'}f()Tr]3Y ()IIvj4LL(]]Sn3': A HISTORY OF KHANTY AND MANSI POLITICAL MOBILIZATION, 1985 to 1996 by Donna L. Atkinson M.A., University of Northern British Colombia, 2005 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF TniIEIlISCfLI[BJElV[E%SrrS:]FC)Il THE DEGREE OF IVLlSTERCMF^JtTS in HISTORY riii;iJQS]i/iiBusiTrt"(]ii7]SM:wR:riiF:]Rjsr F(Ej[TisüH(:()iJu\jBi/i April 2005 © Donna L. Atkinson, 2005 1^1 Library and Archives Canada Bibliothèque et Archives Canada Published Heritage Branch Direction du Patrimoine de l'édition 395 W ellington Street Ottawa ON K 1A 0N 4 Canada 395, rue W ellington Ottawa ON K 1A 0N 4 Canada Your file Votre référence ISBN: 0-494-04627-9 Our file Notre référence ISBN: 0-494-04627-9 NOTICE: The author has granted a non­ exclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or non­ commercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats. AVIS: L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par télécommunication ou par l'Internet, prêter, distribuer et vendre des thèses partout dans le monde, à des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, électronique et/ou autres formats. The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis. Conformément à la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privée, quelques formulaires secondaires ont été enlevés de cette thèse. While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis. Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. Canada ABSTRACT This thesis examines the origias of political mohilization amongst the Khanty and Mansi of Northwest Siberia, hom the advent of per&yfrozAa in the Soviet Union in 1985 to the waning of the native rights movement by 1996. The central questions unda" investigation are how the Khanty and Mansi movement began and, importantly, what methods they employed in their political activism. I argue that they have engaged in politics at a symbolic level, incorporating symbols of their culture into their political activities and discourse, and then injecting these symbols into the public political arena to gain support and to renegotiate their place in the Soviet and post-Soviet political landsc^e. This research is grounded in oral interviews with native and non-native community members and leaders in Northwest Siberia, as well as in primary and secondary documentary sources. n TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract u Table of Contents in List of Maps and Figures Acknowledgement Chapter One: Introduction Chapter Two Chapter Three Chapter Four VI A Rebirth of Politics Soviet Historiogng)hy: An Overview Post-Soviet Historiography: New Directions Oral History and the Ethnohistorical Approach Methods A Note on Dehnitions Mapping the Study 1 5 9 13 15 18 19 Symbolic Studies Political Symbols, Symbohc Politics Indigenous Symbolic Politics: Problems and Prospects Symbolic Politics: Case Studies The Saami of Norway: as Symbolic Politics Conflict at Oka: Mohawk Symbolic Politics Symbolic Politics: 'Siberian Style' 22 24 27 The Khanty and Mansi: Conquest and Colonization The 'Native Question' and Nationalities Policy in the USSR Sovietization in the North The "Broken Generation" 'Oil Imperialism': The Development ofKMAO, 1960 to 1985 "Everything is Ruined Now": Environmental Narratives From Boom to Bust: Tyumen's Oil Lag 38 A Prelude to Reform fereffrorAn: the 'Revolution 6om Above' Social Movements: the 'Revolution &om Below' A Native Rights Movement 'Not by Oil Alone': Khanty and Mansi Social Mobilization Regional and Federal Level Movements CAwM on the Road of Discord 29 32 36 41 44 49 50 54 57 60 63 67 70 73 80 84 in Soviet Collapse and the Troubles of Transition, 1990-1996 Devolution in the North Discord Revisited Saving Yugra? 94 96 98 Conclusion Whither Social Mobilization? 103 Bibliography Unpublished Primary Sources Published Primary Sources Secondary Sources 105 88 IV LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES 1 The Russian Federation. From Marjorie M. Balzer, q/" r» GZo6aZPer^ecAve, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 2. Map 2 The Numerically Small Peoples of Siberia. From Alexsandr Pika, ed., JVgoA-adrAoMuZfg/M m Pur JVor^A." PgqpZ&ï TAeZggucy q/'Per&gA'orAu (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, 1999), 2. Map 3 Ob River Basin Oil and Gas Fields. From Joseph P. Riva, Jr., PeA-oZewT» PxpZornAoM iMfAe PoTTMgr j^ovref UAioM (Tulsa: PenWell Books, 1994), 153. Figure 1 Saami Protest in Masi, Norway. From, Robert Paine, Dom a Prver, Du/MM a Peqp/g? (Lapp) PrveZrAood owZ tAe yf/tu/ Ahw^oAgzMOP^dro-PZecAic Prq/ecf uwd rAe ZVonvegm» PurZZnmeMf, IWGIA Document No. 45 (Copenhagen: IWGIA, 1982), 73. Figure 2 Face-to Face Con&ontation at the Oka Standoff, 1990. From Craig MacLaine and Michael Baxendale, ZAZy ü OwrPumd. TAe AZoAmvARgvoZi nZ OAu (Montreal: Optimum, 1991). Figure 3 Native Protest at Varyegan. From "Picket," 5"gvgrMyg Prosio/}' 39 (March 1991), 18. Figure 4 Translation of telegram to President Gorbachev. From Y. Aipin, "Chum on the Road of Discord," Moscow ZVcws 14 October 1990, 8-9. Acknowledgements Completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the generous support of my family, Mends, and colleagues. First and faremost, I would like to thank my partner in crime Doug Thompson Mr being incredibly helpful, patient, caring, and encouraging. Thanks also to the Atkinson and Thompson families Mr their constant support, and Mr understanding why I was 'Mo busy' sometimes. Thanks to my dog Ren Mr making sure I took the time to walk and smell the flowers. I would like to thank my supervisor. Dr. Aileen A. Espiritu, Mr her guidance and Mr the wonderful opportunity to conduct held research in Siberia. My tbanks also to the members of my committee: Dr. Theodore Binnema and Dr. Gary Wilson, and to my external examiner Dr. Gail Fondahl, Mr their valuable feedback and support on this research. I would also like to thank Pat Norris, Mrmer HisMry secretary and my fairy godmother, Mr sweet-tahang the Russian Embassy in Ottawa to get my visa processed in time. Thanks to Olga Isakova and Halyna Miller Mr their help with translation, and to Dr. Nick Tyrras Mr his help and Mr his comic relief throughout two years of Russian language instruction. Thanks also to Erin Sherry Mr being such an understanding boss in the hnal stages of work on my thesis. I would like M thank my MUow graduate student colleagues Mr their hiendship, advice (pep talks), and technical support (Brenda, Jen, Laura, Andrea, Jacqui, Melanie, and Haijit). Thanks also to the Social Science Research and Humanities Council of Canada (SSRHC) and UNBC Mr Enancial support. Most importantly, I would like to thank the Khanty and Mansi community Mr sharing their stories with me and, of course, Mr all the Esh soup, tea, and vodka. Special thanks M Agrafena Pesikova, our passionate and feisty Mur guide. VI Chapter One: Introduction A Rebirth of Politics When Mikhail Gorbachev assumed leadership of the Soviet Union in March 1985, the Khanty and Mansi,^ and indeed all of Siberia's indigenous peoples, were struggling with a number of daimting problems ranging &om alcoholism, unemployment, and industrial encroachment to political marginalization, and socio-cultural deterioration. AAer almost three decades o f unrestrained oil and gas development, and ecological degradation of thenancestral lands, the Khanty and Mansi were living in a situation dangerously close to becoming an "ethnic catastrophe."^ Yet in the years prior to Gorbachev, their problems were virtually unknown to the Soviet public or to those in the West. State censorship and Party propaganda idealizing native hfe, Native-State relations, and resource and industrial development had masked the harsh realities of native life in the north. However, with the advent of Gorbachev's (restructuring) reAums^ in the late 1980s, the "big problems of small peoples" captured national and international political attention.^ ^The Khanty and Mansi live in the territories suironnding the Ob and Irtysh Rivers located in the KhantyMansiisk Autonomous Okrug (KMAO) o f Northwest Siberia. Because o f their proximity to each other and the similarities in their economic livelihoods, cultural traditions, social organization and religious beliefs they are often hmgied together by anthropologists and other scholars as one ethnic groiq). Aleksei Tarasov, "Drunken Siberia," 27 April 1995, 5, translated in the Cufreni Digest o f iAe fo si5'ovieifress 47:18 (1995):18; Nikolai Vakhtin, "Native Peoples of the RussianFar North," infoiorfep p ies. 5^e(f^Deien»inuiioM andDeveippmeni, ed. Minority Rights Groiq), (London: Minority Rights Grotç, 1994), 31. ^feresiroiAa refers to the reforms implemented by the Gorbachev administration after 1985. It is concentrated around three key strategies: giusnost (openness), peresiroi^ (speciGcaüy economic restructuring) and deMo&raiizotsiia (democratization). See, Mikhail Gorbachev, feresiroiki. New YTtinting/br Our CouMAy and the Ifbrid (New York: Harper and Row, 1987). ^Alexsandr Pika and Boris Prokhorov, "Soviet Union: The Big Problems o f Small Ethnic Groups," DFOM NewskAer 57 (May 1989): 122-135, originally published as "Bol'shie problemy malykh narodov," ["Big Problems of Small Peoples"] in the Soviet joinnal Kommunist 16 (1988):76-83. Indigenous Siberians with populations below 50,000 are referred to as 'small peoples' or 'numerically small peoples' in most literature. f grggfrozAa fundamentally altered Soviet social and political life, inspiring a "rebirth of politics"^ across the USSR characterized by the growth of formal and informal grass-roots social movements and non-govemmental organizations^ focused on a wide array of issues 6om the environment to indigenous rights. The Khanty and Mansi were at the fbrej&ont of the advancing indigenous ri^ ts movement in the north, establishing the Grst indigenous association in the Soviet Union in 1989 called Twgn (7%g SaZvaiioM q/'Twgra). The FZ/yf CoMgreaf offWZgeMows FeopZes of ZAe MortA, S'ZAeno o/i(Z ZAe For Fast fallowed in 1990 resulting in the development of numerous regional-level associations and a federallevel organization, the FossZom ArsocZoZion ofFwZZgeMows FeqpZes o f zAe ZVbrZA (RAIPON). Together, these associations fought to negotiate indigenous rights to land, resources, and selfdetermination vis-à-vis the Soviet state and, since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, with the government of the Russian Federation [M ^ 1]. It is tempting to attribute Khanty and Mansi political mobilization, and arguably that of other indigenous Siberians, solely to the emergence of new political opportunities created by per&yZroZ^; however, an historical analysis of Khanty and Mansi ferment suggests that it is rooted much deeper in their past experiences of Soviet communism. Although a considerable amount of research, both in the Soviet Union and in the West, has been dedicated to the study of the social and political movements that erupted under the focus of this research has been limited to the study of ethnic Russians or other large ethnic groups like Ukrainians or Byelorussians hving in the urban centers of European ^ See Michael Urban, with Igrunov Vyacheslav and Sergei Mitrokhin, 7%g geAirZA o f f oZZZZcr ZfwggZo (New York: Cambridge, 1997). ^ Soviet/Russian non-govemmental organizations (NGOs) are slightly diSerent than those in the West. Although they are somewhat independent in that they are partially funded by national and international organs outside of state control, such as Greeigreace, they also rely heavily on government Amding to survive. Menibers o f non-govemmental organizations in Russia also typically hold posts in the government. See Ruth Mandel, "Seeding Civil Society," in fo f i- focZnZirm." AZeoZs, ZdeoZogi^ and frochces in Fwrarin, (Routledge, 2002), 279-296. USSR.' The origins of activism and unrest amongst the small indigenous peoples living in the peripheral regions have thus been largely unexplored. My study aims to ûll this gap by examining the historical roots of Khanty and Mansi political mobilization, and the strategies they used in their political struggles 6om the onset of reform under Gorbachev in 1985, to the waning of the native rights movement by 1996 as a consequence of the difBcult postSoviet transition period. This study argues that the Khanty and Mansi have engaged in politics at a symbolic level, incorporating symbols of their culture into their political activities and discourse, and then inteqecting these symbols into the public political arena in an ef&rt to gain support and, more importantly, to renegotiate the political landscape and their place in it. While they have not secured rights to land, resources, and self-determination to the same extent as indigenous peoples in the West, they have made considerable gains since 1985 despite the social, political, and economic obstacles put before them by the state and the oil and gas industry. An analysis of the historical development of Khanty and Mansi political mobilization, along with the strategies used in their mobilization including the creation of Twgn and the use of symbolic protest, will illustrate this argument. The investigation will situate Khanty and Mansi political mobilization within the context of Soviet and post-Soviet social movements, and recent developments in the international indigenous rights movement. Moreover, it will provide insight into why the indigenous rights movement, and other grass­ roots movements, have declined steadily in the post-Soviet transition period. ^ See, for cxanqik Jim Butterfield and Judith Sedaitis, "The Emergence o f Social Movements in the Soviet Union," in f e r a r t r o i t u B g / o w . - iSoczaf AJovgrngntr m tAe &)v;ei Union eds. Jim ButterGeld and Judith Sedaitis, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991): 1-11; Paul Goble, "Nationalism, Movement Groups and Party Formation," infergsirozkz_/honi ^eZow. .Soczo/ Afbvgmentr in tAe .Soviet Union eds. Jim Butterfield and Judith Sedaitis, (Boulder Westview Press, 1991): 165-173; Nils Muiznieks, "The Influence o f the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process o f Soviet Disintegration," Ewope-Wf io Audies 47:1 (1995):3-26. Key îo Nurrtsered Areas ftDYGElA 2 KARÂCHAi-OHERKESSîA 66 GHECHN5A 3 KABAmA-BALKARlA i NORTH O^ETTA 5 INGUSHETIA g g CHUVASHSA 1Q M A A H l Dw osmes o f rcpubJics aad othw given in capital letters 7 W^GESTAN CHUKOTKA units are Note that o f the r i i o n s (oblasts) and territta'ies (ÿrais) o f Russia are named for their capital cities WdWvWk \ NOMAK NENET* BAXHA 0-NSfÆTS ^ê^a^rtsjrgyhdi^rtsc elïunœft «A m ur Bl^YATSA Novoabs^a M;g) 1. The Russian Federation. From Marjorie M. Balzer, 7%e Tgnocity o f N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999), 2. v 4 &6ena» in GZo&zZ ferq^ectzve (Princeton, Soviet Histonosraphv: An Overview Until recently, Soviet research in English^ and Western research on the history of the indigenous peoples of Siberia was quite limited. The dearth of historical studies reflects not only the priorities of historians, who throughout the Soviet period were preoccupied with Cold War politics and economics, but also the limitations of historical research including restrictions on certain topics, archival sources, the opportunity to conduct fieldwork, and theoretical and methodological approaches.^ With the liberalization of Soviet society under perestrofAa indigenous history expanded in both nature and scope. However, signihcant gaps continue to exist in the literature, especially with respect to indigenous oral history, ecological knowledge, and political agency. A brief overview of Soviet historiographical trends will illustrate some of the problems of research on indigenous peoples. Prior to 1917, the theory and practice of history and historians in Russia difPered little from that of Europe. Although the discipline maintained "its own character", Russian historians clearly "spoke the same language" as their counterparts in Europe and their research revolved around the same themes and biases. After the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet historians departed hom this line of thought, concentrating instead on the reinterpretation of Russian history through the lens of Marxism-Leninism. The transformation required not only a fundamental shift in historical writing and emphasis, but There are several hundred monogr^hs and anthologies written in Russian on indigenous Siberians; however, there are few Soviet works translated into English available in the W est ^However, it should be noted that the discipline o f history in Russia/Soviet Union is quite broad and incorporates antbropology, ethnography, and archaeology. For discussion on the challenges of history and historians in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation see: In. N. Afanas'ev, "The PhenouKnon of Soviet Historiography," Rwssian & cW S'czence Revigw 43:2 (March-.Aq)ril 2002):26-59; Donald Raleigh, "Doing Soviet History: The hnpact o f the Archival Revolution," 7%g Rwssian Revfew 61 (January 2002): 16-24; Alexander Dallin, "Soviet History," in 7%g GorhacAgv Era, ed. Alexander Dallin, (New York: Garland, 1992), 279-299; Thomas Sherlock, "Politics and History under Gorbachev," in in Crisis.