THE MEANING OF RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA by Hyae-Rim Roncin B.A., Seoul Women's University, 2005 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA September 2011 © Hyae-Rim Roncin, 2011 1+1 Library and Archives Canada Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Published Heritage Branch Direction du Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A0N4 Canada 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87581-0 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-87581-0 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a non­ exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distrbute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non­ commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats. L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou autres formats. The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis. Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privee, quelques formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis. Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. Canada i ABSTRACT When the characteristic of mass violence is primarily intrastate rather than interstate in nature, as was the case during the 1994 Rwandan genocide, geographical separation among conflicting groups is not always a viable solution. In such cases, reconciliation can present a way to recuperate and rebuild broken relationships amongst former adversaries. Reconciliation itself, however, is not a general concept or set of rules to be equally applied towards different groups or countries. This thesis is centered on a key question: what are the meanings of reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda, and how are they related? To examine this relationship, three possible connections are conceptualized: social healing and community development, reparations and economic development, and shared views on history and political development. This research contends that in a post-conflict setting, development without reconciliation is an incomplete process. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i TABLE OF CONTENTS ii LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES iv GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS v ACKNOWLEDGEMENT viii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 1.1 Primary Problem: Post-Genocide Rwanda 1.2 Research Question 1.3 Research Design and Methods 1.3.1 Treatment of data 1.3.2 Definition of actors 1.3.3 Scope of the sources 1.3.4 Limitations and delimitations 1.4 Outline of Chapters 1 2 3 4 6 7 7 10 11 CHAPTER II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RWANDA UNTIL THE 1994 GENOCIDE 2.1 Precolonial Rwanda: Identity of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa 2.2 Colonial Period: The Racial Polarization of Ethnic Distinction 2.3 The Social Revolution and Development Ideology After Independence 2.4 The Civil War and Deepening Polarization of the Hutu/Tutsi 2.5 Conclusion 13 15 19 24 33 39 CHAPTER IH. RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOENT CONFLICT 41 3.1 Conceptualizing Reconciliation 41 3.1.1 Justice 45 3.1.2 Truth 47 3.1.3 Reparation 49 3.2 Major Reconciliation Processes in Other Cases: South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala 50 3.2.1 South Africa 50 3.2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 53 3.2.3 Guatemala 55 3.3 Conclusion 58 CHAPTER IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 4.1 Conventional Perspectives of Development 4.2 The Discourse of Post-Development as an Analytical Tool 4.2.1 Defining post-development 4.2.2 Critiques of post-development 4.2.3 Significance of the theory and application to the research 4.3 Reconciliation 4.4 Reconciliation and Development 4.4.1 Social healing and community development 4.4.2 Reparation and economic development 59 60 62 63 65 66 68 69 70 72 iii 4.4.3 Shared views on history and political development 4.5 Conclusion CHAPTER V. RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA 5.1 Post-Genocide Reconciliation and Development Approach by Actors 5.1.1 Government of Rwanda 5.1.2 Rwandan grassroots 5.1.3 International community 5.2 Analysis 5.2.1 Contested perspectives on justice and judicial programs among actors 5.2.2 Counterproductive effects on gacaca courts and imidugudu 5.2.3 Policies on reparation and poverty reduction 5.2.4 Policies on ethnicity, ingando, and grassroots attitudes 5.2.5 Examining relationships between reconciliation and development 5.3 Conclusion 73 74 76 77 77 89 96 102 105 110 Ill 113 116 121 CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION 123 6.1 Post-Genocide Rwanda's Reconciliation at the Crossroads of Development: The Findings 125 6.2 Implications of the Research 127 6.2.1 Implications for Rwanda's post-genocide reconciliation and development 127 6.2.2 Prospects on future research 128 REFERENCES 131 iv LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES TABLES Table 5.1 Major goals and strategies of actors for reconciliation and reconstruction 103 Table 5.2 Perspectives of the actors toward the relationships between post-genocide Rwanda's reconciliation and development 120 FIGURES Figure 4.1 Interrelation between social healing as reconciliation and community development. 72 Figure 5.1 Cumulative aid amount of donors between 1994 and 2008 98 Figure 5.2 ODA by selected major donors to Rwanda between 1994 and 2008 98 V GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AI AVEGA BBTG CDA CDR CEH CIDA DRC EC EU FARG GDP GNP GoR HDI HIV/AIDS HRW ICG ICTR ICTY IDA IDP IFI IJR IMF IPEP IRDP IRIN ISS of BC IWPR LIPRODHOR MDG MDR MINALOC MRND NCDC NGO NRA NSGJ NUR NURC OAU ODA Amnesty International Association des Veuves du Genocide Broad-Based Transitional Government Critical Discourse Analysis Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique Comision para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico Canadian International Development Agency Democratic Republic of the Congo European Commission European Union Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide Gross Domestic Product Gross National Product Government of Rwanda Human Development Index Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Human Rights Watch International Crisis Group International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Development Association (World Bank) Internally Displaced Person International Financial Institution Institute for Justice and Reconciliation International Monetary Fund International Panel of Eminent Personalities Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace Integrated Regional Information Networks Immigration Service Society of British Columbia Institute for War and Peace Reporting Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l'Homme Millennium Development Goal Mouvement Democratique Rwandais Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement National Curriculum Development Centre Non-governmental organization National Resistance Army National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions National University of Rwanda National Unity and Reconciliation Commission Organization of African Unity Official Development Aid ODHAG OECD OHR OSCE PARMEHUTU PDC PL PSD RANU REMHI RPA RPF RTLM SAP TRC UK UN UNAMIR UNAR UNDP UNGA UNHCR UNIDO UNMIBH UNSC URNG US USAID WCED Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Parti du Mouvement et de 1'Emancipation Hutu Parti Democrate Chretien Parti Liberal Parti Social Democrate Rwandese Alliance for National Unity Recuperation de la Memoria Historica Rwandan Patriotic Army Rwandan Patriotic Front Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines Structural Adjustment Program Truth and Reconciliation Commission United Kingdom United Nations United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda Union Nationale Rwandaise United Nations Development Programme United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina United Nations Security Council Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca United States United States Agency for International Development World Commission on Environment and Development vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT It was a long journey. This research has been embedded in my everyday life for quite some time, departing from thoughts that I have always held while growing up. I still clearly remember the scene showing bodies piled everywhere on the streets of some African country called Rwanda on the evening news. It was such a shock and was an altogether traumatizing experience for an elementary school student. Born and growing up in South Korea where the legacy of conflict and division between brothers and sisters lingers in people's minds and has dictated the path of two nations for more than a generation, it was certainly not a far distant strangers' scream but an echo of my own. My research efforts, humble as they might be, would have been neither completed nor plausible without invaluable guidance and support from a number of wonderful individuals along the way. First of all, I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Drs. Fiona MacPhail and Catherine Nolin, for their valuable insight, guidance and patience over the course of my studies. I am very fortunate to have had the opportunity to learn from and develop my ideas under their collective wisdom and academic support. This research would have never got off the ground without their support and endeavour throughout the whole process. My sincerest appreciation also reaches out to Dr. Paul Bowles for reviewing my thesis and for helping me with insightful suggestions. Dr. Antonia Mills served as my external examiner and Dr. Gary Wilson as Chair. They generously devoted their time and effort to help make my thesis defence a success, and I am extremely grateful. I would also like to acknowledge my friends who have always encouraged me to push myself and reach new heights. Among my academic colleagues from UNBC, I wish to thank Neda Brkic, Jennifer Broughton, Cathy Camite, and Melanie Graham for their warm friendship as well as intellectual inspiration. Encouragement and moral support for one another has been a tremendous source of energy in completing my research. Speaking of support, I am also extremely indebted to Joo Hae Eum, Hye Hyun Jeon, Sohee Kim, Dr. Imogene Lim, and Val Scott for letting me share thoughts and for continuously motivating me to complete this work. The gains and lessons leamt during the entire program hold a value that goes beyond knowledge itself, and I thank those who inspired me through advice and genuine care. My family has always supported my dreams, and for that I am eternally thankful and fortunate. I never stop feeling gratefiil to my parents, In-Jin and Yoon-Hee, for enlightening my research and life with patience, perseverance, and tenacity. Equally important gratitude goes to my mother-in-law Anne. She has been like my own mother with her unconditional support and concern. Finally, I give special thanks and recognition to my best friend and loving husband Shawn. His extraordinary support, care, and inspiration have been present in every step along the way in accomplishing this exciting, but tumultuous at times, adventure. Last but not least, I wish to dedicate my work to all of the victims and survivors of mass violence, namely those who have suffered from the Rwandan genocide, whose traumatic experiences can never be given full recognition by written words, here or elsewhere. If damages caused by natural disasters could be minimized or mitigated through strong preparation, there is also hope for man-made disasters such as violent conflict to be preventable and stoppable through dialogue and understanding. This is the reason my passion continues. 1 CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN In March 2008, a bullet travelled from Nairobi to Vancouver. The bullet, more than 20 years old, was stuck in the right rib of a Ugandan refugee, who has lived his entire 42 years of life seeking refuge in East Africa. The endlessly unfolding story of his refugee life was no different from the voices frequently appearing in academic journals or numerous non-governmental organizations' (NGOs) reports. While listening to his story, the bizarre bump on his rib gave me mixed feelings of shame and anger. Would he ever be healed from the bullet? How could it even be possible that he might forgive the person who shot the bullet into his chest?1 As of April 2011, there are 79 ongoing cases of actual or potential conflicts around the world (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2011). Within these cases, the number of armed conflicts characterized as being intrastate in nature has been on the rise for some time (World Bank, 1998). Since the end of the Cold War era, more than 100 societies experiencing intrastate violence have ended their conflicts and transitioned into a post-conflict stage (United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2008). Emerging from these trends, interest in post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation, as well as early response and humanitarian relief, grew considerably (United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO], 2003; World Bank, 1998). At the same time, the significance of post-conflict settings has also amplified the understanding of concepts and debates that make reconciliation plausible. Truly, there has been abundant research on what reconciliation means, and how it has been attempted in different regions around the globe. These discussions have identified the urgent and pressing need for 1 This narrative is based on a meeting with a Ugandan refugee who I met through volunteer work, hosting newcomers to Canada with the Immigration Service Society of British Columbia (ISS of BC) in Vancouver. The family of two parents and six children landed in Canada in March 2008, with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The male head of the family had sought refuge in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, and Tanzania. The conversation occurred on June 8,2008, and was not an official interview. On November 21,2008, he underwent successful surgery to have the bullet removed. 2 reconciliation. In practice, various approaches to reconciliation are applied in post-conflict societies, and different meanings are attached to reconciliation depending on unique local circumstances. 1.1 Primary Problem: Post-Genocide Rwanda In a three-month period between April and July 1994, a genocide primarily targeting the minority group of Tutsi living in Rwanda, a small landlocked nation situated in the Great Lakes region of East Africa, resulted in an estimated 800,0002 lost lives (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; International Panel of Eminent Personalities [IPEP], 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Longman, 1997,1998; 1999; 2004a; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995,1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 2000). The systematic massacre was premeditated by Hutu political extremists in order to maintain absolute influence throughout the state (Lemarchand, 1995; Reyntjens, 1996). Beyond exterminating all Tutsi, targeted attacks were also directed towards members of opposition Hutu political parties and anyone who held a sympathetic attitude towards the Tutsi (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; C. Newbury, 1995; Reyntjens, 1996). The genocide ended on July 18,1994 when the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control over the country, driving the Hutu extremists into exile (Des Forges & Longman, 2004; Hintjens, 2009; IPEP, 2000; Longman, 2004b, 2006a; Reyntjens, 1996, 2004; Waldorf, 2006). In the wake of government-sponsored mass violence, Rwanda's efforts on the "path of resurgence and economic development" (UNDP, 2007, p. 1) are already underway. Indeed, the 2 No exact statistics for the death toll is available. Broadly speaking, the number is estimated somewhere between 500,000 and 1 million (Des Forges, 1995; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). The post-genocide Rwandan government estimates 1 million (Zorbas, 2004), whereas more conservative calculations tend to be closer to 500,000 (Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand, 1995). The figure of 800,000 is commonly found in the literature of Rwandan genocide (Adelman & Suhrke, 1999; Clark & Kaufiman, 2009; Dallaire, 2005; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 2000; Zorbas, 2004). 3 physical reconstruction of the country has been impressive (Mgbako, 2005, p. 2). The reconciliation process, however, remains sluggish and is still quite a sensitive issue. This imbalance brings about concerns: what does reconciliation mean in a society that has been totally devastated and traumatized by prolonged ethnic divisionism and malice like Rwanda has? What is required for reconciliation in such cases? Who are main bodies to promote the peace process and how are they leading the movement? Rwanda presents a unique and challenging opportunity to explore these issues in both a historical and contemporary context. 1.2 Research Question This thesis is centered around a critical question: what are the meanings of reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda, and how are reconciliation and development related in contemporary Rwanda? The question is derived from problems within the discourse and practice of reconciliation in post-conflict development. Although the significance of reconciliation is often acknowledged, the concept is rarely incorporated into the goals and strategies of postconflict development and peace-building. This tendency is particularly evident, amongst international development agencies and the donor community. In part, the absence can be attributed to the very nature of reconciliation itself, in that meanings and priorities of reconciliation vary, and adapt to different peoples and circumstances (Zorbas, 2008). Furthermore, the lack of empirical data makes it difficult to narrow the gap between the conceptualisation of reconciliation in theory and applications of the discourse in practice (Brouneus, 2007). In this thesis, I argue that development without reconciliation is an incomplete process in a post-conflict setting. The argument is grounded in a hypothesis that reconciliation is an extremely critical component of post-conflict development. This research attempts to examine 4 the argument by detailing the meanings of reconciliation in connection with post-conflict development. Reconciliation is a process, and depending on how a society defines its priorities (e.g., justice, truth, forgiveness, trust, among many others), the process can ultimately heal wounds and mend communities. At the same time, the meaning of development in a post-conflict society can be found at the local level when the lives of devastated people improve. Rather than subsuming reconciliation as one of many topics within the discourse of post-conflict development, this thesis examines and identifies key connections that exist between reconciliation and development, by using post-development theory as a theoretical lens. To conceptualize this connection, three interrelations are put forth: social healing and community development; reparation and economic development; and, shared views on history and political development. These three relationships will be analyzed to establish whether they exist in reconciliation and development policies of the three major participants in post-genocide Rwanda: the Government of Rwanda (GoR), Rwandan grassroots organizations, and the international community who are players in international aid. Through policy documents and other published materials, these actors have collectively articulated their approach and vision for post-genocide recovery. As such, these policy documents are the primary gateway to information that enabled this research process. This thesis is expected to contribute to groundwork for thinking of reconciliation as a critical component within development in post-conflict situations. 1.3 Research Design and Methods Information gathering for this research is based primarily on secondary data analysis gathered through policy and research reports, academic journals, books, surveys, interviews, case studies, news articles, theses dissertations, and other relevant sources. Data were then filtered and examined through the use of qualitative research methods. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) was 5 adopted to identify convergences and divergences of the goals and strategies of the major actors involved in reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda. While exploration, description, and explanation are all contained within this study, it is dominantly based on an explorative purpose. The research does not intend to seek out specific knowledge or information about individuals, regions, or programs, but rather to uncover a broader understanding about the meanings of, and association between, reconciliation and development processes in Rwanda. Thus, the objective is to see how various views, voices, and activities reflect on the reconciliation and development process in post-genocide Rwanda as a whole. To accomplish this task, a wide spectrum of resources was assessed in order to ensure that no single perspective or approach dominated the findings of the research. Extensive and comprehensive secondary data collection was necessary and beneficial for comparing the goals and perspectives of different stakeholders involved. Babbie (2001) emphasizes the importance of using multiple sources to test a hypothesis because "[i]f all the tests seem to confirm the hypothesis, then the weight of evidence supports the validity [and reliability] of the measure" (p. 318). If a particular issue or subject of Rwanda's reconciliation process, for example, is researched using multiple sources, validity can be increased by clarifying omissions or by identifying inaccuracies. Simultaneously, if certain data are repeated in a consistent manner by a number of sources, reliability can be determined by testing for consistency. Critical discourse analysis was applied in analyzing the data in order to assess the relevancy of obtained information, and to assess the "broader issues of ideology and social belief' (Widdowson, 2007, p. 70) that exist within the texts, publications, and policy documents chosen here for analysis. There are indeed numerous organizations and individuals, and their 6 programs actively disseminate information about the situation in post-genocide Rwanda, and many of their programs and projects do not necessarily indicate their goals and concepts in phrases or vocabulary that explicitly promote either reconciliation or development. In this regard, using CDA is the most effective approach to strengthening validity and reliability of the information, and enables the capture of implicit or tacit meaning behind the various actors and their published works. Much like post-development thinking and other interdisciplinary studies, CDA "calls into question ideas and assumptions that have been taken for granted as selfevidently valid" (Widdowson, 2007, p. 71). It was necessary to scrutinize how main points and arguments—discourses—in the unit of analysis were structured and developed. This process enabled an improved comprehension of particular ways of thinking, intrinsic values, hidden attitudes, and perceptions based on epistemology and ontology (Bryman, 2008, pp. 499-500; Discourse Analysis, n.d., para. 1; Waitt, 2005, pp. 164-171). Critical discourse analysis is utilized to determine whether a discussion is treating one concept with greater significance than another, how the debate is being framed, and whether alternate terminology is being employed; for example, referring to reconstruction, peace-building, reconciliation, and other similar terms as one single concept, or as separate entities. By using CDA, a necessary "plurality of theory and methodology" (Weiss & Wodak, 2003, p. 6) is used for this research process. 1.3.1 Treatment of data In order to properly treat the data collected for this research, several steps were involved. First, arguments, statements, sentiments, or voices were clustered by similarities based on epistemological and discipline-based grounds. In analyzing gacaca courts, for instance, perspectives were categorized into disciplines such as political science, law, psychology, and 7 human rights. Second, after the data had been clustered in this manner, patterns of accounts and arguments were identified and extracted for the purpose of analysis. For each discipline, the most prevalent ideas and concerns were collocated to form a discourse. This methodology was used when treating information from both academic theorists and practitioners alike. The approach was not applicable to the study of every actor: the Rwandan government, for example, presented a more unified discourse, but this methodology was necessary in order to consider the widest range of perspectives in a systematic manner. 1.3.2 Definition of actors A framework of actors involved in post-genocide Rwanda's reconciliation and development process has been designed for this research with three levels: local, national, and international. The local level includes Rwandan individuals, communities, and grassroots organizations. The GoR was taken into account as the primary actor on the national level. Finally, international agencies, NGOs, and important donor countries to Rwanda round out the final grouping of actors. A structured categorization of the actors was applied for the puipose of this research in order to compare effectively and clearly the convergence and divergence of the actors' concepts, perspectives, and goals of reconciliation and development. 1.3.3 Scope of the sources For the analysis of each actor, a unique set of documents and information sources was considered. Many of the sources were identified during the preliminary literature review conducted in the earliest stages of this research. Awareness and consideration of other key documents and sources was an ongoing process that required extensive cross-referencing, monitoring of electronic information sources, and a willingness to expand and explore beyond 8 the scope of the initial information gathering process. General source identification and selection strategies for each actor are discussed here for greater clarification. In light of the numerous post-genocide development activities pursued by the GoR, targeted policies and programs analyzed for this research have been strategically selected based on the extent of their relevance to the reconciliation process. First of all, the Constitution of Rwanda (GoR, 2003) was scrutinized in order to obtain the GoR's vision and principles on national unity and identity at the post-genocide stage of the country. The research also paid special attention to the domestic judicial system and criminal laws that aim to deal with Rwanda's past. As the Government's special agency to promote reconciliation, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was also analyzed in detail. The NURC engages in reviewing the GoR's reconciliation and reconstruction approaches by conducting research and interviews, and disseminating the GoR's principles on peace and national unity through civic education and demobilization programs. Ingando is such a case. For population reintegration, as well as land policy, imidugudu was considered for examination. Lastly, Rwanda Vision 2020 (GoR, 2000) is the GoR's road map for national reconstruction and development strategies, and met the research criteria. Analyzing data regarding these programs and activities helped to identify specific concepts, goals, and strategies of reconciliation and development that the GoR emphasizes and attempts to promote, and its perspective and attitude toward the goals. While GoR policy documents were used as direct sources for analysis, secondary sources were equally vital to this research, particularly for their insight and critiques of GoR policy. All data regarding perceptions and attitudes of Rwandan grassroots towards reconciliation were collected from secondary sources. I distinguished the sources into two categories by measuring how the data were found. Field studies—grassroots interviews, opinion 9 surveys, as such—comprised one of the categories. This set of sources was considered primary indirect data as their main focus is on grassroots views and reactions to specific subjects (e.g., psycho-social healing, physical and mental health, government policy, or reconciliation as a whole). Meanwhile, sources that do not aim for Rwandan grassroots but reflect on their opinions fell under the category of secondary indirect data: for instance, a critique of the GoR's judicial institutions that includes direct/indirect quotes from grassroots voices. Both types of sources were valuable for analyzing patterns of study results and narratives. The patterns were searched by breaking down Rwandan grassroots into smaller cohorts by age, gender, ethnic background, experience of the genocide (e.g., victims, survivors, perpetrators, and onlookers), and exposure to the conflict—whether present in the country during the genocide or not. Local NGOs and community associations were also included in the grassroots analysis. Lastly, foreign donors and international agencies that have participated in Rwanda's postgenocide reconstruction and development landscape are categorized and placed on the international level. Key donor states that have played a role in Rwanda in the aftermath of genocide include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US); at the same time, the European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and World Bank serve as major multilateral channels (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2008, p. 3).3 The OECD statistics tool was used to measure the volume of aid and aid trends of the above donors. In particular, the five most influential donors who have provided the highest amount of aid to Rwanda's post-genocide development—EU (more specifically, European Commission, EC), World Bank (International Development Association, IDA), UK, 3 Canada was one of the major donors for Rwanda. Since February 23,2009, however, Rwanda has been omitted from Canada's country list of bilateral assistance programs as its strategy of aid effectiveness moved to Central and South America (Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA], 2009; CTV News, 2009). 10 US, and the Netherlands—were given a specific focus during this analysis, in an effort to identify relationships between these donors and the GoR, and the impact of their roles on Rwanda's peace-building strategy. Ample resources from international NGOs were assessed in order to recognize their voices and the standpoints of Rwanda's reconciliation and development process. Details on the mandates, approaches, and projects of those organizations were excluded, however, as they fell outside the aim of this study and did not contribute to a comprehensive picture of the role of international community. Within this analysis of the international level, the research sought to construct a spectrum of interests and impacts to Rwanda's reconciliation and development process by the stakeholders, and to identify if any form of cohesion or consistency exists. These dynamics were meaningful in structuring an analysis of the convergence and divergence of attitudes on development that the GoR and external forces have had on each other. 1.3.4 Limitations and delimitations While secondary information gathering has proved to be an appropriate method for researching the entire dynamic of Rwanda's reconciliation process at the juncture of development, its weaknesses along with my own personal limitations must be acknowledged. Firstly, in the course of analyzing existing data, a certain level of authenticity tends to be missing. While the methodology employed for this research does not call for in-person interviews, surveys, or other fieldwork, it is recognized that those activities, or by-products of such processes, would have enhanced my understanding of post-conflict societies. Not making an in-person visit (either for research or travel purposes) or having any life experiences in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region has made my research difficult at times, particularly when attempting to grasp a precise understanding of some of the social, political, and cultural landscapes which cannot be gleaned through the printed word alone. 11 Secondly, access to reliable and comprehensive information was not easy to obtain for all sources, particularly for local Rwandan resources. Although many Rwandan NGOs and government departments do have a web presence, pages within their sites were frequently under construction or had been moved to an unspecified new location. Finally, language has also served as a limitation, at times restricting the data search and collection strategy, since some of the sources are written or spoken in languages other than English. Prior to the English-speaking RPF-led regime after the genocide, French was the most commonly used language after Kinyarwanda, the native tongue of Rwanda. My level of French and Kinyarwanda comprehension is insufficient for the interpretation of professional literature or technical jargon. Although this language matter has not been a major obstacle as the majority of sources published in French and some in Kinyarwanda are also available in English, some resources printed exclusively in French and/or Kinyarwanda have had to be excluded from this research, including certain local NGO websites that lack English translation options (e.g., LIPRODHOR). 