18

1.61

9.7

4.36

1.42

3.2

3.14

Savings (%)

***

25.02

22.33

29.31

32.5

34.12

29.24

Government Debt (%

***

***

***

73.32

43.05

50.03

53

***

16.99

38.04

36.6

52.48

49.81

60.17

of GDP)
External Debt (% of
GDP)
82

Tax Revenue (% of

***

***

***

19.39

17.79

14.79

15.61

***

117.98

54.73

68.60

66.09

92.18

58.99

GDP)
Total reserve (% of
GDP)
Source: Global Economy (2015); World Bank (2017)
4.1.3B. Macroeconomic management in Malaysia: Exchange Rate Policies
After independence, the Malaysian dollar (now ringgit) was pegged to the British pound,
but switched from the pound in 1972 to peg against the US dollar after devaluation in the British
pound50 (Bank Negara Malaysia 2017). Malaysia adopted a managed floating exchange rate
system after 1973, primarily because of the increase in the capital inflow51 (Elizabeth and Bauer
2011). To avoid currency crises under the floating exchange rate regime, the central bank used
either expansionary or contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, depending on the
performance of the economy (Elekdag et al. 2012). The aim was to reduce speculation and be
able to adjust policies to signs of currency fluctuation for exports to be competitive. Since 1975,
Malaysia has turned to a dirty float, where the currency is pegged with a basket of currencies
(Aziz 2013). The basket of currencies was not to be disclosed after 1986 due to depreciation in
the US dollar (Elizabeth and Bauer 2011)52.
4.1.3C. Why Macroeconomic management in Malaysia was right
The Table 8 above shows Malaysia’s macroeconomic indicators have been favourable for
rapid growth since 1961. The economy grew steadily, averaging an annual growth rate of 5.96%
from 1961 to 2014, with a minimum of 0.52% in 2001 and a maximum of 9.55% in 1991 (refer
to Table 8). The total reserves were highest at 117.98% of the share of total external debt in

50

A wider band of 4.5% for fluctuations of the market exchange rate was allowed.
As discussed in Chapter Three and theme 1 in this chapter, foreign direct investment increased in the export zones
after Malaysia switched to Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI).
52
See Elizabeth and Bauer (2011) for details on the main monetary and fiscal policies used over the years
51

83

1971, an indication that enough reserves were kept during the pegged exchange rate regime by
the central bank to supply the market with the right money supply to maintain the fluctuations in
inflation and the exchange rate. The state revised the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) to a
flat rate in 1989 for all financial institutions to control speculation and competition among the
banks (Piei and Tan 1999). That accounted for the lowest inflation of -0.18% recorded in 1961.
Thus, Malaysia under the ISI and pegged exchange rate regime recorded the highest reserves to
increase reserve cover for retained imports (i.e., be able to finance imports and to balance any
unexpected capital movements), which contributed to the lowest external debt of 16.99% share
of gross national income (GNI) recorded in 1971.
Malaysia did not adopt full-scale financial liberalization. The central bank in 1994, under
the Exchange Control Act of 1953, imposed restrictions on the floating exchange market by
limiting nontrade related currency swap transactions, as well as prohibited the sale of short-term
monetary instruments (e.g., Treasury bills) to non- residents (Piei and Tan 1999). That
maintained the high reserves to give the central bank the ease, whenever there is the need to mop
up excess liquidity for a competitive export, with the launch of EOI strategy in 1968.
Beginning in the 1980s, the state strengthened prudential regulations, also known as
regulations for safety and soundness, to control financial indiscipline (Stiglitz 1996). For
instance, modern prudential rules together with traditional interactive monitoring where
supervisors elicit cooperation by using the government's leverage over branch licensing, reduced
governments’ leverage on bank, rediscounts, adopted the capital adequacy requirements for
international settlements, and required stronger indirect prudential regulation (Stiglitz 1996). The
government budget deficit from 1988 to 2015 averaged -2.96% of GDP: highest at 2.40% of
GDP in 1997 (during the Asian Financial Crisis) and lowest at -6.70% of GDP in 2009 (Trading

84

Economics 2017). The average government debt from 1961 to 2014 was 42.34% of GDP (see
Table 8). The state’s effort to manage its spending has ensured that fiscal policies are able to
withstand adverse shocks. In their study of the effect of external debt and macroeconomics
performance, Loganathan and Sukemi (2010) observed that, although Malaysia has witnessed
unstable macroeconomic environment in some periods in its development attempts, the external
debt was sustainable with its macroeconomic performance over the years.
The Table 8 above shows inflation has remained below 4% throughout the last five
decades, with the exception of 9.7% in 1981. The lower inflation reduces the degree of
uncertainty for long term planning. Also, the average value for savings to GDP was 28.75%,
with a minimum of 22.33% in 1981 and a maximum of 34.12% in 2011. The state encouraged
domestic savings through the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), where both employers and
employees invest 75% of their savings portfolio in Malaysia Government Security (MGS)
(Brown 1993). At the same time, companies were compelled to rely on retained earnings to
finance their projects to ensure efficient use of funds (Brown 1993). The MGS was used to raise
funds from the domestic capital market to finance the state's development expenditure. The
interest rate was lowered, and as a results household’s incomes were transferred to the corporate
sector which has higher propensity to save (Stiglitz 1996). By increasing national savings, the
pressure on interest and exchange rates were effectively managed with the high reserve
accumulated.
In summary, there is evidence that Malaysia has strong macroeconomic indicators,
particularly in the areas of reserves, external debt, inflation, and savings, which are consistent
with sound macroeconomic environment for rapid economic growth. On that account, the state
has become autonomous in establishing policies for national development. For instance,

85

Malaysia stood out as a country in SEA that refused IMF financial assistance and economic
advice after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (IMF 2000). Because of the conducive
macroeconomic environment, the managers have been able to control production, finance, and
trade for industrial development.
4.1.3D. Macroeconomic Indicators in Ghana
Table 8A, below, provides macroeconomic indicators in Ghana.
Table 8A: Macroeconomic Indicators in Ghana
Year

1961

1971

1981

1991

2001

2011

2014

Economic Growth (%)

3.43

5.22

-3.5

5.28

4

14.05

3.99

Inflation (%)

26.44

9.56

116.5

18.03

32.91

8.75

15.49

Savings (%)

***

14.44

5.61

11.7

16.86

16.78

15.79

External Debt (% of

***

22.86

36.56

67.65

131.77

29.28

49.77

***

***

***

13.16

17.19

14.87

***

***

7.94

17.44

14.70

5.48

52.68

***

GDP)
Tax Revenue (% of
GDP)
Total reserve (% of
GDP)
Source: Global Economy (2015); World Bank (2017)
4.1.3E. Macroeconomic management in Ghana: Exchange Rate Policies
Ghana, after independence, adopted the fixed exchange rate regime where the Ghanaian
pound (now cedi) was pegged to the British pound up to 1966 and the U.S. dollar up to 1982
(Ministry of Finance 2017). With the introduction of economic liberalization under the WB’s
SAP and IMF’s ERP in 1983, the country adopted a flexible exchange rates regime following
three stepwise approaches, involving the auction, the interbank, and the forex bureau market
(Bank of Ghana 2001). The aim was to eliminate the direct control of the exchange rate by the
state, with policies such as import license for importers, for a liberal regime (i.e., exchange rate
86

determine by market forces, demand and supply). Ghana is currently managing a floating
exchange rate system where the forces of demand and supply determine the exchange rate but
with some intervention from the central bank (Mumuni and Owusu-Afriyie 2004).53
4.1.3F. Why Macroeconomic management in Ghana was not right
The economy grew unsteadily, averaging an annual growth rate of 4.64% from 1961 to
2014, with a minimum of -3.5% in 1981 and a maximum of 14.05% in 2011 (refer to Table 8A).
Ghana recorded the second lowest total reserves at 7.94% of GDP in 1971, under a pegged
exchange rate regime and the ISI strategy. With the minimal success under the ISI strategy as
discussed in Theme 1, Ghana remained a primary producing economy (i.e., dependent on
earnings from its raw material exports). On that account, the total reserve earnings in the
economy became more vulnerable to the decline in price of Ghana’s main exports, gold and
cocoa in 1975, so the exchange rate depreciated.
Beginning in the 1980s, the main monetary policies adopted by the central bank was a
move from the direct control measures towards a market based system to achieve price stability.
Under the market based system, reserve money served as the main operating target, money
supply (M2+) as the intermediate target, with the final target being inflation (Quartey and AffulMensah 2014). Under the financial assistance and economic advice from the IMF, the state
adopted full-scale financial liberalization where policy instruments used included open market
operations in both government securities and foreign exchange, repurchase agreements, reserve
requirements imposed on deposit money banks, and the setting of interest rates (Youngblood
2000). According to Table 8A, inflation rose to 116.5% and a negative growth rate at -3.5% in
1981.Thus, under the pegged exchange rate regime, output growth fell more sharply during

53

See Younger (2003) for more details on the main monetary and fiscal policies used over the years.

87

downswings and the exchange rate could not fall enough to keep the country’s commodity
exports competitive.
The central bank maintained the managed floating exchange rate by determining the
amount of currency in circulation either by injecting or draining reserves from the banking
system (Youngblood 2000). For instance, in 1998 and 1999, the central bank was successful in
maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate, but at the cost of running down its international
reserves (Youngblood 2000). The Ghana cedi in 2013 became the 2nd worst performer in SSA
after the South African Rand with a 23% depreciation, prompting an injection of US$60 million
by the central bank to control further decline (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Contrary to the
anticipated stability after the injection, panic buying of the dollar increased the black market
premium (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014).
Inflation in Ghana is positively related to money supply and the exchange rate, while it is
negatively related to real income (Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo 2003). Laryea and Senadza
(2017:7) reported that, “a 100% increase in the exchange rate in Ghana is statistically significant
on prices of domestic consumer price index with an estimated rise of 5% to 10%”. The increase
in inflow of capital after the economic liberalization under SAP and ERP in 1983 was successful
in reversing the negative economic growth of -3.5 in 1981 to 5.28 in 1991 reaching all time high
at 14.05% in 2011. Table 8A shows inflation decreased from 116.5% in 1981 to 18.03% in 1991.
Because reserves decreased from 17.44% of GDP in 1981 to 14.70% of GDP in 1991, the
increased inflow of capital after the economic liberalization meant government had to increase
borrowing under the managed floating exchange rate system to maintain stability in currency
from the speculative activities from the interbank and the forex bureau market. It has been noted
that since 2002, the central bank under the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 adopted inflation targeting

88

(mainly targeting single digit inflation) as a strategy for conducting monetary policy (Quartey
and Afful-Mensah 2014). Under the inflation targeting strategy, the central bank together with
the Ministry of Finance set and target a specific level of inflation54 depending on the fiscal
position of the government (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Quartey (2010) has noted that
targeting single digit inflation by the central bank does not optimize growth in Ghana, therefore,
“getting the price right” characteristic of a developmental state was not achieve.
In their study of the effect of trade and exchange rate policies in Ghana, Laryea and
Senadza (2017) noted one cause of budget imbalances in the country is financial indiscipline by
government, especially during election years. The regulatory authorities have been noted to
increase money supply which adversely affects interest rates (Laryea and Senadza 2017). The
central bank is legislated to be the government’s financier, and also mandated to set interest rates
depending on the cost of servicing the government’s debt (Youngblood 2000). The authority of
the central bank in its operation is undermined by the economic priorities of the government
(e.g., increase spending during election years) due to the autonomy of the president to appoint
head of various institutions in the country (e.g., governor of the central bank) as discussed in
theme 2. Because of the lack of financial discipline, the government budget deficit to GDP from
2004 to 2016 averaged -8.36%: highest at -0.40% in 2004 and lowest at -24.20% in 2008
(Trading Economics 2017). Also, the debt to GDP averaged 58.13% from 1990 until 2015, with
a maximum high of 111.90% in 2000 and a minimum low of 26.20% in 2006 (Trading
Economics 2017). The external debt increased to 131.77% in 2001, causing a rise in inflation to
32.91%, a fall in economic growth to 4%, and the reserve declined to 5.48% (refer to Table 8A).
As a result, Ghana had to sign into donor debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

54

See Quartey and Afful-Mensah (2014, 5) for targeted inflation rate from 2002 to 2012.

89

(HIPC) initiative in 200155 and be dependent on aid56 for development (IMF 2002). The average
value for savings to GDP during that period was 13.53% with a minimum of 5.61% in 1981 and
a maximum of 16.86% in 2001 (Table 8A). The cedi redenomination in 2007 became necessary
as a result of years of decline in the currency’s value, which decreased confidence in the national
currency (Aziz 2009).57According to Youngblood (2000) nominal interest rates have been
maintained at high levels to induce the banks and the non-bank public to hold large quantities of
securities issued by the government to finance its large budget deficits. For instance, the interest
rate in the last quarter of 1999 was raised from 26% to 45% by 2000 to control depreciation of
the Ghana cedi (Youngblood 2000).
The Table 8A indicates Ghana recorded its highest growth at 14.05% in 2011, with the
addition of oil production to its commodity depended economy. However, the increase in
borrowing while failing to keep public spending under control after the beginning of oil
production in 2010 changed the economic fortune in 2014, where economic growth dropped to
3.99%, forcing another IMF bailout (Mark 2014).
In summary, Ghana has shown mixed macroeconomic performance since independence,
with significant shocks being amplified by policy slippages and resulting in external and
domestic imbalances. The policies after the full-scale liberalization in 1983 encouraged capital
flight, which made the primary producing economy (i.e., agricultural and extractive products)
more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations to ensure autonomy in financing. That has

55

HIPC initiative assistance was $781 million in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, equivalent to a total debt-service
saving of $1,446 million over the next 20 years. Debt-service savings from multilateral lenders delivered $95
million per year over the next 10 years. See IMF and IDA (2002) for further discussion.
56

Aid makes up 16% of Ghana’s annual budget. See Tierney et al. (2011) for further discussion.

57

Majority of financial transactions are done with cash, so commercial banks were facing high cash-based
transaction costs because relatively large quantities of notes were needed for transactions. See Aziz (2009) for
further discussion.

90

made the managers of the economy dependent on aid and donor funds and, therefore, unable to
control industrial policies by influencing production, trade, and finance for sustainable growth,
especially for a manufacturing economy.
In general, the central banks in Malaysia and Ghana have worked with the state to
provide the required money supply to the market to control inflation, exchange rate and interest
rates in a bid to make exports competitive. Thus, the central bank has been the main agency that
has maintained the link between the state and business to control industrial policy.
4.1.4 Theme 4: “A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development”
(Stubbs 2012: 92).
A stable political administration as a rational industrial strategy is its enabling
environment for investment and continuity of long-term development plans. Malaysia and Ghana
are assessed on those variables as rational strategy to facilitate economic development.
4.1.4A. Political Environment in Malaysia.
There has been strict adherence to separation of powers between the monarch and the
parliament (a political arrangement which is similar to the British indirect rule). Both the royals
and the citizens have maintained democratic processes in choosing leaders among the monarchy
and the parliament, respectively. At the same time, there has been compromise for an inclusive
government, by creating multiple layers of leadership for the three main racial political parties to
merge together. As a result, the Barisan Nasional (National Front), a coalition of United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian
Congress (MIC), have remained the dominant ruling party since independence. The enforcement
of separation of power present accountability, checks and balance among the governing bodies.

91

That has created a stable political environment which has enabled the implementation of long
term plans for national development (see Table 3, Appendix).
In addition to maintaining cooperation between the monarchy and parliament, the
government has implemented policies to control and meet the demands of interest groups. It has
been noted that the major political instability in 1969 was due to the widening economic gap
among the racial groups, especially the Malays.58 The state’s policies to address the inequality
gap favored the most affected groups. Even though the government acted as a custodian for the
economic interest of all the racial groups, the social position of the Malays as the indigenes of
the country to record asymmetrical distribution of economic assets made the government
prioritized its custodian for Malay economic interests (Guan 2005). Part of the government
initiatives were established new industrial activities in selected growth areas and placed them
under Malay control, while offering training in technical and consultancy services to improve the
Malays’ entrepreneurship and management position (Brown 1993). The government reassessed
the initiative to narrow the economic gap through a new development policy called the National
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 (Roslan 2001). This occurred after complaints of unequal
allocation of the nation’s riches, particularly by Malays.59 To narrow the economic gap among
the various ethnic groups, Brown (1993) reported that the state introduced ownership
restructuring targets in 1973 where the share of corporate wealth that could be owned by
indigenous Malaysians, other Malaysians, and overseas investors was 30:40:30, respectively.
Also, state-owned banks introduced quotas, which gave indigenously owned enterprises

58

In Malaysia, the major flaw of political instability occurred on May 13th, 1969. This was a result of ethnic
violence between Chinese and Malay groups in Kuala Lumpur, then part of the state of Selangor (see Dadzie 2011).
59

Between the 1964 and 1969 elections, ethnic tension regarding the asymmetrical distribution of economic assets
was emerging despite some progress towards equality in certain sectors. At that time, Malays owned 1.5% of all
equity in companies in Peninsular Malaysia, Chinese owned 22.8% and Indians 0.9%. See Ritchie (2004).

92

preferential access to funds. Table 9 in Appendix shows meeting the demands of the various
interest groups and governing in line with the constitutional mandate has created a stable
political environment for continuity in development plans. The vision for national development
has been maintained, irrespective of the political regimes. The political stability in the country
has helped the various administrations adopt and adapt to new techniques for rapid economic
growth.60
Though Malaysia has maintained the rule of law and allowed a democratic process in the
selection of leaders to fill the various administrative positions, the leadership has been noted to
be autocratic in delivering their duties. The U.S. State Department (2009) reported civil rights
violations, such as labour rights abuse, and forced imprisonment, in Malaysia’s political
administration. However, the autocratic style has been channeled mainly towards the delivering
on economic plans than to retain political power in government, which has fueled the country’s
industrial growth (International Labor Organization 2016).
In summary, the political climate in Malaysia has been rational to facilitate economic
development. The boundaries and consistencies set in running the monarchy and the parliament
to meet the basic needs of the governed and resolve factional conflicts through the equitable
distribution of resources have helped to maintain political stability in the country. For instance,
the political stability provided an enabling environment to switch from the failed ISI strategy as
discussed in theme 1 to the EOI strategy. Also, by having representatives of each racial and
interest group in the political administration and being accorded the same degree of power and
responsibility both at the federal and state level puts pressure on the leadership to perform to
please their groups. The pressure on the leadership to perform drove the desire to achieve the

See Economic Planning Unit (2017) for reviews and policy adjustments in Malaysia’s development plans since
independence.
60

93

national agenda rather than meeting group interests. In regard to the issue of civil rights
violations by the autocratic leadership, there is evidence of no targeted group (e.g., specific racial
group), but a national issue affecting all citizens. The increase in the middle class from the
growth in per capital income will gradually decrease the extent of civil rights violations, which is
a feature of growing democracy.
4.1.4B. Political Environment in Ghana
By sidelining the monarch (or chiefs) 61 in the political administration after the end of the
British indirect rule in 1957 has created power struggles to delay plans for national development.
The chiefs, who mostly hold on to traditional customs and beliefs, present different ideologies in
governing their territories (Antwi-Bediako 2018). The delays in adopting and adapting to new
trends by the traditional rulers, as well as the inequitable distribution of resources increases
factional conflicts. Also, an inclusive government for national development has been impossible
with the sole autonomy by the president to appoint leaders for the three arms of government,
especially with the support from the power of the majority group in parliament. Those have
deepened partisan politics and impeded long-term national development.
As discussed in Chapter Three, there was no compromise for an inclusive government
after the first president formed his own party by breaking away from his former party prior to
independence. That increased agitations both internally and externally in the attempts to create a
one-party state, which resulted in a series of coup d’états from late 1966 to 1982 (see Table 3,
Appendix). The 17 years of political instability resulted in short-term planning and abrogating of
national plans under each regime (see Table 9A, Appendix). One million Ghanaians, including

61

In Ghana, customary authorities– namely chiefs and family heads– are responsible for protecting
and administering rights to land for the benefit of the communities that they govern. This allow the chiefs to lease
land to investors who are able to forego requirements by state institutions (e.g., the mineral commission) for their
operation. See Antwi-Bediako (2018) for further discussion.