- Rgofier o f Ifgsiem and jS^oviei Ffgws eds. Alexander Dallin and Gaü Lapidus, (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 270-284. For exang)le, an enqihasis on "heroes' and "great events' at the expense o f regional histories or die history of marginalized groiqis. AAnas'ev, 38. the development of a new language to articulate Communist ideology including class struggle, oppression, the means of production, bourgeois and proletariat experiences, socialist revolution, and Party pohtics/' Siberia's indigenous peoples, whose 'primitive' and 'savage' ways diSered substantially &om the image of the new Soviet citizen and modem industrial order, were therefore not a priority for historians. Instead, they were left to anthropologists, archaeologists, ethnologists and other scholars of 'prehistory' to study. The consohdation of Soviet power in the 1930s under Joseph Stalin merely served to exacerbate these trends. Constrained by the principles of socialist realism, which argued that society must progress in a linear path 6om feudalism to socialism, the main task of the historian or anthropologist was to document indigenous peoples' remarkable leap &om savagery to civilization.^^ In their new role as soldiers for the Party, historians were expected to compromise or outright falsify historical truths and contemporary realities to conform to the dominant Soviet worldview. Scholarship construed as unflattering to the state or the doctrine of socialist realism led to accusations of cosmopolitanism or unprofessionalism and ran the risk of disciplinary action hom the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the KGB (Committee of State Security), and the Academy of Sciences. The combination of " Afanas'ev, 39; Afanas'ev notes that as a consequence of the 'Sovietization' o f history "Soviet historians have been passed by... by the most important developments in historical science, entire directions such as structural linguistics, ethnology, psychoanalysis, historical demography, historical anthropology, conterrqxnary theories o f evolution, die history o f mentalities, historical geography..." quoted 6om an interview in Dalhn, "Soviet History," 287. Their depiction as 'savage' and 'backward' peoples led Russian/Soviet scholars to the assunqition that they were stuck in a prehistoric stage of development. Yuri Slezkine, vfrciic AfzVrors." Russia o/uf iAe RmaiZ ReopZes o f iAe AbriA (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), 32-43; The same can be said o f scholars o f indigenous peoples in North America, for example see: Robert Berkhofer, W%iie Afan's /ndian. Images ofiAe yfrnerican /mfian^om CoZumhus io iAe Rreseni (New York: Vintage Books, 1978). '^Socialist realism was irrplemented in 1934 and applied to virtually every aspect of Soviet culture including art, hterature, history, science etc. A6nas'ev, 43-47; Slezkine describes this type of scholarship, focusing on the "leap" horn savagery to civilization, as "long journey" literature. Slezkine, vfrcZZc AfZrrors, 292-299. Dallin, "Soviet History," 280-287; Afanas'ev, 28-53. these factors created a scholarship that both exaggerated and misrepresented indigenous life in the north. The Soviet regime's efforts to repress academic freedom extended well beyond the boundaries of the USSR. In the West, historical research on Siberia's indigenous peoples was complicated by Soviet propaganda and by a lack of information. Western academics had inadequate access to archival sources and limited interaction with Soviet scholars or native peoples. Western accounts were, as a consequence, replete with inaccuracies and myths that suggested the Russian colonization and Soviet domination of Siberia was both a peaceful and positive experience for native peoples.D espite these limitations, a handftd of groundbreaking studies were pubhshed in the 1980s that con&onted this rhetoric, the most outstanding of which are ''Ethnicity without Power: the Siberian Khanty in Soviet Society" (1983) a pre^er&y/rofAn study by American anthropologist Marjorie M. Balzer, and "The Big Problems of Small Peoples" (1988) published at the heigfit of social and political reforms under by Soviet anthropologists Alexsandr Pika and Boris Prokhorov. In "Ethnicity without Power: the Siberian Khanty in Soviet Society" Balzer explored the inherent contradictions and complexities of the Soviet multi-ethnic state, in particular, the diversity of responses to Soviet power and policies by small national groups. Beginning with the conquest of Siberia in the Ib'^ century, Balzer detailed the various acculturation and assimilation strategies adopted in the administration of the northern minorities including Christianization campaigns, collectivization, and Sovietization. Balzer argued that in spite of Raleigh, 16; Marjorie M. Balzer was the first Western anthropologist to "penetrate the Iron Curtain as &r as the Ob River" when she began her graduate work in Siberia in 1976. Andrei Golovnev, review o f The Tenacity o f Ethnicity," by Marjorie M. Balzer, in ftAnoAKtDry 49:4 (Fall 2003): 873. In the period before peregfrozAa, Soviet scholars would also have had limited access to Western research on indigenous peoples. For a popular Gction account see Farley Mowat, Dircovgyy o f AAerio (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970). these policies the Khanty's ethnic consciousness throughout this time was both strong and flexible, without being anti-Russian or anti-Soviet.^^ She argued that changing social and political contexts since colonization have, in fact, allowed the Khanty to acquire "multiple social identities" without compromising their cultural values or beliefs.Supported by extensive archival and ûeld research conducted in northwest Siberia in 1976, Balzer was the Grst scholar in the West to examine the role of agency in the identity formation and cultural survival strategies of Siberia's natives in the era prior to /Ter&yn-oiAn when indigenous research was still mired in propaganda and misinformation. "The Big Problems of Small Peoples" by Soviet anthropologists Alexsandr Pdca and Boris Prokhorov appeared 6ve years after Balzer's landmark study, under signiScantly changed circumstances brought on by Gorbachev's gZaymoff a n d r e f o r m s . Published in the prominent joumal Kbmniunüf, the article described the Soviet regime's long list of "crimes against nature" and "against the indigenous population" since the early 1930s, including the ecological degradation of traditional territories, and the liquidation or consohdation of villages, and the destruction of traditional economies and culture. Motivated by a desire to expose the alarming state of northern native communities to the Soviet pubhc and to "awaken the self-awareness of the indigenous population", the authors put forth a number of bold recommendations to mitigate further decline, the most important of which was social and economic self-determination.^° Interpretations such as Balzer's and Pika and Prokhorov's were few and far between in the mid to late 1980s; however, they both Maqode M. Balzer, "Ethnicity without Power: The Siberian Khanty in Soviet Society," S'/nvzc j(eview 42:4 (1983): 633. Balzer, "Ethnicity without Power," 643. Pika and Prokhorov, 129. ^ Pika and Prokhorov, 131-132,134. had tremendous impacts and both signalled a new direction and attitude towards indigenous and historical research in the Soviet Union that continued to grow under Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev did not initially embrace the historical candour or historical revisionism that was being pushed by reformers such as historian Yuri Afanas'ev. Rather he believed, and with good reason, that dredging up the past would only "set people at each other's throats."^' As his views on jperes/roiAa and g/os/zosf evolved, however, so too did his opinions on the role of history and historians in realizing his re&rms. Indeed, by 1987 Gorbachev was urging historians to 611 in the "blank pages" and "forgotten names" of Soviet h isto ry .T h e historical revolution that followed saw the liberalization of historical methods and areas of study which was aided, in part, by the opening up of the Soviet archives. Although Soviet scholars were slow to respond, the changes allowed for unprecedented new opportunities in research particularly with respect to 'taboo' topics.^ Several pertinent historical studies on the peoples of Siberia emerged in the post-Soviet period as a result. Post-Soviet Historiosraphv: New Directions Perhaps the most notable English language historical works on Siberia's native peoples in the post-Soviet period have been James Forsyth's ^4 q/"rAe f eqp/as AbrtA vfjza/i Co/omy, 7J&7-7PP0 (1992) and Yuri Slezkine's yfrctic Mirrorg.' aad tAe eqpZay q/"tAg JVbrtA (1994). While both authors provide a sophisticated and well-researched history of native Siberians in the four-hundred year period between conquest and there are considerable differences in their methodological ^proaches and mterpretations. Dallin, "Soviet History," 280. ^ Dallin, "Soviet History," 281; See also, Stephen WbeatcroA, "Unleashing the Energy o f History, Mentioning the Unmentionable and Reconstructing Soviet Historical Awareness: Moscow 1987," ^wsZra/ùzM j'/ovonzc and East 1 (1987): 85-132. ^ For example, Stalinism and collectivization. Sherlock, 270-284. Forsyth takes an ethnohistorical ^proach in his analysis, stressing the 'internal colonialist' dynamic of Russian/Soviet-Native relations horn initial contact in the 11"^ century to 1990. Drawing parallels to Native American Indian colonial experiences, Forsyth argued that the Russian/Soviet-Native relationship was fundamentally an exploitative one in which the Russian/Soviet peoples exercised control over both land and natural resources.^^ Like Slezkine, Forsyth shed light on some of the serious misconceptions surrounding Siberian history, notably assertions found in Soviet propaganda and scholarly literature suggesting that the colonization and the subsequent domination of Siberia was a confhct-hee and benehcial process for indigenous peoples. Instead, Forsyth demonstrated the depth of environmental and economic exploitation in Siberia, reflecting on the devastating impact it has had on the native population. Unfortunately, Forsyth's sole reliance on Russian/Soviet and Western secondary documentary sources in his work considerably weakens his argument and his use of the ethnohistorical approach. Critics have, in fact, charged him with simply replacing the Russian/Soviet views imbedded in the secondary sources with anti-Russian/Soviet interpretations.^^ Moreover, critics argue that Forsyth is guilty of "romanticizing the natives and vilifying the Russians" in his account when, in reality, the situation was "not so clear cut."^^ These criticisms aside, Forsyth provided the hrst detailed general survey of native Siberians in the post-Soviet period. ^ James Forsyth, X /Artoyy o f tAe fecy/gy o f A'terio. Jüfrfwz /taion CoZony, JJ&Z-7P90 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), preface xvi. For a review o f both Forsyth's and Slezkine's work sec: Andrei A. ZnamensM, "Siberian History in Russian and Native Dimensions," RwssioM Review 54:2 (April 1995):270-273. ^ Michael Khodarkovsky, review of.^ history o f iAe fecyZeiy qf&'6erio, by James Forsyth, in EiAnoAzsiory 41:1 (Winter 1994): 205; Zhamenski, 270-273. ^ Khodarkovsky, 204. 10 Heralded as the Siberian equivalent of Robert Berkhofer's 77:6 (1978), Yuri Slezkine's Mzn 'j: Thffia» examines the place of the small peoples in the Tsarist/Soviet political and economic sphere and, ultimately, in the hearts and minds of the Russian/Soviet people. Slezkine argued, contrary to Forsyth's 'internal colonialist' dynamic, that Russian/Soviet-Native relations "cannot be fully described in terms of domination" or "reduced to the gross political fact of colonialism."^^ Instead, he sees their relationship as a fluid one influenced by a myriad of colonial voices and ideologies, &om European romanticism and patemahsm to rationalism, all of which changed and evolved along with the image of the native as 'other.'^^ Drawing on a large body of primary and secondary documentary source material, including the historical accounts and literary works of native northerners, Slezkine's 'long duree' approach illuminates how the concept of 'other as inferior' dictated Russian/Soviet policy in Sibaia and, more importantly, how it shaped Russian/Soviet and native identity. yfrcTic MÜTTors ' greatest strength, however, is in its discussion of native agency. Slezkine skilfully demonstrated, for example, how native women were able to use the new Soviet structure to advance their positions in the tribal kinship system.^^ Although critics have argued that Slezkine failed to juxtapose indigenous experiences with that of ethnic minorities in other parts of the Tsarist empire/Soviet Union, vfrctfc Mirror.; is without a doubt one of the seminal works in indigenous history to emerge in the post-Soviet period. By the mid-1990s, new opportunities to conduct Eeldwork in Siberia led to the publication of more interdisciplinary local and regional studies. Bruce Grant's 7» rAe Sbviei ^ Slezkine, preface. ^ The popular and ofScial image o f Siberia's native people has also been explored in Bruce Grant's "Siberia Hot and Cold: Reconstructing the Image o f Siberian Indigenous Peoples," in Behveen ffeoven and He//. The o f A'berio m Tlwssidn CuTmre eds. Galya Diment and Yuri Slezkine (New York: S t Martin's Press, 1993). Slezkine. 230-246. 11 Cw/fwre." q/'fer&yfroiAas: (1995) is an excellent example. In an approach described as "part ethnography and part history" Grant explored the phenomenon of Soviet culture-bnilding amongst the Nivkh of Sakhalin Island.^° Grant begins by describing the way of hfe and everyday struggles of Nivkhi in the early 1990s, &om their drinking habits and disillusionment with pereyrroiAn to their work at Rybnoe's Red Dawn collective hshery. Working back in time. Grant examined how a century of Nivkh cultural restructuring, 6om traditionahsm to modernity and back again, had created dual sense of loss for the Nivkhi who "having traded in their culture for a pan-Soviet one" were now faced with the deterioration of both.^^ TbMOCzfy m (1999) by Marjorie Balzer follows a similar regional-level approach. Balzer's work sums up over twenty years of research and hiendship with the Khanty community. Building on her previous studies of ethnicity and cultural survival, examines hve distinct trends in Russian/Soviet-Native ethnic interaction hom colonization, Christianization and revitalization in the late 19^ century, to Sovietization and regionahsm in the Soviet period. Balzer argued throughout this 'dramatic saga' the Khanty "transcended victimhood" by redehning and renegotiating their ethnic identity and cultural heritage.^^ In a related study, historian Aileen A. Espiritu examined how the Khanty, Mansi and lamalo-Nenets survived the devastation of resource and industrial development to become strong political actors in ^ Bmce Grant, 7mtAg Tfowgg CwZZwrg. ^4 CgMtw/y o f T'ereïtroîk» (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). Grant, 7n zAg 5ovigt77onfg o f Cu/Znrg, 16; A recent trend towards "neo-traditionalism" or looking to die past to solve contemporary problems has been enthusiastically supported by Soviet/Russian scholars. See, Alexsandr Pika, ed., ^goZT-w/ZAbmo/üm m zAg Rwasiam AbrZA. TWZggmoz^s fgop/ar omJ ZAgZggocy qffgrg^ZroZAo (Edmonton: Canadian Circunqiolar Institute, 1999). Balzer, TgmocZZy ofEzAmZcZZy, 203. 