1.4 Outline of Chapters Within the six chapters of the thesis, several different subjects and concepts will be introduced and discussed at length. To convey the research in a logical and cumulative manner, initial chapters introduce the foundation knowledge and history that is central to the debate that follows. In Chapter II, a detailed account of Rwandan history, spanning numerous centuries and cumulating in the onset of the April 1994 genocide, is presented. This chapter aims to capture the significant events and individuals from Rwanda's past by following a linear time progression. Rwandan history has been penned in many versions and editions. The chapter takes the various 12 accounts and views of history into consideration rather than relying on a single account. In Chapter III, the concept of reconciliation is introduced. The intent of the chapter is to explore the different meanings and approaches to reconciliation that exist both in theory and in practice. A series of case studies from various post-conflict societies is undertaken here to demonstrate how different societies have sought reconciliation. Chapter IV outlines the conceptual framework of this research process, highlighting the separate concepts of reconciliation, development, and their relationship. The concept and relevance of post-development thinking is also discussed in this chapter. In Chapter V, an in depth analysis of the reconciliation and development process of postgenocide Rwanda is put forth. An examination of major actors in post-genocide Rwanda is conducted, looking closely at the programs, perspectives and vision of each actor, and how these actors work with—or against—each other. This analysis is conducted in an attempt to draw out any possible associations between reconciliation and development, and to satisfactorily address the research question, as presented above. Lastly, Chapter VI concludes this research by summarizing the findings and highlighting the key implications that have been identified. 13 CHAPTER II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF RWANDA UNTIL THE 1994 GENOCIDE The rhetoric of the Rwandan genocide is often narrated in comparison with that of the Nazi Holocaust (Eltringham, 2004; Gourevitch, 1998; Lemarchand, 2002; Mamdani, 2001). The unanimously synchronized reaction to such heinous atrocities from outside spectators was to question "[c]an we imagine such an outcome for any of the wars of today?" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 170). What made one group choose to exterminate their long-time cohabitants? Where did the destructive ideology come from? How could neighbours, relatives, friends, priests, teachers, doctors, and even one's own families turn out to be perpetrators all of a sudden? How could such mass participation and buy-in be possible? Why did the international community not make serious efforts to stop the tragedy, instead of standing on the sidelines, watching while it all unfolded? The answers to these and many other questions are still yet to be fully and properly explained. In pursuit of such answers, unravelling the thread of history can help shed light on the proper path of examination. An exploration of Rwanda's history, therefore, is covered here in order to trace the underlying causes and events leading to the genocide of 1994. The ability to enact genocide on such a scale can only be made possible through meticulously premeditated and prepared political manoeuvring (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 1994; Jefremovas, 1995; Melvem, 2009; C. Newbury, 1995) and instigated extermination of one group by another. If the political instability and economic crisis—the former manifesting itself in a monopoly on power and corruption by the president and his inner circle, and the latter resulting from plummeting international coffee prices and natural disasters in the 1980s and early 1990s— provided a specific motive to plan the genocide, a deeper cause also lies in years prior. More than a-century-old ethnic and socio-economic distinction among Rwandans, and its rigidification by the colonial rule was the other, more entrenched condition which led to the atrocity. In this 14 regard, it is not surprising to see the genocide as an extension of previous ethnic violence, such as the Hutu revolution in 1959-62 (Lemarchand, 1995). This chapter, therefore, intends to draw attention to the country's political, social, economic, and cultural milieus in a historical context, for the purpose of comprehending possible roots of the Rwandan genocide. Although awareness and international attention to the Rwandan genocide and other violent conflicts in East Africa have only recently, since the early 1990s, received a great deal of media coverage and spotlight, scholarly efforts on Rwanda and the Great Lakes region have been conducted on a consistent basis by outsiders from different regions for many decades. Some of the key authors who frequently appear in the literature include Alexis Kagame4 (Rwanda), Mahmood Mamdani (Africa); Jean-Pierre Chretien, Rene Lemarchand, Johan Pottier, Gerard Prunier, Filip Reyntjens (Europe, particularly Belgium and France); Alison Des Forges, Timothy Longman, Catharine and David Newbury, and Peter Uvin (North America). The history of Rwanda is usually divided and studied through four major periods (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), which will be followed in this chapter as well: the precolonial period of Rwanda; the colonial period between the end of the nineteenth century and 1962; the 1959 'social revolution' followed by independence and two Hutu-led regimes in the latter half of the twentieth century; and lastly, the 1990 RPF invasion and the genocide. Comprehensive exploration of each period will begin with a look at the first period. 4 Abbe Alexis Kagame (1912-1981) was a Rwandan priest, poet, and historian (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995). He is recognized as one of the foremost and earliest 'Westernized' intellectuals (C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995). His work on Rwanda's precolonial and colonial political development is of considerable importance and is often found in today's discourse by many non-Rwandan scholars (C. Newbury, 1998; Prunier 1995). The controversy, however, in his work lies in his defensive tone toward Tutsi monarchy and power (Des Forges, 1995; C. Newbury, 1998). 15 2.1 Precolonial Rwanda: Identity of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa An understanding of the precolonial history of Rwanda is of great use when attempting to understand who the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are, although attempting this feat can often result in errors and frustrations as these distinctions are rather vague and contentious (Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998). In essence, there are two major accounts of Rwandan history prevalent in Rwandan society, the Hutu and Tutsi versions of history (Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001). At the same time, there has been considerable academic research and effort made to search for more truth and evidence in those accounts on the origin of Rwanda and Rwandans. Clarification and settlement on this matter is imperative (IPEP, 2000). The intensity of such disagreements on the origin of the Hutu/Tutsi/Twa has prevented Rwandan schools from teaching history to this day in post-genocide Rwandan society (Breed, 2008, p. 39; Freedman et al., 2004, p. 248; Zorbas, 2004, p. 41), and has acted as a roadblock to social unity and understanding. The scarcity of written records is largely due to the prevalence of oral tradition and the non-existence of an alphabet makes it difficult to search for reliable proof prior to the mid-nineteenth century (Gourevitch, 1998; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). More importantly, since the society is extremely hierarchical and its people tend to conform to authority (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), the truth of their past lies with whoever holds power (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, p. 170). Mark Twain once said: "[t]he very ink with which all history is written is merely fluid prejudice" (Ayres, 1998, p. 22). The two main attempts to explain the formulation of the country, as it exists today, hinge on the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; IPEP, 2000; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1998). In the so-called 'pro-Hutu' account, 16 distinct difference on origin among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is underlined whereas the 'proTutsi' explanation takes a 'no identity difference' view but suggests that the only differences lie in economic and political distinction (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 41-42). The main point of the former account is that the Twa were the first group of pottery makers and hunters who arrived in the region which is now Rwanda and Burundi around 4,000 years ago (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 2, para. 2), agriculturalist Hutu arrived later from Central Africa and animal-herding Tutsi were the last to settle down, between the fifteenth and sixteenth century (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001). The latter explanation, in contrast, claims that all three of these groups settled and cohabited in the Great Lakes region for more than 2,000 years (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Spottiswoode, 2007). The pro-Hutu point of view was particularly dominant before 1994 and the pro-Tutsi account was undertaken by the current Tutsi-led regime and has now become widespread in post-genocide Rwanda (Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, pp. 162166, 168-170; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 10).5 Although both accounts contain a certain level of mythical rhetoric and political propaganda, some points led experts and scholars to excavate empirical evidence beneath the ostensible statements. Physical difference, for example, amongst Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa led scholars to hypothesize that each group might have originated from different places (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998), which is derived in part from what the first European travellers and colonial scholars saw during African expeditions throughout the nineteenth century (Louis, 1963; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). In general, the Twa were the shortest of all; Hutu were medium height and stocky; and Tutsi were the tallest 5 Catharine Newbury (1998) observes that those two accounts "reflect political positions more than valid historical reconstruction," (p. 10) and fail to provide any suitable evidence for understanding ethnic dynamics. The danger is that this existing fundamental difference on the view of ethnicity in Rwandan history hinders the sustainability of a reconcilable atmosphere and national unity (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004). 17 and slimmest (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 50; Mamdani, 2001, p. 44-45; Prunier, 1995, pp. 4-5). The comparison between the Hutu and Tutsi is particularly extensive: Hutu had a wide nose, thick lips, and dark complexion, which were opposite to Tutsi features (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 50; Mamdani, 2001, p. 44-45; Prunier, 1995, pp. 4-5). Their average difference of height was at the very least between 10 and 12 centimetres (Mamdani, 2001; pp. 44-45).6 What is unanimously understood is that these physically distinguished Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa became the major components of Rwanda's population and that their long-time cohabitation and intermarriage7 led to a shared language (Kinyarwanda), religion, lifestyle, customs, and even physical appearance (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). It has become increasingly challenging to know for certain a person's group affiliation through mere observation of their physical appearance and traits (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 8). It is, therefore, not an easy matter to categorize Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas either by race, ethnicity, class, caste, or rank and no formal agreement on that classification exists (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; Gourevitch, 1998, p. 48; Mamdani, 2001; pp. 41, 73; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 12).8 6 Additionally, the difference embodies genetic traits as well, such as the existence of sickle cells and the ability to digest lactose based on a different diet (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 43-46). 7 The custom of intermarriage certainly played a significant role in obscuring physical distinction of the Hutu and Tutsi but not in integrating for social cohesion, since the ethnicity of children followed that of the father's (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 8; Uvin, 1998, pp. 29-30). Later on, intermarriage became in effect "a cornerstone of the racist discourse" (Uvin, 1998, p. 30). 8 Mamdani (2001) interprets the Hutu/Tutsi/Twa identity through a political lens. Political identity comes about through the formation and enforcement of legal definitions and concepts (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). Essentially, if the law defines someone as 'Hutu,' that—regardless of their cultural, ethnic, or biological identity—is their political identity (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). Political identity rallies around a common project for the future, instead of focusing on a shared past (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 22-27). While cultural and economic realities certainly did exist to define the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in many ways, it was how these realities dovetailed with the perception that the Hutu was the 'native' and the Tutsi was the 'settler' (both political identities) that fuelled genocidal sentiments to their boiling point (Mamdani, 2001, p. 14). It is interesting to note, also, that outside of Rwandan borders, the political identity of both Hutu and Tutsi was simply Banyarwanda, the people of Rwanda in Kinyarwanda (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 36-37). The legal distinction of Hutu or Tutsi which was strictly enforced in Rwanda by the issuance and adherence to identity cards was all but ignored in neighbouring Uganda and Congo (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 36-37). 18 The political geography and physical boundaries of Rwanda also contributed to the formation of Rwandan society. Myriad small chiefdoms of the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa composed the Great Lakes region through expansion and/or control over neighbours between the eleventh and fifteenth century (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Over the next several hundred years these chiefdoms of many clans eventually integrated under one powerful clan, Abanyiginya (Tutsi), which was politically predominant in eastern Rwanda, by conquering the others in the west (Mamdani, 2001, p. 62; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 2, paras. 8,12). Throughout, the king (mwami in Kinyarwanda) remained at the centre and absolute divine of the realm (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 49; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995, pp. 9-11). In particular, the reign of mwami Kigeri Rwabugiri (1860-95) was a critical period of precolonial Rwanda in that the region was shaped as one state through expansion, and its power became centralized and hierarchical through patron-client relationship (African Rights, 1995; Huband, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988; D. Newbury, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). There existed various forms of clientship which all rested on unequal and reciprocal relationships between the ruler (patron) and the ruled (client) (Mamdani, 2001, p. 65; Prunier, 1995, p. 13). The early days of clientship (umuheto) focused mainly on the giving of cattle as a regular offering by a kin group in return for protection from the patron (African Rights, 1995, p. 4; Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). Ownership of cattle meant not only the symbol of wealth and prosperity but also social mobility (Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995, p. 13), which has remained rigid even in today's Rwandan society: "[c]ows are status symbols in Rwandan culture and extremely valuable—selling one was extravagant; selling two was an invitation to financial ruin" (Ilibagiza, 2006, p. 19). The later clientship (ubuhake), however, moved away from voluntary giving and instead allowed a patron to impose cattle collection from a client, or other forms of 19 giving when the intended clients, many of them Hutu, possessed no cattle of their own (Mamdani, 2001, p. 65). Although there was never clear divisions such as Tutsi cattle-herders and Hutu farmers, a forced labour (ubureetwa), introduced during the Rwabugiri era, was applied exclusively to the Hutu whose social and political status further deteriorated (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 65-66). The institutionalized identification of Tutsi and Hutu was generalized and became distinguishable with "Tutsi pastoralists as power-holders and Hutu cultivators as subjects" (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 6). What is clear, however, is that the Hutu-Tutsi stratification and polarization was not yet rigidified until the establishment of colonial rule (Des Forges, 1999; Huband, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). 2.2 Colonial Period: The Racial Polarization of Ethnic Distinction The Great Lakes of East Africa was an area of great importance to European colonial powers as part of their 'scramble for Africa' in the early colonial era between approximately 1880 and 1900 (Louis, 1963; Manning, 1988). During these years Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, and other Western European powers ventured blindly into regions they described as the 'heart of darkness,' in attempts to claim territory that they ascribed with current or future strategic value for trade, settlement, or empire expansion (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 84). While each colonial power had different reasons and public justifications for their presence in Africa, it was often the efforts of individuals or special interests that motivated the nations to press on. In the case of Germany, it was the efforts of one explorer, Karl Peters, who in 1884 negotiated a series of treaties for a vast area of land in East Africa, which encouraged Germany to enter the scramble and eventually lay claim to much of the area around what became known as Tanganyika (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 20 60). There was little resistance to German claims (Calvert, 1917, p. vi), and in October 1886 an agreement was reached between Germany and Britain whereby Kenya and Uganda were to remain under British administration and Tanganyika (including modern day Rwanda) under German (Chamberlain, 1999, p. 61). While this agreement was not the final act by the parties involved in the scramble for Africa which would continue on until the turn of the century, German administration would remain constant in the Central African region for many years to come. In particular, the current area of Rwanda and Burundi (Ruanda-Urundi, as traditional European names for the two countries) was "a strategic junction" (Louis, 1963, p. xv) to Germany, Belgium, and Britain. According to historian William Roger Louis (1963), the area was: seen by German colonial jingoes as part of a German central African empire, by [Belgian] King Leopold II as a stepping stone toward Lake Victoria and the Indian Ocean, and by the Cape to [British] Cairo enthusiasts as the link between the British possessions in the north and south, (p. xv) With a series of diplomatic negotiations and treaties among those European imperialists (Louis, 1963; Pottier, 2002),9 Germany started taking control over Rwanda between 1895 and 1899 (IPEP, 2000; C. Newbury, 1988; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996).10 German administration, however, did not last long. In 1916 Belgium occupied the Rwanda and Burundi domain as the result of the offensives launched from Belgian Congo Free State (the current Democratic Republic of the Congo, DRC) against German East Africa 9 Miscalculating the geography of the region led to a huge controversy which drew out the negotiations for more than two decades, beginning in 1884-5 (Louis, 1963, pp. 3-51). Germany's effort to colonize was under way with its contact with the Rwandan royal court in 1894 (C. Newbury, 1988, p. 53), the first military post in Usumbura (Bujumbura, Burundi's capital) in 1896 (Louis, 1963, p. 114) and in Rwanda in 1898 (C. Newbury, 1988, pp. 5657). Finally, in 1910, the three colonial powers agreed to adopt natural boundaries rather than arbitrary partitions of the Ruanda-Urundi region based on Germany's main position (Louis, 1963, pp. 92-97; C. Newbury, 1988, pp. 5657). 10 The first year of the German colonial rule in Rwanda is not clear as sources indicate different years: 1895 by IPEP (2000); 1897 by Prunier (1995); 1898 by C. Newbury (1988); and 1899 by Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth (1996). 21 (Tanzania region) during the East African Campaign of World War I (African Rights, 1995, p. 5; IPEP, 2000, chap. 2, para. 8; Louis, 1963, pp. 207-231; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, para. 3). Later in the peace settlement of 1919 after Germany was defeated in World War I, Rwanda and Burundi were recognized under Belgian governance (Louis, 1963, pp. 232-254; C. Newbury, 1988, p. 61). Although the 'divide-and-rule' strategy was commonly practiced in African colonies (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Louis, 1963; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996), the approach did not seem to be necessary to the first colonizer in Rwanda where the already wellmaintained hierarchical power structure could deliver authority efficiently from the top to bottom (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 16; Louis, 1963, p. 200; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 1). They, instead, implemented indirect rule, "using existing traditional authorities to govern the country for them, supposedly without altering existing patterns of authority" (C. Newbury, 1988, p. 59, emphasis in the original) in order to compensate for the disadvantage of having to control with only a small German presence as well as to strengthen their authority in the colony (IPEP, 2000, chap. 2 paras. 8-9; Prunier, 1995, pp. 24-26; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para, 1). The clear, but not exclusive, division of power as Tutsi being the ruler and Hutu/Twa the ruled made the colonizers believe that they were "three distinct, long-existent and internally coherent blocks of people, [...] the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid" (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 16). This particular situation—the outsider's misinterpretation of indigenous identity and adoption of racist convictions—in the case of Rwanda made the racialization of the Hutu/Tutsi divide possible (African Rights, 1995, p. 7). The Hamitic hypothesis was the central tenet of the controversy which fuelled the colonizers' understanding of who were Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa (African Rights, 1995; Gourevitch, 22 1998; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The crux of the theory was that '"white Africans' from the northeast had brought civilization to the rest of the benighted continent" (Des Forges, 1995, p. 44). John Hanning Speke, the missionary and explorer of the present-Great Lakes region in 1863, championed the development and reinforcement of the Hamitic myth (African Rights, 1995, p. 7; Gourevitch, 1998, pp. 50-51; Sanders, 1969, p. 528). Speke (1863) argued in his journal as follows: My theory is founded on the traditions of the several nations, as checked by my own observation of what I saw when passing through them. It appears impossible to believe, judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma,11 that they can be of any other race than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of Ethiopia. The traditions of the imperial government of Abyssinia go as far back as the scriptural age of King David [...] Believing [...] that Africa formerly belonged to Europeans, from whom it was taken by negroes with whom they had allied themselves, the Wahuma make themselves a small residue of the original European stock driven from the land—an idea which seems natural enough when we consider that the Wahuma are, in numbers, quite insignificant compared with the natives. [...] We are thus left only the one very distinguishing mark, the physical appearance of this remarkable race, partaking even more of the phlegmatic nature of the Shemitic father than the nervous boisterous temperament of the Hamitic mother, as a certain clue to their Shem-Hamitic origin, (pp. 246-251, emphasis in the original) The essential point to be taken here is that the Wahuma—that is, the Hamite—were regarded as having a European ancestry. The myth played a convenient role for the colonizers to justify the European rule over Africa, as Sanders (1969) interprets, creating the nuance of the indigenous Bantu as an inferior race to be developed by a superior being, which ultimately developed the notion of "the white man's burden" (pp. 528-529). Tutsis were regarded as more similar to Europeans themselves in characteristic qualities—faithful, diligent, and intelligent—as well as in physical appearance (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). As a consequence of this belief, Germans and Belgians found it natural that the 'non-indigenous' Hamite Tutsi was ruling the 'indigenous' Bantu Hutu (Mamdani, 2001, p. 100). 11 Wahflma (or Wahuma) was later changed to what Speke believed to be Tutsi (Watutsi) (Mamdani, 2001, p. 300; Speke, 1863, pp. 250-251). 23 Belgians continued applying the first colonizer's approach to Rwanda, and therefore, ethnic stratification was deepened as Belgium's presence remained (Prunier, 1995, pp. 25-26; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 2). Belgian colonizers strongly preferred to give positions and privileges of power on matters such as politics, economy, and education to the Tutsi rather than to Hutu/Twa (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). During the 1920s through to the 1930s, the administrative system was regrouped as uniformed chiefdoms and sub-chiefdoms, and authority was given solely to local Tutsi chiefs and subchiefs; consequently, power was shifted from the mwami to the local authority (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 13; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 90-92). The 1933-4 census indicated that the majority of the population (roughly 84-85%) was Hutu, 14-15% Tutsi, and less than 1% Twa12 among the entire population of 1.8 million (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 19; Mamdani, 2001, p. 98). At the same time, as a part of the census, identification cards were issued to all Rwandans, stating ethnicity, physical description, and the number of owned cattle (IPEP, 2000, chap. 2, paras. 11-12; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 98-99).13 Prior to their issuance, some Hutus and Tutsis were occasionally able to enjoy advantages by changing their ethnicity from Hutu to Tutsi or vice versa. Rwandans now saw their ethnic affiliation as fixed and rigidified (Des Forges, 1999, History, paras. 19-20; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 11). The Catholic Church was another useful facilitator for the colonial government to collect data on the Rwandan population as the colonial 12 According to Willis (2005), a current representation of the Twa in post-genocide Rwanda is 0.3-0.4% of the whole population (p. 130). The criterion of ethnic affiliation during the population census is rather debatable. For instance, African Rights (1995) notes that a person who owned more than 10 cows was categorized as Tutsi (pp. 8-9). Mamdani (2001), however, points out that the 10-cow rale could not be applied after considering the number of cattle vis-a-vis that of Tutsi population (pp. 98-99). Nevertheless, the Belgian authority did adopt the rule, which implied that not all Tutsi owned 10 cows, or any cows at all, but this categorization was "neither the only nor even always the main basis for identification of Tutsi" (Mamdani, 2001, p. 99). Another explanation made by Des Forges (1999) is that Rwandans were asked to register their identity for themselves (History, para. 19). 24 churches were closely tied to local communities (Mamdani, 2001, p. 99). More significantly, the Catholic Church played a crucial role in the education and conversion of Rwandans to Christianity. First, the opportunity for post-secondary education was restricted to Tutsis, the "natural-born chiefs" except in the case of a Hutu/Twa wanting to study for seminary (Prunier, 1995, p. 33). Often times the Hutu and Tutsi were educated separately and different measures and methods were adopted; for instance, Kiswahili for the Hutu and French for Tutsi was exercised as the medium of education (Mamdani, 2001, pp. 89-90). Second, Rwandans were obliged to convert to Christianity, including the mwami himself (IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). During this process Rwandans were reminded that "[p]olygamy was evil and adultery was a sin, thrift and hard work were encouraged, and social displays of conventional piety were required of all" (Prunier, 1995, pp. 32-33). The impact of the church in its dissemination of religion became fundamentally embedded in the Rwandan society. Ironically, and unknown at that point, the church would later go on to be one of the major actors of mass killings in the genocide of 1994 (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998, Prunier, 1995). As a result, systematic discrimination and exploitation of Hutu led the Hutu peasants to seek "a sense of solidarity" (African Rights, 1995, pp. 6-7; Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 20). Indeed, the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi—Hutu as native, Tutsi as foreign—preceded the Hutu/Tutsi violent conflict. 2.3 The Social Revolution and Development Ideology After Independence Following decades of divisive colonial rule, an inevitable outburst of anger and friction between those two major groups finally erupted. The 1959 'Social Revolution,' or Hutu revolution, was a very notable stage that helped to reinforce the power of a small number of Hutu elites, managed 25 by manipulating ethnic division (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The path to the Social Revolution was spurred on externally by the Belgian authority's final actions and internally by the aspiration of Hutu power and anti-Tutsi sentiment in the sweeping wind of African decolonization (C. Newbury, 1988). In the wake of the Second World War, Rwanda, together with Burundi, was still under the Belgian government; though, at this time in 1946, it was under the name of Administering Authority for Ruanda-Urundi designated by the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations (UN) (Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; United Nations General Assembly [UNGA], 1946). In fact, Belgium was under pressure by the international atmosphere of decolonization, to reduce its influence and presence in Rwanda and its other colonies (Prunier, 1995, pp. 41-44; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, paras. 17-20). Beyond the international pressure, Belgium itself was undergoing its own 'social revolution' in that power was shifting from the upper-class Francophone Walloonians to the working class Flemish majority (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52; Prunier, 1995, p. 44). As a result of these changes, the clergy in Rwanda were becoming increasingly Flemish, and these new members sympathized more with the mass Hutu peasants and supported efforts towards political change (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 52; Mamdani, 2001, p. 113; Prunier, 1995, p. 44). Within Rwanda, anti-Tutsi sentiment was growing among the Hutu and interpretations of democracy as 'majority rule' were widely spreading (IPEP, 2000; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). A small frustrated group of Hutu intellectuals, fuelled by their unemployed and unsatisfactory situation, published a statement called the Bahutu Manifesto in 1957, asserting that "[i]f Tutsis were foreign invaders, [...] Rwanda was by rights a nation of the Hutu majority" (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 58). The Hamitic hypothesis was now being exploited by the Hutu (Gourevitch, 1998; Mamdani, 2001). 26 It was during this anti-Tutsi atmosphere that another incident of critical importance occurred, when an assault was committed against a Hutu sub-chief by a few Tutsi political activists in November 1959. The assault resulted in Hutu counterattacks on Tutsi officials and vice versa, causing the deaths of several hundred and a mass exodus of Tutsi who fled to neighbouring countries (Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1998; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The Belgian administration declared a state of emergency and sent military troops from the neighbouring Belgian Congo led by Colonel Guy Logiest, who instigated the colonial power's partial support for the Hutu (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1998; Prunier, 1995). Fearing the intensifying revolts and the Tutsi court's preparation for eliminating Hutu political opponents (C. Newbury, 1998, p. 13), Colonel Logiest announced: "because of the force of circumstances, we have to take sides" (Prunier, 1995, p. 51). The colonial authority replaced more than 300 Tutsi chiefs and sub-chiefs with Hutu ones, allowing Hutu to hold almost half of the local official positions (Des Forges, 1999, History, paras. 