EGYPTIAN SOCIETY IN TRANSITION:
THE MERITS OF A DYNAMIC MODEL
by

Rahul Gokul Bhanwath
B.A., University of Northern British Columbia, 2009

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
March 2015

© Rahul Bhanwath, 2015

UMI Number: 1526496

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Abstract
Egypt in Transition: The Merits of a Dynamic Model
In 2011, several Middle Eastern and North African countries rose up in defiance
against their governments, an event popularly known as the Arab Spring. The Arab Spring
held hopes for liberal and democratic transition in these countries. Egypt in particular was
very optimistic about a potential transition to a liberal democracy. This thesis examines the
period o f time leading up to the deposal of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s former president, and the
three years following. This thesis will review the events and parties involved in Egypt’s
transition and the role these groups played. Furthermore, the Egyptian transition will be
examined using Alfred Stepan and Juan Linz’ model that states all transition occurs in five
distinct arenas. This thesis will conclude that the optimistic view taken by many regarding
Egypt’s transition was premature and that Egypt has regressed to a previous governmental
model.

Table of Contents
Abstract.............................................................................................................................................ii
Table of Contents............................................................................................................................iii
List o f Tables................................................................................................................................... v
List o f Figures................................................................................................................................. vi
Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................ vii
Introduction....................................................................................................................................... 1
Democracy, Democratization, and Transition.......................................................................... 3
Democratization to Transitions: Moving to a More Fluid M odel...........................................7
Transitology: Linz and Stepan..................................................................................................11
Egypt in Transition....................................................................................................................20
Methodology.............................................................................................................................. 23
Chapter One:.................................................................................................................................. 29
The Egyptian Revolution of 1952............................................................................................ 29
From Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak........................................................................................... 35
Thirty Years to Revolt: Egypt Under Mubarak 1981-2011................................................... 40
“We are all Khaled Said” ..........................................................................................................42
The Arab Spring in Egypt: January 25 2011 .......................................................................... 43
Egypt 2011: After Mubarak......................................................................................................47
Commonalities of 1952 and 2013............................................................................................ 54
Chapter T w o.................................................................................................................................. 56
Civil Society.............................................................................................................................. 56
Civil Society: The Arab Spring of January 2011.................................................................... 58
Amendments and Elections: March 2011 to July 2012..........................................................63
The Draft Constitution: November 2012.................................................................................71
Civil Society and the Coptic Christians...................................................................................74
Revolution or Coup: January to June 2013.............................................................................79
A Second Dethronement: July 2013........................................................................................ 81
Chapter Three:............................................................................................................................... 86
Political Society.........................................................................................................................86
Political Society: The Arab Spring of January 2011..............................................................87
iii

Constitutional Amendments: March 2011.............................................................................. 89
Leading into the Parliamentary Elections of November 2011 to January 2012...................92
Presidential Campaigns and Elections: 2012.......................................................................... 98
Presidential Powers and the Draft Constitution: 2012..........................................................110
Political Society and the Coptic Christians...........................................................................114
Unrest, Instability, and Military Intervention........................................................................120
A Return to Military Leadership.............................................................................................123
Chapter Four................................................................................................................................ 125
Rule o f Law ............................................................................................................................. 125
Rule o f Law: The Arab Spring o f January 2011................................................................... 125
Amendments and Elections: 2011......................................................................................... 126
The Draft Constitution: November 2012...............................................................................129
Morsi’s Deposal: July 2013....................................................................................................140
Islam, Shari ’a, and the Rule o f Law...................................................................................... 144
The Egyptian Judiciary........................................................................................................... 148
Chapter Five................................................................................................................................. 156
Egypt in Transition or Stagnation?........................................................................................ 156
Egypt’s Future and Egypt’s P a st........................................................................................... 163
Bibliography................................................................................................................................ 169

List o f Tables

Table 1. Egyptian Parliamentary Election Results..................................................................... 97

v

List of Figures

Figure 1. EDSC poll versus actual election results.................................................................... 103
Figure 2. Al-Masry Al-Youm poll versus actual election results............................................ 105
Figure 3. ACPS Poll versus actual election results................................................................... 106

vi

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Dr. John Young for helping me avoid many of the pitfalls that I
was directing myself into and for keeping my head on straight. I can’t imagine how many
times I would have had to rewrite this thesis without your support and guidance. I would also
like to thank Dr. Tracy Summerville for helping me discover that this thesis was something I
wanted to write (though such feelings came and went several times throughout the writing
process, that’s for certain), and Dr. Ken Wilkening for kindling and supporting my interest in
politics several years ago when I was still an undergrad. I would also like to thank my
parents, Gokul and Shashi Bhanwath for their support. I would lastly like to thank my
girlfriend, Stacy Kenway, for nodding politely while I droned on about the minutiae of my
research, somehow managing to stay awake during such conversations, and even managing a
kind word or two.
Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to the memory o f my grandfather, Madan
Lai Sharma, who taught me the value of family, education, a good (or bad!) joke, and who I
have to thank for every opportunity I have had in my life.

Introduction

The Arab Spring was a movement which came as a great surprise to the global
political community. The Middle East has been characterized for generations by politicians
and academics as a region o f political stagnation. The West has made significant efforts to
export ideas o f democracy and freedom with their incursions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
however, these efforts met with mediocre results. As Ajami notes, waves of democracy have
swept over other regions, from southern and eastern Europe to Latin America, from East Asia
to Africa. Until recently, the Middle East “was a bleak landscape: terrible rulers, sullen
populations, a terrorist fringe".1 Thus when street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi lit himself on
fire in Tunisia on December 17, 2010 in protest against a corrupt police force that had
harassed him for years, it was astonishing enough that the Tunisian population rallied around
his death and forced political change. That this event then sparked protests in surrounding
Arab countries, surprised both specialists and casual observers alike. The Arab Spring was
then viewed as being a potential catalyst, with consequences for both regional and global
politics.
Since it began in late 2010, The Arab Spring has forced out rulers from four different
countries (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen). It has further inspired uprisings in countries
such as Bahrain, a brutal and horrifyingly violent civil war in Syria, and major protests in
other Middle Eastern countries, such as Jordan and Iraq.2 Though it remains to be seen if the
lofty goals of freedom and greater liberties that were declared near the beginning of the

' Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Spring at One. "Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (March/April 2012): 56-65.
2 Daniel Byman, "Regime Change in the Middle East: Problems and Prospects." Political Science Quarterly
127, no. 1 (2012): 25-27.

1

uprisings can be met, the events of the Arab Spring may be the most important international
events to occur in the last decade. Combined with the understanding that the revolutions are
still very young, the Arab Spring presents a rare opportunity to examine major events. That
this upheaval has occurred, and is continuing to occur, in a region that has historically and
justifiably been characterized by its immutability should invite academic inquiry.
This thesis concentrates on political transition in Egypt following the deposal of
President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. This subject is especially relevant in the aftermath of the
Arab Spring, where several Arab countries have experienced widespread revolutions in
which their populations have demanded greater liberties and rights. Examining the way
Egypt transitions is extremely important in determining the prospects that the region has for
any political development away from authoritarian dictatorship and towards other forms of
government, such as liberal democracy. Although this thesis will focus on conditions for
democratic transition, this does not necessarily mean democracy is the desired or expected
outcome. Instead the prospects for democracy and the claims o f democratization are held as
an experiential approach to facilitate the study of transition from authoritarianism. The
specific question of this thesis is: what factors have affected the Egyptian transition from
2011 to 2013? Answering this question also invites a legitimate conversation about likely
outcomes from the transition. In addressing these issues, it is important to identify the factors
that have influenced transition, as well as the theoretical literature on transitology.

2

Democracy. Democratization, and Transition
Transition literature has evolved considerably over the past decades. It originally
emerged in the 1970s and 80s as a response to dissatisfaction with the contemporary
democratization literature and that literature’s earlier reliance on preconditions. During this
time period, a large variety o f preconditions were outlined by numerous scholars who
believed specific conditions would lead to corresponding forms of government. Most
prominent among these forms of government was democracy, which spawned several
fundamental pieces o f literature. In the 1950s, Seymour Lipset put forward a model of
democratic transition in his article "Some Social Requisites o f Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy" which revolved around economic preconditions.3 In
the 1970s, Dankwart Rustow presented a more progressive, less restrictive model for
transition.4 Edward Said often wrote about patronizing Western perceptions of Middle
Eastern and Islamic culture, termed “Orientalism”, which he then judicious applied about the
region’s perceived incapability to transition to democracy.5 In 1991, Samuel Huntington
described the three periods of wide scale democratic transition in The Third Wave,6 while a
year later, Francis Fukuyama famously stated that liberal democracy was the apex of
government in The End o f History and the Last Man J This literature has understandably
changed through the years, as it became apparent that transitions are not simply a matter of
finding the right combination of ingredients.

3 Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."
The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March 1959) 69-105.
4 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative Politics 2, no. 3
(April 1970): 337-363.
5 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Pantheon Books, 1978).
6 Samuel P. Huntington, “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal o f Democracy 2, no. 2 (1991): 12-34.
7 Francis Fukuyama, End o f History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992).

3

Democratization and precondition theories were once considered the preeminent way
o f examining transitions, however, transitology as an approach to political change has also
emerged, and has gained considerable legitimacy. This led to a parallel development of both
transition literature and democratization literature. The two approaches often reference the
same works and study many of the same cases. Notably, these cases involved South America
and Southern Europe, with post-communist Eastern Europe following in the late 1980s and
1990s. Where the distinction emerged was the way each approach studied these cases.
Democratization literature studied the way in which a country became a democracy,
examining various criteria and conditions believed to be integral to moving towards and
consolidating democracy. Conversely, transitology did not focus on the end result of the
transition, but the transition itself, examining the variables that affected the direction in
which a country transitioned. If a country in question appears to be transitioning to
democracy, this is either incidental or desired, but not the primary focus of transitology,
which emphasizes the process over the result, and the journey rather than the destination.
In 1984, Samuel Huntington wrote an article titled “Will More Countries Become
Democratic” that summarized various alleged preconditions for the development of
democracy and the flaws each held.8 This summary and critique would quickly justify a shift
towards transitology. The first of these preconditions is economic wealth and equality, an
idea put forward by Seymour Martin Lipset in the late 1950s in his article “Some Social
Requisites of Democracy”.9 This article presumes that as countries become wealthier, the
possibility they might transition towards democracy increases. Lipset states that “men have

8 Samuel P. Huntington, “Will More Countries Become Democratic?” Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2
(1984): 193-218.
9 Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites o f Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy."
The American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (March 1959)

4

argued that only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens lived in real poverty
[can] a situation exist in which the mass of the population [can] intelligently participate in
politics and [can] develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of
irresponsible demagogues”.10 Lipset cites a few potential reasons for why affluence is so
vital, such as assumptions that higher levels o f literacy, education, and mass media exposure
are all conducive to democracy.11 He also states that the assumption that greater income
equality, as well as a large, relatively satisfied middle class would likewise help in the
development o f democracy.12 After listing these potential causes, however, Huntington also
noted that such conditions should have led certain Communist and Latin American states, at
the time, to turn toward democracy, but they did not.13 There are likewise more contemporary
examples of countries with rapidly developing economies, such as the United Arab Emirates
or Saudi Arabia, which have also not transitioned to democracy, but may actually be further
entrenched in undemocratic values.
The second precondition Huntington summarizes is social structure, an argument
supported by men such as Alexis de Tocqueville:
[An often-discussed precondition for democracy is a] social structure with relatively autonomous social
classes, regional groups, occupational groups, and ethnic and religious groups. Such groups.. .provide the
basis for the limitation of state power, hence for the control of the state by society, and hence for
democratic political institutions as the most effective means of exercising that control.14

Tocqueville reiterates a fairly common belief that a healthy civil society can increase a
country’s likelihood of developing stable democracy. He states that while pluralistic civil
society can be conducive to democratic transition, it is not as attractive as a civil society with
10 Ibid., 75.
11 Ibid., 81.
12 Ibid., 83.
13 Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2
(1964): 200
14 Ibid., 203.

5

a clear majority. A democracy founded on a pluralistic civil society, Huntington argues, can
be easily weakened by external forces, either military or political, and often only remains
stable by becoming an oligarchy.15
A third precondition relates to the external influences that can strongly affect
democratic development. This precondition is from a publication o f Freedom House, which
classified fifty two countries as “free” in 1984, and attributed British and American influence
as the largest external forces for the success of democracy, especially in the non-Westem
world16. Though Huntington does clearly see that the spread of democracy can be attributed
to these countries’ influence, he also notes that as this influence falters, some countries
regress towards non-democratic practices, such as in East Asia and Latin America during the
1970s.17 Due to this ambivalence, external influences can be catalogued as somewhat of a
wildcard for transition and consolidation.
The last precondition reviewed is culture, specifically political culture. Sidney Verba
defines culture as “the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which
defines the situation in which political action takes place”.18 Huntington outlines a correlation
between certain cultures or religions with a higher propensity for democracy (Protestantism,
specifically), as well as the opposite (Islam).19 While historically, certain cultures have been
more supportive of democratization, there have also been cases where culture has been more
malleable in this regard. For example, Catholicism was once considered to be diametrically
opposed to democratic practice, however, nowadays the church is strongly identified with

15 Ibid., 205
16 Ibid., 205-206.
17 Ibid., 206.
18 Ibid., 207.
19 Ibid., 207-8.

6

democratic values, specifically in the second half of the 20* century, following the Second
Vatican Council. This is not to say that culture cannot be a valuable force in the way a
country transitions; Huntington makes it clear that certain cultural attributes can be vital to
the prospects for democracy. It is still important, however, to be aware of the fact that effects
o f cultural attributes are still highly flexible, and while some cultures have had much more
democratic success than others, this does not necessarily preclude these less successful
countries from effectively transitioning to democracy. For example, countries such as India,
South Korea, and Taiwan have all emerged as stable democracies, despite having cultures
which may not have been seen previously as ideal for democracy.20 In light o f Huntington’s
critique, other transition literature gained prevalence. An article written by Dankwart Rustow
fourteen years prior to Huntington’s article in particular began to gain traction.

Democratization to Transitions: Moving to a More Fluid Model
In contrast to Huntington’s article, Dankwart Rustow’s “Transitions to Democracy:
Toward a Dynamic Model” is an article which very succinctly outlines some ways of
examining a country’s attempted transition towards democracy. The most notable difference
between Rustow’s work and the arguments that Huntington highlights is Rustow’s
concentration on transition to democracy, not democracy itself. These arguments gained
traction as precondition theory began to be discredited over a decade after “Transitions to
Democracy” was published. Rustow focused on the process in which a country becomes a
democracy, instead of a focus on stiff preconditions. Rustow argues that there is no specific
set o f criteria or prerequisites that must be in place for a democracy. Instead, he argues that
20 Ibid., 208

7

such conditions are extremely fluid, and that certain preconditions that existed in one
country’s transition may instead be an after effect of the transitional process in another
country. Rustow explains this as follows:
Specifically, we need not assume that the transition to democracy is a world-wide uniform process, that
it always involves the same social classes, the same types of political issues, or even the same methods
o f solution. On the contrary, it may be well to assume...that a wide variety o f social conflicts and
political contents can be combined with democracy. This is, o f course, in line with the general
recognition that democracy is a matter primarily o f procedure rather than o f substance. It also implies
that, as among various countries that have made the transition, there may be many roads to democracy.21

Rustow thus places importance not on specific ingredients, prerequisites, or even end result,
but instead focuses on the process of political transition. This emphasis on a dynamic model
follows suit with Rustow’s further argument to differentiate between correlation and
causality when examining various factors which are commonly found within democracy, or
are considered necessary in its foundation:
[This approach] does not commit us to any old-fashioned or simple-minded view o f causality, whereby
every effect has but one cause and every cause but one effect... Any genetic theory o f democracy would
do well to assume a two-way flow o f causality, or some form of circular interaction, between politics on
the one hand and economic and social conditions on the other.” 22

For example, one might argue that greater levels of literacy increase a country’s chances
towards successfully transitioning into a functioning democracy. Rustow would argue,
however, that the opposite may very well be the case as well, that a country’s literacy rate
may instead increase after the successful democratic transition. Furthermore, these same
factors which supposedly help initiate a transition may be different from the factors that help
foster democratic stability.
To this end, Rustow states that even a surplus of democrats is not even necessary for
successful transition, and that the existence of non-democrats actually helps push a country
21 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative Politics 2, no. 3
(April 1970): 345.
22 Ibid., 342-344.

8

towards democracy. Rustow even states that conflict between democrats and non-democrats
may be a necessity in a successful transition. “A dynamic model of the transition must allow
for the possibility that different groups - e.g., now the citizens and now the rulers, now the
forces in favor o f change and now those eager to preserve the past - may furnish the crucial
impulse toward democracy” .23
With this dynamic model of transition in mind, Rustow boils down his approach to
seven propositions which make up his argument:
1. The factors that keep a democracy stable may not be the ones that brought it into
existence: explanations of democracy must distinguish between function and genesis.
2. Correlation is not the same as causation: a genetic theory must concentrate on the
latter.
3. Not all causal links run from social and economic to political factors.
4. Not all causal links run from beliefs and attitudes to actions.
5. The genesis o f democracy need not be geographically uniform: there may be many
roads to democracy.
6. The genesis o f democracy need not be temporally uniform: different factors may
become crucial during successive phases.
7. The genesis o f democracy need not be socially uniform: even in the same place and
time the attitudes that promote it may not be the same for politicians and the common
citizens.24
Alone, these seven propositions, Rustow admits, “make the task of constructing a theory of
democratic genesis well-nigh unmanageable”,25 so he adds an additional three:
8. Empirical data in support of a genetic theory must cover, for any given country, a
time period from just before until just after the advent o f democracy.
9. To examine the logic of transformation within political systems, we may leave aside
countries where a major impetus came from abroad.
10. A model or ideal type o f the transition may be derived from a close examination of
two or three empirical cases and tested by application to the rest.26

23 Ibid., 345.
24 Ibid., 346.
25 Ibid.

9

It should be noted that not all of Rustow’s propositions are relevant to this thesis. Specifically
Rustow’s tenth point does not apply, as my research will revolve solely around Egypt’s
transition, with very little emphasis given to other countries.
Huntington and Rustow’s ideas both contribute to the discussion of how transition
occurs. While these articles both deal with democracy, they present these similarities in
different ways. Huntington refutes the idea that specific criteria will lead to specific
outcomes, arguing that explanations that were presented in past decades have been proven
incorrect or at least deeply flawed, thus showing the poor predictive capacity of the
precondition method. This would be integral in moving away from the more rigid theories of
democratization.
Addressing these failures, scholars looked back to Rustow’s work, written fourteen
years prior to Huntington’s article. Rustow likewise argues away from older models, but
unlike Huntington, who refutes those models as being outdated, Rustow instead puts forward
a new model, based around flexibility and adaptability. He does use criteria, but this criterion
is loose enough to allow variability and change, depending on where and when it is applied.
While both are seminal works in a discussion of transition, and represent the broad themes of
the literature, an approach closer to the center of both theories will be most effective in the
examination o f this topic. This middle ground can be seen in the work of Alfred Stepan and
Juan Linz whose work represents another progression in the way transition is studied.

26 Ibid.

10

Transitology: Linz and Stepan
This thesis will primarily concentrate on the work of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan,
who introduce a theory which outlines several arenas which are necessary in a democratic
transition.27 These arenas tie in heavily with Rustow’s article and Huntington’s summary
because Stepan and Linz’ focus is not on the end point, but on the transition, the conditions
for which are highly flexible. Linz and Stepan also state that the type of regime a country
holds prior to a political transition directly affects what kind of regime succeeds it.
Emphasizing the previous regime is particularly relevant when looking at Egypt, considering
how politically and religiously different Mubarak’s regime was from the one which
succeeded it. This ideological divergence is important because Mubarak’s government
struggled constantly to repress Islamic fundamentalism within Egypt, but despite his efforts,
following the Arab Spring, the fundamental Islamic movement became the strongest political
force in Egypt. I believe this sharp shift in Egyptian politics will play an integral role in
analyzing political transition in Egypt.
According to Linz and Stepan there are five arenas within which the drama of
political transition is played out and can be studied; all five are also strong indicators of a
successful transition: civil society; political society; rule o f law; state apparatus and
bureaucracy; and economic society. It is far too early to be certain of the futures of the
countries involved in the Arab Spring, however, using Linz and Stepan’s approach to the
study o f transition will be useful in examining the challenges of political change. Though
these arenas are meant to determine whether a country has transitioned away from
authoritarianism, they can also give insight if a country has not. For example, if a country can
27 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.

only meet the requirements o f some or none o f the arenas, it may mean that the country is not
showing signs of transitioning away from authoritarianism but merely towards a different
non-democratic regime.
The first of these arenas is civil society. According to Linz and Stepan, civil society is
the “arena o f the polity where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals, relatively
autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities,
and advance their interests”.28 In addition, civil society can include various social
movements, such as the pro-democratic movements, and/or the pro-religious movements
which rose to prominence (during the Arab Spring), as well as ordinary, unaligned citizens
who may take part in various protests. The role of these unaffiliated protesters can be
particularly important, and may have broad, overarching effects on the role civil society plays
within a political transition. For example, Google Executive Wael Ghonim played a strong
role in rallying the Egyptian people against the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian revolt,
though he held no political office. Civil society is also not limited to protests and
demonstrations, which are more indicative of the early stages of civil society’s development.
Long term, a developed civil society involves avenues of discussion and patterns of
compromise and cooperation to move forward and progress, as well as meeting mutual goals
and values.
Civil society is integral when examining Egypt, as the nature of the revolution
required a civil society which was strong enough to participate in bringing down an
extremely well-entrenched regime. It is also important to look at the role of civil society

28Ibid.

12

following Mubarak’s ouster, as well as the relationship that is cultivated (or not) between the
new government and civil society. Depending on the strength of civil society, this
relationship can oppose certain political transitions, such as regimes spearheaded by the
military.
The second arena identified by Linz and Stepan is political society, “an arena in which
the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over
public power and the state apparatus”.29 This involves “serious thought and action concerning
the development o f a normatively positive appreciation of those core institutions o f a
democratic political society —political parties, elections, electoral rules, political leadership,
interparty alliances, and legislatures —by which society constitutes itself politically to select
and monitor democratic government”.30
Linz and Stepan emphasize that political society, while distinct from civil society, is
also complementary to it. According to Linz and Stepan, civil society is useful in bringing
about regime change, but afterwards, should be downplayed to make way for political
restructuring. “At best, civil society can destroy a nondemocratic regime. However, a full
democratic transition, and especially democratic consolidation, must involve political
society”.31 While civil society can push forward ideals, and bring about change, political
society is afterwards required to step in and create the institutions required to successfully
transition away from the previous regime. This does not mean that political society should
operate independently from civil society. Stepan and Linz state that such a hostile
relationship is detrimental to a successful political transition, and therefore, argue that civil

29 Ibid., 8.
30 Ibid.

13

and political societies should work in tandem. A robust civil society should affect
governmental change by pressuring and guiding the advances of a political society, but then
allowing political society to properly adjudicate the variety of differences and opinions that
then arise amongst democrats.32 In regards to Egypt, the health of political society is vital
when examining the legitimacy of institutions such as its elections, constitution, and simply
its national unity.
The third arena put forward by Linz and Stepan is the rule o f law. Civil and political
society both require a certain amount of autonomy to operate effectively, and this is achieved
by having a strong rule o f law, where all actors are held equal and accountable under the law.
Linz and Stepan, further explain this as follows:
[Rule o f law embodies a]... spirit o f constitutionalism [which] requires more than rule by
majoritarianism. It entails a relatively strong consensus over the constitution and especially a
commitment to “self-binding” procedures o f governance that require exceptional majorities to change. It
also requires a clear hierarchy of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a
strong legal culture in civil society.33

The rule o f law provides a solid guidepost for the direction a political transition is heading,
and boundaries to gauge the political commitments of prominent actors in the way they seek
to establish the institutions necessary to a working rule of law.
The fourth arena is a functioning state apparatus and bureaucracy. According to Linz
and Stepan:
To protect the rights of its citizens and to deliver the other basic services that citizens demand, a
democratic government needs to be able to exercise effectively its claim to the monopoly of the
legitimate use of force in the territory. Even if the state had no other functions than these, it would have
to tax compulsorily in order to pay for police, judges, and basic services...[and] needs the effective
capacity to command, regulate, and extract.34

32Ibid„ 10
33Ibid.
34 Ibid., 11.

14

A functioning state apparatus and bureaucracy allows citizens of a state to take advantage of
the rights and entitlements provided by the state. A concrete bureaucracy also makes it more
difficult (though not impossible) for problems such as corruption or nepotism to re-emerge,
as the bureaucracy provides methods to repress or prevent this entirely.35 This legitimacy of
the state apparatus would be very useful in determining Egypt’s progress towards democracy
or other regime types.
Though this arena is important in the discussion of transition, there simply has not
been enough time to properly assess the state as well as its bureaucracy, beyond the simple
observation that both o f these areas are severely underdeveloped. There are still parts of the
structure held over from the Mubarak era, but much o f this state infrastructure either suffered
from enormous corruption, grievous ineptitude, poor public perception, or a combination of
all three. This arena ultimately requires more time and effort, as well as stable leadership, to
be able to make more than cursory observations about its current state, therefore this thesis
will not examine state apparatus and bureaucracy in meaningful detail.
The fifth and final arena is an economic society. An economic society is a set of
norms, institutions, and regulations which facilitates the relationship between the state and
the market. According to Linz and Stepan, an economic society is based on two claims which
they state are “theoretically and empirically sound”.36 These are: “first, there has never been
and there cannot be a non-wartime consolidated democracy in a command economy. Second,

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.

15

there has never been...a modem consolidated democracy in a pure market economy”37
(particularly because a pure market economy exists in theory only).
In the case of Egypt, the economic society will likely prove particularly important in
the fixture, largely due to the potential application of shari’a law. Islam itself has a distinct
economic system, and whether or not this system could work together in tandem with
democracy is certainly a question worth answering. The application of shari’a to the
economy, let alone how shari’a would be applied, is, however, a long-term enquiry. Like
state bureaucracy, the confines of my timeline will not give me a definitive answer to these
questions, and therefore, economic society will not be emphasized.
Linz and Stepan’s model also relies pre-eminently on the case study methodology. By
increasing the number of cases, as well as broader application, this model can be further
tested. Arend Lijphart showcases several different ways of approaching case studies. Lijphart
outlines six different categories of case studies: atheoretical; interpretative; hypothesisgenerating; theory-confirming; theory-infirming; and deviant case studies.38 This thesis will
concentrate on the second of the six: interpretative. According to Lijphart, the interpretative
case study uses established theoretical propositions, with the aim of “throwing light on the
case rather than of improving the generalization in any way”.39 Despite this, due to the nature
of the Egyptian transition, both its relative youth and as well as the general stagnation of
other regional governments, it is also possible that this thesis could also have certain theoryconfirming or infirming implications for transitional literature as it applies to the Middle
East.
37 Ibid.
38 Arend Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." The American Political Science Review
65, no. 3 (1971):691.
39 Ibid., 692.

16

The strengths and weaknesses of the case study method, and therefore thick
description, should also be mentioned here. Thick description, according to Clifford Geertz,
is an explanation of phenomena or events which involves context, details, conceptual
structures and meaning.40 The opposite of this, “thin description” is a simpler, factual account
without any meaningful interpretation or context.41 In this way, thick description allows a
researcher to examine a subject in a much more meaningful and explanative way. According
to Arend Lijphart, “the great advantage of the case study is that by focusing on a single case,
that case can be intensively examined even when the research resources at the investigator’s
disposal are relatively limited” 42 Lijphart recognizes that the weakness of a single case study
is that its results cannot be “the basis for a valid generalization nor the ground for disproving
an established generalization”.43 He allows, however, that a case study can either strengthen
or weaken established hypotheses. Given that there is a great deal of academic debate
regarding democracy in Arab or Islamic nations (much of which revolves around the idea that
it is highly unlikely to occur), and combined with the consequences of the Arab Spring, the
case study approach will be very valuable in hypothesizing about the region’s future.
The study of Egypt in transition, falls somewhere between these two categories
(interpretative and theory confirming/infirming). Due to the fact that no Arabic country has
been considered a successful democracy, scrutinizing the Egyptian transition could lead to
new ideas or themes as to why this might be. If no such revelation occurs, then as Lijphart
states, such analysis could lead to a sharper understanding of existing theories, such as

40 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures (BasicBooks, 1973), 3-30.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., 691.
43 Ibid.

17

whether or not the region can transition away from authoritarianism, a form of government
which permeates the region.
Though I am confident in the ideas put forward by these authors, it is still important
to be aware o f the critiques of theories of “transitology.” The most obvious criticism is that
Stepan and Linz’ own research does not include specific examples taken from the Middle
East or Northern Africa, instead concentrating on South America, Southern Europe, and postCommunist Europe. A lack of qualitative research specific to Islamic or Arabic countries may
be interpreted as a reason why the model is not applicable to the region. A similar
contestation, however, was made about the applicability of transitology to Eastern Europe.
The argument was, simply put, that there were too many differences between the cultures and
political infrastructure of South America and Southern Europe on one hand, and Eastern
Europe on the other. Such differences, it was argued, would make application of this model
untenable.
Valerie Bunce described this comparison44 as not “apples and orange,” but “apples
and kangaroos,” due to her belief that there are simply too many variables between regions
and countries 45 Bunce argues that there are strong reasons to assume there are large enough
differences between regions to invalidate comparison, such as the number of variables. She
further argues that such methodology can incorrectly force countries into categories that do
not necessarily represent them, based on the biases and determinations of the researcher.46
Schmitter and Karl refute this point, however, stating that a comparison is first required to
determine whether or not two separate cases or regions are truly so alien to one another to

44 The comparison Bunce refers to is in regards to culture, institutions, regional, and international context.
45 Valerie Bunce, "Should Transitologists Be Grounded?" Slavic Review 54, no. 1 (1995): 112.
46 Valerie Bunce, “Paper Curtains and Paper Tigers” Slavic Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 980.

18

disqualify them from comparison. Eliminating specific cases beforehand based on
assumption ultimately harms the development of political theory, as it “discourages area
specialists from using data from ‘their’ region or country” in a more overarching analysis.47
“The particularity o f any one region's cultural, historical or institutional matrix - if it is
relevant to understanding the outcome of regime change - should emerge from systematic
comparison, rather than be used as an excuse for not applying it”.48
To avoid the problems presented by Bunce, Schmitter and Karl outline two pitfalls
which are particularly important to avoid. The first is the assumption that something
happened because it had to happen, or retrospective determinism 49 This is an important
fallacy to avoid in the case of fallen despots, as it is easy to view various criteria as inevitably
causing a regime change. This also ties in heavily with the assumption that perceptions and
driving factors o f the past are the same as the present (presentism).50 This means it is vital to
provide historical context to events that have occurred over time. The second point that
Schmitter and Karl present is that sometimes transitology can minimalize cultural context,
due to a rigid, impersonal methodology. These two authors state that area specialists (though
they write specifically about Soviet scholars) would “bar all practicing transitologists from
reducing their countries (now more numerous, diverse, and autonomous in their behavior) to
mere pinpoints on a scatterplot or frequencies in a cross-tabulation”.51

47 Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, “From an Iron Curtain to a Paper Curtain: Grounding Transitologists
or Students o f Postcommunism?” Slavic Review 54, no. 4 (1995): 968.
48 Terry Lynn Karl and Philippe Schmitter, "The Conceptual Travels of Transitological and Consolidologists:
How Far to the East Should They Attempt to Go?” S/ov/c .Review 53, no. 1 (1994): 178.
49 Ibid., 176
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 177

19

To support Karl and Schmitter’s conclusions, Stepan and Linz’ model has been
effectively adapted to Latin American, Eastern, and Southern European countries. Each of
these regions has enough cultural difference among them that one might assume that, by
Bunce’ definition, there would also be problems. If this model can be successfully used in
these aforementioned regions, the model may also be further refined and offer insight in the
Middle East, something which has not yet been done. Application to the Middle East would
only further measure the model’s capability. Furthermore, Linz and Stepan place particular
emphasis on the previous regime of a country, as opposed to ideology or religious factors.
This allows Linz and Stepan’s transition criteria to be far more flexible and easily used when
discussing Egypt, as religion and ideology are only now, with Mubarak’s fall, being given a
more direct opportunity to affect the political system. Finally, Linz and Stepan’s work is also
relevant to the discussion o f Egypt as their research was done exclusively on countries where
regimes did not resort to overwhelming force to stop the revolution, which was a notable
characteristic of Egypt’s initial uprising.