12 the post-Soviet period by recapturing, reinventmg and remembering tbeir past/^ Although both authors skilfully demonstrate how cultural revitalization and ethnic identification inform pohtical consciousness and action, neither study links indigenous politicization in the north to the growth o f Soviet and post-Soviet social movements and symbolic initiatives. Clearly, the contributions of Forsyth, Slezkine, Balzer, and others in the field of indigenous research in the post-Soviet period have been considerable. They have not only inspired new directions in research, but also the use of new methods and source materials including the analysis of press coverage and native poetry.^ However, there are many areas of study yet to be undertaken by scholars. My research seeks to expand on the existing hterature on the Khanty and Mansi, and peoples of the north, by situating their activism within the broader context of Soviet/post-Soviet social movements and within the &amework of symbohc pohtics. Oral Historv and the Ethnohistorical Approach Ethnohistory is a methodological approach that integrates aspects of history, ethnography, archaeology, linguistics, and other related helds in the study of non-hterate, non-European peoples.^^ Developed in mid-1950s, the ethnohistorical approach expanded the boundaries of indigenous research by creating new sources for analysis in the absence of native-generated documents, and through the incorporation of disparate methodologies and interpretations 6om other disciplines. For historians, ethnohistory offered the chance to look Aileen A. Espiritu, "The Inqiact o f Industrialization and Resource Development on Indigenous Peoples of Northwest Siberia: The Khanty, Mansi and lamalo-Nenets," PhD. diss.. University of Alberta, 1999. ^ For exanqile, see Hanna Snellman's recent investigation o f Khanty conceptions o f time in KAunis Ame (2001). For discussion o f indigenous media coverage see: Oleg Sugney, "Press Coverage of the Problem's of Russia's Arctic Numerically Small Peoples," in Tbwordir a New Mil/eMmwm. Ten o f tAe fWigenous Afovemeni m Rziïsio eds. Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107, 2002), 130-138. Bruce Trigger, "Ethnohistory: Problems and Prospects," in CZzo's yf fn m er ofNkiorzcal MetAodk, Ted Crowly, ed. (Toronto: Copp Clark Pittman, 1988), 134. 13 beyond the traditional documentary sources of the non-indigenous m^ority, to hnd the underlying motives and details of events 6om an indigenous perspective.^^ The collection of oral histories or oral evidence is central to the ethnohistorical approach. The recording and documenting of oral histories c^tures the experiences, emotions, and ideas of those people who have witnessed and participated in past events. Oral history's greatest strength is its ability to create new sources of information where none previously existed that can both complement and clarify the historical record. It represents a shift in focus hom the study of 'ehtes' to those groups of people who have been ignored or forced into the periphery of historical writing and research.^^ For indigenous peoples, this shift served to legitimize their knowledge and provided an alternative path for its cultural transmission. The collaborative benehts of documenting oral tradition can also not be understated. As a history "built around people" it stimulates social and cultural interaction between different segments of society, and emphasizes the importance of individual and collective voices in history.^^ However, as a methodology, it is not without its critics. Perhaps the most pointed criticism directed at oral history has been the problem of the subjective and selective nature of memory. A signiGcant time lapse between an event and its recollection can impact the details or 'hard facts' imbedded in memory.'^ As well, comparisons based on present understandings of past events can occur, which may influence what memories are recalled and the interviewee's impressions or feelings about them. Recollections are similarly influenced by the assumptions, motives, ideas, and interpretations Wilcomb E. Washbum, "Ethnohistory: History in the Round," EtAnoAiriory 8:1 (Winter 1961): 41. Derek Reimer, ed., "The Challenge of Oral History," in X Guide to Graf Tfiriory (Victoria: Provincial Archives o f British Columbia, 1984), 2. ^ Paul Thong)son, TAe Pbice o f tAe Post. Gro/ Mstoyy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 6. Thong)son, 92 ^ Reimer, 2 14 of the interviewer. The choice of words or order of questioning used by the interviewer can, for example, shape the theme of the interview and the responses of the informant.'*' And, as is often the case, interviewees who would like to be 'helpful' will simply tell the interviewer what they want to hear at the expense of other information. These criticisms aside, it must be stressed that oral history is not more inherently biased than other sources of information. Indeed, written records are replete with the same motivations and value judgments contained io oral histories.'*^ To address these discrepancies, and arguably any other prejudices that arise &om the collection or interpretation of oral history, oral evidence must be contextualized and cross-referenced against documentary sources. By doing this, oral histories can be used without devaluing or depersonalizing the information they hold and, at the same time, they can bring history to hfe. For these reasons, and the advantages already noted, my research on the historical evolution of Khanty and Mansi pohtical mobilization has fbhowed an ethnohistorical approach, relying on a synthesis of oral evidence and primary and secondary documentary sources. Methods Approximately nineteen semi-structured oral interviews were conducted over a three week period in June 2003 in the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug (KMAO) located in Northwest Siberia.'*^ The interviews were targeted at rural and urban Khanty and Mansi between the ages of 26 and 65 who had hved in the region all their lives, and thus had Reimer, 2 Reimer, 2; Washburn, 41. All o f the interviews, except one, were conducted by Aileen A. Espiritu and responses were translated to the author, Donna Atkinson, by Russian translator O. Isakova. The remaining interview was conducted by O. Isakova, and the responses also translated by O. Isakova to the author. The interview questions were entirely conq)osed by the author, Donna Atkinson, and were approved by the UNBC Ethics Board as part o f the author's ethics review. The author takes sole responsibility for die interpretations o f the interview material. 15 experienced many of the pro&nnd ecological, socio-cultural, economic, and political changes in KMAO since the 1960s. The interviewees were predominantly women, in part, because they were the most pohtically active segment of society and, in part, because they were the most readily available and willing participants. Seven interviews were focused on Khanty and Mansi political ehtes in the cities of Khanty-Mansiisk and Surgut that were, or had in the past, been representatives of ewie Tugri, including the founding members of the association and the current president. Through these interviews I attempted to piece together the history and motivations underlying Khanty and Mansi politicization and the creation of fi/grz. As well, I sought to identify the social networks that linked and maintained their movement.^ Interviewees were asked, for example, what had inspired the movement and if they had looked to the international community of other indigenous organizations for help. An emphasis on ecological problems and their role in the formation and structure of the organization was a central theme in this questioning. The interview questions posed tried to determine the nature of the relationship between the Khanty and Mansi community, Tzzgrz, and the regional and federal organs of power. For example, interviewees were questioned about the association's relationship with the federal government and the oil and gas industry, and about the relationship between rural Khanty and Mansi and the native elites running the association. Six of the nineteen interviews conducted were focused on rural Khanty and Mansi living in the national villages surrounding Surgut, speciGcally the villages of Lyantor, Sytomina, and Russkinskaya. An emphasis was placed on these areas because of the high concentration of oil and gas development and indigenous peoples hving in the area. ^ Elisabeth S. Clemens and Martin D. Hughes, "Recovering Past Protest: Historical Research on Social Movements," in MeZAodk o f M b v e r n g M t Research.AYbvements, froZesZ and CanZenZzoM Reries v. 16, eds., Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota, 2002), 211 16 Questions aimed at the rural Khanty and Mansi population tried to ascertain their perceptions of nature, of the development and degradation of their land and what, if any, impact this had on their traditional way of hfe and degree of pohtical involvement. For example, interviewees were asked about their relationship to the natural world, how and when nature began to change, and how this had affected their traditional economic activities. Furthermore, they were asked about their own pohtical activism, or lack thereof and how it had evolved. Interviewees were also questioned regarding their knowledge, opinions of and degree of interaction with the association They were asked, for example, if they felt Fwgn represented their interests and if they had ever contacted or received help 6om the association. The remaining interviews conducted during the course of the held season concentrated on Gve local and regional level bureaucrats in the KMAO government, as weU as an interview with a local joumahst who specialized in ecological and native issues. The questions aimed at government ofhcials, two of whom were Khanty and three of whom were Russian, concentrated on the relationship between the government and Fugrz. Interviewees were questioned, for instance, about what kind of projects they worked on together with Iwgrz and what each group brought to the table in the consultation process. Additionally, they were asked to share their opinions and experiences concerning ecology, resource development, pollution, native rights, law, and intergovernmental relations. For example, they were asked whether the enviromnental practices of oil and gas companies It should be noted diat two o f the individuals I have included under the 'rural' classiGcation were, in fact, village representatives for fugri. I have chosen not to include them under the 'elite' category for several reasons: neither were founding members o f the association, their lives dif&red considerably hom the ehtes hving in the urban centers (specifically with regard to housing and economic hvelihood), and their degree o f involvement and rural location has meant they play a 6 r more marginal role in the association than other Khanty and Mansi ehtes. 17 or native rights had improved in the post-Soviet era. In the last interview with a Russian journalist horn TVovoah Twg/y [[/gra TVews], 1 attempted to gather information on her knowledge of the environment and the native rights movement in KMAO during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. The questions explored themes such as current and past environmental policy and the development of Khanty and Mansi political identity. The interviews were transcribed, summarized, converted to a digital format and then analyzed for content. After drawing out the demographic information, 1 concentrated on identifying speciGc themes within each interview and among interviews. Themes ranged 6om attitudes towards nature and the oil and gas industry, to opinions on legislation and the preservation of land. The interview data was then cross-referenced against a variety of documentary sources. Soviet newspapers and journals in Russian, and those translated in Enghsh in the Cwrremt Digejft q/"fAg Soviet were used to reconstruct the past at both a federal, regional, and local level. The n e w sp ^ rs sources were supplemented by a number of documents generated by S^oofeMie Twgri including published and unpublished manifestos and its constitution. Together, the oral evidence and documentary sources allowed me to reconstruct a detailed history of the Khanty and Mansi movement. A Note on Definitinns For the purposes of this thesis indigenous, native, or aboriginal peoples refers to the 'numerically small peoples' (mn/ocAü/gnr^ÆA mrro^fov) of the Russian North, Siberia and the Far East. The numerically small peoples include over forty different nations with populations below 50,000 who have traditionally been engaged in non-industrial or subsistence based economies [Map 2]. With a combined population of roughly 200,000 the numerically small peoples are considered minorities and are thus legally distinguished and hold special rights 18 distinct 6om the substantially larger ethnic populations of Siberia such as the Komi, Buriats, or Yakuts.'^ Together, their traditional territories encompass almost 58 percent of the Russian Federation, from the Ural Mountains in the Western Siberian Plain to the Bering Sea in the Far East. Ev*m Yukx ' SeCkupy N e n tsy Evenk! Nentsy Eveny I Evenk! Evei Khanty Khenty Evenk! Evenk! Evenk! ToWaiy Map 2. The Numerically Small Peoples of Siberia. From Alexsandr Pika, ed., in iAe Rusfzan jFar NbrtA." jWzgenoas feqp/gg am/ iAe Zegacy feresirozAa (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, 1999), 2. ^ Winhied Dallmaim and Helle Goldman, "Indigenous - Native - Aboriginal: Contusion and Translation Problems," vtASfPAi P (June 2003): 4. 19 MappmE the Study This study is arranged chronologically in order to illustrate the historical roots and symbolic nature of Khanty and Mansi political activism, hom the onset of reform in 1985 to the decline of the movement by the start of Boris Yeltsin's second term in office in 1996. As this thesis will demonstrate, indigenous ferment in the Soviet North emerged concurrently with the grass-roots social movements of European Russia during and into the democratic transition period. I argue that the Khanty and Mansi have engaged in politics at a symbolic level to gain support and, more importantly, to renegotiate the political landscape. Although they have not secured rights to the same extent as indigenous peoples in the West, it is clear that they have made considerable gains since the onset of reform in 1985. Chapter two wiU work towards a theory of indigenous symbolic politics through an analysis of indigenous social movements, specihcally amongst the Saami ofNorway and the Mohawk of Quebec, and of the role of political symbolism played in their movements. Key dehnitions, goals and strategies hom the Geld of symbolic studies will be discussed to demonstrate how, when other legitimate avenues of political action have failed, indigenous peoples have been able to draw upon their symbolic resources to gain support and effect meaningful change. I argue that this is a useful framework by which to assess Khanty and Mansi political mobilization because like the Saami, the Mohawk, and other indigenous groups, they have actively employed symbols of their culture in their political discourse, in protest and in the formation of fwgrz. Chapter three explores two pivotal stages in history of the Khanty and Mansi: frst, the formative years of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the mid-1930s when the state endeavoured to transform the natives of Siberia from 'savages' to 'citizens' and second, the period of mass 20 mdiistriaiization and environmental degradation in West Siberia after 1960 that has threatened their ability to survive as indigenous nations. I argue that during these periods the Khanty and Mansi acquired the political skills necessary to become strong political actors under Moreover, it was during this period that their national identity and the symbols of this identity, which were also fundamental to their mobilization after 1985, were formed. Chapter four will trace the development of Khanty and Mansi political mobilization since 1985. It explores how the Soviet 'rebirth' contributed to the growth of social movements and political awareness in Siberia and across the USSR. Focusing specifically on the key players and political events in the Khanty and Mansi movement, I argue they have engaged in politics at a symbolic level by using symbols of their culture in their political activities and discourse. This chapter will also demonstrate how various Soviet legacies and the troubles of transition contributed to the decline of the native rights movement, and that of other political movements and NGOs, by the start of Yeltsin's second term in 1996. This study wiU conclude with a summary of the arguments articulated throughout, situating it within the existing literature on indigenous politicization and grass-roots social movements in the Russian Far North and Siberia. On a Gnal note, I will briefly outline the developments in native-state relations since 1996 and comment on the future direction of these relations under current President Vladimir Putin. 