21-23; Mamdani, 2001, p. 124), and also organizing 650 guards into a Hutu-dominated armed force in May 1960 (Mamdani, 2001, p. 124). Hutu majority rule was thus confirmed in the administrative and legislative elections of 1960 and 1961 (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988,1998; Prunier, 1995). The communal election which was organized by the colonial power resulted in the victory of the MDR-PARMEHUTU (Mouvement Democratique Rwandais-Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation Hutu), the radical pro-Hutu party, routing Tutsi monarchist party UNAR (Union Nationale Rwandaise) and causing the abolition of the monarchy (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1988,1998; Prunier, 1995). Gregoire Kayibanda, the leader of PARMEHUTU, was inaugurated as the president of the First Republic (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 61; Prunier, 1995, pp. 48, 52-54). In the following year, on July 1, 1962, Belgium granted 27 independence to Rwanda (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 21). Nevertheless, the fundamental problem remained: under the Hutu majority democracy, the only real change was that now it was the Tutsi who became the target of oppression by the regime and ruling clique. First, physically violent acts against the Tutsi prevailed as scattered incursions of Tutsi refugee guerrillas (inyenzi14) attempting to return to their home country continued throughout the 1960s (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The raids made by these small armed bands of Tutsi refugees numbered as many as 10 attempts between 1961 and 1966 (Reed, 1996, p. 481). The outcome, however, was revenge killings and massacres of the Tutsi within the country and an increased influx of refugees, rather than undermining the Kayibanda government (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Reed, 1996; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Until 1967 the result of the series of violent acts resulted in approximately 20,000 Tutsi murders and again produced a massive number of refugees—this time over 300,000 (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 25).15 Second, observers (IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995) note that the Kayibanda regime tended to be authoritarian, elitist, and secretive, a style of leadership quite reminiscent of the old Tutsi monarchy. The identity card system remained fixed, this time however, as a means of excluding the Tutsi from education, government employment, and the armed forces (African Rights, 1995; IPEP, 2000; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). African Rights (1995) notes that "the ethnic hierarchy was simply reversed" (p. 12). Yet, the Tutsi were not the sole scapegoats: 14 Inyenzi means 'cockroaches' in Kinyarwanda (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Reed, 1996; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). 15 The total number of Tutsi refugees and their descendents residing outside of Rwanda were an estimated 600,000 (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; C. Newbury, 1995,1998; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996), which equates to roughly 9% of the entire Rwandan population (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 25) or 40-70% of all Tutsi (Reed, 1996, p. 481). 28 despite Kayibanda's self-proclaimed Hutu democracy being based on a demographic majority (IPEP, 2000, chap. 3, para. 17), the Hutu ideology did not reach to the Hutu peasants whose status remained poor and rural (African Rights, 1995, p. 11). The real beneficiaries were the President and his cadre from Kayibanda's home base of Gitarama, in southern Rwanda (C. Newbury, 1998, p. 14; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, pp. 7-8). The concentration of power was fulfilled with various measures—threats, physical violence, arrests, assassinations, and negotiations—in order to eliminate all opposition parties other than MDR-PARMEHUTU (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 30). Among diverging Hutu factions with different regional and political backgrounds, northern and north-western Hutus were enraged by the Hutu southerners' monopoly of power (IPEP, 2000, chap. 3, para. 18; Prunier, 1995; p. 61). Finally, rivalry between the Hutu from the south, including those who were in power, and Hutu northerners increased tensions, and eventually led to confrontation, which gave Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana, who was from the north (Gisenyi), an opportunity to seize power through a military coup and to become the second president in 1973 (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996).'6 One of the biggest differences between the Kayibanda regime and Habyarimana's Second Republic was the redefinition of Tutsi identity. Whereas "Rwanda is the country of the Bahutus (Bantu)" (Chretien, 1995, as cited in Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, p. 105) and the Tutsi had been designated 'foreigners' during the Kayibanda government, under Habyarimana Tutsis were recognized as an ethnic minority from a foreign race (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, p. 106; Mamdani, 16 International Panel of Eminent Personalities (2000) states that "[t]he atmosphere of the country was so oppressive at that point that the coup was met with widespread popular relief, even by most Tutsi" (chap. 3, para. 20). 29 2001, p. 140).17 This meant that the Tutsi, again as citizens of Rwanda, could participate in the political arena (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001). For instance, every Rwandan, including the Tutsi, was obligated to become a member of the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND), created in 1975, as a single ruling party (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The intention of the MRND was to "mobilize all the people of Rwanda under the banner of peace and national harmony by restoring a climate of confidence among the sons and daughters of the Nation" (MRND, 1985, as cited in Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 3, para. 34). For the first 17 years of the Habyarimana regime, physical violence and pogroms did in fact occur, this time not targeting the Tutsi but among different Hutu factions (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 3; C. Newbury, 1998, p. 13). Restrictions, however, were still outlined in a quota system that limited the number of seats in all political sectors that were allocated to the Tutsi, which was how the Hutu rule attempted to keep Tutsi influence to a minimum (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). Indeed, the real intention of "a carefully-controlled machinery of hypocrisy" (Prunier, 1995, p. 82) was that ethnic prejudice and discrimination was reinforced with the dissemination of ethnic propaganda put forth under the Habyarimana regime (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). Another remarkable aspect of the Second Republic was the regime's focus on economic development and rapid modernization (Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996). The government's well-planned development ideology was "the pursuit of economic development for the underdeveloped (Hutu) masses" (Uvin, 1998, p. 23). The administrative system of the state was 17 Mamdani's point on political identity, which was discussed in Footnote 6, is again quite central to understanding this concept. Mamdani (2001) analyzes that: "Habyarimana defined the prospects and limits of the Second Republic. The prospect was to rehabilitate the Tutsi back to being Rwandans, alongside the Hutu. The limit, however, was that Tutsi and Hutu would remain alive as political identities" (p. 142, emphasis in the original). 30 reorganized so as to maximize the government's control and mobilization over the bottom rungs (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Uvin, 1998).18 Such an impeccable organization, to the eyes of outsiders, contributed to the positive impression that Rwanda was "stable, hardworking and reliable" (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 6). In effect, the government's control under the guise of practicing the development ideology was prevalent in every arena of the society, allowing for greater centralization of power (Uvin, 1998, pp. 23-26). The church remained paramount, but this time, to support the Hutu in power (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, paras. 14-15; Prunier, 1995, p. 81). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda's development was seen as remarkable, sound and well-managed among the international community (Longman, 1997; Uvin, 1998). Yet, the critical fact to be pointed out here is that this image was formed mainly by consensus among outsiders (Uvin, 1998, p. 26), which will be explored more below. The reputation succeeded in attracting a massive amount of foreign aid, at least US$200 million every year (African Right, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The major donor countries at the time were Belgium, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, and US among 20 other nations (Prunier, 1995, p. 81; Uvin, 1998, p. 41). Other donors included about 30 international agencies and 150 international and local NGOs (Uvin, 1998, p. 41). Rwanda was ranked as one of the most financially assisted countries in the world: between 1989 and 1990, for example, 11.4% of its gross national product (GNP) was foreign aid (Uvin, 1998, pp. 40-41). Until the first half of the 1980s, Rwanda's physical record of development was very impressive, especially in infrastructure, agriculture, and reforestation (Des Forges, 1999, History, 18 The administrative reform was composed of 10 prefectures across the country, each headed by a prefect, then divided into 143-145 communes, each managed by a burgomaster (IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9; Mamdani, 2001, p. 144). Communes were further divided into eight collines, or hills, each one of which was composed of secteurs and each secteur contained cellules (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 32; Mamdani, 2001, p. 144). Communes contained about 30,000 to 50,000 residents and they were further divided into 5,000 in each secteur and 1,000 in cellule (Des Forges, 1999, History, paras. 31-32; IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9; Mamdani, 2001, p. 144). The burgomasters were "the ultimate authority at the local level" and their appointment and dismissal was in the President's sole charge (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 31; IPEP, 2000, chap. 4, para. 9). 31 para. 42; Mamdani, 2001, p. 145). Such brisk and vigorous economic growth, however, changed dramatically in the late 1980s. No more land was available for farming (Mamdani, 2001, p. 146), and food production began to decline after 1985 (Uvin, 1998, pp. 53-55). Drought, heavy rain, and plant disease were all factors contributing to this unfortunate situation, as was the decrease in the international price of coffee, a crop which, together with tea, comprised between 75% and 80% of Rwandan agriculture and was an important cash crop for foreign exchange (Des Forges, 1999; C. Newbury, 1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). The result of these problems was a cataclysmic ripple effect on the government's revenue and foreign debt (Uvin, 1998, p. 54).19 The World Bank (1994) reported that the poverty rate of Rwanda in 1985 was 40%, but by 1992 this number had risen to 52% (as cited in Uvin, 1998, p. 54). The constant and colossal level of assistance from international donors and agencies was not by itself enough to overcome Rwanda's economic crisis. The structural adjustment programs (SAPs) spearheaded by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1990, for instance, failed to help revive the country's eroded economy but instead increased poverty and insecurity (Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). An initially promised disbursement of US$90 million was later decreased to US$60 million; the program contained the usual conditions and strategies that were applied similarly to other African countries, but were not considerate of Rwanda's internal factors—such as ethnic prejudice and racism; and the Rwandan government did not install most of the SAPs (Uvin, 1998, pp. 57-59). In addition, even though between 1990 and 1993 human rights violations and social instability were repeatedly reported, few aid agencies changed their project approaches or 19 Data indicate that the aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) per capita decreased from US$355 in 1983 to US$260 in 1990—a startling decline of 7% per year. Rwandan foreign debt, which until the 1980s was relatively low by African standards, began to increase, rising from 16% of the GNP in 1980 to 32% in 1990 (Uvin, 1998, p. 54). 32 strategies and no restraint or positive/negative conditionality tied to aid was added in order to intervene with the problems (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998). Aid was largely given "toward greater [Rwandan] government ownership and control" of the money (Uvin, 1998, p. 88, emphasis in the original). The key question remains: why did donors and NGOs maintain such a positive attitude towards aid and humanitarian assistance, in light of the Habyarimana regime's racist ideology? Peter Uvin (1998) argues that "false and reductionist" (p. 158) views were the reason for such a situation. In his book Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Uvin points to widespread 'blindness' and 'ignorance' as the attitude of the donors and aid community (1998). Development plans are usually addressed with apolitical terms: much of the focus is paid to economic and technical outcomes whereas social circumstances and political conditions of the recipient country are often neglected (Uvin, 1998, pp. 154-156). Even if the donors and aid workers do recognize the problems of the country, in many cases they decide not to redress the issues that are out of the mandate of assistance programs (Uvin, 1998, pp. 94,156-157) because "[t]he development enterprise shares two fundamental assumptions that are so basic [...] first, that they are underdeveloped and we are not; and second, that we have the stuff that will help them become more developed" (Uvin, 1998, p. 157, emphasis in the original). Uvin (1998) warns that these assumptions make it easier to ignore local people's perspective and their social, historical, and cultural dynamics, instead implanting the outsider's approach and methodology, which creates a top-down and authoritarian characteristic of development assistance (pp. 156159, 224-238). Notwithstanding these issues, severe poverty and economic crisis worsened as refugees and peoples displaced during the civil war of the 1990s increased the demand for temporary 33 shelter and food. Equally ironic was that ethnic divisionism and extremist movement against Tutsi, which was merely a prelude to the genocide, became exceedingly problematic in Rwandan society during these challenging times. 2.4 The Civil War and Deepening Polarization of the Hutu/Tutsi In the later 1980s, along with the economic downturn, Habyarimana's development ideology and dictatorship based on one-party rule gradually came to be challenged within the Rwandan Hutu elite (IPEP, 2000, chap. 5, paras. 16-21; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 4, paras. 9, 26). Freedom of speech, particularly criticism toward the government, was oppressed and the price of opposition was often elimination through political assassinations (C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, p. 8). It is important to note that those in the centre of political rivalry and conflict were Hutu factions from different backgrounds rather than Hutu-led violence against Tutsi: the latter was not of much significance until the Tutsi-dominated RPF invaded the Rwandan border with Uganda in 1990 (IPEP, 2000, chap. 5, paras. 16-21; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, p. 8). The formation of the RPF and its invasion is closely related to, and therefore necessary to be understood in, Uganda's political dynamics. The majority of the RPF was comprised of descendents of the Tutsi refugees who fled the earlier violence of the Hutu revolution and its subsequent episodes in the late 1950s, early 1960s and 1973 to neighbouring Uganda (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Melvern, 2009; C. Newbury, 1995; Otunnu, 1999a, 1999b; Reed, 1995).20 For more than three decades, many of the refugees and their descendents were deeply involved in Ugandan politics and military, and the Ugandan 20 In the whole period of their stay, the Rwandan refugees in Uganda had been denied naturalization; furthermore, their political and social standing as refugees was inherited by their children, despite being bom and growing up in Uganda, (Kuperman, 2004, p. 64; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 164-165) including one who would become the RPF leader, and the current President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Otunnu, 1999b; Reed, 1995, 1996). Within Rwanda, on the other hand, the Habyarimana government was adherent to the policy of denying return entry of the refugees to their home country (Kuperman, 2004, p. 64; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). 34 political leaders exploited the refugee population by supporting or threatening to repatriate them in order to seize power (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001). One of the most momentous occasions among those strategic movements was the refugee group's significant contribution to the cause for Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Army (NRA) that ousted the Obote regime in 1986 (C. Newbury, 1995, p. 13; Otunnu, 1999b, p. 31; Reed, 1995, p. 49). With the refugee warriors from the NRA affiliating, the RPF was created and renamed after the intellectual-based political refugee organization, the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1987 (Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Otunnu, 1999b: Reed, 1995). The RPF's main purpose of establishing a new government to share political power with the Hutu regime as well as their long-time aspiration to return home convinced the Front that armed attack on Rwanda was inevitable (Kuperman, 2004, p. 68; Otunnu, 1999b, p. 39). The timing of the invasion (IPEP, 2000; Otunnu, 1999b) was affected by the developing push and pull factors in both Uganda and Rwanda. Within Uganda, the push was on as growing antirefugee sentiment in 1990 among the host population, who were opposed to granting refugees land, imposed heavy burdens on the NRA, and thus, Museveni wanted the refugees to repatriate to Rwanda peacefully (IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001). Meanwhile, within Rwanda, the political liberalization process of the Habyarimana government was moving very slowly. These delays combined with economic stagnation, corruption, and the power monopoly of the president with his cadre served as the 'pull factors' (IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Otunnu, 1999b). On October 1,1990, the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, crossed the border when both Museveni and Habyarimana were attending a UN conference in New York (IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Reed, 1996; Otunnu, 1999b). The civil war broke out. 35 The RPF invasion had a far-reaching impact on Rwanda's political and social landscape (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; C. Newbury, 1995; Uvin, 1998). As a response to the invasion, the Habyarimana government initiated massacres on Tutsi and Hutu civilians, accusing them of being RPF accomplices, as well as counter-offensives toward the RPF (Kuperman, 2004, p. 71). Fake attacks were frequently created by the government to disguise and vindicate its assaults and reprisal attacks of the Tutsi opposition and to gain sympathy from the international community (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 52; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 191-192) Many innocent Hutus were killed by the RPF as well (IPEP, 2000, chap. 6, para. 21; Kuperman, 2004, p. 73). Additionally, the invasion and subsequent civil war consequently produced a number of casualties and displaced: between 1990 and 1993, an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 people were killed (Mamdani, 2001, p. 192; C. Newbury, 1995, p. 14) and in total 950,000 to 1 million were internally displaced or fled the country (Mamdani, 2001, p. 187, 204; Sellstrom & Wohlgemuth, 1996, chap. 4, paras. 38, 72, 75). Massive displacement also contributed to reductions in agricultural production, worsening an already weakened economy and making ordinary Rwandans, particularly rural peasants, more vulnerable (Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996, chap. 4, para. 75). The initial view on the RPF was quite negative among both the Hutu and Tutsi populace as the invasion caused widespread social disruption (Kuperman, 2004, pp. 71-72). The Habyarimana regime was faced with a dilemma both from inside and outside of Rwanda: inside, the invasion brought the justification of the regime's legitimacy and support against its enemy; outside, the donor community pressured the government to democratize and share its power with the RPF (Dallaire, 2005; Des Forges, 1999; Uvin, 1998). With Habyarimana's reluctant acceptance of a multi-party system in November 1990, the multi-party system was legalized in July 1991 (Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; 36 Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). New opposition parties were being launched to compete against the ruling MRND, including the MDR led by the successor of the MDR-PARMEHUTU during Kayibanda's First Republic, Tutsi-based Parti Democrate Chretien (PDC), Parti Liberal (PL), popular among urban and business people, and Parti Social Democrate (PSD), which gained support from intellectuals, professionals, and some from south (Prunier, 1995, pp. 123126; Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996, chap. 4, para. 29). As the power-sharing process accelerated, Habyarimana and his party found less power to exercise and "saw the chance to exploit the invasion to consolidate [his] power base" (Des Forges, 1995, p. 45). The regime considered any political opposition as an enemy and an RPF accomplice (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1995, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). The crux of the ideology was that the Tutsi were a foreign 'race' who were trying to bring the colonial legacy back to the Hutu Nation by invading and subjugating the Hutu, which strategically instilled 'fear' into Hutu peasants for collective participation in Hutu Power, and later on, the genocide (IPEP, 2000, chap. 6, para. 21; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 189-191). Racist hate propaganda against all Tutsis was constantly disseminated through media such as the newspaper Kangura and Radio-Television Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM), funded by the small number of relatives and close friends of the President who sought to maintain the power and privilege of his inner circle (akazu) (Chalk, 1999; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). The MRND created and trained its own youth militia interahamwe ('those who work together') and the Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique (CDR), a Hutu extremist party formed by the MRND hardliners, organized impuzamugambi ('those with the single purpose'). These Hutu extremist wings easily attracted many frustrated unemployed and unmarried youth (Des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Sellstrom 37 & Wohlegmuth, 1996; Uvin, 1998).21 At the centre of Hutu Power lay the akazu, exacerbating tensions and contributing to the ongoing militarization and radicalization of Rwandan society (Uvin, 1998, pp. 64-65). In light of such conditions, the path to peace was lengthy and sluggish. A series of peace negotiations started between the Rwandan government and the RPF in 1991 and they did not reach a conclusion until the final Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic Front, or shortly, Arusha Accords, was signed on August 3, 1993 in Arusha, Tanzania (Peace Agreement, 1993; IPEP, 2000; Jones, 1999; Kuperman, 2004; Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996). With Tanzania as a major facilitator, delegations from regional countries—Burundi, Senegal, Uganda, and the former Zaire (DRC)—and donor countries— Belgium, France, Germany, and the US participated as observers (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000). The UN, UNHCR, and Organization of African Unity (OAU) were involved as well (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000). The Accords proposed: first, the integration of all refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); second, establishment of a Broad-Based Transitional Government (BBTG) and power-sharing between the Habyarimana government and RPF; third, creation of a unified army by integrating the government army and the RPA; and fourth, promotion of national unity and rule of law (Peace Agreement, 1993). The Accords also requested the UN to provide security and assistance for the BBTG setup within 37 days of the agreement coming into effect (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Jones 1999; Laegreid, 1999). None of these acts, however, were able to occur due to dissatisfaction and delays on the part of the Habyarimana regime and disagreement among the opposition parties (C. Newbury & 21 Traditionally, in Rwanda a man could not have a wife without land (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 43; C. Newbury, 1995, pp. 14-15). Due to rapid population growth and lingering poverty from the economic crisis, many young people remained single (Des Forges, 1999, History, para. 43; C. Newbury, 1995, pp. 14-15). 38 D. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). The Agreement was seen to create more RPF gains than gains for the existing government (Des Forges, 1995, p. 46), and Habyarimana called it nothing more than 'a piece of paper' (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Gourevitch, 1998; Ilibagiza, 2006; IPEP, 2000). Habyarimana, at this time, was fast losing his political support and was being blamed by the hardliners in his party for having given up too much ground to the RPF (Lemarchand, 1995, p. 10; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995, p. 13). Moreover, the UN peacekeeping force dispatch was delayed until October 5 when the Security Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandated by the Resolution 872 (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996; Jones, 1999; Laegreid, 1999; UN, 2001). Led by Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, 2,548 troops arrived in Kigali on October 21,1993 (Adelman & Suhrke, 1996, Dallaire, 2005; Des Forges, 1999; UN, 2001). On the day of the UN's arrival, the assassination of the President in neighbouring Burundi brought with it a deeply aggravating impact on the fragile political situation in Rwanda (Fujii, 2004; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). The President of Burundi, Melchior Ndadaye, who became the first democratically elected president at the free and fair election held in June and was a Hutu, was murdered by the Tutsi-dominated government army, which was followed by a mass slaughter of up to 100,000 people and saw an estimated 200,000 to 400,000 refugee influx to Rwanda by April 1994 (Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). Violence and targeted attacks on Tutsi by the Hutu were prevalent throughout Rwanda soon after Ndadaye's death (Des Forges, 1999, Choosing war, para. 99). Once again, fearmongering was rampant within the regime and antagonists of the Arusha Accords claimed that that too was what would likely happen if they were to share power with the RPF, and the idea 39 that all Tutsi could not be trusted was again being claimed (Des Forges, 1995,1999; Fujii, 2004; IPEP, 2000; Lemarchand, 1995; Linden, 1995, as cited in Sellstrom & Wohlegmuth, 1996; Mamdani, 2001; C. Newbury, 1995; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995). To the MRND politicians and Hutu extremists, genocide seemed to be the only option to prevent the Tutsi hegemony (Fujii, 2004, p. 112; Lemarchand, 1995, p. 10). The peace agreement did not last long. On April 6,1994, President Habyarimana was assassinated as his plane was shot down by surface-to-air missiles at the Kigali airport while returning from peace negotiations in Tanzania, and on that same night, the targeted killing against political opponents of the regime took place, including 10 Belgian peacekeepers who were protecting Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and her family (African Rights, 1995; Des Forges, 1999; IPEP, 2000; Kuperman, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). On April 12 violence spread over the country, particularly focused on the planned extermination of the Tutsi and all political opponents, Hutus included (IPEP, 2000, chap. 14, para. 3). 2.5 Conclusion The history of ethnic division and distinction is long and storied in Rwanda, certainly predating colonial rule. While colonial rule did exacerbate ethnic tension and polarize the two major sides, to declare foreign influence as the sole reason behind the Hutu/Tutsi divide would be an insufficient explanation. The colonizers built on a preexisting power structure and took it to an extreme level in a short period of time, and they did it in such an indirect way that their Tutsi beneficiaries were the only possible target of the eventual Hutu uprising. Ethnic tension, however, did not end when power at the top shifted from Tutsi to Hutu; rather, it lingered for decades, eventually boiling over after years of the pot being stirred. With so many factors contributing to ethnic hatred over so many decades, and no real concerted effort to curb the 40 tensions, the tragic history of Rwanda did enter its darkest days. 41 CHAPTER III. RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF VIOENT CONFLICT "[T]hat something is the truth. It is incumbent upon us lawyers not to just talk about the truth, but to actually seek it, to find it, to live it. What is it in us that seeks the truth? Is it our minds, or is it our hearts? I set out to prove a black man can receive a fair trial in the South, that we are all equal in the eyes of the law. But that's not the truth because the eyes of the law are human eyes, yours and mine, and until we can see each other as equals, justice is never going to be evenhanded. It will remain nothing more than a reflection of our own prejudices." - Jake Tyler Brigance, A Time to Kill (Schumacher, 1996) Without doubt, reconciliation is an extremely critical and fundamental matter in many societies dealing with the aftermath of violent conflict and/or massive human rights violations (Pankhurst, 1999). At the same time, it is an overwhelmingly broad and long 'process,' rather than an end 'result' that follows violence (Bloomfield, Barnes, & Huyse, 2003; Borneman, 2002; Brouneus, 2008a; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Opotow, 2001). 3.1 Conceptualizing Reconciliation Attempts on how to understand reconciliation are truly divergent (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Pankhurst, 1999), hinged upon disciplines and even the individual belief and values of authors. Given such diverse perspectives, the conceptualization of reconciliation has not only blossomed in traditional disciplines of social science but has also established a presence in many of the more interdisciplinary fields of study, including international relations, geopolitics, human rights and international law, political anthropology, psychotherapy, genocide studies,22 and comparative studies, to name just a few (Kritz, 2002, p. 22). Theorizing reconciliation tends to take place primarily within the contexts of transitional justice, conflict transformation, and post-conflict 22 See, for instance, the academic journal Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 42 peace-building and reconstruction, notwithstanding a difference on structuring the concept.23 In theory and practice, furthermore, there is very little consensus on how to define reconciliation (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Brouneus, 2008a; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Nesiah, 2005; Pankhurst, 1999): reconciliation can mean quite different things depending on the combinations of political, historical, cultural, economic, and social factors of a post-conflict setting. The term reconciliation can be found in theological roots (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Minow, 1998; O'Neill, 2005; Ross, 2006; Skaar, Gloppen, & Suhrke, 2005), referencing a Christian point of view, for instance, to restoration between God and a person, or between individuals, often in association with forgiveness and confession (Boraine, 2000, as cited in Hamber & Kelly, 2009, p. 287; Minow, 1998, p. 15; Petersen, 2001, pp. 3-25). In the vast majority of the post-conflict reconciliation literature, recuperating a relationship— mutual understanding and acknowledgement, and sharing common goals for the future—are commonly captured phrases (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Kubai, 2007; Lederach, 1997; Staub, 2006; Staub, Pearlman, Gubin, & Hagengimana, 2005). Ervin Staub (2006) emphasizes that reconciliation represents a common future between perpetrators and victims or members of hostile groups not as a "continuation of the past" but as the "possibility of a constructive relationship" seeking humanity and acceptance (p. 868). Anne Kubai (2007) explains that the entity of reconciliation: must include a change in psychological orientation towards one another, whereby victims and perpetrators see themselves as members of the community and nation; accept and see the humane side of 'the other'; and endorse the possibility of a constructive human relationship or engagement with each other, (p. 64) 23 The difference becomes clearer when it comes to other concepts, particularly justice. Some authors (e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2003; Hamber & Kelly, 2009; Lederach, 1997) attempt to theorize reconciliation as a theme which includes justice as a sub-concept whereas for others (e.g., Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Kritz, 2002; McEvoy & McGregor, 2008; Othman, 2005; Pankhurst, 1999; Roht-Arriaza & Mariezcurrena, 2006), more commonly in the literature of transitional justice, reconciliation and justice are compared and contrasted when seeking their relationships. According to Bloomfield et al. (2003), the intrinsic nature of reconciliation as both a goal and strategy accounts for the diverging approaches to the matter (p. 12). 