Egypt in Transition
Egypt is central to any discussion o f both the Arab Spring and transitology for at least
five reasons. The first reason is that Egypt has had a close (even if not completely amicable)
relationship with Western democracies who provide Egypt with annual foreign aid, most
prominently the United States. This gives the international community a measure o f influence
and interest in Egypt, which may or may not influence Egypt’s political transition. The
second reason is the economy. Egypt is not an economic powerhouse of the Middle East, and
has one o f the lowest GDP per capita in the region. Due to its relationship with Western
20

democracies, however, Egypt may be able to access a great deal of knowledge to modernize
their economy, as well as engage many potential trading partners in the West. Third, Egypt is
also the cultural focal point of the region, both historically and religiously, a point underlined
by the fact that the country enjoys one of the few successful tourism sectors in the Middle
East, and its scholars have great influence throughout the Middle East. Fourth, the country
has the largest population in the region, at approximately ninety million, including the
Middle East’s largest concentration of Coptic Christians, numbering approximately ten
million, a great many of whom quickly mobilized in protest during the Arab Spring. Despite
difficulties between Muslims and Christians, Egypt has a foundation for pluralistic politics.
These factors have given Egypt a history of financial weakness and cultural strength which
are important considerations when examining political transition.
Lastly is the prevalence of powerful fundamental Islamic groups within Egypt, and
the large role that such groups have played both during and following the fall of former
Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak. Most prominent among these groups is the Muslim
Brotherhood, an extremely large and influential Islamic association in the Arab world. The
Brotherhood has often advocated goals that center on the implementation of shari’a law,
which is essentially the use o f the Qur'an and Islamic teachings to guide all spheres of
political and societal life. The Brotherhood’s influence has created in Egypt a debate on the
role of Islam in the post-Mubarak era, a debate which will be integral in understanding
Egypt’s future. Prior to the revolution, the Brotherhood was restricted in varying degrees.
This included being banned outright in the 1950s, with its members imprisoned and tortured,
to being outlawed as a political party within the last decade. During the Egyptian revolution,
the Muslim Brotherhood was extremely vocal in its support of the protestors, which gained
21

the Brotherhood greater popularity. This support led them to form the Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP), and eventually succeed in winning the largest number of seats during the
parliamentary elections. Later in the Egyptian presidential election of 2012, their candidate
Mohammad Morsi was elected as president. Additionally, in the parliamentary elections of
late 2011 and early 2012, the party that came in second was the ultra-conservative Salafi AlNour party, a hard line Islamic fundamentalist group. Though there have been several
problems with the Egyptian parliament, most notably its dissolution by the Supreme Council
o f the Armed Forces (SCAF), this does not erase the implications of both the Brotherhood
and Al-Nour party's success.
The reason why the prevalence of these two groups is so important is twofold. First,
the goals established by the protesters during Mubarak’s ouster, which revolved around
creating greater liberties for the Egyptian people, such as those found within liberal
democracies. Given the successes of the Freedom and Justice Party and the Al-Nour party,
two groups which are consistently condemned for their alleged extremist beliefs, these liberal
goals may be compromised. The popularity of these groups may also affect the role of
religion in political transition and the prospects for liberal democracy.
Secondly, why these groups are important ties into the events of summer 2013, when
Muhammad Morsi was deposed as Egyptian President. Though he had many opponents, there
is no denying that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood had, and still has, a very strong
support base. Morsi’s deposal was a highly polarizing event in Egyptian politics, and
showcases a strong divide within the Egyptian population along religious lines. Though I will
not be actively concentrating on the effects of religion specifically within my thesis, it is
impossible to ignore the presence of religion within any discussion of Egyptian politics.
22

These circumstances certainly do not appear to be ideal for any meaningful transition
away from authoritarianism, though a transition to a different authoritarian regime seems
possible. Dankwart Rustow stated that transitions are extremely flexible, and that many
different combinations of events and stimuli can eventually lead to different outcomes.
Determining how Egypt’s circumstances affect its transition will be the primary goal of this
thesis.

Methodology
To recap, this thesis will discuss the political transition in Egypt since the ousting of
Hosni Mubarak in 2011. This thesis will also include some tentative conclusions about the
transition, as well as some speculation on where the transition is headed. Primarily, I relied
on the work of Linz and Stepan, specifically the five arenas where the events of political
transition occur. This section will briefly outline the methodology that was used to reach
these conclusions.
To restate the question at hand: what factors played a part in the post-Mubarak
political transition? As previously mentioned, the goal will not be to establish that Egypt is
transitioning towards one specific form of government or ideology. More broadly, this thesis
will examine the transition itself, including an analysis of the events that occur and the
various actors involved. Using this analysis, I will discuss what the main characteristics of
the transition were, as well as the potential outcomes of the transition, and reach some
tentative conclusions about the future of Egypt.

23

The methodology I will be using to examine Egypt’s political transition will revolve
around a few different areas. The thesis itself will be organized around three of the five
arenas put forward by Linz and Stepan. Within the context of each arena, five specific groups
will be analyzed. These groups will be viewed in the setting of five major events that occur in
the timeline of January 2011, when Hosni Mubarak was deposed, to July 2013, when
Mohammad Morsi was deposed. Much of the context of these groups and events will be
pulled from four primary media sources, with these sources being either regional or
international.
The foundation of my analysis will draw focus on the five arenas identified by Linz
and Stepan. O f the five arenas, I will concentrate primarily on three arenas: civil society,
political society, and rule of law. State apparatus and economic society will receive lesser
emphasis. The reason why the last two will not receive as much focus is because they require
a longer term approach: the development of the state apparatus as well as economic
development, for example, are not a short term accomplishments and therefore require a
much longer timeline. In contrast, the manifestations of civil and political society can be
assessed more directly. While using a limited approach will lead to more tentative
conclusions instead o f definite ones, it will also be far more realistic. Egypt’s transition has
an enormous number o f factors, but by concentrating on Linz and Stepan’ structure, I can
narrow these down significantly while still operating within a methodology which is credible
and experienced, and which has clear guidelines.
Keeping in mind the arenas put forward by Linz and Stepan, I looked at five groups
across three fields (as well as their objectives, platforms, and actions) that have played
pivotal roles in Egypt, both in the time preceding and following the revolution. Of these five
24

groups, not all were given the same amount of attention, depending on their influence in
Egypt’s transition. As I mentioned earlier, one cannot examine the current Egyptian political
scene without placing particular emphasis on The Muslim Brotherhood, as their
parliamentary and presidential victory cemented them as the strongest political movement in
Egypt following the Arab Spring. This also speaks volumes to their political clout before the
revolution, when they were outlawed by former president Mubarak. The examination of the
Brotherhood will also include the now ousted Egyptian President and former Chairman of the
Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammad Morsi.
The second group is the extremely fundamental Salafis, a group which on many
occasions has petitioned for implementation of shari’a, must also be examined, not in small
part due to their contentious relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. At a glance, one
would assume that the two groups would be able to easily form a political alliance; however,
the Muslim Brotherhood on several occasions has publically stated its complete lack of
willingness to make any such compact.
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) will be the third group I will
examine, as they held a great deal of power during and after the revolution, and have been
one of the strongest secular forces in the country. Their goals have also been unclear from the
start o f the revolution, and talks of a military rule have not been uncommon, especially given
the uneven amount o f power they hold. Considering their role in the 2013 deposal of
Mohammed Morsi, they cannot be ignored.
Each o f these first three groups has a very distinct outlook and each holds significant
influence in regards to Egypt’s political transition.

Since the Revolution, the Muslim

25

Brotherhood worked hard to distance itself from its fundamental roots, trying to characterize
itself as inclusive to all Egyptians, instead of simply pro-Islamic, though their words and
actions were not always been consistent in this regard. The Salafis, conversely, have been
straightforward in pushing the merits o f fundamental Islam, and a return to shari’a. The
SCAF perhaps had the most difficulty following the revolt, as they have had to juggle
fundamental and moderate Islam, liberal groups, as well as the demands o f Egypt’s large
Christian base, while still remaining relatively secular.
The last two groups have traditionally held very little power in Egypt. The first of
these are the Coptic Christians, who have faced a great deal o f oppression and have
continually sought to play a role in Egyptian politics. Given their prominent role in the
Egyptian revolt, many Copts had high hopes for their future within Egypt. Furthermore,
considering their history, the way their status develops post-revolution can be used as a
barometer for the way the transition progresses.
Lastly, will be the Egyptian liberal movement. The movement is comprised of various
liberal groups who wished to make post-revolution Egypt into a functioning, liberal
democracy. This movement has been plagued with problems, however, such as
disorganization and constant shifts in leadership. For example, Mohammad ElBaradei,
perhaps the most popular and arguably qualified choice for a liberal presidential candidate,
dropped out o f the presidential race months before the election, and struggled as the leader of
the opposition thereafter. Though these groups have not been particularly influential (though
with the downfall of President Morsi, some might argue that point), it is this lack of influence
which makes them vital to the discussion of transition in Egypt. Their limited roles are
critical to an understanding of civil and political society.
26

The timeline I followed will be from start of the revolution in 2011 J a n u a r y to the
deposal o f Mohammad Morsi in the summer of 2013. Within this timeline, I will primarily
concentrate on five specific events, each being emphasized differently depending on which
arena is being discussed. First, Mubarak’s ouster during the Arab Spring in early 2011;
second, the constitutional amendments and parliamentary elections in late 2011; third, the
presidential election in 2012; fourth, the draft constitution put forward in late 2012; and fifth,
the deposal of Mohamed Morsi in the summer of 2013. While the bulk of my work will
center on this time period, I believe it is also important to provide proper historical context.
To this end, I will also examine recent Egyptian history, starting at 1952, when Egypt fought
yet another revolution, which was also against a corrupt and bloated government. From this
history, I can examine similarities between past Egypt leaders and contemporary ones.
Lastly, due to the very recent nature of the events in Egypt, in addition to scholarly
work, I will also draw on media sources throughout my research. These media sources will
be from a wide spectrum o f perspectives from both within Egypt and the international
community. Specifically, I will be using the New York Times, the BBC, Al-Ahram52 (an
Egyptian newspaper), and the Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI). The New
York Times will provide a distinctly Western or American perspective to the revolution, while
the BBC will be a comparatively objective source, though still being distinctly Western. AlAhram is a Cairo based newspaper and will be used to gain an Egyptian perspective. Finally,
MEMRI is an independent source of translated media from the Middle East, and will be used
to fill in gaps that the other sources may leave. I will follow each o f these sources from the

52 The UNBC library coverage o f Al-Ahram is incomplete by several months, so I will use A1 Jazeera news to
supplement it.

27

start of my timeline, January 2011, until the deposal of Mohammad Morsi in the summer of
2013, concentrating on stories that deal with the revolution and each of the groups mentioned
above. Furthermore, during my analysis, it is imperative to identify criteria that implicate that
transition is occurring, specifically, criteria that relates to civil and political society, the rule
of law, as well as economic and institutional development.
In conclusion, my thesis questions how events in Egypt from early 2011, progressed
to the 2012 presidential elections, and which led to the deposal o f Egypt’s first democratically
elected president both reflect and have affected the country’s political transition. It is not my
purpose to determine whether or not Egypt is moving to a specific form of government, such
as democracy, but to examine the process of transition, and make some theoretically
informed conclusions about said transition. Based on this, I will use my analysis to make
cautious predictions on some of the more likely outcomes.

28

Chapter One:
The Egyptian Revolution o f 1952
Understanding the situation in Egypt following the Arab Spring requires looking back
at the events and circumstances that have shaped Egyptian state and society. Many times in
the sixty years that preceded Mubarak’s ouster there were events that closely mirrored
contemporary Egypt, the most obvious being the leadership style of those in power. Prior to
Mubarak, two men presided over Egypt during this time and each concentrated heavily on
consolidating their power by emphasizing security and monistic politics, often culminating in
oppression and the use of fear to compensate for a lack of political legitimacy. The first half
of this chapter will focus on these two leaders: Nasser and Sadat, followed by a discussion of
Mubarak. In this context, it is far easier to understand why modem day Egypt is so heavily
divided.
On July 23rd o f 1952, the Egyptian military openly mutinied against the highly
unpopular King Farouk I of Egypt. Farouk enjoyed the backing of the British, but was
infamous for his opulent lifestyle and the corrupt government. Farouk’s weakness was also
blamed for Egypt’s loss in the 1948 war with Israel. The coup itself was, nominally, led by
General Mohamed Naguib of the Free Officers, who listed a summary of Farouk’s offenses:
In view of what the country has suffered in the recent past, the complete vacuity prevailing in all comers
as a result o f your bad behavior, [Farouk’s] toying with the constitution, and...disdain for the wants o f
the people, no one rests assured o f life, livelihood, and honor. Egypt's reputation among the peoples of
the world has been debased as a result o f [Farouk’s] excesses in these areas to the extent that traitors and
bribe-takers find protection beneath [Farouk’s] shadow in addition to security, excessive wealth, and
many extravagances at the expense o f the hungry and impoverished people. [Farouk] manifested this
during and after the Palestine War [in 1948] in the corrupt arms scandals and... open interference in the
courts to try to falsify the facts of the case, thus shaking faith injustice.53

53 Amil Khan. Long Struggle: The Muslim Worlds Western Problem. (Washington: John Hunt Publishing,
2010). 58-59.

29

Naguib, however, was primarily a figurehead for the forces behind him. Naguib was in this
high position, to give the Free Officers legitimacy. Chief among these forces was a thirty four
year old colonel Gamal Abdul-Nasser.
The coup was met with little resistance from the British occupation of Egypt. The
Free Officers, the faction that led the coup, seized key points around Cairo, and after their
successes supported the creation o f another civilian run government, which was approved by
King Farouk once he realized that he had no other option than to accept the proposal. This
new government would go on to vote Farouk into exile, and Prince Ahmed Fouad, just six
months old at the time, inherited the throne. Up until this point, Farouk remained certain that
the British would inevitably intervene to save his throne. Due to the moderate approach taken
by the usurpers, however, this intervention did not occur and Farouk left Egypt on the 26th of
July 1952.
Following Farouk’s departure, the newly created Military High Committee,
established by the Free Officers, announced that elections would be delayed for six months to
allow the country to “undergo a period of purification”, wherein political parties were
advised to purge themselves o f corrupt elements held over from Farouk’s reign.54 These
actions, however, were primarily undertaken to delay elections, allowing the military to
further consolidate their power. The interim government was soon thereafter dissolved, and
the illusion o f civilian rule was cast aside to usher in a more obvious, junta-led Egypt. This

54 Michael T. Thornhill, "Britain, The United States And The Rise O f An Egyptian Leader: The Politics And
Diplomacy O f Nasser's Consolidation O f Power, 1952-4," English Historical Review 119, no. 483 (September
2004): 898.

30

dissolution was due to resistance to junta backed land reforms, reforms meant to weaken the
Egyptian pasha elite, while ingratiating the Military High Committee to the peasantry.55
By the beginning of 1953, Naguib was enshrined as “Leader of the Revolution,” and
served as prime minister for the next three years.56 To further consolidate power, the Military
High Committee renamed themselves as the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), as a
more obvious showing o f the military’s influence in Egyptian politics, as well as a way to
even further ingratiate themselves to the general population. Furthermore, Nasser was
appointed the secretary general of a movement called the “Liberation Rally” by the RCC, the
purpose o f which was to further develop the junta’s popularity.57 This appointment would
bring Nasser to the forefront of Egyptian politics.
Following these actions, the next requirement for consolidation was the removal of
British influences entirely from Egypt. To further this end, the Egyptian junta declared itself,
on June 18th of 1953 to be a republic, with Naguib assuming the role of President, and Nasser
becoming the deputy prime minister. Nasser’s new position re-established the assumptions
that he was the true power behind the regime.58 Due to Britain’s intransigence on this
particular issue, the RCC relied heavily on the support of the Society of Muslim Brothers,
more commonly known as the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Brotherhood, established in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, was a fairly new
organization that espoused the now familiar message o f a return to stricter standards of Islam

55 Ibid. 900
56 Ibid., 904.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 909.

31

and shari ’a.59 In the proceeding decades, the Brotherhood had risen far enough in stature and
influence that they were seen as a credible threat, and Al-Banna was assassinated in 1949.60
The government increased the severity of the crackdowns against the Muslim Brotherhood,
but at this point “the Brothers had spread across the country, and then throughout the Arab
world, planting the seeds of the coming Islamic insurgence”.61 Shortly after Al-Banna’s
assassination, the Brotherhood was joined by infamous Islamic scholar Sayyid Qutb, who
would eventually provide the fundamental and extremist philosophy which would come to
characterize the Brotherhood, as well as other Islamist groups.
The government turned to the Brotherhood because, at the time, the organization had
the capabilities to wage guerilla warfare in the Canal Zone. The Brotherhood had played a
role during the initial July coup, and expecting a more prominent role in the subsequent
military rule, hoped that their part in the guerrilla struggle would realize these goals. This
tenuous agreement between the Egyptian government and the Brotherhood would be the first
real interaction between the military and the Brotherhood, and would set off decades of open
conflict and duplicity between military-led Egypt and the Muslim Brotherhood.
In what would ultimately become a recurring trend amongst Egyptian leaders, after
the military consolidated power, it began its suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. This
suppression o f the Brotherhood would lead to further violence in the Canal Zone, which in
turn led to Naguib gaining popularity and power.62 These events were brief, however, as

59 Rupe Simms, “’Islam is our Politics’: a Gramscian Analysis o f the Muslim Brotherhood (1928-1953),” Social
Compass 49, no 4 (Dec 2002): 570.
“ ibid.
61 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007),
19.
62 Michael T. Thornhill, "Britain, The United States And The Rise O f An Egyptian Leader: The Politics And
Diplomacy O f Nasser's Consolidation O f Power, 1952-4," English Historical Review 119, no. 483 (September
2004): 914.

32

Nasser changed the situation rather quickly. Nasser began a media campaign promoting the
idea that an inevitable breakdown o f order was coming, the cause of which were party
elections (which would produce a victory for the Wafd party, the preeminent party under
Farouk’s rule) and Naguib.63 Nasser even organized “spontaneous” labor strikes which
demanded that political parties remain illegal until British forces left Egypt.64 Nasser also
assured the Muslim Brotherhood of their status as a political party, as well as promising the
legalization o f all political parties for forthcoming elections. Nasser did this to show that
political parties were detrimental to Egypt, and again, cast the blame of such implementations
at his political enemies.65
These political developments and maneuverings led to the British agreeing on full
evacuation of all forces from Egypt in the summer of 1954. Due to their exclusion during the
negotiations, the details of the evacuation were heavily opposed by certain groups, notably
the Muslim Brotherhood. At the end of October in the same year, the Brotherhood made an
unsuccessful attempt on Nasser’s life, which would further prove to consolidate his power
and popularity. In a speech he gave on the day as the attack, Nasser stated,” remember that, if
anything should happen to me, the Revolution will go on, for each of you is a Gamal Abdul
Nasser”.66 The speech rallied the Egyptian people around Nasser, and the next day,
demonstrators burned down the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters.67 Nasser further
maneuvered his renewed popularity after his failed assassination into Naguib’s removal from

63 Michael T. Thornhill, "Britain, The United States And The Rise O f An Egyptian Leader: The Politics And
Diplomacy O f Nasser's Consolidation O f Power, 1952-4," English Historical Review 119, no. 483 (September
2004): 915.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., 920
67 Ibid.

33

office. Naguib had been frustrated with his position as figurehead, and had been making a
play for greater independence, so his removal was a large victory for Nasser.
Nasser also orchestrated a severe crack down on the Muslim Brotherhood. This led to
thousands o f Muslim Brotherhood members being arrested, imprisoned, and tortured,
removing one of the greatest opponents to Nasser’s reign, who then assumed the office of
president in June o f 1964. This suppression of the Brotherhood was not finished so quickly,
however, and in 1965, in response to another plot against the regime led by Sayyid Qutb, the
police began a series of arrests, with estimates of 18,000 Islamists arrested near the start of
the incident, and with another 27,000 arrested shortly thereafter.68 Qutb was arrested and
executed on August 29th, 1966, and would be known as a martyr by his followers.69 The
severity o f this crackdown would come to represent the violent relationship between the
Egyptian state and the Muslim Brotherhood for decades to come. The brutality of the
crackdown would also lay the foundation for more fundamental and extreme forms of Islam,
which would affect both Egypt and the world. Lawrence Wright stated:
One line o f thinking proposes that America’s tragedy on September 11 was bom in the prisons of Egypt.
Human-rights advocates in Cairo argue that torture created an appetite for revenge, first in Sayyid Qutb
and later in his acolytes...The main target of the prisoners’ wrath was the secular Egyptian government
but a power current o f anger was also directed toward the West, which they saw as an enabling force
behind the repressive regime. They held the West responsible for corrupting and humiliating Islamic
society.70

This contempt for the West would prove to be a particularly enduring characteristic of
Egyptian society. The crackdown also led to a state of great paranoia within the Egyptian

68 Curtis Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal o f Third World Studies 18, no. 2
(September 2001): 33.
69 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007),
36-7.
70 Ibid., 61.

34

leadership which culminated in more torture, phone-tapping, and arbitrary arrests, actions
that would persist through the reign of the next two Presidents and into the modem age.
The relevance of the 1952 revolution is in its similarities to contemporary events. The
military involvement with the deposal of leader, the manipulations o f society, and the
machinations which led to the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood parallel the
developments and events o f the Arab Spring. The relationships between the Egyptian military
and society, as well as with the Muslim Brotherhood, are two o f the most important dynamics
o f the past several decades in Egypt. The evolution of these relationships would come to play
a vital role in the events o f the Arab Spring.

From Nasser to Sadat to Mubarak
Nasser found legitimacy through in two ways: first, the pragmatic issue of land
reform and redistribution, and second, his opposition to Western influence. Land reform was
an issue the post-revolutionary regime had pushed for, as approximately six percent of
Egyptians at the time owned sixty five percent of the land.71 One contemporary described the
necessity for the redistribution of land as follows: “no one who knows Egypt would doubt
that land reform was needed for reasons of humanity. The majority of Egypt’s fellahin
(peasants) are a wretched proletariat., .without some redistribution of ownership to raise rural
incomes, other measures for raising village standards remain palliatives”.72 Allowing these
poorer Egyptians more opportunities for land ownership endeared Nasser to the Egyptian
people and provided a sharp contrast to the decadent, selfish reign of Farouk.
71 Doreen Warriner, “Land Reform in Egypt and its Repercussions,” International Affairs (Royal Institute o f
International Affairs 1944- 29, no. 1 (Jan 1953): 1.
72 Ibid.

35

Nasser further concretized his legitimacy when he went on to vehemently oppose any
Western influence not only in Egypt, but within any Arab country. Nasser believed strongly
that the greatest threat to Egyptian stability was both the West and Israel, and sought
independence from both.73 To do so, he created a vast intelligence network aimed specifically
at defending against foreign agents, domestic unrest, and any signs of another coup, similar
to the one that he himself had orchestrated.74 He also made use of the largest Arab radio
station, “Voice o f the Arabs,” to broadcast a largely successful campaign of propaganda to
limit Western influence in the region, and in turn helped promote a cult of personality centred
on himself.75
In this way, Nasser effectively created within the Egyptian mindset the idea of the
“other,” the outsider whose sole purpose was to create disharmony and sabotage the state, a
lightning rod to blame for any discontent within the state. This convenient scapegoat allowed
him vast influence over societal dialogue. He was so successful in this sense that the West
was only able to find a single ally in the region, Iraq. Other countries, such as Lebanon and
Syria, instead fell under the sway o f Nasser’s quasi, Arabic unity.76 The legitimacy derived
from land reforms and Arab nationalism allowed Nasser to rule with a freer hand, allowing
him to create the burgeoning security state which would characterize Egypt for decades.
These events would prove to be the end point of both his career and his life; three
years after the Six Day War in 1967, where the Arab forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan
suffered humiliating defeat at the hands of Israel, Nasser tried to resign. Despite this loss, the

73 Scott Baumann, "Nasser, Suez, and Arab Nationalism," History Review, no. 66 (March 2010).
74 Jason Brownlee, "Peace Before Freedom: Diplomacy and Repression in Sadat's Egypt," Political Science
Quarterly 126, no. 4 (2011/2012): 646.
75 Scott Baumann, "Nasser, Suez, and Arab Nationalism," History Review, no. 66 (March 2010).
76 Ibid

36

Egyptian public demanded that he stay, but on September 28, 1970, Nasser died from a heart
attack.77 Regardless o f his failure during the Six Day War, a failure that likely would have
politically crippled a weaker leader, Nasser remained extremely popular. Even in death, his
ideas about Egyptian and Arabic nationalism would survive for decades, even into the
contemporary thinking o f the region.78
Following Nasser’s death, Vice President Anwar Sadat took over the role of
President, but did not follow with Nasser’s ideals. In the 1970s, in response to a substantial
increase in Marxist and Nasserist ideals, Sadat released most members of the Muslim
Brotherhood, who had been heavily persecuted and were imprisoned during the time of his
predecessor. This action may have been seen as an attempt to increase pluralism within
Egypt, however, it was more a ploy to hinder the resurgence of leftist elements. Sadat would
later confront these actors more directly, banning all Marxist and Nasserist organizations,
therefore leaving the Muslim Brotherhood, among other Islamist groups, as the chief voice of
opposition in Egypt.79 The Brotherhood would quickly fill the vacancies left by those
abolished groups, especially within student institutions and associations.80
The ease of Sadat’s abilities to manipulate societal trends using ideology and religion
was indicative of a long running trend in Egypt. It led to a society in which the Egyptian
citizens did not play any meaningful role in the political development of Egypt. Under Sadat,
Egypt remained as much under the thumb of the new government as they did under King
Farouk and Nasser. Any deviation from this control was met with repression. In 1977, in

77 Ibid.
78 Curtis Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal o f Third World Studies 18, no. 2
(September 2001): 36.
79 Ibid., 31.
80 Ibid.

37

response to a wave o f rioting and protest caused by the implementation o f an IMF austerity
program, Sadat would call in the army to forcefully subdue the protesters.81 Military
intervention o f this kind had not previously occurred since the days before Nasser had
consolidated the post-revolution government.82 Furthermore, in 1977, the failures of Sadat’s
economic program, Infitah, came to a head, as massive protests, known as “The Bread Riots”
began.83 To combat this threat, Sadat criminalized all forms o f protest, on threat of life in
prison with hard labor, and instituted policies which only allowed government sanctioned
parties to participate in elections, essentially eliminating completive elections.84
Sadat also entered into a controversial peace treaty with Israel in 1978 in which he
played from a position o f weakness. Many of the key demands made of Israel, specifically
ones made on behalf o f the Palestinians, were all but ignored, such as Israeli withdrawal from
the West Bank and Palestinian self-rule.85 Sadat quickly called for a public referendum on the
treaty, which passed with a preposterous 99.95 percent approval, ratified the peace
agreement, and called for a new round o f elections.86 The referendum was an almost farcical
display of corruption, as visible ballot rigging was recorded and shown by foreign news
studios.87
The approval o f this peace treaty was the tipping point for the Sadat regime, as public
opinion turned sharply against him. Fueled by past Nasserist ideals, Israel was considered by
many to be a grave threat to both Egypt and the rest of the Arabic world. The peace treaty

81 Jason Brownlee, "Peace Before Freedom: Diplomacy and Repression in Sadat's Egypt," Political Science
Quarterly 126, no. 4 (2011/2012): 651.
Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 652.
85 Ibid., 655.
86 Ibid., 661
87 Ibid.

38

was seen by many Arabs as facilitating or ignoring Israeli aggression against other Arabic
countries that had no such treaty, a point supposedly proven correct with Israeli intervention
in Lebanon in 1978.88 Specifically, Islamists took extreme issue with the peace treaty,
specifically the Islamist extremist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad.
As Sadat’s critics grew louder, he in turn began more severe domestic measures
against his opposition, while attempting to gain popularity through various means. These
gestures, however, were largely for show, and changed very little. For example, in 1980,
Sadat would lift Nasser’s state of emergency, but “arbitrary arrests and 24-hour surveillance
of the treaty’s critics continued”.89 Given that Sadat’s pursuit of a peace treaty with Israel
was an attempt to secure his position, it is ironic that it actually was the cause of his
downfall. Albert Wolf states: “autocracies often use foreign antagonisms as a means to
legitimate their rule. When longstanding conflicts are resolved, domestic challengers are
provided with a focal point for organizing against the regime and presenting themselves as a
patriotic alternative to the incumbent”.90 These factors would all contribute to the “Autumn
of Fury,” a series of intense protests occurring in 1981, culminating in Sadat’s assassination
by the extremists, Egyptian Islamic Jihad.91 Sadat’s mistake of presumed invincibility was a
mistake that Nasser did not make, and which Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, would also
learn from. Nasser consolidated his rule by making certain the enemies of Egypt were always
beyond its borders. Mubarak did this as well, but took it further by keeping his domestic
opponents brutally reined in as well.

88 Albert B. Wolf, “Peacemaking and Political Survival in Sadat’s Egypt,” Middle East Policy 21, no. 4 (2014):
133.
89 Ibid., 134.
90 Ibid., 136.
91 Ibid., 132.

39

Thirty Years to Revolt: Egypt Under Mubarak 1981-2011
Lacking both the charisma and nationalist credentials of either of his two
predecessors, Mubarak’s hold on the presidency of Egypt was tenuous at best. “Mubarak’s
accession would bring an abrupt end to Egypt’s [regional] pre-eminence...cautious and
unimaginative, the former air force commander [had] never in his [presidency] come close to
filling the shoes of his predecessors”.92 Instead of change or innovation, Mubarak increased
suppression, beginning by instituting a national state of emergency, which would last for the
vast majority o f the three decades that he was in power. The state of emergency was used
consistently as justification for severe repression against any who were even alleged Islamic
militants.93
This repression, which included assaults on mosques that were believed to be home to
Islamist militants, resulted very often in battles between these supposed militants and the
state. It became common practice to forego any legal due process for those who were
arrested. This in turn led to escalation on both sides, as militants continued campaigns of
increasingly violent terrorism against the state, with the regime answering in kind. This
struggle was used as justification for limiting more and more civil liberties.94 Mubarak’s
costly military campaign against the Islamists (the annual death toll of which, in 1993,
peaked at more than 1,000) would come to characterize his presidency, and would also lead
to the pretext o f repressing nonviolent political opponents and movements as well.95 Once
again, the Muslim Brotherhood, who was still outlawed in the 1990s, but who organized

92 David Ottaway, "The Arab Tomorrow," Wilson Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2010).
93 Curtis Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal o f Third World Studies 18, no. 2
(September 2001):35
94 Ibid.
95 Jason Brownlee, "The Decline o f Pluralism in Mubarak's Egypt," Journal o f Democracy 13, no. 4 (October
2002): 7.

40

without official party status, bore the brunt of Mubarak’s repression. The government took
over the management o f any syndicates in which the Brotherhood found any successes, such
as in leadership elections in the doctors’, engineers’, pharmacists’, and lawyers’ syndicates in
the early-to-mid 90s.96 The regime also sent dozens of Brotherhood members to prison by
military trial, and detained additional thousands without formal charge.97 Events such as
these continued to occur in the 2000s, despite a formal surrender by Islamists (particularly
Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya98 in 1998), and a lack of domestic attacks by militant Islamists.99
Though Egypt was heavily characterized by its Islamic identity, the Mubarak regime never
made any effort at reconciling the religious tension throughout the country.
Unfortunately for Mubarak, his reliance on suppression and limitation for three
decades would lead to ever increasing unrest among the Egyptian populace. Given that his
term o f office began with the death of his predecessor, it is understandable why Mubarak
relied on an almost fanatical dedication to the security o f his regime, but this dedication
overshadowed more pressing matters, such as economic or political reform, as well as civil
liberties and rights.
Excessive reliance on the types o f survival strategies [which were used in Egypt] bodes ill for the
development prospects o f many countries...a leader such as Nasser or Sadat may have a great vision,
agenda, or ideological view aimed at change and development o f the nation, yet the focus on government
survival can easily become an obsession, tempering even the most ambitious plans for a better future.
Political concentration on the short term and the immediate future all too easily loses sight o f lasting
development, with the result that executives may survive but the ultimate losers continue to be the
people.100

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 More commonly known in the West as “the Islamic group,” Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya was an Islamist militant
group whose acts o f terrorism included the 1997 Luxor massacre which claimed the lives of 71 people,
predominantly foreign tourists.
99 Ibid., 7-8.
100 Curtis Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal o f Third World Studies 18, no. 2
(September 2001): 42.

41

Ultimately, it was no single factor that would eventually lead to the end of Mubarak’s
three decade long rule. His government was largely unconcerned with the desires or
hardships of the average citizen, and was instead dedicated to the interests of the decadent,
ruling elite. Human rights and societal progress were prioritized beneath the stability and
security the regime enjoyed from the status quo.
By the end o f 2010, people were pushed to the brink by the sharply rising prices o f basic foods,
escalating, unemployment, crackdowns on the media and university, outrageous rigging o f the
parliamentary elections, an ever-lengthening list o f corrupt actions by the elite, and fear that 82-year-old
Mubarak might run for election again in September 2011 or, even worse, hand power over to his hated
son.101

Even with so much motivation behind them, Egyptians still did not believe that the status quo
could be changed. Only after a fruit vendor in Tunisia immolated himself in front of a police
station, and an unprecedented wave of protest and outrage spread across the Arab world,
would Egyptians take to Tahrir Square to protest the rule o f Mubarak, eventually leading to
the end o f his regime. Before this, Egypt also had its own fruit vendor: a young man named
Khaled Said.