21 Chapter Two Drawing on pertinent literature ûom the ûeld of symbolic studies, and 6om case study analysis of Saami and Mohawk pohticization, this chapter wiH work towards a theory of symbohc politics to determine how symbols and political settings^ are controlled and manipulated to advance indigenous political agendas, to gain support and to instigate meaningful change. The Khanty and Mansi, like the Saami ofNorway and the Mohawk of Quebec, have also employed symbolic resources in their pohdcal activities and discourse.^ I argue that symbolic politics is therefore a useful &amewoik with which to assess Khanty and Mansi political mobilization during Symbolic Studies The study of symbols and the political uses of symbols have been dominated in the past almost exclusively by socio-cultural and linguistic anthropologists interested in ritual, culture, power, identity, kinship, and behaviour.^ At the most basic level, anthropologists deGne a symbol as something that represents or recalls something else with analogous qualities or by association in fact or thought.'* At a higher level of analysis, however, deGnitions become far more complex. According to anthropologist Abner Cohen, symbols are "objects, acts, concepts or linguistic fbrmaGons that stand amhtgwoiAyfy for a mulGplicity ' Political settings are the physical and social spaces where political processes take place. For exang)le, political debates take place in parliament and political rituals or protests occur in central squares or other 'sacred spaces' such as near a monument. ^1 do not contend there is a direct line between the strategies used by the Saami and Mohawk and that o f the Khanty and Mansi, for exanq)le, the Khanty and Mansi did not use the image of 'warrior' like the Mohawk. Rather, the case studies are intended to demonstrate how indigenous peoples use symbols (those appropriate and relevant to them) in their actions and discourse. ^Interest in symbols and symbolism was Aielled, in pai% by the Romantic movement o f the early 19th century. Raymond Firth, fwblic and frrvnte (Ithaca: Cornell, 1973), 92-126; George Mosse, MrrionnlrzaAon of tAe Alnssar.' foA'Acal aymbolüm and Afoss Afovementr in G e n n a n y i A e MzpoZeonic IKzM rAmwgA tAe 7%irdRe:cA (Ithaca: Cornell, 1975), 1-47. * Victor Turner, "Symbolic Studies," /tnnwal Rgvzew of^ntAropo/ogy 4 (1975): 151. 22 of disparate meanings, evoke sentiments and emotions, and motivate action."^ Cohen's dehnition, while slanted towards the role of symbols in social action, emphasizes two important qualities of symbols that diflerentiate them from univocal signs and signals: their arbitrariness and their emotional nature. Symbols, whether they are physical objects or abstract concepts, are not inherently meaningful. Rather, their meaning is ascribed and their interpretation contingent upon complex cultural traditions, beliefs, values, norms, and social practices. Symbols are therefore multivocal or multivalent forms that have the ability to express a multiphcity of meanings and emotions depending on the speaker and the audience.^ The interpretation of symbols and symbohc meaning varies considerably over time and space. Indeed, they are created, appropriated, destroyed, or altered over time in different cultural and geographical settings in reaction to new developments in language, rehgion, pohtics, technology, art, or ideology, to name but a few.^ Perh^s most importantly, however, symbols and symbohc meanings are active forms. As Cohen has noted, symbols occur within a stylized range of pubhc and private activities including ritual, ceremony, gift giving, oath taking, joking, eating, driukmg, and other acts of etiquette.^ Used singularly or in concert with one another, symbols fulhh a number of important functions in culture and social relations. In fwbZrc fnvure (1973) anthropologist Raymond Firth identihes four primary functions of symbols which make them vital components of culture. First, symbols ^Abner Cohen, Two DzmeMJZOMaZMon. on rAe XnrArc^o/ogy o f Power iÿ^MAo/irn; :n Com^/ez &oc;eQ/ (London: Rontledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 23. ^Mircea Eliade, 7%e and (Ae One (New York: Harville Press, 1965), 201-202; Turner, 146. ^For exan^le, in Britain a crown traditionally symbolizes monarchical power; however in Poland, where there is no monarchical tradition, the same symbol has been associated with poUtical opposition and national independence movements. Zdzislaw Mach, 5)nnAok, Co/^ict /dentiry. in Po/idca/ ,4niAropoiogy (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1992), 30-21; For a detailed analysis see Zdzislaw Mach, "National Symbols in the Context o f Ritual: the Polish Exanqile," dbwmai o f iAe .dniAropo/ogica/ 5'ocieiy o f Or/ord, 16:1 (1985): 19-34. ^Cohen, Tivo Dôngn.rionai Afdn, 23-24. 23 clearly express the intellectual and emotional values of a given culture, particularly with respect to politics and rehgion. Firth notes, for example, the importance of flags, national anthems, church paintings, and scriptural text in group identihcation and expression.^ Second, symbols and symbohc acts allow complex ideas or emotions to be communicated and shared without the use of language. In his analysis of a Polynesian tribal ritual, for instance. Firth argues that by rubbing the temple post with scented leaves the Tikopian chief not only communicated respect for his people, but also demonstrated his power over them.^° Third, symbols are instruments of knowledge in that they ahow "one to perceive more clearly, more imaginatively, a particular type of relationship, uncluttered by details."^ ^ FinaUy, symbols function as instruments of control and power between dominant and subordinate entities in a given social system. Firth argues that symbols, because of their abihty to express and communicate cultural values and ideals, can be easily controhed or manipulated to justify or correct behaviour and in order to enforce power relations. As instruments of expression, communication, knowledge, control and power, symbols arguably play a pivotal role in sphere of pohtics. Pohtical Symbols. Svmbohc Pohtics Although pohtics is primarily concerned with the "struggle over interests, access, and advantages" within a social unit, it also involves a struggle over "meanings and communication" both of which demand the pohtical use (and abuse) of symbols. Pohtical symbols, for the purposes of this analysis, are defined as 'objects, acts, concepts, or linguistic ^Firth, lÿymAoZy. fwA/ic owf fWvak, 77. Firth, jymZwZr.' fwAAc awf frrvofe, 79-82. Firth, 82-83; For exanplc, while a shaman's intimate relationship to the spirit world is to some extent unknowable, witnessing shamanic rites and acts can signihcantly aid in understanding the relationship. Firth, 84; Mosse, 1-21. Steven Pfaff and Guobin Yang, "Double-edged Rituals and the Symbolic Resources o f Collective Action: Political Commenmrations and the Mobilization o f Protest in 1989," 30 (2001): 551. 24 formations' that refer to the distribution, maintenance, and exercise of power in the relationships between individuals or groups and a state or governing body.^"* Political symbols possess the same qualities as other symbols in that they are active, multivocal and emotional forms that perform diverse functions in society and whose meaning varies over time and space. In times of political upheaval and social change, political symbols are sources of great comfort and strength because they eSectively link a more stable or desirable past with the present. Moreover, they reduce complex situations or appeals to simple ideas and values, which are easily grasped by the masses and are more effective in harnessing support. Political symbols are drawn, for the most part, from the inventory of symbols we associate with identity. Every social unit, 6om kin or ethnic groups to large communities or nation-states, has an inventory of symbols that effectively identihes the group and denotes their relationship to other groups As Cohen has argued '"we see groups through their symbols" and this symbolic identification makes the beliefs, value systems, religious worldviews, political ideologies, and historical experiences of the group more tangible and comprehensible. ^^ Identity, however, is a not an inherent or prescribed state or sense of being. Rather, it is formed through a "dynamic, processual and contextual" practice whereby symbols and symbolic messages are created, integrated, exchanged, adapted, destroyed, and interpreted by individuals and by groups to set important boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in a social This dehnition is a fusion o f other definitions and discussions on the political nature o f symbols found in: Cohen, Two-Drnienfiona/Afon, 23-27; C. Radha Jhappan, "The Language o f Enyowcrmcnt Symbohc Pohtics and Indian Pohtical Discourse in Canada," Ph.D. Dissertation, UBC 1990,23; Mach, Cbn/hct and /denA'ty, 37-39. " Roger Mac Ginty, "The Pohtical Use o f Symbols o f Accord and Discord: Northern Ireland and South A&ica," C W iPors 4:1 (2001): 3. Jhappan, "The Language o f Engmwerment," 24-26. Cohen, TwoDimensioMa/AfaM, 30-31. 25 unit.^^ Identity is manifested in an inSnite number of symbolic forms including traditional economic activities, housing, religion, art, language, public monuments, flags, folk songs, and national dress, all of which have the abihty to evoke powerful emotions and actions when used in a pohtical context. Pohtical symbols are engaged and legitimized in the pohtical sphere through the practice of symbohc pohtics. Symbohc pohtics is the control or manipulation of pohtical symbols and of pohtical settings by individuals, by groups, or by the state in an attempt to venerate, justify, criticize, or renegotiate the nature of their pohtical relationships and the concomitant pohtical order.Sym bohc pohtical initiatives embrace a wide range of strategies, horn the enactment of pohtical rituals, protest, or other forms of civil disobedience, to pohtical participation and representation at a governmental or informal organizational level. As civil disobedience or protest tends to be a last resort for dissidents or opposition groups, the choice of symbohc pohtical initiative can be said to vary according to the immediacy of the situation and according to the degree of organizational resources available.^° Ah symbohc pohtical actions involve some degree or element of ritual. Ritual, in the broadest sense, is a sequence of repetitive and prescribed actions involving a combination of objects, social actors, behaviours, ideas, and emotions.^^ Regardless of whether they are rehgious or secular in nature, rituals are enacted to fulhl various functions in social hfe including communication or expression, the conhrmation of Mach, jymZwh, oW AfeMAYy, 5, 38-39. This definition is a synthesis o f ideas concerning political symbols and symbolic politics. The two most notable works in this area are: 7%e t/rar o f f o/iAcs (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1964) in which Murray Edelman argues that politics is for most o f us a "passing parade o f abstract symbols" produced and manipulated by governments to maintain mass quiescence, and C. Radha Jhappan's "The Language of Engwwerment," in which he argues that symbolic politics is a tool utilized by disadvantaged minorities seeking political benehts. ^ C. Radha Jhappan, "Indian Symbolic Politics: The Double-Edged Sword o f Publicity," Canodmn E iW c 22:3 (1990); 4 Mach, ^m bo6, Gon/Jict and JdgnAYy, 68-73. 26 social order, and the strengthening of collective identities. Political rituals are predominantly pubhc events designed by pohtical actors, such as movement groups or the state, to convey specihc messages and achieve certain goals. In authoritarian settings, for example, pohtical rituals are designed to reinforce the authority and prestige of the leaders, institutions and ideology, as well as to inspire obedience and loyalty to the state.^^ However, as sociologists Steven PfafF and Guobin Yang (2001) argued pohtical rituals can easily be subverted by dissidents or movement groups. For example, dissidents can appropriate historical anniversaries or national heroes by enacting rituals which discredit the state or criticize the estabhshed pohtical order. Indigenous Svmbohc Pohtics: Problems and Prospects Native-State relations have rarely been conducted on what can be described as a level-playing held. Typically, indigenous or "fourth world"^ peoples inhabit a pohtically weak, economically marginal, and culturally stigmatized sphere on the hinges of whitedominated society.^ To meet these challenges, and to advance specihc pohtical agendas when standard avenues of pohtical action have failed, indigenous peoples have consistently drawn upon symbohc pohtics. Although it does not guarantee meaningful discussion or resolution of issues, symbohc pohtical initiatives have been successful for indigenous peoples on a number of different levels. By drawing upon the 'noble' values of the dominant ^ For exançles in Eastern Europe and China see P6fFand Yang, 541, 557-578. ^ Pfatr and Yang, 553-580. ^ The question over whether indigenous peoples constitute a "fourth world" occupied signiGcant scholarly debate in the 1980s. See: George Manuel and M. Posluros. 7%e fourtA fPor/d." /hdidn TfenZiiy (Toronto: Colher-MacMillan, 1974); N. H. Giabum, "1,2,3,4...Anthropology and the Fourth World," Cw/Ay|Po^tr T Y U M B N' O B L A S T ; 52 3. Ob Basin Oil and Gas Fields. From Joseph P Riva, Jr. QDporfwMfrigj: m rAeFbnMerj'oWef UhioM (Tulsa, Okla.: PenWell Books, 1994), 153. Khanty and Mansi who dropped to a mere 1.7 percent of the total population by 1989.^^ Despite the dramatic increase of oil and gas workers, development was plagued by constant labour deficits. To compensate, the state adopted a 'tour of duty' method that involved flying in an additional 50,000 workers every two weeks in order to fulGll the assignments of the Sve year plan.^^ A lack of basic amenities and inhastructure posed immediate problems for Siberian development. Forced to live in temporary housing, drive on temporary roads, and work in temporary facilities, oil and gas workers began to "think and act along temporary lines" manifested in a careless and wasteful attitude towards work, the environment, and the indigenous inhabitants ofKMAO.^ To correct this 'temporary' line of thought, modem urban centers were constructed across the north, complete with high rise apartments, shopping facilities, schools, medicals centers, entertainment complexes, and sewer and water services. New resource boom towns were accompanied by the rapid expansion of towns surrounding oil and gas sites including Surgut, Nizhnevartovsk, and Neftyugansk. While resource development and urbanization clearly provided new opportunities for northern advancement, it had tremendous social and ecological consequences. First, the center-peripheiy dynamic of oil and gas development solidified KMAO's role as an 'internal colony' in which political and economic control was dominated by ^ The population of the Khanty actually rose 6om 19,410 in 1959 to 22,521 in 1989; however, they steadily decreased in terms of the total okrug population. Vakhtin, 34; Forsyth, 391. V. Lisin, "Mistakes in Calculations," fruvdu, 3 April 1984, 2, translated in Cw/rgniDigarr fAe fr&yf 36:14 (May 2, 1984):5; L Levitsky, "DifBcult Millions," 27 May 1985,2, translated in Press 37:24 (July 10, 1985): 5-6; V. Kuzmishchev et al, "The Tour of Duty's Pluses and Minuses," Prov(6i, 24 Deceihber 1987,1-2, translated in 7%g CwrreniDzgeyi o f iAe Press 38:51 (21 January 1987): 21. ^ L. Levitsky, "DifBcult Millions, "5-6; V. Lisin, "Mistakes in Calculations," 5, "Tour o f Duty Mediod Pressed for Siberian Oil Labour," translated in CwrreMi Digest o f iAe Sbviei Press 29:42 (November 16,1977). 