43 The definition of reconciliation attempted by Hamber and Kelly (2009) defines five wellstructured stages: "(1) developing a shared vision of an interdependent and fair society [...]; (2) acknowledging and dealing with the past [...]; (3) building positive relationships [...]; (4) significant cultural and attitudinal change [...]; and (5) substantial social, economic, and political change" (pp. 291-292). If, then, the central purpose of reconciliation is: "mutual acceptance by groups of each other" (Staub, 2006, p. 868), what would need to be agreed upon for mutual acceptance? Different modus operandi of reconciliation could be possible depending on the type of reconciliation that a post-conflict society chooses: from nonviolent, peaceful coexistence and/or political tolerance (a 'thinner' form of reconciliation) to socio-emotional political reunification (a 'thicker' form) (Crocker, 1999, pp. 60-61; Gloppen, 2005, pp. 20-21; Mukashema & Mullet, 2010, pp. 26-27; Skaar et al., 2005, p. 4).24 In societies where former adversaries share the same geographic space and together compose a political constituency, the thicker notion of reconciliation is essential, resting on top of the thinner form as its foundation (Mukashema & Mullet, 2010, pp. 26-27).25 In societies with "conflicting understandings of history, and diverging views of the meaning and political relevance of the past" (Gloppen, 2005, p. 21), settling on a shared vision of the past is one of the most critical aspects of the reconciliation process. Fundamentally, healing is absolutely imperative in the process of seeking mutuality and 24 Sluzki (2003) additionally assigns a continuum of collaboration, cooperation, interdependence, and integration to show the gradual stages of the reconciliation process that exists between the thinner and thicker forms (pp. 22-27). 25 The need for a shared political vision and future as the necessary final goal of reconciliation is rather debatable. John Borneman (2002) argues that in the theoretical and temporal sense, coexistence could be sufficient for reconciliation as a departure from a violent past. On the contrary, Steven Sampson (2003) avers that coexistence is "only being oblivious to the Other" (p. 182). Simple coexistence means "a Catholic mother in Belfast can take her child to a Protestant school without being stoned, a Kosovo Serb can have a coffee in downtown Prishtina without being knifed, and an Israeli family can drive from Hebron to Jerusalem without being shot at" (Sampson, 2003, p. 182). For more detail on this particular discussion, see correspondence between Borneman (2002, 2003) and others (Falk, 2003; Nader, 2003; Sampson, 2003; Wilson, 2003). 44 in taking further steps towards reconciliation (Brouneus, 2008a; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Gasana, 2009; Minow, 1998; Skaar et ai., 2005; Staub, 2006). Equally puzzling is the next question: how can groups that have been violently divided begin to rebuild their relationships? What measures, principles, social norms, and values—or instruments (Bloomfield et al., 2003)—do post-conflict societies adopt to their reconciliation process? Some choose to forget or forgive the past and move on; others place emphasis on asking accountability for wrongdoings and/or finding out the truth itself. Indeed, societies have applied various strategies to different extents—at the individual, interpersonal, or collective (community, national) level—in dealing with their pasts (Gloppen, 2005, p. 20; McGregor, 2001, p. 32; Skaar et al., 2005, p. 5; van der Merwe, 1999, pp. 80-82). There also have been vigorous endeavours to delineate such practices in the field by instituting a conceptual framework in the reconciliation discourse. John Paul Lederach (1997, pp. 23-35), for example, identifies truth (acknowledgement, transparency), mercy (acceptance, forgiveness, healing), justice (accountability, correction, restitution), and peace (harmony, unity) as mechanisms of the reconciliation process. Embracing Lederach's (1997) approach, Bloomfield et al. (2003, pp. 23-25,77-162) analyze the effects and limitations of healing, justice (both retributive and restorative), truth-telling about past and history, and reparation, whereas van der Merwe (1999, pp. 47-51) considers security over reparation. Despite slight variations amongst explanations, dominant components of reconciliation centre around the debate of justice versus truth (Brouneus, 2007; Gloppen, 2005; Hayner, 2001; Kritz, 2002; Minow, 1998; Rigby, 2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000). To provide additional context and understanding on the elements of justice and truth that reconciliation often entails, the next section will explore both topics in greater detail. Reparations, a third major component, will also be considered. 45 3.1.1 Justice In the transitional period of post-conflict societies, justice lies at the epicentre, able to make reconciliation possible. Stover and Weinstein (2004) contend that justice and reconciliation now share an intimate connection as "[t]his inferred relationship has come to occupy centre stage in post-conflict societies" (Stover & Weinstein, 2004, p. 4). Justice is the most common theme that is emphasized in order to redress wrongdoings in the aftermath of mass atrocity, and is pursued through the use of formal trials and prosecutions of perpetrators (Clark & Kaufman, 2009; Gloppen, 2005; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). The two major forms of justice that post-conflict societies pursue are retributive justice and restorative justice. Retributive justice takes the views that perpetrators should be punished for their crimes, formal legal structures are necessary to preserve the rule of law, and that individuals should be punished, rather than larger groups (Huyse, 2003, pp. 97-98). This form of justice is particularly emphasized amongst Western democracies,26 but has not proven to be entirely appropriate or realistic in all post-conflict societies (Kubai, 2007, p. 57). As Martha Minow (1998) explains, there is both a necessity and danger that surrounds retribution. Vengeance, she explains, is the more basic and implicit response to mass violence. It is an "impulse to retaliate when wrongs are done," a means to express self-respect, and "the wellspring of a notion of equivalence that animates justice" (Minow, 1998, p. 10). The danger of seeking vengeance, however, lies in its emotional nature, and tendency to be excessive (Minow, 1998, p. 10). To match the severity and pain caused by a crime with an equally severe punishment for the perpetrator is a difficult task indeed. 26 Some scholars (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Huyse, 2003; Minow, 1998; Sampson, 2003) observe that seeking justice and reconciliation through a (retributive) judicial system is a view dominantly based on the Western perspective. 46 Restorative justice, on the other hand, does not place the punishment of perpetrators as the ideal outcome. Restorative justice stems from more traditional approaches to conflict resolution (Huyse, 2003; Kubai, 2007), and is a more victim-centric approach to justice, often involving their full participation during the process (Huyse, 2003, p. 111). In defining the roles of both retributive and restorative justice in a post-conflict society, Kubai (2007) contends that: "While restorative justice may be helpful, whereas retributive justice may be counterproductive, it is also likely to be perceived as injustice to victims who see reparation and even punishment as vital ingredients of justice" (p. 57). This challenge indicates the ongoing demands of balancing the needs and wants of victims with the realities and restrictions of a post-conflict society. Trials based on the rule of law are one of the most common forms of justice delivery in many, but not all, post-conflict societies. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY/R) is a perfect example of how the international community has sought to deliver legal accountability against atrocious crimes by embracing the legitimate methods of the court system (Akhavan, 2001, p. 9). Ad hoc international tribunals such as these tribunals are ideally intended to complement national court systems by removing elements of victor's justice that might otherwise pervade the domestic courts (Huyse, 2003, p. 100). Whether retributive or restorative, justice can serve many important roles in a postconflict society. For many situations, the most vital role of justice is that it can work to end a long-standing culture of impunity (Kubai, 2007; Ngoga, 2009). The legal detention of accused criminals can also help to calm certain situations by preventing private revenge by victims, detaining dangerous individuals or by "fulfilling an obligation to the victims" (Huyse, 2003, p. 98). 47 Whether for national security, international order or simply as a symbolic gesture, courts—both formal and informal—and the justice they seek to dispense, play a critical role in the reconciliation efforts of many post-conflict societies. 3.1.2 Truth Post-conflict societies such as South Africa and some of the countries in Latin America, meanwhile, have focused on discovering truth from the past violence in pursuit of reconciliation. Proponents of the truth-seeking principle to finding justice share the belief that forgiveness can only be discernable when the facts of the grim past and acknowledgement of the deeds has occurred (Sampson, 2003). The significance of truth, indeed, lies in that the victim should know what happened to whom in order to forgive wrongdoers. At an interview with an NGO staff member, a Serb resident of Sarajevo speaks: There cannot be lasting peace and true reconciliation until all sides put their cards on the table and tell the truth about crimes that were committed by members of their ethnic groups. We need to know where our loved ones are buried, where their bones are and we are all entitled to that—Serbs, Muslims and Croats alike. Only then can we talk about reconciliation. (Institute for War and Peace Reporting [IWPR], 2006) Through a truth-seeking process, advocates of this perspective unanimously argue (Borneman, 2002; du Toit, 2000; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002; Hayner, 1996; Minow, 1998, 2000; Sampson, 2003; Staub, 2006) that victims' painful experiences are recognized, and through acknowledging their losses and agony, healing of past wounds can occur. About 20 countries have already established truth commissions as official institutions dedicated to searching for the facts of past violent conflict and human rights violations (Hayner, 1996; Ross, 2006). Amy Ross (2006) defines a truth commission as "a body whose purpose is to investigate human rights violations in a particular conflict" (p. 70) with a specific mandate and time period of investigation (Hayner, 1994, as cited in Ross, 2006, p. 70). As a temporary 48 mechanism, according to Priscilla Hayner (2001), a truth commission is in charge of investigating and reporting human rights violations, and making recommendations for preventing future abuses and conflict. Forms, mandates, goals, and official titles of these organizations vary within the circumstances and backgrounds of societies. Ross (2006) suggests that how 'the truth' is found and formulated should be contemplated "within the context of the specific political and social conditions shaping the establishment and function of such commissions" (p. 70). One of the most well-known truth commissions, for example, is South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Cole, 2007; Hayner, 1996; Ross, 2006). Ross (2006) also explains that truth commissions are "creatures of compromises" as a result of their "negotiating resolutions to internal armed conflict, leading to transitions from a state of war to a state of formal peace [...] as the mechanism of choice to address the violations of the past" (p. 70). This point of a truth commission distinguishes its entity from retribution in the wake of conflict situations, and at the same time, shows a weakness that is often criticized by antagonists of truth commissions. Concerns over truth commissions also persist. Minow (1998,2000) expresses that justice cannot be delivered properly since often times many of those commissions, if not all, have no rights to punish perpetrators under the rule of law, and thereby fail to address the issue of impunity by letting the perpetrators get away from egregious crimes they have committed. As a consequence, victims suffer from witnessing the wrongdoers walk on the streets freely and living side by side as their neighbours, adding to a great deal of agony that has already been imposed on the victims from the past harms and losses committed by the perpetrators (Minow, 1998). The unfair treatment of the victims can, eventually, create more animosity and hostility toward the wrongdoers rather than forgiveness and acceptance, which makes reconciliation elusive and 49 might even generate a possibility of further violence (Gloppen, 2005; Minow, 1998). 3.1.3 Reparation Can a debt caused by mass atrocity ever be repaid? How much should a victim of rape expect to be compensated for their suffering, and who should be held accountable for compensating these victims? These are a few of the vexing questions that have continued to surround the inclusion of reparations in the dialogue of reconciliation. Offering a further explanation for the "paradox" (Roht-Arriaza, 2004, p. 122) of reparations, Naomi Roht-Arriaza suggests that: "[t]hey are intended to return victims to the state they would have been in had the violations not occurred— something that is impossible to do" (2004, p. 122). Others, meanwhile, have extolled the virtue of reparations, identifying that the process of seeking reparations can be a valuable experience, as survivors and victims are given the chance to "obtain a renewed sense of dignity" (Minow, 1998, p. 93) by being given the opportunity to share experiences. Reparations take many forms, and are not always financial in nature. In addition to monetary compensation, community service has also been employed in post-conflict situations such as East Timor and Rwanda (RohtArriaza, 2004, pp. 133-135). Preferential access, meanwhile, where past victims receive accelerated access to goods, services, or employment, has also been tried as an alternative form of reparation (Roht-Arriaza, 2004, p. 135). In some situations, where stolen property, money, or valuables have been identified, restitution can be attempted. Restitution takes place when specific stolen items are returned to their original owners (victims), but as Minow (1998) points out, "securing the return especially after many intervening years can be extremely difficult" (p. 107). Still, when available and appropriate, restitution can be an efficient and measurable way to pursue reparations. Economic and ongoing political realities have been a factor in determining what 50 reparations, if any, are made available. In comparing Jewish holocaust survivors and African reparation claims, Howard-Hassmann and Lombardo (2010) note that: "the amounts must not be so large as to seem unreasonable to the governments and publics of the states from whom the reparations are claimed" (p. 44). Other claims for reparations, such as those made by the Chinese, Filipino, and Korean 'comfort women' victims have been met by political denial and indifference on the part of the accused Japanese government (Minow, 1998; Park, 2010). Despite these challenges, many victims and survivor groups continue to pursue reparations as a necessary component of reconciliation, yet reparations alone should not be expected to heal all wounds. Minow (1998) argues that reparation "at best ends the inaction and silence after the violation" (pp. 102-103). Given this statement and its implications, reparations might instead be viewed as a catalyst for reconciliation, rather than its final ingredient. How, then, are the discussions about these concepts being implemented in practice? What makes different post-conflict societies seek out different philosophies and measures to bring about peace and reconciliation? The chapter now turns its attention to three post-conflict countries—South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala—to explore: how the concepts and debates discussed above have been applied; who and what are the major instigators; and, why particular concepts and perspectives have been chosen in certain cases. 3.2 Major Reconciliation Processes in Other Cases: South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Guatemala 3.2.1 South Africa One of the most well-known cases introduced here is the apartheid era of South Africa. Initiated in 1948, a little less than a half century of the rigidly official segregation against non-Caucasians known as apartheid resulted in gross human rights violations and internal resistance as well as 51 severe economic, political, and social gaps between the privileged Caucasian minority and the disenfranchised remainder of the population (Rigby, 2001, p. 123; Rotberg, 2000, p. 5). Throughout its existence, internal opposition to apartheid had always presented a vocal—and often times violent—resistance, but it was only after the reduction of Cold War tensions in the region that an end to apartheid became a realistic scenario (Colvin, 2007, p. 325). In 1994 apartheid was abolished.27 The following year, the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act stipulated the organization of the TRC to discover and report on the truths of the dark past (Government of South Africa, 1995; McGregor, 2001; Rotberg, 2000). The Commission consisted of three committees: the Amnesty Committee, Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, and Human Rights Violations Committee (Government of South Africa, 1995, Act, para. 1). Beginning in late 1995, the Commission published a total of seven volumes of reports, the last volume being published a full eight years later, in 2003 (Cole, 2007). The publication of these volumes served the dual purpose of disseminating the findings of the commission in the present, as well as preserving a written record for historical posterity. The outcomes of TRC, however, were both tangible and intangible, with the process of investigation, notably the public hearings conducted during investigations, standing alongside or even overshadowing the impact of the eventual printed reports (Quinn & Freeman, 2003, p. 1143). What makes South African TRC unique and distinctive from other commissions, as Hayner (2001) emphasizes, is its power to grant amnesty to individual perpetrators. The amnesty, however, was performed under the principles of rooting out a blanket amnesty (Mamdani, 2002). At the same time, the Commission tried to pursue an "exchange" of "amnesty for perpetrators, truth for the society and reparations for victims" (Mamdani, 2002, p. 54, emphasis in the 27 The first non-racial elections were held in April 1994, following a prolonged period of political conflict where over 15,000 South Africans died during the four years leading up to the election (Cawthra, 1999, p. 296). 52 original). Mamdani (2002) explains that since the TRC was the official mechanism for both perpetrators and victims, not just for one or the other, justice was sought not through vengeance or impunity but through forgiveness and acknowledgement; that is, restorative justice. To complement this approach, South Africa also engaged in various memorialization practices such as national holidays, exhumations and reburials, and small memorials at the community level (Colvin, 2007, p. 328). To understand why South Africa chose to focus on the path of amnesty for reconciliation, rather than legal prosecution, it is important to bear in mind that the establishment of the South African TRC was the result of political compromise between the apartheid regime and the new government (Mamdani, 2002; Wilson, 2001; Wilson, et al., 2002). Richard Wilson's (2001) analysis is: [l]ack of faith in the courts was therefore one of the strongest arguments in favour of a truth commission in South Africa; it was widely perceived that apartheid crimes could not be handed over to the old criminal justice system. The whole edifice of a culture of human rights and equal citizenship rests upon the existence of a 'state of right', which involves an end to the arbitrariness and irrationality of a repressive juridical apparatus and the establishment of due process and fairness, (p. 201) Andrew Rigby (2001), meanwhile, accounts for political compromise in transitional circumstances: South Africa [...] faced the dilemma of how an emerging democracy could deal with the legacy of the gross human rights violations committed under the previous regime, when many of those responsible for such abuses remained a powerful force in the land and continued to occupy some of the key positions in the transitional coalition government and in the state security forces, (p. 124) In spite of the circumstances and limitations that necessitated its creation, TRC has undoubtedly served a meaningful purpose, and has in part facilitated the reconciliation process that South Africa has since undergone. One of the successes of TRC, as identified by Rina Kashyap (2009) has been its role as a "trailblazer" (p. 450) for emphasizing gender sensitivity in 53 truth commissions, a model that has been followed in subsequent post-conflict societies (p. 450). Although the work of South African TRC to pursue restorative justice through public acknowledgement and amnesty is deserving of recognition without a comprehensive scheme of reparation and solutions for gross economic inequality Rigby (2001) remains concerned that "the gap between the rhetoric of reconciliation and the practice is painfully apparent" (p. 135). Highlighting this gap was the failure of the Committee on Reparations and Rehabilitation to implement an extensive reparations program that would have directly compensated past victims of apartheid, as it had initially recommended (Colvin, 2007, p. 326). The inability to institute such an important program serves to demonstrate the limited effectiveness of TRC enforcement. Finally, as recent incidents of mobs and xenophobic violence against foreign migrants (Dixon, 2008; Mail and Guardian Online, 2008) show, it is concerning that such acts could be viewed as a legacy of past violence and further jeopardize sustainable reconciliation. 3.2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina In the wake of the dismantlement of the former Soviet Union following the Cold War, long-time ethnic tensions among Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Croats, and Serbs erupted into internal war in the Bosnia region of the former Yugoslavia in 1992 (Freeman, 2004; UNHCR, 2000). Until the peace agreement—Dayton Peace Accords—was signed at the end of 1995, an estimated 250,000 people died, more than 2 million were displaced and some 500,000 fled to neighbouring countries (Freeman, 2004; UNHCR, 2000). In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 827 for the establishment of the ICTY (United Nations Security Council [UNSC], 1993) for the formal trial of war criminals.28 28 The full title of the ICTY is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (UNSC, 1993). 54 Indeed, the efforts of the international community have served to facilitate the construction of a transitional justice system in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Agreements and provisions from the Dayton Agreement were implemented in accordance with various international organizations such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), and UNHCR, naming just a few (Freeman, 2004, pp. 1-2). Since its inception in 1993, the ICTY has had a profound effect on Bosnia and Herzegovina through its efforts to bring war criminals and other human rights violators to trial, and to promote justice within the region (Freeman, 2004, p. 2). Like ICTR, the ICTY is an ad hoc institution. Completion of all first instance trials was scheduled for completion by 2008 and appeals by 2010 (Freeman, 2004, pp. 3-4).29 It is not clearly identified, however, whether the Tribunal was able to contribute to social reconstruction and reconciliation since there are so few studies or attempts to measure it (Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002, p. 585). One study, conducted by James Meernik (2005), found little evidence to prove the belief that the ICTY exercises an effect on societal peace. According to his research which measured the degree of cooperation among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, the ethnic groups tended to be more hostile toward one another after an arrest or trial of the suspects (Meemik, 2005). In fact, the view toward the Tribunal is quite polarized amongst those ethnic groups. Human rights lawyer Mark Freeman (2004) identifies the tendency that people in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly Bosniaks, have more concrete trust in the ICTY; in contrast, the Tribunal is viewed as a "biased, anti-Serb body" (Meernik, 2005) by Bosnian Serbs in the Republika Srpska where some of the most infamous perpetrators are 29 As of March 28,2011, there are 15 cases involving 36 accused persons that remain open (ICTY, 2011). 55 suspected to be harbouring.30 In part, such opposition to the Tribunal can be attributed to the complex nature of the conflict itself. As Minow (1998) contends: [p]articular individuals may be viewed as victims, perpetrators, and bystanders. A student watches his parents being harassed by secret police; the student joins protest or freedomfighting groups and then is arrested; the student emerges willing to use terrorist tactics against the secret police, and sets off bombs that kill civilians, (p. 63) This polarization and dissatisfaction with the reconciliation process may be a natural reaction to perceived unfairness, yet mutual acceptance, as defined earlier in this chapter, is a key element to reconciliation and must be strived for by the leaders of the processes. Nevertheless, in a country where many schools still remain divided along ethnic lines, employment discrimination continues in both private and public workplaces, and "[s]ocial repair is also lagging" (Haider, 2009, p. 100), the question lingers: how effective is international justice at delivering national reconciliation? 3.2.3 Guatemala Beginning in 1960, 36 years of internal armed conflict between the Guatemalan government and the left-wing rebel armies of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG) has cost an estimated 200,000 lives and 50,000 'disappearances', and the destruction of 626 Mayan villages, literally wiped out by so-called 'scorched earth operations' (Amnesty International [AI], 2002a; Godoy, 2002; Nolin Hanlon & Shankar, 2000; Sieder, 2001). After decades of fighting, the armed conflict officially ended with the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace on December 29,1996 (Costello, 1997). In June 1994, the establishment of a truth commission was conceived of and accorded by the Guatemalan government and the rebel group (Ross, 2006; Wilson, 1997). 30 Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two recognized national borders. The east part of the country is the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina where ethnic Croats and Bosniaks (Muslims) reside, and the west side is the Republika Srpska, dominant by Serbs (Meernik, 2005). 56 In essence, Guatemala's efforts towards peace construction in its transitional period focused on the Historical Clarification Commission (Comision para el Esclarecimiento Historico, CEH) and the Guatemalan Catholic Church's project for the Recuperation of Historical Memory (Recuperacion de la Memoria Historica, REMHI) rather than formal justice (CEH, 1999; Nolin Hanlon & Shankar, 2000; Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala [ODHAG], 1998). Vigorous pursuit of the truth and high levels of participation by various grassroots organizations and civil society was the influential energy that stimulated much of the work of the Commission and the REMHI project. Guatemala's truth commission was conceived after lengthy negotiations in Oslo, Norway, with the signing of the accord to establish a Commission for the Historical Clarification of the Human Rights Violations and Other Acts of Violence That Have Caused the Suffering of the Guatemalan People (Ross, 2006, p. 74). The UN, and European and US bilateral donors supported the commission financially (Ross, 2006, p. 77). The Commission's final report, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, was published in 1999 based on 8,000 to 9,000 individual testimonies and 35 submissions from civil society organizations (CEH, 1999; Nolin Hanlon & Shankar, 2000, pp. 265-266; Ross, 2006, p. 78; Sieder, 2001, p. 176). Rachael Sieder (2001) analyzes that the Commission's recommendations in the report to the Guatemalan government were remarkably firm, in light of its relatively weak mandate. Those recommendations included: development of a comprehensive reparation project for the victims, not only as the means of recuperation from the past human rights violations, but also as economic assistance through a National Reparations Programme; investigation of the whereabouts of the disappeared and the locations of mass graves; building monuments and memorials for the victims and survivors; establishment of a commission for looking for missing, forcefully separated or illegally adopted 57 children during the violence; and exemption of victims and their descendents from military conscription (Sieder, 2001, p. 177). The recommendations initially received criticism by rightwing organizations as being prejudiced, but the Guatemalan government made no official opposition (Sieder, 2001, pp. 177-178). Among the public, the report became a national bestseller (Ross, 2006). More significantly, Guatemalan civil society's aspiration to find the truth is a distinguished move toward peace and reconciliation. Sieder (2001) emphasizes that "the widespread involvement of civil society in memory work is perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the Guatemalan truth-telling process" (p. 175). One characteristic, for instance, is active participation in the truth-seeking process based on a religious point of view (O'Neill, 2005; Ross, 2006; Sieder, 2001). The REMHI, which was involved in collecting testimonies throughout the countryside, characterized its project as "the first organized effort to elicit wide­ spread discussion concerning the reality and impact of the violence" (Ross, 2006, p. 75). The outcome of the REMHI project was Guatemala: Nunca Mas (ODHAG, 1998). In addition, Sieder (2001) highlights that cultural practice has empowered collective memory: Culture has also been a factor in the politics of memory. Particularly for indigenous [Mayan] communities, local ritual practices to commemorate the dead have constituted a central feature of collective attempts to deal with trauma and loss. These initiatives have been promoted by many organizations within the heterogeneous Mayan movement that emerged in the wake of the armed conflict, (p. 175) Yet, the attempt to pursue justice through the legal procedure is largely missing in situations where public insecurity jeopardizes ordinary Guatemalans and where the national judicial system failed conclusively due to a lack of resources, capacity, and political will (Godoy, 2002; Ross, 2006; Sieder, 2001). Thus, Angelina Godoy (2002) points out that citizens are overall "understandably cynical" (p. 644) toward legal enforcement, considering the persistent 58 impunity enjoyed by war criminals who have been brought to neither trial nor conviction. The lack and discredit of the rule of law resulted in subsequent public lynchings in many local communities, creating a vicious cycle of violent history (Godoy, 2002). 3.3 Conclusion As these cases demonstrate, approaches to reconciliation can be as unique and complex as the conflicts that they aim to overcome. While these post-conflict situations may still be far from a final resolution, there are still many lessons to be learned from these processes and their initial outcomes. While recent years have seen much attention being devoted to the study of reconciliation and development in post-conflict situations, as indicated by the growing body of literature on the subject, a crucial gap between theory and practice still remains to be addressed (Brouneus, 2008a; Fletcher & Weinstein, 2002). As the discourse reveals, reconciliation remains a vast and encompassing concept, with "no single superior strategy or institutional model for addressing the problem of past human rights violations" (Gloppen, 2005, p. 45). 59 CHAPTER IV. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK This research aims to explore the association between reconciliation and development in postgenocide Rwanda through an examination of some of the major reconciliation and development processes. In so doing, I attempt to discover the value and need for reconciliation as a fundamental process for development in a post-conflict society. The research starts from the presupposition that an important connection tends to be missing between reconciliation processes and development programs. Rather than receiving treatment as an equal and associated process, reconciliation tends to be subsumed as a single aspect of development in a post-conflict peacebuilding stage. This is particularly the case for intervention by the international community. The design of this research is structured around the principal elements and concepts of Rwanda's reconciliatory efforts and the definition of development from different perspectives. The conceptual framework of the thesis is broken down into three areas of focus: development, reconciliation, and finally, the relationship between reconciliation and development. This format is used in order to first define, emphasize, and explain the unique properties and themes central to development and reconciliation separately, and then to bridge these two overarching notions together. The first section will discuss key concepts of development, how these concepts have evolved over time, and shortcomings of the concepts and their application in practice. The post-development theory will be also introduced in this section as an alternative perspective, used to circumvent and find solutions to many of the problems of conventional developmental tactics. In the next section, discussing reconciliation, Rwanda's major reconciliation processes will be described based on the general concepts that have been explored in the previous chapter. Based on the implications of these sections, the third section will contemplate the connection between reconciliation and development. 