“We are all Khaled Said”
On June 6 2010, police arrested twenty eight year old Khaled Said in a cybercafe,
pulling him into the street. As they dragged him, handcuffed behind his back, witnesses say
that the two officers slammed his head against a marble table, and once they had him outside,
they began to viciously beat him to death. Said was arrested because he supposedly had

101 Ann Lesch, "Egypt's Spring: Causes of the Revolution," Middle East Policy 18, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 46.

42

obtained a video o f corrupt police officers splitting the earnings o f a drug bust amongst
themselves.102
Despite the attempts to cover up the killing of Said, pictures of his face post-mortem
were taken by his family after they visited his body in the morgue. These pictures were
released to the internet, showing Said’s face as a twisted, disfigured mask, almost
unrecognizable after the beating that had led to his to death.103 The pictures spread, and
outrage was quick to homogenize the already fomenting outrage against the Mubarak regime,
for which Khaled Said’s death would serve as the catalyst.
A Facebook page entitled “We are all Khaled Said” was created by Google marketing
executive Wael Ghonim. The page quickly grew in popularity, with Khaled Said’s murder
becoming an example of the arbitrary strength of the regime; as the title of the page implied,
anyone could become victim to the corrupt officials and police forces of Egypt.104 Though
not the root cause o f Mubarak’s ouster, this message was simple and relatable. The page
would also prove vital for organization, as it became a gathering point for protesters who
used the page to shape the forthcoming protests in Tahrir Square and elsewhere.105

The Arab Spring in Egypt: January 25 2011
January 25th in Egypt is National Police Day, a holiday put into place by Hosni
Mubarak only two years prior to the protests that would end his rule. Choosing this day as the

102 “Khaled Said: The face that launched a revolution,” Al-Ahram Online, June 6 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/0/43995/Egypt/0/Khaled-Said-The-face-that-launched-arevolution.aspx.

43

start of protests against the Mubarak regime had great significance, as the police were
consistently a symbol o f suppressed civil rights in Egypt. That Mubarak chose to create a
holiday honoring the police is an apt example o f how disconnected he was from the Egyptian
people. “Activists said they wanted to use this particular day to highlight the irony of
celebrating Egypt's police at a time when police brutality is making headlines”, an allusion to
the savage killing o f Khaled Said by police several months earlier.106 The demands of the
protests were not complex. The protesters wanted to immediately removal of Hosni Mubarak
from office, and greater freedoms, rights, and inclusivity.
The protests themselves were entirely unsurprising to the regime. To make certain
that the greatest number of people were aware of the protests, information was openly
distributed throughout Egypt, primarily through social media such as Facebook, Twitter,
YouTube, and even Wikipedia, which was being updated by the minute.107 All of this was
done not only for convenience, but for safety and efficiency. These social media channels
were safe because communications over social media was anonymous, and therefore
protestors could avoid being identified by Egyptian security forces. These challenges were
likewise efficient because communication through social media was fast and easy. Under the
state of emergency, Egyptians were limited in their political associations, in their ability to
demonstrate, and they were prohibited from any non-governmental political activity. Due to
these problems, the internet, specifically social media sites, became integral in anonymously
organizing the demonstrations o f early 2011.

106 Rageh Rawya, “Three dead in Egypt protests,” AlJazeera January 25,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111251711053608.html.
107 Llewellyn H. Rockwell, "A people's uprising against empire," Al-Jazeera, February 6, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/20112312504969243.html

44

In response to the increased online, activity, the government created task forces that
explicitly monitored the internet in search for anti-regime activists.108 During the protests
themselves, the Mubarak regime shut down all internet and phone communications within
Egypt, in an unsuccessful attempt to staunch the flow of information, both to restrict the
protester’s ability to organize and to limit the amount of information sent to the international
community.109 These attempts were only partially successful. Protesters still continued to
organize themselves effectively, using what few online resources (made possible by
“hacktivist” elements within the protests) which were still accessible, as well as more simple
“on the ground” networking.110 Furthermore, media outlets faced obstacles as their journalists
came under attack. This violence clearly affected the way the international community
viewed the event. Many journalists, including foreigners, were reported to have been beaten
or detained by security forces, and some had their equipment destroyed.111
More directly, demonstrators faced off against riot police, who employed tear gas and
water cannons. Protesters also faced roaming bands of pro-Mubarak “thugs”, many of whom
were believed to be undercover policemen.112 There were even instances of pro-Mubarak
forces making charges against the demonstrators while riding horses and camels, using long
knives, whips, and petrol bombs.113 Evan Hill, an American reporter and photographer, was

108 Anne Alexander, "Internet role in Egypt's protests," BBC News, February 9,2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12400319
109 Rageh Rawya, “Three dead in Egypt protests,” AlJazeera January 25,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/20111251711053608.html.
110 Anne Alexander, "Internet role in Egypt's protests," BBC News, February 9,2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-l 2400319
111 Jim Muir, "Egypt unrest: Anti-Mubarak protesters fight back," BBC News, February 3,2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12357891
112 Ibid.
113 BBC Liveblog, "Egypt unrest: Day 10 as it happened," BBC News, February 4, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12357891

45

on the ground during some of the worst o f the violence that occurred during the first few days
of February 2011. He described some o f what he saw as follows:
The anti-government protesters in Tahrir had arranged a field of debris 40m in front of their barricade to
impede the approach of any pro-Mubarak thugs. The square was peaceful, but eerily empty; just 24 hours
earlier, hundreds of thousands of anti-government protested had staged what might have been the largest
political demonstration in Cairo’s history...The jubilance that had turned the square into a giant
campground just a day before was gone; people now feared being overrun and killed by the surrounding
pro-govemment mob - many o f them reportedly hired thugs.114

The beginning o f February was marked with thousands o f injuries, and several deaths.
Mubarak also ordered the army to intervene with live ammunition, though the army refused
this order. Despite this restraint, there were still several cases o f gunfire being directed at the
protestors in the days that followed, leaving several more dead.115
In the days that followed, there was still violence, but it was quickly substituted with
concessions. Beyond Mubarak’s earlier pledges not to run in the September elections, and
thus allow a “peaceful transition,” many within the leadership of Mubarak’s National
Democratic Party (NDP) resigned, including Mubarak’s son, Gamal.116 The government
approved a fifteen percent rise in salaries and pensions, as well as a number of both
legislative and constitutional reforms.117 These reforms would be undertaken by committees
which, at the time, were not yet formed. Mubarak also released a number of political
prisoners, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood.118 These attempts at consolation
were without any real effect on the protesters, who remained resolute in their desire to see
Mubarak step down as President. Three speeches were made by Mubarak in which he tried
and failed to reassure the Egyptian people that the continuation of his presidency was in their
114 Evan Hill, “The battle for Tahrir Square. Al Jazeera, ” February 3,2011,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201123175837480777.html.
115 Al Jazeera, “Timeline: Egypt's revolution,” A l Jazeera, February 14, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html.
1,6 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.

46

best interest. On February 12, 2011, Omar Suleiman announced that “President Hosni
Mubarak [had] decided to step down from the office of president of the republic and [had]
charged the high council o f the armed forces to administer the affairs of the country,” to the
great jubilation o f the demonstrators.119 Following Mubarak’s resignation, the SCAF
assumed control o f the country’s leadership. They suspended the constitution and dissolved
the parliament, stating that they would voluntarily concede their powers once presidential and
parliamentary elections were held.

Egypt 2011: After Mubarak
The euphoria hardly had time to settle before the anti-Mubarak masses took action,
though this was quite short-lived. The protesters raided government security offices, hoping
to dismantle Mubarak’s massive, security apparatus. Many new political parties across the
ideological spectrum were formed. Perhaps the most significant development was the
creation o f the Freedom and Justice Party by the Muslim Brotherhood, allowing the
Brotherhood to formally enter the political arena. The FJP even vowed to limit their
ambition, promising not to field a presidential candidate, assuaging liberal concerns that the
Islamist group would doggedly seek power.120 There was optimism that the civil liberties,
such as greater gender and religious equality, would finally be applied. Less than two months
after Mubarak’s deposal, however, any of the tentative alliances that had arisen among
between the disparate groups began to crumble.

119 Egypt crisis: President Hosni Mubarak resigns as leader,” BBC News, Feb. 12, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12433045.
120 “Muslim Brotherhood will not nominate a presidential candidate: spokesman,” Al-Ahram Online, Dec. 25
2011. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/30185/Egypt/Politics-/Muslim-Brotherhood-will-notnominate-a-presidentia.aspx.

47

The first truly divisive issue in the post-Mubarak period was a referendum which took
place on March 19th, 2011. The referendum was to approve a set of nine amendments to the
constitution, primarily meant to limit the powers of the President, abolish the ability of
authorities to circumvent the judiciary with military trials (that were used to supposedly
“counter the dangers of terror,”) as well as provide full judicial oversight to all forthcoming
elections.121 Though the changes were all essentially common demands from the Egyptian
opposition during Mubarak’s reign, the constitutional amendments were still met with
resistance from youth and liberal movements. Nobel Peace Prize winner and prominent
member o f the Egyptian liberal movement, Mohammed ElBaradei, is quoted as saying that
“most of the people who triggered the revolution are going to say no.”122 Instead, these
liberal groups moved for the creation o f an entirely new constitution, instead of simply
building upon the old. A new constitution would allow Egypt to move away from the
legacies of its previous rulers and towards a more progressive, inclusive future.
The reasoning behind this resistance was that a “yes” vote would accelerate the return
of a civilian government. It would also relegate the army once more to its true role, while
keeping the military away from governance.123 While this may seem like an attractive reason
to vote in favor of the amendments, the groups that would most heavily benefit from more
immediate elections were groups already heavily entrenched within Egypt’s political culture,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood. If the amendments were accepted, parliamentary elections
would follow within two months. Many groups that were founded during and after the
121 Gregg Carlstrom, "Egypt's proposed constitutional amendments," Al-Jazeera, March 15,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/anger-in-egypt/2011/03/20113156309594476.html
122 "Egypt approves constitutional changes," A l Jazeera, March 20, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320164119973176.html
123 Ahmad Rahim, "Egyptian politicians worried by Islamist support for constitutional amendments," BBC
Monitoring Middle East, March 17,2011.

48

revolution would have great difficulty in consolidating and organizing in this period of time,
a task made even greater given that their chief opponent would be an Islamist group with
several decades o f experience. The constitutional amendments also led to concerns about
whether the presidential powers had been limited enough, or if there was still room for
abuse.124 With the Brotherhood pushing so strongly for the amendments, many feared that the
Brotherhood would seek to push forward an Islamist agenda, rather than the liberal agenda
that the protesters fought for in Tahrir Square.
The constitutional amendments were approved, with the “yes” vote winning
convincingly with approximately 77 percent of the vote.125 With eighteen million Egyptian
voters constituting a 41 percent turnout, the referendum enjoyed a higher voter turnout than
many past elections, including the previous year’s parliamentary elections which, according
to different sources, had as high as a twenty five percent turnout and as low as ten.126 This
loss was the first major blow to liberal groups who believed that the revolution had shown
Egypt to be moving towards a path of liberal democracy. The approval of the amendments
would also expedite the process o f parliamentary elections, which would be held at the end of
November 2011, allowing only a few months for liberals to organize themselves.
The months following the March referendum were likewise filled with unrest. Anger
was primarily aimed at the SCAF who had taken over leadership until elections could be
held. The SCAF was facing criticism “for failing to implement the goals of the revolution,

125 "Egypt approves constitutional changes," A l Jazeera, March 20, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/2011320164119973176.html.
126 Ibid.

49

and [was] accused o f being an extension of the previous regime”.127 On July 8 2011, mass
protests, dubbed the “Second Revolution”, rallied against the SCAF, and which marked a
complete reversal o f the exalted position of the SCAF following their refusal to support
Mubarak.128 Previously, the SCAF were seen as integral to Mubarak’s ouster. The failure to
establish any meaningful progress towards the goals o f protesters, however, found the SCAF
labeled as opportunists still aligned with the spirit of the Mubarak regime, if not the man.129
This reversal o f public opinion led to prolonged clashes between protesters and the military,
including the infamous Maspero demonstrations where an estimated 24 people were killed by
security forces, with an additional 300 being injured.130 With so much emphasis being placed
on anti-SCAF protest, campaigning for the parliamentary elections was far less prevalent.
This lackluster campaigning would affect the newly formed, disorganized liberal groups
much more than the Islamists, who enjoyed years of consolidation.
At the end o f 2011, parliamentary elections were scheduled. The parliamentary
elections, held from November 28 to January 11 2012, went much the same way as the
constitutional referendum. The two major Islamist parties were exceedingly successful
throughout each phase of the elections. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice
Party (FJP) won approximately 45 percent of the 498 seats, while the ultra-conservative
Salafist party, Al-Nour, won approximate 25 percent.131 Conversely, the two liberal front
runner parties, the New Wafd and Egyptian Block, won a combined total o f only about 15

127 N. Shamni, “In Egypt, Criticism o f SCAF Intensifies,” MEMRI. Oct. 11, 2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5715.htm.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 Andre Aciman, "After Egypt's Revolution, Christians Are Living in Fear...," New York Times, Nov. 21,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
131 BBC News, “Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to parliament,” BBC News, January 21,2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16665748.

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percent, with the remaining seats being scattered amongst smaller parties, independents, and
ten seats being appointed by the military council.132
The Islamists’ victory was a combination of their own successes, as well as the
failures of the liberal opposition. The Islamist message was one of religion, history, and
tradition. Egyptian Islamic was at the core of the Islamist platform, and was easily digested
by the Egyptian voter.133 The Islamist bloc also succeeded due to the crowded political
landscape filled with new ideology, countless newly formed liberal political parties, and a
general lack o f liberal leadership and cohesion.
This Islamist victory colored the political landscape leading up to the Presidential
elections in June 2012, but also expressed a desire to move away from military rule and back
to a civilian government. This dissatisfaction with the military government was largely due to
several poorly managed incidents that had occurred. Chief among these were the Maspero
demonstrations of October 2012, a peaceful protest against the SCAF. The military police
staged an unprovoked attack against the protesters, and at least 24 were killed, with more
than 200 injured.134 The Maspero demonstrations became a stark example of the military
leadership’s inability to keep the peace without resorting to violence. The second incident
was a soccer riot which occurred in Port Said, where more than seventy people were killed.135
The blame was largely placed on the ineffective government not providing sufficient security
for the event, thus allowing the violence to quickly escalate out o f hand. Protests were also

132 Ibid.
133 Evan Hill, "Explainer: Egypt's crowded political arena," A l Jazeera, Nov. 17,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2011/11/2011111510295463645.html.
134 “Cairo clashes leave 24 dead after Coptic church protest,” BBC News, Oct 9, 2011.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15235212.
135 Adel Abdel Ghafar, “Football and politics in Egypt: An explosive mix,” Al Jazeera, April 17,2012
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201247144949904754.html.

51

held, again blaming the SCAF for their failure of management, and these protests were also
dealt with harshly, as the police deployed tear gas on the protesters.136 This was the political
atmosphere going into the 2012 presidential elections. There were growing concerns about
whether the military would willfully step down, the role Islamists would play in the
forthcoming government, and whether or not the new government could provide the security
which Egyptians felt was severely lacking.
For weeks prior to the election, the media circled around liberal ffontrunners Amr
Moussa and Moneim Abul-Fotouh.137 The media’s belief in these two politicians would
prove them to be a vocal minority, focused around Egypt’s largest cities. Ignored by the
media were the Egyptians who live in rural areas and lacked the resources to understand the
new concept o f liberalism.138 This unseen section of Egyptian society would be responsible
for the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in the election, with a former member of the
Mubarak regime placing second.
The failure o f any liberal candidates to create meaningful competition against a
prominent Islamist candidate and a member of the old guard was a significant loss.
Mohammed Morsi, leader o f the FJP, won a narrow victory in the second round of voting
against Ahmed Shafiq, former prime minister under Mubarak. Morsi was sworn in as
President on Egypt on June 30 2012. He named his cabinet in early August, and promised to
be an inclusive President who would work for the best interests of all Egyptians, regardless
of gender, religion, or affiliation.
136 Ibid.
137 Abul-Fotouh dips, Moussa holds steady in Ahram presidential poll." Al-Ahram Online, May 14,2012
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/41592/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-electionsnews/AbulFotouh-dips,-Moussa-holds-steady-in-Ahram-pres.aspx
138 Sarah Mousa, "Democracy versus Tahrir," A l Jazeera, June 23, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/20126221226533 56816.html.

52

In November 2012, Morsi proposed a draft constitution. The draft ended many of the
arbitrary powers held by the Egyptian President in the past. The draft constitution would
strengthen parliament and also contained provisions against detention without trial and
torture. The draft was an attempt to address several of the key problems that Egypt had
suffered through. The lack of substantial liberal participation was, however, extremely
apparent. Rights of freedom of religion and speech were not expressed clearly, and there was
no explicit mention o f increasing gender equality. Furthermore, the draft constitution clearly
stated that Islamic law would continue be the foundation of the justice system (a holdover
from the previous constitution), as opposed to a more secular approach that many assumed
would follow the revolution. The military would also hold on to much of the power that it
had under Mubarak, and the military budget would be exempt from parliamentary
oversight.139 The draft constitution was supported by Islamist groups such as the FJP and AlNour party, while liberal groups, such as women’s rights activists, youth movements, and
Coptic Christians, were strongly opposed. Rallies both against and for the draft constitution
followed. On December 23, a constitutional referendum was held, and the constitution was
approved, winning with a majority of approximately 64 percent.140
The next six months were characterized by protests, sectarian violence, and general
unrest within Egypt. Morsi became more and more recalcitrant towards his critics, depending
more heavily on his large base of Islamist support. Confidence in Morsi’s ability to pull
Egypt out of instability and economic troubles declined steadily, and state security continued
to worsen. On June 30 2013, a massive planned protest occurred, with estimates of over ten

139 Sharif Tarek, “Inside Egypt's draft constitution: Debates over military powers continue,” Al-Ahram Online,
Dec. 12,2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/88582.aspx.
140 “Egypt approves disputed draft constitution,” A l Jazeera, Dec. 25,2012.
http://www.aijazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/201212251825337958.html.

53

million demonstrators .The military stepped in on July 1 to give Morsi an ultimatum: meet
the demands o f the people (resignation), or the military would step in to restore order within
forty eight hours. Despite some attempts to reconcile the situation, on July 3 2013, General
Abdul Fatah el-Sisi, head o f the SCAF, announced that the military had removed President
Mohammed Morsi from power, the suspension of the recently approved constitution, and that
Presidential elections would soon follow.

Commonalities o f 1952 and 2013
For all the differences between pre and post-Arab Spring Egypt, many of the same,
large issues stay consistent. First, there was frustration. The reason why the Free Officers
deposed King Farouk in the first place was to escape the stagnating influence of a corrupt
ruler more concerned with foreign affairs (namely the British) than he was with domestic
issues. This is a similar situation Egypt found itself in under Mubarak’s presidency: a
president who had largely removed himself from the concerns of most Egyptians, and
convinced himself of his absolute security. Second is the role of Islam. Since 1952, no
Egyptian president has successfully reconciled the question o f Islam and its role in
governance beyond one simple idea: “Egypt is Islamic”. Among other issues, this confusion
was the cause of Sadat’s assassination as well as Mubarak’s deeply paranoid domestic policy.
Following Mubarak’s ouster, liberals underestimated Islam’s popularity, and were served
several electoral losses. And following Morsi’s deposal, General el-Sisi, rather than attempt
to resolve issues with Morsi’s Islamic supporters, instead chose violent repression.

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Third is the idea o f security before progress. Nasser held onto power by prioritizing
measures that supposedly enhanced security, such as denying Western and Israeli influence,
but he also pushed forward important issues such as land reform which won him popularity
with Egyptian society. Sadat, conversely, lost his power and his life because he attempted the
opposite. Sadat also emphasized a security state, but he alienated himself with unpopular
decisions, such as establishing closer ties to Israel, or with unsuccessful economic reform.
Mubarak largely did the same, though he was more successful in his security measures.
Morsi slightly deviated from his predecessors. He attempted to bring progress to Egypt while
consolidating his presidency, but fumbled both dramatically. This point is vital to explaining
why certain events occurred following Mubarak’s ouster, specifically Morsi’s deposal, and
why military strongman el-Sisi’s so quickly rose to prominence. These three commonalities
between past and present Egypt are integral to understanding why the events of 2011-2013
progressed the way they did.

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Chapter Two
Civil Society
Before examining the role, health, and attitudes of civil society, it is important to
define the term civil society. As earlier defined by Linz and Stepan, civil society involves the
various groups, movements, and associations who are independent from the state, and who
seek to “articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests”.141
These groups can include social movements such as religious organizations and women’s
rights groups, as well as civic associations, such as journalists, student associations, and trade
unions.142 The media can also fall into the category of actors in civil society. Beyond these
various groups and associations is another part of society which plays a vital role: ordinary
citizens who are not necessarily part o f any organization. Linz and Stepan write:
Such citizens are often o f critical importance in shifting the regime/opposition balance because they turn
up in the streets in protest marches, heckle the police and the authorities, express their opposition first to
specific measures, support broader demands, and ultimately challenge the regime. Normally they are
initially small in numbers and later more numerous and can, in some cases, overwhelm the
representatives of the regime, forcing them to consider a growing liberalization and ultimately a regime
change.143

Linz and Stepan clarify, their argument by stating that no matter how “important, numerous,
and heroic such relatively unorganized groups may be, they would not be able to overthrow
the regime and establish a democratic regime if there were not [further processes beyond
civil society]”.144 This point is o f particular importance when considering the Mubarak ouster
and subsequent attempted transition.

141 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid., 8.
144 Ibid.

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There is also a stark difference between groups or associations and political parties.
For example, the Muslim Brotherhood is a religious organization that operates intimately
within Egyptian society, and is therefore a part of civil society. Meanwhile, the FJP is a
political party that stemmed from the Brotherhood, works within the sphere of governance
and other political matters, and is therefore part of political society (the next chapter). There
can be some confusion in the terminology, but typically, organizations that stem from and
organize within society are categorized within civil society. These groups from civil society
can also influence politics and government, but they do so indirectly. Meanwhile, political
parties and associations have more direct, straightforward avenues to affect government and
legislation, and are therefore part o f political society.

These civil associations and their

various issues will be the focus of this chapter, while issues of political associations will be
dealt with in the next chapter.
Civil society is integral in political transition for several reasons: first, the agents of
change most often stem from civil society, usually in the form of some sort of movement
opposed to the workings o f the government and the status quo; second, civil society puts
forward the ideals and values for this change, or in other words, the direction that a state will,
ideally, move toward following a successful regime change. The way that the factions within
civil society interact with one another shapes the way a transition progresses, though there is
no concrete set of guidelines for the effects o f civil society on transition (e.g. a united civil
society does not necessarily lead to a liberal democracy; an unhealthy civil society does not
necessarily lead to a communist totalitarian state, etc.), the way a civil society behaves during
a period o f transition can still be used to make reasonable assumptions about the end result.
With this in mind, I will examine civil society’s role during the Egyptian revolution, the

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parliamentary and presidential elections, and finally, the eventual downfall of the first postMubarak president, Mohammad Morsi.

Civil Society: The Arab Spring o f January 2011
During the revolution, civil society was integral in the deposal of Hosni Mubarak; it
appeared to be vibrant, unified, and capable of positive transition. There are several key
events that should be taken from the seventeen days between the start of protests on January
25 2011, and the resignation of a highly entrenched despot who had three decades to
consolidate his power. Two of these occurrences in particular showcase the strength of civil
society during the revolution. The first event is the organization of the protesters, who
numbered in the hundreds o f thousands, and still managed to work as a fairly cohesive whole.
The success of the revolt was in no small part due to this organization. Using various internet
resources, predominantly social media, the protesters were able to behave with relative unity,
no small achievement considering the sheer number of protesters. Organization by way of
social media may arguably be the largest catalyst for the 2011 Revolution, as online
communication via Facebook, Twitter, and other social media outlets proved to be an
obstacle that the Mubarak regime could not restrict.
Conventional means o f authoritarian control could not, nor cannot, halt the impact o f these revolutions.
They have given people access to information that their governments tried to conceal from them. They
have furnished unprecedented means to establish contact, to remain in communication, and to organise
and mobilise. They have broken the monopoly of dictatorial governments on communications and the
media, creating what we might term a media democracy in advance o f the emergence o f political
democracy, serving as a means for opposition forces to spread calls to rally and demand change. The
impact o f this quantum leap forward in media, communications and information technology not only
shook the foundations o f the conventional structures o f totalitarian societies.145

145 Mustafa Barghouti, "Lessons from the Egyptian revolution," Al-Ahram Weekly, March 3-9,2011,
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1037/opl 81 .htm>

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It should be noted, however, that the foundation for the protests themselves were
established in the years prior to the revolution, primarily by groups who were “offline”.146
With the recent influx o f internet users in Egypt, as well as the growth of mobile phone usage
which is estimated at approximately eighty percent of the population, prodigious use of social
media allowed the protesters to organize much more safely and in a way that would
maximize participation.147 With the assistance of social media, the demonstrators were
extremely well organized, especially given the staggering number of protesters who had
gathered. On January 31, Al Jazeera live-blogged that the demonstrations had reached
250,000 in Tahrir Square alone.148 This in itself is quite an impressive feat, considering that
Egyptian society had been repressed by decades of abusive state control.
The second event is the convergence of various political and religious groups who in
the past had been at odds. This convergence allowed the protesters to present a united front
against the Mubarak regime, as well as put forward a message that was generally accepted
amongst protesters, regardless of location: Mubarak must go. This shared goal remained
steady throughout the protests. Even with the regime’s attempts at placating the protesters
with concessions, the myriad groups remained steadfast. This common objective kept the
protesters together as one, instead o f seeking individual goals for individual groups. Egyptian
protesters also stayed together due to the efforts of the men and women who organized the
protests over Facebook and other social media feeds. Google executive Wael Ghonim

146 Anne Alexander, “Internet role in Egypt's protests,” BBC News, Feb. 9 2011. Web.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12400319.
147 Ibid.
I4* Al Jazeera, "Timeline: Egypt's revolution," A l Jazeera, Feb. 14, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html

59

received particular distinction in this regard, as he created the “We are all Khaled Said”
Facebook group which proved to be foundational for the movement.149
This common objective also fostered a coming together of a great many different
groups and ideologies, an indication of perhaps a budding civil society within Egypt at the
time of the protest. Groups that held differing agendas were able to come together in relative
harmony. Those who had suffered inordinately, even by the harsh standards of the Mubarak
regime, such as the Coptic Christians, Muslim Brotherhood, and liberal groups, were very
optimistic about how the future would unfold. There were several notable events which
characterized this common front, such as “on the ‘Friday of Departure’ (February 4), [when]
the Copts secured the approaches to [Tahrir Square] while the [Muslim] demonstrators
performed the Friday prayer” and vice versa.150 Even the possibility of a future where the
Muslim Brotherhood, traditionally considered to be bogeymen who would implement
fundamental shari ’a law, would hold positions of power was not as feared as it once was.
This lack of apprehension towards the Brotherhood was perhaps due to an increased
confidence in the liberal ideals that provided the foundation of the revolt, the belief that the
Brotherhood was widely considered popular only amongst a politically apathetic public, and
the repressive political machinations of the Mubarak regime. BBC correspondent Ahmad
Rahim summarizes this as follows:
Freedom will mean participation. In light o f the repression and dictatorship, the citizens do not
participate in elections at a time when the MB (Muslim Brotherhood) Group members are politicized.
Therefore, they participate in force and achieve political rise. But if freedom is achieved and the
149 “Khaled Said: The face that launched a revolution,” Al-Ahram Online, June 6 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/0/43995/Egypt/0/Khaled-Said-The-face-that-launched-arevolution.aspx.
150 Ahmad Rahim, "Egypt's Copts on role in protests, stance on Muslim Brotherhood," BBC Monitoring Middle
East - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Feb. 7,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

60

revolution manages to impose a genuine democratic regime, everyone will participate, including the MB
Group, parties, Copts, and ordinary citizens. Thus, the MB group will not dominate.151

Liberals also gained a great deal of momentum and they were buoyed by the
prevalence of youth in the revolution who sought meaningful change. Several prominent
candidates were put forward who seemed poised to bring strong leadership to the liberal
platform, potentially allowing them to make Egypt’s previous sham democracy more
legitimate. Chief among these were Mohamed Mustafa ElBaradei, a Nobel Peace laureate,
vocal supporter of Egyptian reform, and potential candidate for the Egyptian presidency.
There was even talk o f ElBaradei leading a coalition which included not only the disparate
liberals, but also the Muslim Brotherhood. These rumors, however, were eventually
overturned by the Brotherhood in a statement which outlined their own agenda: “the people
have not appointed Mohamed ElBaradei to become a spokesman of them...The Muslim
Brotherhood is much stronger than Mohamed ElBaradei as a person”.152 Wael Ghonim was
also considered a strong contender for a leadership position, given his role in the organization
of the protests, claims which were further strengthened after he was arrested and detained for
twelve days.153
These two points led to the successful ouster of Hosni Mubarak, who had held the
office o f president for thirty years. As evidenced both by the uprising and subsequent bloody
civil war in Libya, as well as the ongoing conflict in Syria which has escalated to the usage of
chemical weapons, the deposal of Hosni Mubarak with a comparatively small amount of

151 Ahmad Rahim, "Egyptian politicians worried by Islamist support for constitutional amendments," BBC
Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 17,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
152 "Egypt protesters step up pressure on Hosni Mubarak," BBC News, Jan. 31, 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12320959
153 L. Azuri, "The Popular Uprising in Egypt in Search o f a Leadership," MEMRI. Feb. 23,2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5028.htm#_ednref22.

61

bloodshed is an absolutely staggering victory. This is not to say that there was no violence;
protesters still engaged the riot police with rocks, Molotov cocktails, and a variety of other
improvised weapons, but this violence was not a predominating characteristic of the protests.
Significantly, very few protesters used guns, and when they did the incidences took place
outside o f the largest protest in Tahrir Square, typically occurring in the Sinai. Conversely,
pro-Mubarak forces used firearms much more often though these incidents of violence did
not goad the protesters to behave similarly. For example, when Mohamed ElBaradei arrived
in Cairo, and he was met with police violence in the form of batons and water cannons,
reportedly the protesters chanted “peacefully, peacefully,” even as they were hammered by
riot shields.154
This relative pacifism was due to a combination of both the organization and tenuous
unity held amongst the protesters. The rallies were organized around the simple idea of
peaceful protest, including marches and the sit-in at Tahrir Square, which would last the
duration of the revolution. This made it much more difficult for the Mubarak regime to
escalate the force that was being used. Without a comparable violent reaction from the
protesters, it was simply too difficult to justify.
In the two weeks from the beginning o f the revolution to the resignation of Mubarak
in mid-February, Egyptian civil society might be considered to be growing, as expressed by
the rising up of its people. A healthy and strong civil society can play an integral role in the
progression of the state. Even Egypt’s historically divisive religious identity can see gains
through an active civil society. In Turkey, “religiously oriented groups have formed

154 David D. Kirkpatrick,"A Nobelist Has an Unfamiliar Role in Protests," New York Times, Jan. 28,2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/world/middleeast/29elbaradei.html.

62

organizations around human rights, education, and economic issues. They thus use these
organizations to further a religious agenda and affect public policy.”155 Thus, the engagement
of civil society can create positive development during a transition. The opposite, however, is
also true. Sheri Berman argued that in a state with weak national institutions, a strong civil
society may actually create greater societal divides, and weaken developmental processes.156
Once the protesters were successful, these complexities began to reveal themselves. As the
roles of governance and power became available, the various groups o f civil society began to
fracture apart and act more individually instead of collectively, hoping to fill these newly
vacated seats of power.

Amendments and Elections: March 2011 to July 2012
Though Egyptian civil society during the days of revolution in early 2011 suggested a
civil society on the rise, problems began to emerge quickly after Hosni Mubarak was
deposed, and there was no longer a singular target for the combined anger of the various
separate groups that made up the revolutionaries. Unity lasted only for a short period of time,
long enough only to accomplish a handful of goals. For example, the dismantling of the
security apparatus, as in March 2011 when protesters assaulted state security buildings,
searching for documentation proving human rights violations, and incriminating former
Mubarak supporters (though much of this evidence was shredded or destroyed).157 To further
support this cooperation between the Brotherhood and its revolutionary allies, shortly after
155 Ani Sarkissian, and §. ilgfl Ozler, "Democratization and the politicization o f religious civil society in
Turkey." Democratization 20, no. 6 (2014): 1014-1035.
156 Sheri Berman, “Civil society and the collapse o f the Weimar Republic.” World Politics 49, issue 3 (1997):
401-429.
157 Al Jazeera, "Egyptians raid state police offices," Al-Jazeera, March 5,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/03/201135211558958675.html

63

Mubarak’s ouster, the Brotherhood announced that it would not field a presidential candidate,
nor seek a majority in parliament.158 Ironically, Mohammed Morsi, the man who eventually
become the FJP’s presidential candidate even supported this by saying “The Muslim
Brotherhood are not seeking power...We want to participate, not to dominate. We will not
have a presidential candidate”.159
The lack o f a common and persisting enemy, however, disrupted the coordination of
the protesters. The sudden void caused by Mubarak’s ouster meant that powers and positions
which had remained stationary for decades were suddenly available to be taken. In the
months that followed, this power vacuum pushed these groups into fierce competition with
one another, and a great many of the pluralistic goals that emerged during the Arab Spring
were forgotten in favor o f a more selfish, short-sighed, free-for-all approach.
This selfishness became particularly apparent during the debate concerning the
constitutional amendments of March 2011, which separated civil society along religious
lines. Islamists argued in favor of the amendments, and the more newly formed liberal,
youth, and secular groups argued against the amendments. The amendments, if passed, would
hasten elections, which would allow the already well organized Islamist groups an advantage
over the newly established groups created following Mubarak’s ouster. Strictly speaking,
both arguments held weight; faster elections would bring back civilian government, while a
delay would allow more time to organize and improve the competitiveness of the newer
groups.