94

locally trained teachers, were deported from Nigeria in 1983 (Anaman 2006). The African
Capacity Building Foundation (2002) reported that 60% of all Ghanaian doctors trained locally
in the 1980s have left the country; an indication of the extent to which brain drain increased
during the instability period to retard economic growth. Due to the political turmoil, policy
makers had to restructure development plans by strengthening state institutions and drafting a
new constitution in 1992 to maintain a stable political environment for six successive multi-party
elections (National Development Planning Commission 2010). The National Development
Planning Commission was established in 1994 and the first long-term development plan, the
Ghana Vision 2020, was proposed (NDPC 2010).
The Ghana Vision 2020 could not be completed because of the democratic arrangement
that followed the 1992 constitution. As discussed in Chapter Three, attempts to end corruption by
confiscating properties from the elites in the early 1980s created divisions and alliances among
the population, which has resulted in a monopoly of power between two main political parties in
Ghana. A situation where members see nothing good from the development plans of the opposite
camp. Although the two main political parties sharing the monopoly have held power each in
every 8 years since 1992, there has been discontinuity and abrogating of national development
plan with every change in government. For instance, the Ghana Vision 2020 lasted for 5 years
because of change in government in 2000 (see Table 9A, Appendix). Table 9A in the Appendix
shows there has been completion of development plans since 2000. That is a result of the 8 years
of power held by the two main political parties. However, both political parties have changed the
national plans in each 8 years assumption of power, under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
(GPRS I and II) and the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I and II),
respectively (see Table 9A, Appendix). For example, the total of 17 years pre-university

95

education keeps changing with the changes in government, which interrupts long-term plans for
human capital development (Akyeampong 2010). The human capital development, which was
used as rational strategy to mobilize the diverse ethnic groups together, especially in northern
Ghana, has been turned into partisan politics since 1992. This has increased inequality and
widened the economic gap between the southerners and the northerners, similar to the colonial
development. 62
In summary, the period of instability in governance from the first military coup d’état in
1966 and the restoration of a constitutional democracy in 1992, had an immense adverse effect
on national economic planning and development. For instance, the political instabilities did not
provide an enabling environment for Ghana to either adjust policies or switch from the ISI
strategy to EOI to grow its domestic industry before the full-scale economic liberation in 1983
under the ERP and the SAP. The period of democratic rule after 1992 has also been marked by
political rancor between the country’s two major political parties, who on their respective
assumptions of power have rejected most of the existing plans from their predecessors,
irrespective of their viability. The post-independence era in Ghana has, therefore, been
characterized by discontinuity and short-term development planning, weak institutional
structures for oversight, and a lack of accountability in developmental expenditures. Those do
not ensure a more successful application of the developmental state.

62

See Qui (2012) and Government of Ghana (2017) for further discussion of inequalities in regional economic
developments in Ghana.

96

4.1.5 Theme 5: “Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line
between public and private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development”
(Stubbs 2012:92).
The link between the bureaucracy and business to develop domestic private capital in Malaysia
and Ghana are discussed below.
4.1.5A.The link between the bureaucracy and business in Malaysia.
In Malaysia, to ensure efficiency in production, industries, mostly underperforming State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were divested, and also targets were set (e.g., clause to lose
incentives) for selected industries in their operations (Brown 1993). The government directed
credit to priority firms, groups, industries, and also set a 60% target of total investment for the
share of domestic investment in the long run (Piei and Tan, 1999). The fear of losing government
support enhanced efficiency in production and ensured that the targets to build domestic private
capital by the state were met. An example is the Proton Saga, which to a degree enjoyed a
monopoly in their operation to produce the so-called Malaysian car (Bello 2007). The Proton
Saga guaranteed a monopoly for “a state-directed joint venture between a state-owned firm and a
foreign automobile transnational corporation, Mitsubishi in their operation, thereby, controlled
two-thirds of domestic market in 2007” (Bello 2007:170). Labour laws were tightened to control
trade unions to maintain a comparative advantage, especially in labour-intensive manufacturing
(Jomo 1990). As a result, the initiatives for public-private partnership in industries, were
successful in developing domestic private capital.
Those initiatives used by the state to build domestic private capital complemented foreign
private capital when the state relaxed its role to promote private-led development. The
complementarity and cooperation between both sources of capital have been attractive to

97

business and allowed the state the autonomy to continue to intervene in the market by directing
industrial development. An example is the state’s policy to develop 24 National Key Economic
Areas (NKEA) by allowing the private sector to make investment and employment decisions
under the Economic Transformation Programme in 2010 (ETP 2016). Such a link between the
bureaucracy and business is possible because of the better application of the identified variables
in Malaysia, as discussed in themes one, two and three in this chapter.
4.1.5B.The link between the bureaucracy and business in Ghana
Foreign-owned enterprises were nationalized and underperforming SOEs continued to
receive government bailouts in spite of inefficiencies and corrupt practices (Killick 1994). Also,
by establishing joint ventures with foreign investors, no targets were set, and the existence of
liberal labour laws made trade unions stronger (Gockel and Vormawor 2004). With no targets set
for production and stronger labour unions, cronies and cabals were empowered to influence
policies to cover their inefficiencies, which did not help to build domestic private capital. The
state’s inability to build domestic private capital empowered foreign private capital (after 1983)
to invest on conditions such as privatization and deregulation under the umbrella of the IMF’s
ERP and the World Bank’s SAP. The state was unable to resist those demands from the interest
groups (i.e., foreign private capital) because, at that time, the foreign capital was a requirement to
rebuild the economy due to the poor macroeconomic conditions discussed in theme three. As a
result, the state lost the autonomy to direct the market for national interest. The weak links
between the bureaucracy and business are the result of the weaker application of the identified
variables in Ghana, as discussed in themes one, two and three in this chapter.

98

4.1.6. Theme 6: Impact of socio-political settings to national development.
Both the SEA and the SSA regions are assessed to see if the socio-political settings
contribute to a better application of the developmental state model in Malaysia than in Ghana.
4.1.6A. Impact of Socio-political settings to Malaysia’s development
SEA, over the years, has shown consistencies and similarities in their policies for
development, which have been described by scholars as the Asian model (World Bank 1993). In
the Asian model, due to the underdeveloped institutions and infrastructures at the early stage of
development, the leadership strictly adheres to pragmatic political and industrial policies for
rapid economic growth. The leaders in the early stage of development are often dictators who
curtail civil liberties to reach targeted development goals. Leitch (1989) has observed that
deviant behaviours, such as corruption and opposing views, are abolished or trialed without
following legal procedures. The intent is to avoid delays, such as in the legal process, to support
the vision for national development. Jin (2003) noted that public information (e.g., media) is
controlled by the state. This is to propagate the state’s plans and vision for national development.
For instance, information broadcast by the media is regulated to ensure it is consistent with the
governing ideology for national development. Labour (e.g., unions) is restricted to forgo pressure
and agitations from interest groups for remuneration and better conditions of service (e.g., fair
wages and maximum legal work hours) (Jomo 1990). The World Bank (1993) has observed that
sound macroeconomic policies and infrastructural investments are kept in place with an aim of
transforming the country into a market economy. Also, the IMF (2004) has mentioned that policy
reform, for instance liberalization of the trade and financial sectors, is used in the later stages of
development. Infrastructural investments, trade, and financial policies in the Asian model are
consistent with the characteristics of a developmental state as indicated in Chapter Two which

99

contribute to a more successful application of the model. The leadership style and policies from
the Asian model have been consistent, and also similar to offer mentorship, competition, and
innovation for rapid economic growth in Malaysia.
The Asian model has produced rapid economic growth and development of global
competitive goods and services. Table 4 in the Appendix shows examples of the global
competitive goods and services produced from the Asian model in SEA include electronics and
apparel in Malaysia, banking and financial services in Singapore, and computers and electrical
circuits in Thailand. The consistencies, similarities, and mentorship become positive externalities
for Malaysia to enjoy rapid economic growth.
The market attractiveness in SEA is another positive externality for rapid economic
growth in Malaysia. Burton (1989) has mentioned that the economic power of SEA has
improved with the rise of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East Asia, mainly by
increasing market concentration in the region. For instance, an estimated “$15 billion worth of
Japanese (e.g. of NICs) direct investment flowed into SEA between 1985 and 1990” (Bello 2007:
170). The access to foreign capital attracted FDI into SEA to increase market concentration in
the region, thereby, enhanced Malaysia’s export orientated policies for manufacturing
development. The market in the region was attractive for labour-intensive industries, such as
textiles and apparel.
The growth in the apparel industry in Malaysia is the result of setting itself up as a
contract manufacturer of global brands, such as Marks and Spencer, GAP, Adidas, and Nike, in
the 1980s (Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 2017). Because of the competitive
market in the textile and apparel industry, in terms of pricing and the expectation for producers
to supply swiftly to changes in consumer preferences in the fashion world, global brands find the

100

market in Malaysia attractive to relocate. The region offers positive externalities for top brands
to minimize operation costs. For instance, Vietnam and Cambodia offer cheap labour for the
apparel industries to be competitive in pricing (Workers Rights Consortium 2013). In addition,
Singapore’s large number of industrial firms, well-developed financial institutions, and home to
some of the largest ports in the world, as noted by Oh (1967), provides ready financial services
and trade for transnationals to relocate. Those factors make the market attractive for firms to
relocate to Malaysia because of its experience as a producer of the top brands in textiles and
apparel. The textile and apparel industry, with an estimated export growth rate of 7.80%
annually, accounted for 1.70% growth of GDP of the manufacturing sector in 2012 (Lee et al.
2014). Thus, the positive externalities in SEA help to maintain Malaysia’s export oriented
policies for growth in the manufacturing sector.
Also, the volume of trade among SEA attracts firms into the region, which promotes
economic growth. Table 4 in the Appendix indicates the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN)
has maintained 6% of the total share in the world’s exports since 2001. A total of 70% of
Malaysian exports are shipped to other Asian countries, 11.6% is shipped to North American,
10.9% to Europe, and 2.4% to Africa (Workman 2017). The Economic Watch (2010) reported
that Malaysia’s export partners in 2009 involved Singapore 13.9%, China 12.2%, the U.S.
10.9%, Japan 9.8%, Thailand 5.4%, and Hong Kong 5.2%. At the same time, Malaysia’s import
partners involved China 13.96%, Japan 12.5%, the U.S. 11.2%, Singapore 11.1%, Thailand 6%,
Indonesia 5.3%, South Korea 4.6%, Germany 4.2%, and Taiwan 4.2%. The increase in the
volume of trade in the region benefits Malaysia’s development attempts because of the
concentration of purchasing power and availability of intermediate inputs in the region.

101

The concentration of the market and the volume of trade increases the GDP per capita in
the region, which elevates its ranking in the world’s socioeconomic hierarchy. International
organizations, such as the World Bank, classifies industrialized countries on top of the world’s
socioeconomic hierarchy using the per capita GDP. Table 1 in the Appendix shows the average
per capital GDP in SEA increased from $1,167 in 1960 to $9,993 in 2010. With the exception of
Cambodia, Table 2 in the Appendix shows the income level of the countries in the region have
increased (e.g., from low to either lower or higher income). The growth in income increases the
level of industrialization by determining the nature of economic activities. For example by
shifting economic production from primary to manufacturing. The World Bank (1993) has cited
some Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in SEA as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the
Philippines due to the improvements in their income levels since independence. Those
developments increase the rank of SEA in the socioeconomic hierarchy to become a global force
(i.e., a strong regional or geopolitical bloc) in the world economy.
SEA as a strong geopolitical bloc is able to influence international policies. The
bargaining power of the ASEAN as a regional bloc has increased over the years on international
platforms, like the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ASEAN has been successful in
organizing and speaking with a single voice on common trade interests in recent years. An
example is the ruling in favour of Malaysia and Thailand in 1998 on WTO’s “Dispute
Settlement: DS58” on the import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products by the
United States (WTO 2017). Malaysia benefits from the bargained favourable policies for the
region.
In summary, Malaysia’s socio-political setting present positive externalities, such as
mentorship, trade, market, infrastructures, and stronger geopolitical force, for economic

102

development. These pragmatic policies are disseminated in SEA for a more successful
application of the developmental state model.
4.1.6B. Impact of Socio-political settings to Ghana’s development
In SSA, the period immediately after independence was accompanied by political
instabilities, ranging from the assassination of most nationalist leaders and frequent occurrences
of coup d’états, stemming from strong internal and external pressures on the government
(Koutonin 2014; Table 3 Appendix). Most of the leaders of the pan-Africanism movement (i.e.,
African socialism), such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and
Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, were either assassinated or overthrown in a military coup (CIA
2002). Colonial treaties, for instance the Colonial Debt, which requires former French colonies in
SSA to pay for the infrastructure built by France in their countries during colonization (and are
still paying) drained the available funds for development (Koutonin 2014). Also, colonial treaties
like the Automatic Confiscation of National Reserves, which allow former French colonies to
access only 15% of their deposited national monetary reserves into France’s central bank per
annum, limited the amount of funds to finance the state led development after independence
(Koutonin 2014). 63 According to Koutonin (2014), France withdrew its financial assistance
when Guinea under the leadership of Sékou Touré in the 1960s disagreed with such colonial
pact. As a result, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in the 1960s, negotiated with France for an
alternative form of payment to meet the colonial pact. Those did not help to advance the African
socialism ideology with similar characteristics of the developmental state model that begun in
the early 1960s. Also, those developments in the immediate period after independence account
An estimated 80% of the foreign reserves of francophone countries in SSA are deposited in the “operations
accounts” controlled by the French Treasury. The countries have to borrow the extra money from their “own” 65%
deposited (i.e., 15% less the 80% deposited) from the French Treasury at commercial rates. See Koutonin (2014) for
further discussion on colonial treaties in SSA and France influence on former colonies in post-independence era.
63

103

for the change in the primary focus of post-independence national development plans from
economic to political development. Since then, the political leadership has been more concerned
with increasing political power through violence or election fraud than increasing economic
growth.
Dictatorship regimes have used guerrilla tactics to oppress political activists while
democratic regimes have subverted political activists through clientelism and patronage politics
to increase political power (Carbone 2007; Kura 2008). The increase in political instability from
the nature of political arrangements has affected infrastructural development in the region, which
requires $93 billion annually (about 15% of SSA’s GDP) to meet the deficit (World Bank 2010).
The higher infrastructure deficit adds to the cost of doing business, which is not attractive to
foreign private investors. The African model to development has been more concerned with the
political interest than economic, and served as a yardstick for its members, therefore, less
innovation and competition for long-term industrial development.
The abundant natural resources in SSA have become attractive for primary production.
SSA is home to the world’s largest arable land and has the second largest tropical forest (World
Bank 1993). That has attracted high agricultural production in the region. The export earnings of
a single agriculture commodity as a percentage of GDP in 2009 were Benin (Cotton) 38%,
Burkina Faso (Cotton) 44%, Burundi (Coffee) 61%, Cameroon (Cocoa) 16%, Cote d'Ivoire
(Cocoa) 39%, Ghana (Cocoa) 49%, Kenya (Tea) 27%, Malawi (Tobacco) 65%, and Rwanda
(Coffee) 25% (Addison et al. 2015). Table 4A in the Appendix shows agricultural production
(e.g., crops) in SSA are identical and have dominated their exports.
The region also accounts for 30% of all global minerals and 8% of the world’s oil
reserves (U.S. Geological Survey 2017). The African Development Bank (2016) observed that

104

minerals make up 70% of total SSA exports and 28% of GDP. The abundant resources in the
region attract resource seeking FDI to engage in primitive production instead of manufacturing
production. A total of 75% of FDI in SSA within 1985 to 1991 was concentrated in the mining
and oil extraction industries (Boocock 2002). That was the period when most of the countries in
the region were rebuilding from political instabilities and the SAP and the ERP for better
economic management had been introduced by the World Bank and the IMF, respectively. The
volatility of commodities prices in the global market makes extractive production less
competitive than a manufacturing market. For instance, SSA’s share of global manufacturing is
uneven to its population given that only about 1% of global manufacturing takes place there in
spite of it been home for 15% of the world's population (Deutsche Welle 2011). Table 4A
indicates SSA has remained a primary commodity exporter, with an average of 2.4% share in
world’s exports value from 2001 to 2010.
In spite of the abundant natural resources in the region, the largest concentration of high
risk countries increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as famine, drought, and
earthquakes, are in SSA (Benson and Clay 2003). Lukama (2010) has reported that from 1974 to
2003, 379 natural disasters occurred in parts of SSA. For instance, an estimated 400 deaths and
the emigration of almost a million refugees accompanied the Mozambique Flood in 2000, which
required reconstruction costs of $250 million (Mandel 2002). Also, the United Nation (2015) has
reported that between 1995 and 2015, 77 droughts occurred in East Africa alone. The U.S.
Foreign Disaster Assistance (1983) reported that from 1982 to 1983, drought in major food
producing areas in Ghana contributed to the spread of bush fires, which destroyed up to 35% of
total food production. Table 1A shows stagnant growth in food and agricultural export since the
1980s, which, is an example of how natural disaster has impeded agricultural development in

105

Ghana. The macroeconomic mismanagement in Ghana during the 17 years of political
instability, together with the famine in 1983, limited the government’s option than to sign onto
the ERP and the SAP to loose its autonomy to control national industrial policies. The economic
costs of the natural disaster, which include damage to infrastructure and deaths of the
economically active labour population, involuntarily diverted national funds for development to
be used as disaster relief. The frequency of natural disasters makes the region less attractive for
investment, especially in regard to investing in capital-intensive manufacturing industries. In the
case of Ghana, flooding is more frequent in the rainy season and a predictable seasonal
occurrence in the capital (Lukama 2010). This situation is more worrying for economic growth
as Ghana’s capital is endowed with the best infrastructure, a larger market, and manufacturing
activities.
The market in the region is underdeveloped because of poor infrastructures from natural
disasters and extractive production. The IMF (2014) has reported that less than one-fourth of
total SSA road network is paved, despite the fact that road transport accounts for 80% of freight
and 90% of passenger traffic. The high transport and insurance cost 30% of the value of exports
in SSA’s manufacturing development (IMF 2014). Table 1A in the Appendix shows that regional
trade, especially in manufactured goods, is not enough to attract investments due to the
infrastructure deficit. The share of manufacturing exports increased from 4.15% of total
merchandise exports in 1960 to 10.27% in 2010, which is not enough to produce a higher
positive externalities for rapid economic development. Because of that, Ghana has not benefitted
enough from regional trade to develop a stronger supply response nor raise potential growth.
Furthermore, the income level in SSA has not been enough for the region to emerge as a
strong geopolitical bloc in the world economy. The average GDP per capita (constant US$ 2005)

106

in SSA increased from $940 in 1960 to $1, 841 in 2010 (Table 1A Appendix). This development
means SSA remains a low income, primary producing region as per the World Bank’s country
groupings. Therefore, SSA as a geopolitical bloc is less powerful to be influential in global
politics. That becomes a challenge to influence policies on an international platform such as the
WTO. An example is the deadlock on agriculture subsidies and import quotas between
developing and developed countries at the WTO.
In summary, SSA does not present a more conducive environment nor positive
externalities for economic development. The geographical location is less attractive for trade and
manufacturing investment because of the abundant natural resources and natural disaster
occurrences. While the natural disasters have destroyed and impeded infrastructural
development, the natural resources have hampered trade, especially in manufacturing. In spite of
the hindrances to development from the abundant natural resources and natural disaster
occurrences, the leadership in SSA have not been proactive to design pragmatic policies to
address those challenges for rapid economic growth.
4.1.7 Theme 7: Management and utilization of natural resources for national development
Since 1957, it has been observed that periods of rising commodity prices are much
shorter than those of falling prices, with an average of 37 months for booms and 63 months for
slumps (Page and Hewitt 2001; IMF 2012). Commodity prices have fallen by 64% since 1957
with an average real rise of 28% and falls of 37%. The extent to which utilization of natural
resources (i.e., resource curse) has affected economic development and the application of a
developmental state in Malaysia and Ghana are discussed below.

