THE ABSENCE OF GENDER IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
CANADIAN POLICIES TOWARD SOUTH AFRICA
by
Charelle L. Gribling
B.A., University of Northern British Columbia, 2011

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
January 2017
©Charelle L. Gribling, 2017

ABSTRACT
Using a postcolonial feminist perspective, this thesis investigates gender in Canadian
foreign policy toward South Africa, specifically toward HIV/AIDS programs, during the
Harper era. This thesis shows that other than a superficial inclusion in the discourse, there
was an absence of gender in Canadian foreign policy, under the Harper government.
Moreover, there was a lack of attention paid to the complexity of HIV/AIDS and GBV
intersection, and there was only a shallow effort by DFATD to prompt inclusion of gender
while local practitioners had a keen understanding of the intersection. The absence in the
Harper government discourse and practice showed a lack of understanding of the complexity
of the issue, which is the lived experience of those on the ground in South Africa.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract

ii

Table of Contents

iii

List of Tables and Figures

iv

List of Acronyms

v

Glossary

vi

Acknowledgement

vii

Dedication

viii

Chapter One: Introduction

1

Chapter Two: Theory and Methodology

11

Chapter Three: Gender-Based Violence in South Africa

33

Chapter Four: Canadian Foreign Policy Toward Africa

54

Chapter Five: Discourse Analysis and Interview Findings

82

Chapter Six: Conclusions

128

Works Cited

142

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LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1: Postcolonial Ideas and Pillars

21

Figure 1: HIV and AIDS Estimates in South Africa in 2013

46

Figure 2: Estimated HIV Prevalence among South Africans, by age and sex, 2008

49

Figure 3: HIV Prevalence Rate within Each Ethnic Group in South Africa

77

iv

LIST OF ACRONYMNS
AAP

Africa Action Plan

AIDS

Acquired immune deficiency syndrome

ARVs

Anti-retroviral Drugs

CFP

Canadian foreign policy

CIDA

Canadian International Development Agency

DFAIT

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

DFATD

Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development

GBV

Gender-based violence

HIV

Human immunodeficiency virus

HDI

Human Development Index

MI

Muskoka Initiative

MNCH

Maternal, Newborn and Child Healthcare

NEPAD

New Partnership for Africa’s Development

PCF

Postcolonial Feminism

PEP

Post-exposure Prophylaxis

RSA

Republic of South Africa

SES

Socio-economic status

WTO

World Trade Organization

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GLOSSARY
Except for sati, the following words all come from the Xhosa language, which is a Bantu
language spoken by the Xhosa people in Zimbabwe and Southern South Africa. It is one of
the eleven official languages of South Africa.
Amazni: water
Lobola: dowry
Makoti: A new Xhosa bride.
Muti: Traditional medicines.
Primogeniture: The right of the eldest surviving male to inherit the estate of his parents.
Sangoma: A traditional African healer.
Sati: The Hindu custom of a widow burning to death on her husband’s funeral pyre.
Shweshwe: A type of printed, dyed cotton fabric that was introduced to Southern Africa by
German settlers. Also known as “Germans’ cloth.”
Ukuthwala: The practice of abducting young girls and forcing them into marriage, often with
the consent of their parents.
Ulwaluko: Xhosa initiation and coming of age ritual for teenage boys.
Xhosa: The second largest indigenous group in South Africa, next to Zulu.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I must thank my parents, John and Carolyn Gribling. Your unwavering
support throughout the years and my seemingly never-ending schooling has given me
strength and courage when I needed it most; you have always made me believe that I am
capable of anything that I set my mind to. I love you both and I will forever be grateful for
everything you do for me.
To Heather Smith, my supervisor and mentor—I will take your words of wisdom with me
wherever life takes me, and I will never stop asking, “So what and who cares?” Thank you
for teaching me how to never stop questioning.
To my committee, Fiona MacPhail and Rebecca Tiessen. Thank you both for your amazing
insight and support, and for being a part of my Superstar Team! This final product would not
have been possible without you.
And finally, Brittany Gourley. You believe in me when I don’t believe in myself and you
trust that the end will justify the means. I would not have made it through these last few
years without you beside me, encouraging me to keep going, wiping away my tears, cheering
me on, or just listening when I needed to vent. I love you the most – I win!

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DEDICATION
I dedicate this thesis to the people in South Africa and all over the world who, because of
their sex and gender, possess no agency, and to all the people who fight tirelessly to put an
end to that oppression.

viii

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The Republic of South Africa is the richest country in Africa which happens to be the
only continent that has not benefitted from the global boom over the last 40 years (Standing
Senate Committee 2007). Although it is the wealthiest country in Africa, many of South
Africa’s citizens are in dire need of substantial quality of life improvement: the country and
its people suffer from serious development issues that cannot be ignored.
Since the end of Apartheid in 1994, South Africa has regained their place in the
Commonwealth, and has become the largest and most advanced economy in Africa. While
parts of the country bask in wealth, people in urban and rural townships continue to live in
third world conditions and suffer excessively. According to the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD) (now Global Affairs Canada)1, “since 1990,
[South Africa] has dropped about 40 places [on the Human Development Index] due almost
entirely to the HIV/AIDS epidemic that has severely reduced life expectancy and continues
to strain social services and place a huge burden on women and children” (DFATD 2014b).
Due to the interrelationship between underdevelopment, gender-based violence (GBV), 2
domestic violence, and HIV/AIDS (Onyejekwe 2004), women and children bear the brunt of
destitution, violence and illness. In a report to the United Nations Division for the
Advancement of Women, Lisa Vetten (2005) explicitly states that “violence against women
has been one of the most prominent features of post-Apartheid South Africa” (2). For a
country not at war, South Africa has some of the worst GBV statistics in the world (Mosavel,
1

Before the election of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Global Affairs was the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Trade and Development (DFATD). I will continue to use DFATD for the remainder of this thesis, as all the
research took place before Prime Minister Stephen Harper left office in 2015.
2
Gender-based violence refers to actions that reflect inequalities between women and men, and is defined as
“violence that is directed against a person on the basis of gender” (Eurpoean Institute for Gender Equality
2016). This type of violence includes rape, domestic violence, sexual assault and harassment, trafficking of
women and girls, and harmful traditional practices (United Nations Population Fund 2008).

1

Ahmed and Simon 2011), and has accurately been labelled as having a culture of violence
(Njuho and Davids 2012).
The high incidence of GBV, specifically rape, leads to high rates of HIV infection, as
a study done in 2009 shows that 19.6% of men who have committed rape are HIV positive
(Rape Crisis 2015). This in turn, leads to a proliferation of GBV as men are more likely to
abuse HIV positive women, who they typically blame for the disease (Schefer 2010, 383).
This is especially true in poor, rural townships, where the HIV rates are twice as high as
those in the developed parts of the country (Bhana 2012, 352). Women disproportionately
represent those living with HIV/AIDS, which is reflected by the fact that “nationally, the
HIV prevalence among women in the age group 30-34 years remains the highest with a
prevalence of 42.6% in 2010. . . [which] has increased by 3.3% since 2007” (Health and
Development Africa 2012, 31).
This situation of violence and HIV/AIDS is one that garners the attention of many
different international actors. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss every country
and agency that is involved in the mitigation of these problems and therefore, Canada and its
policies toward South Africa, specifically between 2006-2015 when Stephen Harper was
Prime Minister, will be the focus of this study.
Rhetorically, the Liberal governments of both Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) and Paul
Martin (2003-2006) were deeply committed to providing aid to Africa. Between 2000 and
2005, Africa was made a hallmark of these two governments (Black 2012, 250) and by 2005,
14 out of Canada’s 25 “development partner countries” were in sub-Saharan Africa: Africa
and poverty reduction, it seemed, was a high priority for Canadians. Despite the strong

2

rhetoric within Canadian foreign policy (CFP) discourse however, Canada, along with other
international donors, has failed to achieve any substantial improvements for the lives of
Africans (Standing Senate Committee 2007, VII). Although Canada’s policies toward South
Africa sought to assist those affected by HIV/AIDS, attention must be given to root causes:
gender inequality and GBV.
At the United Nations General Assembly in September 2013, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs, John Baird, emphasized Canadian efforts “to eradicate sexual violence in
conflict, to eliminate early forced marriage and to improve maternal and infant health”
(DFATD 2013a). The Harper government maintained its commitment to gender and genderrelated issues, yet there is a myriad of scholarly literature to suggest that this is simply not
the case (Brodie and Bakker 2008; Carrier and Tiessen 2013; Swiss 2012a and 2012b;
Tiessen and Carrier 2015). Harper’s 2010 Muskoka Initiative promised to “address the
significant gaps that exist in maternal, newborn, and child health in developing countries”
(DFATD 2012), but failed to include any specific language surrounding gender equality, or
even identify the fact that this is a clearly gendered dilemma (Carrier and Tiessen 2013).
South Africa was not and is not a focus country of bilateral Canadian development
assistance—perhaps because it has the biggest economy in Africa and is part of the
economically fuelled group of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS)—but in
2006 the two countries signed a general agreement on development cooperation. As well,
DFATD has asserted that the Canadian development program in South Africa is closely
aligned with the ten priority areas (2009-2014) as identified by the South African
government (Programme of Action 2009). Under this thematic focus, Canada has a clearly
stated goal in the southern-most African country: to “help the country improve service
3

delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS and to build accountable institutions as well as to help
South Africa play its regional role on the continent through sharing relevant expertise”
(DFATD 2014b). The first part of that goal, “to help improve service delivery in the area of
HIV/AIDS and to build accountable institutions” will help shape the questions throughout
this thesis, and will inform the analysis.
1.1 RESEARCH QUESTION AND THESIS STATEMENT
Stephen Harper’s Conservative government had a goal with regard to South Africa to
“help the country improve service delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS and build accountable
institutions, as well as to help South Africa play its regional role on the continent through
sharing relevant expertise” (DFATD 2014b). Gender and HIV/AIDS are so strongly linked
that they cannot be separated, yet there may have been an absence of gender in CFP and
development aid under Stephen Harper. Therefore, the central research question of this thesis
is: under the Harper government, was there an absence of gender in aid to HIV/AIDS
programs in South Africa and if so, what were the implications?
As previously stated, the focus of this thesis is on the Canadian government’s policies
toward HIV/AIDS in South Africa, which of course is an example of an external western, or
Global North agency sending aid to the Global South. Since postcolonial feminist theory
includes focus on external western agencies as well as the intersection of gender, race, and
socio-economic status, I will use this theory to inform my analysis of the extent to which
gender is understood and included in Canadian funded HIV/AIDS programs in South Africa,
as well as the level to which gender was included. This will bolster the research question by
asking if Canadian policies and programmes (directed toward HIV/AIDS in South Africa)

4

consider gendered differences and intersections of gender, race and class. Or more
accurately, is the HIV epidemic examined or considered within the precise social relations in
which it occurs?
Although Harper’s government promised to address health issues of mothers and
children in developing countries and to help South Africa improve its HIV programs,
academics (Brodie and Bakker 2008; Carrier and Tiessen 2013; Tiessen and Carrier 2015)
argue that it all but removed any language of gender from official discourse. The phrase
“gender equality” was even (temporarily) replaced with “equality between men and women”
to avoid any reference to GBV and deny the dilemma of women suffering due to socially
constructed roles (Carrier and Tiessen 2013; Tiessen and Carrier 2015). One of the main
focuses for Canadian Official Development Assistance (ODA) in South Africa is HIV/AIDS,
but for the Canadian government to substantially address the epidemic at its root, gender
must be a central factor to not only its discourse, but also its practice.
Given the observations above and in response to the thesis questions, this thesis will
show that other than a superficial inclusion in the discourse, there was an absence of gender
in Canadian foreign policy, under the Harper government. Moreover, there was a lack of
attention paid to the complexity of HIV/AIDS and GBV intersection, and there was only a
shallow effort by DFATD to prompt inclusion of gender while local practitioners had a keen
understanding of the intersection. The absence in the Harper government discourse and
practice showed a lack of understanding of the complexity of the issue by virtue of not
acknowledging the role that gender plays in HIV/AIDS, which is the lived experience of
those on the ground.

5

As far as policy and process, the Conservative government had a very narrow view of
gender, and as the primary research in chapter five will show, it only seems to have been
included by partners on the ground. If the Harper government failed to include gender, while
promising to enhance maternal health and improve service delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS,
then this is a classic case of treating the symptom rather than addressing the cause. One
cannot attempt to mitigate poor health (such as maternal health or HIV/AIDS) without
confronting one of the root causes: gender-based violence.
1.2 WHY CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY TO AFRICA
This research stems from a deep love for South Africa and its people. After living in
the Eastern Cape for a year, and travelling all over the country, its people adopted me as one
of their own. I started to see things through South African eyes and felt compelled to do
something about the poverty and disease.
The country is a living dichotomy for two major reasons. . First, it has one of the
world’s most gender sensitive constitutions (Republic of South Africa 2016), yet has one of
the highest rates of sexual and GBV. Second,it is the second strongest economy on a
continent of vast resources, yet it has the highest number of people suffering from one of the
world’s deadliest diseases. As of 2013, South Africa’s ranking on the Human Development
Index (HDI) was 121 out of 187 countries, and this low ranking is largely blamed on poverty
and lack of economic productivity resulting from high rates of HIV/AIDS. One of the most
pressing issues concerning this disease is the fact that women are affected at a higher rate
than men, due to gendered disparities. Many women are constrained by traditional gender
roles consistent with a deeply patriarchal society and these roles allow men to engage in

6

polygamous sexual activities and gender violence without fear of reproach. Consequently,
this circumstance perpetuates the cycle of HIV/AIDS. This is a severe problem in need of
crucial support, one to which Canada has offered assistance.
Canada’s aid policies toward South Africa are important due to our historical
relationship. Official relations began in 1939, and Canada played a big role in pressuring
South Africa to end its Apartheid regime. Because of this history, “Canada considers South
Africa to be a true partner and friend based on mutually shared values in support of equality,
democracy, peace, security and prosperity” (Government of Canada 2013). If there is a
public announcement of partnership and friendship, it would only seem fitting that any aid to
South Africa would be helpful and significant. HIV/AIDS is viewed as a catalyst for many of
South Africa’s development problems (Standing Senate Committee 2007; DFATD 2014b;
Onyejekwe 2004) and Canada has the resources to help fight this deadly disease, it just needs
to apply them appropriately and effectively.
1.3 CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This introductory chapter has set up the research problem, given it some historical
context, and provided the research question and thesis statement. I have shown that Canadian
foreign policy and its HIV/AIDS programming is an important topic requiring a careful
analysis of the implications of the reported absence of gender in Canadian foreign policy –
implications that can determine the success and impact of such programs.
To set up the rest of the thesis, the next chapter discusses postcolonial feminist theory
and the methodology used to carry out the research. Drawing from the ideas of postcolonial,
transnational, and postcolonial feminist scholars, the main pillars of postcolonial feminist
7

theory emerged as race, socio-economic status, gender intersection, and external western
agencies. These pillars subsequently informed the methodology design, which includes a
discourse analysis of government documents, speeches and reports, and semi-structured
interviews with individuals in South Africa. As well the ideas and pillars of postcolonial
feminism are woven throughout each chapter as a framework for key ideas which shape the
research analyses.
To begin to build the case that an absence of gender in CFP affects aid programs
negatively, chapter three outlines academic literature on GBV and HIV/AIDS in South
Africa. The four pillars of postcolonial feminism framed the areas of the literature review,
which resulted in four distinct themes: historical and social practices; culture of violence;
“othering” and silence; and feminization of poverty. This literature is presented as two
separate bodies of literature, but the third section of the chapter illustrates their
interconnectedness, and I argue that one issue cannot be mitigated without at least attempting
to confront the other. This chapter shows that there is a very serious problem in South Africa,
and it does warrant international attention and aid.
Next, chapter four focuses on both gender in Canadian foreign policy, and Canadian
foreign policy toward Africa. These foci are given some historical context, followed by a
postcolonial feminist critique of the two. This chapter demonstrates that Canada has
historically had a place in Africa, but this role has changed over time. Although South Africa
has never been a priority for Canada, there are programs and policies in place to help in its
development; however, there is an absence of gender within Canadian foreign policy—
especially under the Harper government—which undermines potential progress and success

8

of development programmes. This has happened in other parts of Africa as well (Tiessen
2003, 2005; Tiessen and Carrier 2013), so there is justifiable concern for South Africa.
Chapter five presents a postcolonial feminist perspective of the discourse analysis and
interview results. Again, ideas and elements of postcolonial feminism are woven throughout,
to illustrate the interconnection throughout the entire thesis. The discourse analysis section is
organized by elements of the discourse analysis template (see Appendix 1), informed by the
four pillars of postcolonial feminism: race, socio-economic status, gender intersection, and
external western agencies. Similarly, the interview section is also organized by theme, as
situated in the four pillars of postcolonial feminism with related sub-sections that arose
naturally during discussion. Between these two sections, implications of the absence of
gender in CFP are made clear.
The sixth and final chapter will summarize the thesis, including findings and analyses
from the literature review, discourse analysis and interviews. Gaps between theory and
practice will be highlighted, as well as implications of those gaps such as the hypocritical
nature of CFP, the “othering” of the Third World by Canada, and the habit of the Harper
government to prioritize trade and economics over altruistic issues such as poverty reduction
and gender issues thereby ignoring the root causes of many development problems. At the
end of the chapter, I will note the theoretical and practical value of this thesis as per
postcolonial feminism, and I will provide recommendations for further research as well as
some concluding remarks.
This introductory chapter presented an overview of the entire thesis. It provided the
foundation on which this research is based, and justified GBV, HIV/AIDS, and Canadian

9

policies toward South Africa as a problem in need of further research. As noted above, the
next chapter will present the theoretical assumptions used throughout this thesis, and will
provide a step by step outline of the research methodology.

10

CHAPTER 2: THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
The previous chapter introduced the underpinnings of this thesis, and laid the
foundation for the research. This chapter will now shift to a theoretical discussion and outline
the theory and methodology that prompted me to ask the questions that propel this study and
guide data collection and analysis.
Postcolonial feminism (PCF) is a critical theory, and has informed the entirety of this
thesis. Originally stemming from postcolonial literary theory for which it was used to
examine both female writers as well as fictional female characters, postcolonial feminism has
evolved into a more globalized theory. I use “globalized” to express that this theory is used
both globally as well as interdisciplinarily. This theory has provided an interesting and very
relevant framework by which to complete the research and analysis for this thesis.
This chapter will discuss the evolution of postcolonial feminism beginning with
second and third wave feminism and moving on to discuss influential theorists. It will
continue by outlining the pillars of PCF, and explaining how together, they and the theory
informed both my research and methodology. Next it will outline my research design and
technique, and will discuss my overall methodology, step by step. Finally, the chapter will
conclude by explaining why I chose this theory and methodology above others.
2.1 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
In the 1980s, about twenty years into second wave feminism, postcolonial and
transnational feminisms appeared as a new category of feminist thought (Mann and Huffman
2005), marking the latest paradigm shift in feminist theory. The need for these subsets of
feminist thought came from the tendency of feminist literary and cultural criticisms, within
11

the second wave, to homogenize and universalize the lives of women through a Eurocentric
gaze. Postcolonial theory does not signify a shift from colonialism to “after colonialism,” but
rather a criticism of colonialism (McEwan 2001), including its practices, and its lasting
legacy. These ideas provided part of the foundation for the third wave.
This next wave continued to advance the second wave agenda, but with a much more
inclusive, diverse, and nuanced approach (Krølokke and Sørensen 2006). Whereas first wave
feminism focused (deliberately or otherwise) on white, cis-gendered, heterosexual, middleclass women, and the second wave began to include women of colour, class issues, and
developing nations. Continuing through the 20th century, the new third wave sought to
operate in a different climate other than just the West, and emphasize personal narratives (not
just collective, universal womanhood), responsible choices, individual-level political
activism (Zimmerman, McDermott and Gould 2009), and an intersectional approach.
As part of the third wave, postcolonial feminist theory is evidently made up of two
parts: postcolonialism and feminism. These two theories intimately intertwine to create a
perspective through which to examine marginalized groups –namely women –in areas that
were once colonized and still suffer from the effects of those colonial eras. Aptly put,
“[p]ostcolonial theory is a diverse field of inquiry that explores the physical, psychological,
and cultural effects of the colonial systems on the colonizer and the colonized” (Jones 2011,
23) It is drawn from postmodern schools of thought, emphasizing socially constructed, nonuniversal knowledge that is situated in a local historical setting (Haslam, Schafer and
Beaudet 2009), and it seeks to critically engage with, and challenge colonial discourses as
well as the social, economic, political, and cultural legacies of such practices (Mann 2012).
Foucault’s analysis of knowledge and power is central to this theory, and while he has been

12

faulted largely for ignoring the imperial context of Europe in his genealogies of modernity
(Spivak in Mann 2012, 364), his analyses remain pertinent, noting that establishment of
knowledges and disciplines is never innocent; they are formations of power by means of
purposeful as well as indiscriminate inclusion and exclusion (Mann 2012). Foucault’s
postmodern ideas are considered to have helped lay the foundations of postcolonial feminism
(Ibid.), although the theory has other influential thinkers to thank for expanding its
principles.
As a postcolonial theorist, Edward Said’s work, Orientalism (1978), has certainly had
a strong influence within postcolonial feminism. Said was a Palestinian writer concerned
with Western prejudice against Arab-Islamic and Asian peoples which he referred to as
“Orientalism” (Mann 2012, 364). He wrote about Europeans who saw themselves as superior
to these cultures, using their perceived superiority as justification for colonization. According
to Said, the main problem was when Europeans started to generalize traits of the indigenous
people of the east (Orientals as they came to be called) and portrayed them through scientific,
literary, and artistic work at home, which created a stereotype in the minds of other
Europeans (Said 1978). This created a bias in the minds of the European people, and for
Said, this was the ‘Othering’ of the people of the Orient.
Like some postcolonial feminist scholars, Said saw the colonizer and the colonized as
mutually constitutive, and for him, the object of postcolonial theory was to analyze the social
implications of that process (Mann 2012, 364). It is for these reasons (recognizing
the “Other” in the colonized, the essentialisms and stereotypes prescribed to the “Other,” and
the mutually constitutive relationship between colonizer and colonized) that Said is so
important to postcolonialism. Postcolonial feminists are constantly reminded to be aware of

13

these practices within the areas of their work, and this awareness leads to heightened
reflexivity and consciousness of positionality.
A discussion about postcolonial feminism would be remiss not to include perhaps the
most influential postcolonial feminists, Gayatri Spivak, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, and
interdisciplinary scholar, Linda Tuhiwai Smith. Each of these women has inspired
postcolonial feminism in an unforgettable manner. Spivak is remembered for questioning
whether the subaltern may speak; Mohanty highlighted the importance of not homogenizing
women and their experiences into one amalgamation; and Smith expanded the idea of
postcolonialism to include knowledge as well as culture, religion, and customs.
Gayatri Spivak’s preeminent essay, Can the Subaltern Speak (1988) as well as much
of her other work (Spivak 1987; Spivak 1999; Guha and Spivak [eds.] 1988) addresses the
manner in which western academic culture investigates other (namely the developing world)
cultures, and the ethical problems that accompany such investigations, and poses the not-sosimple question, can the subaltern speak? This question is not literal, it is philosophical in
nature, and ponders whether the most marginalized people (who tend to be women and
children) might speak up and be heard; might they possess agency.
Antonio Gramsci is often cited as being the first to use the term, subaltern, in the
theoretical sense. He used it to refer to “slaves, peasants, religious groups, women, different
races, and the proletariat as subaltern social groups” (Green 2002, 2). Spivak, while not
coining the term, definitely adapted it, and some may say even perfected it for the use of
postcolonial feminist theory. Spivak’s subaltern, unlike Gramsci’s (who she thought
privileged the male subaltern), is informed by both feminism and deconstruction, and takes
women’s lives and histories into account. The term, itself, “accommodates the contradictory
14

social and class locations who do not fall easily into the categories of orthodox Marxist class
analysis” (Mann 2012, 370).
To Spivak, true subaltern groups are the most marginalized, indigenous populations,
who cannot speak for themselves. They have come to be truly relegated due to Imperial
codes and practices which have really fractured their indigenous sign-systems (Spivak 1988).
These processes, she describes as epistemic violence: the deterioration of “indigenous
languages, culture and thought that accompanies colonial conquest” (Mann 2012, 414). The
result is the dominance of the Western ways of perceiving, understanding and knowing the
world (Spivak 1988, 280). She uses the example of sati (widow sacrificing), an indigenous
practice that was wiped out by colonial powers in India, to illustrate this epistemic violence.
She states, “[t]he abolition of this rite by the British, has been gradually understood as a case
of ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’. . . against this is the nativist (and
agency-oriented) argument. . . ‘The women actually wanted to die’” (Spivak 1988, 297). In
other words, women were denied their own stories and their own decision-making power visà-vis outsider intervention and the documentation of these encounters.
Drawing on this critical analysis, feminist postcolonial theorists consider how
subaltern populations are truly unable to speak for themselves, because power lies within the
West, and in order to speak to the West, the subaltern must use the colonial language, rather
than their native tongue. Consequently, by speaking a language other than their native
language, they have in turn lost any agency that they may have possessed in the first place.
While Spivak warns western researchers to tread lightly when working with indigenous,
developing world populations, Chandra Mohanty highlights the importance of not
homogenizing Third World populations.
15

Chandra Talpade Mohanty is a leading postcolonial and transnational feminist, who
has used her personal experience with colonization to inform her intellection, in order to
bring attention to the importance of intertwining theory with practice and lived experiences.
The major theme throughout her work that seems to resonate with postcolonial feminists is
the criticism of Western, Eurocentric views on Third World women as monolithic. Like
Spivak and Said, Mohanty disapproves of the creation and reinforcement of the binary
between the self-representation of the western scholar and the Third World woman. She
condemns the homogenization of these women as reductionist and ahistorical (Mohanty
2003, 31). Further, she expresses her dismay at the fact that individual lives and narratives of
these women are not taken into account when they are represented by the West as mere
objects of research. “Third World women do not constitute any automatic unitary group”
(Mohanty 2003, 49), but the West tends to see them as some sort of imagined community,
not as the millions of individual women that they are. The Third World is a heterogeneous
community, and like Spivak, Mohanty takes issue with the West’s attempts to speak for this
entire group of women. The final line of Mohanty’s most famous publication, Under Western
Eyes, states this concern very clearly: “It is time to move beyond [Karl] Marx who found it
possible to say: they cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Mohanty 2003,
42).
In order to combat homogenization when performing postcolonial feminist research,
Mohanty reminds scholars of the necessity to take into account personal narratives and lived
experiences. However, she warns that it is crucial to avoid both the traps of being overly
theoretical, as well as overly experiential. There must be some middle ground when
theorizing and working with these groups. One must avoid being too specific, because that
16

type of research tends to lose meaning and is too disjointed. However, to be overly
theoretical is to perform the type of research that Mohanty and Spivak explain as threatening:
if one attempts to speak for all Third World women on a macro scale, then one risks a
disempowering homogenization of these groups. Do not evaluate the ‘Third World,’ evaluate
the community:
The community, then, is the product of work, of struggle; it is the inherently
unstable, contextual; it has to be constantly reevaluated in relation to critical
political priorities; and it is the product of interpretation, interpretation based
on an attention to history, to the concrete, to what Foucault (1980) has called
subjugated knowledges. There is also, however, a strong suggestion that
community is related to experience, to history. (Mohanty 2003, 104)

Communities consist of individuals, their experiences and their narratives; the
superlative Third World society is made up of these smaller communities. A happy medium
(if one does exist) therefore, would be to examine and research communities, and the
individuals that constitute such environments. Mohanty uses difference to deconstruct
essentialism (Mann and Huffman 2005, 67) within these communities, so as to prevent the
trap of Said’s “Orientalism.”
According to Linda Tuhiwai Smith, colonization was not only a social, political, or
economic act, it also served to colonize the minds of those under colonial rule – namely
indigenous populations. Like Said, Smith notes that these processes are still evident today, as
Western knowledge dominates academia, and is really the standard against which all
research and knowledge is measured. These Western perspectives are the academic standard,
but they are fallible in their limitations.