53 bureaucrats in Moscow.^^ Thus, not only did the Khanty and Mansi not have a say in how development unfolded on their land, they did not beneGt 6om the proceeds of extraction. Moreover, they did not receive compensation for land seizures or the degradation of their hunting, gathering, hshing, and herding territories. Second, the urbanization and industrialization of Khanty and Mansi territory exacerbated native-newcomer relations, particularly problems of alcoholism, crime, and marginalization. The 'wild and violent' atmosphere of the 'frontier' led to the theft and vandalism of native encampments, burial sites, and sacred spaces, as weU as the reckless poaching of wildlife and domestic reindeer by oil and gas workers.^^ To escape the busy city centers and the constant harassment by newcomers many natives pushed farther into the peripheral regions, while others, attracted by potential economic gains and an easier lifestyle, severed ties with traditional occupations, families, and settlements to live in the urban centers.^^ Perhaps the most devastating impact of industrialization for the Khanty has been the ecological degradation of their land, on which their economies and way of life depends. "Rverythine is ruined now": Environmental Narratives As the pace of development intensiGed across the north in the late 1960s and early 1970s, large tracts of forest, tundra and taiga were cleared to make way for roads, railways, pipelines, processing facilities, and oil wells and rigs. Economic planners, focused on increasing oil production at any cost, proceeded with little, if any, consideration of the Schindler, 4; Forsyth, preface. Interview conducted with Khant woman in the village o f Lyantor, 12 June 2003; See also, Aipin "Not by Oil Alone,"; V. Azarov, "Preserve and Multiply," fmvdu, 2 September 1977,3, translated in CwTrent Dzgert tAe 29:35 (September 28,1977): 22; Forsyth, 392. ^ S.S. Savoskul, "Urbanization and the Minority Peoples o f the Soviet North," in Devg/ppmeni o f AAgria. fe p p k uwf J(eaowrces eds.. Wood, Alan and R.A. French (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), 96-123; Alexsandr Pika and Boris Prokhorov, "Soviet Union: The Big Problems o f Small Ethnic Groups," BTGL4 Aews/gtter 57 (May 1989); Forsyth, 390-391. 54 possible ecological impacts of development.*^ Immeasurable damage has been done to the Khanty and Mansi's traditional territory as a result, including degradation of land and water resources hrom oil spills, gas Hare emissions, chemical drilling wastes, the ripping iq) of hragile soils by heavy machinery, rusting and abandoned equipment, and other industrial garbage. Environmental degradation not only upset the ecological balance of the region, it devastated traditional economies rehant on the land. According to scholars Alexsandr Pika and Boris Prokhorov, the percentage of native northerners across Siberia engaged in traditional activities decreased &om 70 percent in the late 1950s to just 43 percent by 1988.^^ Reindeer herding has been particularly hard hit by resource development. By some estimates, more than 11 million hectares of reindeer migratory paths and pasturelands have been lost in the Tyumen Oblast since the 1950s.^ This Sgure excludes the incalculable harm done to reindeer lichens and mosses on the remaining pasturelands Aom the 8 to 12 billion cubic meters of gas burned off annually in northwest Siberia.Reindeer and reindeer herders have suffered as a result. Herders interviewed in the villages of Russkinskaya and Lyantor complained of sharp increases in heart and liver problems amongst their herds since the onset of development, which, they argued, stemmed &om the toxins released by nearby gas ^ For reports on the environmental practices of the state see: V. Azorov, "Preserve and Multiply,"22; A. Sihn, "For ourselves and our descendents," 17 November 1977,2, translated in the CwTTeMtDigear o f tAe 29:46 (December 14, 1977): 20; "The Economy, Ecology and Ethics," A/enno proizvodrtva, 3 March 1982,147-194, excerpts translated in the Cwrrgni Digcft o f tAe Eoviei 34:23 (July 7,1982): 1-6. Pika and ProlAorov, 125. ^ Roads, railways, pipelines and oil dnlling sites have been built in the migratory paths and pastures of reindeer herds, while heavy machinery has ripped up vast tracks o f land. Aipin, "Not by Oil Alone." ^ Gas (called casinghead gas) typically lies on top o f oil deposits and if it is not removed can be potentially dangerous. Rather than process the gas, developers in Siberia simply bum it off. Estimates vary on the amount gas burned off and are, for the most part, based on data from the late 1980s and early 1990s. See A. Khersonskii, "Mertvaya Voda Velikoi Reki," [Dead Water of the Great River] Egvermye frosiory 42 (June 1991):10-11 and Andrei Baiduzhy, "The End of the Century in Russia will beatim e o f Catastrophes," Gazeio, 7 July 1993, 6, translated in TAc CurreniDigaït o f iAe fosr-Eovieifrars 45:27 (1993): 17-18. 55 ûares.^^ The presence of oil and gas workers near herding operations also created a serious threat for Khanty and Mansi herders. Habitually struck hy transport trucks or attacked by the stray dogs of oil and gas workers, the size of individual herds has plummeted since 1960. Economies rehant on hunting and gathering have not faired any better. A marked decrease in the quantity and quality of vegetation, including herries and mushrooms, forced the Khanty and Mansi to travel to more and more remote regions to gather forest products for food and medicine. Khanty and Mansi in the villages of Sytomina and Russkinskaya complained that not only were there fewer berries available, they were so "dirty" 6om the gas flare emissions that picking them turned their hands hlack.^^ In addition to being fewer in number and increasingly mutated, mushrooms were also said to create strange foam when boiled.^° Not surprisingly, the wildhfe dependent on these foods and other forest products also decreased in population after 1960. Several villagers observed that bears, which were once abundant in the region and an integral part of their rehgious rituals, were seldom seen. Moreover, they did not know how the bears even managed to survive.^^ Migratory birds that once flourished in the rich swamplands of KMAO also declined. The rivers, lakes, and swamplands of KMAO have experienced similar degradation as a consequence of oil and gas development. Both the drinking water and habitat of hsh and aquatic plant species have been contaminated by heavy metals, oil, and other chemical Several interviewees described a sharp increase in liver and heart problems amongst reindeer populations since 1960: Interview with a Khanty herder in the village o f Russkinskaya 13 June 2003; Interview with Khant herder in the village of Lyantor, 12 June 2003. ® The most common berries mentioned were cranberries, bZacAùgm&v, raf AZueberrier, wAort/eAerriea and cZoud berries. Interview with Khanty in the villages of Russkinskaya 13 June 2003, Sytomina 15 June 2003 and Lyantor 12 June 2003. Interview with Khanty woman in Sytomina 15 June 2003; Interview with Khant man 13 June 2003 in Russkinskaya. Interview conducted with Khant woman in Russkinskaya, 13 June 2003. Interview with Khant woman in Sytomina, 15 June 2003 56 wastes leached through the soil at extraction sites or leaked horn broken pipelines/^ Several interviewees complained about the quality of their drinking water which, when boiled, produced layers of foam that they associated with oil and gas development/^ Khanty and Mansi villagers also reported that the hsh caught hom the Ob, or hom other smaller rivers, "smell like oil" and have strange spots and hn deformities/^ Since the 1960s, a marked increase has occurred in oncological and circulatory illnesses amongst the native population of the Russian North, along with rising rates of tuberculosis, cancer, alcoholism, infant mortahty, suicide, and other instances of violet death. Moreover, escalating mortahty rates and inadequate access to medical treatment dropped the average hfe expectancy of native northerners to 45 years for men and 55 for women, more than twenty years below the non-indigenous average in the entire USSR. From Boom to Bust: Tyumen’s Oil Lag By the early 1980s, it was clear that the "time of golden gushers" and "easy oil" had ended.^^ After two decades of unprecedented growth, the chronic mismanagement and short­ sighted tactics of Soviet developers had caused the West Siberian energy complex to slow. Indeed, when Gorbachev took ofhce in 1985, only one-quarter of West Siberia's petroleum It has been estimated that over 12 million tons o f oil is lost each year in Tyumen 6om pipeline breaks. "The Damage Done by the Petrodollar," 32. ^ Conversation with Khant woman, 14 June 2003; Interviews conducted with Khanty villagers in Lyantor 12 June, 2003 and Russkinskaya 13 June 2003. The most commonly mentioned Gsh species were perch, pike, burbot and sturgeon. Interviews conducted with several elder Khant villagers in Sytomina 15 June 2003, Russkinskaya 13 June 2003 and Lyantor 12 June 2003. ^^Pika and Prokhorov, 130-131. See also: Alexsandr Pika, "The Spatial-tenqwral dynamics of violent death among the native peoples ofNorthem Russia," yfrcAc AntAropo/ogy 30:2 (1993); "Siberian Health: Where is it?" 49:1 (April 16,1997): 20; Irina Pykhteyeva, "Stepchildren o f the North: Numerically Small Peoples are not just dust in the wind," frnvdn, 29 January 1992, 3, translated in CurrgMtDigayt oftAe 44:4 (February 1992): 31. Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "Make the Development o f Ore West Siberian Complex the Concern of AH the People," A-avdn, 7 September 1985, 1-2, translated in 7%g Cwrreni Digest o f tAe Soviet Dress 37:36 (October 2, 1985): 3. 57 deposits were actively producing and over two thousand wells were inoperative/^ With estimated shortfalls of 45 million tons by the end of the eleventh five year plan (1981-1985), and the rapid depletion of oil, gas, and coal reserves in European Russian, Tyumen's oil lag became a serious concern. Heavy rehance on the 'gusher method' in which oil literally gushed 6om the ground under its own pressure, played a m ^or role in Tyumen's slump. By 1980, many gushers had ceased to flow naturally. Shortfalls were immediate and forced producers to literally "open the faucets" at existing gushers to the point of exhaustion.^^ When the 'rainbow of gushers' faded, the short-sightedness of state developers was all too apparent. The gushers had effectively stalled advances in processing technologies, extraction methods, sustainable or realistic development plans and a conservationist ethic amongst oil and gas workers.^^ Both Brezhnev and Gorbachev responded to the crisis by proposing a shift to forced methods of extraction, the relentless exploitation of existing wehs, and the pursuit of new sources in different and often controversial areas.^ Thus, rather than alleviate the Khanty and Mansi's problems, the oil and gas slump exacerbated them. By the mid-1980s, it was clear that development and degradation had threatened the Khanty and Mansi ability to survive, a reahty that compelled them to mobilize and fght for their rights as national minorities and as indigenous peoples. The next chapter will trace the ^ L Levitsky, "Breakdown: How Mismanagement Hastened Samotlor's Fall 6om 1980 Peak," Av&rAio, 28 May 1985, translated in 7%g Cwrrent Digest o f (Ae Soviei frea.; 37:24 (July 1 0 ,1985):5-6. ^ L. Levitsky, "DifBcult Millions,"5-6. ^ Gorbachev, "Make the Development of the West Siberian Coirplex the Concern o f all the People," 4. ^ Deposits farther north on the Yamal Peninsula, for example, caused great controversy because o f the potential damage to the 6agile ecosystems. See: Piers Vitebsky, "Gas, Environmentalism and Native Anxieties in the Arctic," f o/ar Record 26:156 (1990); Fyodor Sizy, "The Price o f Yamal," Ogonyot 46 (November), 20-21, translated in CurrentDzgest o f tAe Soviet fr e sf, 40:47 (21 December 1988): 23-24; Yu Perepletkin, "Attack on Yamal Suspended," Jzvartizo, 10 March 1989, 1, translated in Current Digest o f tAe Soviet Press 41:10 (5 April 1989): 19. 58 development of Khanty and Mansi symbolic political activism 6om the 'rebirth of politics' in 1985 to the decline of the movement by 1996. 59 Chapter Four The ten year period between the advent of in 1985 and the onset of Boris Yeltsin's second term in ofGce in 1996 arguably represents the peak of Khanty and Mansi social and political activism. The 'rebirth of politics' in the Soviet Union succeeded in empowering formerly marginalized national groups like the Khanty and Mansi, enabling them to mobilize their resources and hght to protect their culture and way of life through a series of symbolic political initiatives 6om the formation of the association protests and government lobbying, to precedent-setting legislative initiatives. This chuter win trace the development of their political mobihzation, situating it within the context of Soviet and post-Soviet social movements. Moreover, it will illustrate how Khanty and Mansi symbolic initiatives mirror patterns of indigenous politicization in the international community. A Prelude to Reform With the ascension of Nikita Khrushchev (1953-1964) to power in 1953, Soviet social and pohtical hfe experienced a profound thaw. Under Stalin and Stalinism, the Party dictated the wiU of the people, blurring the lines between state and society, public and private, and the individual and the collective. Following Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, in which he attacked Stalin and his abuse of power, Khrushchev initiated pohcies of détente and de-Stahnizahon in the USSR and abroad.^ In doing so, Khrushchev ' Nikita Khrushchev, "Cult o f the Individual," delivered at the Twentieth Party Congress o f Ihe CPSU, 25 February 1956, in yf Docwmento?}' IfktOTy o f CbTwmmwm in Kwssia. From Zeni» to GorAocAev, ed., Robert Daniels, (Hanover University Press o f New England, 1993), 254-258. 60 introduced a new era of Soviet politics and political culture characterized by totalitarian rule "without terror."'' Seeking to revitalize the Party and institutionalize Soviet pohtics, Khrushchev eased state censorship and repression, allowing for the expansion of civil liberties in the post-Stalin era. Industrialization and rapid urbanization in the post-Stalin years contributed to this process by creating a more hterate and independent populace, capable of asserting and defending social interests and individual rights.^ A generation of younger and better educated workers also played a part in the new social setting. The young workers possessed a different set of values and orientations than their predecessors, most notably a decrease in concern for collective interests such as work. Instead, they expressed afBnity for "private" or individual interests and activities such as family and leisure.^ The privatization of Soviet social and political hfe after 1960 led to the creation of an "informal pubhc" sphere, a diverse network of family, hiends, and members of the mte/IfgeMAym that engaged in state-independent social activities and interactions.^ Operating in 'public spaces' such as cafes, universities or cultural and arts centers, the informal public embraced a number of semi-legal and illegal private practices, including participation in the second economy, publishing, family gardens, and the bard movement among ^Peter Hauslohner, "Politics Before Gorbachev: De-Stalinization and the Roots of Reform," in 7%e XAnwAcAgv andRrezAnev feora, éd., Alexander Dallin, (New York: Garland, 1992) 123. ^Alfred B. Evans Jr., "Recent Assessments o f Social Organizations in Russia," Demob-ahzatMya 10:3 (2002): 323. ^ Soviet scholar Vladimir Shlapentokh has argued this movement towards private and individual interests represents a "privatization" o f Soviet society; Vladimir Shlapentokh, fu M c and frrvuie iAe .Soviet People. Changing Pdluea in Posi-Aolin Pussio (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). This shift corresponded with a move 6om communal hving to private apartments; Gail Lapidus, "State and Society: Towards the Emergence of Civil Society in the Soviet Union" in 7%e GorhocAev Era, ed., Alexander DaUin, (Garland: New York, 1992), 184. ^Elena Zdravomyslova and Viktor Voronkov, "The Informal Public in Soviet Society: Double Morality at Work,"S'ociaiResearcA 69:1 (Spring 2002): 50-53; Shlapentokh, 227-231. 