107

4.1.7A. Relative contribution of Natural Resources in Malaysia
The main natural resources in Malaysia are tin, petroleum, timber, copper, iron ore,
natural gas, and bauxite (Central Intelligent Agency 2017). The total natural resource rent (% of
GDP) was 19.72% in 1971, reaching a record high of 25.40% in 1981. The contribution of total
natural resource rents to GDP has decreased after 1981, falling to a low of 7.23% in 2014 (Table
10 Appendix). At the same time, the total percentage of income from natural resources to GDP
was lowest at 1.44% in 1971 and highest at 15.5% in 1991. It has recorded a decreasing growth
rate since 1991 (see Table 10, Appendix).
Table 10 in the Appendix shows that the contribution of natural resource to GDP has
declined over the years, as illustrated by the record of tin production, in which Malaysia was
ranked 9th among the top tin producing countries in the world in 2014 (World Atlas 2017).
Malaysia produced 28.9 tons of tin in 1988 earning revenue of $203,792 at a price of $7,051
(Table 10A Appendix). The total metric tons of tin production have decreased since 1988 and
income from tin production has shrunk. At a price of $5,595 and a total output of 20.7 tons,
earnings decreased to $115,836 in 1991. An increase in price to $26,051 in 2011, and 3.3 tons of
tin produced resulted in total earnings of $85,969, lower than total revenue in 1988. Table 10A
shows that fluctuations in the price of tin has had less significant impact on total revenue because
of the decrease in tin’s total output. The fluctuations in commodity price has not been a major
influence of total revenue earned because of the decrease in production volume.
Table 1, Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix show that Malaysia’s revenue from natural
resources has fallen over the years because of diversification in the economy. The diversity in the
economy has decreased the government’s overdependence on natural resource revenue and
offered variety in its exports. The prime exported products have shifted from raw to

108

manufacturing exports, which makes Malaysia less vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity
pricing (Table 4 Appendix).
The regulatory authorities managing Malaysia’s natural resources have also been efficient
to minimize corruption. As part of the measures to make production in the resource sector
transparent and to be accountable to the general public, information on natural resource
operations, such as production volumes, prices, export values, royalties, and taxes, are
periodically published by the finance ministry (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2017).
The resource companies are quarterly audited and the reports are published to be accessible to
the general public. The United Nation Office of Drug and Crime (2016) has observed the
government’s commitment to reduce corruption in natural resource development, by organizing
workshops between key agencies and players to discuss challenges and mitigations.
Moreover, Malaysia has managed its natural resources to increase the wealth of the
nation. The government has promoted inclusive growth where resource revenues are invested in
ways that benefit the public. According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017), the
state established a national trust fund in 1988 to save resource rents to be invested in physical and
human capital. There is an annual report on the funds by the finance ministry, where information
on the balance and the investments made are published to be accessible to the public. The World
Bank (2017) has observed such government initiative as a success story, which has increased
average incomes of the bottom 40% of rural households by 7.1% a year, on average, over two
decades.
In summary, Malaysia’s natural resources have been less vulnerable to fluctuations in
commodity prices because of the decrease in government dependence on resource revenue,
mainly by diversifying into manufactured exports. At the same time, the resources have been

109

managed to minimize corruption and increased the nation’s wealth. Those developments are
characteristics of an economy that has overcome a resource curse for rapid and sustainable longterm growth.
4.1.7B. Relative contribution of Natural Resources in Ghana
The main natural resources in Ghana are gold, timber, diamonds, bauxite, manganese,
rubber, silver, salt, and limestone (Central Intelligent Agency 2017). The total natural resource
rent (% of GDP) was 2.34% in 1971 reaching a record high of 19.54% in 2014 (Table 11
Appendix). At the same time, the total share of income from natural resources in GDP has
recorded an increasing growth from 1.21% in 1971 to 19. 45% in 2011 (Table 11 Appendix).
Table 11A in the Appendix shows that the contribution of natural resources have been
increasing over the years, as illustrated by the record of gold production, in which Ghana has
been ranked 10th among the top gold producing countries in the world in 2015 (World Atlas
2017). Ghana produced 0.4 million ounces of gold in 1988 earning revenue of $174 million at a
price of $437 (Table 11A Appendix). The total output from gold production has recorded an
increasing growth, which has increased total earnings since 1988. The increase in total output to
0.8 million ounces increased revenue to $289 million in 1991, in spite of a decrease in price to
$362. A record increase in price, at $1,569 in 2011, and 3 million ounces of gold produced
resulted in income of $4,707 billion. Table 11A shows that fluctuations in the price of gold have
had no adverse effect on revenue because of the increase in gold’s total output.
Figures 2A and 3A in the Appendix show that Ghana’s revenue from natural resources
have been increasing because it has less diversity in its economy and has remained a raw
material producer. Agricultural production has decreased due to factors such as an increase in
demand and higher returns in mineral production. The mining sector, by 1999, accounted for

110

50% of foreign direct investment and from 1983 to 2011 (i.e., beginning of the period of SAP
and ERP liberalization), was responsible for $11.5 billion in total direct investment (Aryee
2012). Despite the fact that mining in Ghana involves gold, manganese, diamond, bauxite, iron,
limestone, and salt, 90% of the total value of minerals comes from gold production (Akabzaa
2007). There has been pressure on agricultural land to be converted for mineral production. For
instance, an average of 2% of agricultural land is transformed annually for mineral production
(Tomo 2016). That has declined agriculture production including Ghana’s main cash crop,
cocoa. Because cocoa production is dominant at the same location as gold production (mainly in
southern Ghana), the share of cocoa exports decreased from 58.9% of total merchandise exports
in 1965 to 38.6% in 2000 (Anaman 2006). Those are among the reasons the exported goods have
remained primary products (Table 1A Appendix).
Moreover, Ghana has not managed its natural resources to increase the wealth of the
nation. The increase in resource revenue has made the state less interested in finding a
sustainable alternative source of revenue, such as taxation (e.g., increase the tax base to include
the informal sector), so it has increased its borrowing from external sources when projected
revenues are not met (Ofori 2009) 64. The state has become less autonomous in its resource
management through borrowing because donors either turn to influence policies on resource
management or get to hold shares in resource production. Akabzaa and Darimani (2001) have
indicated that the government’s foreign currency reserves have decreased due to incentives that
allow investors to retain, on average, 75% of export earnings in offshore accounts. Such
incentives were introduced after a new mining code was enacted in 1986 as part of the IMF’s

According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2000), the state’s
expenditure on industrial development resulted in a budget deficit of 6% of GDP in 1965. The TED Case Studies
(1995) reported an estimated $1.5 billion had matured in loan repayments by 1974 as a result of increased borrowing
by the state to support its development agenda.
64

111

condition for financial assistance in 1983 (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001). That is an example of
how the U.S. and former European colonizers have found a channel (e.g., through loans and FDI)
into Ghana’s economic arrangement for their advantage. That affects the total earnings to
increase the government’s foreign currency reserve, which contributes to the unstable currency
markets, especially with the increasing demand for foreign currency by importers. The general
price level is increased through currency speculation in the imported manufactured goods
dependent economy of Ghana. With respect to donors holding shares in Ghana’s natural
resources, the China Development Bank has been granted a share in Ghana’s crude oil as part of
a $3 billion loan with collateralizing future oil revenues in 2012 (Amundsen 2013). That is an
example of an emerging superpower (China) influence on Ghana’s economy. Those
developments become leakages to the wealth of the nation from the increasing natural resource
revenue in Ghana.
In addition, the dependence on resource revenues has enhanced institutional corruption in
Ghana. The partisan political environment in Ghana has become an obstacle in controlling
institutional corruption. Amundsen (2013) has observed that politicians are favourable
candidates to secure license permit to start operations and are awarded public contracts for their
private business. Ghana’s increasing resource revenue is siphoned into private pockets through
politically appointed managers to manage the resource sector. For instance, the Economic and
Organized Crime Office (EOCO) (2017) reported a corruption scandal in Ghana’s COCOBOD65
of $512 million in 2016 with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) being the main orchestrator
(Modern Ghana 2017). Also, in their studies on extractive industries in Ghana, Bitetti and
Malone (2011) observed that corporate influence is common in Ghana’s resource industry. They

65

The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) is a Ghanaian government-controlled institution responsible for the
management, production, processing, and marketing of cocoa. See COCOBOD (2017) for more details.

112

reported that a gold mining company publicly presented keys to two Land Rover vehicles to
community leaders to influence their operation. Those corporate bodies and investors are able to
ignore Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through bribing, which contributes to the low level
of development in Ghana.
In summary, the economy of Ghana has remained dependent on natural resource revenue
and primary commodities producers since independence. There is evidence of a decrease in
agriculture production because of an increase in mineral production. The growth rate supports
the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis of minimal growth for a primary production dependent economy.
Also, there is evidence of influence on national policies by donors through aid and debt relief.
On the contrary, fluctuations in commodity prices have had no adverse effect on the resource
revenue because of the increase in production. Rather, mismanagement and corruption have
become leakages to the increasing resource revenue. Although Ghana resource development
exhibits some elements of a resource curse, it has not been the main cause of slow economic
development, but rather mismanagement and “policy curse.” 66 The inability of the state to
manage resource revenues from interest groups does not enable a better application of the
developmental state, hence the minimal economic growth recorded over the years.
4.1.7. C. Key Characteristics or Themes that are related and have joint impact
From the analysis of characteristics of a developmental state, it can be concluded that a
better application or function of Theme 5 depends on a better application of the identified
variables in Theme 1, Theme 2 and Theme 3. For instance, the state’s inability to build domestic
private capital as a requirement of Theme 1 makes foreign private capital (or business and
interest group) stronger in Theme 5 to push for their demands (i.e., direct investment focus for
their private interest instead of national interest). Thus, the state’s inability to build domestic
66

Policy curse sarcastically means bad policies.

113

private capital empowers foreign private capital or business to invest on conditions such as
privatization and deregulation.
Another example is Theme 3 where the pilot agency cannot control industrial policy or
unable to resist demand from foreign private capital or interest groups (e.g., the IMF or World
Bank) which provide loans or aids, if there exist weak macroeconomic variables. A good
illustration is Malaysia’s ability to resist expert advice from the IMF after the Asian financial
crisis in 1997 because of its strong macroeconomic standing. Ghana, on the other hand, often had
to accede to the IMF’s conditions and demands with its macroeconomic management.
Also Theme 2 shows that all the identified variables need to be working simultaneously for
a better application of a developmental state. For instance, the lack of autonomy among anticorruption and research agencies in Ghana detracts from the performances of their well trained
bureaucratic personnel. The bureaucracy often has to yield to the directives and demands of
interest groups, such as donors, in addressing national challenges. While anti-corruption
institutions in Malaysia may not be fully transparent, they are provided better facilities including
corruption courts and research officers who ensure that those who are awarded contracts and
public businesses execute them according to stipulated guidelines and standards.
Also, in a situation where there is a weak corruption institution (i.e., Theme 2), the
presence of domestic private capital (i.e., Theme 1) can ensure a strong link with foreign private
capital to allow the bureaucracy to guide industrial development (i.e., Theme 5).

114

Chapter Five: Conclusion
5.1. Conclusion
Malaysia has enjoyed an extended period of political stability after independence. The
country’s political environment has been characterized by an overwhelming respect for the rule
of law, and the government has been successful in mobilizing the citizens to support the
development agenda through equitable distribution of resources and rewards among different
factions. The stability has enabled the state to execute its plans to improve and develop its
institutions and attract external investments. The institutions, in turn, have been able to guide the
nation’s development by effectively implementing the principles of the developmental state
model. The bureaucracy has also managed to shield their resources from predators and have
helped to build various linkages to benefit from the country’s geographical location in an area of
trade and market concentration, which also provides positive externalities in infrastructures and
technology.
In contrast, Ghana has recorded a longer period of political instability after independence.
The country experienced a series of military coups from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, which
resulted in the abrogation of development plans with, little or no consideration for their merits.
For more than two decades after 1966, Ghana was characterized by a crippling state of political
and economic lethargy and uncertainties in its macroeconomic climate. The resulting
bureaucratic inertia and weakening of the institutional order that opened the door to a pervasive
degree of systemic corruption and inconsistent and inefficient implementation of the principles
of the developmental state model. The data shows that Ghana started well and laid down most of
the basic infrastructures for a more successful application of the developmental state model. The
political instabilities adversely affected the implementation of the developmental policy in its

115

process of gestation. The prevailing circumstances enabled both external forces (including the
Bretton Woods institution, foreign private capital and donors), and internal forces (such as
political affiliates and cronies, rival ethnic groups and competing interest groups) to influence
development of new national policies, some of which were completely different to the initial
developmental state principles
After 1983, the policy makers in Ghana completely abandoned the basic principles of the
developmental state model mainly by eliminating the central role of the state in preference for
policies of economic liberalization in directing economic planning. The ensuing inconsistencies
detracted from the foundation for the developmental state model that was laid down in 1957.
Failure of the bureaucracy in stamping out institutional corruption resulted in pilferages from
national coffers and the “resource curse.” The continuous increase in dependence on resource
revenues in a geographical location with vast natural resources and higher rates of natural
disasters have resulted in negative externalities (such as resource seeking investors, and have
negatively affected infrastructural development to attract substantial trade and manufacturing
investment).
Given its rapid economic growth, in spite of the high rate of corruption in Malaysia and
the stagnating economy in Ghana under unstable political regimes that necessitated the
revamping of its macroeconomic environment for improvement after the change to economic
liberalization after 1983, this study will qualitatively conclude that the presence or absence of
effective institutions could account for the differences in the level of development in the two
countries. The information examined also shows that it is not necessary for all the identified
variables in the developmental state model to be present or effectively working simultaneously
for its successful application, especially at the early stage of economic development. The

116

observed inverse link between the rate of corruption and the level of economic development is
one illustration of the latter case.
Whilst the study has uncovered a myriad of essential developmental variables, overall, it
recommends the building and maintenance of strong national bureaucratic institutions manned
by well educated and trained, patriotic and committed personnel by the developing nations of
Sub-Saharan Africa as, perhaps, the most important variable in the developmental effort.
The study finds effective institutions in Malaysia as the main factor guiding its economic
growth and, therefore, recommend that Ghana (and SSA in general) bring back elements of the
developmental state model, if not wholly, to rebuild its institutions for national development. The
study suggests that if SSA can rebuild their institutions, the vast resources can be used as a
comparative advantage in the today’s global economy of trade wars (e.g., U.S.-China, NAFTA)
to negotiate trade and investment for rapid growth. The study challenges the standardization of
rules with the increasing waves of globalization,

as well as the new normal of aid for

development by the IMF, the World Bank, and the global superpowers (i.e., developed
countries), in Ghana (and all of SSA) to increase migration (both legal and illegal) for economic
opportunities at the borders of donors if not reconsidered. By relying on empirical literature on
developmental undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana, this study propose future research address
the limitation of subjectively concluding effective institution as the main difference in
Malaysia’s economic success, and seek to understand the circumstances and impulses which
shaped the institutions that created the industrial policies for rapid growth.

117

Bibliography
24hGold.2017. “Statistics: Ghana Gold.” 24hgold.com accessed on April 05, 2017
http://www.24hgold.com/english/stat_country.aspx?pays=Ghana
Abad Luis, Amalu Ngozika, Kitamura Kenichi, Lohan Ramona and Simalabwi Alex. 2015. “The
Malaysian Semiconductor Cluster.” isc.hbs.edu accessed on December 10, 2016
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/resources/courses/moc-course-at-harvard/Documents/pdf/studentprojects/Malaysia_Semiconductor_Cluster_2015.pdf
Abdulai, Abdul‐Gafaru. 2009. “Political Context Study: Ghana.” polis.leeds.ac.uk. accessed on
August 10, 2015 http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/research-projects/abdulaighana-political-context-study-jan09.pdf
Acemoglu, Daron and Robinson, James. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishing Group
Ackah Charles, Aryeetey Ernest, Ayee Joseph and Clottey Ezekiel. 2010. “State-Business
Relations and Economic Performance in Ghana.” ippg.org. accessed on May 11, 2016
http://www.ippg.org.uk/papers/dp35a.pdf
Adams, Arvil. 2011. “The Role of Skills Development in Overcoming Social Disadvantage.”
unesco.org. accessed on August 01, 2015
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/ED/pdf/gmr2012-ED-EFA-MRT-PI04.pdf
Adarkwa, Kwasi. 2012. “The changing face of Ghanaian Towns.” African Review of Economics
and Finance 4(1):1-29
Addison Tony, Ghoshray Atanu and Stamatogiannis Michalis. 2015. “Agricultural Commodity
Price Shocks and Their Effect on Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of Agricultural
Economics 67(1): 47–61
Adedeji, John. 2001. “The Legacy of J.J. Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics, 1979-2000.” African
Studies Quarterly 5 (2):1-27
Adikorley, Ruth. 2013. “The Textile Industry in Ghana: A Look into Tertiary Textile Education
and its Relevance to the Industry.” researchgate.net accessed on January 03, 2017
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Ruth_Adikorley
Adom, Alex and Zogbator, Edem. 2015. “An Overview of Political and Economic Development
in Ghana from1957-2008.” Journal of Emerging Trends in Educational Research and Policy
Studies (JETERAPS) 6(5): 347-354
African Development Bank. 2009. “Botswana: Support for Education Quality and Technical and
Vocational Education and Training (SEQTVET).” afdb.org accessed on September 23, 2017
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Botswana_118

_Support_for_Education_Quality_and_Technical_and_Vocational_Education_and_Training__S
EQTVET__-_Appraisal_Report.pdf
African Development Bank. 2012. “Republic of Ghana Country Strategy Paper 2012-2016.”
afdb.org. accessed on March 13, 2017
https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Ghana%20%20CSP%202012%20-%202016.pdf
African Forum and Network on Debt and Development. 2015. “Loan Contraction and Debt
Management in Ghana.” afrodad.files accessed on June 03, 2016
https://afrodad.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/loan-contraction-and-debt-management-inghana.pdf
Africa Watch. 1992. “Ghana Revolution Injustice Abuse of the Legal System under the PNDC
Government.” Human Right Watch IV (1): 1-25
Afrobarometer. 2017. “An African-led series of national public attitude surveys on democracy
and governance in Africa.” afrobarometer.org accessed on March 24, 2017
http://www.afrobarometer.org/countries/ghana-1
Ahmad Hj, Sani Zaharuddin, Sabri Ahmad and Hamzah Hafida. 2014. “Religion, Ethnicity and
National Identity: An Analysis of the Islamic Experience in a Multi-Ethnic and Multi-Religious
Malaysian Society.” The International Asian Research Journal 02(04):51-62
Ahmad, Noor. 2009. “The Transformation in Malaysia's 12th General Election: The End of
National Front Hegemony.” (Paper presented at the 4th International Conference on
Interdisciplinary Social Sciences held at the University of Athens, Greece, 8-11 July 2009)
eprints.um.edu.my accessed on June 02, 2016
http://eprints.um.edu.my/11447/1/the_transformation_in_malaysia.pdf
Aisen, Ari and Veiga, Francisco. 2011. “How Does Political Instability Affect Economic
Growth?” imf.org. accessed on January 04, 2017
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1112.pdf
Akabzaa, Thomas and Darimani, Abdulai. 2001. “Impact of Mining Sector Investment in Ghana:
A Study of the Tarkwa Mining Region.” saprin.org accessed on January 12, 2017
http://www.saprin.org/ghana/research/gha_mining.pdf
Akyeampong, Kwame. 2004. “Whole school development in Ghana.” unesdoc.unesco.org
accessed on January 13, 2017 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001466/146616e.pdf
Akyeampong, Kwame. 2010. “Educational Expansion in Ghana: A Review of 50 Years of
Challenge and Progress.” Create Pathways to Access Research Monograph No. 33 accessed on
January 03, 2017
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240637986_Educational_Expansion_and_Access_in_G
hana_A_Review_of_50_Years_of_Challenge_and_Progress
119