17

Smith describes an approach to postcolonialism which assumes that Western ideas
about the most fundamental things are not only the only ideas possible to hold, but are
certainly the most rational ideas, and the only ideas which can make sense of the world, of
reality, of social life and of human beings. It is an approach to marginalized indigenous
peoples which still conveys a sense of innate superiority and an overabundance of desire to
bring progress into the lives of these people – spiritually, intellectually, socially and
economically. It is research which ‘steals’ knowledge from others and then uses it to benefit
the people who ‘stole’ it” (Smith 1999, 56).
She argues “what counts as Western research draws from an ‘archive’ of knowledge
and systems, rules and values which stretch beyond the boundaries of the Western science to
the system now referred to as the West” (Smith 1999, 42). What she means by this, is that in
the realm of academia, it is Western knowledge and ways of knowing that are seen as
legitimate and as the mainstay against which to compare all knowledge. She questions why
Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing are not looked at as appropriate methods to do
research. Smith parallels other postcolonial theorists (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin [eds.]
1995) in her assumptions that because the West were the colonizers, it was their knowledge
and epistemologies that became the accepted discourse, and the appropriate body of
knowledge by which to examine any social phenomenon, including colonized and
marginalized groups. “The globalization of knowledge and Western culture constantly
reaffirms the West’s view of itself as the center of legitimate knowledge, the arbiter of what
counts as knowledge, and the source of ‘civilized’ knowledge” (Smith 1999, 63). Indigenous
knowledge therefore became the “Other,” or the antithesis to the cornerstone of academia,
that was the West.
18

As such, Smith really drives home the urgency to acknowledge different sources of
knowledge. Turning only to Western knowledge and epistemologies can lead to narrowminded, and ultimately flawed projects, specifically those projects which concern indigenous
populations, as many postcolonial projects tend to do.
From the ideas of these influential theorists and scholars, emerge the pillars of
postcolonial feminism: race, socio-economic status, gender intersection and external western
agencies (Weedon 2007). Race is understandably a connection between all of these ideas, as
each of them speak to Western (mainly white, European) investigation into non-Western, or
Third World (mainly non-white, indigenous) populations. Like the gender intersection pillar,
the socio-economic status pillar correlates to the feminist nature of the theory, as women are
among the most disadvantaged people in the world, and individual socio-economic statuses
change the reality of daily life from woman to woman which speaks to Mohanty’s criticism
of homogenization. Finally, the awareness of external western agencies is derived from the
idea of Western exploration into the Third World, with specific attention paid to Tuhiwai
Smith’s idea of the domination of western knowledge in academia.
Consistent with the aim of third wave feminism and its multi-focused concentrations,
postcolonial feminism does not isolate gender as the only source of oppression. Rather, it
focuses on intersections of oppressive factors that work together to create an environment
and experience of oppression. It has been called “a critique of the homogenizing tendencies
of Western feminism” (Mishra 2013, 129) and it “unmasks the interlocking oppressive
effects of race, gender, and social class. . . [it] unpacks the cultural, historical, social and
economic factors that intersect to shape different oppressive contexts that affect health and

19

well-being. These contexts must be apprehended from the participants’ standpoints instead of
the researcher’s perspective” (Racine 2011, 18).
Oppression, violence, inequality, and subordination of women are but a few different
topics addressed all different branches of feminism. Postcolonial feminism then, is centered
on the idea that colonial practices and the legacy of such practices are intricately and
inherently intertwined with the gendered realities of non-white, non-western women.
Postcolonial feminism is also palimpsestic in nature: where most modern approaches are
linear, postcolonial feminism rejects linear views of history and adopts a non-linear method
of analysis. That is, “it rescrambles the here and now with the then and there” (Mann 2012,
364); the past is always visible in the present. Postcolonial feminism is a critical theory that
“engages with and contests the legacy of colonialism’s discourses, power structures and
social hierarchies” (Ibid.) which, according to many scholars who are critical of the West
(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (eds.) 1995), have shaped academia today.
Said’s explanation of the practice of “Othering”; Spivak’s cautioning to tread lightly
while working with and for subaltern populations; Mohanty’s warning to avoid both overtheoretical and over-experiential research; and Smith’s idea that Western academia is the
only type of accepted knowledge are some of the ideas that have informed this research.
These ideas and the pillars of postcolonial feminism have prompted me to ask if Canadian
policies and programs consider the gendered reality of HIV and its intersection with poor,
non-white women (who are affected the most), or are they a one-size-fits-all approach?
The reasons stated above outline why postcolonial feminism was the perfect fit for
this research: South Africa’s colonial past; the gendered nature of HIV/AIDS; the fact that it

20

is predominantly poor, non-white women who suffer from the disease; and the fact that the
Canadian government (an external western agency) is sending aid to help with South African
HIV/AIDS programs. Canada’s stated goal to help improve service delivery in South Africa
in the area of HIV/AIDS is linked to postcolonial feminism’s pillar of external western
agencies. HIV/AIDS is a symptom of some disturbingly systematic violent trends—it is not a
root cause in and of itself. If anything, it is a cog in the cycle of gender inequality, violence,
and underdevelopment. Postcolonial feminist theory therefore has provoked me to enquire
whether Stephen Harper’s Conservative government took into consideration race, status,
gender intersection, historical practices, social practices, or socio-economic status when
providing aid to HIV/AIDS programming. The pillars and ideas of postcolonial feminism are
also how I designed the methodology to answer this question.
Table 1: Postcolonial Feminist Ideas and Pillars

IDEAS

PILLARS













Overly experiential vs. Overly theoretical (focus on communities)
Othering
Mutually Constitutive Colonial Relationships
Speaking for the Subaltern
Individual Lived Realities
Feminism
Western Ways of Knowing
Race
Gender Intersection
Socio-Economic Status
External Western Agencies

2.2 METHODOLOGY
This thesis has adhered to a feminist research ethic. That is, while performing and
analyzing the research, I attempted to maintain a commitment to practices that are reflective

21

of epistemology, boundaries, relationships, and my own location as a privileged, western
researcher (Ackerly and True 2010, 2). This was done in part because I viewed it as
imperative to use a gender sensitive theory and methodology in order to help further the goal
of equitable social and economic development (Beetham and Demetriades 2007, 210). Not to
mention, the people who were the focus of this research are mainly non-white women from
the developing world, and I, a white woman from the developed world, cannot disregard the
differences in perspectives and experiences.
In order to answer my research question, I undertook three main steps: a literature
review, a discourse analysis, and face to face interviews. These three components came
together to provide quite an accurate picture of the state of GBV and HIV/AIDS in South
Africa, as well as the actions taken by the Conservative government to send aid to this
quandary. The following subsections will outline the step-by-step methodology of each
component of research.
2.2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW
The first step I took was a literature review to gain an understanding of academics’
arguments surrounding: GBV in South Africa; HIV/AIDS in South Africa; gender in
Canadian foreign policy; and Canadian foreign policy (programming) toward Africa. Each of
these bodies provided an essential piece of the foundation of the research question. These
bodies of knowledge present themselves as distinct from one another, yet there are instances
where these ideas overlap with one another and offer valuable insight into their
interconnectedness.

22

When I initially started my literature search, the above terms were exactly what I
entered in the search field of several different academic databases. I used Boolean phrases
such as: South Africa AND gender-based violence (>100 results); South Africa AND
HIV/AIDS (>2,000); South Africa AND Canadian aid (0); Canadian foreign policy AND
gender (almost none); Canadian foreign policy AND South Africa (almost none); Canadian
foreign policy AND HIV/AIDS (almost none); Canadian foreign policy AND Africa (almost
none). When the results came up, I would read the abstract of an article that looked pertinent
(from the title) and then I would go into the article’s information. From there, if I thought the
article would be of use to my research I would save it, but I would also look at the “subject
terms” in the detailed record. If I saw any terms that seemed like they were relevant, I would
click on the link, and see what other articles appeared. I would then repeat the same process.
The search process was not isolated to just academic databases, however. I also
turned to books that would provide me with a plethora of literature. These books included
volumes either written or edited by well-known Canadian foreign policy feminist scholars
including but not limited to Heather A. Smith (1999; 2000; 2003) , Claire Turenne Sjolander
(2003), Deborah Steinstra (1994), and Rebecca Tiessen (2003; 2005; 2013; 2015). From
these academic articles and books, I eventually ended up with approximately 130 articles to
review.
After the accumulation of all the articles, I began to read. I started with GBV and
South Africa. As I read, I maintained a postcolonial feminist perspective, and considered the
pillars as specified above: race, socio-economic status, gender intersection, and external
western agencies. I noted the major themes and ideas from each article that addressed these
pillars, writing them on large pieces of paper along with citation information and quotes I
23

deemed important. I then physically placed them on a wall and started to organize them into
groups with similar themes. From that exercise, I discovered four main themes: historical and
social practices, culture of violence and stigma, “othering” and silencing, and feminization of
poverty. I also encountered many different sub-topics which were organized throughout the
third chapter. The information on HIV/AIDS came from similar sources as well as scientific
publications and websites. I began with broad information about the disease, and then
narrowed it down to be specific to South Africa. I was able to glean information about the
rates and prevalence of HIV/AIDS and understand that this is a very gendered and feminized
epidemic. After categorizing and documenting the information about GBV and HIV/AIDS in
South Africa, I could deduce that there was an interrelationship between GBV, domestic
violence, HIV/AIDS, and lack of development in South Africa. As this was the final finding
from the first part of the literature review, it was time to move on to the next part: Canadian
aid to Africa, and gender in Canadian foreign policy.
The first two sections of chapter four provide some context for the research problem
and demonstrate an established Canadian presence in South Africa specifically, and Africa in
general. Once I turned to gender in Canadian foreign policy, I took the same approach with
this group of literature as with the previous. That is, after reading the articles that pertained to
Canadian aid to Africa and gender in Canadian foreign policy, I noted the major themes and
ideas from each article, writing them on large pieces of paper along with citation information
and quotes I deemed important and then put them up on the wall. Again, maintaining the
postcolonial feminist perspective and considering the main pillars, I grouped like themes
together and came up with three obvious trends that appeared throughout the literature:
gender mainstreaming in Canadian foreign policy; the hypocritical nature of Canadian
24

foreign policy in terms of gender inclusion; and the securitization of Canadian aid at the
expense of gender equality.
After the completion of the literature review, I was armed with the understanding of
the situation of GBV and HIV/AIDS in Africa and Canadian aid to Africa and gender within
Canadian foreign policy. It was time to move on to primary research.
2.2.2 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
The literature review gave me an appreciation of the dismal academic view on the
inclusion of gender in the Canadian foreign policy apparatus. Nevertheless, I needed to
perform some primary research to understand what was being articulated by the policy
makers, themselves. I therefore chose to undertake a discourse analysis.
For this analysis, 65 documents were evaluated. They included ministerial statements,
speeches, and government statements published on the DFATD and Government of Canada
websites. The documents were limited to the time during which Stephen Harper’s
Conservatives held a majority government, so they reflected the Conservative mentality.
Therefore, dates ranged from 2011-2015 and speakers were all high-ranking government
officials such as cabinet ministers, the Governor General, and even the Prime Minister.
The 65 documents were chosen because they focused on Canada’s involvement with
policies toward Africa, HIV/AIDS, TB and Malaria, development aid in general, gender
policies, and/or women/girls. This was the criteria for searching of course because of the
nature of the thesis topic and research question. I began the search for documents on the
then-DFAIT (DFATD for some time, and now GAC) website and entered “gender” into the
search bar. This gave me a plethora of results, and I painstakingly browsed through each one.
25

If there was only a passing mention of gender, and no substantial discussion, I moved to the
next article. I repeated this process with the search terms: Africa; South Africa; HIV/AIDS;
HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria; women; girls; and development. Like the literature search, the
articles that resulted from these searches led me to other documents linked specifically to
maternal, newborn and child health, and child, early and forced marriage.
After I narrowed the sources down to those with maximum pertinent information, it
was time to start reading and analyzing. Informed by the pillars of postcolonial feminism, I
created a discourse analysis template (see Appendix 1). The chapters on GBV and
HIV/AIDS in South Africa and Canadian foreign policy in Africa provided me with a
framework for analysis—they prompted me to look for the inclusion of social and historical
practices; women or gender; GBV; race and culture; socio-economic status; gender/race/class
intersection; descriptions of aid; and the context of each.
After applying the template to each article, I followed a method like that of the
literature review: I pulled out quotes that I saw as significant, and read through each filled
out template to interpret major themes. I broke the analysis down by template section and
used quotes to supplement my findings. Now that I understood what was being said by those
who were writing Canadian foreign policy, I wanted to know what was being done in real
life: how were these thoughts and conceptions affecting those who were trying to implement
these policies on the ground?
2.2.3 INTERVIEWS
Chandra Mohanty’s idea that researchers must consider lived realities and individual
perspectives encouraged me to include face-to-face interviews. Her advice to evaluate the
26

community rather than the entire Third World also featured prominently in that decision.
Coming from a place of racial and cultural privilege, I could not simply try to understand
what was going on in South Africa just by reading about it. It was important to experience it
first hand, and to speak directly to those for whom these realities are everyday life. After
going through the appropriate steps with the University of Norhtern British Columbia’s
Research Ethics Board, I was able to start planning my field work. Unfortunately, due to the
vulnerability of victims of GBV and HIV/AIDS,3 I was not able to speak to them directly. I
spoke only to people who helped them and connected with them.
Before I could write any interview questions or even think about performing
interviews of any kind, I had to find individuals and organizations who would be pertinent to
this research, and who would also be willing to speak with me. My first step was to seek out
organizations who were was receiving funding from the Canadian federal government to
support their goal in South Africa. I went through DFATD’s website to see who was getting
funding, and then I went to those organizations’ websites to get information on who they
were partnering with.
Next, using contact information provided on organization websites I contacted as
many programs in South Africa as possible to see if they would be willing to be interviewed
during the time that I was in the country. I only received replies from two former gender
consultants for CIDA, and one programming partner organization. Although the two
individuals were willing to speak to me, we were unable to arrange a meeting. I tried one
more time to contact the rest of the organizations on my list of programming partners with no

I did not actively seek out GBV and/or HIV/AIDS victims. If I happened to speak to anyone in that particular
situation, it was purely coincidental and I was unaware.
3

27

avail—only the one programming partner (PP) was willing and able to speak to me about
their program and their relationship with the Canadian government.
There are several possible reasons as to why I was only able to organize two
interviews. First, the Harper government was famous for its lack of transparency. In 2015,
Newspapers Canada’s annual Freedom of Information audit gave the government a failing
grade (Newspapers Canada 2014). It is possible that those who received Canadian funding
and support during the Harper era could have been instructed to keep tight-lipped. This could
have been further compounded by the fact that this government did not prioritize any
altruistic issues (as will be shown in chapter four) and did not want any attention brought to
these types of projects. Second, as postcolonial feminist theory explains, there could have
been some mistrust with a white, western researcher coming in and questioning existing
processes. As Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues, there is imperialism embedded within
disciplines of knowledge which leads to a certain fear of foreign researchers due to
colonization of knowledge. Those who were contacted for interviews were informed of my
non-indigenous methodology which could have led to fear of foreign ways of knowing and
no desire to speak to me. Despite these small numbers, however, I was fortunate enough to
speak to some amazing people with profound insight.
Of the two former gender consultants with whom I spoke, one said that she could not
be of any help to me, and the other agreed to speak to me. I attempted to schedule a meeting
time and I told her that I was available to meet either face to face, over the telephone or via
Skype, but I never heard from her again. On 16 February 2015, I travelled to South Africa
with only one organization that had agreed to speak with me. That was a long way to travel
to conduct only one interview, but the insight to be gained was worth it.
28

Having previously lived in South Africa, I have been lucky enough to stay in contact
with most of the people I came to know while there. My former host father, “E” (as he will
be referred to maintain anonymity), is one of the people I have stayed in contact with the
most. As a local businessman in a small town in the Eastern Cape, he is very familiar with
different people and families in the area. He is an extremely connected man, having served
on city council for many years and due to both his business and public service, he has a vast
knowledge of Xhosa traditions and the ins and outs of the community, itself. When I arrived
in town, I thought I might ask E if he was interested in speaking to me about my research. As
luck would have it, he is incredibly passionate about his country, but also about helping
anyone and everyone that he can, so he jumped at the chance. This was excellent news, as
this would now provide me with two very different perspectives on the GBV and HIV/AIDS
crisis in South Africa.
The interviews took place in two different towns, approximately 240 kilometers
apart. The Xhosa people, the second largest South African culture next to Zulu, are
predominant in both areas, and Xhosa is the most commonly spoken language, next to
English and Afrikaans. The PP office is located in a tiny village at the mouth of the
Keiskamma River that leads out into the Indian Ocean, and is very much off the beaten path.
It is interesting to note that depending on the source you look at, the population ranges from
100-3000. Sources that put the population at 100 say that the town was established by
British-hired German legionnaires, while sources that place the population in the thousands
include Xhosa people in that number. Clearly, segregation is still in play in terms of
citizenship rights in smaller places like this (DLIST Agulhas and Somali 2011).

29

I was expecting to talk to only one or two people at this particular organization, but
the interest was such that I had a group of seven people who wanted to participate. The
interviews were structured so that they were meant to be one on one, but because of time
constraints on the part of the participants, they asked if they could just have a group
interview. Of course, this was not a problem. I was more than happy to accommodate for a
group interview if it meant that I was going to get multiple perspectives. In the group, I
spoke to seven people4; of which, one was a black male (P7), one was a white woman, and
the rest were black women. All participants were Xhosa except one Afrikaans woman (P5).
Informed by the four pillars of postcolonial feminism, the information I sought from
these interviews was: what people working for/with these programs understand gender to be;
do they understand, or what do they see as the link between gender, GBV and HIV/AIDS;
what, if any, directives are received from DFATD and are any of them gender-sensitive or
specific; do they, themselves, implement any gender-sensitive or specific policies; what the
components and implications of service delivery are and how they are measured; and what
do these South African programs understand Canada’s goals to be in South Africa regarding
their partnership. Again, I wanted to know if these policies/programs consider the gendered
reality of HIV and its intersection with poor, non-white women (who are affected the most),
or if they are a one-size-fits-all approach. Was gender included or was it absent? This is how
the interview questions (see appendix 2) were established.
Interviews were qualitative, semi-structured, 60-90 minutes long, and participants had
the opportunity to elaborate on answers and speak about whatever they deemed important. I

4

For the purposes of anonymity, I have used “Participant 1-7” or “P 1-7” rather than names. In the interview
transcript, I am identified as CG.

30

used the snowball effect for these interviews: responses to initial questions led to other
questions, and answers built upon themselves. Participants were free to refuse to answer any
and/or all questions and to terminate the interview at any given time. They also had the right
to ask that any and/or all responses are prohibited from use and/or publication. However, no
one chose to exercise any of those rights.
All information provided to me has been kept confidential, and I have maintained
anonymity to the best of my ability. Both correspondence and interviews were direct with
me, alone. I had advanced permission to record all interviews and I was the sole transcriber.
The interviews and transcriptions have been saved to USB drives and kept secure. Upon
completion of the thesis, USB drives will be erased, and any and all printed materials will be
shredded.
The interviews were analyzed based on information provided by participant responses
that provided a factual breakdown of the day-to-day operations and attitudes (in terms of a
postcolonial feminist perspective) of these Canadian funded programs. English was the
second language for the majority of the interview participants and the interviews were
transcribed verbatim to reflect the dialect and jargon utilized in that particular part of the
country. After each interview was transcribed, I analyzed them much the same way as the
discourse analysis. I read through them several times and highlighted quotes that I deemed
important and then revisited once more to identify major themes and trends.
From the literature review, the discourse analysis and the field interviews, I ended up
with well-rounded insights of the history of Apartheid in South Africa and the role it has
played to encourage gender inequality and GBV which has in turn fueled the HIV/AIDS

31

epidemic. I have also come to understand the history of Canadian foreign policy toward
Africa generally and South Africa specifically while learning about the inclusion, or lack
thereof, of gender within Canadian foreign policy. Finally, I gained a unique appreciation for
the work that is done on the ground in South Africa with funds from the Canadian
government. All of this information has come together to paint a larger picture of the absence
of gender in the Canadian foreign policy apparatus and their policies toward South Africa.
This chapter has provided information about the theoretical framework in which this
research is grounded. Further, it presented a step by step methodology of the research. Now,
with an understanding of postcolonial feminist underpinnings and the research steps taken, I
turn to the state of GBV and HIV/AIDS in South Africa.

32

CHAPTER 3: GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AND HIV/AIDS IN SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa is a remarkable country with vast resources, untouched beauty, and a
triumphant spirit. With 11 official languages and myriad different cultures, it is indeed a
“Rainbow nation” (Desmond Tutu Peace Centre 2010). This southern most country in Africa
has overcome a disgraceful past to build the second strongest economy on the continent;
however, the country’s strong economy has yet to reconcile with its HDI ranking of 121 out
of 187 countries (DFATD 2015h). Dropping 40 places on the HDI since 1990 (Ibid.) seems a
little drastic and even somewhat unbelievable—until you look at the numbers and figures of
two largely contributing factors: GBV and HIV/AIDS.
Until a decade ago, HIV/AIDS was viewed strictly as a health issue. The Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) (2003) however, played a big role in
highlighting the epidemic as a broader development issue. This is very true in South Africa,
as many of their development problems such as high unemployment rates, sub-standard
quality of education, corruption, and division of society, to name a few, have been largely
attributed to the HIV/AIDS epidemic (DFATD 2014b; Onyejekwe 2004; Standing Senate
Committee 2007). One major obstacle that stands in the way of mitigating HIV/AIDS
though, is the prevalence of GBV. According to the World Health Organization (WHO)
(2014), Africa, overall, has a GBV prevalence rate of 36.6%. Furthermore, women who are
unfortunate enough to be a victim of GBV are also one and a half times more likely to
acquire HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs) (Ibid.). South Africa has
excessive levels of GBV, HIV and underdevelopment and these three maladies most
certainly go hand in hand while exacerbating each other.

33

In this chapter, I present an overview of the situation in South Africa regarding GBV
and HIV/AIDS. In the first section, I provide an overview of the existing literature on GBV
and as per postcolonial feminist insight, and highlight four themes: historical and social
practices, culture of violence and stigma, “othering” and silencing, and feminization of
poverty. I illustrate how each theme fits into the broader conception of GBV in South Africa.
In the second section, I outline the reality of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country, and the
section is broken down into levels of HIV/AIDS and the feminization of HIV, as informed by
the pillars of postcolonial feminism noted in the previous chapter. I conclude the chapter by
establishing the relationship between GBV and HIV/AIDS, and show how and why it leads
to a lack of development. This chapter adds to the overall thesis and research question by
providing context for the unequally gendered nature of HIV/AIDS, its relationship to
development issues, and showing the need for international development assistance.
3.1 GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
When we take violence as a constant companion in our midst—but one we pretend is
invisible—we can only continue to live in a messy state. (Petros et al. 2006, 114)

The European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) (2013) defines GBVas violence
that is directed toward someone on the basis of gender.5 This type of violence includes acts
such as, but is not limited to: domestic violence; sexual harassment; rape; sexual violence
during conflict; and harmful customary or traditional practices (EIGE 2013). These acts,
according to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (2008), “both reflect and
reinforce inequities between men and women and compromise the health, dignity, security
5

“Gender: refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and
men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships
are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable. Gender determines
what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context” (UN Women 2013).