61 others.^ Ofïset by the formal or ofBcial public, which functioned within the parameters of state control and written law, the informal public developed its own set of values and norms consistent with an unwritten common law / The informal public responded to the new opportunities created by Khrushchev's 'thaw' in a variety of ways. Some members reacted by developing informal interest groups primarily in the regions of European USSR, concerned with social and sometimes political issues aimed at internal reform.^ Other members of the informal pubhc, hoping to create a new social order altogether, engaged in the outright critique of Soviet pohcy and practice through transnational action initiatives, pohtical protest, and grass-roots movements in large urban centers such as Moscow and Leningrad (St. Petersburg).^ The activities of the informal pubhc were by no means invisible to or unchecked by the State/Party apparatus however. Arbitrary 'heezes' by the state inspired punitive measures against members of the informal pubhc, hom reprimands and ostracism, to harsher actions such as imprisonment, exile or conhnement in mental institutions.^^ Dramatic show trials of ^ Shlapentokh, 190-230. ^Zdravomyslova and Voronkov, 64; See also, Howard Biddulph, "Soviet Intellectual Dissent as a Political Counter-culture," in 7%e ÆhnwAcAgv and drezAnev ZeoM, éd., Alexander Dallin, (New York: Garland, 1992),158-169. ^JimButterSeld and Judith Sedaitis, "The Emergence o f Social Movements in the Soviet Union," in f Be/ow.AfovemenA in iAe .ÿovier Union, eds., Jim Butterfield and Judith Sedaitis, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 1-3; Vladimir Brovkin, "Revolution 6om Below: Informal Pohtical Associations in Russia, 1988-1989," Soviet 42:2 (April 1990): 215-240; Gordon Skilhng, "Interest Groups and Communist Pohtics Revisited," in AArwsAcAev and RrezAnev Tgars, ed., Alexander Dahin, (New York: Garland, 1992), 157-161; Although the majority o f informal movements were based in the urban centers of European USSR, there are exang)les of grassroots informal movements emerging during this period in some parts of the periphery. For exan^le, the 'Baikal Awakening' o f the 1960s erupted in opposition to the industrial development of the Lake Baikal region. See, Phihp Pryde, Envzron/nenta/ Afanagemeni in iAe Eoviei Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; Katy Pickvance, Deznocracy and Environ/neniaZ Movenzenis in Eofiem Ezzrqpg. d Cozn^aradve Eiizz^ ofFfzzngary zznd Rzzssia (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 112113. ^For exan^le, the Moscow Helsioki Grozqz, a human rights interest group, went so 6 r as to appeal to the United Nations in the mid to late 1970s. Nicolai Petro, The RehiriA Rztrsian Deznocracy.- yfn Tniezpreiaiion o f foiiiicai Czziizzre (London: Harvard University Press, 1995), 125-135. Gaü Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationahties Problem," in The Vadona/iiy gzzesiion in iAe Eoviei Union, ed., Gail Lapidus, (New York: Garland, 1992), 216. 62 dissident writers, musicians, academics and others were also not uncommon in the Khrushchev and Brezhnev periods, and efiectively forced both dissent and informal pubhc activities and interactions underground. However, the "hrst taste of left a lasting impact on the generation of the 1960s" and arguably succeeded in setting the stage for the mass social movements and informal group formation that erupted in European USSR under f ereafrmAu: the 'Revolution From Above' Mikhail Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the CPSU on 11^ March 1985, bringing to a close three years of leadership struggles following Leonid Brezhnev's death in 1982.^^ Gorbachev, at only fifty-four years of age, possessed youth and vigour that symbolized a new direction in Soviet leadership and pohty, one radically different than the gerontocracy that had become entrenched under Brezhnev and his successors. Similar to Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign, Gorbachev attacked the excesses of Brezhnevism, which he argued had exacerbated corruption, economic mismanagement, and bureaucratic decay in the Soviet Union.Characterizing Brezhnev's regime as an era of stagnation, Gorbachev argued that new thinking was needed to save the ailing Soviet system. Gorbachev's new thinking, which sought to "unite socialism with democracy" and 'tevive Leninist principles of socialist construction", inspired a series of far-reaching domestic and foreign reforms referred to collectively a s o r restructuring.^^ Petro, 126; ButtcrGeld and Sedaitis, "The Emergence o f Social Movements in the Soviet Union," 2-3. Yuri Andropov, former head of the KGB, was elected General Secretary fbüowing Brezhnev's death. Andropov died a year and a half later, and was replaced by the elderly and infirm Konstantin Chernenko who also feü dl, dying on March 10, 1985. Richard Sakwa, GorhacAev omf Aü Rg/brmf, fP&J-fPPO (New York: Prentice HaU, 1990), 82-90. Mikhail Gorbachev, fer&yn-oita.- New Owr CownP}' and the Ifbr/d (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 22, 41-45; "Gorbachev Addresses the Party on Change - 1," frovda, 28 January, 1987, translated in the CurrgnrDzg&ÿf qftAeSbvzetfresf 39:4 (February 25, 1987): 1-7; Gorbachev is often given credit for the ideas behind reform, however, there are striking similarities between his reforms and those put forth 'unofficially' for 63 Concentrated around three key policies of restructuring), (speciûcally economic (openness), and zfgmo&rarzzatyna (democratization), Gorbachev's reforms developed in four stages. The 6rst stage, &om March 1985 to mid 1986, focused on the restructuring of the Soviet economy and the de-Brezhnevisation of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev hoped that by improving economic performance and revamping the central planniug system that standards of hving would increase, which would build support for further reform. Although his reform platform lacked specihc details for implementation, it was greeted with some enthusiasm by hke-minded reformers and Gorbachev was able to build enough support to begin the next phase of restructuring. From the spring of 1986 to mid 1987, Gorbachev attempted to stimulate pubhc involvement in restructuring through the promotion of g/uyMOjf or openness in Soviet hfe. Designed to provoke internal criticism of the Soviet system, gZajMOft consisted of three main processes: the dissemination of information, discussion, and participation.^^ With a relaxation of censorship and institutional controls over foreign and domestic media sources, the Soviet pubhc was allowed greater access to information pertinent to their everyday hves. As information on pohcy failures, health hazards, environmental data, poverty, crime, and rates of alcohohsm and drug use surfaced, Soviet intellectuals and the general pubhc became cxanqile see: Andrei Sakharov, Roy Medvedev and Valery Turchin, "Letter to the Soviet Leaders, March 19, 1970," in 7%e Oiyü. .,4 Reaz/er o f WgsierM and Roviet Mews, eds., Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus, (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 81-87. "The Fundamental Question o f the Party's Economic Policy," Report by M.S. Gorbachev, fravda, 12 June 1985,1-2, translated in Ca/rgMt Digest o f iAe .Sovierfraîs 37:23 (3 July 1985):l-7; "Initiative, Organization andEfBciency,"fravda, 12 April 1985, 1-2, translated in TAeCwTTeni Digest qfiAei5ovieifras:s 37:15 (8 May 1985): 1-7; JoanDeBardeleben, .SoweifoZidcs in TraTzsiiion (Toronto: DC Heath and Co, 1992), 63-65; Sakwa, 8-10, 82-90. Sakwa, 65-77; "On Restmctuiing and the Party's Personnel Policy," Report by M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary o f the CPSU Central Committee, at the Plenary Session o f the CPSU Central Committee on 27 January 1987, fravda,28 January 1987,1-5, translated in 7%e Carreni Digest o f tAe Joviet fress 39:5 (4 March 1987): 8-12; M.S. Gorbachev, "Reopening the Past," Report to the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Srqireme Soviet on the 70^ Anniversary o f the Great October Socialist Revolution, frovda,2 November 1987, translated in TAe Carrent Digest o f tAe ;i5oviet Press 39:44 (2 December 1987): 1, 4-9; "Openness in Work," Provdo, 27 March 1985,1, translated in 7%e Carrent Digest o f tAe 5'oviet Press 37:13 (24 April 1985): 3. 64 deeply involved in the discussion of social and political issues/^ Gorbachev beheved that public discussion and debate would mobilize the public and rally support for reform. However, was not easily controlled and an 'excess of quickly led to a period of conservative backlash. By mid 1987, it was readily apparent that andperefP-ozAn reforms were not without their discontents. Alarmed by the amount of criticism directed at the Party and at previous Soviet leaders, and overwhelmed by the emergence of over 30,000 new informal interest groups, the conservatives within the Party/state apparatus began to mobilize against the wave of reform. The anti-per&ïP-ozÆn forces, who opposed everything 6om bberal individuabsm to the Western invasion of Soviet culture, attempted to curb the pace of reform by appealing to Russian nationabsm and Marxism-Leninism.^^ However, Gorbachev's consistent denunciation of bis conservative critics succeeded in reafGrming the Party's reform path, harnessing enough support to push his reform package through to the hnal stage. The fourth phase of reform, beginning in mid 1988 and lasting to 1990, focused on the restructuring of the political system through the process of Gorbachev's visions for a new 'socialist democracy' were grounded in concepts of 6-eedom, humanism, individual rights, and a state-governed rule of law within a representative parliamentary There was a marked increase in newspaper subscriptions and journals during this time, reflecting a new interest in the printed word. BormeU, 207; Sakwa, 66-70; DeBardeleben, 66-67. "Conservatives" included nationalists, radical Slavophiles, neo-Stalinist nationalists and other members of the Party hierarchy. Yitzhak M. Brudny, "The Heralds of Opposition to Perestroika," &)vzgZ Economy 5:2 (1989): 173-177; Jim Butterfield and Judith Sedaitis, "The Emergence of Social Movements in the Soviet Union,"!. Anti-pgr&rZroiAa sentiment was perhaps best expressed in Leningrad scientist Nina Andreyeva's letter published 13'"' March 1988 in the conservative newspaper j'ovcZskozo Eoasno. In the letter Andreyeva praised Stalin and the power o f a strong central state, urging fellow citizens to uphold the principles of MarxismLeninism and oppose deviations from historical and ideological truths. See Nina Andreyeva's, "I Cannot Forgo my Principles," in ZAc S'ovzeZ in CrZrZs.- vf Eezzder o f ffierZcrn omf .5ovfeZ Fiewf, eds., Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 338-346. It is probable that die letter was not written by Andreyeva, but in fact by conservative agitators. DeBardeleben, 68. 65 system/^ Drawing on Western European experiences of social democracy, Gorbachev's first step was legal reform. In the resolutions "On Legal Reform" put forth at the 19^ Party Conference, Gorbachev elevated individual legal rights above those of the collective and above the interests of the state and Party.^' Ideally, the establishment of a rule of law would disseminate Party patronage and corruption, paving the way for electoral reform and competitive elections in new organs of power. The Congress of People's Deputies, created in May 1989, was the first institution to challenge the Party's hegemony. Open elections for two of the three Congress chambers, each with approximately 750 seats, enabled non-Party candidates to run on various election platforms.^ The rejuvenation of civic activity or ohsAcA&yiveMnosi was the second, and perhaps most important, step in the democratization of Soviet hfe. ObsAcAestvennosi denotes various levels of social engagement jhom the expression of pubhc opinion and volunteerism to notions of citizenship and civil society.Arguing that 's success hinged on increasing social input and initiative, Gorbachev enthusiastically took up the oAsAcA&ytvgMMost banner. Although Gorbachev encouraged the growth and participation of grass-roots, informal social movement groups in the process of Party-directed reform, the groups quickly developed goals separate 6om those of the state/Party apparatus. Thus, in ^"Sakwa, 142; "Gorbachev's Speech to the Supreme Soviet," frmWo, 2 October 1988, translated in TAe Curreat Zhgeat o f tAe %wet Prarg 40:39 (26 October 1988): 5-6. The devolution of rights 6om the collective to the individual was central to Gorbachev's notion o f socialist pluralism. David Lane, i5ov;et 5'oc:ety w/zder Pereatroikz (New York: Routledge, 1990), 111 ; Sakwa, 128; DeBardeleben, 67-69. ^ Sakwa, 134-135; Despite Gorbachev's attendis to steer the Congress, it was a center of debate and controversy, see "The Congress o f the USSR's Peoples Deputies," verbatim report, fzvasAzo, 26 May and June 11, 1989, translated in TAeCMrTgMtDzgartqftAe&iWgtPrasf 41:21,34(21 June 1989): 5-6,18-19 and (20 September 1989): 22-25. ^ Oh.sAcAarn'eMMoar was typically identihed with the intelligentsia class. Michael David-Fox, "From Illusory 'Society' to Intellectual 'Pubhc': VOKS, International Travel, and Party-hrtelhgentsia Relations in the Interwar Period" CoMtemporazy European ZfistoT}' 11:1 (2002): 11-12. 66 seeking to complement his "revolution &om above" with a concomitant "revolution &om below" Gorbachev unleashed social and pohtical forces beyond his control/^ Social Movements: the 'Revolution &om Below' The widespread grievances and demands that erupted under were, in fact, nothing new. The 'revolution 6om below' unleashed by Gorbachev had strong roots in the informal and dissident movements of the post-Stahn era and had, despite bouts of repression, carried on quietly beneath the surface of Soviet society in pubhc and private spaces through informal networks of family, hiends, and members of the New opportunities to voice their discontent without fear of retribution encouraged the growth of three distinct types of ne/b/TMo/y or informal movement groups after 1985: non-pohtically oriented movement groups concerned with sport or other leisure activities; pohticahy oriented movement groiqis concentrated on specihc issues such the environment and human rights; and ethnic-based movement groups focused on sovereignty and cultural survival.^ Led by members of the mteZZzgen/gza - students, professors, joumahsts, writers, lawyers, scientists, and other professionals- the informal movement taking shape in European USSR represented a wide array of peoples and interests. The activities and orientation of informal groiq)s was not static or hxed; rather, informal movement groups were in a constant state of flux with goals and/or agendas subject to change and to re-evaluation. Indeed, many non-pohtically oriented movement groups remained dedicated entirely to the social sphere without developing pohtical agendas. For ^ Gorbachev, Fererfroita. A/iew Owr CowR/ry awf rAe 41-45; Brovkin, 253-254. ^ Shlapentokh, 190-231; Zdravomyslova and Voronkov, 50-53. ^ Paul Goble, "Nationalism, Movement Groups and Party Formation," in f A/ovemeMtr in tAe S'oviet [/hioR, eds., Judith Sedaitis and Jim Butterfield, (Westview, 1991),168-169; Valentina Levicheva, "On the UnofScial Wave," Vafe/yu 7, February 1990, 12-18, translated in Cw/Tenr Digest o f tAe ,5ovtet Press 42:8 (28 March 1990): 5-8, 28. 67 example, informal groups concerned with sports or housing continued to tackle social issues and did not enter the pohtical sphere.^^ Other non-pohtically oriented movement groups, on the other hand, became increasingly politicized and moved into the pohtical sphere. For example, informal Christian groups graduahy developed pohtical platforms and estabhshed pohtical parties such as the Christian Democratic Union of Russia.^^ Ethnic-based movement groups often worked in both the social and pohtical sphere to address their issues. For example, to mitigate housing problems, alcoholism, or unemployment they operated in the social sphere by supporting housing projects or helping people to fins work; however, to deal with these issues at a higher level, these organizations also needed to lobby the government or initiate legislation.