Alesina Alberto, Ozler Sule, Roubini Nouriel and Swagel Phillip. 1992. “Political Instability and
Economic Growth.” Journal of Economic Growth 1(2): 189-212
Amankwah-Amoah, Joseph. 2015. “Explaining declining industries in developing countries: The
case of textiles and apparel in Ghana.” sagepub.com accessed on January 12, 2017
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1024529414563004
Amenyo, Kofi. 2008. “Trans Volta Togoland and the refuseniks of the union with Ghana.”
ghanaweb.com accessed on July 04, 2017
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Trans-Volta-Togoland-and-therefuseniks-of-the-union-with-Ghana-143373
American Historical Association. 2017. “The Colonial and Pre-Colonial Eras in Nigeria.”
historians.org assessed on June 04th 2017. https://www.historians.org/teaching-andlearning/teaching-resources-for-historians/teaching-and-learning-in-the-digital-age/through-thelens-of-history-biafra-nigeria-the-west-and-the-world/the-colonial-and-pre-colonial-eras-innigeria
Amidu, Martin. 2017. “The Looter Government and the Lootee Woyome know Amidu had
nothing to do with the Looted public Purse.” martinamidu.com. accessed on May 21, 2017
http://martinamidu.com/articles.html
Ampiah Joseph, Kwaah Christopher, Yiboe Kofi and Ababio Bethel.2013. “Improving Quality
Basic Education in Ghana: Prospects and Challenges of the School Performance Improvement
Plan.” hiroshima-u.ac.jp accessed on January 11, 2017 http://home.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/cice/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/5-2-52.pdf
Amsden, Alice. 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. New York:
Oxford University Press
Amundsen, Inge, 2013. “Can Ghana withstand the resource curse?” cmi.no. accessed on March
21, 2017 https://www.cmi.no/news/1265-can-ghana-withstand-the-resource-curse
Annor, Joseph. 2009. “The Achievements and Failures of President Kwame Nkrumah.”
ghanaweb.com accessed on December 02, 2017
https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/The-Achievements-and-Failures-ofPresident-Kwame-Nkrumah-166895
Ansu-Kyeremeh Kwasi, Casely-Hayford Leslie, Djangmah J.S., Nti James and Orivel Francois.
2002. “Education Sector Review (ESR): Ministry of Education Government of Ghana.”
amazonaws.com accessed on January 10, 2017 https://s3.amazonaws.com/ndpcstatic/pubication/Education+Sector+Review+2002.pdf
Antwi-Asare, T.O. and Addison, E.K.Y. 2000. “Financial Sector Reforms and Bank Performance
in Ghana.” odi.org accessed on January 23, 2017 https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odiassets/publications-opinion-files/8033.pdf
120

Ariff, Mohamad and Semudram Muthi. 1987. “Trade and Financing Strategies: A Case Study of
Malaysia.” Overseas Development Institute Working Paper NO.21 odi.org accessed on March
23, 2017 https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/6885.pdf
Ariff, Mohamed. 1998. “The Malaysian Economic Experience and its Relevance for the OIC
member countries.” Islamic Economic Studies 6(1): 1-41
Arthur, William. 2011. “Depreciation of the Cedi.” academia.edu accessed on December 12,
2016 http://www.academia.edu/6853657/Depreciation_of_the_Cedi
Aryeetey, Ernest and Baah-Boateng, William. 2016. “Understanding Ghana’s growth success
story and job creation challenges.” brookings.edu accessed on March 12, 2017
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Understanding-Ghanas-growth-successstory-and-job-creation-challenges.pdf
Asare-Bediako, Emmanuel. 2014. “The Growth and Development of Free Education in Northern
Ghana: 1951-1966.” ugspace.ug.edu.gh accessed on July 01, 2017
http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh/bitstream/123456789/7302/1/Emmanuel%20AsareBediako_The%20Growth%20and%20Development%20of%20Free%20Education%20in.pdf
Asibuo, Sam. 2014. “The role of the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice
(CHRAJ) in promoting public service accountability under Ghana’s fourth republic.”
unpan1.un.org. accessed on December 12, 2016
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CAFRAD/UNPAN017693.pdf
Austin, Gareth. 2010. “African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies.”
poldev.revues.org. accessed on April 22,2016 https://poldev.revues.org/78
Ayiku. 2007. “Some Achievements of the Rawlings' regime.” jjrawlings.info. accessed on
December 09, 2016 http://www.jjrawlings.info/achievements.html
Ayittey, George. 1990. “The End of African Socialism.” amazonaws.com. accessed on June 01,
2016 https://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/1990/pdf/hl250.pdf
Azikiwe, Abayomi. 2009. “Nkrumah and Ghana’s independence struggle.” workers.org.
accessed on June 02, 2016 http://www.workers.org/2009/world/nkrumah_1008/
Azikiwe, Abayomi, 2016. “Ghana and the 1966 Coup against Kwame Nkrumah: The Role of
African Americans in the African Revolution.” globalresearch.ca. accessed on April 29, 2016
http://www.globalresearch.ca/ghana-and-the-1966-coup-against-kwame-nkrumah-the-role-ofafrican-americans-in-the-african-revolution/5508043
Bah, Tierno. 2016. “The Death of Kwame Nkrumah.” webguinee.net accessed on December 08,
2017 http://www.webguinee.net/blogguinee/2016/03/the-death-of-kwame-nkrumah/

121

Bank of Ghana. 2016. “Monetary Policy Report.” bog.gov.gh accessed on December 09, 2016
https://www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/MPC_Press_Releases/Monetary%20Policy%20Report%
20-%20May%202016.pdf
Bawumia, Mahamadu and Abradu-Otoo, Philip. 2003. “Monetary Growth, Exchange Rates and
Inflation in Ghana: An Error Correction Analysis.” bog.gov.gh accessed on December 11, 2016
https://www.bog.gov.gh/privatecontent/Research/Working%20Papers/Monetary%20Growth%20
Inflation%20and%20Exchange%20Rates05.pdf
Beer, Andrew and Lester, Laurence. 2015. “Institutional thickness and institutional effectiveness:
developing regional indices for policy and practice in Australia.” Regional Studies, Regional
Science 2(1):205-228
Beeson, Mark and Stubbs, Richard. 2012. Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism. Abingdon:
Routledge
Begum Shahida, Kumaran P. and Jayakumar M. 2013. “ Use of Oil Palm Waste as a Renewable
Energy Source and Its Impact on Reduction of Air Pollution in Context of Malaysia.”
iopscience.iop.org accessed on February 02, 2017 http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/17551315/16/1/012026/pdf
Benjamin, Aryee. 2001. “Ghana’s mining sector: its contribution to the national economy.”
Resources Policy 27(2): 61-75.
Benson, Charlotte and Clay, Edward. 2003. “Economic and Financial Impacts of Natural
Disasters: an Assessment of Their Effects and Options for Mitigation.” odi.org. accessed on
January 12, 2017 https://www.odi.org/publications/5011-economic-financial-impacts-naturaldisasters-assessment-their-effects-options-mitigation
Berry, La Verle. 1994. “Ghana: A Country Study.” countrystudies.us. accessed on May 09, 2016
http://countrystudies.us/ghana/
Bhasin, Vijay and Annim, Samuel. 2005. “Impact of Elimination of Trade Taxes on Poverty and
Income Distribution in Ghana.” imf.org. accessed on May 12, 2016
https://www.imf.org/external/np/res/seminars/2005/macro/pdf/bhasin.pdf
Bhattacharyay, Biswa. 2009. “Infrastructure Development for ASEAN Economic Integration.”
adb.org accessed on October 12, 2017
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/155993/adbi-wp138.pdf
Biney, Ama. 2008. “The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect.” The Journal of Pan
African Studies 2(3): 129-159
Bitetti, Deanna and Malone, Samantha. 2011. “Comparing and Contrasting Extractive Industry
Sectors in Ghana and the US.” fractracker.org accessed on April 08, 2017
122

https://www.fractracker.org/2011/08/comparing-and-contrasting-the-extractive-industry-sectorsin-ghana-and-the-us/
Bishop, Matt and Payne, Tony. 2017. “Revisiting the developmental state 1: Introduction.”
speri.dept.shef.ac.uk. accessed on January 30, 2018
http://speri.dept.shef.ac.uk/2017/09/26/revisiting-the-developmental-state-1-introduction/
Bleich, Erik. 2005. “The legacies of history? Colonization and immigrant integration in Britain
and France.” Theory and Society 34 (2):171-195
Boocock, Colin. 2002. “Environmental Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining
Sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.” oecd.org. accessed on January 14, 2017
https://www.oecd.org/env/1819582.pdf
Böwer Uwe, Geis André and Winkler Adalbert. 2007. “Commodity Price Fluctuations and their
Impact on Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Western and Central Africa.” ecb.europa.eu accessed
on March 12, 2017
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp60.pdf?bfb50e4f91ec5d693b8a80f5d3fe4c91
Bowles, Williams. 2012. “Economic and Social Crisis in Post -Apartheid South Africa.”
globalresearch.ca accessed on April 3, 2016 http://www.globalresearch.ca/economic-and-socialcrisis-in-post-apartheid-south-africa/32505
Bresser-Pereira, Luiz. 2016. “Models of developmental state.” bresserpereira.org. accessed on
February 12, 2018 http://www.bresserpereira.org.br/papers/2016/350-Models-developmentalstate-TD-426.pdf
Bridges, Shaw. 2016. “"Unless an Energetic Effort is Made": Kwame Nkrumah's Panafricanism
and the Political Economy of Transition in Ghana 1951-67.” academia.edu. accessed on May 29,
2016
http://www.academia.edu/19972922/_Unless_an_Energetic_Effort_is_Made_Kwame_Nkrumahs
_Panafricanism_and_the_Political_Economy_of_Transition_in_Ghana_1951-67
British Broadcasting Corporation. 2016. “Four more ways the CIA has meddled in Africa.”
bbc.com. accessed on December 09, 2017 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36303327
Brittain, Victoria. 2011. “Africa: a continent drenched in the blood of revolutionary heroes.”
theguardian.com accessed on December 20, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment/poverty-matters/2011/jan/17/lumumba-50th-anniversary-african-leadersassassinations
Brown, Graham. 2005. “Balancing the Risks of Corrective Surgery: The political economy of
horizontal inequalities and the end of the New Economic Policy in Malaysia.” ox.ac.uk accessed
on June 01, 2016 http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper20.pdf
123

Brown, Jason. 1993. “The Role of State in Economic Development: Theory, the East Asian
Experience, and the Malaysian Case”. Asian Development Bank Staff paper No. 52 accessed on
June 21, 2017 https://www.adb.org/publications/role-state-economic-development-theory-eastasian-experience-and-malaysian-case
Bruce-Amartey Eric, Rexford Emmanuel, Amissah Kodwo and Safo-Ankama Kweku. 2014.
“The Decline of Ghana’s Textile Industry: Its effects on Textile Education in Ghana.” iiste.org.
accessed on January 14, 2017
www.iiste.org/Journals/index.php/ADS/article/download/14650/15004
Buah, F. K. 1998. A History of Ghana; Revised and Updated. Malaysia: Macmillan Publishers
Burton, Charles. 1989. “The Role of the NICS in Southeast Asia's Political and Economic
Development.” International Journal 44(3):660-675
Campbell, Ross. 2012. “Why Did the Soviet Union Suffer from Stagnation?” allrussias.com
accessed on October 01, 2017 http://www.allrussias.com/essays/2012/Ross_Campbell.pdf
Carbone, Giovanni. 2007. “Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research
Perspectives.” World Political Science Review 3(3): 1-24
Central Intelligence Agency. 2002. “Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders.”
cia.gov. accessed on December 03, 2017 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP83-01042R000200090002-0.pdf
Central Intelligence Agency. 2017. “The World Fact book: Natural Resources.” cia.gov accessed
on April 04, 2017 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2111.html
Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa. 2013. “Study on the Demand
for and Supply of Evaluation in Ghana”. theclearinitiative.org. accessed on December 26, 2016
https://www.theclearinitiative.org/sites/clearinitiative/files/201604/Study%20on%20the%20Dem
and%20for%20and%20Supply%20of%20Evaluation%20in%20Ghana.pdf
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical
Perspective. London: Anthem Press
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2007. Institutional Change and Economic Development. New York: United
Nations University Press
Chang, Ha-Joon. 2010. “Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History.”
Journal of Institutional Economics 7 (04): 473-498

124

Cheen, Lim. 2017. “Malaysia: Strategies for the Liberalization of the Services Sector.” wto.org
accessed on March 23, 2017
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case25_e.htm
Chete L. N., Adeoti J. O., Adeyinka F. M., and Ogundele O. 2016. “Industrial development and
growth in Nigeria: Lessons and challenges.” brookings.edu accessed on September 18, 2017
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/L2C_WP8_Chete-et-al-1.pdf
Chinery, Rosemary. 2000. “The Dilemma of Rawlings Revolution.” nyu.edu. accessed on
August 10,2015 http://www.nyu.edu/classes/keefer/ww1/chin.html
Clignet, Remi and Foster, Philip. 1964. “French and British Colonial Education in Africa.”
Comparative Education Review 8 (2): 191-198
Commisceo, Global. 2016. “Ghana Guide: Ghanaian Language, Culture, Customs and
Etiquette.” commisceo-global accessed on May 12, 2016 http://www.commisceoglobal.com/country-guides/ghana-guide
Commonwealth. 2017. “Ghana: Constitution and politics.” thecommonwealth.org. accessed on
March 26, 2017 http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/ghana/constitution-politics
Conroy, Courtney. 2010. “France as a Negative Influence on the Côte d’Ivoire: The
Consequences of Foreign Interference.” digitalcommons.salve.edu. accessed on September 26,
2017 http://digitalcommons.salve.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1063&context=pell_theses
Corporate Integrity System. 2017. “Why should you sign CIP: Showing your commitment in
upholding integrity.” cism.my accessed on March 01, 2017 http://www.cism.my/
Country Studies. 2015. “Historical Background: Ghana.” countrystudies.us. accessed on August
05, 2015 http://countrystudies.us/ghana/63.htm
Cribb, Robert. 2010. “Digital Atlas of Indonesian History.” indonesianhistory.info accessed on
September 29, 2017 https://www.indonesianhistory.info/pages/chapter-4.html
Crowder, Michael. 1964. “Indirect Rule: French and British Style.” Journal of the International
African Institute 34(3):197-205
Cuesta Brandon, Milner Helen, Nielson Daniel and Knack Steve. 2016. “No Greater
Representation with Taxation: Experimental Evidence from Ghana and Uganda on Citizen
Action toward Oil, Aid, and Taxes.” princeton.edu. accessed on November 23, 2017
https://www.princeton.edu/~hmilner/working%20papers/NoGreaterRepresentationWithTaxation.
pdf
Dadzie, Richard. 2011. “Developmental State and Agriculture for Development: Lessons for
Ghana from East Asia.” umsystem.edu. accessed on August 01, 2015
125

https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/10812/DadzieDevStaAgr.pdf?sequ
ence=1
Dartey-Baah, Kwasi. 2014. “Political Leadership in Ghana: 1957-2010.” academicjournals.org
accessed on January 02, 2017 http://academicjournals.org/journal/AJPSIR/article-full-textpdf/542054849814
Davis, Ralph. 1962. “English Foreign Trade, 1700–1774.” The Economic History Review
15 (2):285–303
Deutsche, Welle. 2011. “Poor infrastructure is key obstacle to development in Africa.” dw.com
accessed on January 14, 2017 http://www.dw.com/en/poor-infrastructure-is-key-obstacle-todevelopment-in-africa/a-15264436
Drabble, John. 2004. “The Economic History of Malaysia”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by
Robert Whaples. July 31, 2004. eh.net/encyclopedia. assessed on May 01, 2016
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/economic-history-of-malaysia/
Due, Jean. 1969. “Agricultural Development in the Ivory Coast and Ghana.” The Journal of
Modern African Studies 7(4): 637-660
Dunaway, James. 2012. “Voting, fraud, and violence: political accountability in African
elections.” escholarship.org. accessed on February 18, 2017
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/2bs339cm#page-17
Dzulkifl, Fatimah and Zameri, Nazrul. 2010. “The Functions of Constitutional Monarchy in
Malaysian Political System: The Perceptions of Malay Community.” repo.uum.edu.my accessed
on November 2016 http://repo.uum.edu.my/3182/1/S18.pdf
Ebert-Stiftung, Friedrich. 2011. “The Law making process in Ghana: Structures and Procedures.”
library.fes.de. accessed on January 30, 2017 http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/ghana/10506.pdf
Economic Planning Unit. 2010. “Tenth Malaysian Plan 2011-2015.” epu.gov. accessed on May
29, 2016 http://onlineapps.epu.gov.my/rmke10/img/pdf/en/foreword.pdf
Economic Planning Unit. 2013. “First Malaysia Plan, 1966 – 1970.” epu.gov. accessed on
August 01, 2015 http://www.epu.gov.my/en/first-malaysia-plan-1966-1970
Economic Planning Unit 2015. “Malaysian Economic Development: Position, Problems and
Plan.” epu.gov. accessed on August 05, 2015 http://www.epu.gov.my/eputheme/rmk1/chapt1.pdf
Economic Planning Unit. 2017. “Economic Developments, Development Plans, Previous Plans.”
epu.gov.my accessed on March 12, 2017 http://www.epu.gov.my/en/developmentplans/previous-plans
126

Economic Planning Unit. 2017. “Economic Development, Economic Management, A Brief
History.” epu.gov.my. accessed on January 09, 2017 http://www.epu.gov.my/en/economicmanagement/brief-history
Economic Transformation Programme. 2016. “New Economic Model of Malaysia.”
etp.pemandu.gov. accessed on May 29, 2016
http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/upload/etp_handbook_chapter_1-4_economic_model.pdf
Economic Watch. 2010. “Malaysia Trade, Exports and Imports.” economywatch.com accessed
on March 27, 2017 http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/malaysia/exportimport.html
Education and Training Unit. 2007. “Understanding Government: The Developmental State.”
etu.org.za. accessed on August 01, 2015 http://www.etu.org.za/toolbox/docs/govern/state.html
Ekelund Robert, Hébert Robert and Tollison Robert. 1989. “An Economic Model of the
Medieval Church: Usury as a Form of Rent Seeking.” Journal of Law, Economics, &
Organization 5(2):307-331
Ekelund, Robert and Tollison, Robert. 1981. Mercantilism as a Rent-Seeking Society. Texas: 40
A&M University Press.
Evans, Peter. 1995. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton:
Princeton University Press
Fedderke, Johannes and Garlick, Rob. 2008. “Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth
in South Africa: A review of the accumulated evidence.” econrsa.org accessed on October 03,
2017 https://econrsa.org/publications/policy-papers/infrastructure-development-and-economicgrowth-south-africa-review
Fernando, Joseph. 2011. “Tunku Abdul Rahman, Charisma, and the Nationalist Movement in
Malaya, 1952–1957.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 11(3):492–508
Fold, Niels and Whitfield, Lindsay. 2012. “Developing a Palm Oil Sector: The Experiences of
Malaysia and Ghana Compared” Danish Institute for International Studies 08: 1-43
Foo, Domonic. 2015. “The Malaysian Chemical Industry: From Commodity to Manufacturing.”
aiche.org accessed on May 11, 2016 http://www.aiche.org/sites/default/files/cep/20151148.pdf
Food and Agriculture Organization. 2011. “The State of the World’s Land and Water Resources
for Food and Agriculture (SOLAW).” Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
Rome and Earth scan, London accessed on October 01st, 2015
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i1688e/i1688e.pdf
Foster, Vivien and Briceño-Garmendia, Cecilia. 2010. “Africa’s Infrastructure a Time for
Transformation.” siteresources.worldbank.org accessed on February 21, 2017
127