34

and autonomy of its victims.” Gender-based violence is a threat that women around the
world face on a daily basis. The UNFPA (Ibid.) reports that globally, one in three women has
been a victim of GBV, while one in four women have experienced some type of GBVwhile
pregnant. The grim reality of this is that the abuser is often someone she knows.
The problem of GBV however, is more serious in South Africa than anywhere else in
the world. As a, post-conflict (post-Apartheid) country, South Africa still battles many
demons; not least of this is the alarming rate of gender-based violence, specifically rape. The
country has the worst statistics on GBVand sexual violence in the world (Bhana 2009, 596),
which is epitomized by the fact that it consistently tops the list as the number one country
with reported rapes (Britton 2006; OECD 2010). The South African government has reported
a modest drop in the number of rapes: 3% from 2008/09 to 2013/14 (Africa Check 2015).
However, the numbers are still staggering. From 2011 to 2012, there were 9,193 sexual
offenses reported in one province alone (out of nine), and 64,514 in the entire country (Rape
Crisis 2015). Of course, these statistics are hard to rely upon because of the dramatic
underreporting of crimes (Britton 2006.). In 2009, it was estimated that only 15% of rapes
are actually reported, and disturbingly, 40% of those crimes reported, involve children (van
der Bijl and Rumney 2009).

3.1.1 HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL PRACTICES
Gender is shaped by biological, behavioural, social and cultural forces (Marks 2002,
13). It is and always has been an historical process with historical meaning (Praeg and Baillie
2012). South Africa has a strong colonial history, but colonial injustices that many fought to
35

abolish thrive in today’s society, including gender-based violence. Violent acts became
prevalent with colonization and extended within Apartheid. During the racist, patriarchal,
segregationist Apartheid regime, from 1948 to 1994, gender hierarchies entrenched (mostly
white) male power and further disempowered (mostly black) women (Britton 2006). In
addition, black men were not seen or treated as men by their white counterparts and were
routinely infantilized, emasculated and made to feel less than human (Schefer 2010).
To be “masculine” means to have membership to a particular community, and when
the system is threatened, gender identities are threatened with a loss of meaning (Praeg and
Baillie 2011). During Apartheid, black men were de-masculinized in a variety of ways,
sometimes as simply as being referred to as “boy” and not being able to do anything about it
(Schefer 2010). This process of racist de-masculinization invariably led to a loss of identity
(of masculine, black men). Although the repeal of Apartheid ended legal racist policies, this
de-masculinization continues today. Informal employment, such as gardeners or
“handymen,” is dominated by non-white men who are still (20 years after Apartheid) referred
to as “garden boy” or just “boy.” Men previously subjugated and demoralized under
Apartheid may be using rape and GBVin order to regain masculinities that were once denied
to them, but there are other forces at work that help to perpetuate high levels of GBV.
After democratic dispensation in 1994, there was an escalation of rates of rape,
including infant and gang rape (Borer 2009; Britton 2006). Women were scarred from the
GBV and sexual abuse, while men were left with the memories and effects of being demasculinized for years. Whereas rape was used by the white minority as a weapon to
maintain control, obedience, and interracial conformity during Apartheid, it was used by
many black men as desperate attempts to reassert patriarchal dominance in a changing (post36

Apartheid) society (Marks 2002). Like most post-conflict societies, women’s lives rarely
improved (Borer 2009), and they became the targets of this “retaliation.” Rape became a
“weapon of hate” by men who were treated so horribly during Apartheid (Borer 2009;
Morrissey 2013; Praeg and Baillie 2011) and it grew with the desire to reclaim an “authentic
South African identity” which included strength, heterosexuality, and perceived traditional
South African gender roles (Morrissey 2013).
Although the democratic South African constitution has women’s rights and gender
equality embedded within, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) supports the move of
traditional communities back toward traditional institutions that have historically excluded
and marginalized women (Walker 2013). Rural communities tend to place different meaning
on gender roles and practices, and these institutions tend to assign “patriarchally defined
roles,” such as motherhood and caretakers, to women (Hassim 1991). Gender is an issue
throughout all of South Africa, but because of these customary roles, gender tends to be more
of an issue in rural areas. These traditional gender norms include high levels of GBV, but this
type of violence is not necessarily understood as abuse or “wrong” by many. Traditional
culture and cultures were disparaged and ignored for centuries so along with gender equality
rights, they are now protected within the constitution. Of course, these cultural rights must
not infringe upon any provisions of the constitutions’ Bill of Rights, but traditional leaders
have been fighting this, much to the publicized opposition of women’s groups (Beal and
Ngonyama 2009; Koenane 2008; Kompi and Twala 2014; Waetjen and Theoria 2009;
Walker 2013). Many cultural practices and traditions that are protected are generally rooted
in discrimination against women, and in the eyes of human rights, they “function as
instruments for socializing women into prescribed gender roles in South African society, and
37

socializing men into a particular facet of masculinity vis-à-vis these practices –which in turn
promotes their perpetuation” (Mubangizi 2012). Some of these practices and traditions
include: female genital mutilation; virginity testing; Ukuthwala (marriage by abduction), and
Primogeniture (the right of the eldest surviving male to inherit estate of parents).
Clearly, the establishment of, and the subsequent collapse of Apartheid has resulted
in some intricate problems surrounding gender, gender roles, and GBV. In the next section, I
discuss ways that the aforementioned problems have resulted in a culture of violence and
have created stigmas surrounding that violence.
3.1.2 CULTURE OF VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL STIGMA
Excessive GBV and other forms of violence that were a hallmark of Apartheid have
persisted since the 1994 democratic elections. A culture of violence (Njuho and Davids
2012) has been the inheritance of a merciless regime, and this violence is a reaction to the
Apartheid legacy and frustration with post-Apartheid (Praeg and Baillie 2011). According to
Njuho and Davids (2012), there are three major forms of violence: domestic assaults,
robberies, and rape and sexual assault. Consistent with the global statistic (UNFPA 2008),
one in three women in South Africa will be raped in her lifetime, and one in four will be
beaten by a domestic partner (Bhana 2012). While women are generally the immediate
victims, the consequences most certainly extend to the rest of the community. The UNFPA
(2008) recognizes the severe impact that GBV has on both individuals and communities:
GBV also serves – by intention or effect – to perpetuate male power and
control. It is sustained by a culture of silence and denial of the seriousness of
the health consequences of abuse. In addition to the harm they exact on the
individual level, these consequences also exact a social toll and place a heavy
and unnecessary burden on health services.
38

Consequences of GBV can include poverty, low-socio-economic status, condoning of
violence, isolation of women and family, tolerance and acceptance of violence (no justice),
and rigid gender roles (masculinity linked to dominance, honour, and aggression) (GSDRC
2015; Heise 1998; Morrison and Orland 2004; Population Reference Bureau 2010). These
consequences are not mutually exclusive and will be discussed further at the end of this
chapter.
Despite activism,6 it seems as if South African society condones this type of violence.
Helen Moffett (2009, 156) argues, “Apartheid and colonial scripts concerning race and
gender are intertwined and embedded in private spaces, where they remain apparently
impervious to public [activist] efforts (by the state and civil society) to dismantle them.” In a
survey given to men of all racial groups and varying socio-economic backgrounds, more than
four in ten men admitted to being physically violent with an intimate partner. Over one
quarter of those same men admitted to committing rape; almost one in twenty admitted to
raping someone within the previous year (Wood and Jewkes 1997). Although this data is
almost 20 years old, the pattern seems to have stayed the same. There is a clear division of
public and private in terms of gender roles and conduct. While democracy and women’s
rights are strong in the constitution, many men state things such as “I do not believe in
democracy in the home” and “democracy stops at my front door” (Moffett 2009, 172). The
pattern is clearly that men are the undisputed heads of the home and their words are final.
Perhaps one of the biggest features and most far-reaching effects of GBV however, is
social stigmatization. A leading factor in the underreporting of rape is the fact that women do
6

Protests at Jacob Zuma’s rape trial (Waetjen and Theoria 2009), different activist groups around the country
(Wild 2014), social media campaigns that fight against patriarchy and GBV (Kilstein 2014).

39

not want their experiences made public: they do not want to be associated with these acts,
nor do they want to be blamed (Abrahams and Jewkes 2010) and this overarching fear of
stigmatization is not necessarily unwarranted. Although women’s rights are protected in the
constitution, they are not necessarily delivered. Legally, women have freedom and agency—
both promised to them by the constitution—but in everyday practice, they rarely have the
support of the justice system, because gender matters are seen as private matters to be dealt
with by families (Onyejekwe 2004; Waejten and Theoria 2009). Unfortunately, traditional
cultures are very patriarchal and place unwavering power in the hands of males who are
perpetrators of GBV, so there is no justice. It is hard to change this system when the
President himself thinks gender issues should not be dealt with in the official, public realm of
the justice system (Waejten and Theoria 2009). This stigmatization however leads to an
equally, if not more, dangerous habit of “othering” and silencing.
3.1.3. “OTHERING” AND SILENCING
The disturbing trend of “othering” and silencing victims of GBV is reinforced
because women do not want to be blamed for being raped, so they stay quiet. This however,
perpetuates the cycles of GBV. Unfortunately, silence harms everyone and protects the
perpetrators, and it is the “silence around the connections between accepting the everpresence of violence as a given, on the one hand, and the absence of discussions around how
it affects [South Africa] as a society, on the other, which continues to trouble” (Gqola 2007,
114).
Another effect of this silence is that GBV is becoming normalized and entrenched in
everyday lives. At an Eastern Cape health facility that dealt with rape victims, most patients

40

admitted to knowing their rapists, but would not name them (Abrahams and Jewkes 2010).
By remaining silent, perpetrators and victims alike, send the message to younger generations
that this behaviour is acceptable and immune to consequences. Even girls 16-17 years old in
the province of Kwazulu-Natal (KZN) are wary of rape both inside and outside of schools
because it is such a common occurrence (Bhana 2012).
Many victims see this silence as necessary not only because of stigma, but because
they will just not receive any help from the justice system. Due to traditional and cultural
understanding of gender and GBV, women’s status and equality seems to be understood as a
private matter, rather than public, as was noted in the previous section. Even though South
Africa has one of the most gender sensitive constitutions in the world, it has done very little
to diminish stereotypes (Marks 2002) and ensure equality. Women are denied their freedom
and agency promised by the constitution by virtue of living in fear day in and day out (Gqola
2007, 120). Once again, this is perpetuated by the fact that the ANC supports traditional
institutions and the beliefs and practices that are included in such institutions. Even South
Africa`s current President, Jacob Zuma, has been accused of rape.7 Zuma, a traditional Zulu
man, invoked culture at his own rape trial, suggesting that gender power be negotiated in the
private sphere rather than the public arena of civic rights (Waetjen and Mare 2009). If the
country`s own president even refuses to recognize gender power and relationships as a public
issue, then victims of such social power relations do not stand a chance of being heard
openly and fairly. By this blatant “othering,” victims of GBV are shamed and forced to stay
silent, or face public ridicule. This is especially true if the victim is HIV positive.

7

In 2005, then Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, was accused of raping a 31-year-old, HIV-positive family friend.
He claimed it was consensual, and was subsequently acquitted by the South African High Court (The Guardian
2006).

41

The reality of living with HIV is only compounded when the obvious social stigma is
considered. Women especially who live with this disease are looked down upon. Many
women will not report rape for fear of blame and they do not want to be associated with rape
(Abrahams, Naeemah and Jewkwes 2010). People know who are responsible for the
violence, but they keep silent (Gqola 2007, 118). Yet, the onus is on women to address the
problem (Gqola 2007). Unfortunately, silence and stigmatization around rape and other GBV
are only two examples of the hardships that these women must endure. As women, they are
also more likely to live in poverty, which in turn increases their rate of suffering from GBV.
3.1.4 “FEMINISATION OF POVERTY”
This culture of violence and “othering” in South Africa is certainly instigated by a socalled “feminisation of poverty” (Posel and Rogan 2009, 2012). Living in a state of poverty,
as the majority of (black) women in South Africa do, exposes one to more violence than
more affluent citizens. This is yet another systematic, structural inequality from the
Apartheid era that has continued through to present day (Bhana 2012). Further, women are
more prone than men, to live in poverty. 2011 statistics estimate that overall, 61% of women
live in poverty, and 31% live in destitution, compared to 39% and 18% of men, respectively;
and, there are direct links between income poverty and deprivations in health care, education
and social infrastructure (National Planning Commission South Africa 2014). Petros et al.
(2006, 175) argue that “low social status and economic dependence on men [have] affected
women’s capacity to determine their social lives and to confront sexual coercion and
violence.” Poverty increases exposure to violence, but it also limits access to healthcare
(Onyejekwe 2004) which ensures that women who are living with violence—most often at
the hand of men that are known to them—do not get the proper care that they need. Petros et
42

al. (2006) further contend that socio-economic status—not race—creates vulnerability and
rural areas are especially economically disadvantaged, and therefore exhibit staggering
statistics of GBV (Mosavel, Ahmed and Simon 2011; Bhana 2010). Townships are almost
exclusively non-white, so it stands to reason that poor, non-white women suffer from
vulnerabilities to violence, especially GBV.
There has been a rise in the number of female-headed households. However, the
heads of those households earn significantly less than males as there is an overrepresentation
of women in the informal economy and low-earning jobs (Posel and Rogan 2009).
Unfortunately, this constant state of poverty leaves women in need of an income and all too
many turn to the sex trade for answers (Petros et al. 2006).
Sex workers are at particular risk for contracting HIV: in 2010, 19.8% of new HIV
infections were related to transactional sex (Avert 2014). Not only do women have to worry
about GBV and contracting HIV from those who offer money for sex, but they also have to
worry about harassment and violence from corrupt police officers who work directly with
transactional sex workers. One woman in Cape Town reports: “He put me on the floor. The
police officer raped me, then the second one, after that the third one did it again. I was crying
after the third one left without saying anything. Then the first one appeared again. . . He let
me out the back gate without my property. I was so scared that my family would find out”
(Women’s Legal Centre 2012).
The fact that this woman did not want her family to find out that she had been raped
is an example of both silencing and stigmatization as seen above in section 3.1.3. Rather than
tell her family and get the help and care that she needs, this woman remains silent because of

43

her fear of stigmatization from her family. As rape is so prevalent in South Africa, especially
among sex trade workers, this is most likely not the only time that this woman has, or will,
experience this type of GBV. Regrettably, this means that she is at a much higher risk of
contracting HIV/AIDS. The following section will show just how harmful the epidemic is in
South Africa.
3.2 HIV/AIDS
Section 3.1 established that GBV and its implications are prevalent throughout South
Africa, and that it has a direct correlation with HIV, especially for women. This section will
now outline the factors surrounding the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, and show that
women—especially non-white women—bear the largest burden.
HIV/AIDS poses a global threat against human life, and in the past two decades it has
garnered worldwide attention. It has gained so much attention that in 2000, 189 heads of
state unanimously agreed to make the combat of HIV one of its Millennium Development
Goals. It is one of the main challenges faced by South Africa today. The country has the third
highest prevalence rate (behind Lesotho and Swaziland)8 (UN Aids 2013) but is at the top of
the list in terms of absolute numbers. HIV prevalence rates are very much associated with
high-risk and high-vulnerability situations (Marks 2002) that are faced every day by South
Africans, especially non-white, South African women.
According to the WHO (2014), HIV is the sixth leading cause of death worldwide.
Oddly enough, this is good news, because it was only in 2001 that it was the fourth leading
cause. 2012 statistics show that HIV is not among the top ten causes of death in upper8

Noteworthy however, is the fact that these two countries are completely landlocked by South Africa.

44

middle income countries, it is seventh in lower-middle income countries, but it is second
(only after lower-respiratory infections which are often linked to HIV and will be expanded
upon below) in low-income countries (WHO 2014). South Africa is classified by the World
Bank (2014) as an upper-middle economy, but there are exceptions to every rule. According
to the most recent Statistics South Africa (2011) report, HIV/AIDS has officially been the
number seven cause of death in South Africa in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Remembering though,
HIV/AIDS related deaths go tremendously underreported (much like rape) and misreported
(which will be explained in the next paragraph), so these statistics are lower than they may
seem.
In 2005, there were 5.54 million people living with HIV in South Africa: 18.8% of
the population was infected, and of those living with HIV, approximately 55% were women
(Strategic National Plan 2008). Women, aged 25-29, had the highest prevalence rate of any
stand-alone group, at 40% (Ibid.). In 2011, the overall number of people living with HIV
had risen to approximately 5.6 million, which was still the highest of any country in the
world (Avert 2014). Between 2001 and 2011, the number of HIV/AIDS related deaths
dropped by about 100,000, which was attributed to the scale-up of anti-retroviral (ARV)
treatment and the increased accessibility to such drugs (Ibid.). This rise in the access and use
of ARVs and resulting decrease in HIV-related deaths could also be playing a part in the rise
in prevalence (South Africa Department of Health 2014). HIV-related deaths however, could
also be grossly underrepresented because of misclassification errors. Often, doctors do not
report HIV/AIDS as an underlying cause of death. HIV should be recorded as an underlying
cause if it initiated a chain of events which ultimately resulted in death. In some cases,
doctors may not know one’s HIV status; however, in other cases, the doctor may conceal
45

one’s HIV status in order to spare family stigmatization or even invalidation of life insurance
(Ibid.). The following figure illustrates a breakdown of different AIDS-related estimates in
2015:
Figure 1: HIV and AIDS Estimates in South Africa, 2015

HIV and AIDS Estimates in South Africa, 2015
Orphans (0-17) due to AIDS

2,100,000

Deaths due to AIDS

180,000

Children (0-14) living with HIV

240,000

Women (15+) living with HIV

4,000,000

Men (15+) living with HIV

2,700,000

Source, UN AIDS 2016 available: http://www.unaids.org/en/dataanalysis/datatools/aidsinfo/

While HIV rates in the country are outrageous, rates in the townships are twice as
high as the rest of South Africa (Bhana 2012). According to a Human Sciences Research
Council survey, those who live in informal settlements (both urban and rural) are at the
highest risk of contracting HIV (Strategic National Plan 2008). This could be attributed to
the fact that attitudes regarding sexuality and violence are likely to be culturally based
(Mosavel, Ahmed and Simon 2011), and “real men” engage in violence and sexual coercion
(Bhana 2012). As Deevia Bhana (2009) suggests, definitions of rape tend to vary and depend
on people’s views and experiences. In some traditional cultures for example, forced sex is a

46

“wooing process” and male persuasion and sexual violence must be understood in a context
of entrenched ideas of male privilege (Bhana 2009, 597).
The initial response to the HIV epidemic in South Africa was slow and interrupted as
many political leaders in the country doubted the science behind both HIV and AIDS and
antiretroviral treatment (Avert 2014). Not only that, but former President, Thabo Mbeki,
banned the use of ARVs because of fear of “white people’s medicine.” This could very well
be linked to traditional ideologies of both the South African government and the majority of
traditional cultures in the country. It is common for traditional cultures to attribute illness to
spirits and supernatural forces, and in a study done at a township in Cape Town (Kalichman
and Simbayi 2004) they found that 4% of participants believed HIV to be caused by
witchcraft, and 14% of participants were unsure as to whether witchcraft was responsible for
HIV. This study was done in an urban township, but traditional beliefs such as these tend to
be more common in more rural areas. For example, a study done in Zambia showed that 25%
of participants believed HIV to be caused by witchcraft (Ibid.). Those who do believe that
witchcraft is behind this disease were found less likely to use a condom, less likely to have a
formal education, less likely to be employed, and less likely to be married.
These traditional beliefs also tend to lead to deep stigmatization and discrimination.
These stigmatized beliefs include: HIV victims are dirty, cursed and untrustworthy; they
should not work with children; their freedom should be restricted; they should be isolated;
and they should feel ashamed and/or guilty for having this disease. Much like cases of GBV,
stigma and fear of discrimination are often reason enough for people with HIV not to seek
medical attention or testing, but also not to disclose their HIV status. This is clearly
problematic for the health and wellness of South African society at large. The sheer
47

abundance of HIV and its implications is horrific, but the horror only intensifies when you
realize that it affects half of the population considerably more.
3.2.3 FEMINISATION OF HIV
A study in Johannesburg (van der Bijl and Rumney 2009) found that there were two
characteristics of sexual offenses. First, parents, families and society put little pressure on
males to discourage them from committing rape in the first place. The onus of rape
prevention tends to be placed on females who are in the end blamed for both rape and any
lasting effects (pregnancy, HIV, or other STIs to name a few). Second, the use of coercion
for sex is tolerated in traditional communities unless it breaks cultural norms such as the
pursuit of a woman with a higher social standing. There is a line drawn between rough sex
and rape, and it seems to depend on the situation as to whether that line is crossed.
Females really do carry a disproportionately large burden when it comes to
development and wellness in South Africa, particularly with HIV/AIDS. Young women are
at particular risk: there are 5 women for every two men infected, and prevalence among
women (30-34) remains the highest (Global AIDS Response Progress Report 2013). The
following figure illustrates HIV prevalence rates in South Africa, broken down by age and
sex:

48

)LJXUH(VWLPDWHG+,93UHYDOHQFHDPRQJ6RXWK$IULFDQVE\DJHDQGVH[

Estimated HIV Prevalence among South
Africans, by age and sex, 2012
Male Prevalence (%)

45-49 years

13

40-44 years

15.7

Female Prevalence (%)

18.8
27.5

35-39 years

27.5

31.7

30-34 years

25.1

36

16.9

25-29 years
20-24 years

4.9

15-19 years 0.9

27.9
16.5

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49

HIV and healthcare services cannot be separated from women’s rights and HIV prevention
strategies need to challenge social norms around masculinity and sexual entitlement. (Avert
2014)

There is an irrefutable link between GBV and rates of HIV infection. Violence is both
a contributing factor as well as a product of the virus, which results in a ferocious cycle. The
2013 Global AIDS Response Progress Report outlines four direct and indirect mechanisms of
this cycle: fear of violence may result in women not insisting on condom use during sex; fear
of violence may also result in women not disclosing their HIV status, or seeking treatment;
forced penetration (rape) increases the likelihood of HIV transmission; and rape and other
sexual and physical abuse can lead to psychological distress which can manifest in risky
sexual behaviour which can in turn lead to HIV infection. It is estimated that half of the cases
of young women with HIV could have been prevented, had they not had to endure GBV
(Avert 2014). In addition to this list, as section 3.1.4 illustrated, is the exacerbated poverty in
which many women in rural and informal settlements live, forcing them to turn to
transactional sex as a source of income. Women’s empowerment is vital to sustainable
development and requires sustainable development (Njuho and Davids 2012), but race and
class inequalities continue to create vulnerabilities to violence and HIV, particularly in poor,
African townships (Bhana 2012). GBV is related to power inequities based on traditional
male dominant gender roles (Njuho and Davids 2012); it immediately affects women, but its
consequences seep out into society at large. Stark juxtaposition of poverty and affluence
only intensifies behaviours that fuel the HIV/AIDS epidemic—some women have no
alternative to prostitution and many young men feel that they will not be attractive to women
if they cannot provide them with the “three c’s—cash, cars, and cellphones” (Delius and
Walker 2002, 6).
50

In a study done by Naeemah Abrahams and Rachel Jewkes (2010), they interviewed
29 women (16-73 years) in two public health facilities in the Eastern Cape and Western
Cape, which dealt with post-exposure (sexual violence) prophylaxis (PEP). Most HIV/AIDS
patients at the Western Cape health facility were from areas with high levels of
unemployment, overcrowding and poverty. Many of these women would not adhere to their
PEP for a multitude of reasons, including fear of being blamed for HIV infection, poor
support systems, social stigma (did not want to be associated with rape), and more commonly
in the Eastern Cape, they lived too far away and had no transportation to the clinic.
Failure to comprehend the significance of material location and the failure to
understand the power of patriarchally defined roles to women (especially motherhood) has
had dire consequences for political organisation (Hassim 1991). As Shula Marks (2002, 21)
explains, “The success of the struggle against Apartheid and the entrenchment of one of the
most gender sensitive constitutions in the world has done little to diminish these deeply held
stereotypes of masculine behaviour, or their concomitant violence against women, the legacy
of a distorted and distorting society.” Marks’s words seem to perfectly capture the essence
that makes up the lives of underprivileged people—especially women—in South Africa.
Gender violence is inextricably linked to other social problems (Hassim 1991), many
of which are persistent in low-income settings where gender violence is prevalent such as
poverty and HIV, and “an AIDS-related national crisis consist[s] of a range of pre-existing
social and political pathologies, rendered more common and more severe by the underlying
vulnerability caused by human resource losses due to AIDS” (De Waal in Fourie 2007, 299300). This might explain why statistics on social maladies and other crimes only get worse as
HIV/AIDS statistics worsen. HIV/AIDS is undermining development gains and the system
51

cannot cope. There is a need for a “new offensive against unemployment, poverty, ignorance,
disease, and most of all crime—particularly rape and domestic violence (Onyejekwe 2004,
39). Violent masculinities responsible for GBV must be confronted (Petros et al. 2006, 118),
as this continuing high rate of GBV “threatens to blight other achievements of the postApartheid state” (Britton 2006, 145). As Skinner and Mfecane (2004) articulate:
Discrimination is perpetrated against communities which are perceived to be
more affected by HIV, be these physical criteria, such as skin colour; gender;
sexual orientation; type of work, such as prostitution; or geography, and even
an entire continent, such as Africa. So stigma not only affects the individual
who is carrying the virus, but also increases the exclusion of already
stigmatised groups associated with HIV, such as gay men and black people.