60 In attempting to understand Rwandan reconstruction efforts and to bring focus upon the real and potential accomplishments of the various development initiatives, the discourse of postdevelopment is an invaluable resource to draw on, in order to properly situate the analysis of the Rwandan context. This section, therefore, compares the conventional views of development and the discourse of post-development theory as a different way of thinking about development, and then ponders how this theory can play a role in contemplating development and reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda. 4.1 Conventional Perspectives of Development Although development carries various meanings and significance in different contexts, and is a normative and value-laden entity, most of the time it is associated with "something that is possible," "more," or "good change" (Power, 2003, pp. 1-2). Particularly in the traditional sense, development essentially focuses on economic growth (A1 Mamun, 2008). Neoliberalism is rooted in development thinking in this regard. As the dominant ideology and practice within development (Power, 2003, pp. 8-9), the World Bank and IMF have exercised numerous neoliberal approaches in order to address development concerns. Yet, within such an approach, problems such as poverty, unemployment, unequal income distribution, environmental degradation, and social exclusion, among others are considered inevitable side effects of the process of development and are often neglected (Todaro & Smith, 2003, p. 16). In the 1970s, meanwhile, observers started paying closer attention to those dire consequences of development solely emphasizing economic growth. Dudley Seers (1972), for instance, argues that economic growth would be meaningless unless the problems of poverty, unemployment, and inequality are improved, and thus, national income does not reflect appropriately on development as an indicator (pp. 22-25). He suggests, instead, that development 61 is "creating the conditions for the realization of human personality" (Seers, 1972, p. 21). Amartya Sen (1998), in addition, emphasizes that development should be "the process of expanding human freedoms" as the "primary end [and] principal means," (p. 36) which include freedom from malnutrition, illiteracy, premature morality, and freedom of speech and participation. Sustainable development, meanwhile, was recognized by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, or Brundtland Commission) in 1987 in the aftermath of a series of environmental movements from earlier years (Shah, 2005). In light of the view that development should proceed to the extent that future generations are able to perpetuate their needs, sustainable development is concerned with environmental degradation and natural resource destruction (WCED, 1987). In this respect, international institutions have attempted numerous approaches to development. In the 1990 Human Development Report, the UNDP values people as the centre of wealth and delineates that a capability to widen people's choices and achieve well-being is the key parameter of human development (pp. 9-11). In the Human Development Index (HDI), the UNDP has tried to reflect on aggregated data of not only the conventionally quantifiable terms of economic growth but also more diverse aspects of human life by adding the qualitative measures of life expectancy, literacy, equity, participation, governance, and other indicators into their analysis (UNDP, 1990, pp. 11-16). These goals, as first outlined by Seers (1972), UNDP (1990), and later expanded on by Sen (1998), saw new light through the much celebrated UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The seven MDGs outlined by the UN are a prime example of what needs to be achieved in order to realize the principles of human development. Furthering this movement, in the 2000 World Bank publication Voices of the Poor, the 62 institution attempted to capture perspectives on development not held by people of industrialized countries but by poor people residing in developing countries themselves (Power, 2003, p. 4). This redirected focus on grassroots initiatives, local empowerment, and civil society participation has been a trend that can be observed amongst many donors and international institutions. Notwithstanding those attempts at different approaches, the goals of development still remains profoundly economic and focused on physical growth, especially when it comes to development aid for developing countries. The strategies followed by many governments and NGOs alike strive primarily for tangible short-term results, often at the expense of long-term sustainability. As was the case in Rwanda, explored in Chapter II, Uvin (1998) argues that development assistance could be used to fuel negative conditions leading to dire consequences such as political turmoil or civil conflict in a recipient country if inadequate consideration of social, political, and cultural landscapes are ignored. The failure of SAPs by the international financial institutions (IFIs) in most developing countries is another reason to question aid effectiveness.31 It is thus generally agreed that post-development fundamentally rejects the entire paradigm of development (Escobar, 1992,2000; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Nustad, 2001; Sachs, 1992; Ziai, 2004). Why then, does post-development reject the ideology of conventional development? A closer examination of post-development and its utility within this research will now be presented. 4.2 The Discourse of Post-Development as an Analytical Tool The movement towards post-development, or a "post-structuralist critique of development" (Nustad, 2001, p. 480), was rooted in "a radical reaction to the dilemmas of development" 31 For more detail, see Stiglitz (2002). 63 (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 175).32 Although its historical background goes deeper into discussions of modernity and capitalism (Escobar, 2007, p. 19), some post-developmentalists (Esteva, 1992, p. 6; Kiely, 1999, p. 31; Sachs, 1992, p. 2) point to a particular period being the birth of the development era, when American President Harry S. Truman spoke of the Southern hemisphere as 'underdeveloped' in his inauguration speech on January 20,1949. In The Development Dictionary, Wolfgang Sachs (1992) argues that "[t]he label [underdeveloped areas] stuck and subsequently provided the cognitive base for both arrogance and interventionism from the North and pathetic self-pity in the South" (p. 2). Indeed, post-development shares similar views with critical theory, post-structuralism and ecological movements (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 176). 4.2.1 Defining post-development Post-development specifically takes a critical stance on Western points of view toward questions and problems of development—economic growth, science and technological innovations, poverty, among others (Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2004). For example, Aram Ziai (2007) elaborates as follows: The concept of labelling Western Europe and North America as 'developed' and Africa, Asia and Latin America as 'underdeveloped' is a Eurocentric construct in which the own society is perceived as constituting an ideal norm and other societies are perceived as imperfect deviations from this norm, as inferior versions of the self, which are, however, in the process of approaching the norm—although they will never reach it. (p. 8) Using an analogy about how religion and nature were constructed and became embedded in society as beliefs, Gilbert Rist (1990) attempts to demonstrate development as a Western 32 Many arguments of post-development theorists are rooted in Michel Foucault's post-structuralism and power of discourse. For further discussion, see additional works from some of the major post-development authors (Escobar, 1992,1995,2000; Esteva, 1987; Kothari, 1987,1989; Rahnema & Bawtree, 1997; Sachs, 1992; Saunders, 2002). 'myth'33 which is neither acknowledged nor accepted in Third World societies. He explains that in human history certain forms of myth have always existed as ideology though they do not necessarily reflect truth or reality. These myths were religion (Christianity) and nature; now the myth lies in development (Rist, 1990). Another major critique of the traditional concept of development by post-development authors is about "authoritarian and technocratic" (Ziai, 2007, pp. 8-9) connotations. Postdevelopment questions, as Ziai (2007) explains, who is in the position to define development and design a development scheme for the common good considering the fact that some methods for development often bring about detrimental consequences to people who are supposed to benefit (p. 9). Furthermore is the concern that the universal knowledge—particularly the Westernized view—of development would put various regions, cultures, values, and mindsets in jeopardy. Ziai warns that "[s]uch a position becomes extremely dangerous when it is linked to the political power to transform societies according to these supposedly universal standards" (2007, p. 9). Instead, post-development is interested in local knowledge and culture, and promotes people-centric approaches and pluralistic grassroots movements (Escobar, 1995; Ziai, 2004). Post-development is rooted in the belief that it is impossible to attain a middle-class lifestyle and wealth for the whole population on the earth (Dasgupta, 1985, as cited in Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 175). Diversity is thus considered to be one of the features of post-development writers, and it is rooted in various fields and disciplines. However, it is also the most vulnerable aspect of post-development, as many of its critics point out. The focus of the discussion now turns to major criticisms of post-development. In order to properly evaluate the appropriateness of post- 33 Rist's (1990) hypothesis is based on French historian Marcel Gauchet's view that "the modem social order is founded on a myth, which secures its basic consensus, inspires its conduct and functions as a self-fulfilling truth and speech act" (p. 13, emphasis in the original). Thus, the myth is "shared by all, never challenged, and a ready-made plan of action which is available in any circumstances" (p. 13). 65 development theory to this research, a thorough description of its shortcomings must be presented. 4.2.2 Critiques of post-development First of all, the most universal critique of post-development revolves around the binary position of the West/Rest, developed/underdeveloped, and North/South—that the West is bad, the nonWest is good (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Schuurman, 2000; Ziai, 2004). To the proponents of post-development theory, as Stuart Corbridge (1998) argues, the West is "inauthentic, urban, consumerist, monstrous, utilitarian" (p. 144) but the Rest is not. Corbridge continues, however, to point out that they tend to neglect that many people in the Third World follow Westernized lifestyles (1998, p. 144). This critique is due, in part, to the fact that post-development primarily concerns itself with the negative implications of development, rather than weighing both positive and negative consequences. Secondly, critics of post-development also point out that post-development completely rejects Western science and technology (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Ziai, 2004). In this sense, critics argue that proponents of post-development ignore the numerous benefits and positive aspects of scientific innovations and technological development (Corbridge, 1998 p. 145; Ziai, 2004, pp. 1049-1050). Kiely (1999) questions, with respect to the "local-good, foreign-bad" (p. 40) position of technology, whether this viewpoint would change if "western pharmaceutical companies successfully develop a cure for the HIV/AIDS virus in the next few years" (p. 40). Critics also point out that the success of development in East Asian regions is greatly neglected by post-development writers (Kiely, 1999, p. 38; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 183). The first and second accounts connect to the third critique of post-development regarding 66 the 'romanticism' of local cultures and indigenous knowledge but a rejecting, exclusionary tone towards Western science and lifestyle (Corbridge, 1998; Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000; Ziai, 2004). The use of discourse analysis34 amongst post-development thinkers is frequently pointed out as the cause of this criticism (Kiely, 1999; Nederveen Pieterse, 2000). Kiely (1999) asserts that the 'novelty' of post-development comes from discourse analysis, but its methodology is inconsistent (p. 35). In response to the First World's exploitation, accumulation of capital, and subsequent marginalization of the Third World, he suggests that more convincing analysis should be "the unevenness of [...] implementation [of development]" (Kiely, 1999, p. 36), not development itself as a tool for exploiting the Third World countries. 4.2.3 Significance of the theory and application to the research In light of numerous arguments and perspectives toward post-development as examined above, it is too soon, and inappropriate, to conclude that post-development is either useless or ideal. There are certain critiques that post-development takes an excessively binary stance on development, that its methodology is inconsistent, or that its attitude is still authoritative. Nonetheless, the post-development theory is worth discussing in the sense that it suggests a broad and different way of looking at the North-South relations in development (Ziai, 2007). In this respect, it is believed that post-development is an invaluable theory in order to contemplate efforts and processes for reconciliation and development in post-genocide Rwanda. At the same time, its conceptualization should be further clarified and refined, for as much as the theory shows constructive and creative potential (Ziai, 2007, p. 9), it is still developing and evolving. Also, as 34 It is assumed that discourse analysis can assist in searching for assumptions or hidden motivations by questioning interpreting texts (Discourse Analysis, n.d.). As an example, Escobar (1996) postulates that "development can best be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies" (p. 213, as cited in Nederveen Pieterse, 2000, p. 180). 67 Ziai (2004) emphasizes, taking a close look at the 'ambivalence of post-development' is a crucial procedure to undertake prior to the assessment of post-development as a plausible and feasible theory. The exploration of reconciliation in the previous chapter clearly shows that, like postdevelopment theory, reconciliation itself is not a single concept or set of rules to be equally applied towards different groups or countries, rather it is case-specific and must be treated as such. Rwanda is faced with two major assignments: the achievement of economic growth and physical reconstruction after the genocide; and, equally significant, reconciliation between the ethnic groups whose malice and prejudice have been rooted deeply in almost every part of their political, socio-economic, and historical background. In order to understand the reconciliation processes for Rwandans under these challenging circumstances, it is necessary to look to any interrelations between development projects and the reconciliation process. Furthermore, Rwandan leadership, including President Kagame, espouses the view that the application of 'non-western' and uniquely African solutions to questions and problems of development is the necessary next step (Kagame, 2004, as cited in Zorbas, 2008, p. 96). His views, among others, point towards a recognition and willingness on the part of Rwandan policymakers to seek out their own, localized path towards development. During this process, particular focus will be placed on the comparison between 'local' and 'non-local,' or more commonly, 'Western.' The careful utilization of post-development perspective in this procedure of examination will serve as a guide to grasp the influence of diverse development philosophies on Rwanda's reconciliation process. Given the fact that development, in its conventional sense, has often been stigmatized as a contributing factor to the violence of 1994 (Ginty & Williams, 2009; Uvin, 1998), questioning the efficacy and value of 68 conventional development in Rwanda is a necessary component of this research. 4.3 Reconciliation In a post-conflict society where former enemies maintain close proximity with each other, "coexistence is necessary" and "the need for reconciliation is profound" (Brouneus, 2007, p. 5). In a nation or society where reconciliation is pursued, the specific goals and expected outcomes from these efforts are driven by strategy. As seen earlier, Lederach (1997) expounded upon general theories of reconciliation by proposing that there are four dominant approaches to achieve reconciliation: truth, mercy, justice, and peace (pp. 23-35). Each concept might then be applied, either by itself or in conjunction with a secondary or tertiary approach, to formulate a strategy for reconciliation. Indeed, there is "no magic formula for reconciliation" (Brouneus, 2007, p. 14). Instead, particularly when spread over many years or decades, the formula may call for continual refinement and adjustment in order to account for changing priorities and practicalities. In Chapter III, coverage was devoted to the exploration of theoretical concepts and components of reconciliation. These topics were then examined in a series of selected case studies. The three case studies in Chapter III signified that viewpoints and approaches to reconciliation—justice, truth, forgiveness, and reparation, among others—vary by society. In the former Yugoslavia, on one hand, justice through formal legal proceedings was heavily utilized and relied upon to promote reconciliation. In South Africa and Guatemala, on the other, seeking out truth was the driving force through the use of the TRC in South Africa and Guatemala's emphasis on historical clarity. Each case is unique and contains its own set of conditions and challenges. Looking into the often exhaustive and complicated political, socio-economic, cultural, and historical background involved in each specific circumstance is imperative to understanding how and why conflict occurred, and how post-conflict scenarios have unfolded. An exploration, therefore, can be conducted around some of the differing factors that existed both during and after these conflicts formally ended, and interpretations can be drawn from certain successes and shortcomings that may also be applicable to the Rwandan case. The underlying questions become: how have the concepts of reconciliation used in those exemplified cases been applied to Rwanda? What concepts have been particularly dominant in the postgenocide Rwandan society? Do certain demographic sectors hold priorities for particular concepts of reconciliation? In a case as complex and sensitive as Rwanda's, an understanding of how these different elements of reconciliation are operating helps clarify the main research question in this thesis: what are the meanings of reconciliation and development in Rwanda, where society has been deeply fragmented by ethnic prejudice and misconception? Up until this point, the concepts of reconciliation and development have been presented and discussed as separate entities. The final section of the conceptual framework that this thesis is based on, explores how reconciliation and development in a post-genocide nation can form a working relationship to enable recovery. This theoretical exercise draws on a growing body of literature that explores the potential for these two vast fields to coexist and work in tandem. 4.4 Reconciliation and Development At the core of this study is the notion that in post-conflict settings that have undergone mass violence and social disruption and are transitioning to peace, reconciliation is an imperative device, needed to end the vicious cycle of violence and to establish a long-term blueprint for development (Brouneus, 2007; Hamber & Kelly, 2009). I argue that reconciliation is an extremely crucial factor in a post-conflict setting, particularly when the origin of violent conflict is intrastate in its nature, yet the relevant connections between reconciliation and development 70 are often ignored or understated. In relating development to conflict studies, Ginty and Williams (2009) attempt to "recognise the potential of development to contribute to post-war reconstruction and reconciliation" (p. 6) and the prevention of further conflict. Ginty and Williams (2009) contend that: [development can be targeted in ways that aid post-war reconstruction and reconciliation. [...] In an ideal situation a mutually reinforcing relationship can be established between development and reconstruction. Formerly divided peoples can come together for the joint pursuit of economic growth and social progress, (pp. 5-7) This research makes an attempt not to perceive reconciliation as a unique and unrelated entity, but rather to use a looking glass that finds meaningful connections between the reconciliation and post-genocide development process in Rwanda. In order to test the relationship of reconciliation and development, possible interrelations and interactions are conceptualized in three different aspects: social healing and community development, reparations and economic development, and shared views on history and political development. 4.4.1 Social healing and community development One of the most evident connections in both the fields of reconciliation and development is grassroots empowerment and participation. If healing is the essential departure point for reconciliation, as discussed in Chapter III, it is critical to strategize how to start and stimulate the healing process. Solomon Gasana (2009), a counsellor for World Vision who has worked with Rwandan genocide survivors and is himself a survivor of conflict in the Great Lakes region, emphasizes the importance of emotional and psychological healing and reconciliation and how this process is important to post-conflict development. Gasana (2009) observes that genocide survivors lack a great deal of energy and eagerness to rebuild their life and community, and analyzes that this deficiency is due to their "inner struggles to suppress regular explosions of 71 anger, vengefulness and guilt, [which] require immense supplies of energy" (p. 157). The contact hypothesis, as Jeong (2005) and Ryan (1995) explain, suggests that positive social contact between individuals belonging to different groups can reduce inter-group conflict, and can be a valuable component of the healing process. In addition, Robert Putnam's wellknown social capital theory (2000) suggests that a potentially benevolent effect is caused by relationships and community ties. The main group of individuals to which energy recovery and social contact should be directed is die party who were most involved in past violent conflicts— victims, survivors, perpetrators, and witnesses alike. In this sense, empowering local communities to directly and actively participate in energy recovery and social contact is fundamental to bringing post-conflict reconciliation and development activities to success. Both the literature of reconciliation and development in post-conflict peace-building circumstances share a vision of grassroots empowerment and participation, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. Focusing on the common aspect is a key step towards achieving reconciliation and development as positive contact can assist with overcoming past differences, and prevents a return to violence or recurring underdevelopment.35 It is also significant that any program be conducted at the grassroots level, to promote local empowerment and civil society. 35 One example that clearly demonstrates the danger of ignoring this relationship can be found from the case of Somalia. In analyzing the UN, World Bank, the US, and other international efforts to restore peace and democratic normalcy to Somalia in the early 1990s, Ameen Jan (2001) highlights the unintentional and highly detrimental effect that international assistance had on Somali national unity and reconciliation. Jan looks at reconciliation primarily on a faction/group level, and not on an individual-to-individual level. By ignoring the concept of "Somali ownership" (Jan, 2001, p. 73) for the various initiatives they undertook, the international community acted in a way that would deteriorate social, economic, and political conditions in the already divided nation. 72 RECONCILIATION -SOCIAL CONTACT •ENERGY RECOVERY SOCIAL CAPITAL LOCAL EMP0WERMEN1 Figure 4.1 Interrelation between social healing as reconciliation and community development 4.4.2 Reparation and economic development The second association between reconciliation and development that this research seeks to establish is the intersection where reparation and economic reconstruction meet. Eugenia Zorbas (2004) expresses an observation on this matter, arguing that reconciliation would not be thinkable unless basic needs are met for poor Rwandans who have been affected by the genocide and its related violence. As a Rwandan woman questions: "how can I forgive, when my livelihood was destroyed and I cannot even pay for the schooling of my children?" (p. 37). Her sentiments can be placed within Maslow's (1943) hierarchy of needs, where certain human desires, such as esteem and self-actualization, are considered high-level needs. The pursuit of such high-level needs, however, is only realized when lower (basic) priorities such as physiological and safety needs are satisfied. The capacity for forgiveness and reconciliation could be conceivable only after one's basic physical and psychological well-being—health, food, housing, education, and security—is attained. In the immediate aftermath of mass violence where almost every aspect of life has been shattered and few resources are available to manage the functioning of essential systems, 73 economic development in the form of reparation must be thought of as a key element of reconciliation (Bloomfield et al., 2003; Brouneus, 2007; Institute for Justice and Reconciliation [IJR], 2005; Minow, 1998; Roht-Arriaza, 2004; Zorbas, 2004). Beyond the symbolic, atonable, and healing function of reparations, financial and material forms of reparation serve to improve living conditions and alleviate abject poverty, thereby satisfying lower-level personal needs. 4.4.3 Shared views on history and political development The third and last association bridging reconciliation and development is hinged on truth-seeking and a shared understanding of the past. In a society where vast discrepancies exist amongst perceptions and ideas about the past, and where these rifts were a major contributor to the origins of mass violence, establishing a concrete understanding of collective memory is a necessary precursor to reconciliation, as elucidated extensively in the literature of transitional justice. An analysis and better understanding of the divergence is critical as different perspectives on history shape different conceptions of what reconciliation is and ought to be. Lessons learned from the cases of South Africa and Guatemala imply that finding truth—either through truth-telling at a truth and reconciliation commission or recording truth as history to be remembered, is an important process to healing and reconciliation. Rectification of a collective memory is a significant step towards political development. Efforts to remember what had happened correctly give a transitional government in recovery from mass violence the opportunity to search for possible answers to prevent a potential reoccurrence of violence or conflict in the future (De Brito, Gonzalez-Enriquez, & Aguilar, 2001). When the groups share a living space, cultural, social, and historical traditions, a simple geographical separation is not a viable solution. Instead, looking for ways to settle accounts on 74 politics of memory is a more appropriate approach to building eclectic, embraceable, and democratic cultures, and to foster political development. Such a case is Rwanda. Trust among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa is critical, and to foster trust there needs to be a constructive attempt to understand what constituted their identities and perceptions towards one another, as these perceptions are what shapes political and national identity. 4.5 Conclusion These interrelating concepts between reconciliation and development appear to paint a clear and optimistic picture, but before drawing such conclusions, a brief look at other situations where reconciliation and development have been exercised in practice is warranted. Looking at the examples of Northern Ireland and Sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that the absence of a mutually supportive relationship can be detrimental to both goals, and that even if a relationship between reconciliation and development is promoted, successful outcomes are not guaranteed. Government programs in Northern Ireland have focused on drawing divided rural communities into the development process. One of the explicit goals of such initiatives was to embrace and promote community development through social contact, in order to create a shared identity and, as a long-term goal, to increase confidence amongst investors. This form of strategic planning motivated the government to decentralize and to shift responsibility to the local communities themselves (Murray & Greer, 1998, p. 30). This approach, however, as human rights activist Robbie McVeigh (2002) has written, allowed the true issue to be side-stepped, in that government, while actively encouraging communities to work together in development and reconciliation, have shown little willingness to improve upon its own deficiencies (p. 57). All too often, however, reconciliation and development are not thought of or acted upon in a cooperative joint venture. This is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa where NGOs 75 and other external aid agencies are often left to manage post-conflict efforts based on their own individually constructed programs, and lack an "integrated framework needed for realistic sustainable macroeconomic and household livelihood rehabilitation" (Green & Ahmed, 1999, p. 193), or appropriate government partnership and direction. Accordingly, many programs are short-term in nature and have left a legacy of unfulfilled promises, mismanagement, and minimal real sustainable development or reconciliation achievements (Green & Ahmed, 1999, p. 193). To this end, the relevancy and application of the strategies presented here will now be placed within the context of the Rwandan case in Chapter V. In so doing, it is expected that the relationship between reconciliation and development in Rwanda can be observed and analyzed. A series of questions, therefore, will be posed for consideration: What types of programs are designed to promote reconciliation and/or development? Could any evidence of increased grassroots empowerment and social contact be found as a result of these programs? Is there a trend towards different actors putting more weight specifically on either reconciliation or development? Finally, what do reconciliation and development mean to Rwanda and how are they related? Answers for these questions and further analysis from them will be discussed in the case of Rwanda in the following chapter. 76 CHAPTER V. RECONCILIATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN POST-GENOCIDE RWANDA "Rwanda is clinically dead as a nation." -Nigerian Nobel Laureate Wole Soyinka, 1994 (as cited in Boddy-Evans, 2007) If a single word could be used to describe the landscape of post-genocide Rwanda, that word would be absence. Millions of Rwandans had fled the country; judges, doctors, teachers, and other professionals were either dead or missing; buildings and other physical infrastructure had been reduced to rubbles; cows had been needlessly slaughtered; even the corrugated metal roofing had been stripped from buildings and carried out of the country by fleeing refugees (Gourevitch, 1998, p. 162; Melvern, 2000, p. 223). Highlighting this situation, "[according to a Human Rights Watch report issued 1 year after the genocide, the country had 36 remaining judges, 14 prosecutors (only three of whom had formal legal training), and 26 police inspectors" (Boctor, 2009, p. 101). The destruction caused in just over 100 days of genocidal conflict was devastating to say the least, and in many ways still remains evident to this day. In light of these overwhelming challenges, the subsequent growth and revitalization of Rwanda is observed as being nothing less than 'remarkable' (Clark, 2010; OECD, 2010; Vandeginste, 2001). The speed of this physical recovery, particularly considering the need for a full start-over has once again amazed the international community (Clark, 2010; OECD, 2010; Vandeginste, 2001), just as Rwanda's economic achievements of the 1980s had done before. These successes, however, only tell an incomplete version of the entire story. In a country still divided by the memories of ethnic violence, achieving reconciliation must be thought of as a key component of recovery and development. To assess what reconciliation looks like and how it is defined in post-genocide Rwanda, the GoR, Rwandan grassroots, and the international community are selected here as the major 77 actors for analysis. The discussion is divided into two parts: the first section identifies the actors' standpoints on post-genocide reconciliation and reconstruction and their major policies and programs. The second part of the chapter focuses on the convergences and divergences between the stakeholders by comparing and contrasting their major reconciliation and development goals and strategies, then analyzes how the dynamics of their rationales shape the entirety of Rwanda's reconciliation and development. The discussion begins by examining each actor individually, building towards a collective analysis in the second part. This exercise also offers an opportunity to examine any associations between reconciliation and development amongst the actors' policies and approaches based on the three aspects of a reconciliation-development relationship as outlined in Chapter IV. Attention will first be directed towards the post-genocide activities of the Rwandan government. 