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/aicd_overview_english_noembargo.pdf
Freedom House. 2017. “Overview: Political Rights and Civil Liberties.” freedomhouse.org.
accessed on April 18, 2017 https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/malaysia
Frimpong, Enoch. 2013. “The life and times of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah”. graphic.com.gh.
accessed on December 07, 2017 https://www.graphic.com.gh/features/features/the-life-andtimes-of-dr-kwame-nkrumah.html
Frisby, Dominic. 2011. “What the ‘70s Bull Run Can Teach Us About Today’s Gold Market.”
financialsense.com accessed on January 03, 2017
http://www.financialsense.com/contributors/dominic-frisby/2011/06/17/what-the-70s-bull-runcan-teach-us-about-gold
Fritz, V. and Menocal, Rocha. 2006. “(Re) building Developmental States: From Theory to
Practice.” Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 274. accessed on October 1, 2015
http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/2328.pdf
Fujita, Mai. 1997. “Industrial Policies and Trade Liberalization: The Automotive Industries in
Thailand and Malaysia.” ide.go.jp accessed on June 30, 2016
http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Apec/pdf/1997_06.pdf
Fuller, Harcourt, 2010. “Symbolic Nationalism during the Kwame Nkrumah era in the Gold
Coast/Ghana.” lse.ac.uk. accessed on May 29, 2016 http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2379/1/U615328.pdf
Gallup, John. 2000. “Geography and Socioeconomic Development.” cid.harvard.edu. accessed
on January 16, 2017
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/archive/andes/documents/bgpapers/geography_socioeconomicdevelo
pment.pdf
GAN Integrity. 2018. “Ghana Corruption Report.” business-anti-corruption .com. accessed on
January 01, 2018 http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/ghana
GAN Integrity. 2018. “Malaysia Corruption Report.” business-anti-corruption .com. accessed on
January 01, 2018 http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/malaysia
Gerits, Frank. 2015. “When the Bull Elephants Fight: Kwame Nkrumah, Non-Alignment, and
Pan-Africanism as an Interventionist Ideology in the Global Cold War (1957-66).” academia.edu
accessed on June 11, 2016
http://www.academia.edu/12913883/_When_the_Bull_Elephants_Fight_Nkrumah_the_NonAligned_Movement_and_Pan-Africanism_as_an_Interventionist_Ideology_19571966_International_History_Review_2015
Gerring John, Ziblatt Daniel, Gorp Johan and Arévalo Julián. 2011. “An Institutional Theory of
Direct and Indirect Rule.” World Politics 63 (3):377-433
128

Ghacem. 2015. “Background: Development in Ghana.” ghacem.com. accessed on August 10,
2015 http://www.ghacem.com/en/our_background
Ghana Center for Democracy Development. 2005. “Democracy, Development and Good
Governance: The Inseparable Links.” standford.edu. accessed on August 10, 2015
https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/papers/CDD_lecture_05.htm
Ghana, Districts. 2006. “Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah: Social and Economic Developments.”
ghanadistricts.com. accessed on August 03, 2015
http://ghanadistricts.com/home/?_=49&sa=4768&ssa=786
Ghana National Petroleum Company. 2014. “Our Stakeholders: Local and Foreign Companies.”
gnpcghana.com accessed on August 11, 2015
http://www.gnpcghana.com/SitePages/ContentPage.aspx?ItemID=13&ItemTitle=Our%20Stakeh
olders
Ghana Statistical Service. 2014. “Final 2012 Gross Domestic Product and Revised 2013 Gross
Domestic Product.” statsghana.gov.gh. accessed on August 08, 2015
http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/docfiles/GDP/GDP_2014.pdf
Ghanaweb. 2017. “Akufo-Addo sacks MMDCEs.” ghanaweb.com accessed on March 13, 2017
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Akufo-Addo-sacks-MMDCEs500623
Ghanaweb. 2017. “Reeling under financial pressure; CHRAJ looking for relief.” ghanaweb.com
accessed on March, 29 2017
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Reeling-under-financial-pressureCHRAJ-looking-for-relief-515670
Gillen, Mark. 1994. “The Malay Rulers’ Loss of Immunity.” uvic.ca. accessed on June 01, 2016
http://www.uvic.ca/research/centres/capi/assets/docs/Gillen_Malay_Rulers.pdf
Gilson, Ronald and Milhaupt, Curtis. 2010. “Economically Benevolent Dictators: Lessons for
Developing Democracies.” law.stanford.edu accessed on March 21, 2017
http://law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/259432/doc/slspublic/Gi
lson%20Benevolent%20Dictators.pdf
Global Economy. 2015. “Ghana Natural resources Income.” m.theglobaleconomy.com accessed
on April 16, 2017 http://m.theglobaleconomy.com/Ghana/Natural_resources_income/
Goldery, Matt and Wantchekon, Leonard. 2004. “Africa: Dictatorial and Democratic Electoral
Systems since 1946.” princeton.edu accessed on April 3, 2016
http://www.princeton.edu/~lwantche/Africa_Dictatorial_and_Democratic_Electoral_Systems_Si
nce_1946

129

Gold Sheet. 2017. “World Gold Production: Gold Production History” goldsheetlinks.com.
accessed on April 17, 2017 http://www.goldsheetlinks.com/goldhist.htm
Government of Ghana. 1964. “Seven year Development Plan: 1963/64 to 1969/70.”
amazonaws.com accessed on June 03, 2016 https://s3.amazonaws.com/ndpcstatic/CACHES/NEWS/2015/07/22//Seven+Year+Devt+Plan.pdf
Government of Ghana. 2015. “Ghana at a Glance, Pre Colonial Ghana: Ghana Revolution and
Political History.” ghana.gov.gh. accessed on August 08, 2015.
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/about-ghana/ghana-at-a-glance
Government of Ghana. 2017. “Regions.” ghana.gov.gh. accessed on November 23, 2017
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/about-ghana/regions
Government of Ghana. 2017. “The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana.” ghana.gov.gh.
accessed on March 09, 2017 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/images/documents/constitution_ghana.pdf
Griswold, Deirdre. 1998. “Indonesia 1965: The Second Greatest Crime of the Century.”
workers.org accessed on September 14, 2017 https://www.workers.org/indonesia/index.html
Guan, Lee. 2005. “Affirmative Action in Malaysia.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2005):211-228
Guest Greg, Namey Emily and MacQueen Kathleen. 2012. Applied Thematic Analysis. Los
Angeles: Sage Publication Group
Gurib-Fakim, Ameenah, 2015. “African governments must urgently invest in science and
research.” theguardian.com accessed on October 05, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/globaldevelopment-professionals-network/2015/sep/30/african-governments-must-invest-in-scienceand-research
Gyimah-Boadi, E.1991. “Review of M. M. Huq 'The Economy of Ghana: the first 25 years
independence” The Journal of Modern African Studies 29 (1991): 708-709.
Gyimah-Brempong, K. and Traynor, TL. 1999. “Political instability, investment and economic
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Journal of African Economies 8 (1): 52-86
Hamer, Andrew. 1986. “Urban Sub-Saharan Africa in Macroeconomic Perspective: Selected
Issues and Options.” documents.worldbank.org accessed on January 29, 2017
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/539251468006022726/pdf/UDD96000Urban00d0iss
ues0and0options.pdf
Hamid, Ahmad. 2000. “Diverse Approaches to Rural Development in Malaysia: The FELDA
and Darul Arquam Land Settlement Regimes.” academia.edu accessed on May 25, 2016
http://www.academia.edu/331960/Diverse_Approaches_to_Rural_Development_in_Malaysia_T
he_FELDA_and_Darul_Arqam_Land_Settlement_Regimes

130

Hancock, Hannah. 2014. “Indirect VS Direct rule in Africa.” prezi.com. accessed on May 09,
2016 https://prezi.com/8mn4tzast6za/indirect-vs-direct-rule-in-africa/
Handley, Antoinette and Mills, Grey. 2001. “From Military Coups to Multiparty Elections: The
Ghanaian Military-Civil Transition.” clingendael.nl accessed on May 30, 2016
https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20011100_cru_working_paper_2.pdf
Handloff, Robert.1991 “French Expansion in Cote D'ivoire.” countrystudies.us. accessed on June
04, 2017 http://countrystudies.us/ivory-coast/7.htm
Hardi, Yakubu. 2012. “Solving Graduate Unemployment in Ghana.” modernghana.com accessed
on October 01, 2017 https://www.modernghana.com/news/401569/solving-graduateunemployment-in-ghana-1.html
Harrison, Mark. 2002. “Economic Growth and Slowdown.” warwick.ac.uk accessed on October
03, 2017
https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/mharrison/public/brezhnev2002.pdf
Hart, Gillian. 1994. “The New Economic Policy and Redistribution in Malaysia: A Model for
Post-Apartheid South Africa? msu.edu. accessed on June 21, 2016
http://pdfproc.lib.msu.edu/?file=/DMC/African%20Journals/pdfs/transformation/tran023/tran023
004.pdf
Hays, Jeffrey. 2008. “British in Malaysia.” factsanddetails.com accessed on September 23, 2017
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Malaysia/sub5_4a/entry-3619.html
Helmke, Gretchen and Levitsky, Steven. 2003. “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics:
A Research Agenda.” 3.nd.edu. accessed on December 09, 2016
https://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/307.pdf
Hess, Janet. 2000. “Imaging Architecture: The Structure of Nationalism in Accra, Ghana”.
Africa Today 47 (2): 35-58
Hill, Hal. 2014. “Is There a Southeast Asian Development Model?” vwl-iwipol.uni-freiburg.de
accessed on October 01, 2017 http://www.vwl-iwipol.unifreiburg.de/iwipol/discussion_papers/DP26_Hill_Is_There_a_Southeast_Asian_Development_M
odel.pdf
Hobday, Mike. 1995. “East Asian latecomer firms: Learning the technology of electronics.”
World Development 23 (7): 1171-1193
Hodgson, Geoffrey. 2006. “What Are Institutions?” geoffrey-hodgson.info. accessed on
December 09, 2016 http://www.geoffrey-hodgson.info/user/bin/whatareinstitutions.pdf
Holmes, Oliver. 2016. “British embassy questioned whether Malaysian PM cleared of
corruption.” theguardian.com. accessed on January 23, 2017
131

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/19/british-embassy-questioned-malaysian-pmnajib-razak-exonerated-corruption
Hui, Lim. 1981. “Ownership and Control of the One Hundred Largest Corporations in
Malaysia.” The Journal of Asian Studies 42 (03):722-725
Human Rights Watch. 2017. “Malaysia: Rights Decline under Najib.” hrw.org. accessed on
January 12, 2017 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/12/malaysia-rights-decline-under-najib
Huq, M.M. 1989. The Economy of Ghana: The First 25 Years since Independence. New York:
St. Martin’s Press
Husin, Dato’. 2006. “Malaysia’s Economic Development with emphasis on Public-Private
Collaboration.” info.worldbank.org accessed on May 23, 2016
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/232685/Rahman%20Husin.pdf
Husin, Wan. 2011. “Budi-Islam: It’s Role in the Construction of Malay Identity in Malaysia.”
International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 1(12): 132-142
Hutchinson, Francis. 2015. “Malaysia's Independence Leaders and the Legacies of State
Formation under British Rule.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (Third Series) 25 (01): 123151
IndexMundi. 2017. “Commodity: Palm Oil Production by Country in 1000 MT.”
indexmundi.com. accessed on April 09, 2017
http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?commodity=palm-oil
IndexMundi. 2017. “Malaysia Tin Production by Year.” indexmundi.com. accessed on July 04,
2017 http://www.indexmundi.com/minerals/?country=my&product=tin&graph=production
Indonesia-investments. 2017. “Colonial Period of Indonesia.” indonesia-investments.com
accessed on July 31, 2017 https://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/politics/colonialhistory/item178?
Indonesian-Investment. 2017. “New Order Miracle of Suharto's Indonesia.” indonesiainvestments.com accessed on October 12, 2017 https://www.indonesiainvestments.com/culture/economy/new-order-miracle/item247?
International Labour Organization. 2016. “Review of labour migration policy in Malaysia.”
apmigration.ilo.org accessed on January 25, 2017 http://apmigration.ilo.org/resources/review-oflabour-migration-policy-in-malaysia
International Labour Organization. 2017. “Indonesia: Working age | BLK - Vocational and Skills
Training Centers.” ilo.org. accessed on October 12, 2017
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.viewScheme?p_lang=en&p_scheme_id=3159&p_geoaid=
360
132

International Monetary Fund. 2000. “Debt- and Reserve-Related Indicators of External
Vulnerability.” imf.org. accessed on July 04, 2017 https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/debtres/
International Monetary Fund. 2000. “Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the Role of the IMF.”
imf.org. accessed on January 12, 2017
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm#box4
International Monetary Fund. 2002. “Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative Decision Point Document.” imf.org accessed on January 13, 2017
https://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2002/gha/ghadp.pdf
International Monetary Fund. 2004. “Can the East Asian Miracle Persist? Remarks by Takatoshi
Kato, Deputy Managing Director, IMF.” imf.org accessed on March 03, 2017
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp120204
International Monetary Fund. 2014. “Malaysia Financial Sector Assessment Program.” imf.org
accessed on January 18, 2017 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr1498.pdf
International Monetary Fund. 2014. “Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa Staying
the Course.” imf.org. accessed on January 21, 2017
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/afr/eng/sreo1014.pdf
International Monetary Fund. 2017. “Enhancing Resilience to Natural Disasters in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” gwu.edu. accessed on September 30, 2017
https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/events/IMFAfrica17/Presentations/Resilience.pdf
International Network for the Availability of Scientific Publications. 2013. “What is the evidence
on evidence-informed policy making? Lessons from the International Conference on Evidence
Informed Policy Making.” inasp.info. accessed on May 07, 2017
http://www.inasp.info/uploads/filer_public/2013/04/22/what_is_the_evidence_on_eipm.pdf
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research. 2008. “State of Competition Regime in
Ghana.” cuts-ccier.org. accessed on January 07, 2017 http://www.cuts-ccier.org/7up4/pdf/PCPGhana.pdf
International Tin Research Institute. 2011. “Historical trends in tin production.” itri.co.uk
accessed on April 17, 2017
https://www.itri.co.uk/index.php?option=com_mtree&task=att_download&link_id=49601&cf_i
d=24
Ismail, Fauziah. 2017. “MACC’s efforts are to ensure a clean and trustworthy administration.”
nst.com.my accessed on February 01, 2017
http://www.nst.com.my/news/2017/01/203705/remembering-my-dads-legacy-against-corruption

133

Iyer, Lakshmi. 2008. “Direct versus Indirect Colonial Rule in India: Long-term
Consequences.”hbs.edu. working paper 05-041 accessed on September 15, 2015
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/05-041.pdf
Jedwab, Remi and Osei, Robert. 2012. “Structural Change in Ghana 1960-2010.” gwu.edu.
accessed on August 09, 2015
http://www.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/papers/Jedwab_IIEPWP2012-12.pdf
Jeshurun, Chandran. 2008. “Diplomatic Profile Series, Profile of Malaysia’s Foreign Ministers:
Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra Al-Haj.” .idfr.gov. accessed on May 21, 2016
http://www.idfr.gov.my/images/stories/publication/2008/tunku.pdf
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Japanese
Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy: 1925-1975. California: Stanford University Press.
Johnson, Chalmers. 1984. The Industrial Policy Debate. Washington: ICS Publication
Johnson, Chalmers. 1995. Japan, who Governs?: The Rise of the Developmental State. New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc
Johnson Laura, Howell Jordan and Evered Kyle. 2015. “Where nothing was before:
(re)producing population and place in Ghana’s Volta River Project.” Journal of Cultural
Geography academia.edu accessed on May 30, 2016
http://www.academia.edu/14204790/_Where_nothing_was_before_re_producing_population_an
d_place_in_Ghanas_Volta_River_Project
Jomo, Sundaram and Hui, Wee. 2009. “Policy Coherence Initiative on Growth, Investment and
Employment, the Case of Malaysia: Development Policies, Macroeconomic Regime and
Employment in Malaysia.” ilo.org. accessed on August 10, 2015
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/--robangkok/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_101733.pdf
Jomo, Sundaram. 1990. Growth and Structural Change of the Malaysian Economy: Studies in
the Economies of East and Southeast Asia. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Jonathan Brooks, Andre Croppenstedt and Emmanuel Aggrey-Fynn. 2007. “Distortions to
Agricultural Incentives in Ghana.” ageconsearch.umn.edu. accessed on January, 17, 2017
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/48523/2/Ghana%20%20Agricultural%20Distortions%20Working%20Paper%2047,%20Dec%202007.pdf
Kadir, Kaziah. 2005. “Investment Incentives: Malaysia’s Perspective.” info.worldbank.org
accessed on August 16, 2015
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/205682/7%20Dato%20Kaziah%20%20Session%207%20Plenary%20Incentives.pdf

134

Kapoor, Dip. 2011. “Critical Perspectives on Neoliberal Globalization, Development and
Education in Africa and Asia.” sensepublishers.com accessed on September 01, 2017
https://www.sensepublishers.com/media/217-critical-perspectives-on-neoliberal-globalizationdevelopment-and-education-in-africa-and-asia.pdf
Karimi, Mohammad and Yusop, Zulkornain. 2009. “FDI and Economic Growth in Malaysia.”
mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de. accessed on March 13, 2017 https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/14999/1/
Kemubu Agricultural and Development Authority. 2016. “National Key Economic Area.”
kada.gov. accessed on June 09, 2016http://www.kada.gov.my/en/web/guest/bidang-ekonomiutama-negara-nkea
Kennedy, Jeffrey. 2002. “Leadership in Malaysia: Traditional Values, International Outlook.”
The Academy of Management Executive 16 (3):15-26
Kheng, Cheah. 2009. “The Communist Insurgency in Malaysia, 1948-90: Contesting the NationState and Social Change.” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 11 (1):132-52.
Kolavalli, Shashi and Vigneri, Marcella. 2013. “Cocoa in Ghana: Shaping the success of an
Economy.” worldbank.org. accessed on June 03, 2016
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/2586431271798012256/ghana_coco
a.pdf
Kim, Jiyoung. 2013. “Aid and State transition in Ghana and South Korea.” WIDER Working
Paper No. 2013/121: 1-27
King, Charles. 1966 “Building on Diamonds: The Contribution of Diamonds to Botswana’s
Development.” debeersgroup.com accessed on September 19, 2017
http://www.debeersgroup.com/en/reports/impact/country/botswana-and-cut-8/the-contributionof-diamonds-to-Botswana-development.html
Konadu-Agyemang, Kwadwo. 2000. “The Best of Times and the Worst of Times: Structural
Adjustment Programs and Uneven Development in Africa: The Case of Ghana.” The
Professional Geographer 52(3): 469-483
Kong, Liew. 1969. “Investment Incentives Act 1968: Malaysia.” heinonline.org accessed on
August 15, 2015
http://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/singlrev1&div=17&id=&page=
Koponen, Juhani. 1993. “The Partition of Africa: A Scramble for a Mirage?” Nordic Journal of
African Studies 2(1): 117–135
Korieh, Chima. 2010. “The Land has Changed History, Society and Gender in Colonial Eastern
Nigeria.” dspace.ucalgary.ca. accessed on May 15, 2016

135

http://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/48254/13/UofCPress_LandHasChanged_2010_Chapter
02.pdf
Koutonin, Mawuna. 2014. “14 African Countries Forced by France to Pay Colonial Tax for the
Benefits of Slavery and Colonization.” siliconafrica.com accessed on December 09, 2017
http://siliconafrica.com/france-colonial-tax/
Kryeziu, Alush. 2016. “The Impact of Macroeconomic Factors in Economic Growth.” European
Scientific Journal 12(7): 331-345
Kuo, Lily. 2016. “The updated chart of Africa’s longest-serving rulers if these two step down in
2017 as promised.” qz.com accessed on October 03, 2017 https://qz.com/852384/an-updatedchart-of-africas-longest-serving-rulers-without-gambias-yahya-jammeh-or-angolas-dos-santos/
Kura, Sulaiman. 2008. “African Ruling Political Parties and the Making of ‘Authoritarian’
Democracies: Extending the Frontiers of Social Justice in Nigeria.” accord.org.za accessed on
December 12, 2016 http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCafrican-ruling-politicalparties-and-the-making-of-authoritarian-democracies/
Kwang, Han. 2017. “Singapore's R&D: Expensive lesson or worthwhile investment?”
straitstimes.com. accessed on October 07, 2017 http://www.straitstimes.com/authors/han-fookkwang
Kwarteng, Francis. 2015. “Kwame Nkrumah: Nkrumahism and Francophone Africa 1.”
modernghana.com. accessed on December 14, 2017
https://www.modernghana.com/news/616927/kwame-nkrumah-nkrumahism-and-franco.html
Lambert, Tim. 2017. “A Brief History of Indonesia: Ancient Indonesia.” localhistories.org
accessed on September 11, 2017 http://www.localhistories.org/indonesia.html
Laryea, Amarquaye and Senadza, Bernardin. 2017. “Trade and Exchange Rate Policies since
Independence and Prospects for the Future.” ugess3.files. accessed on February 16, 2017
https://ugess3.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/ghana-trade-exchange-rate-policies_laryeasenadza_final-draft.pdf
Lau, Lawrence. 2015. “Lee Kuan Yew, a Man of the Century.” igef.cuhk.edu.hk accessed on
October 09, 2017 http://www.igef.cuhk.edu.hk/igef_media/workingpaper/IGEF/igef%20working%20paper%20no.%2036%20english%20version.pdf
Lebowitz, Michael. 2004. “Ideology and Economic Development.” monthlyreview.org accessed
on January 12, 2017 http://monthlyreview.org/2004/05/01/ideology-and-economic-development/
Lee Khai, Udin Zulkifli and Hassan Mohamad. 2014. “Global Supply Chain Capabilities in
Malaysian Textile and Apparel Industry.” ojs.excelingtech.co.uk accessed on March 16, 2017
http://ojs.excelingtech.co.uk/index.php/IJSCM/article/viewFile/917/pdf