3.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter reviewed the literature on GBV as well as HIV/AIDS in South Africa in
order to provide context for the research problem, and to show how and why gender is so
important when trying to understand the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Informed by postcolonial
feminist theory, this literature review revealed four main themes: historical and social
practices, a culture of violence and stigma, “othering” and silencing, and the feminisation of
poverty. These major trends illuminate the state of GBV and HIV/AIDS in South Africa.
South Africa has the worst GBV statistics for a country not at war, and this violence
has been shaped by social and historical practices, most notably Apartheid and its associated
problems. Men who were emasculated during the Apartheid regime have largely turned to
GBV to reassert their masculine status and this “performance” of masculinity has led to a
culture of violence that places women directly “in the line of fire” under a justice system that
is seemingly apathetic when it comes to protecting them. This apathy is compounded by the
52

stigma that is faced by these victims which leads to silence and the underreporting of crimes.
Further, this chapter brought attention to the high rates of poverty that stem from Apartheid
which affect women at a much higher rate that also goes hand in hand with higher rates of
GBV.
The high rate and prevalence of HIV/AIDS in South Africa was also highlighted, and
it was shown that it tends to be women who suffer the most in terms of numbers of those
infected, as well as effects of caring for loved ones with the disease. Finally, this chapter
showed that there is a high correlation between rates of GBV and rates of HIV infection, and
that these two phenomena are also related to underdevelopment in South Africa. This clearly
shows that GBV and HIV/AIDS are so obviously intertwined with each other as well as the
intricacies of gender and the understanding of such, that they are three sides of the same coin
that cannot be treated as mutually exclusive.
Now with the understanding of interrelationship between GBV, HIV/AIDS and
development, the next chapter will discuss Canadian foreign policy toward Africa. It will
discuss the historical relationship between Canada and South Africa, while highlighting the
complexities of Canadian aid, including its work with HIV/AIDS programs. Because gender
is so fundamental to the prevention and solution of HIV/AIDS, gender in Canadian foreign
policy will be emphasized.
CHAPTER 4: CANADIAN AID TO AFRICA, GENDER IN CANADIAN FOREIGN
POLICY, AND A POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE
As a highly developed state, and as a self-proclaimed “caring and sharing” (Nimijean
2006, 68) country that has “defined its national interest more broadly [and] less selfishly than
53

many others” (Clark 1997, 541), one might expect Canada’s foreign policy to have a large
focus on poverty reduction, human security, gender issues, and the countries where all these
issues predominate. Canada has been blasted for stepping away from what former Foreign
Affairs Minister, John Baird, calls its “legendary generosity” (Johnston 2010), but it
continues to be among the top donors to Africa. However, that fact may be overshadowed by
reality that the 2010 World Bank Report on aid effectiveness ranked Canada 29th out of 38
donors (Knack, Rogers, and Eubank 2010). The 2007 Standing Senate Committee on Foreign
Affairs and International Trade Report labels Canada’s aid to Africa as having “slow,
unaccountable, and poorly designed development assistance” and “ineffective foreign aid
institutions in Africa, including the Canadian International Development Agency, have also
failed to achieve sustained improvements in the quality of life of African citizens” (VII).
This chapter provides a brief overview of Canadian policies toward Africa in general,
and South Africa in particular. I begin with Canada’s engagement in Africa under Jean
Chrétien in the early nineties, and carry on to Paul Martin, concluding with Canada’s policies
under Conservative Prime Minister, Stephen Harper. The section on Canada and South
Africa goes further back to the 1940s (during John Diefenbaker’s time as Prime Minister),
when Apartheid became official policy. Understandably, Apartheid was cause for tense
relations between South Africa and many other states, Canada included. These first two
sections are meant to provide context for the research problem, and to illustrate that there has
been an established Canadian presence in Africa, as well as an established relationship
between Canada and South Africa through the years, so there is substantial justification for
Canadian aid to South Africa.

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The third section then turns to gender, or the absence thereof, in Canadian foreign
policy and policy formation. Because chapter three outlined the understanding of gender,
GBV, and HIV/AIDS in South Africa and showed that the three are inextricably linked, this
section means to expose the inclusion of gender within the part of the Canadian government
that addresses these issues: Canadian foreign policy. Finally, I present a postcolonial feminist
critique of Canadian foreign policy toward South Africa. This critique uses the four pillars of
postcolonial feminism, as outlined in chapter two—race, gender, socio-economic status, and
external Western agencies—to inquire if HIV/AIDS in South Africa is approached or
considered (by Canadian policy makers) within the precise social relations they occur
(Weedon 2002).
This chapter adds to the overall thesis and research question by providing historical
and political context for Canada’s engagement within Africa—South Africa specifically. It
shows that there has been an established relationship and that Canada has been aware of and
involved with the trials and tribulations faced by South Africa over the decades. It also sets
up the presence of gender within Canadian foreign policy as a baseline for further research.
4.1 CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD AFRICA
Change in government brings change in foreign policy, so this section will focus on
the African policies of former Prime Ministers Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, and Stephen
Harper, as these have been the three Prime Ministers in office since the end of Apartheid in
19949. As David Black (2012) notes, certain idiosyncrasies predispose leaders to make
particular policy decisions and Canadian leaders are no exception. With each change in
9

This research was completed before the end of Stephen Harper’s final term so current Prime Minister, Justin
Trudeau, is not included in this thesis.

55

leadership, there has been a change in policy decisions which has affected Canadian actions
in different ways.
Former Prime Minister Chrétien ostensibly made Africa a prime focus at the dusk of
his career, which was carried on by his successor, Paul Martin. Prime Minister Harper
however, came under fire for his lack of concentration on the continent. Critics such as
Stephen Brown (2013) and David Black (2004) say that Prime Minister Chrétien was only
worried about leaving a legacy before leaving office, while Prime Minister Harper is chided
for not caring about poverty reduction, gender issues, and human security, which make up
the bulk of policies in Africa. Is it worse though to commit to making a difference in order to
leave a Prime Ministerial legacy without showing results, or to be honestly disinterested in
altruistic issues and show that Africa really has no place on the Canadian foreign policy
agenda other than to further Canadian interests?
4.1.1 CANADA AND AFRICA
Over the decades, Canadian aid to Africa has been on an upward trend (OECD 2010).
There was however, a downturn in 2013, when Canada made the biggest cut to its aid
program of any donor country—other than Portugal who was dealing with their own
recession (Porter 2014). It is not necessarily the amount of aid though that constitutes
effectiveness or good policy. As Stephen Brown (2013, 181) points out, Africa has
consistently received more Canadian aid than any other developing region between 1980 and
2011. The main problem however, as Brown points out, is that Canada has “never had a
clearly defined policy or strategy for assistance” (181), only sporadic initiatives.

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David Black (2004) argues that Canadian policies toward Africa are not about Africa
at all, rather they are about Canada and are about “recapitulating a favourite story about
ourselves: as good international citizens and, more broadly, a force for good in the world . . .
about our own moral self-affirmation and sense of collective identity and purpose” (151 and
138). While this argument was made during Paul Martin’s leadership, shortly after Jean
Chrétien’s decade in office, this seems to be a broader pattern that spans the decades of
different parties and different leadership. Edward Ansah Akuffo (2013) supports Black’s
argument by saying that Canada really only seeks to present a moral identity such as
promotion of human rights, human security, the rule of law, and poverty reduction. This
moral identity:
means the normative image of Canada that motivates or shapes the behaviour,
interests, and activities of Canada in the global arena generally and on the
African continent specifically. Canada’s moral identity entails how Canada
perceives itself as caring, a good international citizen, and as a humanitarian
and moral actor. The other side of the coin is the construction of Africa as the
‘other’ which is conflict-ridden and poor and, hence, requiring the benevolent
support of Canada especially through development assistance and
peacekeeping. (Akuffo, 2012, 2)

This idea of presenting a moral identity is important to consider, as it relates to the
idea of internationalism which has long been associated with the way that Canada conducts
itself in the international realm. Kim Nossal (1998) defines Canadian internationalism (which
he is prudent to point out as different from American internationalism or simply,
multilateralism) as a dedication to multilateralism, community at a global level, good
international citizenship, and volunteerism. Humane internationalism though, is often closely

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related to Canada’s engagement largely with altruistic issues. Cranford Pratt (1989) argued
that humane internationalism was a vital Canadian tradition and defined it as
…an acceptance of an obligation to alleviate global poverty and to promote
development in the LDCs; a conviction that a more equitable world would be
in their (developed countries’) real long-term interests; and an assumption that
the meeting of these international responsibilities is compatible with the
maintenance of socially responsible national economic and social welfare
policies. (16)

As Rebecca Tiessen and Krystel Carrier (2013) argue though, Stephen Harper’s Conservative
government still attempted (while presenting a moral identity) to operate within the
parameters of internationalism, but those ideas were not promoted based on gender equality
and therefore becomes what they call “hypocritical internationalism.” This will be discussed
further in section 4.2.
From 1993 to 2003, during Jean Chrétien’s tenure as Prime Minister, policy and aid
Africa saw many changes. At the beginning of his leadership in the early nineties, aid to the
continent saw harsh cuts. As his government disengaged from Africa after the Cold War in
the early 1990s to help balance the budget, they began an austerity and
trade/investment/promotion effort that “bode ill for Africa” (Black 2004, 138). The end of
the Cold War lessened strategic importance in Africa and in 2000, aid fell below $400
million, less than half of the annual amount given between 1982 and 1992 (Brown 2013).
A major turning point came in the early 2000s during the 2001 Genoa G8 Summit
and a year later at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit. As Prime Minister Chrétien grew closer and
closer to retirement, his legacy was on his mind, and while he had “presided over Draconian

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cuts in aid to Africa sought to improve his legacy through a few special initiatives” (Brown
2013, 184).
The Genoa Summit saw the creation of The New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) by African leaders (initiated by Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal,
and South Africa), and acceptance by G8 leaders. The NEPAD was a blueprint for Africa’s
development in the 21st century, and it focused on the biggest challenges facing the
continent. The main objectives of this proposed partnership were “to eradicate poverty; to
place African countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth
and development; to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process; to
accelerate the empowerment of women; and to fully integrate Africa into the global
economy” (NEPAD Transforming Africa 2012). This was also seen by G8 leaders as “a
pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to consolidate democracy and sound
economic management, and to promote peace, security and people-centred development”
(Government of Canada 2006). Also during the 2001 Genoa G8 Summit, Jean Chrétien was
making plans for the Summit that would be held in Kananaskis, Alberta, the following year.
From the outset, he made it very clear that Africa was going to be the primary focus, and he
insisted that his Summit would put an end to “Africa’s exclusion from the rest of the world
and reverse the downward-spiralling trend in the quality of life of the vast majority of
Africans” (Fowler 2003, 223).
In response to the NEPAD, Chrétien called for a group of representatives to draw up
the Africa Action Plan (AAP) to be presented in Kananaskis. The AAP reaffirmed
partnership between the G8 and African countries, while laying out over 100 specific
commitments in key areas including peace and security, governance, education, health,
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economic growth, debt reduction, agriculture and water (Government of Canada 2011).
According to the leaders who drafted the response, “[the] Africa Action Plan is the G8's
initial response, designed to encourage the imaginative effort that underlies the NEPAD and
to lay a solid foundation for future cooperation” (Government of Canada 2006). Further,
known as the Canada Fund for Africa, Chrétien pledged $500 million to boost support for the
NEPAD and to highlight Canada’s commitment to the evolving AAP (Fowler 2003 and
Government of Canada 2011). Those in charge of the AAP also declared that aid would be
doubled by 2010, and Chrétien announced that in addition to this doubling of aid that Canada
would double its investment in basic education by 2005 and invest $100 million annually
into universal primary healthcare—which is obviously not restricted to Africa, but the
majority of funds would be needed in and allocated to that region (Government of Canada
2011).
In addition to the AAP, at a World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial
Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, WTO member countries (including Canada)
adopted a declaration that would allow least developed countries to produce generic
pharmaceutical drugs that were currently patented in developed countries. This declaration
was in order to protect the public health of citizens in these countries that could not afford to
import name brand drugs (Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network 2006). In 2003, Jean
Chrétien’s last year in office, Bill C-9, now known as the Jean Chrétien Pledge to Africa Act
was proposed. This would be Jean Chrétien’s last gesture to Africa as Prime Minister.
Chrétien’s successor, Paul Martin, maintained interest, and it was his government
who passed the Pledge to Africa Act in 2004 and saw it become law a year later (Médicins
Sans Frontiers). Not only did Martin continue Chrétien’s work, but he showed his own
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interest, promising to double 2003/4 levels of aid to Africa by the 2008/09 fiscal year (CBC
2005) and was clear about firm numbers that were not to be subject to revision (Clark 2010).
He was only in office for three years, but his commitment to Africa was clear.
Edward Akuffo (2012) contends that Canada’s moral identity was upheld by Chrétien
and Martin but had been set aside by Prime Minister Harper. But it was just that—an
identity—there were not necessarily actions to back up the identity. Even though the rhetoric
was strong and the identity was upheld, there was a gap between rhetoric and reality—the
resources just did not match the promises. The leaders at Kananaskis were not necessarily
able to “enforce” or shape outcomes (Black 2004, 143). The rhetoric was strong but
Canada’s ties to Africa were “comparatively minor, on virtually any tangible criterion one
wishes to apply” (Brown 2001, 196 in Black 2004, 151), but after the change in leadership,
even the rhetoric died down. All the work put into the NEPAD and the AAP waned even
further under Harper, and engagement on the continent began a period of stagnation. While
he met Martin’s goal of doubling aid to Africa by 2008/09, it has been pointed out that this
accomplishment was much less about helping Africa than honouring the goals set out by
previous Liberal governments. He has upheld Liberal promises, but has not done much to
improve Canadian relations within Africa (Akuffo 2012).
As David Black points out in his piece on Harper’s new “tilt in the developing world”
(2009), Prime Minister Harper never really had any interest in Africa, whatsoever. This is
due to what Black (2012) calls the “idiosyncratic variable” (41). Among other idiosyncrasies,
Harper had an aversion to big government and socially redistributive transfers, and his
intellectual views caused him to be deeply sceptical of the usefulness of aid. Further, he saw
the real value of any aid in the promotion of Canadian economic and security interests—he
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was also very pro-Western, pro-NATO, and pro-American (Ibid.). As well, the partisanship
of Harper’s leadership tended to push him away from policies of previous Liberal
governments; “it is no secret that the [Harper] government [saw] Africa as a Liberal idea”
(Owen and Eaves in Black 2009). Liberal rhetoric tends to endorse the ideas of social justice
and solidarity, while Conservative debates focus more on dependency, insufficiency, and
waste (Noel, Therien, and Dallaire 2004). Additionally, Harper drew his own line in the sand
and sought to personalize his Conservative party, as he tried to distance himself from all
other parties, including weakening ties with the Commonwealth. This led to a comparable
dwindling of commitment to Africa, which has a large number of Commonwealth countries
(Black 2009).
After being in office for a year, following two Liberal governments whose Africa
policies were at least rhetorically robust (Sjolander 2005), the only major Africa-related
decision that had been made by the Conservative government was to not abandon any of the
commitments that Canada had made previously (Clark 2007). Again, this was more about
keeping promises, keeping up the appearance of a moral identity, and maintaining close ties
with G8 countries than about providing aid to Africa. Not to mention, Harper only had a
minority government for his first five years in office, so his policy decisions had to be made
carefully. Even in the first year of his first year as Prime Minister, he was successful in other
areas of foreign policy, such as with China, the Middle East, and Latin America, and Joe
Clark (2007, 5) foresaw that “significant departures from Canada’s traditional international
priorities [multilateralism, good governance, human security] should not be considered as
rookie mistakes, but deliberate policy.” This seemed to carry throughout his time in office.

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During the mid-2000s, global health experts and health advocates came together to
“raise awareness of key maternal and child health concerns across the developing world”
(Bhushan 2014). Globally, there had been significant gaps in maternal, child, and newborn
health (MCNH) and because Canada was hosting the 2010 G8 Summit, Harper took a
leading role in an initiative to help battle these gaps. Even though he has not shown any
serious interest in aid to Africa, the 2010 Muskoka Initiative (MI) can be seen as a somewhat
indirect way to show a certain level of renewed interest: 80 percent of the overall funds for
the MI and seven out of ten priority countries are in Africa (Black 2013). The Muskoka
Initiative focuses on maternal, newborn, and child health issues in developing countries and
aims to assist the countries in preventing the deaths of 1.3 million children under the age of
five; preventing the deaths of 64,000 mothers; and giving access to modern methods of
family planning for 12 million couples (DFATD 2015d). It includes elements such as
prenatal care; attended childbirth; postpartum care; sexual and reproductive health care and
services, including voluntary family planning; health education; treatment and prevention of
diseases, including infectious diseases; prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV;
immunization; basic nutrition; and safe drinking water and sanitation (Ibid.). As stated by
David Black (2013, 246) however, “Canada’s relatively small and declining aid program,
and its mounting emphasis on private sector-led economic growth as the key to development,
is inconsistent with the conditions necessary to improve MNCH outcomes where they are
weakest.” As well, Tiessen and Carrier (2013, 186) note that this initiative is not the best use
of money. Monies could have otherwise been spent on enforcing legal action against sexually
violent crimes, transactional sex, and other services that directly target women, which have

63

been proven more effective at stopping life threatening diseases such as HIV. This gendered
dilemma will be considered further in the next two sections of this chapter.
Besides the Muskoka Initiative—which some only see as Harper wanting something
high profile and “announceable at the Canadian-chaired G8 Summit rather than a well
thought-out strategy” (Brown 2013)—critics see any aid directed toward Africa under the
Harper government as lacking any altruistic or humane internationalist qualities (Pratt 1989)
which was essentially counter-intuitive to presenting a moral identity. The Conservatives’
foreign policy agenda focused on Canada’s national interests which were (determined by the
Harper government) security and economy based and anything otherwise was seen as
residual. In fact, sub-Saharan Africa was of very little concern to Canada’s security policies
(Kaplan 2009). Harper’s somewhat renewed interest in Africa—after making several trips to
the continent—was focused on “trade not aid” (York 2012) and he tended to prioritize the
“West over the rest” (Akuffo 2013, 177). Aid to Africa under Harper was still substantial, but
priorities were given to economic partnerships in the private sector such as commercial trade
and mining companies (York 2013).
4.1.2 RELATIONSHIP WITH SOUTH AFRICA
As section 4.1.1 illustrated, Canada has had a development relationship with the
African continent for decades. This section will now outline the bilateral relationship with
South Africa specifically, and demonstrate the rapport that has been built between the two
countries beginning only a few decades after Canadian confederation.
The relationship progression between Canada and South Africa has ebbed and flowed
over the years, and the two countries have had a complex relationship, to say the least.
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Before official diplomatic relations began, Canada fought with the British to defeat the Boers
(Dutch/Afrikaans farmers) in the first major international conflict in the 20th century, the
South African Boer war (1899-1902). In 1910, the previously independent Boer territories,
The Transvaal and The Orange Free State, joined the British territories of Natal, and the
Cape Colony to form the Union of South Africa. General Louis Botha became the first Prime
Minister, and introduced a policy of racial segregation, whereby the minority whites in the
country would run the government, and the non-white population would be separated and
made to live in isolated own communities. In 1948, as the world was still trying to rebuild
itself from the horrors of World War Two, the Afrikaans National Party won the national
election, and Daniel François Malan became Prime Minister. The party came to power under
the slogan “Apartheid,” which literally means “separateness;” and, as soon as Malan took
office, the policy became law (History of South Africa 2012).
Official diplomatic relations between Canada and South Africa began in 1939, and
grew stronger in the post-war period. Both had been dominions in the British
Commonwealth, and had fought on the same side during both World Wars. This parallel
allowed for a special relationship. Like other western countries, South Africa was seen as an
ally against Communism, even as Apartheid became official state policy in 1948. Therefore,
while Canada made strong statements against the racial policy at the United Nations, they
were opposed (under the St. Laurent government) to investigations into Apartheid, and
abstained or vetoed any resolutions that would single out and condemn South Africa
(Freeman 1997, 17). Moreover, South African officials would routinely make visits to
Canada that were sanctioned by the Departments of Indian and External Affairs, to observe
conditions of Canadian First Nations’ reserves. From the 1940s to the 1960s, both countries
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paid special attention to the way that they treated their indigenous populations. These
mutually respectful relations however, ended in 1960 (Freeman 1997, 16).
The Sharpeville Massacre, as it came to be known, would signal the beginning of the
end of warm relations between Canada and South Africa. On March 21, 1960, thousands of
black protesters around the country staged peaceful protests, rallying against the
discriminatory pass book laws.10 In Sharpeville, a small town outside Johannesburg, a group
of 300 armed, white policemen opened fire on 5000 peaceful, black protesters. Sixty-nine
demonstrators were shot dead, while 180 were severely wounded (South African History
2012; South Africa Info 2015; History of South Africa from 1940 to Today 2015).
Even after the massacre, then Prime Minister of Canada, John Diefenbaker, did not
want to completely oust South Africa from the Commonwealth, like many of the other
members did (especially Afro-Asian countries). While he and his government condemned
South Africa for the carnage, he proposed a probationary sentence rather than overall
ejection, in order to give the governing National Party time to reconsider its policies and
compromise. The request was unsuccessful, and not long after, Diefenbaker changed his tune
anyway, to one of complete condemnation. He was however upset that some sort of
compromise could not be reached in order to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth
(Freeman 1997, 284), but knew that this was the decision that had to be made (CBC 1961).
Members of the Commonwealth did not get a chance to vote on South Africa’s fate in
the institution however, as Hendrick Verwoerd (South Africa’s Prime Minister at the time)
pulled out of the Commonwealth on 31 May, 1961, before they could be expelled. The same
These laws required that all black adult men to carry passbooks with varying information in order to restrict
movement and rights.
10

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day they gave up their membership, South Africa became a republic (South African History
Online 2014). As the years went on, and the South African National Party maintained power,
Canada became increasingly critical of their Apartheid policies. Black South Africans,
including Nobel Peace Prize winner, Bishop Desmond Tutu, called on the international
community to impose sanctions on their country that had gone down such a dreadful path—
knowing full well that they would suffer the most in the short run (Henderson 1986).
In 1985, shortly after Brian Mulroney became the 18th Prime Minister of Canada, he
expanded on previous Prime Minister Trudeau’s minimal, rhetorical policies.11 Against the
advice of Britain and the United States, Mulroney and his External Affairs Minister, Joe
Clark, announced a series of voluntary bans and embargoes (Henderson 1986). At the United
Nations General Assembly in 1985, Mulroney said, “if there is no progress in the dismantling
of Apartheid, our relations with South Africa may have to be severed” (Valpy 2014).
While Mulroney definitely took the toughest stance against Apartheid of any
Canadian Prime Minister, “Canadian sanctions on their own did not have much of an
economic impact, imposing them was comparable to ‘rain dancing, an activity that
accomplishes very little, but that makes participants feel good because something is being
done about a serious problem’” (Nossal 1994 in Freeman 1997, 258). Canada was seen as a
respected Western voice on international issues and respected by Third World leaders, so it
was constantly approached on the issue of Apartheid in South Africa (Henderson 1986, 1).
African leaders were happy with decisions of voluntary and selective economic sanctions,
but Britain was vocal about its feelings that these measures were counterproductive (Ibid.).
Britain under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, and the United States under Ronald
11

Prime Minister Trudeau was openly opposed to Apartheid, but did little in way of policy to stop it.

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Reagan, were opposed to sanctions, as they saw South Africa as a strategic partner during the
Cold War. Domestic opinion was that Canada should maintain company with its allies as far
as big policy decisions were concerned (Freeman 1997, 256). So, until Mulroney came to
power, official policy was less about Apartheid, and more about staying within a spectrum of
Western reactions to “cycles of resistance and repression which occurred periodically in
South Africa” (Freeman 1997, 286).
As Apartheid finally came to an end in 1994, Canada, under Jean Chrétien, supported
South Africa’s re-entry into numerous multilateral institutions. Over a decade later, in 2006,
the two countries signed a General Agreement on Development Cooperation which provided
a legal framework for development cooperation. The agreement outlined the bilateral
programme that focuses on “strengthening service delivery with regard to issues around HIV
and AIDS, governance and rural development, as well as leveraging South Africa’s
knowledge to promote regional cooperation” (National Treasury of South Africa 2006).
Despite the list of development programs that Canada funds in South Africa,
including many aimed at the shocking HIV/AIDS epidemic (DFATD 2015b), scholars
(Akuffo 2013; Hornsby 2013a and 2013b; Hornsby and van Heerden 2013) note the lack of
meaningful partnership. When South Africa emerged from Apartheid, it became Canada’s
most promising African partner, not because of its strengths, but only because of the
weakness of alternative African partners (Dobell 1998, 73). While Stephen Harper
diminished the role of the NEPAD and took a step away from engagement in Africa, Edward
Akuffo (2013) says that “Canadian foreign policy needs to take a closer look at the role of
South Africa as a major power in Africa and an emerging market in the global economy.”

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Because Harper’s priorities were so economically based, it would have bode well for him to
strengthen ties.
Official Canadian government statements say that the two countries now work
closely together on international issues. However, David Hornsby (2013b, 151) says that
“Canada and South Africa appear to be ‘like ships passing in the night’” and those
contemporary relations between the two countries are “disconnected, fraught [and] uneasy”
(Hornsby and van Heerden 2013, 153). While there seems to be a mutual respect between the
two former colonies—Nelson Mandela was an honourary Canadian citizen, and the South
African constitution took many cues from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms—
there is still seems to be a disconnect on international cooperation (Ibid.).
4.2 GENDER IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY
This section will now turn to gender in Canadian foreign policy. As in most
developing regions of the world, women in many Africa societies are, to varying degree,
limited by their sex and gender (Costanza 2011). As such, a study on foreign policy toward
such a region would be incomplete without an examination of gender within the system. As
gender covers such a broad scope, I am unable to cover it in its entirety. Therefore, this
section will operationalize the UN Women’s (2013) definition of gender—as highlighted in
chapter two—as it pertains to foreign policy, gender mainstreaming in Canadian foreign
policy, the hypocritical nature of Canadian foreign policy in terms of gender inclusion, and
the securitization of Canadian aid at the expense of gender equality.
According to UN Women (2013), gender:

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refers to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and
female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as
well as the relations between women and those between men. These
attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are
learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and
changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a
woman or a man in a given context.
Through socialization—not natural occurrence—these stereotypes are reinforced.
Gender is context/time-specific and changeable, and determines what is expected, allowed,
and valued in a women or a man in a given context (UN Women 2013). Some examples of
feminine stereotypes include: emotional, dependent, sensitive, passive, weak, innocent, and
quiet. Contrary to these are masculine stereotypes such as: independent, strong, competitive,
tough, aggressive, confident, and hard. Feminine characteristics and behaviours are generally
associated with the private or domestic sphere, while masculine traits tend to be associated
with the public or formal employment sphere (Tiessen 2005).
As Deborah Steinstra (1994) explains, gender is not merely a subject of Canadian
foreign policy: it is a set of relationships, and it is not enough to simply include women in an
analysis or to “add women and stir” (Steinstra 2000, 236). She expresses further that when
looking at Canadian foreign policy through a gendered lens, one must not only look for the
number of women involved in a given aspect, but rather “consider the impacts that policies
have on people’s lives, the ideas that support certain practices, and the institutions which
perpetuate them in order to understand how gender relations are shaped, and in turn shape
Canadian foreign policy” (Steinstra 1994, 127). These ideas support the notion of gender
mainstreaming, which according to the UN Office of the Special Advisor on Gender Issues
and Advancement of Women (2001) is:

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not about adding on a ‘women’s component’, or even a ‘gender equality
component’, to an existing activity. It involves more than increasing women’s
participation. Mainstreaming situates gender equality issues at the centre of
policy decisions, medium-term plans, programme budgets, and institutional
structures and processes. Mainstreaming entails bringing the perceptions,
experience, knowledge and interests of women as well as men to bear on
policymaking, planning and decision-making.