158 Whewell, Tim. "Competing Muslim Brotherhood visions for Egypt." BBC News, March 3,2011.
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/9412967.stm.
159 “Muslim Brotherhood: “We are not seeking power,” CNN News, Feb. 10,2011.
http://www.cnn.com/2011 /W ORLD/africa/02/09/egypt.muslim.brotherhood/.

64

The amendments would quickly become a highly polarizing debate within Egyptian
society, due to a religious emphasis. Despite the merits of either argument, Islamists,
specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, urged voters to vote in favor of these amendments
based on a “religious duty.” A fatw a160 supporting the amendments was even advertised in
the prominent Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, which led to accusations from the youth
movements o f self-interest instead of achieving revolutionary goals.161 “The Brotherhood is
polarizing Egyptians on the basis of religion. It is undermining the national unity that the
revolution has nurtured”.162 The emphasis on religion would prove to be the sign of broken
faith between the liberals and Islamists. This division would prove to characterize the
Egyptian landscape for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the ideological slant of this
division would come to overshadow other concerns, primarily economic, security, and
development. The arguments about transitioning back to civilian rule quickly faded. Instead,
debate centered on the Islamist agenda, and whether, if elected, the Islamists would embrace
the liberal ideals of the Arab Spring, or if shari'a would be more rigidly applied, thus
subjecting all Egyptians, regardless of religious background, to the standards set by
fundamental Islam.
These accusations were further supported by the Brotherhood’s unchanged party
platform, which centralized shari ’a as the basis of Egyptian governance. This same platform,

160 A fatwa is an interpretation of legal judgment based on the opinions o f a mufti, or Islamic scholar, on issues
regarding Islamic law, and must be fundamentally based on some form of religious evidence. A fatwa is not
legally binding, nor is it the final word on a particular issue, but it is typically a respected interpretation of
shari’a, given by one who is considered to be well versed in such ideas. It is, however, a clear expression of the
Islamic faith, and therefore, subject to any connotations held therein.
161 Ahmad Rahim, "Egyptian politicians worried by Islamist support for constitutional amendments," BBC
Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 17,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
162 Alaa Al-Aswany, "Egyptian Author Alaa Al-Aswany Criticizes the Military for Undermining the
Achievements o f the Revolution in Egypt," MEMRI, April 5, 2011.
http://www.memri.org/report/en/print5176.htm.

65

however, stated that the Brotherhood supported not only religious freedom for non-Muslims,
but also the “the right to follow their own religious laws in matters of faith, worship, and
personal status whenever these laws differ from those of the shari ’a.”163 The Brotherhood
platform also states that in all other spheres of life, all Egyptians must be judged on “Muslim
principles of justice and equality,” and stating plainly that Egypt should be, first and
foremost, an Islamic state, leaving little room for misinterpretation.164
This conflict would be vitally important, as society divided between the powerful
Islamist groups, (chief among them, the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis) and a vast number
o f disorganized liberal and youth oriented political factions. These factions were formed
directly after Mubarak was deposed. They were barely a month old and they lacked strong,
coherent leadership and organization (which will be examined more closely in the next
chapter). Getting the liberal message out amongst a population so heavily inundated with the
Islamist message was exceeding difficult.
The amendments were eventually passed by referendum, and the following months
were characterized by liberal discontent against the Islamists, and general discontent against
the ruling SCAF. For a time, how close specific groups were to the SCAF quickly became
the barometer for how strongly a particular group kept up with revolutionary ideals and how
well these groups understood Egyptian society. After months of dissatisfaction, in July 2011,
protesters returned by the hundreds of thousands to Tahrir Square, as well as Suez and
Alexandria, to again demand changes. The act was called “The Second Egyptian Revolution

163 L. Azuri, "Egypt's Islamic Camp, Once Suppressed by Regime, Now Taking Part in Shaping New Egypt Part II: Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Parliamentary, Presidential Elections," MEMRI, Oct. 25,2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5745.htm#_ednref7.
164 Ibid.

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of Rage,” according to a Facebook page.165 Chief among these demands was the removal of
the SCAF from its leadership position, and the resignation of Field Marshall and leader o f the
SCAF, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.
The Muslim Brotherhood quickly drew fire, as the issue of some sort of secret
alliance with the Military was brought again to the forefront. They were accused by liberal
forces o f having an alliance with the SCAF, as the SCAF involved the Brotherhood in certain
political movements, while excluding the liberal factions.166 This accusation was
strengthened further by the Brotherhood’s announcement that they would not take part in the
protests.167 The Brotherhood would change its mind, but only after the protest organizers
agreed to drop the demand to draft a new constitution (which would render the constitutional
amendments which had been voted in earlier 2011 void) prior to elections. Even then, the
Brotherhood did not support continued sit-in strikes in these various locations, and
furthermore, the Brotherhood did not sign the document outlining the protester’s demands.168
Shortly thereafter, the Brotherhood more openly supported the SCAF, with the Brotherhood’s
Supreme Guide Muhammad Badi calling on Egyptians to unite with the military, “’and to
appreciate [the military’s] role in preserving the revolution rather than criticizing it’”, and all
but officially confirming in the eyes of the Brotherhood’s critics that some kind of deal was
brokered between the military and the Brotherhood.169

165 Disappointed with Revolution's Gains, Egyptians Renew Protests." MEMRI. July 3,2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5429.htm#_ednl.
166 "The Egyptian Protests: A Second Revolution - Now against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,"
MEMRI, July 15,2011. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5471.htm#_ednl.
167 "Disappointed with Revolution's Gains, Egyptians Renew Protests." MEMRI. July 3,2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5429.htm#_ednl.
168 "Thg Egyptian Protests: A Second Revolution - Now against the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces,"
MEMRI, July 15,2011. http://www.memri.Org/rcport/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5471.htm#_ednl.
169 Ibid.

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In this way, many o f its detractors saw this pro-military perspective as a way for the
Brotherhood to play both sides of the conflict (SCAF and the protestors) to its advantage. “In
light of the increasing tensions between the protestors and the SCAF, the Brotherhood [was]
trying to maneuver between the two sides: its officials...voicing support for those protestors
whose demands match the Brotherhood's policies, while expressing their faith in the SCAF's
capacity to meet these demands, and these demands alone”.170 Therefore, this reluctant union
was characteristic of Egyptian civil society at the time. Even with the SCAF performing
vicious abuses o f power (e.g., the Maspero incident), both liberals and Islamists were hesitant
to work together: liberals feared that cooperation would lead to the appearance o f concession,
and that it would give the Islamists more power, perhaps even legitimacy; Islamists
concerned themselves with appeasing both sides of the debate (at least temporarily), which
left detractors skeptical o f the Islamists’ intensions. Instead of a united front, such as the one
put forward against Mubarak, mutual distrust allowed the SCAF an inordinate amount of
power and influence. These attitudes persisted into the end of 2011, and the parliamentary
elections held in November.
The parliamentary elections resulted in a clear victory for Islamist parties and a
decisive loss for the liberal, secularist, and youth groups who composed the bulk of the
protesters who brought down Mubarak a year earlier. The year’s focus was already very
much on religion, and the parliamentary elections, which took place at the very end of 2011
and into 2012, would do little to change this. The elections themselves were monitored by the
judiciary, foreign observers (distinct from foreign monitors),171 and concerned citizens who,

171 “Egypt not to allow foreign poll monitors,” Al Jazeera, July 21, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/07/2011720222415556480.html

68

using social media outlets such as Facebook and Twitter, also turned to citizen monitoring.
With so much oversight, official and independent, these elections were characterized by
comparably little corruption. Regardless of the apparent success of this democratic
endeavour, animosity remained.
Liberals and secularists quickly rose to attack the Islamist victory in the parliamentary
elections as not being representative of the revolution. Fahmy Howeidy, a prominent Islamic
political scientist described the mood of secularists and liberals as being like a “funeral... [a]
state of grieving”.172
The Islamists have been portrayed in the media “as coming to power over the bodies o f the Tahrir
martyrs,” or chosen by “Egypt’s 40 per cent o f ignorant, impoverished and frustrated people” who are
now “hijacking the revolution. One liberal activist was quoted...as having vowed to “confront the
Islamists’ grip on the country, even if this means engaging in conflict with them”.173

The concentration on “Islamist vs. Liberal” has also concerned various unaligned observers,
worried that “this scenario...in post-revolutionary Egypt [had] diverted the attention of the
elite from attending to the more urgent demands of the revolution”, including issues such as
the economy, social justice, poverty, and hunger.174 Instead of focusing on these issues, the
Islamists dedicated their efforts towards assuring Egyptian society and foreign observers of
the purity o f their intentions. Meanwhile liberal groups desperately tried to discredit them.
At the time, there was reason to believe that the Muslim Brotherhood, and the FJP
that represented it, might move away from ambitions of an Islamic state run by the shari ’a
that most people fear. The Brotherhood emphasized that it was a party “open to all Egyptian
citizens regardless of religion, gender, age, profession, or social status” and that while it
supported shari 'a, it did so in a way that advocates “the real meaning of the principles of the
172 "Islamism at the crossroads," Al-Ahram Weekly, Feb. 18,2012, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.

69

Islamic shari’a, its moral standards and its values, which are shared by the other
monotheistic faiths, as a way of life for the individual and for society”, strongly implying a
pluralistic approach.175 The ideas behind shari’a have a long history in Egypt, and that is
very significant. Even if the Brotherhood’s public message is one where shari’a does not
resemble what it historically may have been (often a tool of repression against specific
demographics o f society), the idea of shari ’a remains strong, and deeply rooted in Egyptian
(and Arabic) culture. Conversely, concepts of “liberalism” and “secularism” simply do not.
John Owen o f the New York Times describes this situation:
Political Islam...is thriving largely because it is tapping into ideological roots that were laid down long
before the revolts began. Invented in the 1920s by the Muslim Brotherhood, kept alive by their many
affiliates and offshoots, boosted by the failures o f Nasserism and Baathism, allegedly bankrolled by
Saudi and Qatari money, and inspired by the defiant example of revolution Iran, Islamism has for years
provided a coherent narrative about what ails Muslim societies and where the cure lies. Far from
rendering Islamism unnecessary, as some experts forecast, the Arab Spring has increased its
credibility.176

This credibility, which the Brotherhood may have initially underestimated in early
2011 when they declared they would not elect a presidential candidate, is the reason why the
Islamist movement in Egypt so sharply turned away from a cooperative agenda, and towards
a more self-interested one. This is one of the likely reasons why the Brotherhood reneged on
their promise to not field a presidential candidate in the forthcoming elections, why
Mohamed ElBaradei, considered by many to be the most prolific liberal presidential
candidate, dropped from the race (though he vaguely cited corruption as his reason), and why
during the elections there was no real liberal front runner. Instead, the two front runners in
the first round of elections were Mohammad Morsi, representing the Brotherhood’s Freedom

175 L. Azuri, "Egypt's Islamic Camp, Once Suppressed by Regime, Now Taking Part in Shaping New Egypt Part H: Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for Parliamentary, Presidential Elections," MEMRI, Oct. 25, 2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5745.htm#_ednref7.
176 John M. Owen, "Why Islamism is Winning," New York Times. Jan. 7, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/07/opinion/why-islamism-is-winning.html.

70

and Justice party, and Ahmed Shafiq, the prime minister serving under Mubarak at the time
of his deposal, with Morsi going on to win the election, officially declared president on June
24 2012. The lack of success by the “leaders of the revolution” during the presidential
elections represents the overwhelming trend in Egyptian civil society: tradition and
experience before unfamiliar, though potentially effective, new ideas. This division would
only grow further over the next year, and eventually lead to continued violence in 2013.

The Draft Constitution: November 2012
There was still a great deal of tension between the victorious Islamist movement, and
the defeated liberal groups, despite the relatively smooth presidential elections (there were
claims o f corruption, but in no way comparable to the fraud perpetrated by the preceding
regime). Morsi’s promises o f an inclusive Egypt were met with extreme skepticism, and the
months following would do little to help. Following his successful election, Morsi quickly
moved to make assurances that Egypt would be “a civil, democratic, constitutional, and
modem state...where the President is the servant of his people”.177 The first major event of
his presidency, however, proved this optimistic statement wrong.
Near the end o f 2012, Morsi and his government put forward a highly contested draft
constitution. The draft constitution created further tensions between the Islamist ruling party
and the liberal opposition by pushing contested issues: a commitment to political Islam, the
complete omission of women’s issues, and only a small emphasis on religious freedoms. The
draft went completely against Morsi’s promises of being an inclusive, pluralistic president.
177 "Egyptian President-elect Morsi vows civil state," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, June 30,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic

71

Instead, the draft became a symbol of Morsi’s perceived duplicity, of his pandering to one
specific demographic namely the Islamic supporters who had lifted him to power. This
pandering was in addition to the rushed nature of the draft, which was created following
“marathon meetings of the Constituent Assembly...[and] despite widespread public
opposition to the composition of the assembly...and despite the fact that some 40% of the
assembly’s members - representatives of the liberal factions - had withdrawn from it”.178
Outrage against the draft was immediate, as thousands o f demonstrators took to the
streets in protest. Further thousands of pro-Morsi Egyptians staged counter-protests in favor
of the draft constitution, and this turmoil allowed Morsi to hasten through the process of
approving the constitution, announcing a referendum on the draft to be held.179 As before,
with the parliamentary and presidential elections, a referendum allowed the Egyptian people
to decide whether or not to accept the constitution. The anti-Morsi protesters rightfully stated
that the draft constitution primarily reflected the desires o f the Muslim Brotherhood (though
perhaps not as strongly as they could have). The referendum, however, provided a seemingly
legitimate way to circumvent these claims: if Egypt did not want a constitution heavily
influenced by Islamist politicians, then a constitutional referendum would be a simple way of
indicating this. Nothing was set in stone until after the votes were counted.
The approaching referendum on Morsi’s draft constitution quickly exacerbated the
problems that Egypt society already faced, causing protests which turned violent. On
December 5, anti-Morsi protesters were attacked by Morsi supporters, leaving ten people

l78L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State - The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt's History," MEMRI, Dec. 3,2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6846.htm#_edn9.
179 Ibid.

72

dead.180 This is particularly significant because the violence was based on ideological
difference, and the catalyst was the action of the president, a man who only months before
assured Egyptians that he would represent all of them, and that he would be a “servant of his
people”.18' Instead, Morsi’s draft constitution further split society between his supporters and
his opposition, a situation which would severely hamper any positive transition.
The referendum went ahead, and the draft constitution was put into effect with a
reported 63.8% o f voters voting in favor of the constitution (though the turnout was
reportedly a dismal 32.9), despite weeks of protest against the draft constitution.182
Unsurprisingly, this did not cool relationships between the two dominant societal groups, and
leading up to the anniversary of the January 25 revolution, tensions flared significantly.
Opposition-aligned media outlets published articles condemning the Brotherhood General
Guide, Muhammad Badi. There were calls to send him to jail, or, more dramatically, to
hell.183 In response, Badi praised the idea of martyrdom and self-sacrifice. This was a thinly
veiled move that was generally considered to be a call to arms of Morsi supporters to
confront the opposition groups who were organizing rallies to coincide with the revolution’s
anniversary. Various revolutionary youth groups openly called for violence on their
Facebook pages, some showing diagrams on how to make weapons, such as Molotov
cocktails, despite the assurances from the National Salvation Front (the umbrella
organization that chiefly represented the opposition and liberal forces) that such
180 "Egypt probes alleged incitement to oust Morsi," Al Jazeera, Dec. 28, 2012,
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/2012122842320389703.html.
181 “Egyptian President-elect Morsi vows civil state," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, June 30, 2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
182 BBC News, "Egyptian voters back new constitution in referendum," Dec. 25,2012.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-20842487
183 N. Shamni and H. Varulkar, "Egypt Prepares For Second Anniversary Of January 25 Revolution Amid
Unprecedented Tension Between Muslim Brotherhood And Opposition Camp." MEMRI. Jan. 24,2013.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6951.htm#_edn9.

73

demonstrations would be non-violent and peaceful.184 Unsurprisingly, the anniversary turned
violent, at least seven people were killed on the 25th, and hundreds more wounded.185 This
turmoil between Islamist and liberal not only affected these groups, but also smaller, less
influential groups. Specifically, Egypt’s Coptic Christians.

Civil Society and the Coptic Christians
Shortly after Mubarak’s ouster, one of the groups who suffered the most oppression,
both social and political, were the Coptic Christians. Christianity was introduced in Egypt
shortly after the religion was founded. A few hundred years after the church was established
in Egypt, the country was invaded and taken over by the Arabs, who Islamized Egypt over
the following centuries. The Copts were eventually outnumbered and overshadowed by their
conquerors.
In contemporary times, the Copts have faced problems not only with the ruling
SCAF, but also increasingly with popular Islamists. This oppression undermined the
perceived strength that the Copts had within Egyptian civil society during the revolution.
Despite opposing claims, Islamists were steadfast on their platform that their election
successes would not be detrimental to opposing movements. “[The Islamists] said these
apprehensions [about the way Islamists would operate in government] are a continuation of
the former regime’s policy of frightening people of the Islamists to ensure the continuation of

184 Ibid.
185A1 Jazeera, "Deadly clashes as Egyptians mark uprising," AlJazeera, Jan. 26,2013.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/0 i /2013 12571638570662.html

74

the regime”, scaring the people into complacency186 Violence between Islamists and nonIslamists increased, specifically against the historically oppressed Coptic Christian
population, despite assurances to the contrary. These are some of the incidents which
occurred in the spring of 2011 alone:
In early March, clashes broke out in the village o f Sol over the demolition o f a church...On March 23,
in...Qena, Salafists attacked and cut off the ear of a Copt suspected o f having relations with a Muslim
women...Qena also saw mass demonstrations by Muslims over the appointment o f a Coptic province
governor, ultimately leading the authorities to suspend his appointment...Violence also erupted on May
19 in...Cairo, when Muslims demonstrated against the government’s decision to reopen the Church o f
the Virgin...on May 7... a fight broke out outside the Mary Mina Church...of Cairo...leaving 12 Copts
and Muslims dead and hundreds of others wounded. Violence was sparked off when hundreds of
Muslims gathered outside the church, demanding the release of...a young Coptic woman who, according
to her Muslim husband, was being held there against her will after having converted from Christianity to
Islam.187

The specific details o f this last story, like other similar cases, could not be confirmed, and
was indicative o f the trend of sectarian hostility aimed at the Copts. A newspaper headline
that followed the next day read, “Copts kidnap Raghada!” with a quote from the girl: “’They
tied me up with ropes, beat me with shoes, shaved my hair,’ Raghada Salem Abdel Fattah,
declared, ‘and forced me to read Christian psalms!”’.188
This sensationalized quote is meant to misdirect the reader away from the cultural
reality in Egypt, where a person is unable to freely choose their own religion. One columnist
said, in regards to a story almost exactly the same as the one above, that it was a case o f a
woman being persecuted because of “the outmoded social tradition that dominates [Egyptian]
society as a whole and the [Egyptian] woman in particular...Unfortunately we still live in a

186 "Egyptian Islamists say liberals' "apprehensions" about them unjustified," BBC Monitoring Middle East Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, March 29,2011 .www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
187 L. Azuri and N. Shamni, "In Egypt, Muslims' Attacks on Copts Increase," MEMRI, June 2, 2011,
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5338.htm#_edn7.
l88David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egypt's Christians Fear Violence as Changes Embolden Islamists," New York Times,
May 31, 2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

backward society in which a woman’s, and even a man’s freedom is strictly limited”.189
Hilmi Mahmoud Al-Qa’oud wrote that the stories also broached this cultural aspect, but
places the blame solely at the feet of the Coptic Christian Church, instead of Egyptian society
as a whole. Al-Qa’oud states:
The church-state, which perpetrates intellectual terrorism and sectarian insurrection, and which was an
ally of the previous regime, has striven for two important things. The first is to segregate the [Coptic]
sect from the Islamic society which is its natural environment, while the Church [continues to] enjoy the
privileges the previous regime showered upon it... The second is to [tear] the Muslims [away] from Islam
by [spreading] fear o f extremism, fundamentalism, terrorism, and Salafism. [The Church's] opposition to
the Islamic shari'a and the second clause o f the constitution [according to which Islam is Egypt's official
state religion and the shari'a is the primary basis for legislation] was one of the conspicuous signs that
[the Church] was challenging the overwhelming Muslim majority...In the era o f the revolution, it is
essential that the church-state be toppled, in order to [ensure] that a single state, called Egypt, will
remain on the banks of the Nile. [The accusations that] the Salafists and the Islamic movements
[instigated the sectarian strife] are cheap lies...190

This tension and violence rose to an apex on October 9 2011, in the Maspero area of
Cairo, when a protest that included Copts and liberal Muslims was attacked by conservative
Muslims. The violence was intercepted by Egyptian security forces, but instead o f breaking
up the two groups, the security forces rammed their armored vehicles, apparently on purpose,
into the Coptic crowd.191 These security forces also fired indiscriminately, killing 24 people,
and injuring another 300.192 This incident was the worst instance o f sectarian violence to
occur in Egypt in sixty years.
Conflict between the Muslim majority and the Christian minority was certainly
nothing new. Even Mubarak, who actively repressed extremist Islamists, still allowed the
Copts to be oppressed by Muslims. The concern that the Coptic Christian population had was
“with Mr. Mubarak gone...an elected Muslim majority is likely to prove far less tolerant than
189 Hilmi Mahmoud Al-Qa’oud quoted in L. Azuri and N. Shamni, "In Egypt, Muslims' Attacks on Copts
Increase," MEMR1, June 2,2011, http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5338.htm#_edn7.
190 Ibid.
191 Andre Aciman, "After Egypt’s Revolution, Christians Are Living in Fear...," New York Times, Nov. 21,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
192 Ibid.

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a military dictatorship”.193 Many Copts have already opted out of this potentially destructive
situation; more than 100,000 Copts are estimated to have emigrated from Egypt from
between 2011 and 2013.194
After the Maspero incident, the interim Prime Minister, Essam Sharaf, blamed the
flagrant killing of civilians not on religious or sectarian tensions, but on “hidden hands”
within Egypt, attempting to create discord amongst the population. Andre Aciman, an
Egyptian Jew, describes the misdirection used by the state as endemic to Egyptian civil
society, created by decades of paranoia under its past three regimes:
Sadly, the phrase "hidden hands" remains a part o f Egypt's political rhetoric more than 50 years later -an invitation for every Egyptian to write in the name of his or her favorite bugaboo. Rather than see
things for what they are, Egyptians, from their leaders on down, have always preferred the blame game —
and with good reason. Blaming some insidious clandestine villain for anything invariably works in a
country where hearsay passes for truth and paranoia for knowledge. Sometimes those hidden hands are
called Langley, or the West, or, all else failing, o f course, the Mossad. Sometimes "hidden hands" stands
for any number of foreign or local conspiracies carried out by corrupt or disgruntled apparatchiks of one
stripe or another who are forever eager to tarnish and discredit the public trust. The problem with Egypt
is that there is no public trust. There is no trust, period. False rumor, which is the opiate o f the Egyptian
masses and the bread and butter of political discourse in the Arab world, trumps clarity, reason and the
will to tolerate a different opinion, let alone a different religion or the spirit of open discourse.195

Though Aciman is specifically speaking to issues of sectarian violence and religious
differences in the above quote, it is indicative o f problems experienced by the greater part of
Egyptian society. Aciman’s critique can easily encompass the relatively alien views of the
newly formed liberal and youth groups, as well as women and the political groups that
represent them. It is simpler to blame incidents of sectarian violence on elements beyond
government control, than to seek out and solve these difficult problems which have had
decades to entrench themselves. Even after calls to investigate the violence in Maspero, the

193 Ibid.
194 Michael Adel, “The Copts Flee Egypt,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 2,2013.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/2402/24/The-Copts-flee-Egypt.aspx.
195 Andre Aciman, "After Egypt’s Revolution, Christians Are Living in Fear...," New York Times, Nov. 21,2011.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

77

media responded with calls to support the army instead. According to these media sources, it
was the army that was being targeted by conspiracies meant to discredit or destroy it.196
This response from the media is a strong indicator of the status of Egyptian civil
society at the time. The role o f the media is typically to provide information about various
events, without the benefit o f coloring them according to specific opinions or views.
Sensationalist, accusatory, and clearly biased, these Egyptian media sources instead only
served to further entrench and pander to specific popular views within Egyptian society. In
this case, those views revolve around the inferiority of the Coptic Christian population.
With no one taking responsibilities for events such as Maspero, sectarian violence
directed at the Copts continued steadily into 2012 and 2013, even following Morsi’s
successful election and subsequent vow to provide security for all Egyptians. A month after
his election, police were forced to intervene against a Muslim mob who sought to set fire to a
Coptic church, and though the police successfully repelled the attack, there was still arson
and looting o f other Christian owned properties.197 The tension was supposedly caused by a
Christian drycleaner who was accused o f singeing a Muslim client’s shirt while ironing it,
and this incident culminated in the exodus of all Christians from the town of Dahshur.

1 Qft

Another incident in Rafah in September involved Christians fleeing their homes, and in the
same month a Christian teacher had his six year jail term for blasphemy against Islam upheld,
while another trial for a similar charge began.199

196 "Analysis of post-revolution Egypt: Copts, Muslim Brotherhood, polls," BBC Monitoring Middle East Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Nov. 3,2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
197 BBC News, "Coptic-Muslim clashes erupt in Egypt," BBC News, Aug. 1, 2012.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19089474
198 Ibid.
199A1 Jazeera, "Coptic Christian families flee Egyptian Sinai," Al-Jazeera, Sept. 28, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/09/201292820814460621.html

78

Barely more than two months before Morsi was deposed, he was criticized by Pope
Tawadros II of the Coptic Church for his “negligence and poor assessment of events”. Morsi,
however, was not the only one responsible for the continued harassment and violence
directed at the Copts. The sheer volume of these events shows the indifference, even hatred,
which large portions the Egyptian Muslims have for the Copts. Any negative incident which
occurs between Muslims and Christians, regardless of what other factors may be at play,
ultimately devolves to a matter of religion. Worse yet, government and law enforcement, by
all appearances, seem to be affected by this same sectarian attitude, and either blind
themselves to the inequality o f Egyptian civil society, or encourage it. All of this leads to a
society which not only suffers from deep hostilities, but has a large proportion which actually
supports the perpetuation o f these hostilities.

Revolution or C o u p : January to June 2013
Protests would escalate steadily for the first six months of 2013, most often
characterized by violence and often deaths. In January 2013, 48 people were killed in violent
clashes. Unfortunately, the clashes that led to those deaths occurred because of the death
sentences o f another 21 people. Ironically, these 21 people were tried over their involvement
in the deaths o f another 70 people killed during riots caused by a football match a year
earlier.200 Furthermore, security forces began utilizing brutal tactics reminiscent of the
Mubarak era. Most infamously, a video emerged of a protester being dragged naked, beaten
by several members o f the riot police, pulled into a truck, and then later coerced by the

200 "January death toll in Egypt's Port Said reaches 48,” AlAhram Online, March 16, 2013.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/67005/Egypt/Politics-/January-death-toll-in-Egypts-Port-Saidreaches-.aspx.

79

security apparatus to shift blame away from the Morsi regime and onto the protesters.201 A
growing insurgency in the Sinai had developed since Mubarak was pulled from office, and
which Morsi had not yet been able to quell. This insurgency included an attack (which the
Egyptian government blamed on foreign fighters and a previously unknown extremist group)
that left sixteen Egyptian guards dead near the Israeli border.202 Furthermore, sectarian
violence increased not only against the Coptic Christian population, but also the Shia Muslim
minority. In one horrifying incident, a group of Salafis surrounded a house with four Shias
within, demanded they exit the house before they began lobbing Molotov cocktails, beating
them to death, and dragging their bodies through the street.203
Morsi’s inability or unwillingness to effectively breach issues of religion within his
government, provide meaningful security and stability, and staunch sectarian violence
reached a boiling point only one year after his election. Massive protests from his detractors
who demanded his resignation erupted at the end of June. On July 3, after days of massive
renewed protests by Morsi’s opposition, and despite simultaneous counter-protests by Morsi
supporters, the Egyptian armed forces stepped in to resolve the crisis of leadership, and
removed Morsi from office.

201 Nada Hussein Rashwan, "Victim o f police torture changes testimony, accuses officers." Ahram Online, Feb.
4, 2013. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/63977/Egypt/Politics-/Victim-of-police-torture-changestestimony,-accuse.aspx.
202 "Egypt vows strong response to Sinai attack," AlJazeera, August 6, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/08/20128523429347102.html.
203 "Egypt mob attack kills four Shia Muslims near Cairo," BBC News, 24 June, 2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23026865

80

A Second Dethronement: July 2013
There are many dominant themes that occur within civil society in the two and half
years following the deposal of Hosni Mubarak and the unsuccessful presidency of
Mohammed Morsi. The most prominent of these is the rapid decline of cooperation between
groups who initially came together in opposition of the Mubarak regime. As mentioned
earlier, one o f the most important roles that society plays in regime change is putting forward
the ideals and values that will characterize the succeeding regime. In this sense, civil society
had no shortage o f ideals, however, where it failed was its inability to find compromise
between the various groups that emerged in the aftermath o f the Arab Spring. The two largest
factions, the Muslim Brotherhood and the myriad smaller liberal and youth groups who led
the revolution, failed utterly to build on the cooperation that characterized the initial
demonstrations, and therefore both sides were responsible for this failure.
The Muslim Brotherhood initially made attempts to assure skeptical opposition
parties that they were not the same Brotherhood typically associated with fundamentalism or
extremism. For a brief period o f time, this seemed to be the case, but these pragmatic goals
were cast aside in favor o f more idealistic choices. For example, the Brotherhood used its
political power, grown strong over many decades, to influence Egyptian voters to vote in
favor o f Brotherhood approved candidates and measures, such as in the Parliamentary
elections in 2011, which in turn alienated liberal groups. Attaching religion to politics was a
simple way of consolidating power. With Islam as its foundation, the majority of Egyptians,
many of whom were unfamiliar with liberal ideals, were simply more comfortable with the
Muslim Brotherhood, and exercised this in their decision to vote in its favour. This is turn
created alienation and animosity within non-Islamists groups throughout Egypt.
81

Conversely, the youth groups and liberals possessed significantly less influence than
they expected. Regardless o f what the ideals of the revolution were, ultimately Egypt is a
country which identifies heavily with an Islamic identity. Instead o f trying to integrate this
religious identity into their platforms, perhaps using a form of progressive Islam to further
liberal goals and solutions, these groups concentrated instead on demonizing the popular
Islamist movements and seeking a more secular government without addressing the issues
that secularism would have in such a religious society.
The greatest failure, however, was the way this social conflict affected Egypt as a
whole. With society so divided by religion and ideology, more pressing matters were
forgotten, specifically, economic interests, as well as security and stability. As these facets of
Egypt continued to deteriorate, the differences between the two major factions of civil
society were exacerbated, as either side ramped up pressures against their opposition, seeking
to lay the blame o f these difficulties on the other. With either side deadlocked in an
unproductive, self-destructive conflict, the faction which found itself with the lion’s share of
power was the military. With the first democratically elected president in Egypt considered a
failure by many, Egyptians turned towards a tried and tested alternative: the strong horse of
the military.
These events all lead to a great deal of speculation on who is to blame for these
myriad of failures. On one hand, Morsi was democratically elected in fair elections, in which
there was relatively little vote rigging or corruption, a far cry from the elections held during
the Mubarak regime. His draft constitution was not simply forced through by way of
presidential decree, but was voted on in a referendum by eligible Egyptian voters, and was
passed by a significant margin. This shows that a majority of voting Egyptians were in favor
82

of the platform that Morsi ran on, and despite this, opposition groups still fought tooth and
nail to see him deposed from office.
Significantly, however, the voter turnout was extremely low, estimated at only 31
percent.204 As the draft constitution was accepted by approximately a 64 percent approval
rate, this means that only about one fifth of Egypt’s voting population actually approved of
the draft constitution. This low voter turnout is indicative o f the central problem of the
Egyptian transition: the lack o f compromise and pact building between competing groups in
Egypt. There was no effort to bridge gaps between Islamists, liberals, or those in between
who were only concerned with the renewed stabilization of Egypt. After decades of
meaningless elections which never had different results, there was little done to brush away
the general apathy o f Egyptian society. The lack of faith in the both Morsi regime and its
opposition to correct the underlying problems facing Egypt may be the reason why so many
Egyptians turned out to neither accept nor to reject the draft constitution. The draft
constitution, heavily favoring the values and beliefs of one certain demographic while
ignoring all others, was a powerful example of this division.
Morsi’s actions, though pleasing to his supporters, were extremely problematic for
any who fell beyond the area o f his sizable power base, especially given his assurances that
he was leading Egypt towards a functioning democracy. This left liberals, women, Copts,
secularists, and progressive Muslims highly underrepresented (if at all) in Morsi’s
government. The way in which various “sides” behave during a transition is indicative of the
direction that transition is moving. Guillermo O’Donnell describes this as “the democratic

204 Kareem Fahim, “First Round o f Voting Spurs Dispute in Egypt.” New York Times, 16 Dec 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/world/middleeast/egypt-constitution-voteresults.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

83

wager”. The democratic wager is the idea that all citizens have the right to participate within
the democratic system, and in turn, must accept that other citizens may also participate,
regardless of whether or not one might consider said citizen to be “inappropriate”.205 This
essentially means that citizens should respect and be respected for decisions made within the
democratic arena, including voting, running for office, winning elections, etc. In return, the
state must uphold certain universal freedoms, including expression, association, and political
participatory rights.206
If Morsi’s government was only concerned with the interests of a specific
demographic, then the only difference between the Morsi government and the Mubarak
government is the recipient o f these benefits. Under Mubarak, it was loyal NDP supporters;
under Morsi, it was the Brotherhood, Islamists, and their supporters. Again, using
O’Donnell’s work as an example, this favoritism would compromise the democratic wager. It
is neither unreasonable nor unexpected that demonstrations would occur against these
practices. Mubarak was ousted in 2011 to address the general lack o f power so many o f these
societal demographics suffered from.
Therein lays the real crux of this issue, that both major sides of civil society, the
Islamists and liberals, played a role in the Morsi government’s failure. The Islamists believed
that ignoring the pleas o f opposition groups was perfectly acceptable; after all, it was their
candidate who had won. Most Egyptians have only ever known a country where the ruling
party is able to do as it pleases. From a Brotherhood perspective, it is unsurprising that after

205 Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullel, and Osvaldo Miguel The Quality o f Democracy: Theory and
Applications (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame, 2004), 16-17.
2“ Ibid., 17

84

“one of theirs” gained power he would behave much the same, and be justified in doing so,
especially given the assumed legitimacy o f the relatively transparent elections.
On the other hand, there was still the matter o f the role of religion in the government,
specifically the role and breadth o f shari’a. From the outset, shari’a appeared to be an
irreconcilable difference between the two sides. Pro-Morsi supporters voted for him largely
because of what Morsi represented: tradition, history, and religion. Morsi’s opposition
rejected him for the exact same reasons. This no-win, zero-sum situation was what Morsi had
inherited, and with society so sharply divided and focused on the issue of religion, there was
no way for him to succeed. Given the divisive nature of the situation, it is unlikely that
anyone could have reconciled the situation. Morsi may have exacerbated the societal
problems with his clumsy leadership, but it is unclear if there was anyone who could have
solved Egypt’s religious quagmire.
Civil society in Egypt ultimately failed to engender the trust and unity that was such a
distinguishing theme during the revolt in 2011. Instead of building on initial promises, lines
were drawn and sides were picked, and over the course of the next two and half years, society
fractured more and more. Now, the situation is largely what it was under Mubarak, with
Islamists again being harshly oppressed, the Muslim Brotherhood banned, and the groups
who once marched in Tahrir square cheering in support of such actions.