136

Leftwich, Adrian. 1995. “Bringing politics back in: Towards a model of the developmental
state.” The Journal of Development Studies 31(3):400-427
Leitch, Barbara. 1989. “Thailand: A country study.” cdn.loc.gov. accessed on January 03, 2017
https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/th/thailandcountrys00lepo/thailandcountrys00lepo.pdf
Leith, Clark and Söderling, Ludvig, 2000. “Ghana: Long Term Growth, Atrophy, and
Recovery.” oecd.org. accessed on December 12, 2016
https://www.oecd.org/countries/ghana/2674846.pdf
Leng, Khor. 2014. “The Political Tussle over FELDA Land Schemes-UMNO Strengthens its
Malay Rural Fortress in 13th General Election.” Kajian Malaysia 32(2):89–121
Lewin, Michael. 2011. “Botswana’s Success: Good Governance, Good Policies, and Good
Luck.” siteresources.worldbank.org accessed on September 28, 2017
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/AFRICAEXT/Resources/258643-1271798012256/Botswanasuccess.pdf
Lewis, Martin. 1962. “One Hundred Million Frenchmen: The “Assimilation” Theory in French
Colonial Policy.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 4(02): 129-153
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0010417500001304
Library of Congress. 2010. “Africana Collection: List of Sub-Saharan African Countries.”
loc.gov accessed on April 30, 2016 https://www.loc.gov/rr/amed/guide/afr-countrylist.html
Lim, Hai. 2002. “Electoral Politics in Malaysia: ‘Managing’ Elections in a Plural Society.”
aceproject.org accessed on March 21, 2017 http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/asia/MY/01361005.pdf
Linn, Zin. 2013. “Analysis: Burma’s natural resources curse.” asiancorrespondent.com accessed
on October 04, 2017 https://asiancorrespondent.com/2013/10/analysis-burmas-natural-resourcescurse/#kaBhWCQeI3BLUWGB.97
Loganathan Nanthakumar, Sukemi Muhammad and Sanusi Nur. 2010. “External Debt and
Macroeconomics Performance in Malaysia: Sustainable Or Not?” Global Economy and Finance
Journal 3(2):122 – 132
Lukama, MT. 2010. “Natural disasters in African countries: what can we learn about them?” The
Journal for Transdisciplinary Research in Southern Africa 6(2):478 – 495
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission. 2016. “Corruption Case- Local in Engineering and
Construction (An Investment Holding II - A Case Study).” sprm.gov.my accessed on January 12,
2017 http://www.sprm.gov.my/index.php/en/ace/knowledge/industry/construction/case-studies
Mandel, Robert. 2002. “Security and Natural Disasters.” journals.lib.unb.ca accessed on March
06, 2017 https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/396/636
137

Mansur Kasim, Mamalakis Markos and Idris Sidah. 2003. “Savings, Investment and FDI
Contribution to Malaysian Economic Growth in the Globalization Era.” International Business
and Economics Research 2(8): 1-14
Mark, Monica. 2015. “Ghana's top undercover journalist masters disguise to expose corruption.”
theguardian.com. accessed on May 16, 2016
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/24/anas-aremeya-anas-ghana-corruption
Martinez-Fernandez, Cristina and Powell, Marcus. 2009. “Employment and Skills Strategies in
Southeast Asia Setting the Scene.” oecd.org. accessed on October 07, 2017
https://www.oecd.org/indonesia/45592999.pdf
Marwala, Tshilidzi. 2006. “Foundations for a Developmental State: A case for technical
education.” arxiv.org. accessed on August 01, 2015
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/0907/0907.2019.pdf
Mauzy, Diane. 2009. “After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial
and Post-communist States.” press.umich.edu. accessed on May 21,2016
https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098985-ch3.pdf
Mazrui, Ali and Tidy, Michael. 1984. Nationalism and New States in Africa. London:
Heinemann Educational Books
Meadows, Donella. 1988. “Singapore Leads the Good Life under a Benevolent Dictator.”
donellameadows.org accessed on January 03, 2017
http://donellameadows.org/archives/singapore-leads-the-good-life-under-a-benevolent-dictator/
Meesook Kanitta, Lee Houng, Liu Olin, Khatri Yougesh, Tamirisa Natalia, Moore Michael and
Krysl Mark. 2001. “Malaysia: From Crisis to Recovery.” imf.org accessed on March 14, 2017
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/nft/op/207/
Meng, Joyce. 2004. “Ghana’s Development: Miracle or Mirage?” joycemeng.com. accessed on
August 02,2015 http://www.joycemeng.com/writings/ghana.pdf
Mensah, A. H. 1998. “Ghana’s Privatization Policy: Rationale, Problems and Prospects.”
Journal of African Finance and Economic Development 1 (3): 105-134
Meyer, Richard and Nagarajan, Geetha. 1999. “Rural Financial Markets in Asia: Policies,
Paradigms and Performance.” adb.org. accessed on January 21, 2017
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28030/rural-financial-markets-asia.pdf
Miescher, Stephan. 2012. “Building the City of the Future: Visions and Experiences of
Modernity in Ghana’s Akosombo Township.” The Journal of African History 53 (03): 367-390

138

Mills, Wallace. 2017. “Africa in the Twentieth Century: African Socialism.” Smufacweb.smu.ca. accessed on December 11, 2017 http://smufacweb.smu.ca/~wmills/course317/10African_Socialism.html
Ministry Of Education. 2017. “Policy Documents: Ministry Of Education.” moe.gov.gh.
accessed on March 11, 2017 http://www.moe.gov.gh/site/policy
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 2015. “Minerals Commission: Artisanal and Small
Scale Mining (ASM).” mofep.gov.gh accessed on April 14, 2017
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/ASM%20FRAMEWORK.pdf
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 2016. “Ghana’s Turnaround Story” mofep.gov.gh
accessed on April 09, 2017
http://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/reports/Ghana%20Investor%20Presentation%20on%20the%20'State%20of%20the%20Economy'.pdf
Ministry of Finance. 2017. “2017 Budget Statement and Economic Policy.” mofep.gov.gh.
accessed on March 21, 2017 http://www.mofep.gov.gh/?q=content/2017-budget-statement-andeconomic-policy-1
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2001. “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa.”
archive.unu.edu. accessed on August 21, 2015
http://archive.unu.edu/hq/academic/Pg_area4/Mkandawire.html
Morbid, Listicles. 2015. “6 Assassinations of African leaders (that were caught on film).”
owaahh.com. accessed on December 14, 2017 http://owaahh.com/6-assassinations-of-africanleaders-that-were-caught-on-film/
Moreno, Antonio. 2012. “The Contribution of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah to the Struggle against
Imperialism.” anti-imperialism.com accessed on June 02, 2016 https://antiimperialism.com/2012/10/31/the-contribution-of-dr-kwame-nkrumah-to-the-struggle-againstimperialism/
Mueller, Dennis. 1996. “Constitutional Democracy.” pdf.usaid.gov accessed on March 19, 2017
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaby432.pdf
Mun, Har. 2007. “Malaysian Economic Development: Issues and Debate.” harwaimun.com.
accessed on May 21, 2016 http://www.harwaimun.com/malaysian_economics_development.pdf
Muslim Nazri, Hassan Wan and Umar Azizi. 2013. “The Role of the Malay Royal Institutions
According to the Constitution in Safeguarding Malay Position from the Higher Education
Perspective.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3(13): 267-272
Mutume, Gumisai. 2007. “Africa aims for a scientific revolution: More funding needed for
research institutes and universities.” un.org. accessed on October 14, 2017
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/october-2007/africa-aims-scientific-revolution
139

Namasaka, Martin. 2014. “Rich but poor: Exorcising Africa’s resource curse.” blogs.lse.ac.uk
accessed on August 30, 2017 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2015/03/16/rich-but-poorexorcising-africas-resource-curse/
National Automotive Workshop Administration Malaysia. 2016. “Economic Transformation
Programme (ETP).” nawam.com accessed on June 04, 2016 http://www.nawam.com.my/atom2/products
National Broadcasting Corporation. 2017. “United Nations General Assembly High Rollers.”
youtube.com accessed on October 10, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CEHrA_Usqsg
National Commission on Culture. 2009. “The famous Seven Year Development Plan of Dr.
Kwame Nkrumah.” ghanaculture.gov.gh accessed on January 03, 2018
http://www.ghanaculture.gov.gh/modules/mod_pdf.php?archiveid=1600
National Development Planning Commission. 2010. “Medium-term National Development
Policy Framework: Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA), 2010-2013.”
amazonaws.com accessed on January 09, 2017 https://s3.amazonaws.com/ndpcstatic/pubication/(GSGDA)+2010-2013_December+2010.pdf
National Development Planning Commission. 2012. “2010 Ghana Millennium Development
Goals Report.” gh.undp.org accessed on January 03, 2017
http://www.gh.undp.org/content/dam/ghana/docs/Doc/Inclgro/UNDP_GH_IG_2010MDGreport_
18102013.pdf
National Development Planning Commission. 2015. “History of Development Planning in
Ghana; The First Development Ghana.” amazonaws.com. accessed on December 26, 2016
https://s3.amazonaws.com/ndpcstatic/CACHES/NEWS/2015/07/26//HistoryofDevPlanGh.pdf
National Key Results Area. 2013. “Certified Integrity Officer Programme (CELO).”
newsdata2.bernama.com assessed on March 23, 2016
http://newsdata2.bernama.com/newsletter/nkva_v3/pdf/monitore-newsletternov.pdf
National Library Board Singapore. 2008. “Singapore Association of Trade Unions.”
eresources.nlb.gov. accessed on March 19, 2017
http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1237_2008-11-30.html
National Research Foundation. 2014. “Campus for Research Excellence and Technological
Enterprise: About the Campus.” create.edu.sg accessed on October 07, 2017
https://www.create.edu.sg/about-create/about-the-campus
Natural Resource Governance Institute. 2017. “Malaysia's Performance on the Resource
Governance Index.” resourcegovernance.org accessed on April 12, 2017
http://www.resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/malaysia

140

New York Times. 1964. “Nkrumah escapes Assassin 5th Time.” nytimes.com accessed on
December 07, 2017 http://www.nytimes.com/1964/01/03/nkrumah-escapes-assassin-5thtime.html
NG, Charlotte. 2008. “The Developmental State and Economic Development.” e-ir.info.
accessed on August 05, 2015 http://www.e-ir.info/2008/06/15/the-developmental-state-andeconomic-development/
Nischalke, Tobias. 2000. “Insights from ASEAN's Foreign Policy Co-operation: The “ASEAN
Way", a Real Spirit or a Phantom?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 22 (1): 89-112
Noordin, Shaikh and Keng, Lim. 2008. “An Overview of Malaysian Legal System and
Research.” nyulawglobal.org. accessed on March 12, 2017
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Malaysia.html
Norkevičius, Mindaugas, 2014. “Regional Institutionalism in Southeast Asia.” mruni.eu assessed
on October 01, 2017 https://www.mruni.eu/upload/iblock/510/SMS-14-6-1-06.pdf
North, Douglass.1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Norton Rose Fulbright. 2016. “Business ethics and anti-corruption laws: Malaysia.”
nortonrosefulbright.com accessed on January 13, 2017
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/121097/business-ethics-and-anticorruption-laws-malaysia
Nourbakhshian Mohammad, Hosseini Sepehr, Aghapour Ali and Gheshmi Reza. 2012. “The
Contribution of Foreign Direct Investment into Home Country’s Development.” International
Journal of Business and Social Science 3(2):275-287
Observatory of Economic Complexity. 2017. “Malaysia: Econ Complexity, Exports, Imports and
GDP per capita.” atlas.media.mit.edu accessed on April 03, 2017
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/mys/
Odutayo, Aramide. 2015. “Conditional Development: Ghana Crippled by Structural Adjustment
Programmes.” e-ir.info accessed on April 27, 2016 http://www.e-ir.info/2015/03/01/conditionaldevelopment-ghana-crippled-by-structural-adjustment-programmes/
Ofori, Emmanuel. 2009. “Taxation of the Informal Sector in Ghana. A Critical Examination.”
ir.knust.edu.gh accessed on April 03, 2017
http://ir.knust.edu.gh/bitstream/123456789/583/1/Emmanuel%20G.%20Ofori.pdf
Oh, John. 1967. “The Federation of Malaysia: An Experiment in Nation-Building.” The
American Journal of Economics and Sociology 26 (4): 425-37

141

Okafor, Samuel. 1973. “Reviewed Works: The Warrant Chiefs: Indirect Rule in Southeastern
Nigeria, 1891-1929 by A. E. Afigbo; The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase,
1898-1914 by T. N. Tamuno.” The Journal of Modern African Studies. 11(3): 487-89
Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi. 2007. “Want to help Africa? Do business here.” ted.com accessed on
October 05, 2017 https://www.ted.com/speakers/ngozi_okonjo_iweala
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2010. “Singapore: Rapid
Improvement Followed by Strong Performance.” oecd.org accessed on October 08, 2017
https://www.oecd.org/countries/singapore/46581101.pdf
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. “Recommendation of the
Council on Regulatory and Governance.” oecd.org. accessed on February 23, 2017
http://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2017. “Inclusive Growth.” oecd.org.
accessed on December 12, 2017 http://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/
Owusu-Amoah, David. 2015. “Planning for a Nation’s Economic and Social Development: The
Journey from Guggisberg Economy to the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda
(GSGDA).” ghana.gov.gh. accessed on August 11, 2015.
http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/features/1323-planning-for-a-%20nation-seconomic-and-social-development-the-journey-from-guggisberg-economy-to-the-ghana-sharedgrowth-and-development-agenda-gsgda
Owusu-Dabo E, Lewis S, McNeill A, Anderson S, Gilmore A and Britton J. 2009. “Smoking in
Ghana: a review of tobacco industry activity.” ncbi.nlm.gov. accessed on August 08, 2015
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2679188/
Page, John, 2014. “Africa’s Failure to Industrialize: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?” brookings.edu.
accessed on March 06, 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/11/20/africasfailure-to-industrialize-bad-luck-or-bad-policy/
Panford, Kwamina. 1992. “Reviewed Work: Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery by
Donald Rothchild.” African Studies Review 35 (2): 112-114
Parliament of Malaysia. 2017. “Legislative Affairs Division: House of Representatives.”
parlimen.gov.my accessed on February 21, 2017 http://www.parlimen.gov.my/maklumat-umumsekretariat.html?&uweb=p&view=221&lang=en
Petras, J., Veltmeyer, H., Bowles, P., Invernizzi, N., Tang, K. and Cornelissen, S.2007. Regional
Perspectives on Globalization. England: Palgrave Macmillan.
Piei, Mohd and Tan, Tiangchye. 1999. “An Insight into Macroeconomic Policy Management and
Developments in Malaysia.” aric.adb.org. accessed on February 10, 2018
https://aric.adb.org/pdf/aem/external/financial_market/Malaysia/mal_mac.pdf
142

Popa, Adriana. 2010. “Ghanaians campaign for independence from British rule, 1949-1951.”
swarthmore.edu accessed on May 02, 2016
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ghanaians-campaign-independence-british-rule-19491951
Quartey, Peter. 2006. “The Textiles and Clothing Industry in Ghana.” library.fes.de. accessed on
August 05, 2015 http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/03796/10ghana.pdf
Quartey, Peter. 2010. “Price Stability and the Growth Maximizing Rate of Inflation for Ghana.”
file.scirp.org. accessed on February 09, 2018
https://file.scirp.org/pdf/ME20100300008_95141050.pdf
Quartey, Peter and Afful-Mensah, Gloria. 2014. “Financial and monetary policies in Ghana: A
review of recent trends.” Review of Development Finance 4(2): 115-125
Qiu, Weini. 2012. “ Ghana’s Regional Development in Economics, Education and Natural
Resource, with a Case Study on Customers’ Preferences for Household Water Treatment and
Safe Storage Products.” web.mit.edu accessed on March 14, 2017
http://web.mit.edu/watsan/Docs/Student%20Theses/Ghana/2012/weini-qei-Thesis-Complete.pdf
Rabushka, Alvin and Shepsle, Kenneth. 1972. “Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of
Democratic Instability.” stanford.edu accessed on June 01, 2016
http://web.stanford.edu/~rabushka/politics%20in%20plural%20societies.pdf
Radetzki, Marian. 2006. “The anatomy of three commodity booms.” radetzki.biz. accessed on
November 13, 2016 http://radetzki.biz/rapporter/ThreeBooms_71.pdf
Rajeev. 2015. “Political System in Developing Countries.” ijecbs.com accessed on January 11,
2017 http://www.ijecbs.com/January2015/2.pdf
Rani, Osman and Haflan, Mohd. 1990. “Malaysia’s Industrialization and Trade: Issues, Options
and Strategies.” Jurnal Ekonomi Malaysia 21(22):13-44
Rankin, Keith. 2011. “Mercantilist Reasoning in Economic Policy Making.” nzae.org. accessed
on April 02, 2016 http://nzae.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2011/Session5/57_Rankin.pdf
Rashid, Zakariah and Elameer, Ahmad. 1999. “Sources of Industrial Growth using the Factor
Decomposing Approach: Malaysia 1978-87.” The Developing Economies 37(2):162-96
Razali, Norazlan. 2013. “Malaysian Anti-Corruption Governance and Initiatives.”
iceaustralia.com accessed on December 10, 2016
https://www2.iceaustralia.com/ei/images/APSACC13/ppt/Mr%20Norazlan%20Mohd%20Razali.
pdf

143

Reid, Anthony. 2010. “Malaysia/Singapore as immigration societies.” Asia Research Institute
working paper Series No. 141 assessed on May 29, 2016
http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/wps/wps10_141.pdf
Richmond Antwi-Bediako. 2018. “Chiefs and nexus of challenges in land deals: An insight into blame
perspectives, exonerating chiefs during and after Jatropha investment in Ghana.” cogentoa.com accessed
on July 12, 2018 https://www.cogentoa.com/article/10.1080/23311886.2018.1456795

Rieffel, Lex. 2008. “Suharto’s Legacy and the Future of Indonesia.” brookings.edu accessed on
October 11, 2017 https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/suhartos-legacy-and-the-future-ofindonesia/
Rijksmuseum. 2017. “Timeline Dutch History: 1820-1950 Indonesia and decolonization.”
rijksmuseum.nl accessed on August 30, 2017
https://www.rijksmuseum.nl/en/rijksstudio/timeline-dutch-history/1820-1950-indonesia-anddecolonisation
Rinehart, Ian. 2015. “Malaysia: Background and U.S. Relations.” fas.org. accessed on May 21,
2016 https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43505.pdf
Ritchie, Bryan. 2004. “Politics and Economic Reform in Malaysia.” umich.edu. accessed on
August 08, 2015
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/40041/wp655.pdf?sequence=3
Robinson James, Torvik Ragnar and Verdier Thierry. 2006. “Political foundations of the
resource curse.” Journal of Development Economics 79(2):447–468
Róbinson Rojas Archive. 2014. “The Spread of Development Planning.” rrojasdatabank.info
accessed on August 09, 2015 http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/devplan/dplan69p52-68.pdf
Rodriquez-Pose, Andre. 2013. “Do institutions Matter for Regional Development?” Regional
Studies, Regional Science 47(7):1034-1047
Rosegrant, Mark and Hazell, Peter. 2000. “Transforming The Rural Asian Economy: The
Unfinished Revolution.” adb.org. accessed on January 09, 2017
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28034/transforming-rural-asian-economy.pdf
Roslan, Abdul- Hakim. 2001. “Income Inequality, Poverty and Development Policy in
Malaysia.”ged.ubordeaux. accessed on August 11, 2015 http://ged.ubordeaux4.fr/SBROSLAN.pdf
Rostow, Walt. 1960. “The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.” ou.edu
accessed on January 09, 2017
https://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/articles/IntPol/Rostow.1960.Ch2.pdf
Rothchild, Donald. 1991. Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery. Boulde: Lynne Rienner
Publishers
144