However, Rebecca Tiessen (2005) notes that despite most countries adopting gender
mainstreaming (including Canada), they have been slow at turning policy into action. The
former Conservative government had been reproached in regard to its track record on the
inclusion of gender in their foreign policy, but this is not necessarily a uniquely Conservative
problem.
Edna Keeble and Heather Smith (2000) emphasize that “crafters” of foreign policy
have predominantly been male, and “the fact that few women have been at the top echelons
of Canadian foreign policy is symptomatic of a general institutional and governmental
tendency to treat women and gender in a superficial and rhetorical manner” (Keeble and
Smith 2000, 131). In Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government, there was a push to include
women in international secretariats and development projects (Ibid.), but Keeble and Smith
(2000) predicted that if Canada did not change its behaviour around these gendered issues,
that it would run the risk of being seen as hypocritical and Claire Turenne Sjolander (2005)
has called it just that. She says that if there is any place at all for women in foreign policy
statements and policies, it is only secondary (Sjolander 2005). Further, she underscores
Canada’s hypocritical nature in terms of gender in our foreign policy by saying that if there is
a push to include more women in the Canadian foreign policy lexicon, the gendered nature of
existing practices must be questioned and managed. Complacency only serves to reinforce
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these practices and there will be no hope of enjoying gender equality at home or abroad
(Sjolander 2005, 29). This argument aligns closely with Carrier and Tiessen’s (2013) point
that although Harper attempted to work within the parameters of internationalism, or at least
attempted to portray such an affiliation, none of his policies were prompted by or grounded
within gender equality, which fundamentally became hypocritical internationalism.
Additionally, Sjolander (2005) explains that Canada took pride in our role at the United
Nations as a champion of gender mainstreaming, but the Canadian foreign policy apparatus
(CIDA in particular) was not, and is not necessarily traditionally welcoming of women.
These hypocritical practices are only demonstrated further with the Muskoka
Initiative. As Carrier and Tiessen (2013) argue, there is a clear division between the rights of
women in Canada and those in the developing world. The initiative, which advertises a
closing of the maternal, newborn, and child health gap has put Third World women’s health
“on the line for the sake of political gain of the Conservative government, which, since
having taken power, has blatantly rejected gender equality as a fundamental principle of
Canadian foreign policy” (Tiessen and Carrier 2013, 192). Inclusion of gender equality
within CFP was been superficial at best, appearing as a budget line (NGO employee in South
Africa), and donor proposals and reports (Tiessen 2005).
Gender issues had no place on the list of Stephen Harper’s foreign policy priorities.
Rather, he and his government focused on market accountability and sound macroeconomics
(Brodie and Bakker 2008): gender was only a priority when it served an instrumental purpose
(Swiss 2012a). Stephen Harper’s Canada was not Africa-friendly, and did not promote
internationalism based on gender equality (Carrier and Tiessen 2013). Although the “degendering” of social policy dates back to the mid-1990s, “Canada’s minority Conservative
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government . . . declared that the goal of gender equity had been achieved and then purged
any reference to gender equality from the mandate of Status of Women Canada” (Brodie and
Bakker 2008, 7). In fact, foreign aid, as a tool of foreign policy and national interest, had
been what Liam Swiss (2012a) calls “securitized.” That is, there was an alignment of aid
priorities with security concerns, as determined by the Harper government, and there was a
shift of bilateral aid toward states that are prone to conflict which helped these regions’
domestic security concerns.
Although Harper made his big maternal, newborn, and child health announcement
with the Muskoka Initiative at the 2010 G8 Summit, his de-prioritization of gender equality
in aid was in sharp contrast to this (Swiss 2012b). Moreover, Carrier and Tiessen (2013)
pointed out that the language of “‘equality between women and men’ has ‘othered’ the Third
World woman by victimizing her and silencing gender” (183-84). This change in language
“effectively denies that socially constructed roles tend to result in women bearing the brunt
of the suffering associated with inequalities between men and women and to experience
gender-based violence disproportionately” (Carrier and Tiessen 2013, 188). The Harper
government saw women as mothers and caregivers who are in need of rescuing, rather than
“individuals with agency who are defined by much more than their reproductive capacity”
(Ibid.).
Edward Akuffo (2013) talks about Canadian foreign policy as a two-tier structure:
strategic and politico-economic relationships with the United States, the Transatlantic and
Global North on the top, and the Global South including Africa, Asia and Latin America on
the bottom. Further, he states that the bottom tier competes for attention, or “ranking” within
Canadian foreign policy. This structure could otherwise be seen as a dualistic
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masculine/feminine binary. In Rebecca Tiessen’s (2003) gender analysis of then-DFAIT’s
(now GAC) sustainable development strategies, she highlights the binary masculine/feminine
nature of Canadian policies. She explains that this binary also lends itself to international and
domestic policies, whereby the domestic sphere is seen as feminine, and the international
sphere is seen as masculine. Stephen Harper was a Prime Minister whose idiosyncrasies
predisposed him to focus on more traditionally masculine policies such as economics and
security (Black 2009). In Harper’s Muskoka Initiative, women are seen as mothers and
caregivers who are in need of rescuing (Tiessen and Carrier 2013) and they are innately
“othered” (Smith 2003, 24), or simply categorized as “subaltern” (Spivak 1988): women who
lack agency and are confined to their roles as reproducers nurturers, and “less than” (Tiessen
and Carrier 2013 and Spivak 1988).
The inclination of the Harper government to place masculine qualities—competition,
consumption, security, economic welfare—ahead of feminine qualities—gender equity,
cooperation, and participation of marginalized groups (Tiessen 2003, 116)—gives the sense
that the “feminine” side of politics and policies really are of a second rate standing and are
only addressed and given priority if the first rate, masculine priorities are already taken care
of—which of course, they never are. If policies toward Africa are seen as feminine, it is no
wonder that under Stephen Harper, they were put on the back burner.
4.3 POSTCOLONIAL FEMINIST CRITIQUE/ANALYSIS
The biggest impediment to the successful application of the Africa Action Plan is our own
tendency to expect and require instant and comprehensive satisfaction from any high-profile
endeavour, no matter how complex . . . Our own expectations of what can be achieved in
Africa and how quickly, even in the most promising sub-regions, need to be tempered with
healthy doses of reality. (Fowler 2003, 236)

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Edna Keeble and Heather A. Smith (1999) ask what feminist insights might bring to
the study of Canadian foreign policy. They explain that different streams of feminisms ask
different questions, which is why postcolonial feminism is a very fitting theory and tool for
this analysis. As chapter two explained, this theory is mainly concerned with the legacy of
colonial practices, and how they intertwine with the gendered realities of non-white, nonwestern women. South Africa, in terms of colonialism, is a unique case. It went through
more than one “round” of colonization and for the purposes of this research, colonization and
colonialism is understood to be “a form of domination; the control of individuals or groups
over the territory and/or behaviour of other individuals or groups” (Horvath 1972, 46). As
shown in previous sections, Apartheid unofficially began in 1910, and became law in 1948.
It was a system of internal colonization, which was based on racial segregation, gender
injustice, and white male privilege. Although no longer an institution, the legacy of
Apartheid is alive and well.
Also outlined in chapter two, were the pillars of the postcolonial feminist theory:
race, socio-economic status, gender intersection, and external western agencies. These
framed the key areas of this chapter and have prompted me to enquire if Canadian policies in
Africa examined or considered HIV/AIDS within the precise social relations it occurs
(Weedon 2002). As noted earlier in this chapter, South Africa has never been a priority focus
country for Canada, and any aid to Africa in general has traditionally been sporadic and illdefined. Regardless, there are countless numbers of Canadian funded aid programs in South
Africa, and many of them fall under the HIV/AIDS and gender. Colleen O’Manique and
Sandra MacLean (2011) argue that a gender analysis is critical to providing effective policy

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on HIV/AIDS, which is why this section turns now, to a postcolonial feminist critique of
Canada’s HIV/AIDS related policies toward South Africa.
Injustices of the past have been maintained through social and economic processes,
and the scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa must be understood in the context
of post-Apartheid, neoliberal policies. The majority of non-white (mainly black) South
Africans live in poverty in informal settlements, and they also suffer from the highest rates of
HIV (see figure 3.). Central to my argument then, those who form Canadian policies must
understand and address the racialized and gendered nature of the disease. Almost 14% of the
African (black) population in South Africa is living with HIV or AIDS, and the next closest
demographic is coloured12 people—not even 2% of their population is living with the
disease.
Figure 3: HIV Prevalence Rate within Each Ethnic Group in South Africa

HIV Prevalence by Population Group (%)
Indian

White

Coloured

African

0

12

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Those in South Africa who are of mixed race are referred to as “coloured.”

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Source: Data adapted from Avert.org, available at http://www.avert.org/south-africa-hiv-aids-statistics.htm

Not only do more women suffer from HIV than men (Avert 2016; UN Aids 2016, they also
carry more of the burden, especially in traditional settings.They must still take care of the
household, including housework, husbands, children, and often other relatives such as
grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and cousins.
These intersections of race, gender, and socio-economic status must be taken into
consideration, as each one is a piece of the macabre HIV epidemic puzzle. Non-white women
are the poorest people in the country, and they are also the most likely to suffer from genderbased violence. This in turn increases their chances at becoming infected with HIV. Other
intersections include the fact that those with a lower socio-economic status often do not have
the access to transportation in order to make it to health clinics for testing or to receive vital
medications. As well, women are expected to take care of the home and are often not able to
leave. Again, the majority of those living in poverty, and who need access to these programs
are black women. These dilemmas are the enduring legacy of Apartheid and its colonial
practices.
The Canadian government funds hundreds (DFATD 2015h) of development projects
in Africa. Under the Harper government, there were six projects in South Africa that related
to HIV/AIDS and/or gender, alone. Among those six programs, the Canadian government
gave money to 14 grant recipients (Ibid.). Although these areas need assistance, executing
agencies—including sources of funding—must account for local realities. Programs that deal
with HIV/AIDS especially must consider race and gender, and as section 4.2 illustrated, the
former Conservative government was less than enthusiastic about integrating gender into
foreign policy. However, “programmes that directly address social determinants of health
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and development, such as discrimination and stigma, subordination of women, poverty and
inequality, violence and traditional practices, are essential for promoting health and reducing
disease” (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders and McIntyre 2009). Just blindly dumping
money into a region that needs directed assistance is not going to make the impact that is
both needed and desired. Policies need to adjust for these “behind the scenes” elements that
are rampant in South Africa society. As Rebecca Tiessen (2005) argues for the case of
Malawi, “the commitment at the personal level to make gender equality a matter of priority
in all development programming, especially HIV/AIDS programs, is essential for getting
beyond the superficiality of writing gender issues into donor proposals and reports” (21), this
too must be the case in other African countries including South Africa.
4.4 CONCLUSIONS
Canada and South Africa were both born from British colonies, but have gone two
very different ways. Both are middle powers, but Canada is considered traditional with a
more equal distribution of wealth and an influence on superpowers (Jordaan 2003), while
South Africa is an emerging middle power with a young democracy and more unequal
distribution of wealth (Ibid.). Their relationship has gone through many changes, and at the
moment is not a “strong partnership” but there are still exchanges between them in the form
of development assistance, especially in the area of HIV/AIDS. This seems to be consistent
with Canada’s foreign policy to Africa in general. There has never been a lack of aid going to
the continent, but there has been a lack of strategic programming (Brown 2013).
The lack of concrete results could be tied to poor policy formulation, especially in the
case of HIV/AIDS. This obviously gendered issue needs “programs that address gender
inequality, masculinities, power relations and cultural norms” in order to have a chance at
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prevention and mitigation (Tiessen 2005, 22) but although there may have been rhetoric
surrounding the inclusion of gender within the Canadian foreign policy lexicon, the inclusion
is actually quite superficial, if it is even there at all. This superficiality only highlights the
hypocritical nature of gender in Canadian foreign policy as DFATD officials were asked to
replace “gender equality” with “equality between men and women” which effectively denies
the existence of socially constructed gender roles and their associated consequences (Tiessen
and Carrier 2015). Not only that, but policies surrounding women’s issues in poor,
developing countries are not consistent with domestic women’s policies.
Finally, a postcolonial feminist analysis shows that any programs that deal with
issues such as GBV and HIV/AIDS must consider the precise social relations in which they
occur. HIV/AIDS programs and services cannot be separated from women’s rights or issues,
but the Harper government had no interest in these types of aspects of development. Even the
Muskoka Initiative that is meant to address maternal, newborn, and child health issues fails
to tackle the real issues such as gender inequality and gender-based violence. Instead, these
women’s roles are only reaffirmed as mothers and caretakers who are in need of rescuing,
rather than individuals with voices that are in desperate need of being heard. The MI “fails to
acknowledge that poor maternal health is a symptom of broader societal, cultural, and gender
issues” (Tiessen and Carrier 2013, 194). These women are not “brown women in need of
white men to rescue them from brown men” (Spivak 1988, 297), they are strong individuals
who are violated at the hands of enduring structural violence, and the institutions that are put
into place to help them.
The literature in both chapters three and four has clearly illustrated the gendered
reality of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, and the need for gender to be at the center
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of any policy intended to help mitigate and prevent the disease. However, under Stephen
Harper’s Conservative government, gender was almost completely absent. This absence
resulted in serious implications including: the essentialization of women in developing
countries under the Muskoka Initiative; the inefficient use of funds in the same project due to
the failure to recognize root causes of poor maternal, newborn, and child health; a creation of
the “other” in need of rescuing because of this essentialization and presentation of a “moral
identity”; and most significantly, inability to provide effective policies on HIV/AIDS
programs owing to the failure of considering the epidemic in the precise social relations in
which it occurs.
The next chapter will summarize the findings from the discourse analysis, which will
highlight the failure of the Harper government to account for these social relations. However,
it will also review the findings of face-to-face interviews which show that programming
partners in South Africa have a much better understanding of the role played by gender.

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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter summarizes the findings from both the discourse analysis as well as
face-to-face interviews that were conducted in South Africa. It highlights the major trends
found throughout the 65 Canadian government documents that were analyzed as well as the
major themes that appeared from the different interviews. While the pillars of postcolonial
feminism framed the key areas of the literature reviews, the themes from those reviews
shaped the discourse analysis and interviews by way of the major themes shaping both the
questions (see Appendices 1 and 2) and the analysis. The end of the chapter will go over the
main points of both analyses and will compare the findings to evaluate any rhetoric-reality
gaps.
5.1 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS FINDINGS

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Like the literature reviews informed by the pillars of postcolonial feminism specified
in chapter two, the findings in this section are organized into the same sections that were
used on the discourse analysis template (see Appendix 1): identifiers of gender and/or
women; historical and/or social practices; identifiers of socio-economic status (SES);
gender/race/socio-economic status intersection; and key words to describe Canadian aid. The
final two sections were not on the template, but certain articulation around Canada’s
relationship with Africa and the way in which Africa has been described in the Harper
rhetoric were deemed noteworthy. Additionally, because this research looks at Canada’s
policies toward HIV/AIDS in South Africa, I have isolated significant observations about
those policies.

5.1.1 IDENTIFIERS OF GENDER AND/OR WOMEN
As the primary conceptual underpinning for this thesis is gender, the majority of
trends that revealed themselves pertained to identifiers of gender and/or women. However,
given the Harper government’s penchant for rhetoric regarding sound economic policy, the
biggest overall theme was that under the Conservative majority, anything and everything is
secondary to economic growth and prosperity. Stephen Harper and his ministers alike have
tried to promote different policies and projects as having other prime foci, such as maternal,
newborn and child health and child, early and forced marriages, but these are still secondary
to economic growth and security, generally in the form of trade partnerships. As Brodie and
Bakker (2008) put it, gender issues (such as maternal, newborn, and child health and child,

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early, and forced marriage) had no place on the list of Stephen Harper’s foreign policy
priorities. Rather, he and his government focused more on market accountability and sound
macroeconomics. Consistent with arguments in chapter four, it would seem that even other
objectives that are presented as end goals, such as the empowerment of women, or poverty
reduction are only side effects of economic growth—if they did not lend themselves to
boosting the economy, they would not be emphasized. Rather, they are the means to the end:
sustainable economic policy.
Section two of the discourse analysis template asked about key words and identifiers
of gender, and consistent with postcolonial feminism, section five asked about gender, race
and socio-economic status intersections. While gender was not mentioned enough to be
considered a theme or even to be taken seriously by the Harper government, the
empowerment of women did show up enough to warrant attention. This idea came up in
numerous speeches. The phrase “empower women” appeared in five separate documents
(CIDA 2012a; DFATD 2012; DFATD 2013a; DFATD 2013b; DFATD 2014b);
“empowerment of women” in 14; “empower girls” in two; and “empowerment of girls” in
one. In most of the occurrences though, the concept of empowerment was tied to economic
growth. For example, the banner statement for International Development Week in 2012
was, “We empower women to start or expand businesses with microfinancing and loans
because we know that they are fundamental to economic growth. . . Canadians can be proud
of Canada's efforts to empower women in developing countries to lift themselves out of
poverty and break down the barriers preventing equality” (Canadian International
Development Agency [CIDA] 2012b). This connection to economic growth was further
solidified by Beverly Oda’s statement in 2013:
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This year, IDW focuses on the empowerment of women and girls, particularly their
participation in a country's sustainable economic growth. Studies have shown that
investing in women is one of the best ways to reduce poverty and help the economy
grow. When women have greater control over household resources, there is greater
investment in the well-being of their children and improved quality of life for their
families. When women are empowered, they become agents of change, making
decisions that positively shape their families, communities, and countries (DFATD
2012a).

John Baird, Harper’s minister of Foreign Affairs, echoed this sense in 2014 when he said, “I
truly believe that the advancement of equality between men and women—and the
empowerment of women and girls—is at the root of peaceful, prosperous, sustainable and
stable countries” (DFATD 2014c). This is one example that Krystel Carrier and Rebecca
Tiessen (2013 and 2015) noted of the change from “gender equality” to “equality between
men and women.”
Although the majority of discourse around the empowerment of women certainly
supported this notion, there were some instances in which the term empowerment was not
succinctly linked to economic growth. For example, a year earlier in 2013, Baird stated that
“education is essential on many fronts. Girls must be empowered to have a voice in the
decisions that affect their lives” (DFATD 2013b). However, this was in relation to child,
early, and forced marriage and the inability for these girls and women to go to school,
therefore having their prosperity and opportunities diminish. Canadian policies pushed for
girls to go to school because:
According to the World Bank, each additional year that girls and women spend in
school increases their earnings by 10 to 20 percent. As well, the children of educated
women are more likely to survive beyond their fifth birthday, be healthier, and stay in
school longer. Women and girls have made significant contributions to Canada’s long
evolution. And we believe the same can happen in Mali, Afghanistan, and the rest of
the world. It is why we support efforts to empower girls and keep them healthy,
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educated and safe. And why we will continue to make the health of women and
children a central piece of our development assistance. (DFATD 2014l)

Therefore, while the explicit connection to economic sustainability may not be present, the
implication certainly is. To further support this nexus, Oda discusses the value of women to
their communities, and then moves on to the idea that women can be empowered to lift
themselves out of poverty:
rural women are [invaluable] to their communities. Women not only grow the crops,
they also generate income for the family, care for the children, and perform the
majority of domestic chores. . . Canadians can be proud of Canada's efforts to empower
women in developing countries to lift themselves out of poverty and break down the
barriers preventing equality. (CIDA 2012b)

When taken into consideration along with the absence of gender in CFP as illustrated
in chapter four, the above trends point to a distressing reality: it seems as though the Harper
government was not concerned with the well-being of women for the sake of their well-being
as autonomous individuals, but rather for the fact that when women and girls are safe, they
are able to play a more active role in society. Following the general tone of any Harper
government discourse, that would mean that they are able to contribute more to the economic
well-being of their community, and therefore become a trade and investment opportunity for
Canada, as will be discussed further in this chapter.
If the empowerment of women rhetoric was an attempt to make people think that
Stephen Harper was concerned with the well-being of women, the Muskoka Initiative was
meant to be the Conservative flagship of concern around gender and women’s issues. The
fact that maternal, newborn, and child health was a very high priority for the Harper

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government was very clear. The terms “maternal health; maternal and newborn health; and
MNCH” showed up in the discourse analysis at least 40 times (DFATD 2012; DFATD
2014g; DFATD 2014m; DFATD 2014o; DFATD 2015d; Prime Minister of Canada 2010).
On numerous occasions it was stated outright: “As many of you know, maternal, newborn
and child health is the centrepiece of our Government's international development policy”
(DFATD 2014a) and, “As you probably know, the Prime Minister has made maternal,
newborn and child health Canada’s top development priority” (DFATD 2014g).
However, as chapter four demonstrated, gender issues of any kind, including gender
equality, gender-based violence, and violence against women, were not high on the Harper
government’s list of priorities. Any time throughout the discourse analysis, if there was a
significant discussion about women or girls, it was either around maternal, newborn, and
child health (the top priority) or child, early and forced marriage, which was a close
secondary focus. Even though GBVand violence against women are specific causes of both
maternal, newborn and child health, and child, early, and forced marriage, there was no
exclusive mention or discussion of tackling any of them. This, it seems, is congruent with the
Harper government’s penchant for tackling different symptoms of problems rather than their
roots which is exacerbated by the absence of gender in their discourse and policies.
Though the government tended to see women as economic agents, there was an
inclination within the Muskoka Initiative to not only equate, but to relegate women to their
roles as mothers and caregivers, essentializing them and consequently denying them any
agency. Again, this was a trend already noted by Carrier and Tiessen (2013). At the core of
the MI, it focuses solely on the health of mothers and children. Its parameters alone exclude a

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large portion of women in the developing world. In a statement on Canada’s leadership in
maternal, newborn, and child health, the language itself is contradictory:
Women and children in developing countries are significantly more likely to die from
simple, preventable causes. . . However, global progress is being made. The number of
women who die each year during pregnancy or childbirth has dropped substantially,
from 523,000 deaths in 1990 to 289,000 in 2013. . . The MI aims to prevent the deaths
of 1.3 million children under five and 64,000 mothers, and to give 12 million couples
access to family planning. (DFATD 2014l)

This statement makes it very clear that women are pigeon-holed into the role of mother.
Seemingly, according to the government discourse around the Muskoka Initiative and
maternal, newborn, and child health, if women are not pregnant, or do not already have
children, they are not in need of aid. This is surprising, given the above statement that
“women” not “mothers” are more likely to die from preventable causes. Further, in 2014,
then Minister of Health, Rona Ambrose, articulated, “Under the leadership of our Prime
Minister, Stephen Harper, just this past May, Canada renewed its commitment to mothers
and children by announcing $3.5 billion over five years for global efforts to reduce maternal
and child mortality, starting in 2015” (DFATD 2014k). Again, a woman’s life is different
and has different challenges when she becomes a mother, but it does not make childless
women, women who are incapable of having children or women who have lost children any
less in need of help.
A close secondary focus behind the MI was the Conservatives’ endeavour to end
child, early, and forced marriage. Kellie Leitch, Harper’s Minister responsible for the Status
of Women in 2014, explains that,
Canada places a high priority on the full participation of women and girls in all aspects
of society. For example, in Zimbabwe, Canada is working with partners to empower
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girls from the poorest and most vulnerable regions of the country. This is being
achieved by building social skills, challenging stereotypes, promoting girls’ ambitions,
and providing education on the consequences of child, early and forced marriage.
(Status of Women Canada 2014)

In the same year, John Baird pulled these two ideas together when he said, “We all
have the responsibility to take up this mantle of leadership and speak out for the protection of
those that are most vulnerable. This is why Canada has always been and continues to be a
strong voice in the effort to end violence against women. And that’s why I am so active in
the campaign to end child, early and forced marriage” (DFATD 2014d).
However, during these conversations around child, early, and forced marriage, there
is no discussion of women having or not having control of their own bodies. A feminist
perspective would surely take issue with girls having children, but it would also look to the
root of the problem: these girls are not only too young to bear children of their own, but they
are also too young to even consent to having babies. From the perspective of the Harper
government though, they are only seen as too young to carry children—the fact that they
have not consented (their family has consented on their behalf)—is not mentioned
whatsoever. What then, is the motivation behind the outcry over child, early, and forced
marriage if it has nothing to do with children being old enough to consent? These girls are
being equated to their ability to bear children rather than being seen as autonomous beings.
Again, the motivation behind ending child, early, and forced marriage seems to be much the
same as empowering women and still falls under the umbrella of economic prosperity.
This rhetoric began a year earlier when Baird gave an address to the United Nations
General Assembly:
Canada places a high priority on the full participation of women and girls in all aspects
of society. So many problems are resolved when women participate actively in society,
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and what we hope to achieve becomes possible: access to education and improved
child and maternal health care. What is good for women and girls is good for us all.
(2013b)
In 2014, Christian Paradis said, “Our government’s top development priority is
improving the health of mothers, newborns and children around the world” (DFATD 2014p).
This has been said over and over, but when one looks deeper, it is evident that the main
reason why the top development priority is maternal, newborn, and child health, is because
the healthier women and children are, the more they will be able to participate in the
economy, which in turn not only alleviates their poverty, but it allows for stronger trading
partners for Canada, which at the heart of it is the main drive behind any development aid.
Further, this idea of empowerment aligns closely with Spivak’s (1988) ideas
surrounding subaltern populations. The leader of the Conservative Canadian government, a
white, western, Christian man, sought to give these women power, but on his own terms. In
doing so, Canada took on the role of “white knight” (Jeffrey 2005), rescuing, or empowering,
“brown women” which raises questions of further colonization, as the next section will
illustrate that the discourse showed nothing about consideration of social or traditional
practices.