85

Chapter Three:
Political Society
Linz and Stepan describe political society as the arena in which the political apparatus
and its various institutions arrange themselves to legitimately exercise control over the public
and the state. Specifically, the core institutions of political society are “political parties,
elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances, and legislatures - by which
society constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government”.

907

According to Linz and Stepan, while political society and civil society are distinct, ideally,
they should still be complementary; civil society should actively play a role in the way that
political society operates.208 As stated earlier, groups that are categorized as being part of
political society are ones that have the ability or potential to directly affect the various
spheres o f government. There is some overlap between political and civil society, but this
chapter will concentrate on political associations during the events of 2011-2013.
One of the biggest missteps a transitioning country makes is the belief that once a
transition has begun (in other words, the preceding regime has been removed), civil society
should take a back seat to allow the development of political society.209 Linz and Stepan
argue that an active civil society is a necessity in any successful transition, especially when
moving away from an authoritarian regime. This is not to say that civil and political society
should work in perfect harmony: differences between various groups are important, if not
necessary. Regardless, “many civil society leaders view with moral antipathy ‘internal
conflict’ and

‘division’ within

the

democratic

forces.

Institutional

routinization,

207 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 8.
208 Ibid., 8-9.
209 Ibid., 9.

86

intermediaries, and compromise within politics are often spoken of pejoratively”.210 All of
these processes are vital to the process of consolidation. Linz and Stepan describe this as
follows:
Democratic consolidation requires parties, one of whose primary tasks is precisely to aggregate and
represent differences between democrats. Consolidation requires habituation to the norms and procedures
of democratic conflict regulation be developed. A high degree of institutional routinization is a key part
of such a process. Intermediation between the state and civil society and the structuring o f compromise
are likely legitimate and necessary tasks o f political society. In short, political society, informed,
pressured, and periodically renewed by civil society, must somehow achieve a workable agreement on
the myriad ways in which democratic power will be crafted and exercised.211

Essentially, what Linz and Stepan are writing here is that conflict between civil and political
society is not inherently destructive or destabilizing. Rather, these conflicts are vital in
consolidating democracy, so long as they are properly arbitrated by governmental procedures
and routines which allow said conflicts to be resolved amicably. These ideas articulated by
Linz and Stepan are of great importance when examining Egyptian political society, as this
lack of regulation quickly became the defining conflict in the two and half years following
the success of the revolution.

Political Society: The Arab Spring of January 2011
Political society was weak prior to the initial uprising in 2011 to depose Hosni
Mubarak. Political groups were strictly regulated by the Mubarak regime, and only the most
sycophantic groups found any real success during elections. Despite the immature state of
political society at the time, it is worth examining some of the trends that could be seen at
this time, and how these trends were received by the political actors who took part in the
revolution, even though many o f these trends were eventually cast aside in the months that
2,0 Ibid., 10.
211 Ibid.

87

followed. The most prominent of these trends was the overuse of the term, and its multitude
of variations, “the goals o f the revolution.” The phrase reflected every ideological objective
o f every group, including liberals, secularists, Islamists, fundamentalists, Copts, and so on.
These goals included a multitude o f expectations, some realistic, others not. A list of some of
these:
.. .banning military trial o f civilians; raising the minimum wage; bringing Mubarak, his sons, and the
senior officials o f his regime to justice; banning former National Democratic Party (NDP) members from
political activity for five years; releasing all political prisoners; purging the state institutions - the police,
the legal system, the media, the universities, and the banks - o f members of the former regime; electing
new municipal councils; and stopping the exportation of natural gas to Israel.212

These demands are a small sampling of the goals, as many groups had different ideas of the
objective o f the uprising stood. What was important was that each group in Egypt’s newly
formed political landscape claimed to be working towards these “goals,” while claiming that
opposing groups were actively moving against these goals. In a similar vein to civil society,
this conflict would be indicative of the chaos in Egyptian politics.
The formation of political parties was an extremely important event after Mubarak’s
deposal. For decades, few political parties had been founded. Under Mubarak, new parties
required state approval from the Political Parties Committee, a committee created and run by
regime interests. Even those few parties which emerged were typically ones which fell in line
with the aims of the regime. With Mubarak’s deposal, such limitations were gone, and
dozens o f registered and unregistered parties quickly flooded the Egyptian political scene.
Liberal movements formed many of these parties, the largest o f which was the Coalition of
the Youth of the Revolution (sometimes referred to as the Revolutionary Youth Movement),
which was comprised o f several popular movements (including the April 6 Movement, the

212 “Disappointed with Revolution’s Gains, Egyptians Renew Protests,” MEMRI, July 3, 2011.
http://www.menui.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5429.htm#_edn4.

88

socialist Al-Tagdid movement, the Muslim Brotherhood Youth, Youth for Justice and
Freedom, the Free Front for Peaceful Change, and the Democratic Front Party).213 Islamist
groups also formed many new political parties, although they primarily relied on already
entrenched organizations to promote their viewpoint, most prominently the Muslim
Brotherhood and the Salafis. In addition to the liberals and Islamists, there was also a third
side: the old guard, members o f the Mubarak regime who were not so shamed or reviled that
they would not run for office, though their activities were not as public as youth and Islamist
groups. Notably, the Coptic Christians did not field a political party, instead hoping to find
places amongst other parties. O f these three groups, the Islamists and the old guard were
highly experienced, with decades of practice, while the Revolutionary Youth Movement was
untested. This uneven experiential divergence would heavily influence the way each group
performed in challenges ahead.

Constitutional Amendments: March 2011
The first major political event following Mubarak’s deposal was the passing of
constitutional amendments which aimed to speed up the return of civilian rule. It was also the
first time that liberal groups showcased their relative inexperience and naivete with politics.
The liberals assumed that due to their successes in Tahrir Square earlier that year, the
Egyptian political process would revolve around their goals and values, completely
disregarding other non-Mubarak forces.

2,3L. Azuri, "The Popular Uprising in Egypt in Search of a Leadership," MEMRI, February 23, 2011.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5028.htm#_ednref22.

89

The results of that referendum came as a huge shock to liberal and secularist forces. They had imagined
that, since the revolutionary youth were from the secularist ranks and since even the Muslim
Brotherhood youth...were liberal for the most part, the Egyptian political mood had changed.
Then...they opened their eyes to find the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis had thrown themselves into
the electoral battle in full vigour, not only wielding the religious card...but also flexing their superior
organisational and financial muscle and, frankly, playing the political game as it should be played, which
is to say among the people.214

In response to their losses, these liberal groups turned to the tactics used before and
during the revolution, primarily demonstrations and internet activism. While these tactics
were exceeding useful in deposing a dictator, with Mubarak gone, they were ineffective in
currying favor amongst the Egyptian population, a large proportion of whom were not even
capable of accessing these media streams, and therefore the values pushed by the
revolutionary youth. Due to poverty or because they lived in the more remote areas o f Egypt,
these poorer Egyptians lived where technology and therefore “the secular values that drove
the revolution [had] not reached”.215 This overreliance on modem forms of communication
was a common misunderstanding that the liberals did not address. Even more primitive
attempts at connecting with those Egyptians who lacked access to technology were
disappointing and out of touch. While Islamist parties “were campaigning by providing social
services - handing out meat and discount medicine - to impoverished communities, [liberal
politicians] were giving stump speeches at town-hall-style meetings”.216 While the Islamists
had spent decades organizing their support base and keeping connected to Egyptian society,
“liberal, secular, and nationalist intellectuals were busy arguing among themselves and
penning op-eds for their party newspapers”.217 The effects of this disorganization would

214Abdel-Moneim, Said, "Why Liberals Failed," Al-Ahram Weekly, April 5,2012.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
215 Neil MacFarquhar, "Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes," The New York Times, March 20,
2011. http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
216 Sarah Topol, "Egypt's Liberals Adrift," New York Times, Dec. 13,
2011.http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/egypts-liberals-adrift/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0
2,7 Ibid.

quickly intensify in the months to come. The liberals were campaigning for a Westem-style
election when, by all accounts, that was clearly not the case in Egypt.
Comparatively, the Islamist political machines worked with incredible efficiency,
especially the Brotherhood. The Brotherhood had an advantage in Egypt which its opposition
did not have: history. Their platform revolved around Islam, a message that had been
ingrained into society over the course of centuries, and was easy to interpret, especially
compared to the new and alien ideas o f liberalism. Concepts like secularism and gender
rights were vague and unfamiliar when contrasted with the concrete, fundamental ideas of
religion and faith.
In addition to its easily understood message, the Islamist bloc was also leagues ahead
of their liberal competition from a strictly practical perspective. Their aforementioned
organizational capabilities allowed them to rally their forces. Instead of idealism, these
groups used more relatable, religious ideas, though they were not always scrupulous. Some
reports stated that “religious organizations had spread false rumors, suggesting that voting
against the referendum would threaten Article 2 o f the Constitution, which cites Islamic law
as the main basis for Egyptian law”.218 As one liberal stated, ruefully, the Islamist bloc made
the choice extremely simple: “if you vote [against the amendments] you are a follower of
America and [ElBaradei], and if you vote [in favor of the amendments] you are a follower of
God...The idea is that Muslims will vote yes and Copts and atheists will vote no”.219
Furthermore, though it was never officially stated by the Brotherhood, it was widely believed
that some kind o f deal was struck between the Brotherhood and the military, allowing the
218 Neil MacFarquhar, "Egyptian Voters Approve Constitutional Changes," New York Times, March 20,2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/03/21/world/middleeast/21egypt.html?pagewanted=all
219 Neil MacFarquhar, "Ahead o f Vote, Egypt's Parties and Skepticism are Growing," New York Times, Nov. 10,
2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

91

Brotherhood greater mobility within Egypt, while helping the military create stability by
keeping protest numbers down.220

Leading into the Parliamentary Elections of November 2011 to January 2012
Parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held at the end of 2011. In the months
that led up the elections, the same problems that persisted for the liberal factions would in
turn be extremely useful for the Islamist bloc. According to one journalist, “the biggest
failing of the liberal forces [was] that they [were] divided across dozens of parties”.221 The
liberals also suffered from the inability o f these various groups to find common vision, goals,
or leadership. These problems are evidenced prominently by the Egyptian Bloc, a group
formed in 2011 as “a vehicle for liberal and leftist parties to band together.”222 The Egyptian
Bloc started with promise, but quickly began bleeding members. Smaller factions felt they
had little voice in the bloc, too many conflicting ideas could not be reconciled, and
accusations that the Bloc was harboring former members of the Mubarak regime were some
of the reasons for the Bloc’s dwindling membership.223 Leading into the parliamentary
elections, the Egyptian Bloc was comprised of only three parties, the Free Egyptians, the
Social Democrats, and the “nearly irrelevant” Tagammu party, down from the initial fifteen
which had joined when the Bloc was created only months earlier.224 The second liberal bloc
was the Revolution Continues Alliance, represented by many of the parties that broke away
220 Michael Slackman, "Islamist Group Is Rising Force in a New Egypt," New York Times, March 24,2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/03/25/world/middleeast/25egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
221 Joshua A. Tucker, "How do the elections in Egypt compare to post-communist elections in the former Soviet
Union," Al Jazeera, Dec. 7,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/12/2011127111524244220.html.
222 Evan Hill, "Explainer: Egypt's crowded political arena," A l Jazeera, Nov. 17,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2011/11/201 111 1510295463645.html.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.

92

from the Egyptian Bloc. This Alliance was characterized by groups that were unwilling to
compromise their political platforms, meaning the Alliance was unified only in the thinnest
sense, its disparate members lacking any meaningful organization or funding.225 An example
o f this disorganization is the fact that the Alliance only announced its electoral platform the
day before candidate registration closed in October. Even near the end o f November, some of
its parties had not yet posted their candidates.226 Liberalism is extremely young and foreign
within Egypt already, so complicating the dilemma of explaining these ideas with a large
multitude of platforms and parties makes liberalism that much more impenetrable to
Egyptian society.
The parliamentary elections were thus rife with a simple lack of understanding of the
liberal platform, caused by the large multitude of parties and lackluster organization of these
groups. The liberal campaign was also bereft o f specific solutions to specific problems.
Instead, liberal groups spoke more of ideals and values, trying to best represent themselves as
the standard bearers of the revolution. As tangible issues like security, unemployment, and
stability rose in prominence, an ambiguous liberal platform became difficult to support for
the average Egyptian. For example, a speech made by Basem Kamel, a fairly prominent
liberal politician, was criticized as being “more earnest than electric,” and with potential
voters wishing that he had “offered specific prescriptions for solving [Egypt’s] complicated
social and economic problems”.
Comparatively, the Islamists still had the majority of the Islamic vote concentrated in
the Brotherhood’s FJP. According to the New York Times, “despite the splintering of the
225 Ibid.
“ ‘ Ibid.
227 Neil MacFarquhar, "Ahead o f Vote, Egypt's Parties and Skepticism are Growing," New York Times, Nov. 10,
2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

93

Islamist parties into factions, analysts [estimated] that the Muslim Brotherhood still
[c o m m anded] a hefty 70 percent or so of the Islamist vote”.228 Years of abuses at the hands

o f the Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak had strongly consolidated the Islamist bloc. This
consolidation was previously expressed through violence and extremism.229 With Mubarak’s
removal, however, these associations could now be used to enter the political arena and
obtain power legitimately. The Islamists also stayed on message, concentrating on Egypt’s
specific problems. When the liberals faced with the reality of their limited popularity “they
turned the finger of blame against the [SC AF] and began to sound the cry for the fall of the
generals, who, in turn, had no option but to press ahead with the roadmap for the
parliamentary and presidential elections”.230 These attacks by the liberal bloc would actually
backfire, and would prove to be extremely useful to the Islamist political base:
Not only did [the Islamists] have the advantages o f organisational and financial superiority, the
revolutionary youth and secularists were fighting other battles. Instead of fighting the electoral battle,
[the revolutionary youth] fought to prove that [the SCAF] lied and that the Islamists were in cahoots with
[the SCAF], Then [the revolutionary youth] tried to forge for themselves a revolutionary legitimacy
distinct from the political legitimacy that derives from the electoral process. Eventually, [the liberals]
gave up fighting windmills and entered the electoral fray, only to lose by the same percentage as they
lost the [constitutional] referendum and other polls.231

The battle waged by the liberals was for the “goals of the revolution,” composed of
goals such as the “democracy and freedom, a civil state and equality between all citizens, the
empowerment o f women to participate in all fields, an independent judiciary, and a
separation between legislative and executive bodies”.232 What was uncertain was how these

229 Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2007),
61.
230 Abdel-Moneim, Said, "Why Liberals Failed," Al-Ahram Weekly, April 5,2012.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
231 Ibid.
232 Mohamed Abdel-Baky, "Liberal uncertainty," Al-Ahram Weekly Online, May 5-11, 2011.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011 /1046/eg7.htm

goals would be achieved, and it was clear that the liberals did not have a clear answer.233
Meanwhile, the FJP used more easily relatable and achievable campaigning strategies. These
strategies revolved around the preservation of religion within the state, tradition, and security
as well as continuation of free social services, such as state sponsored subsidies, and a large
state presence in certain industries.234 Ultimately, the liberal goals o f equality and social
justice were unsuccessful in converting the majority of Egyptian voters to the liberal, secular
bloc, as these voters preferred the clear, relatable goals of the Islamists.
While this debate continued in 2011, the leadership of Egypt fell to the military. Once
heralded as the saviors o f Egypt, the military quickly began to mismanage the state, and
decaying public opinion starting as early as April.235 In fact, a general sense of animosity
towards the military was one of the few things that Islamist and liberal groups could agree
upon. This change in military behaviour occurred steadily in the months following
Mubarak’s ouster, manifesting in violent reactions to various protests, as well as the
staunching of freedom of speech. The SCAF also drew criticism for not promoting
independence between branches of government, as well as not purging the judiciary of
corrupt former members o f the Mubarak regime.236 Perhaps most horrible were “virginity
tests” performed on female activists after Tahrir square had been cleared, and many activists
had been detained. Prominent Egyptian feminist Mona Eltahawy described these actions as,

234 Evan Hill, "Explainer: Egypt's crowded political arena," Al Jazeera, Nov. 17,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2011/11/201 111 1510295463645.html.
235 Neil MacFarquhar, “Protesters Scold Egypt’s Military Council,” New York Times, April 1, 2011.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/middleeast/02egypt.html?_r=2&.
236 "The Egyptian Protests: A Second Revolution - Now against the Supreme Council o f the Armed Forces,"
MEMRI, July 15, 2011. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5471.htm#_ednl.

95

“rape in disguise”.237 In the face o f such outrages, many groups, both liberal and Islamist,
began to accuse the SCAF o f adopting a similar strategy to the Mubarak regime.238 Strangely,
however, there was little mention, if any, of the fact that Mubarak, Sadat, and Nasser all
hailed from the same upper military echelon that presided over Egypt in 2011. Indeed there
was no connection between the authoritarian government which was tom down only months
earlier, and the military who took control.
In the meantime, the Brotherhood held to a tenuous alliance with the military. This
precarious union lasted until the end of 2011, when the alliance became untenable. Increasing
brutality against protestors, as well as general mismanagement and incompetence in leading
Egypt towards safety, stability, and economic growth reflected poorly on the SCAF as well
as its allies. This led to another temporary, if shaky, truce between liberal and Islamist groups
(specifically the Muslim Brotherhood), as their attention became focused on SCAF
sponsored violence. Specifically, in response to mass protests against military rale in
December 2011, the military responded with “batons, water cannons, and tear gas,” injuring
hundreds, and killing twelve by the fifth day of these protests.239 One picture in particular
galvanized the opposition, a picture of “a group of soldiers pulling the abaya240 off a prone
woman to reveal her blue bra as another soldier raises a boot to kick her. The picture,
circulated around the world, [became] a rallying point of activists opposed to military rale,

237 Mona Eltahawy, "Why Do They Hate Us?" Foreign Policy, April 23, 2012.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why_do_they_hate_us.
238 "The Egyptian Protests: A Second Revolution - Now against the Supreme Council o f the Armed Forces,"
MEMRI, July 15,2011. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5471.htm#_ednl.
239"Egyptian army continues crackdown on protests," AlJazeera, Dec. 20,2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/12/20111219114141785291 .html
240 An abaya is a robe-like dress worn by some women, predominantly in the Islamic world.

96

though cameras captured soldiers pulling the clothes off other women”.241 Skepticism grew
around the assurances o f the military that they would step down from power, and would
instead resort to repressive and violent measures if necessary.
These events led into the parliamentary elections of November 2011-January 2012.
The elections themselves were an overwhelming victory for the Brotherhood’s FJP, and the
Salafist Al-Nour party.
Table 1. Egyptian Parliamentary Election Results

Freedom and Justice Party

235 seats (47.2%)

Nour Party

121 sears (24.3%)

New Wafd Party

38 seats (7.6%)

Egyptian Bloc

34 seats (6.8%)

Other (Al-Wasat, Reform and Development,

52 seats (5.2%)

Revolution

Continues,

Other

Parties,

Independents)
Source: “Egypt's Islamist parties win elections to
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16665748.

parliament,”

BBC

News,

Jan.

21,

2012.

The trend o f Islamic domination would continue into 2012, as the presidential elections drew
nearer.

241David D. Kirkpatrick, "As Violence Continues, Egyptian General Blames Protesters," New York limes, Dec.
20,2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

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Presidential Campaigns and Elections: 2012
Faced with the overwhelming successes of the Islamists, the youth movement which
made up much o f the liberal movement voiced their displeasure not by revitalizing their
political campaigns, but by resorting again to protest against the SCAF, demanding a swifter
transition to civilian rule. This course o f action was more idealistic than realistic. The general
opinion put forward by observers is that the liberal bloc did not know anything else, and so
clung to their original plans. Dr. Muhammad Al-Sa’id Dawir, a member of the left-wing
Tagammu party, explained this weakness as follows:
The Egyptian left failed to propose or propagate a real plan for building [the country]. Although [the
liberals] were willing to sacrifice and fight for their ideas, they lacked the necessary abilities... to take up
public action or offer services based on the socialist approach. They [were] an aloof cadre that look[ed]
at the world from behind the pages of a book, and form[ed] personal ties chiefly with members of its
own school. We created for ourselves a world detached from the [real] world. Many o f us settled for the
power of the idea and for general programs. We severed the very hands that should have been
outstretched to the masses...242

This delusion would explain how the liberals convinced themselves of their own successes.
The liberal movement mistakenly confused their popularity amongst their own circles and
parties with a more universal popularity amongst the general Egyptian populace.
During this time, there still was no unifying figure or movement within the liberal
camp to cement the liberal movement in reality. Mohamed ElBaradei, a popular face of
liberal and secular change, announced that he would pull out of the forthcoming presidential
race. As the most prominent member of the liberal cause, his actions were a blow to the
liberal movement. ElBaradei’s prominence, however, also showcases the problem that the
liberals faced. Though he cited a lack of democratic legitimacy in the electoral process as his
reason of dropping out, his decision also had to do with “the long odds he faced. Polls
242 L. Lavi, “People's Assembly Elections in Egypt Yield Victory for Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis; Downfall
for Liberals, Left, and Revolutionary Youth,” MEMRI, Feb. 3,2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6052.htm.

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showed that many Egyptians harbored doubts about him. The years he spent in Western
capitals as an international diplomat raised questions about his authenticity as an
Egyptian”.243
This alienation was in no small part due to a lack of understanding of what ElBaradei
represented and the detachment he had from Egyptian society. ElBaradei’s supporters might
claim that he represented liberalism and secularization, but the truth is that the majority of
Egyptians were disconnected from social media and technology and had no understanding of
how such liberal ideas would be beneficial. Egypt had lived under the yoke of dictators for
decades, and these dictators morphed ideas such as liberalism and democracy to best suit
their needs. Mubarak’s lopsided elections and bogus claims of democratic freedoms were the
only experience that many Egyptians had with democracy and liberalism, and this false
definition would be ingrained into Egyptian political culture. Even ElBaradei did little to
clarify how liberal successes would positively affect Egypt. In an interview prior to his
decision to drop out o f the presidential race, ElBaradei did not explain the advantages of
liberalism nor democracy. For example, his response regarding the leadership qualities of the
Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF:
At the base o f the revolt which led to the downfall o f [Mubarak].. .there was a demand for freedom, and
justice, which has been undermined and trampled on in the last few months...Slogans, or statements
designed to be reassuring, are not enough to govern. The real test for those who are putting themselves
forward as candidates to govern is to show that they are able to do so. That they are up to the job. As far
as I am concerned, change for me means democracy, freedom, social justice, and respect for minorities.
Non-negotiable principles.244

243 David. D. Kirkpatrick, "Nobel Laureate Drops Bid for Presidency o f Egypt," New York Times, Jan. 14,2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/middleeast/mohamed-elbaradei-pulls-out-of-egypts-presidentialrace.html?_r=3&hp&.
244"Egypt's presidential candidate issues challenge to military, Islamist parties," BBC Monitoring Middle East Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Dec. 19,2011. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

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While rhetoric o f this kind sounds impressive to those who already understand it, it makes
very little progress in appealing to those who have no prior experience with ideas such as
social justice or democracy.
In this way, ElBaradei represented the two greatest shortcomings that the plethora of
liberals faced: first, the lack of singular, unifying, and accessible leadership; and second, a
significant social disconnect from Egypt’s poorer citizens. ElBaradei’s return to Egypt at the
beginning of the revolution was cause for a great deal of excitement, and he served briefly as
a representative for the movement,245 but even then there was notable scepticism. Gamal Eld,
director of the Arabic Network for Human rights Information, a human rights group
operating in Egypt, described ElBaradei’s return with open doubt: "whoever wants to be a
leader of a democratic movement should be working among them. He cannot lead a real
battle against corruption and authoritarianism by remote control or Twitter. People don't
forget who stood next to them and who deserted them when they were calling for democracy
and fighting corruption”.246 ElBaradei had even returned shortly before in 2009 to settle
down in Egypt, and work for its democratic benefit, but quickly disappointed his supporters
by constantly travelling out o f Egypt, and failing to unify the opposition.247
ElBaradei exacerbated this problem when discussing the social rift between
Egyptians. In an interview, he promotes the “us versus them” mentality which was so
prominent within Egypt:

245David D. Kirkpatrick and Anthony Shadid, "Opposition Rallies to ElBaradei as Military Reinforces in Cairo,"
New York Times, Jan. 30, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/201 l/01/31/world/middleeast/31egypt.html?pagewanted=all
Alaa Bayoumi, “ElBaradei’s Last Stand," Al Jazeera, Jan. 27, 2011.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/2011127123331526535.html
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Right now, we have the educated middle class on one camp and the so-called Islamists and the majority
of the illiterate part of the country on the other side. That’s not the way we expected after the uprising.
We needed a charter that unified the people, that starts talking not about controversial issues, like the role
of Sharia law, how you restrict freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom o f worship, but talk
about science and technology, education, health care.248

Even if this social situation described by ElBaradei is accurate, ElBaradei’s rhetoric gives
lofty, patronizing impressions of the liberal side, and only serves to further exacerbate the
separation between liberals and the many Egyptians who are unfamiliar with their platform.
Despite his shortcomings, ElBaradei was still an extremely well-known figure with
decades o f experience working within democratic institutions with, if nothing else, the
potential to rally the many disorganized liberal parties into an effective whole. This would
not be the case, however, as when ElBaradei was faced with the popularity of Islamist
political movements, he instead chose to drop out of the presidential election.
While liberals campaigned ineffectively, Islamist political parties put forward
concrete platforms for change. Since Mubarak’s ouster, economic problems had arisen with
alarming consistency. Unemployment reached its highest level in a decade at approximately
12 percent; tourism, which employs, directly or indirectly, one in seven Egyptians, had fallen
by eighty percent from 2011; and vital gas exports to Israel and Jordan had been interrupted
by increasing insecurity in the Sinai.249 Leading into the elections, the FJP had a concrete,
though overambitious, economic plan. Meanwhile, it was extremely difficult to find
information about an economic or security plans from the liberals. This was due to the
dozens o f prospective liberal parties in play, many of whom were more concerned about
issues o f social injustice and religion. There was no unified political message being forward,

248 “ElBaradej; Egypt’s Draft Constitution Will ‘Institutionalize Instability’,” PBSNewshour, Dec. 24 2012.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-decl2-egypt2_12-24/.
249 Robert Springborg, “The Political Economy o f the Arab Spring.” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 3 (Nov.
2011): 428.
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and Egypt’s political landscape was inundated with numerous conflicting solutions to the
country’s growing problems.
The presidential campaign itself misrepresented Egypt’s political realities as well.
The major media outlets focused on Amr Moussa, a secularist running on a campaign of
inclusion, and Aboul Fotouh, a former Brotherhood member who now espoused a more
liberal message and was even endorsed by the extremist Salafis.250 These two candidates
engaged in a televised, four hour long debate less than two weeks prior to the election. What
is significant is that neither the FJP’s candidate, Mohammed Morsi, nor former prime
minister under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafiq, were invited to participate, despite the successes
they would have in the forthcoming election. Morsi was actually not invited because he was
falling behind in opinion polls, and deemed unpopular enough to be ignored.251 In fact, Morsi
and Shafiq were considered dark horses throughout the campaign.
This underestimation was again showed in the variety o f opinion polls undertaken by
the media in central, urban areas. For example, in a series of eight separate polls, polling
thousands of Egyptian citizens, and undertaken by Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram, the future
Egyptian president, Mohammed Morsi never once topped the polls.

Furthermore, the FJP

only once received a higher than ten percent in these polls, losing out by wide margins to

250 David D. Kirkpatrick, Mayy El Sheikh, and Kareem Fahim, “Egyptian Presidential Campaign Focuses on
Islam's Role in Public Life.” New York Times, May 12, 2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
251 Ibid.
252 "Abul-Fotouh dips, Moussa holds steady in Ahram presidential poll." Al-Ahram Online, May 14, 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/41592/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-electionsnews/AbulFotouh-dips,-Moussa-holds-steady-in-Ahram-pres.aspx
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Amr Moussa, Moneim Abul-Fotouh, and Ahmed Shafiq, the three of whom were considered
to be the frontrunners in the election.
The first of these polls was undertaken by the Egyptian government’s Information
and Decision Support Center (IDSC), which carried out four opinion polls, its last poll
published less than two weeks prior to the election. Below are the results of the polls
compared with the actual election results:
Figure 1. IDSC poll versus actual election results
30.00%

25.00%

20 .00 %

15.00% -|--------

■ IDSC Polls
I Actual Election Results

10 . 00 %

5.00%

0 .00%
M orsi

Shafiq

Sabbahy

A bul-Fotouh

M oussa

Source: Ahmed Feteha, "Egypt election results show opinion poll failures," Al-Ahram Online, June 5, 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/43804/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-electionsnews/Egypt-election-results-show-opinion-poll-failures.aspx.

Admittedly, they were correct about Shafiq finishing comparatively well, however, they
deeply underestimated his overall success, as well as Morsi and Sabbahy. Furthermore, the

253 Ahmed Feteha, "Egypt election results show opinion poll failures," Al-Ahram Online, June 5,2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/43804/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-electionsnews/Egypt-election-results-show-opinion-poll-failures.aspx.