5.1 Post-Genocide Reconciliation and Development Approach by Actors 5.1.1 Government of Rwanda On July 19,1994, the Rwandan genocide officially ended after the RPF, occupying almost the entire country, drove the remnants of the former government into neighbouring Zaire and Tanzania (Des Forges & Longman, 2004; Hintjens, 2009; Longman, 2004b, 2006a; Reyntjens, 2004; Waldorf, 2006). Following these events, the RPF proclaimed the commencement of a fiveyear transitional period where the basis of a new government was to be established for Rwanda (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 227). In June 1999, the government extended this initial transitional term to include four more years (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 247). During these initial post-genocide years the RPF and its leaders were able to firmly establish themselves as the basis of the Rwandan government, eventually leading to the election in 2003 of RPF General and Vice-President Paul Kagame as President (Mgbako, 2005; Reyntjens, 2004). The rapid and extraordinary post- 78 conflict development efforts of the GoR during this first decade of power drew the attention and recognition of the international community, an experience similar to the 1980s economic boom (Clark, 2009; OECD, 2010; Vandeginste, 2001). Within the context of reconciliation and development endeavours, the GoR stresses the need to eliminate ethnic distinction and to pursue justice under the national motto of "unity, work and patriotism" (GoR, 2003, p. 3). Four areas— eliminating ethnic distinction, justice, land policy and economic development—are central themes in the GoR's approach to post-genocide reconciliation. 5.1.1.1 The official abolishment of ethnic distinction The task, deemed essential by the post-genocide Government of National Unity, was to rebuild the Rwandan society in a united manner that would prevent any further conflict. First, in order to generate an environment conducive to national unity and peace, the Kagame regime deemed it necessary to deal with and eradicate its most persistent obstacle: the legacy of ethnic division. This view held by the GoR is clearly stated in the revised Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda, adopted on May 26, 2003 (Reyntjens, 2004, p. 185). In Article 9, for instance, fundamental principles are stipulated to "[fight] the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations; eradicat[e] ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity; [and share the] equitable [...] power" (GoR, 2003, p. 4). More significantly, the Government banned any attempt to disrupt national unity or exacerbate ethnic distinction as expressed in Article 11 and 13: Article 11 All Rwandans are born and remain free and equal in rights and duties. Discrimination of whatever kind based on, inter alia, ethnic origin, tribe, clan, colour, sex, region, social origin, religion or faith, opinion, economic status, culture, language, social status, physical or mental disability or any other form of discrimination is 79 prohibited and punishable by law. Article 13 The crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not have a period of limitation. Revisionism, negationism and trivialisation of genocide are punishable by the law. (GoR, 2003, p. 5) Since any discussions or activities that can lead to the impediment of national unity are strictly outlawed, officially no ethnic distinction exists among the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa anymore (Lambourne, 2001; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Waters, 1997). Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas are indicated only as Rwandans, or Banyarwanda (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, 2006b; Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; Hilker, 2009; Waldorf, 2009; Zorbas, 2004). Anyone, regardless of individual, organization or nationality, who attempts to challenge the idea of unity or mention the ethnic categories in public is considered a 'divisionist' and is subject to legal prosecution (BuckleyZistel, 2006a, 2009; Hilker, 2009; Waldorf, 2009; Zorbas, 2004). Such robust sentiments on national unity and reconciliation are also apparent in the governments attempt to reestablish the view of ethnic integration and disintegration through Rwandan history. The 'new' position taken by the post-genocide government (NURC, 2005a) on the historical background of ethnic groups—Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa—is that "there exists one unique ethnic group in Rwanda: the ethnic group of Banyarwanda" and that "such a difference has never existed" (p. 4) until "negative ideologies [were] inherited from colonial times" (p. 18). The GoR has also attempted to reinforce the historical merit of its stance through a 'We-Are-AllRwandans' policy, which states that Rwandan identity existed long before colonialism (Veale, 80 2000, p. 238). As of this writing, history has not been taught in schools since the genocide.36 Instead, the NURC has vigorously disseminated its discourse to the Rwandan population through civic education programs such as ingando. The NURC was launched in 1999 as a specialized governmental organization to facilitate national unity and reconciliation; its existence having been stipulated in the Constitution, Article 178 under Title III Special Commissions and Organs [sic], (GoR, 2003; IJR, 2005; Kubai, 2007; Zorbas, 2004). The NURC is mandated to do research for plausible approaches that might accelerate reconciliation and peace, coordinate demobilization and reintegration programs in order to educate the general population and to prevent "any kind of discrimination, intolerance or xenophobia" (GoR, 2003, p. 48). Additionally, the Commission is expected to produce documents on the situation of the reconciliation process and report its findings to the President of Rwanda and the Senate (GoR, 2003; IJR, 2005; NURC, n.d.). By placing such weight on the importance of educating Rwandans about the dangers of ethnic divisionism (Cook, 2006, p. 296), the government deemed it necessary to modify the NURC over the years to better serve its purpose. The NURC has already been restructured three times since its inception (IJR, 2005, p. 2). The NURC has also been instrumental in the creation and implementation of several major civic education programs, notable among them is the solidarity camp called ingando?1 Ingando is a reintegration and rehabilitation program for various groups including excombatants, genocide survivors, students, returnees, politicians, judges, church and community 36 Yet, ample research and attempts to develop history curriculum are underway. For example, the Human Right Center of University of California, Berkeley, in partnership with National University of Rwanda (NUR) and National Curriculum Development Centre (NCDC) conducted a research project on developing a history curriculum for instruction at primary and secondary schools (Freedman et al., 2004; Freedman, Weinstein, & Longman, n.d.). 37 The name ingando stems from the Kinyarwanda verb Kuganda, meaning to halt everyday activities to find solutions to national problems (Nantulya, 2006, p. 47). 81 leaders, among others, and offers different content, program duration, and procedures for the divergent groups that participate (Nantulya, 2006, p. 48). In the case of ex-combatants and exarmed groups, demobilization is prioritized as the key outcome of the education and they are given US$100 worth of supplies in a Basic Needs Kit.38 Ingando for students, meanwhile, is the most common program. The student participants study the GoR's programs and achievements, history, ethnicity, unity, and reconciliation and other subjects through the use of open debates and discussions focused on the challenges of Rwanda's reconciliation. 5.1.1.2 The pursuit of justice Just as eradicating ethnic distinction and division remains a top priority of the GoR, a strong push for justice and an end to the culture of impunity that has plagued the country for decades has also occurred. The quest for justice has in many ways become the cornerstone of the reconciliation and development policy pursued by the Kagame regime (Lambourne, 2001; Longman, 2006a; Sarkin, 2001; Uvin, 2001; Uvin & Mironko, 2003; Vandeginste, 2001). The statements and actions of the post-genocidal government confirm the priority that has been placed on justice. During a visit to New York in December of 1994, only months after conflicts ended, Paul Kagame made his stance clear on the need for justice, stating: "there can be no durable reconciliation as long as those who are responsible for the massacres are not properly tried" (Daly, 2002, p. 375). The GoR followed with a statement of their own, claiming "only when the guilty had been punished, would it be possible for the victims, as well as the nonguilty, to create a joint future together" (Uvin, 2001, p. 181). The GoR regularly states its firm belief in the need to eradicate all semblances of the culture of impunity. One of the ways they 38 The Kit includes transport home from the ingando camp, a food stipend for three months and basic home supplies (Mgbako, 2005, p. 224). The World Bank provides 47% of total program funding and the GoR is responsible for the rest (Mgbako, 2005, pp. 210-211). 82 have taken action is through support for the domestic judicial system (Vandeginste, 2001). Demonstration of this support is often shown through spending and budgeting for the legal system. Exemplifying this, in 2005, the Government set an ambitious goal of spending 3% of its total budget on the domestic justice system (Kirkby, 2006, p. 117). Rwanda's domestic justice system is unique in two ways: its structure and guilty pleabargaining mechanism. First of all, the structure of Rwanda's domestic justice system is comprised of two levels: formal national judicial institutions, for which the first trial started in December 1996 (Sarkin, 2001, p. 157; Schabas, 2009, p. 215); and, local "popular justice" (Apuuli, 2009, p. 18) gacaca courts. Such an extraordinary structure is influenced by the GoR's estimation that in the aftermath of mass violence, a formal legal system alone would not be capable of bringing a massive number of genocide perpetrators and suspects to trials promptly, particularly when adequate judicial facilities and human resources were extremely lacking (Apuuli, 2009, p. 12; Boctor, 2009, p. 104). By 1999, approximately 100,000 to 125,000 detainees were being held in jails designed for only 30,000 persons, living in squalid and unsanitary conditions while they awaited trials (Boctor, 2009; Clark, 2009,2010; Daly, 2002; Kirkby, 2006; Longman, 2006a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; National Service of Gacaca Jurisdictions [NSGJ], n.d.a; Sarkin, 2001; Steward, 2009; Uvin & Mironko, 2003; Vandeginste, 2001; Waldorf, 2006,2009; Zorbas, 2004). In order to accelerate the legal proceedings to meet the GoR's ambitious goal of prosecuting all genocide suspects, the establishment of gacaca courts, a concept that reflected traditional conflict resolution mechanisms used by local communities was conceived, and instituted by the Organic Law in 2001 (Apuuli, 2009; Sosnov, 83 2008).39 As this section specifically aims to outline the structure and functioning of the judicial system led by the GoR, a full discussion of the processes and impacts of gacaca courts will instead be covered later under the focus of Rwandan grassroots. In order to bring consistency and clear goals to the domestic justice system, national prosecution occurs according to the Organic Law (No, 08/96) of August 30,1996 on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed Since October 1,1990 (Apuuli, 2009, p. 25; Boctor, 2009, p. 105). The first trials began in December 1996 (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 234). In accordance with the 1996 Organic Law, four specific categories of suspects are tried, for crimes of varying severity (GoR, 1996). The punishment of those found guilty is determined according to these same categories (Boctor, 2009; Daly, 2002; Eltrigham, 2004; Sosnov, 2008; Vandeginste, 2001). From Article 2 of the Organic Law: Category 1 a) persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or of a crime against humanity; b) persons who acted in positions of authority at the national, prefectoral, communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, or fostered such crimes; c) notorious murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed; d) persons who committed acts of sexual torture; Category 2 persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation place them among perpetrators, conspirators of accomplices of intentional homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death; Category 3 39 Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26/01/2001, Setting Up Gacaca Jurisdictions and Organising Prosecutions for Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity Committed Between 1 October 1990 and 31 December 1994 (Clark, 2009, p. 298; Schabas, 2009, pp. 223-224). 84 persons whose criminal acts or whose acts of criminal participation make them guilty of other serious assaults against the person; Category 4 persons who committed offences against property. (GoR, 1996, Article 2) As punishment, the death penalty40 or life imprisonment is the sentence ordered to Category One offenders. Those convicted of Category Two crimes face between 25 years to a maximum of life in prison while five to seven years is the penalty for Category Three offenders. Finally, for the least serious crimes matching Category Four, physical and financial return of stolen or damaged properties is the prescribed sentence (NSGJ, n.d.a). Cases for persons accused of Category One are subject to trial at the State Court or are transferred to the ICTR (Boctor, 2009). Aside from these major offenders, the rest of the categories are under gacaca jurisdictions (Boctor, 2009; Clark, 2009; Vandeginste, 2001).41 For many years these categories were closely adhered to, until finally in 2004, a major amendment was made to merge Category Two and Three, leaving just three distinct categories for all remaining offenders to be classified under (Clark, 2009, p. 303; Sosnov, 2008, p. 135). This two-tiered approach to national justice assists in facilitating the massive number of trials, and helps to reduce the burden of overpopulated prisons. Secondly, another unique and critical feature of the post-genocide judicial system lies in its guilty plea-bargaining mechanism, as also stipulated in the 1996 Organic Law (Apuuli, 2009; Clark, 2009, 2010; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Schabas, 2009). Under this mechanism, if a 40 Stemming from recent developments, a repeal of the death penalty was officially put into effect on July 25,2007 by Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007 (Boctor, 2009; Schabas, 2009). 41 The GoR carried out administrative reform in 2001, replacing 12 prefects with 11 provinces and the City of Kigali, 106 districts (previously known as communes), 1,545 sectors, and 9,201 cells, by descending order of administrative units, on which the gacaca jurisdictions are based (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 252; Waldorf, 2006, p. 434). Suspects under Category Two are tried in the district-level gacaca, and Category Three in the sector-level, whereas pre-trial information gathering and investigative procedures are allocated to the cell-level courts (Vandeginste, 2001, pp. 241-242; Waldorf, 2006, pp. 425-426). 85 defendant gives a confession, the penalty is typically reduced, allowing for half of the sentence to be served in prison and the other half as community service under probation (NURC 2003, p. 5; Sosnov, 2008, pp. 136-137). Between 1997 and early 2000, the number of confessors grew from about 500 to 20,000 (Schabas, 2009, p. 217). These confessions came into play again during the gacaca trials that later emerged. Following the nationwide elections of 260,000 gacaca judges in October 2001, initial pilot trials of the courts eventually began in June 2002. By 2006, gacaca courts were gradually implemented throughout the country (Daly, 2002; Longman, 2006a; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). According to the latest calculation (Clark, 2010), approximately 400,000 genocide suspects have been brought to trial through gacaca courts since 2001 (para. 1). As crucial as the overhaul of genocidal norms and the establishment of transitional justice were, the post-genocide government was also tasked with handling an ongoing population crisis. A massive number of refugees had fled the country, while at the same time many returnees from neighbouring states decided to come back to Rwanda. Due to these sudden influxes and outflows, policies on redistributing and restructuring land property and ownership had to be implemented. The next section explores the GoR's population reintegration program for more effective land usage and resettlement called imidugudu. 5.1.1.3 For effective land use and reintegration: Imidugudu, a villagization program In many ways land remains significant in Rwanda, a country with a primarily subsistence economy where agriculture and animal husbandry are the major industry for most ordinary Rwandans' livelihood (Pottier, 2002; Van Hoyweghen, 1999). Beyond its economic purposes, land also represents a social and family value to its holders (NURC, 2005b). In today's Rwanda land belongs to the state, with few exceptions, and purchasing land means obtaining ownership 86 of land use, not the land itself (Pottier, 2002, pp. 180,229; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 368). Post-genocide Rwanda saw an estimated influx of 2.5 million refugees and returnees, a number that more than replaced the population loss of between 800,000 to 1 million persons from the genocide (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; Van Hoyweghen, 1999; van Leeuwen, 2001). Two waves accounted for this population movement. The first wave of mass returns mostly included those labelled 'old case' refugees, many of them Tutsi descendents whose predecessor generation fled earlier violence during the period 1959 to 1963 and again in 1973. Many of these refugees repatriated immediately after the genocide concluded and the RPF took control (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 265-266; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 354; van Leeuwen, 2001, pp. 630-631). The second wave, on the other hand, was primarily comprised of 'new case' refugees who had vacated their homes and land during the civil war and the genocide ordeal (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 265-266; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, pp. 354, 363, van Leeuwen, 2001, pp. 630-631). The majority of their returns occurred in 1996 and an estimated 1.3 million people were repatriated to Rwanda (Van Hoyweghen, 1999, p. 354). Originally, imidugudu was conceived of in the Arusha Accords as an emergency relief effort intended to better accommodate returnees—mostly old case refugees—in certain locations through resettlement (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). In early 1997, the program expanded its mandate to encompass the entire country. As part of this change, the focus of the program shifted to regrouping the scattered rural population into designated areas, and its overall objective moved from emergency to long-term development in nature (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). The expansion of the policy was induced by the GoR's rationale that with effective control over land, Rwanda could improve agricultural productivity and mitigate the problems of population density, in addition to dealing with the original goal of resettlement and security of the populace (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; NURC, 2005b; Van Hoyweghen, 1999). Furthermore, the GoR's strategy of reconciliation was implicated in its claim that "the country had enough resources to sustain all Rwandans, and that every Rwandan living abroad was welcome to repatriate" (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 267). This disposition is in stark contrast to the stances taken by the former Habyarimana government, as highlighted in Chapter II (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 266). As a result of imidugudu implementation, about 85,000 dwellings were built in 250 communities by 2000 (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, p. 264) with the intent of moving residents living in existing dispersedly located dwellings into the new communities (Zorbas, 2008, p. 267). While such numbers are by themselves quite promising, these achievements vary considerably, largely depending on the interactions amongst local authorities, supporting donor agencies and NGOs, and beneficiaries (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; Obura, 2003; van Leeuwen, 2001). Indeed, the blueprint of imidugudu brought many different scenarios on the ground because it was entirely up to the local administrations' interpretation and decision­ making on how to implement the national scheme to their communes (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000; van Leeuwen, 2001). According to the case studies researched by Hilhorst and van Leeuwen (2000), the program was a success in some communes but actually caused problems in many others (pp. 272-273). Often times the move was enforced rather than voluntary, even for those who already had homes; newly built villages were worse off, often lacking adequate security and facilities such as access to water and income-generating opportunities; the sites selected were fertile level ground and were distanced from traditional dwelling areas, consequently forcing families to commute to their farms and fields in order to make a living or to 88 cultivate new but less fertile land; therefore, the practice did not necessarily lead to increased agricultural productivity but rather soil erosion and other environmental degradation (Daly, 2002, p. 379; Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 272-273; Integrated Regional Information Networks [IRIN], 2004, para. 31; Longman, 2004a, p. 80; Obura, 2003, p. 38; Sarkin, 2001, pp. 152-153). Although redistribution of land was part of the imidugudu policy, the question of how many lots were actually redistributed in the stage of implementation remained unanswered in many communities (Hilhorst & van Leeuwen, 2000, pp. 267, 274). Defending the program, the Minister for Infrastructure Jean Damascene Ntawukuliryayo mentioned that "[djespite some shortcomings in implementing this policy, the government still firmly believes that [imidugudu] represents the only feasible alternative to Rwanda's land population equation for the foreseeable future" (IRIN, 2004, para. 39). 5.1.1.4 Goals and strategies of economic development In 2000, the GoR announced a national reconstruction and development plan called Rwanda Vision 2020. Within this policy document, the primary goal of transforming Rwanda from an agriculture-based economy into a middle-income country, with an annual economic growth rate in excess of 7% per year, and to become the economic and communication hub of East and Central Africa by the year 2020, is expressed (GoR, 2000). The transformation is structured specifically into three phases: first, reducing foreign aid dependency is the short-term blueprint; second, replacing current subsistence agriculture practices with a knowledge-based society is the mid-term phase; and finally, raising Rwanda's economic status to a middle-income country is the overarching long-term goal (GoR, 2000, pp. 9-11). Such a blueprint intends to overcome the country's disadvantages and obstacles that have long hampered development, namely its lack of natural resources, landlocked geographic location, rapid population growth, and lingering 89 poverty. The GoR professes sound economic growth by imploring all Rwandan individuals to have economic opportunities to poverty reduction (2000, p. 3). In order to achieve these goals, Vision 2020 outlines a set of strategies for the above development goals that places particular emphasis on six pillars: good governance; human resource development; private sector-led development; infrastructure development; productive high value and market-oriented agriculture; and regional and international integration (GoR, 2000, pp. 11-19). In addition to these pillars, Vision 2020 highlights gender equality, natural resources and the environment, and science and information technology as three cross-cutting issues relevant to achieving its development goals (GoR, 2000, pp. 19-20). Prior to Vision 2020, the GoR established the Fonds d'Assistance aux Rescapes du Genocide (FARG, Genocide Survivors Fund) in 1998 (Buckley-Zistel, 2006b; Waldorf, 2006). The FARG is indicated as a part of the social protection sector under the auspices of the Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC) in the GoR's poverty reduction scheme (GoR, 2002, p. 83; MINALOC, 2011, p. 60). About 5% of the national tax revenues every year (approximately US$3.5 million) are allocated to the program, earmarked for spending on assisting genocide survivors with medical care, housing, and education (AI, 2004, p. 17; Buckley-Zistel, 2006b, p. 139; HRW, 2004, p. 42; Waldorf, 2006, p. 430). The descriptions provided in this section are intended to serve as an introduction to the reconciliation and development activities and efforts of the GoR, with further analysis yet to come. Next, the focus of this chapter will turn to the Rwandan grassroots. 5.1.2 Rwandan grassroots In the aftermath of genocide, the demographic composition of Rwanda is far more complex and intricate than it was in the pre-genocide period. The genocide ordeal drastically altered most contemporary post-genocide Rwandan communities: among the Rwandans who remained in the country before and during the genocide are survivors/victims, genocide perpetrators, suspects, detainees/the accused, and their families, including an estimated 400,000 widows and 500,000 orphans (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 58). By 1997, some 4 million of these people were internally displaced (Steward, 2009, p. 173). Many of the widows and female survivors are particularly susceptible to traumatization, often suffering from HIV/AIDS due to the massive number of rapes that occurred during the genocide (Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004a; Roht-Arriaza, 2004; Stearns, 2006). Close to 60,000 Rwandan households are now headed by children under the age of 18 (Steward, 2009, p. 173), as a result of parents lost during the genocide, and due to genocide suspects and the accused remaining detained in prisons. Meanwhile, refugees—both old and new cases—have returned to the country, more than filling in the huge population vacuum left by the 800,000 victims killed during the genocide. In some of these groups, many, if not all, share a similar ethnic identity. 5.1.2.1 Grassroots activities Numerous efforts, aimed at coping with the painful past, have been explored at different levels— individual, community—and through different methods. At the individual level, many of the persons who experienced the violence and aftermath of the genocide, particularly genocide victims and survivors, have gone on record and are having their stories reported through research and media interviews or personal biographies.42 One approach to personal healing often sought 42 Interviews with Rwandans who provide vivid accounts of personal experiences of the genocide are well documented in Gourevitch (1998), Neuffer (2001), Nolen (2005), to name a few. See also Ilibagiza (2006), Kayigamba (2009), Rusesabagina (2006), and Umutesi (2004) for Rwandans' direct accounts of their own stories and insightful perspectives of how to overcome their past. has been to look towards religious principles (Brouneus, 2008b; Clark, 2009).43 Commonly found among personal accounts is a belief in God to get through the extraordinary ordeal of the genocide. A rape victim, for example, states in an interview with Globe and Mail reporter Stephanie Nolen (2005) that '"I doubted your [God's] existence [...] Grant me this thing [...] the courage to end this.' And I heard a voice, saying, 'Patience, patience'" (p. 117). In her personal biography, Immaculee Ilibagiza (2006) recalls how she managed to survive the ordeal, and now attempts to forgive the perpetrators who killed her family and friends through her strong religious beliefs. Such accounts demonstrate the pivotal place that faith, which fundamentally adheres to religious beliefs, has occupied in the individual lives of those affected by the genocide. At the community level, a burgeoning number of local grassroots organizations and associations have been developed to foster social healing and mental health, most notably among women and survivors (Mukashema & Mullet, 2010, p. 37). The number of women's organizations alone reached more than 15,000 in 1999, 50 of which were national in scope (United States Agency for International Development [USAID], 2000, p. 4). In representing genocide survivors, one well-known organization is IBUKA ('remember' in Kinyarwanda) (Cook, 2006; IBUKA, n.d.; Kirkby, 2006). IBUKA embraces smaller local NGOs which serve survivors and other genocide-affected populations as its members and focuses on promoting justice, memorialization of the victims, assistance to genocide survivors, and peace-building (IBUKA, n.d.). Of similar prominence is the local human rights association Ligue Rwandaise pour la Promotion et la Defense des Droits de l'Homme (LIPRODHOR) (Buckley-Zistel, 43 Christianity, in particular, has had a long and deep influence on the formation of Rwandans' mindset, and its significance is entrenched in almost every aspect of Rwandans' socio-cultural and political life (Betts, 2005, p. 748; Clark, 2009, pp. 306-307). Longman (2010) analyzes how Christianity has been incorporated into the political identity of Rwanda in a historical context. Also see Cantrell (2009) for further insight on how Rwandan churches' post-genocide development has maintained close relations with the Kagame administration and American donors. 92 2006a). Many women's organizations, often with the support of both the GoR and donors, have been set up to assist female victims, widows, and household heads, focusing on civic education, women's rights, and income-generating programs (USAID, 2000). One of the most active organizations in this category is Association des Veuves du Genocide (AVEGA, or AVEGAAGAHOZO) Association for Widows of the April Genocide (AVEGA, n.d.; Stearns, 2006). 5.1.2.2 Grassroots perspectives on reconciliation These experiences of healing and recuperation from the genocide demonstrate that diverging attitudes and perspectives exist among the Rwandan populace, and that there is no single path to be taken when dealing with a violent past. Quite a few research interviews, surveys, and observations have been conducted to examine these dynamics (Ingelaere, 2009; IJR, 2005; Longman, Pham, & Weinstein, 2004a, 2004b; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; Mukashema & Mullet, 2010; NURC, 2003; Nolen, 2005; Smith & Meyer, 2001; Staub et al., 2005; Steward, 2009; Veale, 2000). Notwithstanding slight differences of evidence and emphases, the findings of these studies tend to concur that population groups with different life experiences, and individual and social conditions have distinct, and often contrasting, priorities and needs for personal healing and reconciliation (Longman et al., 2004a, p. 610). A clearly different perception about reconciliation exists between the young and old. Based on the findings of an interview survey by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR, 2005), younger generations have a tendency to demonstrate more positive attitudes toward reconciliation and post-genocide peace. The respondents between 15 and 25 years old, whose ages were 4 to 14 during the genocide in 1994, tend to think of reconciliation as "living together and moving forward" (IJR, 2005, pp. 9-10). Conversely, for the group between 46 and 55 years, who had more direct experiences and vivid memories of the genocide, reconciliation meant 93 remembrance through "truth telling, truth seeking, respect for survivors and forgiveness" (IJR, 2005, p. 10). Another divergence is found in terms of educational level. People with more education tend to show more skeptical attitudes towards the judicial systems, including gacaca courts (Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Megwalu & Loizides, 2010; Smith & Meyer, 2001), and "less openness to reconciliation" (Longman et al., 2004b, p. 223). Above all, justice as a reconciliation process is observed to be the most indicative and prevalent value to the grassroots, although ideas of how to achieve justice vary (Clark, 2009; Longman et al., 2004b). Whereas seeking retributive justice in holding wrongdoers accountable through a judicial approach is generally supported by grassroots, among both survivors and the accused, attitudes also show physical and psychological security and socio-economic well-being to be highly critical to reconciliation and peace (Lambourae, 2001, 2004; Longman et al., 2004b; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Veale, 2000). Genocide survivors particularly emphasize the importance of some form of reparation, such as IBUKA's adamant insistence on "no justice without reparation" (Kubai, 2007, p. 64). The accused—many but not all Hutu—express their support for an approach of punitive justice in order to avoid collective Hutu guilt (Longman et al., 2004b, p. 212; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004, pp. 173-174). The difference is apparent as: while a majority of Tutsi strongly agreed that trials should punish the guilty, a majority of Hutu merely agreed. Similarly, support for reparations was much stronger among Tutsi, while a much larger percentage of Hutu supported using trials to release prisoners (although slightly more Hutu opposed this purpose than supported it). (Longman et al., 2004b, p. 212) As the bulk of community involvement injustice occurs in the gacaca courts, closer attention to the dynamics among the grassroots now will be presented in the context of the gacaca practice. 