5.1.2 HISTORICAL/SOCIAL PRACTICES
The absence of any strong consideration of historical or social practices in the areas
that Canada was and is still delivering aid speaks volumes for what the Conservatives were
not doing. As shown in chapter two, according to postcolonial feminism, one must take into
account these practices in order to write and put into place policies that will actually make a
sustainable difference. Throughout the discourse analysis, there was no mention whatsoever
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of historical and/or social practices. A weak link could be made to child, early, and forced
marriage, but that practice is sought to be ended rather than taken into consideration for
policy making.
5.1.3 IDENTIFIERS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
There were no identifiers of socio-economic status unless you include the fact again
that every Conservative policy was aimed at sustainable economic growth of both Canada as
well as the areas receiving aid. Throughout the analysis, poverty alleviation was certainly
synonymous with economic growth. For example, in 2015, Chris Alexander, then Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration, reminded students involved in the World University Service of
Canada: “let us not forget that sustainable economic development is the only lasting solution
to poverty” (DFATD 2015g).
Two years earlier, then Minister for International Development, Christian Paradis,
said it all in a statement on development as part of Canada’s foreign trade policy:
Ending extreme poverty and promoting global prosperity are two sides of the same
coin. By stimulating the economy in these countries and helping them create an
environment conducive to investment, we are contributing to the well-being of people
living in poverty . . . Canadian assistance delivers results for the countries that receive
it and that it is aligned with Canada's interests and values. . . Investments in
development contribute to Canada's long-term security and unlock the economic
potential of the developing world by building future markets for Canadian trade and
investment . . . Together, we can make Canada's sustainable economic growth strategy
a success story that will tangibly improve the lives of those people most in need and
serve as a model for the world. (DFATD 2013l)
This however seems to have set the tone that Canada’s trade and investment opportunities
considerably outweigh those in need of development assistance, which again highlights the
lack of interest in altruistic issues that has been highlighted by Liam Swiss (2012a and
2012b) who discussed the securitization of aid at the expense of more “feminized” issues
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(Tiessen 2003) like altruistic poverty reduction, women’s rights, and gender issues. Focusing
much of DFATD’s aid on “masculine” (Ibid.) trade and investment priorities while merely
mentioning poverty reduction supports Carrier and Tiessen’s (2013) idea of hypocritical
internationalism. That is, while attempting to work within the parameters of internationalism
and saying that they want to empower women and alleviate poverty, these ideas are not based
on gender equality, but rather Canada’s interests and values such as security and sustainable
economic growth. This attempt to present a moral identity (Akuffo 2012) is paper thin, and
will be expanded upon in the next section.
5.1.4 GENDER/RACE/SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS INTERSECTION
Like historical and social practices and SES alone, there was not enough mention of
gender, race and/or socio-economic status intersection to consider it a theme or trend on its
own. The only mention was what was in sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.3 above: the way to alleviate
poverty is through economic prosperity, and the best way to make sure a country can achieve
economic prosperity is through the empowerment of women. There was however, neither
mention of race, nor any implication. The lack of discussion around race is highly
problematic from a postcolonial feminism standpoint. The research very clearly shows that
non-white, non-western women are the most disadvantaged group of people when it comes to
development in all its forms, most notable HIV/AIDS—the brunt of which is carried by
black women as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Not to mention, those who need the most poverty
reduction are black women. Failure to acknowledge race in these situations is catastrophic in
the sense that along with being extremely gendered, HIV/AIDS is an extremely racialized
disease in South Africa. Again, just as the absence of discussion around historical and social
practices were significant, so too is the dearth of any intersection of gender, race, or socio91

economic status. In the course of this research, not only has there been an implication of race
neutrality (due to silence from the government), but there has been strong indication that all
women are lumped together into a homogenous, subjugated and oppressed group which is
precisely what postcolonial feminists, most notably Chandra Mohanty, are critical of: the
complex lived realities of women from different parts of the world are not taken into
consideration when it is their lives toward which these development policies are directed.
All of these facets (gender, race, SES, social and historical practices) must be
considered when formulating policy, as they all come together to create the perfect storm that
is HIV/AIDS. However, as the next section will show, it seems that the Harper government
was more concerned with presenting itself in a positive light rather than taking actual steps in
the fight against the disease.
5.1.5 KEY WORDS TO DESCRIBE CANADIAN AID
And as Prime Minister Harper said: ‘When the need is great and the cause is just, Canadians
are always there. And we will always be. Because that is what Canadians do.’ (CIDA 2010)

Governments tend to boast when it comes to foreign policy, especially aid policies,
and Canada is no exception. No one in the Harper government seemed shy about placing
Canada on a pedestal when it came to development aid. Canada has been painted by many to
be a leader focused on internationalist, selfless pursuits. Phrases such as “[Canada has]
inspired the world to act” (DFATD 2014i), “[Canada has] led the way” (DFATD 2013p),
“[Canada is] a strong supporter [of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, and the Millennium Development Goals]” (DFATD 2013 k), “Canada has long been
a world leader” (DFATD 2013k), and “[Canada] has led international efforts” (DFATD
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2013l) appeared on several occasions, and really demonstrated the identity that officials wish
to portray to both domestic and international audiences.
Further, words emerged throughout the discourse that seemed to be presented as the
epitome of Canadian values. These values included “active and engaged citizens” (DFATD
2014b and 2014l), “compassionate neighbour” (DFATD 2014b and 2013n), “Canadians are
compassionate and generous” (DFATD 2014b), “[Canada shows] compassion and concern”
(DFATD 2013d), “a world leader in poverty development” (Ibid.), and “our assistance
program [is] a source of pride for Canadians” (Ibid.).
Finally, there were a group of expressions that jumped out that could be interpreted as
ways in which the government would like to have been perceived. These included “[Canada
has a] strong voice” (DFATD 2013b and 2014d), “[Canada] underpins economic
development” (DFATD 2012b), “[Canada is] making a difference” (DFATD 2014b), and
finally “[Canada is] generous” (Ibid.).
These descriptions pulled from the discourse analysis are yet again, more examples of
the Harper government attempting to present a moral identity (Akuffo 2012) to Canada and
the world. As Julian Fantino, then Minister of International Cooperation, expressed, “CIDA
live[s] out the best of Canadian values every day, in every corner of the globe” (DFATD
2013p). The rhetoric discernibly characterized DFAIT, CIDA, then DFATD and even the
Canadian government as “world saviours” but again, they were “saving the world” for their
own economic gain:
The bulk of CIDA's work is focused on long-term development in some of the world's
poorest countries. This is the less visible - but no less important - work of growing and
strengthening individuals, families, communities, and countries, helping them to
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become more resilient and self-sufficient. Why does this matter to Canadians and our
economy? Today's developing countries are tomorrow's trading partners. (Ibid.)

Turning back to Spivak (1988) however, this was one of her biggest criticisms: “white
men” rushing in to save “brown women from brown men.” In this sense, colonization
continues, as does the creation of the “Other” (Said 1978; Spivak 1988). The hypocritical
nature of this is such that Canadian programs base their aid on western ideals, and refrain
from acknowledging not only other types of social and historical practices, but also other
types of knowledge. As Tuhiwai Smith (1999) argues, colonization is more that just tradition
and religion—indigenous minds are continuing to be colonized as well.
Following the trend displayed among three of the four previous sections, Canadian
aid was presented as economic opportunity. Lois Brown, Parliamentary Secretary to the
Minister of International Development, was unambiguous when she stated “It’s easy to see
how our international development work and our trade-promotion efforts are, in a very real
sense, naturally reinforcing” (DFATD 2014p). Just a year earlier Fantino said, “our
government is committed to building a more prosperous and secure world, not only for our
neighbours in developing countries but as a means to strengthen Canada as well” (DFATD
2013n).
The same year, Christian Paradis was very clear about the reasoning behind Canada’s
development assistance:
Canadian assistance delivers results for the countries that receive it and that it is
aligned with Canada's interests and values . . . Investments in development contribute
to Canada's long-term security and unlock the economic potential of the developing
world by building future markets for Canadian trade and investment . . . Together, we
can make Canada's sustainable economic growth strategy a success story that will
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tangibly improve the lives of those people most in need and serve as a model for the
world. (DFATD 2013l)

In 2014 while discussing maternal, newborn, and child health, he was even more transparent
about Canada’s economic needs. He said, “to [end preventable deaths of women and
children], our government must put in place an additional tool to help developing countries
grow their economies. At the same time, we need a mechanism that will help Canadian
businesses gain access to the markets of the future” (DFATD 2014q).
The merger of DFAIT and CIDA into DFATD in 2012 upheld the notion that
development aid could not be separated from trade objectives as Minister Paradis pointed out
when he said, “Foreign policy, development and trade objectives are increasingly
interrelated. There are also more opportunities to build on each of these components. The
merger allows us to harness the full potential of these opportunities” (DFATD 2013p).
Buttressing the strong emphasis on economic prosperity was the equally strong
emphasis on public-private partnership. So many statements and speeches were rampant with
the call for investment and private partnership. For example, in 2012, Ed Fast, then Minister
of International Trade, explained, “when Canadians invest in companies abroad, they expect
not only to make an investment for themselves but to invest also in the countries in which
they’re doing business, to give back what they are also receiving in terms of profitable
enterprise” (DFATD 2012b). This was one of many examples calling for private investment
abroad, being spun as a great opportunity for private citizens while making a positive
difference in developing countries. The stress on economic prosperity, trade relationships,
public/private partnerships and private sector cooperation only intensified when dialogue
turned to Africa.
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5.1.6 KEY WORDS TO DESCRIBE AFRICA/CANADA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH
AFRICA
While there were no specific key words found throughout the discourse to describe
this relationship per se, there were some obvious ideas. The underlying message throughout
the discourse around Africa was that it is certainly in need of development assistance;
however, it is a continent rife with investment opportunities which is what makes help
warranted. So while helping African economies may be a good way to help these countries
develop, this aid certainly is not altruistic in any way. The message was clear: by investing in
economies, we are investing in the countries’ well-being. Helping African economies is
helping Africa—but it is also helping Canada. The following statement from Minister
Paradis at the Canada-Africa Business Summit in 2014 summarizes this very point:
Twenty years ago, a prosperous Africa would have been considered just a dream.
Today, Africa is filled with hope . . . Many commentators say Africa is on the rise.
I say Africa has risen. In part because more and more African economies are
embracing trade and investment. And seeing it as an engine for growth, job creation
and poverty reduction. We are seeing the creation of regional hubs of trade and
investment in countries such as: South Africa; Ghana; Nigeria; Tanzania; and Senegal .
. . And Canada is proud to be a part of this success. We understand the tremendous
economic opportunities that exist in Africa . . . Our government has also identified 12
sub-Saharan African countries as priority markets under our Global Markets Action
Plan . . .This is Canada’s blueprint for creating jobs and economic growth through
trade and investment. (DFATD 2014f)
The top priority in anywhere in Africa is overwhelmingly about economic prosperity. Any
other benefits to the continent or any given country are second to this. Ed Fast, then Minister
of International Trade and the Asia-Pacific Gateway, was quite clear about that when he said
the following in 2012:
today [Africa] is also a region that is of great strategic importance to the global
economy . . . These challenging economic times call for more trade and investment, not
less . . . Canada is proud to be part of Africa’s rising commercial success . . . Canadian
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businesses are very excited about the potential there . . . Last year, our bilateral
merchandise trade with sub-Saharan Africa reached a record high of $10.3 billion—
compared to $7.8 billion in 2010 and $5.3 billion in 2009 . . . For example, Canadian
firms can help our African partners build the infrastructure they need . . . Canada is
committed to deepening its trade and investment ties throughout Africa . . . These
FIPAs will help to attract more Canadian investment into those countries, while
strengthening economic growth and opening new markets for Canadian businesses.
(DFATD 2012e)
In the same year, Ed Fast explained that “Canada has taken note of the developments in
Africa and we have recently taken a number of steps to deepen commercial ties with likeminded African nations” (DFATD 2012b). And on Africa day the following year, Julian
Fantino showed Canada’s true colours on the topic of Africa when he stated that "the
development of mining, oil and gas resources in Africa is critical to the future prosperity of
the continent” (DFATD 2013j).
With the obvious focus on fiscal gain and situation, one must wonder about the
motivation behind giving aid to HIV/AIDS/TB. But looking back through the previous
sections, it is clear that the Harper government saw that helping people get healthy meant
more human resources to build the economy. This may seem like an appalling assertion, but
that is what the discourse seems to represent overall.
5.1.7 IDENTIFIERS OF HIV/AIDS
As part of the Harper government’s goal in South Africa was to “help the country
improve service delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS,” specific attention was paid to Canada’s
rhetoric and discourse surrounding the disease.
One of the biggest findings in this area was that there were no direct or even
underlying themes about HIV/AIDS programs unless the speech or statement was
specifically about foreign aid directed to HIV/AIDS programs. It should be noted as well,
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that of all the documents examined for the discourse analysis, there were no documents
speeches, statements, or press releases on HIV/AIDS alone—they were always in
conjunction with TB funding. Though they are both very serious diseases in South Africa,
and need to be combatted, what is noteworthy about this is that neither of these diseases have
been taken seriously enough to warrant attention on their own. (This is similar to Harper’s
policies on women and gender: gender issues and women are seen as a homogenized group,
which is in direct contradiction to the postcolonial feminism perspective of this thesis as
shown in section 5.1.4.) If the Harper government met some of their HIV goals, it is only a
by-product of larger initiatives (other than the stated goal, itself)–there was little evidence
that HIV/AIDS was a focus for the Harper government, whatsoever. This was illustrated by
generic statements in any of the HIV/AIDS/TB documents. The only things anyone in the
Harper government said about the disease were merely describing the policies themselves.
Even when Julian Fantino went on the defensive about Canada’s funding of TB programs he
spoke only of what Canada was doing. Even then, the latent message is that Canada will not
do any more than it already is:
CIDA has contributed directly to strengthening TB control to ensure underserviced areas in the developing world have access to cost-effective TB
treatment, care and support. No single organization has a monopoly on CIDA
funds. On TB, and all our development priorities, we will partner with the
most effective and efficient organizations to get the job done. (DFATD
2013o)

Further, in an address by then Minister of International Development, Christian
Paradis during a media event to highlight Canada’s contribution to the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (DFATD 2013c) he did not outline anything about the

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diseases, or Canada’s motivations behind any contributions. Rather he just highlighted and
glorified what the Harper government was doing to help fight them:
Through the $2.85-billion Muskoka Initiative announced by the Prime
Minister in June 2010, Canada made a firm commitment to improve the lives
of millions around the world. And the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria is a key component of reaching that goal. The
Global Fund is a new and innovative approach to international health
financing. It is a partnership between governments, civil society, the private
sector and affected communities that aims to reduce maternal and infant
mortality and improve the health of mothers and children in the world's
poorest countries by focussing on three key paths: strengthening health
systems; improving nutrition; and preventing and treating the leading illnesses
and diseases that kill women and children.

The key highlight here is that with Canada’s help, the Global Fund is saving more than
100,00 lives every month. Again, the latent content seems to commend Canada and highlight
its internationalism rather than focus on the Global Fund, or HIV/AIDS.
In none of the HIV/AIDS/TB documents was there any mention of gender, violence,
poverty, or any of the other root causes, which speaks directly to the research question. Even
though Canada had a clearly stated goal in South Africa that dealt with HIV/AIDS, these
statements merely brush the surface and show the public exactly what kind of priority is
given to these diseases—thin, if any at all. This only serves to magnify the inability of the
Harper government to provide effective policies on HIV/AIDS: they failed to consider the
precise social relations in which HIV/AIDS occurs!
With an understanding of government discourse and rhetoric, I now turn to personal
interviews to offer a clearer understanding of the reality of aid implementation. These
interviews add to this section and to the overall thesis by providing a glimpse into the real99

life hard work and dedication by those people on the ground that thrive so hard to combat
GBV and HIV/AIDS with money from the Canadian government.
5.2 INTERVIEWS
Chapters three and four indicated the reasons as to why there is a problem with
HIV/AIDS in South Africa, and why and how the problem needs to be approached. E, and
those I interviewed at the Programming Partner (PP), are only a few people who try to help
ease the pain of this national epidemic, and the following sections allow for some insight into
the problems that they deal with daily.
As explained in chapter two, I had the pleasure of conducting two interviews. While
one of the interviews was one on one, the other ended up as a group interview at a program
that operates to help those infected with, and affected by HIV/AIDS. The program was
started many years ago by a doctor of a small village along with her nurse (P3), and they
both recognized the prevalence of HIV within the Xhosa communities when the disease was
still associated with whites and the gay community. They began with five patients who were
both TB and HIV positive, and they did not have a facility at that point, so they stayed with
P3 in her home. She explained,
In fact it was three and then a gentleman from [another village] was brought
by his family, his family actually rejected him and they said to him they hear
in [the village] there is a certain white lady, there is a white doctor who cures
HIV/AIDS and then they brought him. He was the fourth patient who was
staying with me and then we got the fifth patient and they were staying at my
house. . . And my house, it was coming far too small. It think it was a year
and 8 months. It became far too small. Because we had to cook for them, they
were sleeping there, we would put them in a wheelbarrow and we would take
them to the clinic because I’m not too far from the clinic, and we would take
them there and then they would see the progress, they are no longer being
wheeled, they are slowly walking now and then now they were waking up and
they were thinking that hey this thing of AIDS and this thing of putting people
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on ARVs it is working. And then they were flocking. . . It was illegal what we
were doing, but we were doing it because these people were coming from
faaaar away. Queenstown, the Transkei, Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port
Elizabeth, they would be brought here and we would admit them. Relatives
would fetch them from far away. They would hear that there was a white lady
with medicine that could heal HIV.
These were the humble beginnings of a facility that now works with funding from the
Canadian government to provide treatment to HIV/AIDS patients.
As chapters two and three illustrated, black women bear the brunt of the HIV
epidemic, but there are also numerous amounts of black women leading the charge against
the disease. The interviews in this section allow for different voices to be heard: five of the
interviewees were black women, one was a black man, one was a white woman, and one was
a white man. These individuals represent the countless number of people in South Africa
who are affected by HIV/AIDS, and who are also working to combat the prevalence of the
disease. While every attempt was made to ensure the approved interview questions
themselves were answered, participants were inspired to speak freely. Each conversation
began with a question from the list in Appendix 2, but many of the responses snowballed into
deep, rich discussions that yielded more insight than I could have asked for.
Located on the central south east of South Africa, the Eastern Cape Province was
formed in 1994 out of the traditional homelands of the Xhosa13 people: the Transkei and the
Ciskei. While there are of course exceptions, the vast majority of Xhosa people live in
poverty which, as discussed in chapter three, directly coincides with housing, medical care,
and vulnerability to violence and HIV/AIDS. Xhosa women are on the bottom end of the

Xhosa is the second largest ethnic group in South Africa next to the Zulu. Famous Xhosa people include
Steve Biko and former South African Presidents, Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Oliver Tambo.
13

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poverty spectrum, as men are seen to be the protectors and providers who yield all the power
in their culture and society.
These interview participants were all Xhosa, except for one Afrikaans woman, and
one English man. We spoke about many different aspects of HIV/AIDS including direct and
indirect causes, effects, and foreign aid. The findings and analyses from field interviews will
be presented in this section. Each major trend that was noticed has its own section, and is
categorized under the pillars of postcolonial feminism theory as articulated in the chapter on
methodology: socio-economic status, gender intersection, race, and external western
agencies. A list of interview questions can be found in Appendix 2.
5.2.1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
This first section sets the stage for a better understanding of black South Africans and
traditional African cultures. As chapter two illustrated, most of the black population in South
Africa lives in extreme poverty. Interview respondents supplemented the literature with
anecdotes of daily life and insight into the lived realities of the black community.
As an upper-middle class businessman, E has no financial worry. However, he is not
blind to the situations of others. As a local businessman, he works predominantly with black
families who live in surrounding townships, and his business will often take him into their
homes. When I asked him if the many AIDS-related deaths that he has witnessed over the
years could be related to poverty or considered a cultural or gendered problem, he certainly
thought so, and discussed the common living situation on the outskirts of the town:
But when I say cultural, I say just because the black people are the poverty stricken
people in South Africa. The people who live in ghettos—I mean ghetto is quite a posh
word to describe some of the places are absolutely terribly disgusting. You live in a
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room that hasn’t even got a bed in it and it’s made out of cardboard and it leaks like a
sieve when it rains. . . The poverty in South Africa—I mean this is going to Canada
where I don’t think people can imagine the poverty you’ve seen in South Africa. But
the poverty is absolutely criminal. . . I believe, and it’s my opinion, honestly that
most of the black people who die of AIDS die where they are living in a ghetto
situation. There’s no other way of describing it except a ghetto situation.

One circumstance that seems to be reinforcing the low socio-economic status of these
communities is child-headed households. These unnatural situations are a growing
phenomenon in South Africa, and according to those with whom I spoke, they are definitely
related to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. A situational report on child-headed households in South
Africa, conducted by the University of South Africa (2008) found that high incidence and
prevalence of child-headed households is due to the HIV/AIDS epidemic as well as
unemployment, desertion or abandonment, and alcohol abuse. HIV/AIDS was also noted to
be the leading cause of orphan-hood and child vulnerability. E’s opinion was that “the
biggest difficulty with AIDS in the country is the children that get left behind.” He has seen
too many heartbreaking incidents of such:
And if [the father] dies, all of a sudden or worse if [the mother] dies, he decides that
there’s no future in this little lot and he goes and finds himself another girlfriend, and
the children often with the eldest child being 15 or 16 years old—they have lots of
children, that’s just part of their wealth—these children are left to fend for
themselves. And although there are child welfare grants available, really they are so
little, I think it’s R35014 a month per child. But the situation is that you’ve got a kid
who might be looking after their siblings but if she finds a boyfriend or the boy finds
a girlfriend then they are going to decide that there are better things to do than look
after the siblings. As a result they will suffer. And there is just so much of that.

In many circumstances, those living in poverty, especially children with no parents around,
cannot see a way out other than to sell the only thing they have: their bodies.
14

350 South African Rand is approximately 31 Canadian Dollars

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As discussed in chapter three, there are many instances of young people—both males
and females—who sell sex in order to obtain material goods and have an outward appearance
of affluence. Many of these teenagers do not see this as prostitution, however. E describes a
conversation he had with an American exchange student who his family hosted, who became
good friends with some of the black girls at school:
These girls who come here, I drop them off at home and they come from the most
poverty stricken places, where do they get such fancy cellphones? And the beautiful
watch and dress she’s wearing?” And so on… And she said, “Aw, but they all what
they do, they sell sex.” “Oh, so they prostitutes?” “No, no, no! They not prostitutes.
They don’t sell it like that. . . Not selling their bodies for money, but selling it for
goods and the relationship and so on and they are usually with much older men
because the older ones are the ones that are more likely to have money to spend on
them so that they number one prize, according to what she told me, was to get a bloke
of about 30 or so because he was established.
This idea of transactional sex and trading one’s body for material goods was echoed
by the PP participants when asked about GBV:
P2: And the lack of jobs. If the women are not working, then the men are the ones
that put food on the table so sometimes it’s difficult to say you must use a condom
because he gives something to you and you don’t have means to have food so…
P6: The best thing about this sugar daddies
CG: So that’s just if there’s no employment?
P6: Yes it’s an issue of poverty.
P4: Transactional sex
P1: And sugar mommies too. A small group.
P2: They give the money to the young men
CG: So would you say that poverty is also quite linked to HIV? [Emphasized group
agreement]

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These types of activities are linked to HIV/AIDS in much the same way as they are in
North America. Ostensibly, these men have more than one girlfriend, whether they pay for
them or not. If they are driving long distances, and stay over in different cities, you can
imagine that this would most definitely lead to the spread of HIV.
These situations have the potential to cause severe medical problems. However,
access to medical care is one of the biggest hurdles to those who live in such poverty. There
are public hospitals but they are often over-crowded, out of supplies, or too far for people to
travel, whose only means of transportation is by foot. Then there are the private hospitals—
which during Apartheid were for whites only—that are clean, well-stocked, and usually in
the middle of town. These are the hospitals that one must pay for, however. For people like
E, this is no problem. For those who live in poverty however, these hospitals are out of the
question. E explains:
Medical treatment I can get easily there’s no problem at all because I’ve got enough
money to afford a medical aid and I can go to a private hospital; [But] you read letters
to the newspapers where people need something like Panado (Tylenol), you know
easily available stuff. But they genuinely can’t. I mean Panado, they go to the clinic
and sit all day. I mean I just go to the chemist and buy it and that’s it. But these
people haven’t got the money to buy bread for their kids.