Rudolph, Lloyd and Rudolph, Susanne. 1966. “Rajputana under British Paramountcy: The
Failure of Indirect Rule.” The Journal of Modern History 38(2): 138-160
Sachs, Jeffrey and Warner, Andrew. 2001. “The curse of natural resources.” European Economic
Review 45 (4–6):827–838
Saraceno, Francesco. 2014. “Enhancing legitimacy of multiparty-institutions through political
expertise: Democratic transition of Benin and Ghana.” ecpr.eu. accessed on June 02, 2016
https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/646c4b43-74da-47fc-a43f-61d03db9f1be.pdf
Savage Victor, Kong Lily and Yeoh Brenda. 1994. “The Human Geography of Southeast Asia:
An Analysis of Post-War Developments.” Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 14(2) 229–
251
Serra, Gerardo. 2013. “Continental Visions: Ann Seidman, Reginald H. Green and the Radical
Economics of African Unity.”duke.edu. accessed on August 05, 2015
http://econ.duke.edu/uploads/media_items/gerardo-serra-hope-seminar-continentalvisions.original.pdf
Shillington, Kevin. 1994. Ghana and the Rawlings Factor. London: Oxford University Press.
Short, Emile. 2015. “Empowering Ghana's Anti-corruption Institutions in The Fight against
Corruption.” africaportal.org. accessed on July 29, 2017
https://www.africaportal.org/publications/empowering-ghanas-anti-corruption-institutions-inthe-fight-against-corruption/
Shuib Md, Saludin Mohamad, Feigenblatt Otto, Keling Mohamad and Ajis Mohd. 2010. “The
Role of Malaysian Leaders in Nation Building Process (1957-2003).” astonjournals .com.
accessed on June 04, 2016 http://astonjournals.com/manuscripts/Vol2010/ASSJ-3_Vol2010.pdf
Snodgrass, Donald. 1995. “Successful Economic Development in a Multi-Ethnic Society: The
Malaysian Case.” earth.columbia.edu accessed on June 04, 2016
http://earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/about/director/pubs/503.pdf
Solomon Charis, Islam Aminul and Bakar Rosni. 2015. “Attracting Foreign Direct Investment:
The Case of Malaysia.” International Business Management 9(4):349-357
South African History Online. 2011. “Organization of African Unity Timeline 1884-2000: The
Emergence of a Pan-African Rhetoric.” sahistory.org.za accessed on December 09, 2017
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/organisation-african-unity-oau
Sovacool, Benjamin. 2010. “The Political Economy of Oil and Gas in Southeast Asia: Heading
towards the Natural Resource Curse?” The Pacific Review 2010 (23): 225–259

145

Steer, Liesbet. 2011. “Ghana’s sustained agricultural growth: Putting underused resources to
work.” developmentprogress.org accessed on April 29, 2016
http://www.developmentprogress.org/sites/developmentprogress.org/files/ghana_report-full.pdf
Stiglitz, Joseph. 2001. “Redefining the Role of the State: Building a Post Washington
Consensus.” World Economics 2(3): 45-86
Stiglitz, Joseph and Uy, Marilou. 1996. “Financial Markets, Public Policy, and the East Asian
Miracle.” World Bank Research Observer 11(2): 249 – 276
Stratfor, Worldview. 2017. “The IMF and the World Bank Bow toward Malaysia.” stratfor.com
accessed on February 14, 2017 https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/imf-and-world-bank-bowtoward-malaysia
Stubbs, Richard. 1999. “War and Economic Development: Export-Oriented Industrialization in
East and Southeast Asia.” Comparative Politics 31 (3): 337-355
Stuchtey, Benedikt. 2011. “Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450–1950.” ieg-ego.eu accessed on
March 24, 2016 http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/backgrounds/colonialism-and-imperialism/benediktstuchtey-colonialism-and-imperialism-1450-1950
Subira, Larissa. 2011. “A Developmental State in Africa: What can policy makers in Africa learn
from the idea of Developmental State?” wiredspace.wits.ac.za accessed on February 03, 2018
http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10539/10299/A%20Developmental%20State%20in
%20Africa.%20doc.pdf?sequ
Suwannathat-Pian, Kobkua. 2009. “British Colonial Rule, Japanese Occupation, and the
Transformation of Malay Kinship 1930s-1957.” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies 11 (1):
106-31
TED Case Studies. 2013. “How I name, shamed and jail.” ted.com. accessed on May 16, 2016
https://www.ted.com/talks/anas_aremeyaw_anas_how_i_named_shamed_and_jailed
TED Case Studies. 2015. “Tin Mining in Malaysia - Present and Future.” american.edu.
accessed on August 01, 2015 http://www1.american.edu/ted/tin.htm
Teik, Khoo. 2005. “Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance in the Public Sector: Malaysian
Experiences.” unrisd.org. accessed on June 10, 2016
http://www.unrisd.org/80256B3C005BCCF9/(httpAuxPages)/19309421DF6D65D3C12570FA0
0392E12/$file/Khoo%20(small).pdf
Thiboutot, Monika. 2006. “Cures to Stalled Development: Causes and Solutions to Economic
Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa.” ucf.edu. accessed on May 29, 2016
http://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1770&context=etd

146

Thomas, Tommy. 2007. “The Social Contract: Malaysia’s Constitutional Covenant.”
tommythomas.net accessed on May 29, 2015 http://tommythomas.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/11/politics-MLC.pdf
Tirivangani, Augustine. 2016. “Dancing in the Dust and ideology of white supremacy: How
Apartheid was born in South Africa.” thepatriot.co.zw accessed on December 10, 2017
https://www.thepatriot.co.zw/old_posts/dancing-in-the-dust-and-ideology-of-white-supremacypart-two-how-apartheid-was-born-in-south-africa/
The African Capacity Building Foundation. 2002. “Africa: Major Development Challenges and
their Capacity Building Dimensions.” africaportal.org. accessed on October 16, 2017
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/36485/1/OP%201%202002.pdf?1
The Commonwealth. 2017. “Malaysia: History.” thecommonwealth.org accessed on September
22, 2017 http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/malaysia/history
The Economist Newspaper Limited. 2017. “Lee Kuan Yew, The wise man of the East:
Authoritarians draw the wrong lessons from Lee Kuan Yew’s success in Singapore.”
economist.com accessed on October 11, 2017
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21647282-authoritarians-draw-wrong-lessons-leekuan-yews-success-singapore-wise-man
Toye, John and Toye, Richard. 2003. “The Origins and Interpretation of the Prebisch-Singer
Thesis.” History of Political Economy.35 (3): 437-467
Tracy, James. 1990. The Rise of Merchant Empires Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern
World, 1350-1750. New York: Cambridge University Press
Trading Economics. 2017. “Ghana Government Budget.” tradingeconomics.com accessed on
March 21, 2017 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/ghana/government-budget
Trading Economics. 2017. “Indonesia Inflation rate.” tradingeconomics.com accessed on
October 14, 2017 https://tradingeconomics.com/indonesia/inflation-cpi
Trading Economics. 2017. “Malaysia Government Budget.” tradingeconomics.com accessed on
December 12, 2016 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/government-budget
Trading Economics. 2017. “Malaysia Corruption Rank.” tradingeconomics.com accessed on
March 12, 2017 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malaysia/corruption-rank
Transparency International. 2016. “Corruption Perceptions Index 2015.” transparency.org
accessed on March 03, 2017 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015
Transparency International. 2016. “Overview of Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Ghana.”
transparency.org accessed on January 14, 2017

147

http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption_in
_ghana
Uddin, Shahzad and Tsamenyi, Mathew. 2005. “Public sector reforms and the public interest: A
case study of accounting control changes and performance monitoring in a Ghanaian state‐owned
enterprise", Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 18(5): 648 – 674
United Nations. 1970. “United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Federation of
Malaya, North Borneo, Sarawak and Singapore.” treaties.un.org. accessed on June 20, 2016
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20750/volume-750-i-10760-english.pdf
United Nations. 2005. “Malaysia: Public Administration, Country Profile.” unpan1.un.org
accessed on April 15, 2017
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan023317.pdf
United Nations. 2017. “UN report finds 90 per cent of disasters are weather-related.” un.org.
accessed on March 22, 2017 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=52627
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2007. “Economic Development in
Africa: Reclaiming Policy Space, Domestic Resource Mobilization and Developmental State.”
unctad.org accessed on January 08, 2017 http://unctad.org/en/Docs/aldcafrica2007_en.pdf
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2015. “ASEAN Investment Report
2015: Infrastructure Investment and Connectivity.” unctad.org accessed on October 10, 2017
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_asean_air2015d1.pdf
United Nations Development Programme. 2016. “Briefing note for countries on the 2016 Human
Development Report: Myanmar.” hdr.undp.org accessed on October 13, 2017
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/MMR.pdf
United Nations Development Programme. 2017. “What are the Sustainable Development
Goals?” gh.undp.org accessed on March 03, 2017
http://www.gh.undp.org/content/ghana/en/home/sustainable-development-goals.html
United Nations Office of Drug and Crime. 2016. “Malaysia targeting corruption to fight
environmental crimes.” unodc.org accessed on March 30, 2017
https://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/2016/04/malaysia-environmentalcrimes/story.html
United State Department of State. 2011 “Malaysia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2011.” us.state.gov. accessed on February 14, 2017 https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/186496.pdf
United State Department of State. 2017. “Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor:
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016.” us.state.gov accessed on January 11,
2017 https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper
148

United State Geological Survey. 2017. “Mineral Resources Program: Data and Information.”
minerals.usgs.gov. accessed on March 21, 2017 https://minerals.usgs.gov/
United State Foreign Disaster Assistance. 1983. “Disaster Case Report: Ghana-Food Shortage.”
usaid.gov. accessed on November 09, 2017 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAB318.pdf
United State Library of Congress. 2017. “French Rule until World War II: Evolution of Colonial
Policy.” countrystudies.us. accessed on September 12, 2017 http://countrystudies.us/ivorycoast/7.htm
University of California. 2008. “What Are Primary Sources?” lib.uci.edu. accessed on January
12, 2018 https://www.lib.uci.edu/what-are-primary-sources
USAGold. 2017. “World Gold Production by Country: Top ten producers, in metric tonnes 2004
– 2015.” usagold.com accessed on April 06, 2017
http://www.usagold.com/reference/globalgoldproduction.html
Volta Aluminum Company Limited. 2016. “History: Birth of VALCO.” valcotema.com accessed
on May 11, 2016 http://www.valcotema.com/history.html
Vondee, Joana. 2011. “Aid as a Catalyst to Endogenous Drivers of Development and Change?”
iss.nl assessed on May 11, 2016
http://www.iss.nl/fileadmin/ASSETS/iss/Documents/PhD_Abstracts_and_theses/Vondee_Dissert
ation_Design_03.pdf
Wade, Robert. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in
East Asian Industrialization. New Jersey: Princeton University Press
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. “The Modern World-System.” thebasebk.org. accessed on
November 16, 2016 https://thebasebk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-Modern-WorldSystem.pdf
Wall Street Journal. 2017. “Malaysia Corruption Scandal, 1MDB and Najib Razak: Malaysia
Controversy.” wsj.com. accessed on January 03, 2017
http://www.wsj.com/specialcoverage/malaysia-controversy
Watson, Eric. 2015. “Lee Kuan Yew and The Curious Legacies of “Benevolent Dictators”
thepolicywire.com accessed on March 23, 2017 http://thepolicywire.com/lee-kuan-yew-thecurious-legacies-of-benevolent-dictators/
Whah, Chin. 2010. “Towards Inter-Ethnic Business Development and National Unity in
Malaysia.” qeh.ox.ac.uk accessed on May 29, 2016
http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/crisewps/workingpaper73.pdf
Whah, Chin and Guan, Benny. 2015. “Malaysia’s Protracted Affirmative Action Policy and the
Evolving Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community.” .iseas.edu. accessed on May
149

09,2016
https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ISEAS%20Economics%20Working%20Paper%20201503.pdf
Williams, Tracy. 2009. “An African Success Story: Ghana’s Cocoa Marketing System.” Institute
of Professional Studies 2009 (318):1-49
Worker Rights Consortium. 2013. “Labor Rights Violations in Vietnam’s Export Manufacturing
Sector.” usfashionindustry.com accessed on December 23, 2016
http://www.usfashionindustry.com/pdf_files/WRC-Report-Vietnam.pdf
Workman, Daniel. 2017. “Malaysia’s Top 10 Exports.” worldstopexports.com accessed on
March 29, 2017 http://www.worldstopexports.com/malaysias-top-10-exports/
World Atlas. 2016. “Leading Tin Producing Countries in The World.” worldatlas.com accessed
on April 17, 2017 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/leading-tin-producing-countries-in-theworld.html
World Atlas. 2016. “Top Gold Producing Countries in the World.” worldatlas.com accessed on
April 15, 2017 http://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-14-gold-producers-in-the-world.html
World Bank. 1993. “The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy.”
documents.worldbank.org accessed on March 01, 2017
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/975081468244550798/pdf/multi-page.pdf
World Bank. 1993. “The Population, Agriculture and Environment Nexus in Sub-Saharan
Africa.” documents.worldbank.org accessed on December 19, 2016
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/813911468008453377/pdf/multi-page.pdf
World Bank. 2007. “Disasters, Climate Change, and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan
Africa Lessons and Future Directions.” ieg.worldbankgroup.org accessed on October 12, 2017
https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/reports/disasters_climate.pdf
World Bank. 2008. “Regional trade blocs: Merchandise exports within bloc.”
siteresources.worldbank.org. accessed on February 14, 2017
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/2390541187893756753/wdItable6_6_2008.pdf
World Bank. 2009. “IDA at Work Ghana’s Concerns—IDA’s Priorities.”
siteresources.worldbank.org accessed on February 23, 2017
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/IDA-Ghana.pdf
World Bank. 2015. “World Data Bank: World Development Indicators.” worldbank.org.
accessed on August 01, 2015,
http://databank.worldbank.org/data//reports.aspx?source=2&country=SRB&series=&period=

150

World Bank. 2017. “Anti-Corruption Authority, Profile: Ghana.” acauthorities.org. accessed on
March 02, 2017 https://www.acauthorities.org/country/ghana
World Bank. 2017. “FELDA Land Settlement Project (06).” projects.worldbank.org. accessed
on December 28, 2017 http://projects.worldbank.org/P004251/felda-land-settlement-project06?lang=en&tab=overview
World Bank. 2017. “Malaysia Economic Monitor, June 2013: Harnessing Natural Resources.”
worldbank.org accessed on March 30, 2017
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/publication/malaysia-economic-monitor-june2013-harnessing-natural-resources
World Bank. 2017. “Where We Work, Malaysia: Overview.” worldbank.org accessed on March
20, 2017 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malaysia/overview
World Ecology Report. 2008. “Special Focus: Famine: Natural or Man Made?” worldinfo.org
accessed on October 01, 2017 http://worldinfo.org/wpcontent/uploads/library/wer/english/2008_Winter_Vol_XX_no_4.pdf
World Economic Forum. 2016. “The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016.”
reports.weforum.org. accessed on November 14, 2016 http://reports.weforum.org/globalcompetitiveness-report-2015-2016/
World Facts US. 2008. “Facts about Malaysia.” worldfacts.us. accessed on June 04, 2017
http://worldfacts.us/Malaysia.htm
World Gold Council. 2015. “Gold Facts: Ghana.” goldfacts.org. accessed on August 08, 2015
http://www.goldfacts.org/en/economic_impact/countries/ghana/
World Trade Organization. 2017. “DS58: United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products.” wto.org accessed on March 16, 2017
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds58_e.htm
World Trade Organization. 2017. “Ghana: Trade Profile.” stat.wto.org. accessed on March 22,
2017 http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Country=GH
World Trade Organization. 2017. “Understanding the WTO: the Agreements, Agriculture, fairer
markets for farmers.” wto.org. accessed on April 02, 2017
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm
World Trade Organization. 2017. “Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Membership,
alliances and bureaucracy.” wto.org. accessed on March 16, 2017
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm
Yeoh, Brenda. 2005. “The Global Cultural City? Spatial Imagineering and Politics in the (Multi)
cultural Marketplaces of South-east Asia” Urban Studies 42 (5/6): 945–958
151

Yergin, Daniel and Stanislaw, Joseph. 1998. “Commanding Height: Kwame Nkrumah (18891979).” pbs.org. accessed on December 12, 2017
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/prof_kwamenkrumah.html
Yin, Sam.2003. “Economic Growth and Social Performance in Singapore.” choonyin.tripod.com.
accessed on March 14, 2017 http://choonyin.tripod.com/economicgrowth/
Yoshino, Naoyuki and Nakahigashi, Masaki. 2000. “The Role of Infrastructure in Economic
Development: (Preliminary Version)” econ.keio.ac.jp accessed on January 15, 2017
http://econ.keio.ac.jp/staff/dikamiya/pdf00/seminar/1205.pdf
Young, Arthur. 1989. “Macroeconomic Assessment of Ghana’s Economic Recovery Program
and its Impact on Private Sector Development.” usaid.gov accessed on June 01, 2016
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABH480.pdf
Youngblood, Curtis. 2000. “Instruments of Monetary Policy in Ghana.” pdf.usaid.gov accessed
on February 13, 2018 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacu159.pdf
Yusoff, Mohamad and Awang, Azmi. 2009. “Democratic Reforms in Malaysia: Where it’s
heading to?” Paper presented at the XXI IPSA World Congress of Political Science, to be held
July 12-16, 2009 in Santiago, Chile ipsa.org accessed on May 29,2016
http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_1052.pdf
Yusoff Mohammed, Hasan Fauziah and Jalil Suhaila. 2000. “Globalization, Economic Policy,
and Equity: The Case of Malaysia.” oecd.org accessed on January 29, 2017
http://www.oecd.org/countries/malaysia/2682426.pdf
Yusof, Zainal and Bhattasali, Deepak. 2008. “Economic Growth and Development in Malaysia:
Policy Making and Leadership.” worldbank.org. Growth commission .org working paper
27(2008):1-76
Zagel, Marija. 2010. “Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Processes and Obstacles
Case Studies: Ghana, Nigeria, DR Congo.” bg.ac.rs. accessed on May 30, 2016
https://www.bg.ac.rs/files/sr/studije/studije-uni/radovi/MasterRadMarijaZagel.pdf

152

Appendix: Tables and Figures: Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Figure 1: Geographical location of Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization (2011)
Note: 1. Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are painted in green
2. Ghana and Malaysia are painted in yellow

153

Figure 1A: GDP per Capita (constant 2005 US$) Malaysia and Ghana

GDP per Capita (constant 2005 US$)
8000.00
7000.00
6000.00
5000.00

Ghana

4000.00

Malaysia
3000.00
2000.00
1000.00
0.00
1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Source: Extracted from World Development Indicators (WDI) 2015

154

2020

Table 1: Economic Indicators of Southeast Asia
Country
SERIES
1960
1970
Rural
73.40
66.55
Malaysia
population
(% of total
population)
Rural
81.45
78.49
SEA
population
(% of total
population)
Urban
26.60
33.45
Malaysia
population
(% of total)
Urban
17.79
21.51
SEA
population
(% of total)
Agricultural67 51.83
50.05
Malaysia
raw materials
exports (% of
merchandise
exports)
Agricultural
39.56
34.07
SEA
raw materials
exports (% of
merchandise
exports)
Food exports 9.42
12.64
Malaysia
(% of
merchandise
exports)
Food exports 24.85
24.45
SEA
(% of
merchandise
exports)
Manufactures 5.18
6.55
Malaysia
exports (% of
merchandise
exports)
Manufactures 10.01
10.86
SEA
exports (% of
merchandise
exports)
67