94 S.1.2.3 Gacaca courts and Rwandan grassroots' interpretation of justice The current gacaca courts originate from a traditional local dispute-solving mechanism where all members, together with a respected person of the community acting as an arbiter, participate in a meeting to decide on a verdict and to find the proper method of reintegrating the wrongdoers and his/her family back into the community (Longman, 2006b; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005). The name gacaca in Kinyarwanda means 'grass,' and is derived from the common practice of encouraging people attending to sit on the lawn during the hearings (Longman, 2006b; Sarkin, 2001; Sosnov, 2008; Waldorf, 2006). The traditional gacaca holds great meaning in the community, as political authorities were not essentially involved in the process unless participants appealed the result by an adjudicator to their chief (Longman, 2006b, p. 210). Today's post-genocide gacaca system, however, contains few elements of these traditional practices; rather, it is an official institution established by the GoR (Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005, pp. 118-119; Vandeginste, 2001, pp. 243-244), and is "intimately linked to the state apparatus of prosecutions and incarceration, and applying codified, rather than customary, law" (Waldorf, 2006, p. 425). Gacaca trials proceed on a weekly basis, with 15 judges44 hearing the testimonies and arguments of victims, the accused, and witnesses. After listening to the participants and deliberating, the judges conduct sentencing, applied in accordance with the gacaca laws (Longman, 2006a; Tiemessen, 2004), as explored in the previous section. The judges, inyangamugayo meaning 'people who hate dishonesty' in Kinyarwanda, are elected from each community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, p. 5; Longman, 2006a, p. 22,2006b, p. 211). To be selected as inyangamugayo, candidates are expected to demonstrate the highest moral and ethical 44 The initial number of judges was 19 during the pilot period of the gacaca implementation until the Gacaca Law of 2004 (Sosnov, 2008, p. 135). 95 standards, and to have demonstrated an 'uncorrupted' record in the past (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, p. 5-6). Today's reinvigorated gacaca courts have five goals: (1) "[t]o reveal the truth about what has happened;" (2) "[t]o speed up the genocide trials;" (3) "[t]o eradicate the culture of impunity;" (4) "[t]o reconcile the Rwandans and reinforce their unity;" and (5) "[t]o prove that the Rwandan society has the capacity to settle its own problems through a system of justice based on the Rwandan custom" (NSGJ, n.d.b). The establishment of gacaca courts enjoyed a high level of positive support from the Rwandan public (Daly, 2002, p. 374; Longman, 2006b, p. 212; Longman et al., 2004a, p. 212-219; Smith & Meyer, 2001, p. 20). The expectation of the program served the prospect of restorative justice as "a forum in which all members of the community, suspects, survivors, and the general population, can debate and discuss legal and non-legal issues related to the genocide" (Clark, 2009, p. 316). Although the impact, results, and success of gacaca courts vary by region (Megwalu & Loizides, 2010, pp. 19-20), the level of Rwandan grassroots participation remains low (Clark, 2009; Longman, 2006b). Just as the courts provide an opportunity to bring victims and perpetrators together to express themselves, it also jeopardizes these participants by retraumatizing them when opening up the painful memories and experiences of the past (Brouneus, 2008b; Clark, 2010). In addition, perceptions between Hutu and Tutsi citizens on how to reconcile are notably different. Many Hutu people perceive gacaca as just another form of victor's justice from the Tutsi-led government (Clark, 2010, para. 12; Sarkin, 2001, pp. 149-150). On the other hand, Tutsi survivors hold the argument that there would be no forgiveness without the punishment of genocide instigators and perpetrators, and proper compensation for physical and psychological 96 damages. IBUKA, for instance, emphasizes that releasing those accused of participating in the genocide will impede respect for the survivors, and that survivors will deem the gacaca courts "irrelevant" in bringing justice to Rwanda (IRIN, August 9,2005, as cited in Kirkby, 2006, p. 114). These perspectives and activities reflect a wide range of actors within the grassroots. While the diversity evident in the various grassroots organizations should not be overlooked, understanding the overarching behaviour of the Rwandan grassroots community in its entirety is vital for this research and its attempt to situate the various actors on the Rwandan post-genocide stage. Building on the preceding exploration of the GoR and Rwandan grassroots, the final actor presented is the international community. 5.1.3 International community The involvement of the international community in Rwanda has been continuous since the colonial period, regularly manifesting itself in different forms and through different actors. The interest of the international community in Rwanda remained high throughout the period before and after the 1994 genocide, ironically only pausing for its silence and neutrality during the genocide. Since those events, particular and tremendous focus is given to rebuilding the physically and mentally devastated society. These unprecedented aid flows and levels of international assistance are attributed in part to moral guilt, resulting from the inaction and unwillingness of the international community to engage in stopping the genocide (Kirkby, 2006, p. 117; Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743; Umutesi, 2006, p. 163). The discussion in this section focuses on identifying post-genocide activities by major international donors and organizations. Who are involved and what are their efforts and approaches? 97 5.1.3.1 Aid trends To start, it is important to identify the major donors to Rwanda, and to illustrate the recent patterns and trends of post-genocide aid inflows. As was mentioned in Chapter IV, the top multilateral donors to post-genocide Rwanda are the EC, UNDP, and World Bank (IDA), and bilateral donor countries include Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK and the US (OECD, 1999; Samset, Petersen, & Wang, 2007; Zorbas, 2008). According to OECD statistics from between 1994 and 2008, official development aid (ODA) was explosively high during the period immediately after the 1994 genocide, with these levels remaining elevated for several years, particularly in case of the US (see Figure 5.1 and 5.2). Eventually these levels tapered off, with aid levels reaching low points in the years 1997 and 2000. Since the turn of the millennium, however, aid levels to Rwanda have again been increasing for all major donors with the exception of France (see Figure 5.2). These upward and downward trends demonstrate that aid patterns to Rwanda are rarely consistent year after year. A brief overview of certain individual donor countries will provide additional insight to better understand the reasons for these changing levels. 98 S94J3 120.58 148.54 169 06 Current USD (Millions) Figure 5.1 Cumulative aid amount of donors between 1994 and 2008 Source: OECD (n.d., accessed on March 10, 2010) 200 94 9S 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Year —•—Belgium -•-Netherlands —*—UK —H—USA —•—France —•—EC —4—©A Figure 5.2 ODA by selected major donors to Rwanda between 1994 and 2008 Source: OECD (n.d., accessed on March 10, 2010) 08 99 Belgium and France, as the largest and most influential donors to Rwanda in the pregenocide period, significantly reduced aid to Rwanda after the genocide ended (OECD, 1999, p. 12; Zorbas, 2008, p. 148). Conversely, the Netherlands, Norway, the UK, and the US, have all increased their aid, and thereby their influence on Rwanda. The disbursements by the Canadian and German governments remain fairly consistent (OECD, 1999, p. 12). As a result of this transitioning aid landscape, the top five donors, according to Eugenia Zorbas (2008), are relative newcomers to the country, having emerged after the genocide. These donors tend to be more cooperative and flexible towards the GoR than the traditional donor governments (Zorbas, 2008, pp. 146-150). This tendency is partially because of 'genocide credit' (Betts, 2005, p. 749; Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 199-200, 210; Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743)—the guilt trap that they themselves, and in general the international community, did not intervene to either prevent or stop the genocide—and partially because of the lack of information on the ground and their relative inexperience in Rwanda, compared with that of Belgium or France (Zorbas, 2008, p. 149). Finally, when observing aid levels to countries entering post-conflict phases, a phenomenon termed 'frontloading' is often evident, referring to the abnormally high levels of aid given to countries in the immediate aftermath of war (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 737). Rwanda, as evident in Figure 5.2, was arguably a beneficiary of such practices. Considering the volume of aid to Rwanda over the past decade and a half, the next questions to be asked are: where is this money directed and how involved are donors in the controlling and monitoring of aid money? By following the trail of aid money over the years since the genocide, the relative importance of national reconciliation and development, as expressed by donors, can be better understood. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, much of the frontloaded aid was not closely 100 related to specific programs or priorities (Scherrer, 2002, p. 197). This aid, claim Suhrke and Buckmaster (2005), was largely humanitarian and for emergency relief. Eventually, however, this form of 'emotional' aid runs out (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005). For Rwanda, the year 1997 may have marked the end of this initial aid inflow, as during that year aid returned to pre-war levels (UNDP, 2007). Additionally, following their invasion of the DRC and subsequent accusations of committing massacres during 1996 and 1997, the reputation of the GoR and its aid attractiveness was negatively affected (Suhrke & Buckmaster, 2005, p. 743). As aid levels again began to rise in the years that followed, more aid was earmarked for issues such as reconstruction, refugee resettlement, human rights, government improvement, and justice (Scherrer, 2002). While these and other foci of aid money, such as health, education, technology, and general infrastructure, are certainly areas of concern for most donors, the issue of aid spending on justice—largely due to the emphasis placed on it by the GoR itself (Peskin, 2008, p. 158-161)—is perhaps the most discussed and debated of all. Much of the focus of the major donors' aid activities in post-genocide Rwanda is centred on rebuilding the justice system. The donors use two channels to support and practice the priority of justice. The first channel is through their indirect funding and cooperation on projects in facilitation with the GoR. Secondly, the donors contribute directly to an externally imposed system of justice, by funding and operating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). As one example of their commitments to justice, international donors funded more than US$100 million towards judge training, court rebuilding, and justice-related projects (Kirkby, 2006, p. 99; Uvin & Mironko, 2003, p. 223).45 Although justice can certainly be labelled as an important component of the overall aid picture for Rwanda in the years following the genocide, 45 The UNDP is a major international organization for the promotion of justice building, coordinating the management, and funding many of the justice-related projects through its Justice Trust Fund with Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium (OECD, 1999). 101 some donors were more willing to contribute aid to justice than others. The Netherlands, for example, allocated nearly 20% of their overall contributions to this area (Samset et al., 2007, p. 13). The UK, meanwhile, only devoted a fraction—less than 2%—of their contributions in this manner (Samset et al., 2007, p. 13). Continuing the inquiry into the role played by the international community injustice for post-genocide Rwanda, the next section will discuss the creation and ongoing existence of the ICTR. 5.1.3.2 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Roper and Barria's study (2007) of donor country motivations identified three factors that influence the amount of aid that gets directed towards war crimes tribunals such as the ICTR; these factors are: GDP; democratic values; and former status as a colonial power (pp. 297-299). With these factors in mind, it is perhaps not surprising that one of the major initial outcomes of the efforts of the international community was the creation of the ICTR. Since the establishment of the ICTY in 1993 and the subsequent adoption by the UN Security Council of Resolution 955 for building the ICTR46 on November 9,1994 (Betts, 2005, p. 738; Uvin & Mironko, 2003, pp. 119-120; Vandeginste, 2001, p. 230), the international community has shown its eagerness to pursue formal justice in the wake of large-scale atrocities (Mokhiber, n.d.). The establishment of these two courts represented, for the first time, an actual implementation of the Genocide Convention of 1948, allowing for the first real application of international justice (Oomen, 2005, p. 891). The creation and workings of the ICTR, meanwhile, is not without its critics. While the 46 The full name of the ICTR is the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States Between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 (Kirkby, 2006, p. 94; UNSC, 1994, Annex; Uvin & Mironko, 2003, p. 219). 102 official aim of the ICTR is to "bring to justice the persons who are responsible for [crimes of genocide]" and to "contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace" (UNSC, 1994), Uvin and Mironko (2003) claim that the international community views the ICTR as little more than "symbolic politics" based on the "reaffirmation of the international community's own morality" (p. 220). The ICTR has demonstrated its ability to deal with many difficult issues of international justice. Among the ICTR's achievements, the indictment of rape as a crime against humanity, acknowledgement and indictment of representatives of the media for incitement of genocide, trying and convicting civilians for war crimes, and an improved and refined overall definition of genocide are often cited as noteworthy precedents and contributions towards international justice (Jallow, 2009; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). One of the other functions of the court is its ability to focus on accused persons who were in leadership or authority positions (Akhavan, 1997, p. 339), in theory shifting some of the workload from the domestic court systems to the ICTR. These achievements, however, are primarily of concern only to the international community. In reality, the inefficiency and bureaucratic manners of processing cases has not sufficiently alleviated the Rwandan government's burden of conducting a large number of trials, but instead aggravates the Government's, and some Rwandans, view and attitude toward the court itself (Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). This challenge, and other dynamic interactions between the actors will now be given consideration in the analysis portion of this chapter. 5.2 Analysis The primary objective in this second section of the chapter is to scrutinize the findings of the previous section. What concepts of reconciliation do the actors put greater focus on, and are they similar, divergent, or contrasting? How do the dynamics of their rationales and approaches 103 (de)form Rwanda's reconciliation process? Can any association between Rwanda's reconciliation and post-genocide development be found in the three stakeholders' rationales and approaches? In so doing, this section ultimately attempts to demonstrate what reconciliation means to the stakeholders in the juncture of post-genocide Rwanda's developmental stage. "^^Perspectives Actors Reconciliation Goals Justice; National unity; GoR Population reintegration Rwandan grassroots Healing, Justice, Security, Truth, Reparation, Forgiveness Development Strategies National courts, Gacaca; Abolition of ethnicity, Ingando; Imidugudu Goals Agricultural productivity; Poverty reduction Grassroots associations support, Gacaca Reparation as poverty alleviation; Improving quality of life Justice ICTR, Funding domestic justice programs Strategies Imidugudu; Good governance, Private-sector investment, Building infrastructure Genocide victim assistance programs, Gacaca (through GoR); Grassroots associations support Good governance, Aid, Technical assistance Poverty reduction (also a International part of community reconciliation goal) Table 5.1 Major goals and strategies of actors for reconciliation and reconstruction In an effort to illustrate the principal approaches for the post-genocide reconciliation process above, the research finds two common themes among the perspectives of the GoR, Rwandan grassroots, and international community (Table 5.1). First, a priority on justice is a clearly noticeable and commonly shared element of reconciliation by all three stakeholders although their approaches towards justice in policy and practice are at times quite divergent and 104 conflicting. Secondly, though not as apparent as justice, all the actors consider poverty reduction as another important aspect of reconciliation, as well as post-genocide development. This position is particularly emphasized by Rwandan grassroots. Grassroots organizations perceive physical and symbolic functions of reparation to be a fundamental aspect of healing, recovery, and poverty alleviation. Some post-genocide programs aim for both reconciliation and development more clearly than others. The villagization program, imidugudu, for example, seeks to reintegrate all Rwandan population groups together by increasing agricultural productivity while at the same time regrouping scattered dwellings. In a similar vein, gacaca serves a developmental purpose as well as a reconciliatory one in that its reparation scheme provides victims a symbolic gesture of restitution and a financial and physical basis for the rebuilding of livelihood. To this point the discussion of actors and their programs, efforts, and strategies pursued in post-genocide Rwanda have largely been treated separately in order to properly explore the theoretical basis for each approach. In practice, however, there are countless differences and gaps between the rationales of stakeholders and how each actor has sought to implement and achieve their vision. At the national and international level, for instance, justice is mainly interpreted as finding and punishing wrongdoers. Attitudes of Rwandan grassroots, meanwhile, have ascribed a broader and more encompassing interpretation of justice that includes physical and mental security, healing from traumatic experiences, truth about what happened in the past, restitution for victims and those affected by the violence, social and economic well-being, as well as retributive aspects. Considering these stipulations, the latter can be refined as social justice (Lambourne, 2001; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). 105 5.2.1 Contested perspectives on justice and judicial programs among actors 5.2.1.1 Dynamics of rationales between the GoR and ICTR The GoR's firm stance towards justice necessitates its need to expedite judicial procedures and to bring all of the genocide perpetrators to trial sooner rather than later. As explored above, inducing suspects to confess and plea-bargain systems were chosen as the major methods to exercise this priority. Yet, the ICTR, donor community, non-Rwandan academics, and others regularly emphasize the importance of procedural standards and fairness for trials in which human rights fundamentally lie. In light of such perspectives on justice, the 1999 OECD report highlighted that donors tend to emphasize the symbolic meaning of justice, whereas the Rwandan government makes firm demands for "clear and absolute justice" (p. 20). The report further expands that: [f]or donors, [...] it seemed possible to limit judgements to only a small group of genocide leaders, freeing many of the ordinary people to empty the prisons and accelerate reconciliation. For the GoR and many others in Rwanda, this was heresy; there could be no reconciliation without justice, (p. 20) Such divergence between approaches is well proven in practice—mandates, laws, penalties, and procedures—between the Rwandan domestic judicial courts and the ICTR, a court that the GoR reproaches as being irrelevant (Longman, 2006b, pp. 208-209). The Rwandan government strongly disagrees with the model and mandate of the ICTR and was, in fact, the only country to vote against the resolution to institute the tribunal (Jones, 2010, p. 9). Firstly, regarding mandates, the ICTR strives to deal only with trials resulting from the crimes of genocide committed between January 1 and December 31 of 1994. In contrast to this timeline, the Organic Laws for the national courts have set the dates between October 1,1990 and December 31,1994 (Boctor, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). The GoR, however, perceives that such a short period for prosecution would allow genocide suspects and 106 wrongdoers to escape, allowing impunity to prevail (Habimana, 2000; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). Secondly, the maximum penalty for those found guilty by the ICTR is a life sentence, while capital punishment could be applied to suspects under Category One in the domestic courts until 2007, when the death penalty was abolished (Betts, 2005; Boctor, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Uvin & Mironko, 2003). Furthermore, the conditions of the ICTR prisons are not nearly as cramped, and are more comfortable and 'luxurious' for the prisoners than the conditions found in domestic jail cells (Lambourne, 2001; Vandeginste, 2001; Waldorf, 2006). Thirdly, the GoR has placed heavy criticism on the ICTR's inefficiency and the slow pace of its working process, particularly in light of its disproportionally high budget, in relation to gacaca (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 231).47 As of October 2010, 52 cases are completed, 22 are in progress and two are awaiting trial in the ICTR (ICTR, n.d.), meanwhile it is estimated that the national courts prosecuted 7,000 genocide suspects, excluding all gacaca trials, during the first 10 years of operation (Apuuli, 2009, p. 21). The ICTR has received over half a billion dollars in total funding in the decade following its creation (Roper & Barria, 2007, p. 286). Reflecting on such vast amounts of spending, it is not surprising to see that many observers of the ICTR proceedings have noted how the lawyers and judges employed are often decorated in expensive suits and apparel, seemingly worlds away from the realities of the victims of the genocide itself (Vokes, 2002). Finally, the ICTR also faces criticism for its venue location, as the court is based in Arusha, Tanzania. This physical separation poses several drawbacks, particularly in that its activities are not well communicated to the Rwandan public (Jones, 2010, p. 185). Also resulting from this physical separation, the development of the Rwandan national judiciary receives 47 According to the Kigali-based Institute for Research and Dialogue for Peace (IRDP) (2003), the ICTR's budget in 2002 was US$177,739,400 whereas the estimated annual budget for gacaca courts is US$2.2 million (as cited in Zorbas, 2004, p. 34). 107 minimal benefit from the ICTR because the potential for training and skill building is limited, despite being part of the initial mandate of the ICTR (Jones, 2010, p. 185; Zaum, 2009, p. 372). In comparison, other situations of transitional justice, such as the case of Kosovo, involved greater participation and local ownership of the judicial institutions. These contributions led to the development and establishment of a stronger national legal foundation for those involved (Zaum, 2009, p. 372). Among the international community, meanwhile, critiques and views toward the GoR's national and local justice system are divided largely into two camps. On one hand, human rights advocates48 and some academics with a legal background doubt the fairness and formality of the domestic legal procedure—due process—and respect for human rights, all fundamental concepts in Western judicial institutions (Clark, 2009; Longman, 2006b; Nagy, 2009; Schabas, 2009; Zorbas, 2004). In particular, the competency and accountability of the guilty plea-bargaining mechanism is considered problematic in that the 'truth' discovery of the genocide tends to rely highly on confessions and guilty pleas made by suspects (Clark, 2009, p. 319). The fact that confessions are only accepted if they contain a detailed description and the date of the crime, apology to the victims, and names of co-conspirators and accomplices, is seen as a likely generator of false pleas and insincere apologies in order to obtain reduced sentences (Clark, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Zorbas, 2004). This standpoint conflicts with the GoR's approach of encouraging confessions, as increased confessions help facilitate one of the major goals of the gacaca courts: relieving the difficulties of the domestic detention facilities (Kirkby, 2006, p. 107). On the other hand, many academic and journalistic commentators (Clark, 2009; Kubai, 48 See, for instance, reports and articles from African Rights (2003), Amnesty International (1997,2002b), Human Rights First (1997) and Human Rights Watch (2008). 108 2007; Longman, 2006b; Nagy, 2009; OECD, 1999; Vandeginste, 2001) underline the point that local approaches to the trial mechanism are worthy of respect and that it is incongruous to be critical of the gacaca courts based purely on Western standards and perspectives. What the purely legal critiques mentioned above miss, however, is consideration for "the importance of [participants'] interpretations of gacaca" (Clark, 2009, p. 311) and Rwandans' participation and ownership of the process (Clark, 2009, p. 311; Longman, 2006b, p. 221; Vandeginste, 2001, p. 245). Longman (2006b) also emphasizes that the gacaca courts' cultural aspects are based on customary law and local norms, and therefore better suited for understanding the uniquely Rwandan circumstances where perpetrators, victims, and their families share the same living proximity and neighbourhood, or in his words, "contextual competence" (p. 214). By providing victims and wrongdoers an opportunity to tell their stories and encouraging apology and forgiveness, the gacaca process is capable of fulfilling the restorative model of justice (Clark, 2009; Kirkby, 2006; Kubai, 2007; Tiemessen, 2004). The USAID reports that post-genocide Rwanda's legal system is analyzed not simply as a process of "re-construction, but rather the first-time construction" (1996, p. 14, as cited in OECD, 1999, p. 23) of a very different judicial model from the past, pre-genocide period. What concerns this group, rather, is how the execution of the local approach proceeds, and whether the goals of proactive local participation and ownership are actually accomplished (Clark, 2009, pp. 317-318; Longman, 2006b, pp. 221-223). 5.2.1.2 Grassroots view on gacaca courts and the ICTR From the grassroots viewpoint, gacaca issues that discourage support and turnout for the meetings are summarized as: (1) insufficient and improper measures for supporting the procedures; (2) oppressive demeanour of the authorities in practice; and, (3) partiality of the courts muting out RPF-induced crimes. First, in light of the gacaca procedures, this research 109 found that the lack of adequate safeguards for participants' physical and mental health and insufficient reparation to be major hindering factors. The empirical evidence found by Brouneus (2008b) suggests that without proper security measures, truth-telling can be counterproductive to healing and can jeopardize the reconciliation process, furthering the idea that truth does not always lead to healing in practice (pp. 72-72). In addition, Longman et al. (2004a) conclude that using a judicial approach to reconciliation cannot be assumed because not all Rwandans who experienced trauma share the same idea of justice (pp. 611-612). Secondly, the local authorities' top-down and coercive manner of inducing participants for gacaca undermines the reconciliation motive of the program (Sosnov, 2008; Tiemessen, 2004). To some Rwandans attending a gacaca meeting is an experience similar to that of participating in umuganda, a civic labour duty imposed by the Government, in that time usually devoted to economic activities and earning household income may have to be sacrificed (Tiemessen, 2004, p. 69). Such a vertical relationship between authorities and locals is evident not only for the gacaca courts but is embedded in almost all stages of nation-building (BuckleyZistel, 2006a, 2006b; Ingelaere, 2010; Kubai, 2007; Longman, 2004a; Reyntjens, 2004; Stover & Weinstein, 2004; Veale, 2000). Thirdly, perhaps the most controversial judicial issue, faced at both domestic and international levels, lies in the fact that RPF-induced violence and crimes are excluded from the trials. Numerous critics (Clark, 2009,2010; Evans & Ellis, 2005; Jones, 2010; Lambourne, 2001; Sarkin, 2001; Tiemessen, 2004; Vandeginste, 2001; Waldorf, 2006) maintain that the judicial approach of Rwanda is little more than a disguised form of victor's justice, in that the postgenocide RPF-led regime deals exclusively with the genocide crimes but not the revenge killings 110 and massacres of Hutus committed by the RPF under the Organic Law mandate.49 Vandeginste (2001) describes the situation as "rendering justice on behalf of the victor, that is, the militarily strongest party" (p. 231). Neither Rwandan national courts nor the ICTR adjudicates RPFinvolved human rights violations (Jones, 2010, p. 181). Efforts to capture the Rwandan grassroots' attention, made by the ICTR, have for the most part been failing (Betts, 2005; Lambourne, 2001; Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b; Neuffer, 2001; Nolen, 2005; Vandeginste, 2001). Most ordinary Rwandans are not aware of the existence of the ICTR or the tribunal's purposes and functions, given that little information about the ICTR is disseminated to the public and that nearly half of the Rwandan population lacks the basic literacy skills necessary to seek out such information on their own (Habimana, 2000; Longman et al., 2004a). The physical location of the courts, based in Arusha, Tanzania, and the ongoing marginalization of survivor voices creates an "enormous (mental) distance" (Vandeginste, 2001, p. 231) between the Rwandan population and the Tribunal. Brought about by these shortcomings, the ICTR has received much less support than the gacaca courts from the local population (Betts, 2005; Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b). 5.2.2 Counterproductive effects on gacaca courts and imidugudu During the implementation of many post-genocide reconciliation and reconstruction programs, there have been indications of adversarial impact and effects. Such evidence is palpable where the policies of gacaca and imidugudu meet in practice (Longman, 2004a). Although the imidugudu aims to foment both reconciliation and development by purporting population reintegration and regrouping, and effective land use, the process of relocating the existing population within the country and returnees to newly built villages has resulted in a weakened 49 Trials for former RPF soldiers are only conducted in closed military courts (Jones, 2010, p.181). These trials have been very infrequent, and the information about the trials is sparsely communicated to the Rwandan public. Ill sense of the traditional community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, pp. 23-24). Many of the returnees, particularly old case refugees, did not have direct experience or exposure to the genocide, and were subsequently unable to make meaningful personal connections within the community (Daly, 2002, pp. 378-380; Van Hoyweghen, 1999, pp. 363-365). To the existing population who remained in the country during the genocide, furthermore, the relocation policy broke up their cultural and emotional ties within the community (Karbo & Mutisi, 2008, pp. 23-24). For the procedures of gacaca courts, this separation makes the bringing together of witnesses and the accused to a trial more difficult. As the local social norm that 'everyone is known to everyone else' weakens, the notion of community being the fundamental unit for the gacaca practice becomes questionable (Daly, 2002, p. 379). 