5.2.2. GENDER INTERSECTIONS
As explained in the theory and methodology chapter, the idea that oppressive
institutions such as racism, sexism, ethnocentrism, to name a few, do not exist isolated from
one another, leads to an intersectional analysis. This section presents major trends from the
interviews that fall under the category of gender intersection. These trends include traditional

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gender roles, different expectations, marital expectations, gender insecurity, gender power
assertion, and GBV.
The discussion about traditional gender roles (Questions 1-6 in Appendix 2) was by
far the longest and most in-depth at the PP. When participants were asked if they thought that
there were particular tasks that should be performed by women and vice versa, the responses
flooded out. Not only are there different roles for men and women, but there are also
different expectations for similar circumstances. Upon review of the interview responses,
several different trends emerged throughout the conversation. These included: different
expectations; acceptance and non-acceptance of tradition; everything has an origin; power
dynamics; families perpetuate roles; men must assert their power; cultural differences;
gender insecurity goes both ways; there are a spectrum of views; GBV is a problem; poverty
is a problem; change is slow and localized; there needs to be a ripple effect; and the need for
generational overturn. The group described how traditional gender roles are very much
adhered to by traditional African cultures, such as the Xhosa.
The main difference between Canadian gender roles and South African (specifically
Xhosa) gender roles it seemed was the fact that in South Africa, women tend to have less
agency within their own homes. As chapter three explained, some men say “democracy stops
at [their] front door” (Moffett 2009, 172). For example, even if doing the dishes or laundry
may still be seen as feminine work in Canada, it is generally accepted that men will still help
and not be seen as “sissies” for doing so. Whereas in a typical Xhosa household, this is
unacceptable: “There are things, there are tasks that have to be done by men as the protector
of the family because he is supposed to head us and protect us” (P1); “So there is quite a

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number of things that we don’t do that they do and that they don’t do and we do. You know
whether we are favouring them or they are favouring us, I don’t know” (P3).
These roles and traditions are generally rigid enough in the Xhosa culture and
communities that they do not need to be discussed at all, they are just tacitly followed. Even
if young boys are taught to do their own laundry, cooking, and dishes, when they grow up,
are initiated and become men, they no longer have to do those things for themselves:
P4: But also, even if they grow up like that, then they’ll marry a traditional woman
who will say “No, no, sit down. I’ll do the washing, I’ll do the cooking.”
P3: The women don’t have to say sit down. The women automatically, she knows
that she’s got to do the washing. Not even being told! She came from her home where
she’s been taught…
P4: That’s what I’m saying. There’s no chance for him to even try and wash dishes.
Because she’ll be there, body blocking!
P1: If a man does this washing and dishes and what-not. He’s sort of taken as a sissy.
He’s a sissy of a man and no one wants to have a husband who is a sissy. You also
want your husband to be a man and not a sissy.

The ultimate role for a woman though, is to get married and produce children. This is why
she joins a family. She is there to extend the bloodline; she is there to serve as a conduit of
her husband’s masculinity:
P3: And also, where children are concerned, even if you have a small bubba, and then
it’s hardly a year and you fall pregnant again and you’ve got another bubba, and
hardly another year and you’ve got another bubba. It’s nothing strange to the in-laws.
That is what you came here for. It’s to have a bubba, one after another. And also,
those years, there was nothing about to contracept and things like that. The only way
that you are contracepting is when your husband leaves and he goes to Johannesburg
and he goes and work and he stays there for maybe four, two, or three years, and he
will be unable to raise these children. When he comes back, he makes another bubba.
And there’s nothing funny about that. You came here to this family to produce
bubbas and if you do not produce bubba, we’ll have to go somewhere even if it’s to a

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sangoma15 or wherever to go and find out what is happening with you. Why don’t
you get children? And that is one of the reasons that makes the husband then to go
outside. Because he wants to prove himself that he can make bubbas. So you are the
one that is at fault. And once that happens and he gets a child outside, then you can
forget about it because every time he wants to go. Because he wants to make children
outside because you don’t produce any bubbas.
P1: They don’t think of any incompatibility. They don’t think that one day you can
meet another man and have a child. They don’t consider such things.

Not only does the man exert his power, but the traditional cultures are so patriarchal
that even the rest of the family, including the women, tell wives that they must be submissive
and cater to their husband and his every whim. Consequently, this leads to women
reinforcing the structural gendered violence that is ever-present in these communities
therefore making it much harder to combat. It is a more intricate problem than just reeducating or changing the men. The entire society needs to be revolutionized.
As the following conversation shows, not only do men hold women accountable for
performing particular chores and acts, but the women hold their men to be manly, masculine,
and not a “sissy.” These reinforcing behaviours make change and equality harder to achieve.
Moreover, while there are different expectations for gender roles, there are also different
expectations for similar circumstances such as the death of a spouse, fidelity, and number of
sexual partners.
When it comes to the death of a spouse, there are different expectations for widowers
and widows. Because polygamy is widely accepted, while polyandry is strictly forbidden,
after a man’s wife dies, he is not expected to live day to day life any differently. However as

15

Xhosa term for any Southern African traditional healer

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widows, women are expected to mourn publicly for their husbands by wearing special
clothing. As P2 explained:
There are traditional clothes you supposed to wear with a black toque and a small
blanket on your shoulder. But the men, they wear nothing. But then if your husband
died, there are special clothes you supposed to wear. The black clothes sometimes—
it’s not black it’s navy clothes, sometimes it’s Germans16 clothes but the men wear
nothing to show that he’s lost his wife.

This practice of double standards is most certainly related to the fact that men and
women are expected to treat relationships differently. E discussed this by saying:
In the black community in this area, often men are not very loyal to their wives,
whether they’ve got AIDS or not. But often the husband is probably the reason for the
wife to have AIDS in the first place. But they often have girlfriends. Our president
has five wives so it’s not unusual for any ordinary fellow to have two wives at least
and children with all of them.
At the PP, this type of polygamy was explained as being a playboy:
P1: A playgirl is not allowed.
P5: A playboy is a good person, but a playgirl is a bad person.
P3: Strange hey?
P3: Even if you do have a boyfriend and you’re a woman it’s like the talk of the
town. Everybody will be talking about that. But if your husband has got a girlfriend
or girlfriends it’s like…
P1: An honour!
P3: Nobody says anything really. You know? And even where money is concerned,
he’ll have money. He’ll spend his money with the girlfriends but you even if you go
to the in-laws—your sister in-law, or whoever—and complain, it will be like…
P4: [laughs] what’s the problem??
P3: What’s the problem? You’ve got a house and you’ve got children and he buys
you food! So why do you bother? Leave him! Let him go!

16

Shweshwe fabric introduced to the Xhosa by German settlers in the mid-1800s

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This seems to indicate that because men are the providers, in an economic and security sense,
that they should have free reign in their lives. This is bought into by both men themselves, as
well as elders in the community who perpetuate these customs and in turn, seemingly give
these men the go-ahead to maintain their power and control anyway they see fit. In fact, the
women are explicitly told that when their husbands go off for days or even months at a time,
that they are not to ask questions about where he has been, what he has been doing, and who
he has been doing it with. When he returns, they are to feed him, give him water to wash, and
be nice to him. You do not question him, no matter what. As P7 said, “don’t ask where you
come from. Just kiss him and give him food.”
As the discussion about GBV continued, it expanded into the participants telling me
how the older women in families prepared new wives to serve their new husbands. Makotis17
are taught by elders not to question their new husbands, to do whatever he asks, and then
some. Not only is she to not question anything he does, but she is to support him in whatever
he does, including leaving home for days at a time to go see other women or to do any other
number of things.
P3: A new bride…And we sit there and we talk to her. That is one thing that you
would mention to her. If your husband, if he is missing…he is just late in the
afternoon or evening…if he just gets missing.
P6: Don’t look around.
P3: Don’t look around. Go and make your bed and then go and sleep. And he comes
early in the morning, and when he comes in the morning, just give him amanzi18, give
him water to wash. Whatever, coffee and so on. And don’t ask questions! That is us
saying this to the new bride. You get what I mean? And he’s around us in the house
while we talk to the new bride. He hears all these things. So I think they take a lot of
17
18

A Makoti is a new Xhosa bride
Xhosa word for water

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advantage, the men, because he knows that one: you’re not going to go and try to find
him. Two: tomorrow morning when he knocks even if it’s two in the morning or even
five, you’ve got to get up and you’ve got to open up. You’ve got to give him water to
wash and so on and give him coffee and get his things together
P6: And be nice to him
P3: So that he can go.
Rape is one of the leading causes of the spread of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, but of course,
these polygamous habits and leaving home for days or months at a time does not help
mitigate the epidemic whatsoever. Rather, it further exacerbates the problem. With the power
over women that these men exercise, in theory they also have complete control over sexual
relationships. For example, P6 explained,
When it comes to a relationship between a man and a woman, married or not married,
the man is more powerful. You cannot say when your husband wants to sleep with
you and then you can refuse as a woman even if you feel like refusing. So it’s like
men are having power in that area. And then that’s when if you refuse as a woman,
when the violence comes in . . . So you have to do what you don’t want to do because
so and so wants that.

Further, as a woman, you cannot ask your husband to wear a condom. This must be
his choice, and often, he will refuse to wear one. If these men are away for long periods of
time, presumably having sex with other women, he is most likely not using a condom with
these women either. As P2 mentioned, “they can tell you that ‘No, I pay lobola19 for you. I
pay a lot of money for you to be my wife’” which translates into these women being the
property of these men, and having to listen to him and do what he says for fear of being
beaten or raped, as will be discussed further in this chapter.

19

Xhosa word for dowry

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Although these gender roles and duties benefit men far more than women, there is
also stress on the part of the men, which is a factor that leads to GBV. Society has
expectations of women to do particular things and perform certain tasks, but there is also
pressure on men to act or behave in certain ways and eschew a sort of external manliness. P1
made a particularly interesting statement to that effect: “When you’re a grown man, a man is
the head of the family so there are things now that the family that is me, my children, cannot
watch their father doing them. . . There are things, there are tasks that have to be done by
men as the protector of the family because he is supposed to head us and protect us.” This
shows that certainly not all men are abusers all the time. However, it can also be understood
that in return for protection and provision, wives must cater to their husbands in every way.
This seems to be one of the cogs in the wheel of perpetual patriarchy and violence that make
up these gendered power dynamics.
At the beginning of our interview, P4 made a very noteworthy statement that is
echoed in the literature. She said, “I think because we live in a patriarchal society, sometimes
the men feel that they need to be in power and sometimes when they don’t feel that they [are]
in power, they find other ways to yield that power.” In a society where men do not want to be
seen as “sissies,” they must make sure that their power and superiority is exhibited in such a
manner that it is not mistaken. P4 went on to say, “I feel a lot of it is because of this
patriarchal society where men feel that they have to be a certain thing and when that power is
taken away, they feel that they have to assert it in another way. That’s my understanding of
it. And there have been examples in my own family.” As argued by Judith Butler (1999),
these men are “performing” their masculinity.

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Power relationships however, are not limited to husband and wife. They are even
present in the school system, according to E:
It even where I get the stories from is the school [sic]. They used to be white schools
and they still have white staff who don’t really understand these things properly
where they say that they encourage parents to send boys during the school holidays to
get initiated20 to make sure that they finish during the holidays otherwise when they
get back to school and there women teachers, they the boss of the women teachers so
they don’t dare tell them what to do, they now the boss to tell the woman teacher
what to do. And this comes from the school where we’ve had letters from the school
that have said “Please, if you want to send your boys to be initiated…” They have to
send the letters to everyone. And I’ve from more than one of the schools, “Just
remember that your child knows that any female teacher is to be respected in all
ways.

This is where a lot of the GBV begins. The interrelationship between colonial
practices and cultural tradition combine to create the perfect storm of the need for men to
regain and assert power and the feeling of having authority over women. As E explained:
The Xhosa tribe that lives in the area, it seems to be and this story comes from the
school. The initiation, when a boy is about 16 (this applies only to black kids) he gets
initiated and made a man. But one of the things they get told is “You are now the
boss of the woman. Don’t let any woman tell you that she’s not going to open her
legs for you. You are now the boss.” And apparently that leads to violence. They go
back and the first girl they come across that they fancy and they tell her what they
want her to do and she tells them to go get knotted and they’ll smack her.

Another understanding or explanation behind GBVin these communities is the fact
that the head of the household—the man—must make sure that his wife or girlfriend knows
when she is not performing her feminine duties as well as she is expected:
The man is the head of the house, you see the women, she supposed to cook and she
supposed to wash the clothes as well but when the man is coming and maybe one of
those things aren’t done, like maybe there’s no food on the plate…being as a female,
20

Initiation, or Ulwaluko, is the Xhosa circumcision and coming of age tradition.

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you feel because I am just hungry now, I am just coming for food. It feels like the
female, you are not doing anything. You are failing being someone who can provide
your thing [sic]. . . You’re looking after the kids as well as a female. But as a man,
you must do nothing, or just coming from the farm, looking after the cows, but now
I’m just back it seems like you are just doing nothing. It seems as though you are not
right. (P7)

Husbands’ families, mainly older relatives, also have a say in the way a wife is
supposed to act in the marriage and treat her husband. They will give her (forceful) advice on
household duties as well as their sexual relationship, her husband’s faithfulness, and having
children.
P3: Nobody says anything really. You know? And even where money is concerned,
he’ll have money. He’ll spend his money with the girlfriends but you even if you go
to the in-laws—your sister in-law, or whoever—and complain, it will be like…
P4: [laughs] what’s the problem??
P3: What’s the problem? You’ve got a house and you’ve got children and he buys
you food! So why do you bother? Leave him! Let him go!
P1: He’ll come back in time.
P3: Yeah, he’ll come back in time. And they don’t see anything hurting you or so on.
P7: And even [Xhosa] they say don’t ask your husband when he’s coming back.
Maybe he’s coming after a day. Don’t ask where you come from. Just kiss him and
give him food.

GBV is seen as a problem not only by outsiders, but by locals as well. Even the
older, more traditional women agreed that this type of violence was most certainly a
problem. As the participants spoke about gender norms and roles, and what happens in a
typical Xhosa relationship, they acknowledged that many of these behaviours lead to
violence.

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P4: But also just to link this to violence…if you are tired of having children and you
ask your husband to wear a condom, that could be a problem. So that could lead to
violence. Or if you were to ask him, why is he coming late three days a week or
whatever, then that could lead to violence. So it’s everybody has their gender norms
and if you deviate, violent things can happen.
P5: But also there’s women who’s been faithful in the marriage and then they get
HIV. But then even then, they are accused of bringing HIV into the family. So the
same rules don’t apply for everybody.
P4: Yeah, even though it’s obvious that it’s the man. Who’s been in Johannesburg
who’s brought. . .
P1: There was a couple here at one stage. The man was so aggressive. He was [HIV]
positive. And the poor woman came to [inaudible] here with us. He was so
aggressive. Didn’t want to listen and whatnot. And then we asked the wife, why is he
like this? She said “Because I’m not positive, he is positive. He keeps on asking me
why I’m not positive when he’s positive?” As if it is her fault. That’s the type of
violence that women are… You have to answer why you are not positive. When your
husband is positive. Can you imagine that?
P3: And why are you not getting children?
P6: When it comes to a relationship between a man and a woman, married or not
married, the man is more powerful. You cannot say when your husband wants to
sleep with you and then you can refuse as a woman even if you feel like refusing. So
it’s like men are having power in that area. And then that’s when if you refuse as a
woman, when the violence comes in.
P3: They start hitting you and all this and that.
P6: So you have to do what you don’t want to do because so and so wants that.

As these participants worked for an HIV/AIDS education and rehabilitation centre, they
understood that this violence should not be happening, let alone be considered normal or
acceptable. However, to reiterate the sentiment above, many Xhosa people still practice these
types of violent relationships every day and there does not seem to be an end in sight.
The most profound statement during the interviews came from the male gender
ambassador (P7) when he said, “gender is something that we can change.” The PP is slowly
starting to see changes in the surrounding villages, but they do see a need to involve other
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communities. The change is slow and localized to the small village where the PP operates,
and as P4 said, “change won’t happen overnight because these things take time. And
sometimes it’s a mindset shift that needs to happen first.”
5.2.3. RACE
There were no concrete questions about race, but certainly the socio-economic status,
the transactional sex, the gender intersection and gender roles can all fit into the wider
category of race to where some conversation naturally progressed. Of course, there are white
people who are affected by the problems discussed throughout this chapter, but most the
people who are suffering are non-white.
These issues are root causes of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. As E stated, “I’m not for one
moment trying to be racist, but no white girls die of AIDS and no one can tell me that they’re
not having sex.” One of the big issues that came from the post-Apartheid era, which again is
supported by the literature, is that Thabo Mbeki (South African President from 1999-2008)
did not believe in anti-retroviral drugs. It was his opinion that they were introduced to harm
black people rather than treat HIV, so he banned them. E remembers: “our state president
believed that the ARVs were an invention of western medicine and they were not designed
for black people, they were designed to kill black people and all sorts of weird stories
attached to it. But the upshot was that we weren’t allowed to get them in South Africa.”
Perhaps one of the reasons why these ARVs were not trusted is because in many black
cultures, it was believed that HIV/AIDS could not affect black people, that it was a white
person’s disease. P3 explains:
Of course HIV/AIDS by then, nobody was accepting the fact that black people, we
can also be affected. It was associated with the gay community and with the white
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community and as time went [she] being the doctor of the village, she could see and
she could pick it up that people were infected irrespective whether they were black or
white, educated or not, rich or poor, but they were infected with HIV/AIDS . . . And
as we all know, it was late in 2004 when our gov’t in SA did the roll out and people
even before then they were infected but it was more of family people that were
jealous of them and that they were using certain mutis,21 and medicines so that you
can be ill. But it was not described as HIV/AIDS to the families. It was like there was
some jealousy and this muti, they were being bewitched and all sorts of things . . . I
would go around to the clinics and try to educate—it was very bad that time. Even the
sisters at the clinic, at the time they wouldn’t accept that there was this thing called
HIV/AIDS. And when I was introducing myself, when I said that I am coming
originally from Cape Town then they would say that is a Cape Town disease that
you’re talking about. It’s not a disease that’s existing here in our villages.

It appears the black cultures were so oppressed by the colonial powers that they would not
trust anything that came from white people, or the western world (Steenkamp 2009). There is
still a lot of mistrust between black and white people in South Africa. Most, if not all this
mistrust can be traced back to Apartheid. E described one archaic policy in particular:
You don’t get an awful lot of mixing with the white and black kids but this one came
from America and she got pally with some black kids and she used to bring them
home—they were lovely children/teenagers—and they were really, we had never
because of the separateness, Apartheid, neither my wife nor myself, or anyone really
had had anything much to do, it was actually illegal for a [white] boy, if you were
caught holding a [black] girl’s hand, you could go to jail for it. They had what they
called the Immorality Act. And blacks were not allowed to have any intimate contact
with whites at all, as far as sex whether it was homosexual or what kind of sex, they
were not allowed to have it.

Although policies like this are no longer law, the effects are still very real. It is still
the white people who hold the majority of affluence in the country, and it is still largely the
black people who are suffering. There is a need for international help because so far the
country has not been able to fix these problems on its own.

21

Traditional medicine

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5.2.4. EXTERNAL WESTERN AGENCIES
The fact of the matter is that we (in South Africa) need to be extremely grateful for any aid
that is given from other countries. The obvious extreme, extreme poverty that there is in
Africa and a lot of it is particularly in child-headed families which is the result of AIDS and
anything that can be done to help the AIDS sufferers which is possibly an unpopular charity
in SA. (E)

While it is clear that people in South Africa (specifically those with HIV/AIDS) are
in need of help, those who are giving, need to make sure they are giving the “right” help. The
research question that informs this thesis is: Under the Harper government, was there an
absence of gender in aid to HIV/AIDS programs in South Africa and if so, what were the
implications? To help answer this question I also asked if Canadian policies and programmes
(directed toward HIV/AIDS in South Africa) consider gendered differences and intersections
of gender, race and socio-economic status: is the HIV epidemic examined or considered
within the precise social relations in which it occurs? Consistent with a postcolonial feminist
perspective, these things must be taken into consideration when writing policy, particularly
on gendered issues such as HIV/AIDS.
When allocating funds, DFATD asked the PP to please include gender, but did not
give them any direct policies. All they said was to include it in some way, however they see
fit. They did not have to provide any details however, so DFATD (now GAC) had no idea
how or to what extent gender is or was included. The only care seems to be that the term
“gender” be included in the official budget in some capacity. It was completely up to the PP
in how they wanted to include it, and the reasoning was because DFATD did not know the
issues as well as the PP did. The fact that they do not understand the issues is clear from the
discourse, but unless this is a way of DFATD showing respect to the local community, the
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addition of a miscellaneous budget line seems to be somewhat of a cop out in terms of
gender inclusion. If this is true for all programming partners on the ground, then this is
certainly not good enough to say that gender analyses are undertaken, nor is gender included
appropriately on the part of the Canadian government. This then begs the question if this is
enough to satisfy the component of gender. After the interview at PP, this question seemed
more unanswered than before this research began. This could possibly be because each
participant had a different outlook on the non-institutional questions that were asked of them.
There seemed to be a spectrum of ideologies and opinions that stretched from the older, very
traditional to the younger, very modern or “Westernized.” Of course there was an
understanding of each other’s perspectives, but there was a clear distinction in their stance.
For example, when asked about different roles that must be played by males and females,
there was a large divide. The older, more traditional women jumped in right away and said
yes of course there are things that males must do and things that females must do. Some were
however mindful to say “Yes, I feel that there are. There are tasks that are performed by men
and there are tasks that are performed by women, whether it’s my cultural influence or what”
(P1). So despite having these strong beliefs, they recognized that there were external factors
to explain their feelings.
These separate views could perhaps be enough to say that yes, external western
agencies (DFATD in this case) do at least take gender into account. However, that does not
necessarily mean that their policies include gender. The precise social relations in which the
HIV/AIDS epidemic occurs however, is a different story. The next section will discuss the
gaps between government rhetoric and the on-the-ground reality.

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5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
From the previous two sections in this chapter, one can infer—due to the absence in
the discourse and the inattention in practice—that from a government perspective, the things
that matter to HIV/AIDS programming such as gender, race, historical and social practices,
and socio-economic status, are not considered when writing policies. As noted above, these
considerations are not even in the discussions surrounding maternal, newborn, and child
health and child, early, and forced marriage, which were the Conservatives’ top priorities
under development aid. However, when you talk to people in South African communities
who are directly impacted by HIV/AIDS, such as those at the PP, they not only understand
the things that impact HIV/AIDS programs on a day to day basis such as poverty, GBV, rigid
gender roles and lack of access to proper medical care, but they live them. Unlike
government discourse, the programs on the ground take these important things into
consideration when implementing their plans. Therein lays the biggest gap between discourse
and practice.
While the government discourse analysis focuses solely on the view from the
Canadian government, and the interviews are the perspective of those working and living in
South Africa, there were some interesting overlaps between the two. There were
unfortunately many more gaps though, than similarities. The government may be financially
supporting these programmes, but the following contrast and comparisons demonstrate that
they do not hold the same priorities.
The major similarity between government rhetoric and information from the PP was
the fact that men are seen as the providers and women are seen as mothers and caregivers.