1980
57.96

1990
50.21

2000
38.02

2010
29.09

2014
25.99

74.49

68. 34

61.79

55.43

52.91

42.04

49.79

61.98

70.91

74.01

25.51

31.66

38.21

44.57

47.09

31.00

13.80

2.61

2.64

14.34

5.70

1.95

2.82

15.05

11.66

5.54

11.90

14.51

12.18

6.33

8.92

18.75

53.78

80.43

67.20

22.30

57.77

78.70

65.55

Data available for Agriculture and Manufacturing exports start from 1962 instead of 1960

155

School enrollment,
secondary (% gross)
School enrollment,
SEA
secondary (% gross)
GDP per
$
Malaysia
capita
1,158.67
(constant
2005 US$)
GDP per
$
SEA
capita
1,167.52
(constant
2005 US$)
Source: World Bank (2016)
Malaysia

33.82

45.64

54.66

66.16

66.88

32.00

41.00

49.00

64.00

78.00

$
$
$
$
$
1,762.95 2,610.58 4,080.06 5,468.45 6,840.94

$
$
$
$
$
2,152.14 3,535.47 5,718.06 7,812.48 9,993.03

156

Table 1A: Economic Indicators of Sub-Saharan Africa
COUNT SERIES
1960 1970
RY
Rural population (% of total
76.7 71.04
Ghana
population)
5
Rural population (% of total
85.2 80.76
SSA
population)
7
Urban population (% of total) 23.2 28.96
Ghana
5
Urban population (% of total)
6.23 10.56
SSA
Agricultural raw materials
12.3 8.66
Ghana
exports (% of merchandise
0
exports)
Agricultural raw materials
23.3 18.77
SSA
exports (% of merchandise
0
exports)
Food exports (% of
72.9 77.75
Ghana
merchandise exports)
1
Food
exports
(%
of
62.9 48.42
SSA
merchandise exports)
6
Manufactures exports (% of
0.95 0.47
Ghana
merchandise exports)
Manufactures exports (% of
4.15 4.17
SSA
merchandise exports)
School enrollment, secondary (%
43.09
Ghana
gross)
School enrollment, secondary (%
8.00
SSA
gross)
GDP per capita (constant 2005 $
$
Ghana
US$)
474. 459.93
45
GDP per capita (constant 2005 $
$
SSA
US$)
940. 1,401.
07
36
Source: World Bank (2016)

157

1980

1990

2000

2010

68.84

63.56

56.07

49.29

74.42

57.53

49.71

47.69

31.16

36.44

43.93

50.71

17.14
3.57

33.87
14.70

41.81
10.25

43.83
6.95

4.04

7.53

6.22

4.74

78.42

50.94

48.42

60.67

13.86

16.35

11.89

12.98

0.93

7.74

14.75

20.68

1.90

3.36

4.83

10.27

39.15

35.95

41.04

57.09

14.00

20.00

26.00

42.00

$
$
$
$
359.36 406.06 502.49 702.75
$
1,479.
25

$
1,506.
38

$
1,603.
82

$
1,841.
10

Table 2: Social Profile of Southeast Asia
Country
Income level
Colonizing
Name
Power

Independence
Day

Years of
Political
freedom

Type of
Government

Britain

23-Feb-84

31

France

09-Nov-53

62

Lower middle
income
Upper middle
income
Lower middle
income
Lower middle
income

Netherlands 17-Aug-45

70

Constitutional
Sultanate
Constitutional
Monarchy
Republic

Britain

31-Aug-57

58

Britain

4-Jan-48

67

4-Jul-46

69

High income

Spain,
United
States
Britain

31-Aug-63

52

Lower middle
Portugal
28-Nov-75
income
Upper middle
No Western 5-Dec-60
income
powers
Lower middle
France
2-Sep-45
Vietnam
income
Lower middle
France
22-Oct-53
Lao PDR
income
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2017); CIA (2016)

40

High income
Brunei
Darussalam
Low income
Cambodia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines

Singapore
TimorLeste
Thailand

158

55
70
62

Constitutional
Monarchy
Military
Authoritarian
Republic

Parliamentary
republic
Republic
Constitutional
Monarchy
Communist
State
Communist
State

Table 2A: Social Profile of Sub Saharan Africa
Country Income
Colonizing Independence
level
Power
day
Low
France
1-Aug-60
income
Britain
30-Sep-66
Botswana Upper
middle
income
Low
France
5-Aug-60
Burkina
income
Faso
Low
France
8-Nov-60
Chad
income
Lower
France
7-Aug-60
Cote
middle
d'Ivoire
income
Upper
France
17-Oct-60
Gabon
middle
income
Lower
Britain
6-Mar-57
Ghana
middle
income
Lower
Britain
12-Dec-63
Kenya
middle
income
Lower
Britain
4-Oct-66
Lesotho
middle
income
Low
Britain
6-Jul-64
Malawi
income
Low
France
3-Aug-60
Niger
income
Lower
Britain
1-Oct-60
Nigeria
middle
income
Upper
Britain
31-May-10
South
middle
Africa
income
Low
France
27-Apr-60
Togo
income
Source: World Bank (2016); CIA (2016)
Benin

159

Years of
Political
freedom
55

Type of
Government

49

Parliamentary
Republic

55
55

Parliamentary
Republic
Republic

55

Republic

55

Republic

58

Constitutional
Democracy

52

Republic

49

55

Parliamentary
constitutional
monarchy
Multiparty
democracy
Republic

55

Federal Republic

21

Republic

55

Republic

51

Republic

Table 3: Frequency of Insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
Frequency of
SEA
SSA
Frequency of Insurgence
insurgence
BRUNEI
1962
ETHIOPIA
1974-1977/ 1991/ 1994/1998
CAMBODIA

1970/1975/1979/19
97

GHANA

1966/1967/1972/ 1978/1979/1981

EAST TIMOR

1975-1999

NIGERIA

INDONESIA

1965/ 1966

KENYA

1966/1975/1976/1983/1985/1990/199
3
1970/1982/2007

LAOS

1959/1960/1964/19
65/1966/1973/1975

TANZANIA

1964/1980/1983/1988

MALAYSIA

1948-1960

SOUTH
AFRICA

1994/1983

MYANMAR/BU
RMA

1962/1988

SUDAN

1958/1959/1966/1969/1971/1975/197
6/1977/1981/1984/1985/1989/1990/1
991/1992/1996/2004

PHILIPPINES

19861990/2001/2003/20
06

BURKINA
FASO

1966/1980/1982/1983/1987/1989/201
4/2015

COTE
D'VOIRE

1980/1991/1995/1999/2001/2002

UGANDA

1966/1971/1974/1975/1979/1980/198
5/1986/1987

BOTSWANA

coup free zone from 1960-2015

THAILAND

VIETNAM
SINGAPORE
Source: CIA (2016)

1932/1971/1976/19
77/1981/1985/1991/
2006/2014
19451960/1963/1967/19
72
1948-1960/1961

160

Table 4: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Southeast Asia
Exporters
major exports
Exported
Exporte Exporters
Association
value in
d value
of South-East
2001
in 2010
Asian
Nations
(ASEAN)
Aggregation
$383,514,50 $1,051,7 Share in value in
6.3
(ASEAN)
1
93,527 world's exports,
Aggregatio
% in 2001
n
Singapore

Malaysia

Thailand

Refined
Petroleum , Integrated
Circuits, Computers ,Oxy
gen Amino Compounds ,
and Packaged
Medicaments
Refined
Petroleum , Petroleum
Gas, Palm
Oil , Integrated Circuits ,
and Computers
Computers , Rubber , Del
ivery Trucks , Refined
Petroleum , and Gold

Coal Briquettes ,
Petroleum Gas , Palm Oil
, Crude Petroleum and
Rubber
Broadcasting
Viet Nam
Equipment, Crude
Petroleum , Leather
Footwear, Computers ,
and Coffee
Philippines Integrated
Circuits , Computers , Se
miconductor
Devices ,Office Machine
Parts , and Electrical
Transformers
Crude
Brunei
Darussalam Petroleum , Petroleum
Gas , Acyclic
Alcohols ,Jewelry and Di
amonds
Indonesia

$121,753,78
9

$351,86 Share in value in
7,167 world's exports,
% in 2002

6.3

$88,004,487

$198,79 Share in value in
0,691 world's exports,
% in 2003

6.3

$64,919,226

$195,31 Share in value in
1,520 world's exports,
% in 2004

6.2

$56,316,867

$157,77 Share in value in
9,103 world's exports,
% in 2005

6.2

$15,029,192

$72,236, Share in value in
665 world's exports,
% in 2006

6.4

$32,150,203

$51,497, Share in value in
515 world's exports,
% in 2007

6.1

$3,508,207

$9,026,1 Share in value in
51 world's exports,
% in 2008

6.1

161

Myanmar

Cambodia

Lao
People's
Democratic
Republic

Petroleum Gas , Rough
Wood , Dried
Legumes , Non-Knit
Men's Coats ,
and Rubber
Postage Stamps, Knit
$1,499,274
Sweaters, Knit Women's
Suits, Non-Knit Women's
Suits and Non-Knit
Men's Suits
Refined Copper, Copper
$333,256
Ore, Rough Wood , NonKnit Men's Suits ,
and Sawn Wood
Average
$76,702,900

$7,625,2 Share in value in
37 world's exports,
% in 2009

6.5

$5,590,1 Share in value in
04 world's exports,
% in 2010

7

$2,069,3 Average
74

$191,23
5,187
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (2015) and Trade Map (2015)

162

6.34

Table 4A: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Sub-Saharan Africa
Exporters
major exports Exported
Exported
Exporters
Africa
value in
value in 2010
Aggregation
2001
$114,663,24 $495,794,239 Share in value in
1.9
Africa
9
world's exports, %
Aggregation
in 2001
petroleum and
$18,046,079
$86,567,913 Share in value in
1.8
Nigeria
petroleum
world's exports, %
products, cocoa,
in 2002
rubber
$25,997,549
$82,625,557 Share in value in
1.9
South Africa gold, diamonds,
platinum, other
world's exports, %
metals and
in 2003
minerals,
machinery and
equipment
cocoa, coffee,
$3,649,816
$10,283,509 Share in value in
1.8
Côte
timber,
world's exports, %
d'Ivoire
petroleum,
in 2004
cotton, bananas,
pineapples,
palm oil, fish
gold, cocoa,
$1,716,127
$5,233,390 Share in value in
2.1
Ghana
timber, tuna,
world's exports, %
bauxite,
in 2005
aluminum,
manganese ore,
diamonds,
horticulture
crude oil ,
$2,521,519
$8,556,428 Share in value in
2.5
Gabon
timber,
world's exports, %
manganese,
in 2006
uranium
diamonds,
$2,532,938
$4,693,238 Share in value in
2.8
Botswana
copper, nickel,
world's exports, %
soda ash, meat,
in 2007
textiles
oil and
$1,811,881
$11,529,255 Share in value in
3.3
Sudan
petroleum
world's exports, %
products;
in 2008
cotton, sesame,
livestock,
groundnuts

163

Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Kenya

Chad

Burkina
Faso

diamonds, gold,
copper, cobalt,
wood products,
crude oil, coffee
tea,
horticultural
products,
coffee,
petroleum
products, fish,
cement
oil, cattle,
cotton, gum
Arabic
cotton,
livestock, gold

$1,238,880

$5,639,706 Share in value in
world's exports, %
in 2009

3

$1,520,157

$5,169,112 Share in value in
world's exports, %
in 2010

3.3

$84,179

$3,034,942 Average

2.44

$174,837

$1,288,134

tobacco, tea,
$449,410
$1,071,173
sugar, cotton,
coffee, peanuts,
wood products,
apparel
uranium ore,
$211,269
$483,502
Niger
livestock,
cowpeas,
onions
cotton, cashews,
$204,165
$533,902
Benin
Shea butter,
textiles, palm
products,
seafood
tobacco, tea,
$712,873
$1,996,261
Mali
sugar, cotton,
coffee, peanuts,
wood products,
apparel
cotton,
$220,246
$667,222
Togo
phosphates,
coffee, cocoa
Average
$10,338,540
$42,656,911
Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (2015) and Trade Map (2015)
Malawi

164

Table 5: Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP): Malaysia and Ghana
Years
1971 1981
1991
Ghana
0.11
1.81
0.76
Mineral rents (% of GDP)
Malaysia
0.19
0.64
0.16
Ghana
2.30
7.32
5.36
Total natural resources rents (% of
GDP)
Malaysia
6.46 19.41
15.78
Ghana
51.42 52.74
55.90
Agricultural land (% of land area)
Malaysia
12.28 15.53
20.93
Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

165

2001
0.13
0.01
10.39
12.95
63.77
21.26

2011
7.53
0.41
19.09
11.41
69.09
23.22

Table 6: School enrollment; Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Vocational: Malaysia and
Ghana
Years
1971
1981
1991
2001
2011
Ghana
67.19
77.71
79.94
81.82 106.7468
School enrollment, primary (%
gross)
Malaysia
84.83
94.54
93.60
97.29 101.4169
Ghana
43.09
39.89
35.95
39.03
57.09
School enrollment, secondary (%
gross)
Malaysia
47.47
7.51
54.66
65.87
67.24
Ghana
0.69
1.62
0.98
5.71
12.08
School enrollment, tertiary (%
gross)
Malaysia
3.88
4.34
7.98
27.92
35.97
Ghana
39,630 38,723 36,500 14,090
71,848
Secondary education, vocational
pupils
Malaysia 20,058 18,521 65,460 134,302 178,480
Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

68

Gross enrollment ratio for primary school is calculate by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary
education regardless of age by the population of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education,
and multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015)
69

The last available data for Malaysia is in 2005 (101.41%)

166

Table 7: Inputs: Value added, Manufacturing: Malaysia and Ghana
Years
1970 1980
Ghana
Chemicals (% of value added in
4.43
4.53
manufacturing)
Malaysia 8.62
5.43
Ghana
2.94
1.27
Machinery and transport equipment (% of
value added in manufacturing)
Malaysia 5.50
7.51
Ghana
16.15 10.79
Textiles and Clothing (% of value added in
manufacturing)
Malaysia 3.45
6.97
Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

70

The percentage for Ghana in 2003 and 2010 are for 1993, the last available data

71

0.59% was in 2003, the last available data

72

6.44% was in 2003, the last available data

167

1987
2003
2010
70
9.70
5.32 9.70
14.68 10.31 11.55
0.77
0.59 0.59 71
5.31 35.52 27.85
7.87
6.44 6.4472
6.97
2.83
1.95

Table 9: Malaysia’s National Development Plans since 1950
Name
Planned Period
1.First draft for development
1950 – 1955
in Malaya
2. General Plan of
1956 – 1960
Development
3. Second Five Year Plan
1961 – 1965
4. First Malaysia Plan
1966 – 1970 (5 years)
5. Second Malaysia Plan
1971 – 1975 (5 years)
6. Third Malaysia Plan
1976 – 1980 (5 years)
7. Fourth Malaysia Plan
1981 – 1985 (5 years)
8. Fifth Malaysia Plan
1986 – 1990 (5 years)
9. Sixth Malaysia Plan
1991 – 1996 (5 years)
10. Seventh Malaysia Plan
1996 – 2000 (5 years)
11. Eighth Malaysia Plan
2001 – 2005 (5 years)
12. Ninth Malaysia Plan
2006 – 2010 (5 years)
13. Tenth Malaysia Plan
2011 – 2015 (5years)
14. Eleventh Malaysia Plan
2016 – 2020 (5 years)
Extracted from Brown, 1993; EPU, 2017

168

Implementation (Years)
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
Ongoing

Table 9A: Ghana’s National Development Plans since 1950
Name
Planned Period
1. The First 10- Year
1951-1959 (10 years)
Development Plan
2. The Consolidated
1957-1959 (2 years)
Development Plan
3. The Second Development
1959-1964 (5 years)
Plan
4. The 7-Year Plan for
1963/4 - 1969/70 (7 years)
National Development plan
5. The 2-Year Development
1968/9 – 1969/70 (2 years)
Plan
6. The 1-Year Development
July 1970 – June 1971( year)
Plan
7. The Year Development
1975/ 6 – 1979/80 (3 years)
Plan
8. The Economic Recovery
1983 – 1989 (7years)
Programme/SAP
9. The Ghana Vision 2020 –
1995 – 2020 (25 years)
The First Step
10. The Ghana Poverty
2002/3 – 2005/6 (3 years)
Reduction Strategy (GPRS I)
11. The Growth and Poverty
2006 – 2009 (4 years)
Reduction Strategy (GPRS II)
12. The Ghana Shared Growth 2010 – 2013 (3 years)
and Development Agenda
(GSGDA I)
13. Ghana Shared Growth and 2014 – 2017
Development Agenda
(GSGDA II)
Extracted from (CLEAR-AA, 2013: p6; NDPC, 2015)

169

Implementation (Years)
5
2
4
3
2
1
3
7
5
3
4
3

Ongoing

Table 10: Average size of total Natural Resource Production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014
Year
1971
1981
1991
2001
2011
2014
Total (% of GDP)
19.72
25.40
20.39
8.29
9.06
7.23
Income (% of GDP)
1.44
14.41
15.5
12.32
11
***
Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015), Global Economy (2015)

170

Table 10A: Average size of Tin production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014
Year
US Dollars per Metric Ton
Production (000 tones)
Income (US$ 000
million)
1988

7051.633

28.9

203,792.2

1991

5,595.962

20.7

115,836.4

2001

4,489.436

5

22,447.18

2011

26,051.45

3.3

85,969.78

Source: Statistical analysis conducted with data from International Tin Research Institute (2011)
and IndexMundi (2017).

171

Table 11: Average size of Total Natural Resource Production for Ghana 1971 to 2014
Year
1971
1981
1991
2001
2011
2014
Total (% of GDP)
2.34
6.77
5.40
9.50
18.11
19.54
Income (% of GDP)
1.21
6.19
5.37
10.39
19.45
***
Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015), Global Economy (2015)

172

Table 11A: Average size of Gold production for Ghana 1971 to 2014
Year
US Dollars per Troy Ounce Production Million ounces

Income (US$ million)

1988

437.0483

0.4

174.8193

1991

362.1825

0.8

289.746

2001

270.9892

2.2

596.1762

2011

1569.211

3

4707.633

Source: Statistical analysis conducted with data from Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning (MOFEP, 2015), Gold Sheet (2017), IndexMundi (2017) and 24hourGold (2017)

173

Figure 2: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia
40.00

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)

35.00
30.00
25.00

Malaysia Agriculture,
value added (% of GDP)

20.00

SEA Agriculture, value
added (% of GDP)

15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014

Source: World Bank (2016)

174

Figure 2A: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa
70.00
60.00

Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)

50.00
40.00

Ghana Agriculture, value
added (% of GDP)

30.00

SSA Agriculture, value
added (% of GDP)

20.00
10.00
0.00

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Source: World Bank (2016)

175

Figure 3: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia
35.00
30.00

Manufacturing (% of GDP)

25.00
20.00

Malaysia Manufacturing,
value added (% of GDP)

15.00

SEA Manufacturing, value
added (% of GDP)

10.00
5.00
0.00

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014

Source: World Bank (2016)

176

Figure 3A: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa
14.00
12.00

Manufacturing, value added (% of
GDP)

10.00
8.00

Ghana Manufacturing,
value added (% of GDP)

6.00

SSA Manufacturing, value
added (% of GDP)

4.00
2.00
0.00

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013

Source: World Bank (2016)

177

Figure 4: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia
60.00

Services,etc, (% of GDP)

50.00
40.00

30.00

Malaysia Services, etc.,
value added (% of GDP)

20.00

SEA Services, etc., value
added (% of GDP)

10.00
0.00

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2014

Source: World Bank (2016)

178

Figure 4A: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa
60.00

Services,etc., value added (% of GDP)

50.00
40.00

30.00

Ghana Services, etc.,
value added (% of GDP)

20.00

SSA Services, etc., value
added (% of GDP)

10.00
0.00

1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013

Source: World Bank (2016)

179