^^ In the Erst two years of Gorbachev's adrninistratioii, informal movement group activity was actually quite minimal. As the term 'informal' suggests, the new groups lacked ofScial protocols for membership, organizational structure, Enancing or even a hst of goals and activiEes.^^ Moreover, many informal groups were sEU testing the pohEcal waters during this time. Indeed, even with assurances Eom Gorbachev and the state that /?ere;rrofAa's success required their involvement, informal groups used public demonstraEons and rallies with cauEon. A series of new state guidelines for holding public demonstraEons had been For more on the dynamics o f social versus political movement groups see Rudolf Heberle, "Social Movements and Social Order," in SbcW MovemenA. CWtigugr, Cbweptr, CaLse-S'mdigy, Stanford Lyman ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 49-59; Herbert Blumer, "Social Movements," in Mbvgmgnü. Concqoü, Caag-S'mdzea, Stanford Lyman ed., (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 60-81. Levicheva, 7. The association is an excellent exangile. fwgri emerged initally as a social movement groups concerned with social issues; however, to address these problems they became increasingly political. In die post-Soviet period they contiue to operate in both realms, though predominantly the political realm, to achieve their goals. ^ Brovkin, 233. 68 implemented by 1988 and were actively enforced by riot police.^^ Despite these initial growing pains, by 1989 informal group activity had reached a peak with over 50,000 groups operating in the Soviet Union. Improvements in telecommunications and technology stimulated their development by allowing groups to engage in dialogue with other informal groups in the Soviet Union and, importantly, with other NGOs in the international arena. Given the rapid acceleration of the informal movement, it is not surprising that the State/Party apparatus experienced dihSculty maintaining control. Regime responses varied with timing, location, and context, but as Jim ButterGeld and Marcia Weigle have argued, responses can be classiSed into hve main categories ranging from cooperation to complete antagonism. Non-pohtically oriented movement groups and ethnic-base movement groups that outwardly supported Gorbachev and the restructuring process, such as the Latvian People's Front, initially received the state's cooperation and some form of Gnancial assistance.^^ Meanwhile other pohtically-oriented movement groups whose pohtical goals were perceived as a threat, like Moscow's Democratic Union who favoured a complete overhaul of the Soviet system, were antagonized by the state or subject to pre-emption or cooptation tactics.Regardless of the state's response, it is clear that informal movement groups accelerated the processes of per&yfroi&a in a number of ways. "Guidelines for Rallies, Demonstrations Set," Zrveariid, 29 July 1988, translated in Digest o f tAe .Soviet Press 40:30 (August 2 4 ,1988):15; "Democracy and Legality," J^esA'm, 30 July 1988, translated in 7%e Current Digest o f tAe S'oviet Press 40:30 (August 24, 1988):15-16. For exanqrle, informal groiqrs were given ofEce space and equipment by various state ministries such as the Ministry of Culture. Jim Butterfield and Marcia Weigle, "UnofBcial Social Qrorqrs and Regime Responses in the Soviet Union," in Perestroiki^om Peiow. Pocioi Movements in tAe Poviet Union, eds., Judith Sedaitis and JimButterheld, (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 176-178; See also JimButterûeld, "State Responses to Informal Groups," Aotzbnaiities Papers 18:2 (1990): 56-65; "Latvians Set Up a People's Front Too," PovetsAqya Latvia, 1 October 1988, translated in TAe Carrent Digest q f tAe Poviet Press 40:41 (Noveiriber 9 , 1989):7-8 and "Estonian People's Front: What Does it Want?" Pravifa, 29 September 1988, translated in 7%e Carrent Digest o f tAe Povi'et Press 40:40 (November 2,1988): 1-6. For exangile, a group's goals would be pre-enqitively adopted by the state, albeit in a "water downed fashion." ButterGeld and Weigle, 178-182; For a detailed analysis o f the Democratic Union see Brovkin, 242244. 69 First, informal groups tackled the difhcult issues and concerns surrounding Gorbachev's plans for "renewal" such as improving national relations and enviromnental conditions across the Soviet Union.^ Second, unlike revolutions of the past, informal groups helped to bring beyond the urban centers of Moscow and Leningrad to the peripheral areas of the Union. The people's 6onts in the Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) were perhaps the most successful groups operating in the periphery. Advocating for enhanced autonomy, cultural revitalization, and improvements in the ecological situation, the people's hronts were able to gain widespread public support and the backing of the Party.^^ Third, with the advent of legal and electoral reform after 1989, informal movement leaders were able to enter the political arena through local, regional, and federal level elections. For example, in 1989 Latvian popular hont activists won 26 out of 34 races, while Lithuanian candidates secured 34 of 42 seats.^^ The energy and force of the Baltic Fronts served as a model for informal group mobilization in other areas in the Soviet Union's periphery.^^ A Native Rights Movement Although social and political ferment in the Soviet North cannot be directly linked to the pre^eresfroiAa informal movements of European USSR, the native rights movement after 1985 arguably followed a similar pattern of development as other j^erestroiAa-era social movements.^^ Indeed, it also began within the hamework of 'renewal' and sought to address the long-standing problems of the North that had been exposed by g/osnosf including ^ Mark Pomar, "The Role of Informal Groups and Independent Associations in the Evolution of Civil Society in the Soviet Union," Mzhonu/zA'&r 18:2 (1990):50-56. "Latvians Set Up a People's Front Too," 7. ButterGeld and Sedaitis, 5. 37 See Muiznieks, Nils, "The Influence o f the Baltic Popular Movements on the Process o f Soviet Disintegration," Ewrqpe-vfjia 47:1 (1995): 3-26. Particularly those ethnic-based movement groiq)s focused on sovereignty and cultural survival. See Goble, 165-173; Levicheva, "On the UnofBcial Wave," 5-8, 28. 70 environmental degradation, socio-cultural deterioration, discrimination, alcoholism, and unemployment. Drawing its leadership from informai networks of family, Aiends, and the native mW/zgentyia, the native rights movement also capitalized on the increasingly hberal media sources to advance their grievances, notably through the publication of a series of critical articles on the situation of northern minorities. In an open letter dated 20*^^ April 1988, seven northern native writers appealed to Mikhail Gorbachev to rectify the "serious errors" committed by the state towards indigenous Siberians in the past and to '"implement effective measures for the rebirth of the peoples of the north."^^ The authors recommended thirteen strategies to enhance indigenous socio­ political, economic, and cultural development including: the creation of reservations for traditional activities and hvehhood, cultural and educational centers for national revival, publishing facilities for indigenous literature, legislative protection of indigenous languages, compensation for industrial encroachment on native territories, indigenous representation in regional and federal level decision-making bodies, and the creation of new autonomous regions for numerically small indigenous groups.^ The following year, in two separate manifestos published in the popular journal j'evemye f rosiory (Northern Expanses), the native writers of the north issued yet another appeal. Addressed to the "to the geological workers, oü and gas workers and other developers of the north" the writers demanded that the extraction of oil, gas, gold and Two of the seven writers, Ycremei Aipin and R. Rugin, were prominent Khanty activists. Vladimir Sangi, ei oZ, "To the General Secretary o f the Central Committee o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union Comrade M.S. Gorbachev," in AbrtA.- /wAgenour f copier in yovzei and fori-iSbviei Rzorria, .Se/ecied Document;, leOerr and drdc/er, eds., Alexander Pika, Jens Dahl and Inge Larsen, (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 86, 1996), 47-51 ; See also, "Native Northern Peoples Eye Their Rights," DverAio, 12 July 1990, translated in 7%e Current Digertr^tAe Soviet frerr 42:29 (1990):20. ^ The authors noted several indigenous groups particularly in need of autonomous regions including the Nanai, Saami, Nivkh, Selkup, Even, Udege and Evenk. Sangi et oZ, 49. 71 diamonds at "any price" be stopped.'*^ Declaring their symbolic rights to the land as its "real owners" they argued that at such a pivotal point in time, when g/aynofr and had given the people a means to hght, the developers of the north must "mobilize the power of [their] soul" to save the natural regions and people of the north/^ Criticism and bold demands for change were not limited to the native mWAgenifza however. Russian ethnogr^hers and other social scientists were, at the same time, openly discussing the dismal results of their work amongst the northern natives for the first time aAer decades of academic censorship.'*^ Mounting concern over the fate of the numerically small peoples amongst Russian mieZ/zgentym culminated in a round table discussion panel of scholars, coined the 'Anxious North' group, held in Moscow 22°^ February 1989. Revealing the limits of afBrmative action and socialist development in the north, the Anxious North group argued for a strengthening of national autonomy through the establishment of an 'ofBcial' association representing the interests of Siberia's indigenous peoples.^ Moreover, they urged the state to Anally implement the provisions they had outlined in the CPSU decree "On Measures for the Future Economic and Social Development of the Regions Inhabited by "K rabochim geologicheskikh partii: k stroitel'yam ncfk —i gazoprovodov, shosseynykh, zhelezn^th dorog, poselkov i gorodov: k tmzhenikam leskhozov i lespromkhozov: k zoloto - i almazodobytchikam: k rechnikam, aviatoram: ko vsem tnidovym kollektivam, osvaivayushchim promyshlennyye rayony Seveia, Sibih i Dal'nego Vostoka," ["To workers o f geological Parties: to builders o f oil and gas pqxlines, railways, villages and towns: to toilers o f the forestry and tnnber industries: to gold and diamond miners: to river pilots and aviators: to all workers o f collectives developing the industrial regions o f the North, Siberia and the Far East,"] (March-April, 1989): 2:4-5. Ibid, 4-5. See the groundbreaking article by A. Pika and Boris Prokhorov, "Soviet Union: The Big Problems of SmaU Ethnic Grorqrs," Agw.$/eOer No. 57 (May 1989): 122-135, originally published in the popular Soviet journal Aomynwnw'r. ** "More Autonomy Bar North's Native Peoples," Awlmra, 11 February 1989, translated in Cw/Tenr Digest o f tAe ,5ovtet Press 41:14 (May 3, 1989): 8-9; "Anxious North Group," in Anxious AbrtA, 95103. 72 the Peoples of the North" (1980) and to uphold international standards for deahng with tribal populations/^ Under the banner of the realities of native life in the north extended beyond academic circles to the mainstream media through newspapers and journals including Æw/A/ra, Æv&yAm and In 'Tundra: How to Help the Peoples of the North Preserve their Ethnic Culture" published IS'^ June 1989 in JzvesAm, journalist L. Shinkaryov detailed how decades of progressive policy and heedless economic development had destroyed the native peoples of Siberia. Questioning why Soviet "equality" had not meant genuine equal rights for northern natives, Shinkaryov similarly argued for the creation of an indigenous association capable of mediating native-state relations and including the peoples of the north into "international political hfe."^^ By August 1989, the Khanty and Mansi would become the Erst indigenous groups in Siberia to realize this goal. 'Not bv Oil Alone': Khantv and Mansi Political Mobilization The publication of Khant activist Yeremei Aipin's election manifesto "Not by Oil Alone" in 8*^ January 1989 symbolized the entry of the Khanty and Mansi grievances and struggles into the political arena. Using his candidacy for the Congress of the The Soviet Union participated in the ILO talks but failed to ratify the convention. Olga Murashko, "Prospects oflLO Convention No. 169 concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries being ratiGed by the Russian Federation," AA/SZPA4 RULLE77N lOA (January 2004): 3-4. ^ Press coverage increased dramatically, see for example Irina Pykhteyeva, "Stepchildren o f the North: Numerically Small Peoples are not just dust in the wind," Pruvdu, 29 January 1992, 3, translated in Current D;geyro/'rAefosi-6'm';gtPr&rj:44:4 (February 1992): 31; L. Skopstov, "The End ofNorthem Silence," 20 March 1990, translated in Current Digest o f tAe S'ovtet Dress 42:12 (1990): 33; "More Autonomy for North's Native Peoples," 8-9; Oleg Sugney, "Press Coverage o f the Problems o f Russia's Arctic Numerically Small Peoples," in Tbwurdk a New AftffenMtum.' Ten F^rs o f tAe Jtuftgenous Afovement in Russia, eds., Thomas Kohler andKathrin Wessendoif^ (Copenhagen, IWGIA Document N o.l07, 2002), 130-138. Leonid Shinkaryov, 'Tundra: How to Help the Peoples o f the North Preserve their Ethnic Culture," ^ e stiia , 15 June 1989, translated in TAe Current Digest o f tAe Roviet Dress 41:24 (June 12, 1989):25; For other media exposes see also, "The Price of Yamal," DgonyoA 46, November, translated in TAe Current Digest tAe Roviet Dress 40:47 (1988): 23-24. 73 Peoples' Deputies as a vehicle for Khanty and Mansi activism, Aipin eloquently detailed how oil and gas extraction had severed the roots between the land and his people. Asking voters to consider what was more precious, "the future of a whole nation" or "a ton of oil produced at whatever cost" Aipin argued that the creation of reservations where the land and culture of native peoples could be preserved was the only possible solution.^^ Linking Khanty and Mansi cultural survival, and undoubtedly that of all indigenous Siberians, to the shifting political climate of the USSR under Grorbachev's reforms Aipin contended that: The future of my people, I think, depends on the future of perestroika. If perestroika goes on, my people wiU survive. Without perestroika, my people stand no chance. Quietly and unnoticed we'll quit this land under some new slogans boasting achievements and successes. This ^pphes not only to the Khants, but also to many other small nations of the north. The same fate is in store for them.^^ The future of the peoples of the north was called into question just six months later at the Samotlor Practicum, held 1-3"^ June 1989 at the site of one of Tyumen's largest oil reserves. Similar to the Anxious North meeting ofFebruary 1989, the Samotlor Practicum brought together various 'experts' and native mreZ/iggMrsia to discuss northern native issues and paths for future development. Three possible paths were discussed: the Srst being non­ interference, the second being the creation of native reservations and programs for socio­ cultural and economic revitalization, and the third path cultural assimilation.^ Not surprisingly, the majority of participants advocated for the second path of development and. Yeremei Aipin, "Not by Oil Alone," Moacow Aewf, 8 January 1989, 8-9. Aipin, "Not by Oil Alone," 8-9. ™Nikolai Vakhtin, "Native Peoples o f the Russian Far NorA," in fo /o r feop/er. uwf Development, ed. Minority Rights Groig) (London: Minority Rights Group, 1994) 77; Soviet nationalities theory suggested "natural assimilation" o f the numerically small peoples was a possible path hu development. Natural assimilation is the fusion o f closely related, territorial, tribal and other groups o f people into large nations and nationalities, widi the dissolving o f smaller minorities within larger and "more developed ethnos." "National Processes in the USSR - Results, Trends, and Problems," Ato/fu &SSR 6, November-December 1987, 50-120, translated in Current Digest o f tAe Soviet Prars 40:9 (30 March 1988): 11-15. 