5.2.3 Policies on reparation and poverty reduction As discussed earlier, reparation is strongly highlighted as an aspiration among Rwandan communities. Forms of restitution are sought through two channels in principle: the FARG, and reparation sentences in gacaca courts for Category Three offenders. It should be noted that although the FARG does not provide direct compensation to genocide survivors (Sosnov, 2008, p. 152; Waldorf, 2006, p. 430), it is meaningful to the extent that its financial support aims to alleviate poverty as well as to meet the needs of the grassroots. This research finds, however, that the implementation of such polices in practice produces vastly different results than in rhetoric, and largely fails to benefit the grassroots population (AI, 2004; Buckley-Zistel, 2006b; Des Forges, 1999; HRW, 2004; Neuffer, 2001; Waldorf, 2006). The proceedings of the FARG have frequently been reported as being corrupt. Politicians and high-level government officials receive the funding, and the FARG has shown discrimination towards certain Hutu survivors and their families compared to Tutsi survivors 112 (AI, 2004, p. 17; Waldrof, 2006, p. 430). Furthermore, the FARG leaves little room for many Rwandans other than the survivors to understand "why survivors are singled out as recipients when they, too, are living in abject poverty" (Buckley-Zistel, 2006b, p. 146). Moreover, some cases suggest that recipients are not aware of the contents of the benefit (HRW, 2004, p. 42). Similarly, compensation has barely been given to the victims and survivors in contrast to what was announced during gacaca sentencing (Des Forges, 1999, chap. 20, para. 76; Sosnov, 2008, p. 145). A lack of systematic guidelines for monitoring sentences under Category Three also hinders the enforcement of community service and effective delivery of compensation to victims (Sosnov, 2008, p. 145). The disconnection between the desire amongst survivors for reparations and, in contrast, the minimal reparations demands from gacaca continues to fuel the debates surrounding the appropriateness of the courts as a whole for post-genocide reconciliation (Kubai, 2007; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Neuffer, 2001; Steward, 2009; Umutesi, 2006; Waldorf, 2006). Notwithstanding the importance placed upon compensation by grassroots and civil society, neither the Rwandan national court nor the ICTR provides reparation to victims and survivors (Des Forges, 1999; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Vandeginste, 2001). While donor countries deem poverty reduction to be an important element of reconciliation, direct reparations to the victims are not included as a component of their strategy (Zorbas, 2008). Rather, according to Zorbas' (2008) in-depth study of the top five donors' attitudes towards Rwandan reconciliation, the donors tend to think "reconciliation = poverty reduction + good governance" (p. 140). A particular focus of their poverty reduction approach is paid to the rural sector and good governance frequently refers to technical assistance, service delivery, and transparency (Zorbas, 2008, pp. 141-146). Zorbas' analysis concludes that the donor perception of 113 reconciliation in the Rwandan context is concerned primarily with economic development for conflict prevention and social stability, which "has not translated into meaningful change in terms of the kinds of interventions and programmes they favour on the ground" (2008, p. 146). The donors' perspective and attitudes towards reconciliation in Rwanda is implicit and can be inferred, at best, as being a part of the country's economic development. It is difficult to grasp specific viewpoints of the donor community towards reconciliation per se as given the tendency among donors that such discussions are minimal and seldom communicated. 5.2.4 Policies on ethnicity, ingando, and grassroots attitudes Perhaps the most delicate and contentious matter that challenges post-genocide Rwanda's future of peace and reconciliation is that of ethnicity. The unity of Rwandans is strongly promoted by the Kagame government through its prohibition of public discourse on ethnic distinction and by its version of Rwanda's history before the colonial period, specifically the origins of Hutus, Tutsis, and Twas, an account that opposes the message of predecessor regimes who used ethnicity for political division (Buckley-Zistel, 2009). Speaking of ethnic identity has become taboo in post-genocide Rwandan society: any type of public discussions on ethnic description and or views of ethnicity are silenced (BuckleyZistel, 2006a, 2006b; Hilker, 2009; Longman, 2006a; Veale, 2000; Zorbas, 2004). Nevertheless, the ethnicity of Hutu/Tutsi/Twa remains an essential determinant in grassroots' mindset when generating images and perceptions of relationships with people (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Daly, 2002; Hilker, 2009; Longman et al., 2004b; Mamdani, 2001; Waters, 1997; Zorbas, 2008). The altering societal norms and atmosphere around ethnicity are analyzed here with two explanations. First, any disregard of the 'no ethnicity' rule or version of history other than the 114 Government's is subject to legal accountability. This authoritarian and oppressive approach taken by the GoR in handling such dissenting voices has come under heavy criticism. Cases report that both individual opponents of the government position, as well as entities with any critical opinions toward the GoR—whether local or international—are oppressed by threats, incarcerations, assassinations, shutdowns, visa denial to foreign nationals, deportations, and more (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a, pp. 111-113,2009, p. 46; Reyntjens, 2004, pp. 202-204; Uvin, 2003, pp. 3-4). As a result, when conducting fieldwork, 'silence' is often observed during direct contact with community members in the field when asked about views of ethnicity, at least until researchers gain a certain level of trust from them (Veale, 2000, p. 238). Moreover, as the opportunity to exchange opinions on ethnicity is eliminated from public discourse, a gap continues to widen between the conceptual imagery about ethnic groups in Rwandan mindsets and the "concrete people around them that contradicted these stereotypes" (Hilker, 2009, p. 92, emphasis in the original). Second, a more fundamental question lies in the feasibility of the policies—whether such approaches by the GoR can in fact reconcile Rwandan images towards one another from ethnic to national identity, or whether the 'no ethnicity' agenda is simply another way to exploit and to concentrate Tutsi power (Longman, 2004a; Uvin, 2003). Criticism underscores the fact that the NURC is a very vertical tool for instilling the Tutsi-led government's political indoctrination and propaganda through ingando (Mgbako, 2005, pp. 209-210; Zorbas, 2004, p. 39). The GoR's philosophy on ethnicity in the multi-party system is, in reality, used only to the extent of "not publicly challenging] the [Government's hegemonic narrative" (Longman, 2006a, p. 16). Through its democratic political structure, such challenges have virtually disappeared (Uvin, 2003, pp. 1-2). In fact, a field research report analyzing the grassroots perspectives on Rwandan 115 life before and after the 1994 genocide (Ingelaere, 2009) reveals that Hutu respondents generally think of themselves as being less significant and represented in politics since the genocide. The trust level amongst different ethnic groups has not improved, despite the GoR's position, and is actually worsening in some situations (Hilker, 2009; Ingelaere, 2009). A bipolar perception of Tutsi 'victims/survivors' and Hutu 'perpetrators' tends to be prevalent in grassroots, particularly amongst the younger generation who have a different understanding of history, civil war, and the genocide (Hilker, 2009). Numerous authors warn (Clark, 2010; Hilker, 2009; Longman, 2006a; Longman & Rutagengwa, 2004; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 2004; Reyntjens & Vandeginste, 2005; Vandeginste, 2001) about the danger of generalizing Hutu guilt. Pottier (2002) elaborates that: the challenge in Rwanda today is complicated further in that the official discourse on the 1994 genocide maintains in practice the ethnic division which the RPF-led government denounces in theory: only Tutsi are victims of genocide; moderate Hutu are victims of politicide who died in massacres (Eltringham and Van Hoyweghen 2000: 226). The distinction has an implied moral hierarchy, (p. 126) What makes reconciliation so elusive is that it is contingent on both how and by whom, Rwandan history is perceived (Mamdani, 2001, p. 267). Mamdani (2001) evaluates that "Rwanda's key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a guilty majority alongside an aggrieved and fearful minority into a single political community" (p. 266, emphasis in the original). Mamdani (2001) further argues that if Hutus are viewed as either perpetrators or passive onlookers, but not as victims just as the Tutsis were, and Tutsis are viewed only as survivors, this interpretation would continually exacerbate Hutu-Tutsi divisionism. The discourse on ethnic differences and prejudices is well-known to donors, and in some cases it makes their partnership with recipients—local NGOs and civil society—difficult and 116 intricate (Peter & Kibalama, 2006, p. 121). Nonetheless, the dominant standpoint of the international community is that peace and reconciliation in Rwanda is a specifically domestic issue to be resolved and practiced; that as an intermediary it could play at best a supportive role (OECD, 1999; Schimmel, 2010; Zorbas, 2008). One OECD report (1999) assesses that: [reconciliation [...] is a complex social process, involving issues such as the recognition of their crimes by the perpetrators; the application of justice to the leaders and organisers of the crimes; compensation of the victims; and a beginning of forgiveness from the victims. Yet, the social climate in Rwanda remains profoundly hostile to reconciliation. There has been little expression of recognition or remorse of the crimes either in camps, prisons, or refugee circles, from political leaders, intellectuals, or religious authorities. Denial or counter-accusation is more common. The RPF also denies its own involvement in human rights violations after 1994. Fundamentally, the international community cannot do anything about this, and it probably has under-estimated the poisoning social atmosphere this has caused in Rwanda, (p. 26, emphasis added) Such viewpoints demonstrate the lack of motivation and willingness of the donor community to engage in Rwanda's reconciliation process. This position of the international community ignores the challenges and unique circumstances faced by a post-conflict society, essentially denying the capacity for reconciliation among the Rwandan populace, and highlights the drastically different priorities driving each actor. 5.2.5 Examining relationships between reconciliation and development 5.2.5.1 Social healing and community development Healing is frequently cited as being a crucial and central component of reconciliation, particularly among the grassroots—it is the very starting point of recovery—and can act as a driver for personal and community decisions to make peace with past ordeals, either by forgiving, forgetting, or simply moving towards a constructive future. While certain previously strained individual relationships appear to be on the mend, this research finds that an aggregated sense of community development is still lacking in Rwanda. Longman et al. (2004a) observe 117 that: "respondents are willing to develop relationships at an individual level but that these relationships do not yet constitute a shared sense of community" (p. 610). This deficit of healing and community development is largely due to a lack of local empowerment and the coercive attitude of the GoR, including its involvement in the gacaca courts. The GoR's largely top-down and authoritative manner of implementing post-genocide policies is widely stated as a substantial hindrance to social healing and Rwanda's reconciliation process as a whole (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Ingelaere, 2010; Lerhe, 2005; Longman et al., 2004b; Stover & Weinstein, 2004; Veale, 2000). In contrast, the contributions of the ICTR hold a more symbolic role, prosecuting top instigators and planners of the genocide, yet possess minimal relevance for bringing about social healing and rehabilitation in Rwandan communities, let alone at the individual level. Meanwhile, gacaca courts remain a pivotal grassroots movement because the principle ownership of the process, participation, and operation of the trials is held by Rwandans themselves. By serving the people and communities that were either directly or indirectly involved in the violence, gacaca courts remain a meaningful vehicle for social healing. Gacaca is: intended to strengthen communities by encouraging people to work together. This is an admirable goal in any case; in Rwanda's situation, it is essential to long-term stability. Rwanda will thrive only if the communities within it function cohesively. The gacaca plan thus aims to link two important goals—retributive justice and community rebuilding—by making them interdependent. (Daly, 2002, p. 378) For gacaca to reach its full healing and community development potential, increased local empowerment—a major grassroots priority—is necessary. As indicated by the many voices of discontent, however, the post-genocide GoR does not fully reflect the grassroots needs and perspectives. The efforts of the international community, meanwhile, are not well connected to local people and healing. The ICTR is retributive justice with symbolic meaning, not a direct 118 mechanism for community development. 5.2.5.2 Reparation and economic development The second dimension for connecting reconciliation and development is in the aspect of reparation. As indicated throughout this research, the meaning and magnitude of reparation is robustly highlighted and pursued by the genocide victims and survivors organizations. Given that abject living conditions and the gravity of poverty have an impact on ordinary Rwandans' everyday lives, survivors view reparation as an opportunity to improve their quality of life and to alleviate poverty, giving reparations a practical as well as symbolic meaning. Meanwhile, the other actors, as reflected by the policies and approaches of the GoR and donor community, have given very little attention to reparations. Their fundamental position implies that addressing poverty issues can lead to social stability and conflict prevention. Economic policy papers, poverty reduction plans, and donor feedback and guidelines rarely attempt to refine or contextualize Rwandan reconciliation, or even use the term 'reconciliation,' making it very difficult to conceive of how reconciliation is defined and viewed from their perspective. Even well intended efforts at restitution through the programs of the FARG and gacaca, as seen above, are insufficient and controversial when functioning in practice. The meaning and value attached to reparation as a reconciliation and development strategy in the GoR and donor community remains little more than rhetoric. 5.2.5.3 Shared views on history and political development The third and final focal point of the analysis considers reconciling the past of Rwanda and its political development. Settling the account of ethnic identity represents an intersection of the two concepts. The post-genocide GoR chose national identity—Rwandans—as Rwanda's political 119 identity, detangling the thread of what represented Rwanda during predecessor governments, where ethnicity had been embedded in every aspect of Rwandan life. The current GoR's decisive effort to disseminate this new doctrine has had a significant influence on Rwandan society as a whole, especially on younger generations. Mentioning and discussing someone's ethnicity has become a strict taboo and is considered inappropriate among Rwandans (Rusesabagina, 2006, pp. 198-199). The intent of the GoR's approach is noteworthy, in that ethnicity in principle is no longer an 'official' indicator of someone's social, economic, or political status. Summarizing the merit of the GoR's stance, Hintjens (2009) explains: the government has constantly stressed the point that Rwandans should not be divided along racial lines. Attempting to reinvent Rwandan national identity by removing race labels from public political discourse is the government's way of trying to ensure genocide can never happen again, (p. 79) The compelling question, however, is whether such a policy represents true freedom from the legacy of ethnicity, or merely another manipulation of power by the GoR. While it is still too soon to measure success or failure, the GoR's implementation of the policy has come under criticism for facilitating the concentration and continuation of RPF power through political manoeuvring and manipulation. The GoR is silencing its opposition, not allowing for a diversity of voices. In this way, ethnicity does not matter in principle, but is still pervasive in determining and appointing positions of social authority or within the political arena. Those of Hutu-descent continue to be implicitly marginalized and discriminated (Buckley-Zistel, 2006a; Longman, 2004a; Reyntjens, 2004). This reality does not necessarily have a positive influence on the perspectives of Rwandan grassroots toward ethnicity, nor is it helpful or constructive in building a reconciliatory mode for the society. Two layers now exist. In public and official discourse, ethnicity is discouraged and disappearing on the surface. In practice, however, ethnicity still remains 120 significant and contributes to Rwandans' perceptions of one another (Longman et al., 2004a, 2004b; USAID, 2000). Concerning the GoR's policy towards ethnicity and history, the role of the donor community and external parties involved in Rwanda's post-genocide exercise typically fall into one of two categories: silence or acquiescence. Donors are often reluctant to act on such domestic issues given their inability or unwillingness to understand Rwandan history and local conditions (Zorbas, 2008, pp. 144-154). Rather, they feel that the best they can do is to support the GoR through "a 'backseat' strategy where their most substantial contribution to reconciliation is their public commitment to support the government, financially and diplomatically" (Zorbas, 2008, p. 152). Synthesizing the above discussions, the connections between post-genocide Rwanda's reconciliation and development among the major actors are found in the Table 5.2. Perspectives of ^^relationships Actors Healing and community development Reparation and economic development History and political development Implicit: Strongly related: no Rhetoric retributive justice ethnic difference Strongly related: Strongly related: Rwandan multi-dimensional Strongly related ethnic difference grassroots justice exists Rhetoric: International retributive, symbolic Rhetoric Silenced or irrelevant community justice Table 5.2 Perspectives of the actors toward the relationships between post-genocide Rwanda's reconciliation and development GoR 121 5.3 Conclusion Building on the assessments of the major actors in post-genocide Rwanda presented in this chapter, the cross-actor analysis of an association between reconciliation and development yields the following primary findings. Firstly, the majority of all policies for reconciliation and those for development are stated and treated in a separate and distinct manner. Even in cases where the actors acknowledge the relationships between reconciliation and development, the relationships are not necessarily discussed explicitly or clearly. The GoR, in particular, makes it difficult to recognize what reconciliation means and how it is defined. There is virtually no direct clarification of the notions and definitions of reconciliation provided by the Government, despite its post-genocide vision of national unity and reconciliation in order to "strive for a peaceful, united and prosperous nation" (NURC, n.d.). In most official documents, rather, the methodology of reconciliation—how to reconcile victims and perpetrators, people with different ethnic backgrounds, the rich and poor, and the old and young—is emphasized without any specific conceptualization of what reconciliation means in the Rwandan context. The GoR, by positioning reconciliation as a vague 'moving target,' dilutes the structure of lasting relationships between reconciliation and development on their part. Secondly, different priorities and strategies for reconciliation are apparent by different actor depending on the actors' rationale and position. This means a certain amount of friction or disagreement is experienced. Grassroots attempts at reconciliation are often impeded by overbearing GoR policy, or in the case of reparations, lack thereof. The international community, meanwhile, views reconciliation as an ultimately domestic issue and thereby a problem to be solved by Rwandan society itself. 122 The final finding of this analysis is that the meaning of reconciliation is highly divergent by actor. Each actor places their own meaning upon the concept of reconciliation, drawing from the pool of 'reconciliation resources' (e.g., justice, truth, reparations, healing, unified perspective on history, etc.), to meet their unique needs. With three different and often conflicting approaches to reconciliation being incorporated into the post-genocide development of Rwanda, a substantial multi-actor association between reconciliation and development remains elusive. 123 CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION As the number of societies that have undergone mass violence continues to rise, an increased level of importance and interest is being paid to the discourse of post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction, both in theory and practice. When the characteristic of conflict is primarily intrastate rather than interstate in nature, geographical separation among adversarial groups is not always a viable solution. In such circumstances, consequently, reconciliation presents a way to recuperate and rebuild broken relationships amongst former conflicting parties. Reconciliation can promote lasting peace and conflict prevention. This research stems from the notion that reconciliation is an integral part of development in post-conflict societies. Societies have different ways to deal with their violent pasts. Despite the difficulty of applying the discourse of reconciliation to unique situations, efforts to conceptualize the vast and vague 'realm of reconciliation' are in fact expanding. In situations where a culture of impunity has prevailed, justice often holds the key to conflict resolution (Kubai, 2007; Ngoga, 2009). Embodying another approach to reconciliation, formal truth commissions have been instituted in over 20 countries where the search for historical clarity and incident verification is paramount (Hayner, 1996; Ross, 2006). While the balance between justice and truth tends to dominate discussions concerning the meaning of reconciliation (Brouneus, 2007; Gloppen, 2005; Hayner, 2001; Kritz, 2002; Minow, 1998; Rigby, 2001; Rotberg & Thompson, 2000), this dichotomy should not overlook the practical value of reparations as an additional component of reconciliation. The case of Rwanda is evidence of this phenomenon, where a complex history and divergent actors' perspectives necessitate a multi-faceted approach to reconciliation. Such an approach, moreover, underscores the possibilities for reconciliation and development to intersect. 124 In the context of a post-conflict setting, this thesis attempted to search for the meanings of reconciliation and development and to explore the possible connections and bridging points between these two themes in post-genocide Rwanda. The history of Rwanda demonstrates the combustible outcome of ethnic division when political instability and numerous other factors converge. Dating back to precolonial Rwanda, ethnicity has followed a contentious path. Physical, socio-economic, and political differences have regularly been exploited for political power and gains, initially by colonizers and then by Rwandans themselves after independence. As colonial powers leveraged ethnicity in order to control Rwanda through indirect rule, first siding with the ruling Tutsi, and later backing the ruled Hutu, ethnic difference became rigidified in Rwandans through an identity that determines his/her social, political, and economic status in society. After the era of independence, the tactics of ethnic divisionism took on a renewed position as a means for competing and eliminating any opposition and to seize political power. With this approach, Hutu politicians obtained control during almost the latter half of the twentieth century. Tensions among the ethnic groups grew and perceptions on ethnicity polarized. Throughout these transitions it was Rwandans at the bottom rung, regardless of their ethnicity, who suffered the greatest burden of mass violence, exile, loss of life, and such. As many (Des Forges, 1995,1999; IPEP, 2000; Longman 1997,2006a; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1998; C. Newbury & D. Newbury, 1995; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1995) view, the 1994 genocide is not an isolated and unexpected tragedy but is understood as an extended period of violence stemming from oppressive political dictatorship, pressure for democratic reform, a faltering economy, RPF invasion, and civil war. The genocide that eliminated 800,000 lives left with it a number of challenges, most 125 importantly the rebuilding and recovery of a devastated society. More than 15 years have now passed since the conflict, and studies conducted about post-genocide Rwanda are indeed vast. Accordingly, the main objective of this research has been to seek out the meanings of reconciliation and development in Rwanda, two concepts that are frequently mentioned, but seldom combined in the literature or in practice. To enable this undertaking, the goals and strategies of three prominent actors—the GoR, Rwandan grassroots, and the international community—were examined in order to find the meanings they hold for reconciliation and development, and to consider the relationship between these concepts. This research hypothesized three associations between reconciliation and development—social healing and community development, reparations and economic development, and shared views on history and political development; and then, it examined them against the meanings of reconciliation and development of major actors in post-genocide Rwanda. 6.1 Post-Genocide Rwanda's Reconciliation at the Crossroads of Development: The Findings Perspectives and approaches by Rwandan grassroots, the Government, and non-Rwandan stakeholders involved in Rwanda's post-genocide peace-building and development exercises were subject to examination and study as the major actors in this post-conflict scenario. There is a clear cohesiveness among all three actors that emphasizes punishment of the guilty as the first and most meaningful step towards reconciliation and development. Beyond this concurrence, however, there exists a divergence among these actors when it comes down to the specific notions of justice and the perceived magnitudes of the concept and its delivery. The GoR subscribes to a model of widespread retributive justice. The international community sought out a more nuanced and symbolic form of justice by putting top genocide leaders, planners, and 126 inciters on trial. At the grassroots, meanwhile, participation in gacaca courts was the preferred approach to justice, aiming for both retributive and restorative outcomes. Grassroots justice emphasizes the importance of open discussion, truth-telling, forgiveness, and above all, local empowerment. In practice, however, local participation is low, and issues of security, revenge attacks, threats, and enforced participation are common. Even when reconciliation is pared down to a single concept such as justice, consensus and agreement among actors does not necessarily occur. To grassroots, who were the most affected by the experiences of violence, reconciliation means many different things and cannot be simplified to a single statement or concept. Unlike the donor community, who tends to follow the guidelines, principles, and rhetoric of transitional justice and post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building, reconciliation for the grassroots occurs in real time and among the dynamics of real people. Similarly, the meaning of development does not translate well amongst the actors, as different metrics and results are employed by each actor. On one hand, grassroots priorities include tangible improvements in areas such as security, property rights, job protection, education, and health. For grassroots, practical utility takes precedent over rhetoric. The GoR, on the other, places priority on the achievement of economic growth, in order to reduce poverty through more efficient usage of natural resources and knowledge-based capital. To the international community, Rwanda's development is primarily economically driven, with GDP growth and aid inflows dictating the bottom line. Taking these three perspectives into consideration, tackling the issue of poverty emerges as a shared meaning, though poverty reduction alone does not satisfy the development goals of each actor. At the same time, the meaning of development, as highlighted by both the GoR and international community, appears 127 to be infused with rhetoric, often stating lofty goals or impressive strategies, but rarely incorporating these words into practice. In examining for relationships between reconciliation and development, no simple answers or obvious trends were observed. Instead, the analysis revealed numerous missed opportunities and cross-actor discrepancies. Gacaca courts, for example, while seemingly designed to embrace both social healing and community development, are plagued by top-down implementation, thus limiting their crossover potential. Even policy documents, particularly from the GoR and international community, fail to make explicit the relationship between reconciliation and development, often due to imprecise concepts or definitions of what reconciliation means in the Rwandan context. The meanings of reconciliation and development in Rwanda, as evidenced through this analysis, are unique for each actor, with conflicting agendas and competing strategies in place. When the agendas of each actor do collide, reconciliation and development endeavours often become fragile and ineffective. Limited success, GoR opposition, and the low grassroots appeal of the ICTR serve as examples. This reality is particularly concerning at the grassroots level, where viewpoints and priorities such as reparations are being ignored or not being implemented. By testing relationships between reconciliation and development, these disconnections and limitations of post-conflict initiatives in a multi-actor environment were made apparent. 6.2 Implications of the Research 6.2.1 Implications for Rwanda's post-genocide reconciliation and development In Rwanda, considerable focus is given to the issue of justice, often at the expense of alternative concepts of reconciliation that look beyond the judicial dimension. As discussed earlier, there are 128 alternative approaches to reconciliation that have been tested in other post-conflict societies, but these concepts, such as truth-telling and reparations, tend to be overshadowed or marginalized in Rwanda. One avenue of reconciliation that has been discussed and holds potential for Rwanda is a truth commission (Lambourne, 2001; Sarkin, 1999; Vandeginste, 2001). As Vandeginste (2001) succinctly observes: "dealing with the past in such a context cannot solely be a judicial issue; it is a political challenge and a challenge for society as a whole" (p. 223). In part, the solution lies in grassroots empowerment and the embracement of bottom-up approaches by the GoR (Moyo, 2009; van Hoyweghen, 1999). By encouraging local ownership of key processes, the main driving force of reconciliation can be realized. For reconciliation to occur and thrive in Rwanda, wider concerns relating to post-conflict development, such as personal security, social healing, poverty alleviation, reparation, equality, historical clarification and a systemic reparation scheme, remain unresolved (IPEP, 2000; Kirkby, 2006; Mamdani, 2001; Minow, 1998). In light of these and other preconditions, it is still too soon to analyse the outcomes of Rwanda's recovery from genocide, nor was it the intent of this research to produce such findings. Additional data, evaluation, and long-term research is still necessary in order to assess the full achievements and potential of Rwanda's reconciliation and development process. With each discovery and exploration of post-genocide Rwanda, new stones are uncovered and more constructive analysis is made possible. 6.2.2 Prospects on future research The discourse of reconciliation is relatively new, and is still developing and attracting new research. Discourse that treats reconciliation and development as a joined concept, however, is neither common nor emergent. Almost all dialogue speaks of the two concepts as separate entities. After experiencing such a paucity of discourse, this research hopes to lend itself not only 129 to further conceptualization about concrete relationships between reconciliation and development but also to the impact of the discourse in practice both in Rwanda and other post-conflict situations. At present, the discourse of reconciliation tends to be subsumed within the blueprint of post-conflict development, rather than being treated with an equal depth and weight of importance. Given the impact that reconciliation has upon development initiatives in postconflict societies, this discrepancy needs to be balanced, or to borrow from the theme of this thesis, it deserves to be 'reconciled.' Notwithstanding the enhanced emphasis on development and conflict prevention, documentation of any in depth and specific efforts to find an interactive relationship between both agendas is quite minimal. The interrelation of reconciliation and development is not being specifically discussed in depth, and the respective discourses of each study are incompatible with the other—they do not speak the same language. This essential obstacle demands immediate attention, with respect to how closely related and intertwined the two topics are. When development is strategized without fully reflecting ongoing or potential social and/or cultural factors—such as ethnicity in the case of Rwanda—critical synergies are bypassed, certain socio-economic conditions can be aggravated, and a vicious cycle of violence may prevail. Additionally, the question of whether or not reconciliation is purely a domestic issue needs to be addressed. Numerous development programs aim to strengthen the civil society of war-torn countries through funding and development aid for capacity-building. This begs the question; if the donors are really committed to making their money work for the improvement of society, why leave reconciliation out of the picture, given the tremendous potential that development, particularly at the local level, can have on reconciliation? 130 This research underscores that in a post-conflict society such as Rwanda, reconciliation and development are not stand-alone entities that operate in isolation from each other. 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