103

poll predicted an 84 percent turnout, though the actual turnout was a little more than half of
that, at 46 percent.254
The next poll, carried out by the Basira Centre for Public Opinion Studies, was
published by Al-Masry Al-Youm Newspaper on May 19, 2011, less than a week before the
election. This poll was slightly more accurate on Shafiq’s popularity, but suffered the similar
shortcomings as the IDSC’s with all other candidates:

254 Ibid.

104

Figure 2. Al-Masry Al-Youm poll versus actual election results
30.00%

25.00%

20 .00 %

15.00% -I

■ Al-Masry Al-Youm Poll
■ Actual Election Results

10. 00 %

5.00%

0 . 00%
M orsi

Shafiq

Sabbahy

A bul-Fotouh

M oussa

Source: Ahmed Feteha, "Egypt election results show opinion poll failures," Al-Ahram Online, June 5, 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/43804/Presidential-elections-/Presidential-electionsnews/Egypt-election-results-show-opinion-poll-failures.aspx.

The Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPS) had a similar failure as the
Basira Centre, as they grossly overestimated Moussa’s popularity, while underestimating
Morsi and Sabbahy.255

255 Ibid.

105

Figure 3. ACPS Poll versus actual election results

■ ACPS Poll
■ Actual Election Results

M orsi

Shafiq

S abbahy

A bul-Fotouh

M oussa

Source: Ahmed Feteha, "Egypt election results show opinion poll failures," Al-Ahram Online, June 5,
2012. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/43804/Presidential-elections-/Presidentialelections-news/Egypt-election-results-show-opinion-poll-failures.aspx.

This variety of polls, which consistently showed Morsi losing by considerable
margins, proved to be inaccurate, as Morsi would narrowly win both rounds of the
presidential election, and be sworn in as the first president of the post-Mubarak era. Each of
these polls also stated that approximately a third of voters were undecided, which could
account for the enormous influx of votes for Morsi.256 More likely, however, it was the
organizational capacity o f the FJP to get their supporters in the voting booths. Meanwhile,
the various liberal groups, disorganized and without central leadership, could not do the same
for their followers. Adding insult to injury, the chief competition to Morsi’s campaign was
not even a liberal, it was a former member of the Mubarak regime, Ahmed Shafiq, who was
not considered a particularly popular candidate due to his past affiliations with the Mubarak
regime. O f the liberal candidates, the most successful one was the Nasserist Dignity Party,

256 ibid.

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led by Hamdeen Sabbahy. Sabbahy, whose ideology only remotely resembled the original
liberal goals desired during the Arab Spring, garnered approximately twenty percent of the
popular vote.
The FJP’s successes during the elections were met with outrage from liberal groups,
some calling for boycott for the second round of elections. ElBaradei called for a provision
which limited the first term to one year, to allow a new constitution to be drafted.257 This,
however, may be interpreted as the angry rhetoric of the losing side, and it bears considering
if ElBaradei would make a similar suggestion if a liberal candidate was positioned to win.
Ultimately, one o f the goals of liberalism is the ability to vote for a candidate that you wish to
see elected, and for that candidate to be able to serve the duration of his or her term.
Conversely, if your candidate loses, there is an expectation that the results will be respected
by all parties. As O’Donnell put it, this is the democratic wager.258 Based on the results of the
presidential election, it is clear that a sizable amount of Egyptians preferred a candidate
which they had history with, either religiously (the FJP), or politically (Shafiq, former
member o f the Mubarak regime).
With this in mind, a great deal of the anger turned towards the FJP and the Muslim
Brotherhood may be attributed to the fact that they turned out to be far more successful than
expected. One voter who voted against the FJP stated that “[the Brotherhood] still want to
dominate; this is very obvious from their position on the assembly for drafting the
constitution where they want to have a very large share of seats, no matter how unpopular

257 "Decision Time," Al-Ahram Weekly, June 15,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
258 Guillermo O ’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullel, and Osvaldo Miguel The Quality o f Democracy: Theory and
Applications (Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame, 2004), 16-17.

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this is”.259 This hostility towards the Brotherhood, however, was found chiefly amongst the
vocal liberal factions within Egypt. The Brotherhood’s deep well of support was found
beyond the liberal bloc. This popularity led them to renege on claims that they would be
seeking fewer seats in parliament and not fielding a presidential candidate. Considering how
well the Brotherhood performed, reneging on these promises was a logical step. Clearly
many Egyptians thought the Brotherhood were the best choice to lead the country.
Morsi himself was also a rather unknown candidate, which may have actually been
one of the reasons his presidential bid was successful. As chairman of the Freedom and
Justice Party, Morsi was considered a safe, if underwhelming, candidate.260 He had played a
role in Egyptian politics in the past, but was not considered a major player before the
elections. In fact, he was only chosen as the FJP’s candidate because their first choice,
Khairat El-Shater was disqualified from running.261 As shown in the above polls, he was
essentially written off by mass media as a fourth or fifth place candidate for the presidency,
in favor of more well known, or at least more visible, candidates such as Amr Moussa or
even Ahmed Shafiq. From a western perspective “even after the two-month presidential
campaign, Mr. Morsi [remained] an unfamiliar figure to most Egyptians”.262 His victory
seemed dependant on two key factors, which were rarely discussed in the news.
The first of these factors is Ahmed Shafiq, Morsi’s chief opposition in the election,
former member of the Mubarak regime, and, technically, Mubarak’s successor for a brief

259"Countdown to the unknown," Al-Ahram Weekly, June 15,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
260 “Profile: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi,” BBC News, Dec. 18,2013. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-18371427.
261 Ibid.
262David D. Kirkpatrick, "Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History," New York Times, June 24,2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-asegypts-president.html?pagewanted=all.

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period o f time following Mubarak’s downfall. Shafiq was representative of the old regime. In
this context, to his supporters he was a known value, representing decades of relative
stability. Conversely, to his detractors, primarily composed of the youth movement that
pulled Mubarak down from power, he represented a regression to a pre-revolution Egypt. It is
certainly reasonable to assume that many Egyptians voted for Morsi not because they
believed he was the best choice for president, but because they believed that he was still
better than a remnant o f the Mubarak era. With the second round of elections devoid of any
liberal influence, choices were certainly limited.
The second factor is that Morsi did not require the support o f the vocal minority to
win because he enjoyed a support base which was less evident to the main stream media.
Morsi (as well as Shafiq) both had sufficient amounts of support from less vocal Egyptians
who lived outside of the large Egyptian cities, in the more rural areas which did not gamer
nearly as much coverage from the media, and where liberal ideas were at best alien concepts.
For Morsi, these were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, or many otherwise religious
Egyptians who had similar beliefs to Brotherhood members. It is this section of people whom
the liberals claim supposedly stole the election away from them. As one liberal explained:
Egypt has a 35-40 percent rate of illiteracy. It is this percentage that the Brotherhood manipulated, in the
name o f religion, to achieve a majority in the failed parliament that has been ruled unconstitutional. It
will be this ill-informed, uneducated and indifferent section o f the population that the Muslim
Brotherhood will lobby intensively to vote.263

While news stories covered the liberal surge in Cairo or Alexandria, the more remote areas of
Egypt held onto heavily entrenched beliefs. Egypt’s rural population amounts to about 57
percent of the country, and a great deal o f this demographic wets responsible for the successes

263Ayman El-Amir, "Constitution in the balance," Al-Ahram Weekly, Oct. 10,2012.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/! 117/op8.htm.

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of Morsi and Shafiq during the election.264 It was these regions that liberals either blamed
primarily for their continuing failures, or simply ignored entirely. In these regions, there were
people who spent their entire lives knowing either the NDP (Mubarak’s political party) or the
Brotherhood. Shafiq himself made several visits to these rural regions, actively campaigning
in areas where he understood that history created support, while avoiding the larger towns
and cities, “where residents suggest that he would have been met unwelcomingly by educated
youth”.265
This sharp divide in priorities would create a great deal of tension following the
election. Liberal frustration at neither being able to build on the momentum of the revolution
grew. In the year that followed, however, the tensions of this victory would rise significantly,
and a great deal o f this strain would be fueled by the very actions that, from the beginning,
many feared the FJP would take.

Presidential Powers and the Draft Constitution: 2012
The start of Morsi’s rule was promising. He assured his large support base that he
would live up to their expectations, while appeasing his opposition. Morsi vowed to
guarantee Egypt’s transition to a “civil, democratic, constitutional, and modem state”.266 He
followed this up with a variety of bold claims, which, if acted upon, would have been
extremely promising. These included reinforcing the rule of law, stating that “Muslims and
Christians are equal before the law,” as well as declaring that parliamentary elections would

264Sarah Mousa, "Democracy versus Tahrir," A l Jazeera, June 23, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/2012622122653356816.html.
“ ’ Ibid.
266"Egyptian President-elect Mursi vows civil state," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, June 30,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
110

occur after a new constitution was drafted.267 He also promised that the “prime minister and
an advisory council would come from outside the Brotherhood as part of a unity government
based on a rebuilt alliance with liberals and other secular activists”.268
It did not take long, however, for legitimate criticism to target the Morsi regime. This
was partly his own doing, as during his campaign, he had made a multitude of promises to be
carried out during his first one hundred days in office, including improvements in the areas of
security, economic reform, infrastructure, sanitation, and so on. Morsi fell short in each
department.269 In fact, much of what transpired over the next year would come to directly
contradict the claims he made about the direction his leadership would take Egypt.
First, Morsi made widespread changes to the media. These included: appointing Saleh
'Abd Al-Maqsoud, a loyal Brotherhood member, as information minister; having the upper
house of parliament (otherwise known as the Shura Council) replace approximately fifty
chief editors and board directors of state-owned newspapers; seizing copies of the
independent daily newspaper Al-Dustour after they criticized the Morsi government; and
filing lawsuits against journalists who allegedly published false information against the
Brotherhood.270 Much o f this was done under auspices of increasing journalistic ethics,
providing a voice for Egypt’s remerging Islamic character, or simply purging the media of

267"Egyptian president hails EU role in supporting democratic transition," BBC Monitoring Middle East Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 30,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
268 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History." New York Times, June 24, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-declared-asegypts-president.html?pagewanted=all.
"Egyptian President-elect Mursi vows civil state," BBC Monitoring Middle East - Political Supplied by BBC
Worldwide Monitoring, June 30,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
270 L. Lavi, "Muslim Brotherhood Efforts To Take Over Egyptian Media," MEMRI, April 30,2013.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7157.htm#_edn3.

Ill

members o f the old regime.271 None of these reasons were compelling enough to convince
Morsi’s detractors.
Furthermore, Morsi made attempts to fill the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC)
with Brotherhood loyalists to avoid any resistance from the SCC. As the highest judicial
power in Egypt, the SCC was supposed to be independent.

777

Morsi had also forced head of

SCAF, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and army chief of staff, Sami Anan, into retirement
(though he did so “softly,” by naming them advisors to the president instead).273 Morsi then
cancelled constitutional amendments issued by the military which placed limits on Morsi’s
presidential powers.274
Morsi also increased his powers in the form of a constitutional declaration on
November 22 2012, which effectively “stripped the Egyptian judicial system of the power to
appeal his decisions, thus giving constitutional validity to his status as ultimate arbiter in the
country - far exceeding his powers as head of the executive authority.”275 Morsi would use
this declaration to speed up the creation of a draft constitution and the referendum for
December, using his new powers to circumvent any legal interference. The declaration stated
that any decisions made by him could not be appealed by the judiciary until a new
constitution was in place, thus making it impossible for any opposing factions, liberal and

271 Ibid.
272 David D. Kirkpatrick and Mayy El Sheikh, "Citing Deadlock, Egypt’s Leader Seizes New Power and Plans
Mubarak Retrial," New York Times, Nov. 22, 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ll/23/world/middleeast/egypts-president-iiiorsi-gives-himself-new-powers.html.
273 Kareem Fahim, "In Upheaval for Egypt, Morsi Forces Out Military Chiefs," The New York Times, August
12,2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/13/world/middleeast/egyptian-leader-ousts-militarychiefs.html?pagewanted=all.
274 Ibid.
275 N. Shamni, "Egypt Under Muslim Brotherhood Rule: The Constitutional Declaration - Dictatorship In The
Name O f The Revolution." MEMRI. Dec. 7, 2012.
http://www.memn .org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6862.htm#_edn 1.

112

secular in particular, to affect the draft constitution that he desired, which he put forward
shortly thereafter.
Morsi’s draft constitution proved extremely problematic to liberals, secularists, and
Copts. It perpetuated the clause that defined Islamic law as foundational to legislation, while
neglecting any mention o f how alternative belief systems, namely Coptic Christianity, would
operate under the constitution. It also remained devoid of any mention of increasing women’s
rights, but instead described at length military powers comparable to what they were under
Mubarak. In response, the liberals attempted to create an alliance called the National
Salvation Front united loosely by the desire to oppose Morsi’s constitutional draft. One of the
coalition’s most prominent members, and former presidential candidate, Hamdeen Sabbahy
stated that if the constitution was passed “Egypt [would] continue in this really charged state.
It is certain this constitution is driving us to more political polarisation”.276
Morsi scheduled a referendum on the draft constitution to begin on December 15th,
2012. President Morsi defended his actions in a nationally televised speech:
The nation is ready for the referendum on time. If the people agree, then they will start building
institutions upon this foundation. If it is rejected, I will use my authority and duty to create a new
constitutional assembly based on an agreement or on direct elections for a new assembly. I will never
allow anyone to kill or destroy a public foundation. I will not allow those calling for the overthrow of the
people's legitimate government, the free design that Egyptians have taken.”277

This statement showcases a surprising amount of naivety, lack o f self-awareness, and perhaps
even willful ignorance from not only a well-educated man, but the president o f a prominent
country. Despite the seemingly obvious repercussions his actions would have on the unity of
Egyptian civil society, Morsi did not seem willing to understand how his actions were met
276 "Rival rallies held in Egypt over constitution," A l Jazeera, Dec. 11,2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/20121210235329634676.html.
277 "Will the constitution divide or unite Egypt," A l Jazeera, Dec. 15,2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/12/201212159381583365 .html.

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with so much derision and anger. Unfortunately, like Mubarak before him, this substantial
disconnect from such a sizeable portion of Egyptian society caused factions which had been
mired in discord over the past two years to find common ground and unite against Morsi.
It is entirely possible that Morsi’s stance was bom of a lack of ability. Mubarak’s
downfall was no small feat, and in his departure, Egypt was hardly in any position to have an
easy or simple transition towards any other form of government or ideology. The task at hand
involved rebuilding a country which had suffered decades o f harsh oppression, and it is
entirely possible that even Morsi’s presidential opponents would not have been up to the task.
The fact remains, however, that it was Morsi who was voted in as President, and it was Morsi
who failed not only to hold Egyptian society in some semblance of union, but actually played
an integral role in breaking it apart. Pushing the draft constitution forward, and eventually
implementing it, was considered perhaps the greatest example of this lack of understanding.
The draft would come to represent the new regime’s inability to recognize and mend Egypt’s
fractured society, as well as its failure of leadership, two themes which would become even
more pronounced over the next six months.

Political Society and the Coptic Christians
Throughout all o f this difficulty, the Coptic Christian population was largely a non­
factor, despite their wishes to the contrary. Following the successful revolution, there was a
great deal o f expectation regarding the forthcoming role of the Coptic Christian populace in
Egypt. Severely underrepresented during the eras of Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak, the Copts
believed the liberal emphasis o f the revolution would allow them opportunities to play a

114

greater role in the forthcoming government. While in the past the Copts were not actively
persecuted by the government, neither were they particularly well defended against
harassment from elements within the Muslim majority. For example, since Nasser’s era, there
was an unspoken policy stating that only Muslims could occupy senior state positions, “with
the exception of a few “public Copts” as a token. There [was] no Coptic college dean,
university rector, or provincial governor”.278 Copts also required specific permits from the
head of state to build churches, which were given out with less and less frequency following
Nasser’s coup. 279 The Copts hoped to reverse their situation with Mubarak’s removal.
Despite the role they played during the revolution, and assurances made by the
Muslim majority, the Coptic Christians were soon relegated to a very minor position in the
wake of Mubarak’s downfall. In addition to the violence mentioned in the previous chapter,
after Morsi was elected President, and the time came to select a new Egyptian cabinet, only a
single Copt280 was selected by Morsi and his prime minister, Hesham Qandil.281 Qandil
justified this exclusion by stating that he made his decisions without regard to “party
affiliation, sect, religion, or gender,” that “all [he saw was] Egyptians,” though he eventually
chose two women, one of whom was also the single Copt.282
Such sentiments of complete equality are certainly idealistic. There is even a strong
belief within the Coptic community which does not seek to distinguish the Copts from other
Egyptians, but instead to “so fully and harmoniously [integrate the Copts] into Egyptian

278 David Zeidan, “The Copts—Equal, Protected or Persecuted? The Impact of Islamization on Muslim-Christian
Relations in Modem.” Islam & Christian-Muslim Relations 10, no 1. (1999): 58.
279 Ibid.
280 D. Parvaz, “Egypt's feminists prepare for a long battle,” A l Jazeera, Feb. 7, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/01/2012117113758961894.html.
281 Kareem Fahim, "New Egyptian Cabinet Includes Many Holdovers," New York Times, Aug. 2012.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/world/middleeast/new-egyptian-cabinet.html?_r=0>.
282 Ibid.

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society as to be indistinguishable from Muslims”.283 Mona Makram-Ebeid, a prominent
Coptic politician, even made it clear that her agenda was not in favor of pushing for a Coptic
political wing. According to Makram-Ebeid:
Dignity, justice, freedom and human rights were the issues... She didn't particularly define herself as a
Coptic politician, nor even as a feminist. Yes, women's issues were o f concern to her, but first and
foremost she was an Egyptian politician. She was sceptical of the inward-looking attitude o f many
Coptic Christians - politicians and laypersons. She was troubled by the Copts' incomplete absorption into
the Egyptian political establishment and refused to play the token Copt or woman.

Assuming, however, that Egyptian society has progressed far enough to enjoy such
religious equanimity completely ignores decades of sectarian strife. Instead, QandiPs words
revealed the idea that Copts should not expect the government to address the deep, historical
inequalities between Copt and Muslim, a remarkably tone deaf way of handling decades of
sectarian strife. This dismissal o f societal inequalities essentially asks the oppressed group to
allow itself to be marginalized. Anne Phillips makes this point when she says “when an
oppressed group is called upon to put its own partial needs aside, it is being asked to
legitimate its own oppression”.285 By ignoring this fundamental characteristic of Egyptian
society, the newly formed Egyptian government set itself up to fail in even the appearance of
endeavoring towards an inclusive and liberal government, such as the one they had been
pledging to build.
It should also be noted that Qandil’s sentiment is hardly isolated. Morsi, prior to his
election, described the Copts’ situation as "fake problems that had been produced by the

283 Yvonne Haddad, “Good Copt, Bad Copt: Competing Narratives on Coptic Identity in Egypt and the United
States.” Studies in World Christianity 19, no 3. (2013): 215.
284 “Copts step out o f Church’s shadow,” Al-Ahram Weekly, May 19,2012.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
285 Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1993), 94.

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former regime", meant to distract from real issues.286 His runner-up in the election, Ahmed
Shafiq also stated that "Christians should be excused for their worries after the Islamic
current dominated parliament. I say to them: wait, things might be better. Egyptian people
will never allow for any offence against Copts".287 This is an idealistic sentiment, but not
indicative of societal realities.
This isolation o f the Copts became more pronounced when, shortly after his election,
Morsi introduced his draft constitution. Islamists within the government stating that “’the
principles o f Islamic law’ should continue to be the guiding principle for Egyptian
law...[and] that the al-Azhar institution, the leading authority in Sunni Islam, should be
consulted on any matters related to Islamic law”.288 No mention was made of how
emphasizing Islam as the centre o f governance would affect the Copts.
The draft was approved and passed in December 2012, but was ultimately replaced by
a new constitution put forward after Morsi was deposed as President. Even though it did not
last long, Morsi’s draft constitution is still integral in discussing the role, or lack thereof, that
the Coptic population played within Egyptian politics. Though the draft constitution did not
explicitly state that shari ’a would be the only source of law within Egypt, neither did it state
any alternative. Given the lack of input from the Coptic population, as well as liberals,
reformists, and women, the draft constitution was very problematic for any demographics
beyond male Islamists. The acceptance of this exclusion also has ramifications for Egypt’s
prospects of moving away from an authoritarian government.

286 “Egyptian talk show discusses presidential candidates’ vision on Coptic issue,” BBC Monitoring Middle East
- Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring, May 13,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
287 Ibid.
288 Jon Leyne, "Egypt Divisions Likely to Deepen over Draft Constitution," BBC News, Nov. 30,2012.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20553766.

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Guillermo O’Donnell states that, “under democracy, the state institutions have the
duty (correlative to the rights o f political and civil leadership) of treating everyone with the
full fairness, consideration, and respect due to an agent”.289 With this idea in mind, there are
two main problems for the Copts that Morsi’s draft constitution presented. The first is that
the Morsi government had no issue with completing the draft constitution without the
involvement or even consideration of the Coptic population. This shows that Coptic Christian
participation in the government, despite claims to the contrary, was not important to the
Morsi government. This particular point, however, might be characteristic only of the Morsi
regime; there is no accounting for how Morsi’s successor will behave in relation to Coptic
considerations and political aspirations. The fact remains, however, that historically, the
Copts have been a forgotten entity during the decades Mubarak’s tenure. The second
problem, however, is more deeply seeded, and far more difficult to change. This problem is
that the draft was voted in with 63 percent approval. Therefore, a majority of voting
Egyptians are fine, or at least indifferent, with the continued marginalization of the Coptic
Christians, both in their involvement in government, as well as their rights in society. This
point is certainly undermined by the low voter turnout of approximate 33%, however, such
numbers are not inconsistent with Egyptian turnouts in the past.290 The results of the
referendum may also have a profound effect on the behaviour of prospective political
candidates, who, seeking a pragmatic approach to elections, will attempt to curry the favor of
this majority.

289 Guillermo O’Donnell, Jorge Vargas Cullell, and Oswaldo Miguel Iazzetta, The Quality o f Democracy:
Theory and Applications (Notre Dame, IN: University o f Notre Dame, 2004), 35.
290 The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter turnout data for Egypt,” The
International Institute fo r Democracy and Electoral Assistance. Oct. 5, 2011.
http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=EG.

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If Islamic principles play a role within the Egyptian government non-Muslims would
lack the same capabilities within both government and society because they would not have
similar representation. Regardless o f how a Coptic Christian may vote, if an Islamic body can
influence, or even be allowed to make the final decision about a particular issue, then the
Coptic position within political society will remain deeply unequal compared to that of the
Muslim. Furthermore, depending on how fundamental the Islamic governing body acts, this
inequality may bleed outwards towards other demographics, such as women, who already
have a poor standing within Egypt.
Linz and Stepan’s definition of a healthy political society includes the involvement of
civil society. The exclusion of the Coptic Christian population, which makes up
approximately ten percent o f the overall Egyptian population, is a problematic sign for the
post-Mubarak transition, especially given the Islamic majority’s complacency in the matter.
Anne Phillips describes this failure succinctly:
It is indeed dangerous to pretend that who or what we are is irrelevant, to ask people to submerge their
group differences in an abstract citizenship, to say that politics is only a matter o f ideas. Such
complacency leaves democracy too much at the mercy o f existing power relations, which will just
reproduce existing patterns o f power. More specifically, the composition of political representatives
does matter, and we need the kind o f institutional changes that will guarantee proportionality - at least
by ethnicity and gender...We exist not just as abstract citizens, but also as members o f variously
privileged or disadvantaged groups. Political organization based around the dominant cleavages whether these are gender or class or ethnicity or religion —is rightly viewed as one possible means of
redressing the balance.291

This exclusion may be the single greatest obstacle that Egypt faces if it hopes to establish a
legitimate democracy.

291 Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 1993), 100-101.

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Unrest. Instability, and Military Intervention

In 2013, protests persisted almost unceasingly. Clashes between police and protesters
were common, often culminating in several deaths amongst the protesters. During this time,
the Morsi government seemed unable or unwilling to make any decisions to counteract the
growing tide o f discontent amongst the Egyptian people. Morsi supporters instead turned the
blame against the opposition, accusing it of “corruption, betraying the homeland, and serving
its own partisan interests, and o f using violence to destroy Egypt and instigate chaos. They
described the opposition leaders as fu lo u f92... and extremist secularists who hate Islam”.293
Gone was any pretense of dialogue between the two groups, replaced by the rampant finger
pointing that characterized the Mubarak regime in the last days of his presidency.
Morsi turned his attentions to matters which were, at best, questionable, instead of the
pressing issues o f security or economic concerns,. On March 30th, an arrest warrant was
issued for Bassem Youssef, a political satirist, for “insulting Islam and [Morsi]”, an attempt
to silence opposition.294 This was even followed up with another arrest warrant, this time for
popular Western satirist Jon Stewart, who attacked Morsi for his media restrictions as well as
arresting Youssef.
With Morsi’s attention set on consolidating his power, any hopes of dialogue between
the ruling government and its opposition quickly vanished. In its place, the opposition
ramped up its protests against the Morsi government, leading to a kind of stalemate between
the two powers, one which led to a state of torpor in Egypt’s political transition. In the
292 Remnants o f the Mubarak regime.
293 N. Shamni and H. Varulkar, "Egypt Prepares For Second Anniversary O f January 25 Revolution Amid
Unprecedented Tension Between Muslim Brotherhood And Opposition Camp," MEMRI, Jan. 24, 2013.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6951 .htm#_edn6.
294"Egypt satirist Bassem Youssef faces arrest warrant." BBC News, March 30,
2013 .http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21980343.
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absence o f any real political discourse between political society and civil society, a different
dialogue emerged, between the Morsi government and the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces.
There were already some problems between the regime and the SCAF after Morsi
forced Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, former head of the armed forces and defense minister, to
retire shortly after the presidential election. Now rumors began to circulate that there were
plans to “replace the top echelon of the military with one loyal to the MB. These fears
emerged following statements by MB officials that were interpreted as criticism of the
current military leadership”.295
Not even a year earlier, Egyptian civil society was in uproar over even the possibility
of the military playing a continued role in government. Lavi describes this attitude as
follows:
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ruled Egypt for 18 months, starting with the ouster
o f Hosni Mubarak in January 2011 and ending with President Muhammad Morsi's victory in the June
2012 election. During its rule, the SCAF was widely criticized publicly; mass protests were held and
there were calls for its removal. In mid-August 2012, Morsi, to establish his status, removed the
military's top echelon; this move was not strongly opposed, and even led to speculation that there was an
alliance between the new leadership of the military and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB).296

In 2013, however, with discontent steadily fomenting, public opinion began to turn, and the
military was again embraced as a potential agent of change. The rumors of Morsi’s regime
changing the military hierarchy to one more suitable for the regime’s goals quickly sparked
more protests, this time in support of the military.

295 L. Lavi, "In Egypt, Tension Between Mursi Regime And Military, And Calls To Restore Armed Forces To
Power." MEMRJ. April 30,2013. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7157.htm# edn3.
296 Ibid.
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Defense Minister and Supreme Commander of the Egyptian Armed Forces Abdel AlFatah El-Sisi quickly began to rise in popularity amongst large swathes of the Egyptian
people. This popularity was spurred on by the Morsi government’s specific desire to see him
replaced by a pro-regime ally. There were calls from liberals as well as disillusioned
Brotherhood supporters for El-Sisi to be appointed as president, replacing Morsi.297 Many of
these calls ignored the electoral process altogether, though high ranking liberals, including
the National Salvation Front, did not.298 These liberals instead called for only security
intervention, not political.299 Ultimately, this intervention did occur, as the military deposed
Egypt’s first elected post-revolution president.
It seemed that the military had returned to its previous role - defending national
security, and distancing itself from political affairs - and thus regaining the public's trust and
its image as the people's military. In the process of regaining this trust, however, the military
also became the most viable option for the Egyptian leadership. This created a potential
repetition o f the pre-revolution Egyptian government, where the country was led for almost
sixty years by military men. It is impossible to know for certain that a military bred president
would cause Egypt to regress to Mubarak-era politics. There is, however, reason to be
doubtful o f the liberal aspirations of the now Egyptian president, Abdel Al-Fatah El-Sisi.
These reasons include his immediate crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the days of
Morsi’s deposal. The subjugation of Islamists, specifically the Brotherhood, as well as the
potential marginalization of the Coptic Christians, and potentially even liberal groups

297Ibid.
298Ibid.
299

Ibid.

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(perhaps the largest unknown for a military-led government) creates some very real doubts
about the kind of the political society that is forming in Egypt.

A Return to Military Leadership
Like civil society, the failings of political society revolved around the inability for the
dominant powers to reconcile their differences and work towards positive change. While this
solution seems like it should have been simple, the truth is that successfully transitioning
from one form o f government to another is no simple task. This is complicated further due to
the regional culture. North Africa and the Middle East is a region where a governmental
transition is an overwhelming rarity. Given also that Egypt’s political culture has largely
been built around decades o f authoritarian rule, certain tendencies were bound to roll over
into the post-Mubarak political sphere.
It is entirely possible that Mubarak’s former regime did in fact play a significant role
in the way the Morsi government behaved while in office. Morsi created an environment of
political exclusion, ignoring all other avenues of discourse in favor of unilateral, partisan
decision making, the same methods utilized by the Mubarak regime, and those of Sadat and
Nasser before him. It is not entirely surprising that after decades o f absolute, concentrated
power, a newly formed government, even with liberal aspirations as the basis of change,
would still behave the same as its predecessor. After decades of often violent and brutal
suppression it is reasonable to assume that the Muslim Brotherhood, gaining a position of
power, would seek to use their power to redress their position in a less than even and
democratic manner. It is furthermore impossible to know if the liberal opposition would have

123

behaved differently. Ultimately, what is noteworthy is that the rifts within the Egyptian
political landscape remained unbridged, and the end result was a lopsided political society
characterized by heavy polarization. Whether or not these problems are irreconcilable is
something that future Egyptian leaders will have to address.

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Chapter Four
Rule o f Law
The third of Stepan and Linz’s arenas is the rule of law. According to Linz and
Stepan, the rule of law revolves around a “spirit of constitutionalism [which] requires more
than rule by majoritarianism”.300 This definition is specifically used to describe the rule of
law in a consolidated democracy, however, it can still be used when examining political
transition more broadly. The interim government that took power following Mubarak’s
deposal, nor the Morsi government which was elected in 2012, had the opportunity to create
a new “hierarchy of laws” to replace or even revise Mubarak’s old ones. Therefore, this
chapter will concentrate primarily on the failure to successfully re-establish a working legal
system by examining Morsi’s draft constitution, put forward in 2012; Morsi’s deposal in the
summer of 2013; and the judiciary’s status and role following Mubarak’s deposal

Rule o f Law: The Arab Spring o f January 2011
Mubarak’s ouster was not so much an example of the rule o f law, as much as it was
the result o f a lack thereof. As mentioned in previous chapters, Hosni Mubarak ruled Egypt
with an almost childlike assumption of invincibility. For thirty years, Mubarak found
legitimacy through rigged elections that were comically one-sided.301 His reign was
characterized primarily by his singular obsession o f maintaining power. Mubarak
accomplished this by brutally suppressing any emerging opposition. In order to peipetuate his

300 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 7.
301 Michael Bowen, "Analysis: Egypt's unfinished revolution," BBC News, Feb. 8 , 2011.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12396728.

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survival, he ignored the troubles of the average Egyptian, in lieu of appeasing the wealthy
Egyptian elite which composed the majority of his support base.302
Stepan and Linz’ definition is readily problematic when compared with Mubarak’s
political platform, specifically Linz and Stepan’s point about the “spirit of constitutionalism”
defined by plurality and bipartisanship. As Linz and Stepan describe this idea, “the spirit of
constitutionalism” revolves around cohesion between various demographics or interest
groups, allowing for greater or equal rights for minority populations, and avoiding a tyranny
of the majority (in the case of Mubarak’s Egypt, the wealthy, powerful elites.) This spirit of
constitutionalism achieves this plurality primarily by creating an inclusive constitution which
holds the rights o f all groups as paramount. Encouraging negotiation and compromise, rather
than assuming the political arena winner-take-all. Mubarak, of course, did not affect any of
these changes, and in 2011, the Egyptian people pulled him from power.

Amendments and Elections: 2011
Though not the most significant event in regards to the law, the referendum on the
constitutional amendments in 2011 became the first major conflict between the two
prevailing factions, and would be repeated in the coming months. If the amendments were
voted in, they would be beneficial to the highly organized Islamist bloc within Egypt, as the
amendments would speed up elections, giving the Islamists a substantial advantage over the
less organized liberals. If the amendments were voted against, they would delay elections,
providing the liberals with much needed time to prepare. Ultimately, the constitutional
302 Curtis Ryan, "Political Strategies and Regime Survival in Egypt," Journal o f Third World Studies 18, no. 2
(September 2001): 42.