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This however, is not a positive similarity. As the literature, and many of the interview
responses illustrate, these rigid gender roles are at the root of many of the problems
associated with GBV and HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Again, men in traditional South
African cultures, like the Xhosa, assume they hold the power, and when women do not
conform, many will resort to violence. If the Conservative government thought equating
women to their reproductive capabilities was okay, then they need only read the remarks
made by those at the PP who reiterated more than once that these old traditional ways must
be changed to reach a permanent solution to the HIV/AIDS crisis. And in order to make
permanent changes in South Africa, there cannot be external agencies reinforcing such
opinions and statuses.
However, that was another issue: in the past, DFATD and CIDA had said,
“development cooperation always involves people. Within CIDA, a gender analysis that
addresses the connections of gender with factors such as race, ethnicity, culture, class, age,
disability, and/or other status, among others, is required for all policies, programs and
projects” (CIDA 2013a). While a gender analysis that addresses all of these points is indeed
necessary in order to write effective policies, the interview with the PP made it very clear
that the Canadian government does not address all these points—at least in the directives that
they give to the PP. The PP said the only directives in regard to that list were that the PP
must include gender in some way, and that was the end of it. Therefore, this statement is
either obsolete, or DFATD does not follow through with the regulations it so publicly sets
out for itself.
If including a gender analysis was indeed the practice pre-DFATD, it is certainly not
a priority now insofar as DFATD has nothing to do with the analysis, itself. Even within the
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discourse, there is an exceptionally clear lack of gender, race and socio-economic status
intersection. The only gendered insights brought (publicly at least) into discourse around
policy, were the archaic notions that a women’s role is to reproduce and care for children, as
the rhetoric around maternal, newborn, and child health and child, early, and forced marriage
clearly indicated.
In terms of HIV/AIDS programs, particularly the PP with whom I spoke, it appears
Stephen Brown (2013) was correct in saying that even though there is a substantial amount
of aid sent to Africa, it lacks “a clearly defined policy or strategy for assistance” (181). In the
eyes of the Conservative government however, Canadian aid was clearly classified and seen
as a self-proclaimed ‘saviour’ to aid recipients. This again links back to Akuffo’s (2012) idea
of the presentation of a moral identity, but in doing so, the Conservatives essentialized and
“othered” those in need of assistance—exactly what Said (1978) and Spivak (1988) warned
against. The nature of the assistance, however, focuses almost exclusively on economic
prosperity in every sense of the word, rather than the assistance that was truly needed. Even
the maternal, newborn, and child health and child, early, and forced marriage have goals to
help women and mothers but they are focused on getting them out into the working force to
contribute to their community’s economy which of course is a positive but not the root of the
issues. This is noteworthy, given the concentration on the build-up of foreign economies to
become strong trading and investment partners for Canada, especially in Africa. Health and
gender equality is second to economic prosperity.
When it comes to Canadian aid to South African HIV/AIDS programs though, there
does not seem to be as much excitement. Throughout the articles about aid, Africa, and

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HIV/AIDS, the passion allocated to economics, trade and investment seemed to be missing.
Of course, those at the PP had only good things to say about the Canadian government (they
seemed to share E’s sentiments that they should be grateful for any help at all), and the
money they received, but DFATD (they were previously involved with CIDA) seemed
exceptionally hands off. There were no specific directives given along with the money other
than to include a budget line for gender, anyway they saw fit. Again, the fact that the
government assigned these types of decisions to the PP could in fact be enough to say that
when providing aid to programs like this, they do take into consideration the precise social
relations. Yet, while that may or may not be the case, it is clear from the discourse that things
like gender, race, and socio-economic status are not priorities and are not taken into
consideration by the Conservative government at all.
The interviews resonate with the findings of the literature review in chapter three,
which expressed very clearly that HIV/AIDS is very closely linked to rape, which is a form
of GBV, which is fuelled by both low socioeconomic status, as well as rigid gender roles.
Further, the fight for masculinity and power can be directly linked to Apartheid and the postApartheid era. The Conservative government’s silence around these factors most certainly
legitimizes the same silences in South African society. The PP is evidently aware of this
cycle and does its best to combat it, but there is little to no support from governments, which
makes the process that much harder.
5.4 CONCLUSIONS
This chapter outlined the findings from the discourse analysis and face-to-face
interviews. The discourse analysis template was informed by the pillars of postcolonial
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feminism, while chapters three and four provided me with a framework for analysis of both
the discourse analysis and interviews—they prompted me to look for the inclusion of social
and historical practices; women or gender; GBV; race and culture; socio-economic status;
gender/race/class intersection; descriptions of aid; and the context of each.
Major findings from the discourse analysis included: the fact that all development
priorities were secondary to economic growth and prosperity; “empowerment of women”
was a strong theme but still did not account for gendered differences; women were
pigeonholed into their roles as reproducers and nurturers; there was no attention paid to
historical or social practices within aid recipient countries which denied an understanding of
the need for aid in the first place; there was no attention paid to race which indicated either
an assumption of race neutrality or a denial of the impact of race; and finally there was a
strong representation of the idea that the Conservatives portrayed themselves as “saviours” of
those in need of development aid. These were the trends that arose out of the discourse from
the upper echelons of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government. Unsurprisingly, these
trends were presented in a positive light, but were attempting to hide the fact that there was a
lot of empty rhetoric around development aid, and the aid that was given did not consider the
precise social relations in which these circumstances existed. The findings from the face-toface interviews provided insight into what these social relations were and are in surrounding
the GBV and HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa.
The interviews were analyzed and organized by the postcolonial feminist pillars:
socio-economic status; gender intersection; race; and external western agencies. Upon
analysis, the major findings of the interviews included: poverty strikes black people in South
Africa the hardest; poverty plays a large part in the transmission and treatment of HIV via
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transactional sex and the inability to pay for healthcare; rigid, traditional gender roles are at
the root of many or most of the problems associated with GBV and HIV/AIDS; there is
gender insecurity associated with being male and female so many feel the need to assert or
“perform” their gender and power; GBV is a problem in these rural communities; and things
(traditional gender roles, GBV, HIV/AIDS rates) can change, but it has to start locally and
spread outward.
There were also some interesting links between the two sets of research. The
interview findings indicated that people who are living and working in these rural
communities agree that harmful traditional practices, specifically rigid gender roles, must
change before they can arrive at a permanent solution for GBV and/or HIV/AIDS. However,
the Conservative discourse reinforced rigid gender roles with the equation of women to their
roles as reproducers and nurturers. Moreover, the Conservatives contradicted themselves
when they stated that development projects need gender analyses but the interviews exposed
the fact that not only are these analyses not being performed by the Canadian government,
but they do not care how or if they are performed in the field, at all. Perhaps the most
noteworthy link though, is that colonial practices and their legacies have exacerbated GBV
and HIV/AIDS in South Africa; however, through the Harper government discourse that
portrayed themselves as “saviours” and in turn essentialized and “othered” those in need of
assistance (HIV/AIDS programs in South Africa, in this case), they have inevitably carried
on those colonial values and legacies that have created the need for aid in the first place.
As P7 said, “gender can change.” So too then, can the practices that support GBV,
low socio-economic status, and rigid gender roles. This mindset shift needs to happen not
only in South Africa society, but also within their government, and any government that is
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providing aid to these programs, such as the Canadians. The rhetoric needs to change before
actions can revolutionize. These governments and the people in charge of writing policy need
to acknowledge that there are more profound problems that need to be addressed to change
the course of GBV and HIV/AIDS in South Africa. As it stands now, the Canadian
government has not and does not consider the precise social relations in which the
HIV/AIDS epidemic occurs. There is an absence of gender in aid to these programs, and
there are harsh consequences to that absence. An important question arising from this
analysis is the prospects for effective aid donor-ship when the donors themselves are not
keeping up with contemporary ideas and practices in the area of gender and development
programming.

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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This concluding chapter will restate the research question and thesis statement, and
summarize the main findings of this thesis. Next, it will reflect upon contributions of this
research both theoretically and practically. Furthermore, it will discuss strengths and
limitations and will provide recommendations for areas of further research. The final section
will offer some recommendations for further research and concluding remarks.
6.1 DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The general research topic of this thesis was Canadian foreign policy toward South
Africa, particularly around aid to HIV/AIDS programming. HIV/AIDS is a very multifaceted problem, but this thesis recognizes gender and GBV as a leading challenge in the
proliferation of the disease. Therefore, the relationship between gender, GBV and HIV/AIDS
in South Africa was one of the main research focuses. Because the understanding of gender
is so prominent in the fight against HIV/AIDS, gender in Canadian foreign policy was also
scrutinized. Thus, the research question was: under the Harper government, was there an
absence of gender in aid to HIV/AIDS programs in South Africa and if so, what were the
implications? In response to the question, this thesis has shown that other than a superficial
inclusion in the discourse, there was an absence of gender in Canadian foreign policy, under
the Harper government. Moreover, there was a lack of attention paid to the complexity of
HIV/AIDS and GBV intersection, and there was only a shallow effort by DFATD to prompt
inclusion of gender while local practitioners had a keen understanding of the intersection.
The absence in the Harper government discourse and practice showed a lack of

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understanding of the complexity of the issue, which is the lived experience of those on the
ground.
Along with the four pillars of postcolonial feminism (race, socio-economic status,
gender intersection, and external western agencies), Canada’s stated goal in South Africa, to
“help the country improve service delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS and build accountable
institutions, as well as to help South Africa play its regional role on the continent through
sharing relevant expertise” (DFATD 2014b) helped inform the analysis of the literature
which in turn provided me with key themes (historical and social practices, culture of
violence and stigma, “othering” and silencing, and the feminization of poverty) that helped
shape the questions I asked in the discourse analysis and the face-to-face interviews.
6.1.1 KEY FINDINGS OF THE DISCOURSE ANALYSIS
Although the word gender appeared several times throughout the discourse, it was not
mentioned enough or spoken about in such a way to illustrate that the Conservatives took it
seriously, or to even be categorized as a theme. This is problematic, as ignoring the existence
of gender reinforces the stereotypes and stigma faced by women.
Maternal, newborn, and child health and child, early, and forced marriages were the
Conservatives’ top priorities under the umbrella of internationalism, but the Muskoka
Initiative—the program behind those priorities—did not consider race, socio-economic
status, gender intersection, or the fact that DFATD was an external western agency in the
areas of the world upon which these initiatives were focused, all of which are root causes of
MNCH and CEFM. And, “programmes that directly address social determinants of health
and development, such as discrimination and stigma, subordination of women, poverty and
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inequality, violence and traditional practices, are essential for promoting health and reducing
disease” (Coovadia, Jewkes, Barron, Sanders and McIntyre 2009). Because none of these
things were considered, let alone prioritized, which led to only a presentation of a moral
identity as described by Edward Ansah Akuffo (2012), which consequently led to a practice
of hypocritical internationalism (Carrier and Tiessen 2013). That is, while the Conservatives
attempted to work within the parameters of internationalism such as the empowerment of
women and alleviation of poverty, none of these ideas were based on gender equality, only
Harper’s values of security, trade, and sustainable economic growth.
Furthermore, not only was there an absence of gender, but women were pigeon-holed
into their roles as reproducers and nurturers, and not seen as autonomous agents. This is
exactly the type of behaviours that Mohanty (2003) and Spivak (1988) warned against—
homogenization and speaking for the subaltern. One correlation to homogenization and
removal of autonomy is the deficit of discourse around race, historical or social practices—
these silences speak loudly and have implications for foreign policies in general, but
especially those aimed at HIV/AIDS programs. As postcolonial feminism tells us, historical
and social practices create the here and now, while different races experience these historical
and social circumstances differently. Thus, those in the Third World—particularly women—
were homogenized by the Conservative government and not understood as individuals or
communities (Mohanty 2003) in need of targeted aid and support.
Finally, throughout the discourse, the Harper government portrayed themselves as
saviours of the Third World. Government officials were not shy when portraying the
development aid and work they did as inspiring, leading the world in poverty development,
being compassionate and generous and as making a difference. This is problematic in itself,
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as the portrayal of Canada as the “White Knight” (Jeffrey 2005) reinforces the “othering”
and essentializing (Said 1978) of the Third World as a people who cannot save themselves
and need Canada to do it for them.
6.1.2 KEY FINDINGS OF THE INTERVIEWS
Major findings of the interviews included the fact that rigid gender roles are at the
root of many development problems including HIV/AIDS and that men and women in
traditional Xhosa communities (as a sample of black South African society as a whole) must
“perform” their gender via those rigid gender roles as gender security was an issue for both
men and women. Further, it was discussed that men feel that they must assert their
dominance but also their power as they do not want to be labelled sissies by their wives or
other people in the community. They generally do this by committing physical violence in
the home, or psychological violence by leaving home for days or weeks at a time to take up
with other women. As black women represent the largest group of people living with
HIV/AIDS in South Africa, links have been made between these gender roles and violence,
and HIV/AIDS. Moreover, interviewees stressed that poverty is certainly a factor in GBV
and HIV: black people are the poverty-stricken people in South Africa. Many of the women
in these communities turn to transactional sex as a source of income, which heightens the
risk of enduring GBV and contracting HIV.
Finally, upon sending aid, the Canadian government gave no directives to the PP
about gender other than asking them to please include it somehow in the budget. There were
no specific directions, let alone a request for a gender analysis. Although those working in
South Africa directly with the HIV/AIDS crisis are keenly aware of the gendered nature of

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the disease, the superficial inclusion of gender within Canadian aid policies to the country is
enough to conclude that HIV/AIDS was not considered by the Harper government within the
precise social relations in which it occurs.
The most positive finding from the interviews was a belief among local community
workers that gender and gender roles can change. Change is slow and localized, but gender
can change. It just needs to stem out from the local community.
6.1.3 THE GAP
Not only has it been made clear throughout this thesis, but CIDA stated it clearly (and
DFATD maintained it post-merger): a gender analysis is needed for all policies, programs
and projects (CIDA 2013a). The interviews clearly show that this is not always the case.
Although DFATD had asked the PP to please include a budget line for gender, the practical
gender inclusion did not come from DFATD but rather from the PP. This is likely because
they are aware of the situation, but nonetheless, the Conservatives failed to follow one of
their own policies. The lack of a gender analysis was also shown with the absence of gender
within the discourse. If these analyses had been done, there would be more gender inclusion
in the rhetoric and discourse. This illustrates very clearly that HIV/AIDS was not considered
by the Harper government within the precise social relations in which it occurs.
The findings from the discourse analysis and the interviews illustrate the fact that the
Harper government attempted a superficial inclusion of gender in their discourse while
paying no attention to the complexity that is GBV and HIV/AIDS intersections. They also
made a shallow attempt to include gender with programming partners, but their discourse and

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practice really showed a lack of understanding of the real issues, which is the lived reality of
those on the ground.
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE LITERATURE
The theory behind this thesis was postcolonial feminism. This is a broad theory, but I
chose to focus on the ideas of Edward Said (1978), Gayatri Spivak (1988), Chandra Talpade
Mohanty (2003), and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999). These scholars prompt western
researchers to remember their place within the research process by not “othering” the Third
world and seeing oneself, especially one’s western knowledge, as superior. They also remind
us not to homogenize Third World women, to consider individual stories and lived
experiences. These ideas, and other characteristics of postcolonial feminism provided me
with the four pillars of the theory: race; socio-economic status; gender intersection; and
external western agencies. These pillars framed the key areas of my literature.
The GBVliterature raised questions of: historical and social practices; culture of
violence and stigma; “othering” and silencing; and the feminization of poverty. My case
shows that gender is and always has been a historical practice: violence during apartheid led
to a de-masculinization of non-white men, and GBV (specifically rape) has been one means
as to regain some masculinity and power post-apartheid. Further, omen’s lives did not
improve post-Apartheid, rather their archaic patriarchally-assigned roles were further
reinforced which partially accounted for the rise in GBV and therefore HIV. A culture of
violence was inherited from apartheid; violence is a reaction to a merciless regime. South
Africa has the worst GBV statistics for a country not at war—1 in 3 women will be raped in
her lifetime (UNFPA 2008). Women are the immediate victims, but consequences extend to

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families and communities which could account for South Africa’s 40-place drop on the HDI
(DFATD 2014b).
Victims of GBV tend to remain silence due to stigma: they do not want to be blamed
for the violence, associated with the violence, beaten further, or even acknowledge that it
happened. Stigma leads to silence which leads to a normalization of violence. It sends a
message to the younger generations that this behaviour is okay.
There are four major reasons for a strong link between GBV and HIV: fear of
violence leads to women not insisting on using a condom; fear of violence leads to HIV
women not disclosing their HIV status; forced penetration increases the likelihood of HIV
transmission; and rape/sexual abuse leads to psychological problems and distress which can
manifest in risky behaviours which increase vulnerability to HIV. It is estimated that half the
amount of HIV cases could have been prevented had the women not endured GBV (Avert
2014).
Furthermore, there has been a “feminization of poverty” which means that most black
women in South Africa live in poverty. It also means that most of those who live in poverty
in South Africa, are women. As poverty increases, violence increases which leads to higher
rates of HIV, which cycles back to greater poverty, less access to healthcare, and a higher
rate of transactional sex which also leads to higher rates of HIV. This poverty is also a legacy
of Apartheid and the segregationist laws that kept white people wealthy and non-white
people in poverty.
What makes this bad situation even worse though, is that victims of GBV and HIV
become “othered” or outsiders; they viewed as tainted, or used up, unless they keep quiet.
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These women suffer the initial attack but then must live with subsequent attacks. The irony is
however, that the onus is on women to stop the rape. All of this literature shows that HIV and
healthcare services cannot be separated from women’s rights and HIV prevention strategies
need to challenge social norms around masculinity and sexual entitlement (Avert 2014).
This thesis therefore serves as a reminder of the dangers inherenet in the absence or lack of
gender.
The Canadian Foreign Policy literature links gender mainstreaming in CFP, the
hypocritical nature of CFP in terms of gender inclusion, and the securitization of aid. As
Deborah Steinstra stated, when looking at Canadian foreign policy through a gendered lens,
one must not only look for the number of women involved in a given aspect, but rather
“consider the impacts that policies have on people’s lives, the ideas that support certain
practices, and the institutions which perpetuate them in order to understand how gender
relations are shaped, and in turn shape Canadian foreign policy” (Steinstra 1996, 127). This
thesis illustrates the importance of Steinstra’s insights through the case study which brings us
to the level of lived experience.
Canada was a proud champion for gender mainstreaming at the UN, but gender was
not featured in CFP under the Conservatives. In fact, Harper’s Muskoka Initiative which was
meant to improve maternal, newborn, and child health, lacked any altruistic or humane
internationalist qualities: policies were not prompted by or grounded in gender (Carrier and
Tiessen 2013). As such, Harper attempted to present a moral identity (Akuffo 2012 &
2013)—Canada as a saviour, promoting human rights, rule of law, poverty reduction, good
international citizen, humanitarian and moral actor. He attempted to work within the
parameters of internationalism but his ideas were not promoted based on gender equality and
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was therefore an exercise in hypocritical internationalism (Carrier and Tiessen 2013). This
thesis supports these arguments and provides more evidence of the widespread nature of
hypocrisy in CFP.
Rather than making better use of money to attack the root causes of maternal,
newborn, and child health, Harper focused on sound macroeconomics economic growth,
trade relationships, and sustainable economics, which he saw as “security” for Canada. In
fact, foreign aid, as a tool of foreign policy and national interest, had been what Liam Swiss
(2012a) calls “securitized.” That is, there was an alignment of aid priorities with security
concerns, as determined by the Harper government, and there was a shift of bilateral aid
toward states that are prone to conflict which helped these regions’ domestic security
concerns. These foci left little room for altruistic causes such as gender equality or poverty
reduction, which again is at the root of many of the development problems that the
Conservative government liked to state as priority areas.
6.2.1 PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
As this thesis has shown, under the Harper government, there was an absence of
gender in aid to HIV/AIDS programs in South Africa. This section discusses the implications
of that absence.
Not focusing on gender leads to focusing on symptoms of the problem rather than the
root. By now, it is very clear that HIV/AIDS is an incredibly gendered disease. Additionally,
the gender problems associated with HIV/AIDS are rooted in historical and social practices
of those living in South Africa, as well as the legacy of apartheid. The Harper government
promised to help service delivery in the area of HIV/AIDS programming, but failed to reflect
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on any of the root causes of the disease. They did not look at it as the intricately woven
together development problem that it is. By promising help, but not actually taking the
appropriate steps, the Conservatives only presented a moral identity rather than acting as
such.
Presenting a moral identity, but not actually practicing moral Canadian foreign policy
(that is, considering gender equality and poverty reduction) results in hypocritical foreign
policy, and hypocritical internationalism: a focus on trade, investment, economics, and
security, while only briefly mentioning poverty reduction. Rebecca Tiessen argues that this
issue needs “programs that address gender inequality, masculinities, power relations and
cultural norms” in order to have a chance at prevention and mitigation (Tiessen 2005, 22).
Consistent with Tiessen’s work, the research in this thesis reinforces and highlights the need
to look more deeply at these issues.
Colonial practices and their legacies have exacerbated GBV and HIV/AIDS in South
Africa; however, through the Harper government discourse that portrayed themselves as
“saviours” and in turn essentialized and “othered” those in need of assistance (HIV/AIDS
programs in South Africa, in this case), they have inevitably carried on those colonial values
and legacies that have created the need for aid in the first place. Consequently, this thesis
reminds us of myriad ways in which colonial practices manifest.
6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
6.3.1 LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY
As indicated in chapter two, I reached out to numerous agencies and individuals but
received replies from only one program and one private citizen. Though these interviews
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were immensely helpful and provided invaluable insight into the dire HIV/AIDS
predicament along with its contributing factors, additional interviews would have been
helpful. The sample size was not large enough to draw broad conclusions, but rather only
sufficient to supplement the findings from the literature reviews. It also would have been
helpful had I been able to speak directly with members of the Canadian government who
worked within CIDA, DFATD, or any department for that matter.
Because of ethical constraints, I was also unable to interview people about being
victimized by GBV, or having HIV. Due to the staggering statistics, I may very likely have
spoken to people who have endured or are enduring such things, but ethical concerns
prevented me from asking questions in relation to this. To have primary research from those
who live those realities would have been invaluable to this study, but it would have likely revictimized them, and no study is worth the pain of others.
Finally, I am a white, Canadian woman with a middle-class upbringing. No matter
how hard I tried to leave my Western, Canadian perspective at the door and work from a
position of pure empathy, I could not. This perspective was helpful for both areas of the
study: GBV and HIV in South Africa as well as gender in Canadian foreign policy. However,
it was also obstructive. For the study of Canadian foreign policy, I had the advantage of preexisting knowledge base about Canadian politics. It gave me an idea of where to look for
information, and I already had an idea of what I might find. However, along with that preexisting knowledge base came pre-existing opinions and biases, especially as a critical
feminist. These opinions aided in the analysis part of the study, but I had to do my best to set
them aside while simply gathering literature and documents for the discourse analysis.

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Contrary to the Canadian foreign policy study, I had a complete outsider’s view of
the issues in South Africa. Even though I had spent a significant amount of time there prior
to commencing the research for this thesis, I always maintained a Canadian identity with
particular impartialities to the woes of the country. That being said, that outsider point of
view that I carried with me may have worked against me in the sense that I may have
maintained the existence of the “Other” and even attempted to speak for them through this
study. As the research process moved along, it became more and more difficult to shed my
Western perspective.
6.3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
As I said previously, there is always room for more. In the case of this thesis, I have
three recommendations for further research. First, there needs to be another study done with
longer, more detailed interviews, with many more participants. There should be enough
separate interviews to draw conclusions directly from them rather than secondary literature.
Second, there needs to be more primary research done with government officials. This is
highly unlikely, but nevertheless interviews with current government officials would be
invaluable to a study such as this. They could provide direct answers rather than researchers
having to infer conclusions from ambivalent statements and secondary research.
Finally, while I cannot change where I come from, and the privileges my place of
birth and social circumstances have provided, I can suggest that scholars with different
backgrounds and perspectives take on a study like this. It would be interesting to read an
investigation informed by a black South African woman who has suffered from devastations
reported here, but who also benefited from a Canadian funded program. This would also

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address the limitation of not being able to interview vulnerable people for the purposes of
this research.
6.4 CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
There are two major findings that arose from this research. First, the interrelationship
between gender, race, socio-economic status, GBV, and HIV/AIDS in South Africa is so
complex that none of these components can be overlooked when writing policies or running
programs whose goal is to mitigate the spread and damage of HIV/AIDS. Second, the
Canadian government under Stephen Harper promised to help service delivery in the area of
HIV/AIDS in South Africa, but absence of gender in foreign policy discourse and practice
showed a lack of understanding of the complexity of the issue.
But how did these phenomena come to exist, and how do we address them? At the
PP, P5 gave some profound insight into these questions:
There’s this story that the husband was asking his wife: “why when you
putting the chicken in the pot you cut here—I think it was the leg of lamb
[?]—you cut here, you cut here and you put it in the pot.” She said, “no, my
mother did it.” So she went to ask her mother who said, “no, my mother did
it.” So the granny said, “Ah, my pot was small and then I had to cut it so it
would fit.” And I think some of these things—there is a reason initially. Then
it becomes this rule that by the time it becomes this law at the end of the line.
You know, and sometimes some of the things are good but sometimes they
are not so good. Perhaps it is the original reasons that we need to re-examine
whatever they may be.

This is the crux of the problem when it comes to both sending aid, and receiving help
from outsiders: external western agencies often do not understand “foreign” cultures and
traditions, nor do they consider the precise social relations in which these problems occur. To
write more effective policy, and achieve better results, the Canadian government needs to at
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least attempt to understand and confront the causes and intricacies of the issues at hand—
they need to find Granny’s pot.

140

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APPENDIX 1: DISCOURSE ANALYSIS TEMPLATE
Section 1: General Information
1a. Source (Speech, Newspaper, Document etc.) and Publisher:

1b: Date Published:
1c. Title of Content:
1d. Speaker (Minister, PM, Media, etc.):
1e. Brief Outline (Who? What? When? Where?):

Section 2: Key Words and Identifiers of Gender
2a.What, if any, gendered language or words are used? In what context is it mentioned?

2b.Is there any mention (implicit or explicit) for the need to empower women? If so, how?

2c. Are women mentioned? If so, how are they characterized? What words are used?

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2d. Is there any mention of gender-based violence (GBV)? If so, in what context?

Section 3: Historical and Social Practices
3a.Is race and/or culture mentioned? If so, in what context? What words are used?

3b.Is Apartheid mentioned? If so, in what context?

Section 4: Key Words and Identifiers of Socio-Economic Status (SES)
4a.If SES is mentioned, at words are used to describe it? Is it characterized as a gendered
problem? If so, how?

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4b.In what context is SES status mentioned? Are there any links made between SES,
violence, HIV, and/or underdevelopment?

Section 5: Gender, Race and Class Intersection
5a. Is there a clear indication of intersection between two or three of these elements? Y N
5b. In what context do these aspects intersect?

Section 6: Canadian Aid
6a.What words are used to describe Canadian aid? In what context do they appear?

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6b. What words are used to describe the aid? Who does it seem to benefit?

6c. Are previous governments’ policies mentioned? If so, in what context?

Section 7: Notes/Latent Content

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APPENDIX 2: INTERVIEWQUESTIONS FOR PROGRAMMING PARTNERS IN
SOUTH AFRICA
1. Do you think there are particular tasks that should only be performed by men/women?
a. What are some examples of male/female-specific tasks?
2. Do you think there are particular requirements of men/women in daily life?
a. What are some examples of these specific requirements?
3. As a woman/man, are you expected to perform specific duties at home?
a. Why do you think you are expected to perform these duties?
4. What duties do you expect the men/women to perform within a household?
a. Why do you expect men/women to perform these particular duties?
5. What does society consider to be appropriate duties for women within the home? For
men?
6. What do you understand gender roles to be?
7. What do you understand gender-based violence to be?
a. Do you think South Africa has a problem with this type of violence? Why/why
not?
8. Do you think there is a relationship between gender, gender-based violence and
HIV/AIDS?
a. If so, how would you describe this relationship?
9. Do you think your program (place of employment) takes into consideration a relationship
between gender, gender-based violence and HIV/AIDS?
a. If so, how? If not, why not?
10. When your program was funded by CIDA (now Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade,
and Development), did you receive any specific directives from them?
a. If so, were any of these directives related to gender (as you understand gender)?
11. Did CIDA, at any point, implement any direct policies?
a. If so, were any of these policies gender-sensitive/specific (as you understand
gender)?
12. Were you made aware, at any point in time, of Canada’s specific foreign policy goals as
they relate to South Africa?
13. Is there anything else you would like to add that might be relevant to this conversation?

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