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amendments were voted in, but the argument that followed from the liberal side was whether
they should have been approved. From the Islamist bloc the question was whether this
success gave them more room to maneuver as they pleased. These perspectives created
tension in both civil and political society, which only grew during the presidential election.
These contentious attitudes run contrary to the pluralistic guidelines set forth by
Stepan and Linz, and encouraged during Mubarak’s ouster, but would persist nonetheless.
Following the Muslim Brotherhood’s successes in the parliamentary elections, the liberals
were vocal in their disapproval of the new president. Many liberals called for a boycott of the
second round of voting, after it became clear the ffontrunners were an Islamist, and a former
member of the Mubarak regime.303 ElBaradei even asked that the first term in office be
limited to one year.304 Despite these protests, Morsi was voted into office, with no limits
placed on his tenure.
The bitter attitude adopted by the liberals during the presidential elections shows a
recurring trend. Morsi was voted in democratically in fair and free elections. Certainly, losing
an election, especially such a monumental and historic one such as Egypt’s first elections
following Mubarak’s deposal, can be frustrating, however, legal rights of office cannot
simply be changed at a whim within a state with a functioning rule o f law. As Stepan and
Linz stated, rule o f law requires a “commitment to ‘self-binding’ procedures of governance
that require exceptional majorities to change”.305 A spasm of anger and frustration at losing
an election should not be enough to justify a drastic change in electoral process.

303 "Decision Time," Al-Ahram Weekly, June 15,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
304 Ibid.
305 Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems o f Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe,
South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1996), 10.

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The speed with which the liberals moved to try and limit Morsi’s first term
illuminates two very troubling points about the liberals concerning the rule of law. The first
is that by encouraging a circumvention of the law in order to facilitate a more favorable
situation for themselves, they undermine the law and their own liberal aspirations. The law
does not exist only when it is convenient, and it must be universally applied within a
functional, liberal democracy. Linz and Stepan state: “All significant actors - especially the
democratic government and the state - must respect and uphold the rule of law...it also
requires an independent judicial system...supported by a strong legal culture in civil
a, ,99 306
society
.

The reticence o f the liberals to play a role in the political landscape of Egypt, and
instead immediately begin to circumvent the legal system shows a deep misunderstanding of
the law, as defined within a working democracy. This attitude also directly contradicts the
spirit of constitutionalism that Linz and Stepan encourage. The second point is that by
attempting to change the rules without an exceptional majority for support, and in
contradiction with the very basic tenets of the rule of law, shows that the liberals were not
truly democrats. The democratic process requires the legitimate possibility that an election
may be lost, as well as the expectation that the losing side will adhere to the result. Again,
this uncertainty is O’Donnell’s democratic wager. Morsi’s spectacular failure in his
presidency is not the salient issue insofar as the rule of law is concerned; rather it is the
liberals’ inability to even attempt to work with him to find compromise in an already volatile
situation.

306 Ibid., 10.

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Admittedly, the liberals’ resistance was bom from fear that the Islamists would
quickly dismantle the country’s liberal democratic ambitions. Liberals worried that the very
same liberal institutions, established for the purposes of creating a democratic system, would
instead be used to dismantle democracy. The fear was that shari ’a would be the focal point of
political transition. The “spirit of constitutionalism” characterized by plurality and
bipartisanship was likewise ignored by the Islamists, in favor of a creating a potentially one­
sided state of affairs similar to Mubarak’s previous dictatorship, though differing
ideologically. To combat this possibility, the liberals used tactics which contradicted many of
the ideas that they espoused. Their choice to boycott the various elections was considered a
tactic o f de-legitimization, showing that not all sides would be properly represented.
Likewise, the Islamists, despite their constant reassurance, were also not truly
democrats, but for different reasons. Instead of violating the letter o f the law, the Islamists
violated its spirit. While they did work within the boundaries created within the legal system,
they did so in a way that alienated and weakened their opposition. As the end of 2012 neared,
however, and Morsi began preparing his draft constitution, many of these fears became far
more justified, as Morsi began to abuse his powers.

The Draft Constitution: November 2012
Before the presidential election, neither the liberals nor the Islamists performed any
truly egregious violation o f the law. These actions were seen in the harsh oppression of the
interim military government, but not in the two main political factions. There was much
rhetoric which ran contrary to the rule of the law, but at the point that Morsi was elected,

129

very little had actually been done. The draft constitution created by Morsi’s government was
put forward at the end o f 2012, and was immediately met with outrage from opponents of the
Islamists, namely the liberals, due to its emphasis on Islam as the fundamental basis for
Egyptian policy and politics, as well as the omission of minority and gender rights. Morsi had
already faced heavy criticism from the judiciary for assuming powers which effectively
barred the courts from opposing his decisions.307 Morsi would annul the decree shortly
thereafter, but before he did so, he pushed through a referendum on the contested draft
constitution. Morsi’s opponents, primarily liberals, felt that this draft constitution was selfserving, and ignored many o f the original goals of the 2011 revolution.
The draft constitution also highlights, much to the chagrin of Egyptian liberals that
the central political conflict was not between Islamists and liberals, shari ’a and secularism.
Instead, there seemed to be no question or argument from the Islamists about whether or not
shari ’a would be applied, only discussion on how fundamental its application would be. As
one source from the committee who deliberated over the draft constitution put it, the question
was simply “how much shari’a should we have?”308 Shari'a has been a part of Egypt’s
constitution for decades, however, now the debate centered on whether it should still be
included and just how widespread its inclusion should be.309 Meanwhile, while debate around
shari 'a is so hotly contested, issues such as the role of the judiciary and the balance of
powers are almost completely ignored.”310 To highlight this prioritization, thousands of
ultraconservative Salafis demonstrated in favor of a more fundamental constitution, pushing

307 "Egypt judges condemn Morsi's new powers," AlJazeera, Nov. 24, 2012.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/ll/2012112415251208318.html.
308 Gregg Carlstrom, “Political Clash Over Egypt’s Constitution,” Al Jazeera, Oct. 20, 2012.
http://www.alj azeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/20121019620186523.html
309 Ibid.
3 ,0 Ibid.

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for archaic measures to be added to the draft constitution, including the protection of female
genital mutilation and the marriage of girls as young as nine years old.311
Given the fractured state of civil and political society, the draft constitution created
many problems for all factions, all of whom were extremely reluctant to work with one
another. Morsi sought to create a draft constitution that relied on shari ’a, but not so severely
that any moderates would assume he was attempting to create an Islamist state.312
Meanwhile, more fundamental Islamists, such as the Salafis, believed that Morsi’s
constitution was not heavy handed enough.313 The liberal faction, including the Coptic
Christians and women’s rights activists, wanted the omission entirely of any religious
emphasis in favor of secular gains and more specific protection of religion and gender
rights.314 To this faction, the inclusion of shari’a simply exchanged one totalitarian regime
for a different type. Lastly, there was the military that feared Morsi’s constitution was a step
towards reducing their power, or even replacing them with pro-Islamic elements. With none
o f these factions willing to compromise, the constitution was treated as a zero-sum game,
with each side vying to have their own priorities to trump all others.
Looking at the draft constitution itself, there are several articles that are highly
contested. Article 2 of the draft was, perhaps, the most contentious in the entire draft. Article
2 reads: “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. The principles
o f Islamic Sharia are the principle source of legislation.” The article was completely

311 “Egypt’s ultraconservatives demand Islamic Law,” AlJazeera, Nov. 9,2012.
http://www.aljazeera.eom/news/middleeast/2012/l 1/201211916932346480.html
312 David D. Kirkpatrick, “A Vague Role for Religion in Egyptian Draft Constitution,” New York Times, Nov. 9,
2 0 1 2 . http://www.nytimes.eom/2 0 1 2 / l l / 1 0 /world/middleeak/draft-egyptian-constitution-adopts-a-role-forreligion.html?_P= 0
313 Ibid.
3 ,4 Ibid.

131

unchanged from its initial inclusion in the 1971 constitution.315 This lack of progress was the
main reason why article 2 was so problematic for the liberals, as it completely negated one of
their central wishes: change. Inclusion of shari ’a indicated that the draft was not progressive.
Muslims were given favor, while the sizable Coptic Christian population, as well as smaller
groups, such as the Baha'i were ignored. The article itself was actually unclear on what the
limits would be for the role of shari ’a. It is entirely possible that shari ’a would only be used
lightly, or even in conjunction with more inclusive policies. The opposite, however, may
have been true as well, that Islam and shari ’a could have become the primary inspiration for
legislation. Liberals feared this would ultimately be the case, once power had been further
consolidated:
Through the proposed draft constitution, the [Muslim Brotherhood] hopes to send a message - both
within Egypt and internationally - that Egypt under its helm is not bowing to Islamic radicalism. At the
same time, it is trying to leave the formulations o f articles pertaining to religious status vague and
convoluted, giving room for maneuvering and making it possible to grant the constitution a more radical
interpretation at a later date . 316

This uncertainty creates the possibility that the rule of law could be used against itself to
establish an illiberal legal system.
Even within the assembly, there was a general consensus that opposing article 2 was a
lost cause, and that at least preserving the ambiguous language was a victory.317 Outside of
the assembly, in the Egyptian media and intelligentsia were more enthusiastic to call out the
problems of article 2. Abd Al-Mu’ti Higazi specifically pointed out the contradiction of

315 The New Constitution of the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 2. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
316 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State - The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt's History," MEMRI, December 3,2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6846.htm#_edn9.
317 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part II: The Egyptian Public Debate Over Religion
And State." December 5,2012. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6851.htm#_ednrefl4.
132

identifying Egypt as a democratic country (according to article 1),

lift

but then promoting such

an inherently undemocratic article: “When [Islamic factions] say that the shari'a is the main
source for legislation, they are bringing together two parallel threads that could never meet,
for the shari'a pertains to Muslims alone, whereas legislation is the basic right of all
Egyptians, since the people [are] the source of all authorities”.319 Muhammad Mounir
Mugahid was less ideological in his criticism, and bluntly stated that Article 2 “provides
constitutional sanction for discriminating between citizens on a religious basis”.320 The fact
remains that the argument, according to Islamists in the assembly was never about whether or
not to include shari ’a, but instead how it should be included, and the extent o f its influence.
Beyond article 2, article 219 was introduced, which read: “principles of Islamic
shari'a include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible
sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community".321 The purpose of this
addition was to ensure that a shallow reading o f article 2 could not occur. Article 219 assures
that terms of article 2, specifically the points regarding shari'a, could not be limited,
allowing a potentially broader implementation of shari’a. Article 219’s addition was even
more problematic because o f its identification o f Sunni juridical schools which meant
theoretically that a larger portion of the Egyptian populace could be discriminated against,
specifically “all who are not Sunni Muslims, including Shi'ites”.322 Certain radical Islamist
groups, including the fairly popular Salafis made little effort to hide their intentions to enact
318 The New Constitution o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 2. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
319 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part II: The Egyptian Public Debate Over Religion
And State." December 5,2012. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6851.htm# ednrefl4.
320 Ibid.
321 The New Constitution o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 219. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
322 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State - The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt’s History," MEMRI, Dec. 3,2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6846.htm#_edn9.
133

greater shari ’a in this method were they ever in a position of power. For example, one of the
most extreme of these legal changes was the Salafist proposal “calling for a reduction in the
minimum marriage age for women to nine years if the girl has reached puberty”.

Other

archaic practices, such as the cutting off of hands for theft, could easily follow. Though it did
not say so directly, article 219 had the potential to allow codification of shari’a into Egypt’s
legal system.
The uncertainty of article 2 transfers to article 3 as well, which read: “the principles
of Christian and Jewish laws are the main source o f legislation for followers of Christianity
and Judaism in matters pertaining to personal status, religious affairs and nomination of
spiritual leaders.”324 Initially, this article seemed like progress for the minority populations,
but there were still problems apparent even here. First, was the omission of any nonChristian, non-Judaic religions, such as Baha’ism. It is unclear how polytheistic religions
would fare, as there was no mention o f them whatsoever in the draft constitution. Second was
the perceived potential for abuse based on the vagueness o f both article 3 and its preceding
article. Article 3 allowed certain personal religious freedoms, but did not stipulate the extent
to which these freedoms could be stretched. It is unclear, for example, if article 3 would
protect a Copt from being discriminated against by a Muslim employer.
There was also concern, when taking into account the constitution’s Islamic character,
that article 3 may be an attempt to judge all non-Muslims by Islamic standards. To put it
another way, making an unequal distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims leaves open

323 Ahmad Naguib Roushdy, "The codification of Sharia," Al-Ahram Weekly, March 5, 2013.

www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
324 The New Constitution o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 3. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.

134

the possibility that the freedoms of the minority (in this case, non-Muslims) would be open to
the interpretations o f the majority (Muslims), because all such conversations about rights and
freedoms can be filtered through the beliefs of the majority. Egyptian liberal and political
analyst Tarek Heggy described this concern as follow:
Out of the womb o f faith in pluralism issues faith in otherness (the acceptance o f the other). And out of
the womb o f either comes "relativism". By this I mean that in the culture and climate o f a more
progressive society the concept o f the relative nature of opinions, rulings, theories and interpretations is
widely shared. The Islamist may say, in his own words, that he believes in relativism, yet a discussion
with him on the subject of women, non-Muslims, the theory of evolution or opposing viewpoints will
always go to prove that the Islamist cannot welcome relativism. For by his nature he must extend the
"absolute" beyond the realm o f the private and personal onto the realm o f public affairs. Consequently he
alone ~ as opposed to anyone else on the face of the planet today —is the one who, in his ideology,
possesses "permanent solutions" that may not be changed to face up to problems which by their very
nature are changeable. If you were to say to him that these solutions are the product o f specific times and
places he will become angry and simply reject this logic. 325

Without specific guarantees, there was legitimate concern that article 3 did not go far enough
to protect religious minorities from the Islamic majority who had openly oppressed them for
decades.
The third concern was the even greater emphasis placed on religion. Egypt is strongly
defined by religion and article 3 was meant to provide assurances that non-Muslims (at least
Copts and Jews) would be able to have some increased rights. Liberals in particular worried
that defining the Egyptian constitution so heavily in terms o f religion would eventually
undermine any attempts to create a secular civil code, and potentially further isolate nonMuslims from the Muslim majority. Instead of having specific, constitutionally sponsored
protection o f their religious rights, many Copts simply wanted equality as citizens and in the
eyes o f the law.326 Article 3 could even be interpreted as “special allowances” for the non-

325 Tarek Heggy, "Political Islam versus modernity," Al-Ahram, Sept. 8 , 2012.

www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
326 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part II: The Egyptian Public Debate Over Religion
And State." Dec. 5, 2012. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6851.htm#_ednrefl4.

135

Muslims, creating resentment among the Muslim minority due to irrational fears that perhaps
these religious minorities might have advantages that Muslims do not.
These three articles adequately demonstrate how deeply Morsi’s draft constitution
created rifts in Egyptian society. These articles promoted exclusivity within government and
created different standards for different minority groups based on religion. Instead, the draft
constitution should have focused on issues that would have promoted stability and at least
attempted to bridge the ever-increasing gap between factions. Even then, there was enough
uncertainty and vagueness in these articles that one could at least entertain a hope of
plurality. Article 4, however, complicates this issue. It reads:
Al-Azhar is an encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive competence over its own
affairs. It is responsible for preaching Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and throughout
the world. Al-Azhar’s Council o f Senior Scholars is to be consulted in matters relating to Islamic
Shari’a. The state ensures sufficient funds for Al-Azhar to achieve its objectives. Al-Azhar’s Grand
Sheikh is independent and cannot be dismissed. The method o f appointing the Grand Sheikh from among
members o f the Council of Senior Scholars is to be determined by law. The foregoing is regulated by
law . 327

The worry that this article created was simple and consistent with previous concerns: “many
[feared] this clause [would] politicise the Sunni world’s most celebrated theological college,
and would give an unelected body a sort of veto power over legislation”.
On one hand, Al-Azhar is a relatively moderate voice within Islam. Article 4, which
gave Al-Azhar a voice in all matters relating to shari ’a (which according to article 2 would
be the principle source o f legislation) allowed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to put a
check on any extreme application of shari’a; Al-Azhar would be unlikely to approve any
actions that were too fundamental, as they had in recent history tried to remain relatively
327 The New Constitution o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 4. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
328Gregg Carlstrom, "Political clash over Egypt's constitution," A l Jazeera, Oct. 20,2012.
http://www.alj azeera.com/indepth/features/2012/10/20121019620186523 .html.

136

neutral “Al-Azhar is trying to maintain the delicate status quo, in place in recent decades,
which provides for partial implementation of the shari'a, whereas the Salafis are trying to
gain constitutional endorsement of the full implementation of the shari'a, a move that would
lead to the Islamization of Egypt”.329 As long as the Al-Azhar institute remained moderate, it
would create a constitutionally approved barrier between the extreme fundamentalist goals
that the Salafis and more fundamental elements of the Brotherhood were working towards.330
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, article 4 again showed that the main conflict
in Egypt at the time was not whether Islam would play a role in Egyptian politics, but instead
it became a matter o f how large a role Islam would play. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, this assumed inclusion of Islam within the constitution would create a state where
there is a clear difference between Muslims and non-Muslims. Regardless of how moderate
the Al-Azhar Institute is, it is still an Islamic body meant to make decisions based on Islamic
doctrine. Any non-Muslims, such as the Coptic Christians, would therefore be forced to
comply not with an objective constitution, but one specifically made to prioritize the beliefs
and principles of Muslims. This uneven application means that all non-Muslims in Egypt,
under Morsi’s draft constitution, may have had to live their lives not in accordance with their
own beliefs, but rather in accordance with beliefs that may not be their own. Nada Hussein
Rashwan states that “submitting laws to Al-Azhar is in itself an encroachment on legislative
authority. Laws apply to everyone equally and should not be under the jurisdiction of people

329 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State -

The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt's History," MEMRI, Dec. 3, 2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6846.htm#_edn9.
330 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State —The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt's History," MEMRI, Dec. 3,2012.

137

who act upon a certain conviction, which means they are not impartial.”331 Furthermore,
while the contemporary Al-Azhar institute is a relatively moderate voice for Islam, there is
no saying what the future might hold. If radical Islamists were able to find their way into
positions o f power within Al-Azhar, a situation might arise where an exceedingly
fundamentalist organization would have influence over all legislation, regardless of election
results. At the time of the draft constitution, “the Muslim Brotherhood and...Islamist
intellectuals [did] represent a challenge to al-Azhar’s religious authority,” due to al-Azhar’s
more measured approach to Islam.332
This point again arose in Article 6, which stated that the “political democratic system
is based on the principles o f democracy and consultation (also known as shura).333 334” This
clause was purposefully written as the general principles of shura are actually inherently
democratic, but their use also distinguishes Egyptian democracy from Western democracy.335
While shura does relate to democratic principles of bipartisanship and discussion, it is still
distinctly Islamic. Shura makes it clear that the Egyptian government is subject to Islamic
tradition, and therefore, anything illegal under the tenets of Islam is not permitted.336 Simply
put, article 6 would allow a constitutionally sponsored tyranny of the majority, while
operating under a fa9ade o f democratic acceptance. Ironically, article 6 goes on to state that

331Nada Hussein Rashwan, "How Islamist is Egypt's would-be constitution?" Al-Ahram Online, Dec. 14,2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/60471.aspx.
332 Rachel M. Scott, “What Might the Muslim Brotherhood Do with al-Azharr? Religious Authority in Egypt,”
Welt Des M ams 52, no. 2 (June. 2012): 143.
333 Consultation is the direct translation for the Islamic term, shura, and is an Islamic principle which states that
rules must consult with formally appointed, authoritative advisors. It is a concept which encourages decisions to
be made with the direct involvement of those that said decisions would affect.
334 The New Constitution o f the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 6 . http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.
335 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part I: Religion And State - The Most Islamic
Constitution In Egypt's History," MEMRI, Dec. 3,2012.
http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/6846.htm#_edn9.
336 Ibid.

138

equal citizenship, assuring “political and multi-party pluralism, the peaceful transfer of
power, the separation and balance of powers, the rule of law, and respect for human rights
and freedoms...as provided in the constitution”.337 Like Article 4 before it, however, the
inclusion of shura over a broader democratic process still forces non-Muslims to conform to
Muslim beliefs.
The

articles

discussed

here

again

directly

contradicted

the

“spirit

of

constitutionalism” that is vital when building a democracy by ignoring diversity and
plurality. Morsi’s draft constitution made clear its priority: Islam. While the draft constitution
guaranteed freedom o f belief for groups such as the Copts, the actual government was still
rooted in Islam. Regardless of how accepting of other religions it might be, by using one
specific religion over any others inherently precludes these latter religions from enjoying true
equality, as ultimately their own beliefs and principles are subordinate to the majority
religion. This preferential treatment of one demographic also disregards an independent
judiciary, as a religious council having any say whatsoever, no matter how small, ultimately
creates bias for and against specific groups.
This distinction between religions essentially negates vital attributes o f the rule of
law. Instead o f having a fair and even legal landscape, there would be a clear demographic
that would seem to be benefitting from the constitution at the expense of other groups.
Without specific measures to protect these minority groups, this inequality is stretched
further. This draft, hastily written and approved, was a self-serving gesture that aimed to
further concretize Morsi’s support base which he assumed was both unassailable and
reflected the majority o f Egyptians.
337 The New Constitution of the Arab Republic o f Egypt, 2012, art. 6 . http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-

content/uploads/2013/05/Egypt-Constitution-26-December-2012.pdf.

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Morsi’s Deposal: July 2013
The second event which contradicts a spirit of constitutionalism was Morsi’s deposal.
His reign as president was at best controversial, and in the relatively short period of a year he
not only failed to close the rift between various competing groups, but actually made them
worse. He was also unsuccessful in making any significant headway in important issues such
as security and the economy, leaving many disillusioned by his previous claims to further
Egyptian prosperity under his reign. Even after these failings, when protests broke out it was
not a clear majority of Egyptians who wanted to see Morsi deposed. Unlike Mubarak’s
ouster, there was a large, comparable group of counter protests in Morsi’s favor, making it
clear that, to use Linz and Stepan’s theory, there was no “exceptional majority [seeking]
change.” Morsi was elected as Egyptian president, and enjoyed a substantial support base,
and so military intervention to see him deposed, something that even Mubarak, a dictator of
thirty years, was able to escape, creates a difficult situation for Egypt’s already struggling
rule o f law.
The biggest problem was not Morsi’s deposal, but the consequences and aftermath of
his removal from office. Comparatively, Mubarak’s deposal was relatively clean: he was
taken from office with relatively little violence. Morsi’s deposal, conversely, affected not
only him, but also began the subjugation and vilification o f The Muslim Brotherhood. It is no
secret that many Brotherhood members are against the liberal goal o f plurality that is
essential in Linz and Stepan’s definition of rule of law. If, however, these Brotherhood
members are forcibly removed or disallowed from participating within government, the rule
of law is still unevenly applied. The worst example of this attack on the Brotherhood was at
the Rabaa Mosque, where the military had killed hundreds, if not thousands, of Muslim

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Brotherhood members by the end of August 2013, with the Brotherhood claiming death tolls
o f over 2000 in a brutal massacre.338
Morsi’s deposal was seen by many liberals as a victory against the conservative,
Islamist front, that somehow this military intervention against their Islamist opponents was a
victory for the 2011 revolution, a victory for liberalism and democracy. While a few liberals
were apprehensive about the military initiative, most supported it enthusiastically. Among
these supporters included the National Salvation Front, many within the Egyptian media, and
even ElBaradei, who stated that “the military has a national duty to intervene”. 339 When the
military finally toppled Morsi, the liberals believed themselves victorious.
While Morsi’s deposal was certainly a loss for the Islamists, it was not, however, a
win for the liberals. In the simplest terms, what happened in Egypt in July 2013 was a
military coup against a democratically elected president, though some would contest this
assertion. Specifically, many Egyptian liberals were vocal that this deposal was absolutely
legitimate: “Many on the left are still locked in a battle of semantics, trying to persuade the
world — and perhaps one another — that the overthrow of Mr. Morsi was not a ‘coup’ but a
‘revolution.’ The army merely carried out the popular will, they insist”.340 Instead of outrage
at killings, such as the one at Rabaa, the attitude was one of celebration and uniform
condemnation of the Brotherhood. One Egyptian, when describing the aftermath o f the coup,
stated: “The very shocking thing for me was...those who were pro-military — they were
very OK with ... the death toll. It's acceptable for them because for a lot of people, especially
338 James Reynolds, "Egypt declares national emergency," BBC News, Aug. 14,2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23700663.
339 "Chronicle O f An Inevitable Intervention: The Egyptian Military Moves In To Direct Egypt's Political
Process." MEMRI. July 3,2013. http://www.memri.Org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7273.htm#_edn30.
340 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egyptian Liberals Embrace the Military, Brooking No Dissent," New York Times,
July 15,2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/world/middleeast/egypt-morsi.html?pagewanted=all.

141

on the pro-military side, they're considering everyone who is Brotherhood a traitor or a
terrorist”.341 Liberal columnist, Khaled Montaser even called the Islamists worse than
“criminals and psychopaths...their treason, terrorism, and conspiracies are an indelible
tattoo”.342
Furthermore, arguments against these generalizations were met with extreme
hostility. Amr Hamzawy, a political scientist and former member of the dissolved Parliament,
quickly denounced the military crackdown on the various Islamist organizations. Hamzawy
attacked the liberal rhetoric that followed Morsi’s ouster as “rhetoric of gloating, hatred,
retribution, and revenge,” calling the celebratory mood within the liberal camps following the
killings o f Islamists as “fascism under the false pretense of democracy and liberalism”.343
Many liberals attacked Hamzawy for being a Brotherhood sympathizer.344 Even ElBaradei,
once the darling o f the liberal movement, was denounced after he resigned in protest as
interim prime minister following the Rabaa massacre.345 The National Salvation Front
implied that he may have been secretly a Brotherhood supporter, and Ahmed Shafiq,
Mubarak’s first and last prime minister and former presidential candidate, stated that
“ElBaradei was ‘on a mission to divide Egypt’”.346

341 Evan Hill, "Many Egyptian liberals back military's crackdown." Al Jazeera, Aug. 23, 2013.
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/23/once-a-vanguardofrebellioncairomiddleclassembracesarmycrackdown.html.
342 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Egyptian Liberals Embrace the Military, Brooking No Dissent," New York Times,
M y 15,2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/16/world/middleeast/egypt-morsi.html?pagewanted=all.
343 Ibid.
344 Ibid.
345 James Reynolds, "Egypt declares national emergency," BBC News, Aug. 14,2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23700663.
346 Evan Hill, "Many Egyptian liberals back military's crackdown." Al Jazeera, Aug. 23,2013.
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/8/23/once-a-vanguardofrebellioncairomiddIeclassembracesarmycrackdown.html.

142

The decisions made by the Morsi government, and the response taken by the liberals
and military both portray the rule o f law as weak. One of the most vital aspects of a working
rule of law, the spirit of constitutionalism, had been completely ignored. Instead of the
plurality and compromise required to create an even-handed rule of law within a consolidated
democracy, the events that led to Morsi’s deposal instead revolved around rapidly expanding
polarization and distrust. Without any kind of cooperation, a political environment was
created where neither side believed it could succeed in any real capacity if they gave any
ground to their adversary. When Morsi won the 2012 presidential election, it was considered
a grievous blow to the liberal ambitions for Egypt. When Morsi was deposed a year later, the
popular Muslim Brotherhood were branded as terrorists and traitors. With such a poisonous
political environment, the likelihood of establishing a fairly applied rale of law was
essentially impossible.
Strangely enough, the acceptance of military intervention for Morsi’s deposal was
widely approved, as it was supposedly for the purpose of bringing Egypt back towards
democracy. Examining Morsi’s year as president of Egypt shows a profile of inefficiency and
ineffectiveness. Regardless o f his inability to live up to the impossible standards set for him,
what Morsi still had in his favor was that he was democratically elected in fair and free
elections. The precedent set in 2013, where a military coup is a suitable response to an
unpopular leader, is problematic for any Egyptian leader who does not rale with force, either
implied or literal. This coup opens up the possibility for all future leaders to be vulnerable to
the whims o f the mob or military interests, instead of a concrete legal code.

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Islam. Shari ’a. and the Rule of Law
These articles, along with the contentions about the draft constitution itself, also bring
to the forefront a key conflict left unresolved: Islam and its role on the rule of law. With
Egypt’s identity so closely tied to Islam, the religion has always been strongly tied to politics.
The Muslim Brotherhood was severely repressed under Nasser. Sadat made a brief attempt at
reconciliation with Islamic groups. His attempts, however, were clumsy and ineffective, and
would lead to his eventual assassination. Mubarak’s relationship with these same Islamist
forces would often culminate in brutal arrests and torture.
The conclusions this leads to is that, historically, Islam has been an extremely divisive
force within Egypt, often causing vast rifts between various actors. This is either because of
the ineptitude of the country’s rulers to properly broker any kind of harmony in politics and
religion, or because o f the nature of Islam itself. This question o f whether the Egyptian
leadership or Islam itself is to blame for this quagmire is exceedingly difficult to answer due
to Islam’s strong, perhaps inseparable, connection to Arab culture. This uncertainly makes it
more difficult to establish if the problems caused by Islam are a problem within the religion
itself, or if these problems arise due to the influences of the culture that grew around Islam.
Ironically, there exists within the Qur’an and the teachings of the Prophet a strong,
underlying idea o f unity being dominant above all else. Gudrun Kramer describes this as
such: “pushed to its logical conclusion, the emphasis on unity can imply the refusal of all
divergence o f opinions, o f all criticism or opposition to the dominant doctrines and practices,

144

which are denounced as fitna, or menace to and crime against the all-important value of
Muslim unity.”347
On the surface, Islamic unity may appear to be hostile to plurality that Egypt’s
uncooperative factions needed so desperately, however, another interpretation may lead to
the opposite conclusion. This argument is based on parts of the Qur’an348 which point out
that while Islam is infallible, mankind is not, and is therefore not “capable of reading the
[messages of the Qur’an] correctly and of finding truth with infallible certainty.”349
The notion of mankind’s fallibility also directly relates more specifically to shari’a.
Several Islamic scholars have pointed out that while “shari’a was in fact constructed by
Muslim jurists... although derived from the Qur’an and Sunna, shari'a is not divine because
it is the product o f human interpretation of those sources.”350 These two perspectives, while
encouraging, are also very progressive, and therefore, rarely evident in the platforms of
fundamental Islamists, especially those in Egypt. More commonly, when shari’a is
discussed, specifically in regards to human rights, the results are less optimistic. Few
fundamental Muslims are willing to accept this interpretation which places the certainty of
shari ’a on shaky ground, as there is comfort is the supposed divine authority o f shari ’a. Ann
E. Mayer stated, rather bluntly, that: “[fundamentalists] uphold the primacy of Revelation
over reason”.351 This statement highlights the conflict within Islam between tradition and
progress. While these points are certainly generalizations, there are still many amongst the
347 Gudrun Kramer, “Islam and Pluralism,” in Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World:

Theoretical Perspectives, ed. John D. Kelly et al. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Pub, 1995), 114.
348 This thesis is based on Sura 49:13 o f the Qur'an: “O mankind, indeed We have created you from male and
female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed, the most noble of you in the
sight o f Allah is the most righteous of you. Indeed, Allah is Knowing and Acquainted”.
Ibid.
350 Bassam Tibi, “Islamic Law/Shari’a, Human Rights, Universal Morality and International Relations,” Human
Rights Quarterly 16, no. 2. (May 1994): 279.
351 Ibid.

145

more traditional Islamic community who hold strongly to the absolute authority o f all aspects
o f Islam, which creates the difficulty outlined here.
One thing that is certain is that shari’a is unlikely to be removed from Egyptian
politics anytime in the near future. Sadat and Mubarak ran largely secular regimes that were
hostile to Islamist groups, but even still, the Egyptian constitution adopted in 1971 explicitly
named Islam the state religion, and shari’a the country’s principle source of legislation.352
Despite this, shari ’a, or more specifically fear or adoration of shari ’a (depending on which
group one looks at) came to be a focal point for the mounting hostility between Egypt’s
liberals and Islamists. Liberals would not tolerate shari’a, and Islamists would not tolerate its
removal. Rationally, the only solution was compromise, but both sides were unable or
unwilling to look beyond their own concerns. Shari’a was either a fundamental part of the
national identity of Egypt, or a disastrous inclusion which would halt Egypt’s progression.
Even with such a polarized landscape, this does not mean that Islam, or even
shari ’a, is inherently incompatible with liberalism, or democracy, or a working rule of law.
The divergence o f opinion regarding the meaning of shari ’a in itself implies that it is the
responsibility of lawmakers to properly establish the boundaries for Islam and the law. In the
case o f Egypt, the bigger concern is the inability to communicate, compromise, and
cooperate towards some sort of middle ground, which could very well include Islam. Shari ’a
was only the point o f intransigence in this standoff, perhaps the fundamental topic of
contention. In clinging to their beliefs, both sides would grind the country to a halt.

352 “Constitution o f Egypt,” Constitution Society. Sept. 11, 1971. http://www.constitution.org/cons/egypt/consten.html.

146

Shortly before the referendum on the draft constitution took place, Morsi even made
several half-hearted proposals supposedly in the name of compromise, outlining talks to add
amendments after the draft constitution was passed.353 These proposals did not address the
key demands of the liberals (postponing or canceling the referendum in favor of a rewrite)
and Morsi suggested that he might even impose martial law to ensure the referendum went
smoothly.354 For their part, the liberals had already publicly stated their refusal to
compromise even before Morsi had made his proposals.355
Aside from the specific points discussed above, the constitution was largely
unchanged from its previous incarnation under Mubarak. Considering the desire for positive,
liberal change which drove Mubarak’s ouster in the first place, this stagnation was
particularly distasteful to Morsi’s opposition. Ziyad Bahaa Al-Din, an Egyptian legal expert
and member o f the Egyptian Democratic Party rejected the constitution for this lack of
progress in particular, stating that in addition to the religious inequalities, “the constitution,
which [the revolutionaries] hoped would bring about clear achievements for the Egyptian
people in terms o f economic and social rights and human development, includes the usual
flowery phrases without imposing specific standards or goals upon the state, and therefore
offers [nothing] new”.356
Morsi’s draft constitution was indicative of the political and social environment
within Egypt at the time. All sides vying for power saw the scenario as a zero-sum: any

353 David. D. Kirkpatrick, “Morsi Extends Compromise to Egyptian Opposition,” New York Times, Dec. 8 ,

2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/worid/middleeast/egypt-protests.html.
354 Ibid.
355 Ibid.
356 L. Lavi, "An Examination O f Egypt's Draft Constitution Part ID: Presidential Powers, Status O f Military And
Judiciary, Civil Freedoms." MEMRI. Dec. 11,2012.
http://www.memri.0 rg/report/en/O/O/O/O/O/O/6 8 6 8 .htm#_ednl.

147

compromise made would be a loss of power for themselves and a gain for their opponents.
There was no trust amongst the different factions, and thus, every political move was made
with consideration only for their respective support base, leaving many Egyptians without
support. This draft constitution was strongly characteristic o f the hostile political
environment within Egypt, even if it was overturned following Morsi’s deposal. It is unclear,
however, how any government will approach the constitution, given the popularity and
acceptance o f the clearly lopsided draft that was voted in under Morsi.

The Egyptian Judiciary
Any conversation about the rule of law requires an overview of the state of the
judiciary. In Egypt, the status of the judiciary prior to the revolution had been a contentious
one. On the one hand, most members of the judiciary were appointed not through Egypt’s
executive branch, but through the Supreme Judicial Council, a group made up of senior
judges.357 Since a state o f emergency had been in effect since 1981, there existed other
special courts which tried civilians of any charges relating to national security, such as
terrorism, whose judges were appointed directly by the president, and whose verdicts could
not be appealed.358 It is worth noting that the former branch o f the judiciary, which managed
to maintain some form of independence, was often critical of the ruling Mubarak regime, and
even openly critiqued the regime’s methods, described as “integrated dissidents” by some,

357 Meryl Chertoff and Michael Green, "Revitalizing the Rule o f Law," Harvard International Review 2, no. 34

(2 0 1 2 ): 61.

due to their overarching conflict with the executive branch following the second world

Though there were judges who were critical of the state, the Mubarak regime made it
very difficult for these judges to operate. In 1969, Nasser issued several presidential decrees
which severely limited the powers of the independent judiciary, making it subservient to the
executive, an act which would be known as the “judges’ massacre.”360 Some powers were
restored to these judges under Sadat in the 1980s, but even this restoration was more o f an
attempt to create the image o f a legitimate judiciary in Egypt, rather than actually creating an
independent, functional judiciary. All of these measures were undertaken because of the
rapidly growing security state. The state required the ability to take extraordinary measures
against any factions deemed subversive to the regime, most often Islamists.
The relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch was historically
tension filled. This tension persisted into Morsi’s presidency. Ahmed el-Zend, president of
the association o f Egyptian judges, put forward an agenda prior to the 2012 presidential
elections that stated “[the judges’ were abandoning their neutrality toward the coming
presidential runoff in an effort to guard against an Islamist monopoly of power”.361 Only two
days before Egypt’s run-off election, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), filled
with judges appointed by Mubarak before his deposal, dissolved the newly elected Egyptian
parliament, calling the parliamentary vote unconstitutional.362 In a separate ruling, the SCC

359 Sarah Wolff, "Constraints on the promotion o f the rule of law in Egypt: insights from the 2005 judges'
revolt." Democratization 16, no. 1 (Feb 2009): 102.
360 Ibid., 103
361 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian judge speaks Against Islamist Victory Before Presidential Runoff,” New
York Times, June 8 ,2012. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
362 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt’s Parliament," New York Times, June
14,2012. http://www.nyti mes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-in-egypt-as-courtinvalidates-parliament.html?pagewanted=all&_r= 1 &.

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also decided that Ahmed Shafiq, former Prime Minister under Mubarak, could also continue
to run for president in the run-off, an act deemed illegal due to the Political Exclusion Law
which banned officials o f Mubarak’s fallen regime from running for office.363 The ruling
mirrored events from the last several decades in which secular elites severely repressed
Islamist groups who were poised for success. In this case, it was the heavily Islamist
parliament who were repressed, as well as the Brotherhood’s FJP who were poised for
success in the presidential elections.
Both Islamists and liberals were unified in outrage against the dissolving o f the
parliament, as it left the country with neither a parliament nor a constitution. With the
presidency about to be decided, the lack of parliament and constitution left a great deal of
power in the hands of the would-be president.364 ElBaradei stated that without a parliament or
a constitution, the election o f a president was like “electing an ‘emperor’ with more power
than the deposed dictator. A travesty”.365 Mirroring ElBaradei’s sentiment, the Brotherhood
stated that the dissolution o f parliament “confirms that the former regime hasn’t surrendered
yet and won’t give up easily”.366
Morsi would still go on to win the presidency, however, the judiciary’s shot across
the bow o f his presidency would perpetuate tension and misgivings between his office and
the judiciary for his year in office. Shortly after the election, he attempted to reinstate the
dissolved parliament, an action deemed illegal by the judiciary. In October 2012, Morsi

363 "Egypt supreme court calls for parliament to be dissolved," BBC News, June 14, 2012.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18439530.
364 Ibid.
365 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Blow to Transition as Court Dissolves Egypt’s Parliament," New York Times, June
14,2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/15/world/middleeast/new-political-showdown-in-egypt-as-courtinvalidates-parliament.html?pagewanted=all&_r=l&.
366 Ibid.

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attempted to dismiss Mubarak-era Prosecutor General Abdel-Meguid from his post.
Meguid’s dismissal was due to his increasing unpopularity for failing to successfully
prosecute police officers on trial for killing protesters during the 2011 revolution. Morsi did
not have the legal power to dismiss Meguid, however, and was ultimately unsuccessful.367
This attempted dismissal was shortly followed up by Morsi’s presidential decree absolving
his decisions from judiciary oversight, which he used to push forward the referendum on his
draft constitution. This decree resulted in widespread strikes amongst the judiciary including
the Court of Cassation, Egypt’s highest court, and appeals courts in Egypt’s largest cities.368
In response, many of Morsi’s supporters protested against the SCC, and over the next several
months, attacks on the judiciary increased steadily. The attempts made by Morsi and his
supporters to interfere with the independence of the judiciary continued through Morsi’s
tenure and characterized the difficulties of establishing a working rule of law. The Arab
Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession (ACULP) published its
annual report on the health of the judiciary in Egypt stating that “[a] aggression on justice
represents threats to the collapse o f the state of law in Egypt”.369 Morsi eventually
backpedalled on the decree after facing enormous backlash.
In 2013, Morsi attempted again to purge the judiciary o f his detractors. This time he
took a more indirect route, attempting to lower the retirement age for judges, threatening

367"Morsi dismisses Mubarak-era prosecutor general Abdel-Meguid Mahmoud," Ahram Online, Oct. 11,2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/News/55393.aspx.
368 David D. Kirkpatrick, "Panel Drafting Egypt’s Constitution Vows Quick Finish," New York Times,
November 28,2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ll/29/world/middleeast/wrangling-in-egypt-as-constitutiondeadline-looms.html
369 The Arab Center for the Independence o f the Judiciary and the Legal Profession. Summary o f the annual
report o f 2012 "An Attack on Justice in Egypt," The Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the
Legal Profession, The Arab Center for the Independence of the Judiciary and the Legal Profession, 2012.
http://www.acij lp.org/main/en/art.php?id=9&ait= 130#.VCSQi Vf7ScE

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thousands o f posts across Egypt.370 This plan was done under the auspices of purging the
judiciary o f Mubarak loyalists, though skeptics claimed it was an attempt to fill the
institutions with supporters of Morsi’s own regime.371
Tension continued to build, but never had a chance to boil over, as Morsi was
deposed shortly thereafter. Though Morsi had several run-ins throughout his interactions with
the judiciary, it is worth noting that the Egyptian judiciary was also quite unscrupulous as
well in its actions. Without Morsi as a polarizing, Islamist element, several events occurred in
2013 which underlined the problematic and biased behaviour of the judiciary.

Two

events in particular characterize this bias, the first of which was the sentencing to death of
683 alleged members o f the Muslim Brotherhood, including the Brotherhood’s supreme
guide, Mohammad Badi. The lawyer who represented 25 of the defendants stated that “the
verdict was handed down in a court session lasting less than five minutes...[and] the judge
refused to listen to any arguments from the defence”.372 The judge presiding over the case,
Saeed Youssef had only a month earlier condemned another 528 defendants to death, though
the ruling reversed for 492 o f the defendants, with most being resentenced to life in prison.373
The second event was the conviction of three Al-Jazeera reporters, Peter Greste,
Baher Mohamed, and Mohamed Fahmy who were accused of supporting the Muslim
Brotherhood. According to human rights group, Amnesty, the trial was a “vindictive farce”
and was simply a part of the ongoing conflict between Egypt and Qatar, which supports the

370 “Egypt Judiciary crisis: Morsi hints at compromise,” BBC News, April 28,2013.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-22333744.
371 Ibid.
372 "Egyptian court sentences 683 people to death," AlJazeera, April 29,2014
http://www.aljazeera.eom/news/middleeast/2014/04/egyptian-court-sentences-683-people-death201442875510336199.html
373 Ibid.

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Muslim Brotherhood, and where Al-Jazeera is based.374 For example, some of the pieces of
“evidence” presented included a report made while none of the three were in Egypt, a video
of recording artist Gotye, and recordings that were unrelated to Egypt or Egyptian issues.375
The trial elicited outrage from the international community, including the US,
Australia (from where Greste hails), and the UN. US Secretary of State John Kerry called the
sentence “chilling and draconian,” though the Egyptian judiciary defended its actions.376 At
the United Nations, Egypt’s deputy UN Ambassador, Osama Abdelkhalek Mahmoud, stated
that “’the Egyptian judicial system is very well-known for providing full guarantees for the
defendant...I have full confidence that the due procedures will be followed and justice will
be done in such cases and in all other cases.”377 Despite this reassurance, at the time of the
trial, fourteen journalists were jailed in Egypt, meaning that Egypt had jailed more journalists
than any other country in the Arab world, including Syria.378
Morsi’s attempts to subvert the judiciary as well as the two cases outlined above
showcase deep, underlying problems within Egypt’s legal system. Morsi’s actions perpetuate
attitudes from the Mubarak era, where the executive branch could put itself above the rule of
law using weak justification and popular support. Alternatively, the judiciary, raised in an
environment where fair and equal application of the law was non-existent, likewise used the

374 "Egypt trial: Journalists protest over al-Jazeera trio," BBC News, June 24,2014.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27988754.
375 "Outrage as Egypt jails A1 Jazeera staff," AlJazeera, June 24,2014.
http://www.aljazeera.eom/news/middleeast/2014/06/outrage-as-egypt-jails-al-jazeera-staff2014623234322236195.html.
376 Ibid.
377 "Egypt defends judicial system," AlJazeera, June 26, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/egypt-defends-judicial-system2014625223851510246.html.
378 Ibid.

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legal system to consolidate its own power. With the rule of law being so unevenly applied,
the difficulties following the 2011 revolution is entirely unsurprising.

Egyptian Law after Mubarak
What can be gleaned from the two and a half years following Mubarak’s removal
from office is that the rule o f law is at best a misunderstood concept in Egyptian society and
government. Adding to this complexity is shari ’a, which creates a seemingly unanswerable
question by the stubborn factions of Egypt. In many cases, this leaves a working rule of law
largely ignored or altered in favor of more dramatic and arbitrary behaviour from all sides in
Egypt. The Islamists used the law to legitimize (or at least give the appearance of legitimacy)
their illiberal and undemocratic behaviour. They were able to use the letter of the law, as
opposed to the spirit of the law, to push forward lopsided legislation which only benefitted
the Islamist support base. The liberals on the other hand simply ignored all legal avenues in
favor of civil disobedience, and later, military intervention. Civil disobedience certainly does
have a place within a consolidated democracy, however, it cannot be the only answer to each
and every problem. By choosing protest instead of the democratic processes that they
claimed they wanted, the liberals weakened their own position, though many of them would
argue that protest was the only avenue available to them. Furthermore, by pleading to the
military for assistance against the successful Islamists, they further weakened their own
platform in regards to the liberal capacity o f creating stability, security, and economic
growth, a particularly unfortunate consequence considering how misunderstood the concepts
of liberalism and democracy are in the region. Finally, the judiciary itself behaved with
apathy towards the law, abusing it at several junctions where it would be in their best interest.
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The behaviour of the judiciary leads to a situation in which Egypt is without a
functioning rule o f law, as defined by the standards of a consolidated democracy, which in
2011 was a chief goal of the revolutionaries. Instead, the military has benefited in particular
from this quagmire, appearing to be the only faction within Egypt capable of settling the
country’s numerous accounts. This is not to say that Egypt is now a lawless state without a
legal foundation or a government founded on certain principles within a legal framework.
There is, however, a distinction to be made between an impartial rule of law, applied to all
citizens fairly and equally without consideration to ideology, religion, or gender, as opposed
to a rule o f law applied differently based on these aforementioned attributes, and enforced by
a governing body put into power illiberally.

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Chapter Five
Egypt in Transition or Stagnation?
Successful consolidation of Linz and Stepan’s five arenas is a strong way to predict a
country’s transitional path. Following the Egyptian revolution, the five arenas have largely
failed to develop as per Linz and Stepan’s definitions. The original goal of the 2011
revolution, a transition to liberal democracy or at least away from authoritarianism, has
become unlikely in the foreseeable future. Civil society initially appeared to be developing
towards being strong and healthy, but quickly deteriorated as time passed. The problems that
arose ultimately came from a breakdown in communication between the various factions
within civil society and which led to seemingly irreconcilable differences. The liberals and
Islamists became more and more entrenched in their own views and stubbornly unwilling to
compromise. With so much emphasis placed on battling the opposition and claiming victories
in a supposedly zero-sum game, neither side concentrated on the difficult task of changing a
country which had experienced decades of political stagnation. Further complicating this
situation was the complete dismissal of the large Coptic Christian population who played
little to no role following the revolution, but still suffered from sectarian attacks from the
Muslim majority.
Civil society, when populated by diverse groups with different ideologies, is supposed
to harmonize together to exercise influence over politics. This is not to say there should be no
contention between various interest groups, however, this contention should not become civil
society’s defining characteristic. In Egypt, civil society was not able to preserve the unity that
it briefly enjoyed during the Arab Spring. Instead, Egypt became divided along ideological
and religious lines, a distinction which would quickly escalate from competition to violent
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hostilities. It also meant that Egyptian civil society was unable to productively influence
political development, forcing the political discourse to ignore issues such as security,
stability, and the economy, in favour of placating specific interest groups within civil society.
Furthermore, the division in civil society affected the other four arenas, particularly
political society. Given that democracy was the supposed goal of the Arab Spring,
partisanship was problematic. Democracy does not require perfect agreement for it to be
consolidated. Such contention is actually characteristic of a healthy democracy, as it allows a
plurality o f opinions to take shape, and for divergent groups to find compromise which
allows a mutually beneficial outcome. Following Mubarak’s deposal, however, such
compromise quickly dissipated, which led only to increasing hostility. The lack of
compromise affected the transition greatly, moving it away from its planned course.
The ideological or religious division that came to characterize civil society was
further escalated in political society, as were the ramifications of such disunity. With the
allowance o f new political parties to be formed for the first time in decades, the fractures in
civil society were multiplied as factions further split as dozens of new parties were formed.
Instead of having only two groups in opposition, liberals and Islamists, lines were drawn
within each side. Liberals in particular suffered from this surge in numbers, as new political
parties were formed rapidly and without a unifying vision. Egyptians who already had little
experience with liberal goals and principles were further overwhelmed by the legion of new
parties. Islamists fared better, due to long histories of organization, but lines were already
drawn based on how fundamental each political party claimed to be. This divide affected not
only Islamist parties, but also affected how outsiders perceived the Islamist’s political
aspirations. Paranoia and skepticism became commonplace. The Islamists had fewer, more
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organized groups, as well as vast quantities of support, but regardless of any inroads or
promises they made, truthful or not, the only word on the lips of the opposition was shari ’a.
With the emphasis placed on ideology, political society was unable to concentrate on
the vital task of handling the problems caused by any revolution. Infrastructure, employment,
and security were forgotten as political parties bickered about more transient issues, such as
the role o f religion and social justice, both issues which would take years, if not decades or
even centuries, to properly establish. The result was a schizophrenic political environment
waiting to collapse. There were too many ideas, few of which were properly fleshed out,
many of which were quickly forgotten, and most of which ignored the immediate problems
facing Egypt.
While Morsi was blamed for this mismanagement, he cannot be blamed entirely.
Though he appeared rather incompetent throughout his brief tenure, Morsi really had
inherited an impossible situation: he succeeded a heavily entrenched dictator; he was
expected to fix the ongoing problems from that regime, which were previously swept beneath
Mubarak’s authoritarian rug; he had to somehow manage to realize the liberal goals of the
revolution; and he had to stay true to his more fundamental support base, who were
responsible for putting him into office in the first place. Without a totalitarian sledgehammer
to solve the lingering problems left by Mubarak, it is unlikely that that any other candidate
could have fared better.
Though the Egyptian political landscape centered primarily around greater, legally
ensured rights, Linz and Stepan’s third arena, the rule of law, would fall flat as well.
Historically, Egypt has never enjoyed a fair and even application of law amongst its

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population. Over the past several decades, specific demographics, usually the government
and government supporters have been held above certain legal standards, while the ordinary
Egyptian citizen, especially minorities and women, have had to suffer through inequalities
based on race, religion, or gender. With the success of the revolution, there was much
excitement about the idea of correcting these injustices, as liberal ideas were spoken of as
inevitabilities. In the following months, however, it became clear that a justice system
without prejudice would become unlikely for the same reasons that civil society and political
society were unable to resolve their differences.
The immensely popular Islamist bloc ran on transparent campaign platforms that
emphasized certain traditional Islamic values, which immediately alienated anyone who did
not conform to such values. Alternatively, the liberals did campaign for greater human rights
throughout Egypt, but they did so while making it clear that Islamist values were not
welcome. Therefore, even though the liberals espoused liberal values, their attempts to
exclude Islamists from contributing and benefitting from governance and a reconstructed
legal system made their platform no different from the Islamists.
The failures in these three arenas caused similar failure in the last two arenas as well
(state apparatus and bureaucracy, and economic society), which in turn has caused a sizable
obstacle for democratic transition: the military. With the failure of civil and political society
to effectively harmonize and fulfill specific goals, the result is many Egyptians turning
towards the military to solve the dilemma, and in the process, deposing the democratically
elected president. The entire process closely mirrors the 1952 coup against King Farouk
which eventually led to Nasser obtaining the presidency. Both coups had charismatic military
leaders (Nasser in 1952, el-Sisi in 2013) who rose to prominence by spring boarding
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themselves off o f the failures of their predecessors. Furthermore, the insertion of these
leaders was met with little resistance by the Egyptian population. This strong leadership
above all else allowed Egypt to successfully transition away from the depredations of the
corrupt King Farouk.
These events ultimately amount to a failure o f meaningful transition in Egypt, at least
for the time being. The burden lies on the potential democrats to properly rally support and to
organize so that during elections they can be as well-prepared as possible. This preparation
and organization is, o f course, no easy task. Depending on el-Sisi’s success, the Egyptian
population, including the liberals themselves, may find it simpler to continue on with him
(and by proxy, the military) in charge. Given the difficulties that arose during the first few
years after Mubarak, it would be very easy to embrace anyone who could bring stability,
even if not necessarily democracy.
The absolute exclusion of the Muslim Brotherhood also needs to be addressed.
Declared a terrorist group and effectively relegated to the same status they suffered prior to
the revolution, the Brotherhood’s current situation may strongly influence Egypt’s transition.
The rule of law cannot be disproportionately applied based on ideology or religion; it must be
uniform in its application, not selective and arbitrary otherwise, the law is simply another
arm o f a totalitarian regime. Ironically, this makes the Egyptian liberal platform more severe
in structure to that of Morsi’s own, as the liberals have embraced el-Sisi’s brutal exclusionary
tactics. Before the Brotherhood was voted into power, there were multiple concerns that they
would use their popularity to win the presidency, and then use it to push forward their own
principles, while ignoring democratic ones. With the complete elimination of the

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Brotherhood in contemporary Egyptian politics, the liberals are actually guilty o f the same
offense o f which they were terrified of barely a year earlier.
The behaviour o f the liberals presents another complication in Egypt’s transition, as
Morsi’s opposition may claim to be liberal, but they certainly are not democratic. The liberal
bloc has been adamant in its liberalization of Egypt, pushing for increased minority and
gender rights, greater liberties, and a democratically elected government representative of all
Egyptians - as long as these Egyptians are not also Islamists. Again, there is no question that
Morsi’s showing as president was unimpressive, however, this should be not have been
enough to warrant military intervention. The enthusiasm with which Morsi’s opponents
embraced the recently-hated military to depose a democratically elected President shows that
democratic processes are still not fully understood, or they are simply ignored. While Morsi’s
elections did not give him unassailable legitimacy, neither does reliance on a military coup.
As mentioned earlier, the relationship between civil society and political society must be a
symbiotic one, where civil society informs political society, as well as the rule of law,
without controlling it, and vice versa. Morsi’s deposal signifies a disruption of this
relationship, because the chief mechanisms for democratic political change, elections, were
ignored. “The genius o f democracy.. .is that it wants voters to change their minds when
leaders fail and to replace them not in spasms of fury but regularly and for the best reason:
that others can better deliver what the people want”.379
Even with Morsi’s deposal, it should be clear that the liberals have still not come out
on top, though they have celebrated as if they have. In fact, it was the liberal’s own multiple
failures that allowed Morsi to be elected in the first place, and then subsequently do as he
379 Sanerm Shehata, "In Egypt, Democrats vs. Liberals." New York Times, July 2,2013.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/03/opinion/in-egypt-democrats-vs-liberals.html.

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pleased. The Islamists were similarly inexperienced as the liberals in matters o f governance,
however, their organizational capabilities were able to compensate. The liberal movement in
Egypt mistakenly relied upon its own momentum of toppling a three decade old dictator,
convincing themselves that the hard part was over. For the liberals, the two and a half years
following Mubarak’s downfall were rife with overestimated popularity, indulgence in
idealism instead of pragmatism, confusion over its own platform, and crippling
disorganization and disunity. Liberal popularity within urban areas with dense populations
was mistaken for universal popularity throughout Egypt. Large tracts of the country were
ignored by the liberals, and then left to the influence of the older, better organized Islamist
and old guard loyalists. Even after they were handily defeated in the presidential elections,
the liberals did not change tactics. Instead of throwing themselves into hard task of
organization and campaigning that would allow them a better showing in forthcoming
elections (a goal made easier by Morsi’s own mishandling of the presidency), the liberals
instead embraced tactics which did not prove to be as effective against the Islamists. “If the
millions in the streets want the Brotherhood out of power, they must learn to organize and
campaign effectively, and vote them out. That would be the best way to establish liberal
democracy in Egypt. Removing Mr. Morsi through a military coup supported by the secular
and liberal opposition could well be the worst”380. Faced with their own inadequacy within
the political arena, they turned desperately to the same military they had protested against not
so long ago.
As the Brotherhood went down, it became clear who the real winners were, and it was
neither the liberals nor the 2011 revolutionaries. When General Abdul-Fattah el-Sisi

380 Ibid.

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announced that Morsi had been deposed, “flanked by Egypt’s top Muslim and Christian
clerics as well as a spectrum of political leaders including Mohamed ElBaradei...and Galal
Morra, a prominent...Salafi” it was clear that the military found the greatest success381. The
military’s own mishandling of power in 2011-12 was forgotten as they became the only
viable option within Egypt, an admission which delegitimized any prospects the liberals had.
Also forgotten was the fact that the hated “pharaoh,” Hosni Mubarak, hailed from the
same military apparatus that was now being praised as the only solution to Egypt’s weakened
security, economic decline, and sectarian violence. General el-Sisi was being pushed towards
the presidency by the vocal majority as the singular candidate for the post, with this same
vocal majority speaking o f him in the same tones that echoed Mubarak’s own former cult of
personality. After a momentous revolution, and a two and half year hiccup, it would appear
that Egypt would once again have a president pulled from the ranks o f the military.

Egypt’s Future and Egypt’s Past
There are a few contentious conclusions that can be made based on the results of
Egypt’s political transition; the greatest of these revolve around expectations. In 2011, after
Mubarak was pulled down, the rather naive expectation was a quick transition to democracy,
similar to a Western model, but still distinctly Egyptian. Greater liberties, rights, and the
positive results o f these freedoms were expected from the revolutionary youth, and they were
expected in short order. These were only further tempered by Western expectations which
heralded the Arab Spring as the turning of a new page for the Middle East and Northern

381 David D. Kirkpatrick, “Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody,” New York

Times, July 3,2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all.

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Africa. This enthusiasm was infectious, and quickly spread throughout Egypt, converting
even the skeptical.
The problem with these expectations was that they were unrealistic. Many scholars,
including those cited here, agree that democracy can arise from any number of different
stimuli and criteria. The consolidation of democracy, however, is a lengthy process.
Countries in Africa, South America, and Eastern Europe who transitioned years, if not
decades ago still face obstacles within their democracies. The amount of support given the
coup of 2013 shows an Egypt that is unwilling or unable to put the effort required of it to
transition to democracy, foregoing what future benefits democracy might create in favor of
the short-term advantages provided by a more authoritarian government.
Again, democracy can arise from any number of different avenues. To restate
Dankwart Rustow’s statement about the fluidity of transition:
[This approach] does not commit us to any old-fashioned or simple-minded view of causality, whereby
every effect has but one cause and every cause but one effect... Any genetic theory o f democracy would
do well to assume a two-way flow o f causality, or some form of circular interaction, between politics on
the one hand and economic and social conditions on the other. ” 382

With this rational, even the events of 2011-2013 could, theoretically still lead to a healthy,
consolidated democracy, but this is highly unlikely. Morsi’s deposal sets a dangerous
precedent where military intervention can be used to circumvent the democratic process. The
Muslim Brotherhood is facing a similar, if not worse, repression than the one it suffered
under Mubarak. The Coptic Christians are still largely ignored and unengaged by the
governing bodies of Egypt; the liberal movement has convinced itself of victory, though in
reality it has failed. El-Sisi achieved his presidency by way of democratic election, lending
his new position legitimacy. This victory, however, was a Mubarak-esque landslide, where
382 Ibid., 342-344.

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El-Sisi faced off against only one other candidate, and won a staggering 96.91 percent of the
vote.383 The Muslim Brotherhood, who represented a very large demographic, were of course
unable to field any candidates, as they were branded as terrorists and traitors, thus negating a
large portion of Egyptians without a viable candidate. With the events of the 2013 deposal of
Mohammed Morsi, Egypt has found itself in a situation closely resembling the time prior to
the Arab Spring.
The Egyptian transition is currently characterized by relapse. El-Sisi is already
consolidating his rule through questionable methods. Civil society is not acting in any way
conducive enough to affect the el-Sisi regime. The Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the only
group with the organizational capability to oppose the new regime, has been severely
oppressed, a move celebrated by in the remainder o f civil society. Political society, controlled
by el-Sisi, enjoys relative autonomy from external influence, particularly civil society.
Actions taken by the new regime are all but legitimized by words of reassurance and
placation towards civil society. The judiciary, once under siege by the Morsi regime, in turn
perpetuates these habits, coopting pragmatically the rule of law to further consolidate the elSisi regime by acting in its interest, while maintaining a fa?ade of neutrality and
independence.
El-Sisi being elected president highlights a trend in Egyptian society: a tendency to
look backwards rather than forward for solutions. This is the same trend which created
extreme difficulty for liberals when matched against the Islamists after Mubarak’s deposal,
and which allowed those Islamists such easy victories in the parliamentary and presidential

383 “El-Sisi wins Egypt's presidential race with 96.91%,” Al-Ahram Online, June 3, 2014.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/l/64/102841/Egypt/Politics-/BREAKING-PEC-officially-announcesAbdelFattah-ElSi.aspx.

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elections. It is this trend which explains why only two years after deposing a ruler who hailed
from the military, Egyptians cheered as another military-bred ruler took the reins. It is the
same trend in the region o f the Middle East and North Africa which is so pervasive it allows
tyrants and dictators to rule without real opposition for decades. This trend is at best reliance
on conservative and safe political thought, and at worst, political stagnation.
These problems in turn bring up the matter of religion, specifically, shari’a. While
not the central point o f this thesis, religion played an enormous role in the events following
Mubarak’s ouster, though not directly. Looking back at the complete lack of cooperation
between liberals and Islamists, there is a common thread of shari’a apparent in most
arguments. In many ways, the fear alone of shari ’a created a thick atmosphere of distrust.
Liberals were terrified that that Islamist success would lead to a state run on a religious
foundation, rather than liberal ideals. Islamists feared that liberals would not respect Islam
enough, and would steer Egypt away from its Islamic identity. The military, fearing the
effects religion would have on its newly regained power, “solved” the religious question with
extreme violence and repression, mirroring the former presidents, Mubarak, Sadat, and
Nasser. What is clear about religion in Egypt is that it is responsible for much of the
polarization which drove apart the various factions of the Egyptian civil and political
landscape.
Egypt is therefore a reaffirmation of why, generally, Middle Eastern and Northern
African countries have so much difficulty transitioning away from totalitarian regimes and
towards democratic governments. The extreme reliance on tradition is legitimized when
difficulty is found during transition. Islam provides a clear and infallible roadmap which
supposedly leads to prosperity, and which requires no debate. An authoritarian government
166

can create an entrenched regime which can act freely based on the promise o f future
affluence. This traditional mindscape is further aggravated by an insular, disconnected
society and state-sponsored propaganda. In the case of Egypt, the multitude of hardships that
arose from the attempted liberal, democratic transition only served to glorify and sanitize the
relative stability that Egypt had under the rule of a military dictator. It also heavily
entrenches the large plurality o f peoples along political lines, as the lines o f discourse do not
yet exist to manage the multitude o f perspectives. These several factors create a hostile
environment for transitioning away from authoritarian governments.
The inability for Egyptian society to seemingly resolve any of the problems it faced
after Mubarak’s ouster provides a blunt outlook for Egypt’s transition. Rustow states:
...new issues will always emerge and new conflicts threaten the newly won agreements. The
characteristic procedures of democracy include...a host o f devices, in short, for expressing conflict and
thereby resolving it. The essence o f democracy is the habit o f dissension and conciliation over everchanging issues and amidst ever-changing alignments. Totalitarian rulers must enforce unanimity on
fundamentals and on procedures before they can get down to other business. By contrast, democracy is
that form of government that derives its just powers from the dissent o f up to one half o f the governed. 384

The points Rustow outlines here parallel the failures that Egypt’s transitional governments
made after the Arab Spring, as well as the areas that need extreme alterations. Progress
requires introspection, dedication, and flexibility, qualities that the various factions in Egypt
did not employ during the country’s transition.
None of these obstacles are insurmountable, as Rustow might argue. He even implies
that the process is neither brief, nor simple: “there must be a conscious adoption of
democratic rules, but they must not be so much believed in as applied, first perhaps from
necessity and gradually from habit. The very operation o f these rules will enlarge area of

384 Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Comparative Politics 2, no. 3
(April 1970): 363.

167

consensus step-by-step as democracy moves down its crowded agenda”.385 But this cannot be
done through disrespect, repression, and violence. Egypt must find “the tenuous middle
ground between imposed uniformity (such as would lead to some sort of tyranny) and
implacable hostility (of a kind that would disrupt the community in civil war or
secession)”.386 Though the 2011 Arab Spring failed to bring about the change that many
Egyptians and global observers thought would rationally follow, it may have still created at
least a foundation upon which future change could occur. As Huntington, Rustow, Linz, and
Stepan have emphasized, there is no set way to assure a successful democratic transition, and
el-Sisi’s “Mubarak-lite” approach to democratization may not have the long-lasting appeal to
survive for a long period of time. What is clear, however, is that Egypt requires greater
emphasis on communication and bipartisanship in the future if it wishes to accomplish the
goals set out by the protesters in Tahrir Square in 2011.

385 Ibid.
386 Ibid.

168

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