74 like the recommendations of the Anxious North group, the Samotlor Practicum argued native interests and issues would be best represented through a self-governing public association. In an attempt to transform the Samotlor Practicum's recommendations into action, a handful of female Khanty and Mansi national rebirth and survival. The association, organized an informal group focused on Twgrf, or the q/'Pwgra, emerged through their social network of family and hiends, including Valentina Salovar, Tatiana Moldanova, Ronalda Olzina, Agrafena Pesikova, Nadezhda Alekseyeva, and Tatiana Gogoleva among others.^^ As Ronalda Olzina remembered, the initial group of women was energetic, "young and educated" and "had ideas about what role we could play and how we could decide our fate."^^ The initial groiip members also had the political skills necessary to play a strong role. For example, Valentina Salovar was an academic-activist involved with the region's Ministry of Culture, Tatiana Moldanova was a prominent activist and ethnogr^her, Ronalda Olzina was an academic-activist, museum director, and journalist in the Okmg, and Tatiana Gogoleva was a member of the Komsomol (Young Communist League). Undated photocopy o f Tatiana Moldanova, "S Chevo Nacbinalas Assotgiatsiia 'Spasenie Yugii': K Istoni Dvizheniia,"["How the Association Spasenie Yugri Began: To the History o f the Movement,"] Abhhel [Crndk], no page number given (article in the possession of the author); Agrafena Pesikova, "Trebuempravo na 2kmliu, Trebuem Samoupravleniia Okruga," ["We Demand Right to Land, We Demand Right to SelfGovernment o f the Okrug,"] frovdh, 8 June 1989, 3; Balzer, 148-149. Olzina argued that women were better suited for this type o f political activism, not only because they tended to be more educated and more assertive than Khanty and Mansi men, but also because they had adapted better to the changing social structure brought about by development and non-indigenous migration to KMAO. Interview with Ronalda Olzina, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk. Similar arguments were also put forth by Valentina Salovar, %ho added that Æe assimilation o f native women had been much easier than for men, particularly because losing their land had also meant that men lost their way o f life. Interview with Valentina Salovar, 9"^ June 2003 in Khanty-Mansüsk. L. Leibzon, "Prezidentombudet Tanya," ["Tanya will be President,"] .ÿevemye PrortoTy 1 (January-February, 1990):7-8; Ronalda Olzina, "Na Puti K Vozrozdenii," ["On the Path to Rebirth,"] Provdo, 5 August 1989,2; Moldanova, no page number given; Balzer, Tenuczty EtAwiciO', 147153; Interview with Ronalda Olzina, 9 June 2003 in Hianty-Mansiisk; Interview with Valentina Salovar, 9"" June 2003 in Khanty-Mansüsk; Yeremei Aipin, for his part, was involved in the Writer's Union and at the time o f the publication of "Not by Oil Alone" (1989) was also a member o f the Bureau o f the Party (Committee o f the Area, deputy o f the Soviet of the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area. Aipin "Not by Oü Alone," 9. 75 Meeting infbnnally in both public and private spaces such as in their homes and in the region's ethnography museum, they began the process of political mobilization with preparations for a national assembly to be held 10^ August 1989 at the Okrug's House of Culture in the co ital of Khanty-Mansiisk. After securing support and hnancial backing for the assembly 6om regional CPSU functionaries and local organs of power, who viewed their movement as part and parcel of the cultural renewal taking under the association issued a series of pubhc announcements in both Russian and native newspapers. Reahzing that the time had come for them to elevate their status hom that of "second class citizens" to indigenous peoples with distinct rights, the association urged fellow Khanty and Mansi to join their inkrmal movement and "fight for their rights to hfe, culture, traditions, and selfdevelopment."^^ The hard work and passionate rhetoric of the initial group members paid off and the national assembly, which featured native representatives hom all over KMAO and other areas of Siberia, was by and large a success. The assembly concluded with the entry of iÿusenze Twgn into the ofBcial/fbrmal sphere of politics and the election of the young Mansi Tatiana Gogoleva as the association's hrst president.T he initial group, while only a handful of members, soon expanded to incorporate Khanty and Mansi hom six different districts in KMAO for a total of twenty-three department offices representing 27,000 people. ^Olzina, 2. Pesikova, 3; "Programma Assotsiatsii Spasenie Yngri," ["Program Spasenie Yugri,"] frowia, 20 June 1989, 6. Similar articles were published in the Khanty and Mansi languages prior to the assembly in Iwima j'grgws and fo n t Olzina, 2. ^ Leibzon, 7-8. According to the current president o f Spasenie Yugri Alexsandr Noviukhov, there is one Spasenie Yugri representative for every 200 Khanty and Mansi, Interview conducted with Alexander NoviuÛiov, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk; The six districts include: Berezovo, Khanty-Mansüsk, Konda, Oktyabryask, Surgut, and 76 eMze 5rst and most difScult task was the creation of a charter or manifesto outlining the legal status, goals, primary activities, organizational structure, and the rights and responsibilities of members necessary to transform fwgrz &om an informal group to a formal organization. As founding member Tatiana Moldanova recalled, it was a painful process not only because they lacked experience in constructing legal documents, but because it was difScult to express the humihation and devastation of their nation in such a document.^^ Moreover, as the first indigenous association in Siberia, Tugrf had no immediate socio-political organizations on which to model their association. Instead they may have looked to flourishing people's hunts in Latvia and Kazakhstan, as well as, international organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Conference for guidance. Despite these obstacles the association had by the 31^^ January 1990 issued a detailed programme outlining its position. Con&onted immediately by a number of disparate, pressings concerns from unemployment and alcoholism to environmental degradation of their lands, lugrz decided to concentrate first on one of the most important symbols of their traditional hvehhood and occupancy in KMAO: the revival and legal protection of ro&ivye wgoefzu or clan territories. The revival of roffovye wgWia, the ancestral clan lands of Khanty and Mansi recognized under the Speranskh Codes, involved the coming together of various Nizhnevartovsk. Yeremei Aipin, "I've Got My People Behind Me: Interview with Anatoly P. Kanrtaev," in Tbwordk a Aiew Mü/enniioM. 7 ^ Pieorr o f iAe ImAgenowr Movement, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendoif, (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107,2002), 94-102. ^ Moldanova, "S Chevo Nachinalas Assotsiatsiia Spasenie Yugri," no page number given. Interview conducted with Ronalda Olzina, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk. The current president of xSjoorenie Pwgn, a young Khanty male by the name o f Alexsandr Noviukhov who was only fourteen at the time o f die formation o f I^gn, has vehemently denied that diey looked to other informal groiqis such as the Latvian Front as role models. Interview conducted with Alexsandr Noviukhov, 9 June 2003 in KhantyMansiisk. However, an analysis o f primary documentary sources and secondary sources suggests that fugTi did indeed look to their neighbours and international organizations for guidance. See for exan^le Leibzon, 7-8. 77 professionals (lawyers, scientists etc.), local and regional bureaucrats, the oil and gas industry, and members of The wgoffm project, which utilized Khanty and Mansi traditional knowledge of clan boundaries, involved the mapping of settlements and hunting territories for each family and extended family and the identification of family members.^^ Joseph Sopochin, a pmminent Khant activist and former head of the Surgut district ofBce of Tugri, was pivotal to the wgWm m oping project. As a liaison to native communities for 5'wrgMiM^ga.;, Sopochin was all too aware of the problems experienced by natives as a result of oil and gas exploration and extraction. Believing that rWoyye Mgoffiu were one of the only means by which native territories and way of life could be preserved, and by which economic agreements with industry could be regulated, Sopochin began to mq) rocJovye ugodio territories in 1990.^ At the same time Gogoleva, Moldanova, Olzina, and others worked on formulating the draft legislation for rodovye wgof^m in KMAO. The move towards rodbyye wgocfm legislation was sparked, in part, by new opportunities for land tenure in the wake of Soviet coll^se in 1991, as well as by incentives under Yeltsin to expedite the transfer of lands for traditional hving.^^ The draft legislation advocated giving rights to the Khanty and Mansi, and even some non-indigenous residents of KMAO whose ancestors were engaged in traditional economies, symbolic ownership of the land for the purposes of carrying out traditional activities and livelihoods. The land, which was inheritable and transferred at no cost for the duration of the ^ "Vnachale budet Zakon: Tri Interviu ha Zadanmiiu Temu," ['Tirst we will have Legislation: Three interviews on that job,"] frogfOTy, (1997):11-12. Andrew Wiget and Olga Balalaeva, "National Communities, Native Land Tenure and Self-Determination among the Eastern Khanty," fo /o r 21:1 (1997): 23. ^^"UitilOstatsia," ["ToLeaveandtoStay,"]SgverMyefro.stofy 1:2(2003): 38-41. Gail Fondahl, et oZ. "Native 'Land Claims' Russian Style," 7%e CanudZuM Geographer 45:5 (2001): 545-561. 78 owner's lifetime, could be given to individuals, families, or Owners held the right to lease the land for industrial activities; however, development had to be regulated through economic agreements that stipulated length of time and compensation amounts for damages and they must be approved by the local administration.^^ Moreover, the legislation stated that land and resource use by rcxfoyye owners or industrial operators must be responsible, sustaiuable, and lawful. Although supported by regional organs of power, and by oil and gas companies eager to negotiate the required economic agreements as quickly as possible, roffoyye wgodio owners could assert their symbohc rights to land until such time as the draft legislation was passed.^ In addition to rodovyg wgoffia legislative initiatives, .ÿosgmze also focused on aspects of social and cultural renewal in its formative years between 1989 and 1990. Seeking to bridge the gap between younger and older generations, and undoubtedly between the rural and urban native population, fwgn organized events and conferences aimed at enhancing cultural awareness, communication, education, health, and participation.^^ The revival of symbolic rituals such as bear ceremonies, reindeer saciihce, and traditional sports ^ According to Article 12, owners do not have the right to sell or give away their rodovye wgodin, nor can they use it as collateral. Thus, their ownership is not the same as the fee singile private ownership system in the West. "Polozhenie O Statuse Rodovye Ugodii v Khanty-Mansiiskom Avtonomnom Okmge, 1992" ["Regulations on the Status o f Rodovye Ugodia in the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, 1992"] in ZakoModatefnzkA ; frovovzkA yfktov v 06/arh ZemfgzofzovaMzn Aorgnnym; MakcAWennymz Aorozfamz ; zkA j Wafrppokovate/mmz i fnrozfopoZzovate/imM: [Cbf/ecAom o fia w j nnzf RzgAk m OMkoW f/yg of Ahhve Awz// fgop/ar z^AonA omf Re/ofrons wztA f/mzfgrgroMMzf rarowcgf OMzf AoAzrof Rg^owrggy] (Khanty-Mansiisk: Committee for Questions o f Small Peoples o f the North, Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, 2001), 68-74; Obshchinas are essentially communes, for a more detailed description of obshchinas see, Gail Fondahl gt of., "Native 'Land Claims' Russian Style," 545-561. Ibid, 68-74, Articles 18-22. ^ The draft legislation was eventually passed in February 1992; 'Tolozhenie O Statuse Rodovye Ugodii v Khanty-Mansiiskom Avtonomnom Okmge, 1992" ["Regulations on the Status o f Rodovye Ugodia in the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okmg, 1992"], 68-74. Urtov ^urgmg 15-16 Marta 1991 g. (Osnovanie GAKMAO 418:17), 1-8; Yeremei Aipin, ''I've Got My People Behind Me: Interview with Anatoly P. Kaurtaev," in Tbwarzfs a Wgw MzffgMnwm.- Tgn fgoM o f tAg /ndiggMows RzgAts Afovgrngnt, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: IWGIA —Document No. 107), 95-96. 79 festivals and feasts was important to this process. The restoration of ritual life not only allowed the Khanty and Mansi to redeSne their relationship to the natural world, it emphasized the core symbols and traditions of their ancient culture that hgured prominently in their social and political mobilization. Much like the national revival programs of the early 1920s, concentrated on the promotion of national languages, folklore, cultural symbols, and the support of national The association supported the publication of Khanty and Mansi language books to be used in school curriculum, and sponsored the creation of ethnographic held schools or 'revival camps' where children could learn traditional trades hom Elders out on the tundra and t a i g a . iÿnsgnie Tugn also helped to establish new ethnogr^hic museums and archives throughout KMAO, as well as to organize film seminars and other cultural education events.^° The creation of fwgn, however, is only one of the chief manifestations of Khanty and Mansi symbolic political initiatives after 1985. Indeed, while Iwgn members often played a part in other symbolic initiatives, such as protests, the Khanty and Mansi movement extended beyond the creation of the association. Regional and Federal Level Movements The success of Hwgn's socio-cultural and legislative initiatives inspired the social and political mobilization of surrounding ethnic groups. Aided by the new law "On ^ For works on socio-cultural revival and survival see: E. Rnttkay-Miklian, "Revival and Survival in lugra," fapgrs 29:1 (2001): 164-168, and several works by anthropologist Marjorie M. Balzer "Rituals o f Gender Identity: Markers o f Siberian Khanty Ethnicity, Status and Belief" /(mencan yinrAropo/ogirt 83:4 (1981):850-67; Balzer, 'The Route to Eternity: Cultural Persistence and Change in Khanty Burial Ritual," 17 (1980): 77-90; Balzer, Tbnuczty ofEiA/HcrO', 8-12,173-202. ^ Interview with Ronalda Olzina, 9^^ June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk; Interview with Nadezhda Alekseyeva, 9* June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk; Interview with Valentina Salovar, 9* June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk; See also, Aipin, T've Got my People Behind Me," 94-102. ™Balzer, 8-15. 80 Public Associations" and the encouragement of the Goibachev regime, smaller regional-level native movements began to materialize across the Russian North/^ Uniting either the peoples of an entire region (republic, oblast, okrug or krai) or representing the interests of one ethnic group, the regional-level native rights movement flourished in those regions particularly hard-hit by industrial and resource development. To the north of the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, in the oil and gas rich region of the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the association yhTMaZ-PotomAwM [Thma/ ybr owr now called emerged in December of 1989.^^ Other indigenous associations quickly followed including the fteZ/Me/w ReWva/ Cowncz/ in Kamchatka, the tAe AbZa (1990), 5'ocietf 5"eZ (1989), the Regiona/ iS'ociety q/"EyAzmoj? (1990), and the Society q/"Ket Cw/twre (1990).^^ By the spring of 1990, the regional-level native rights movement had set the groundwork for a federal-level forum to discuss the situation of Siberia's indigenous peoples. On 30-3 March 1990 representatives 6om twenty-six indigenous Siberian nations, along with foreign observers &om the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Nordic Saami Council, and the International Working Group for Indigenous ASairs (IWGIA), convened at the Kremlin parliament buildings in Moscow for the First Congress of the Northern Numerous articles and manifestos at this time were calling for the peoples o f the north to unite. See, "More Autonomy for North's Native Peoples," 8-9; 'Northern Native Peoples Eye their Rights," 20-21; Pika and Prokhorov, "Soviet Union: The Big Problems of SmaU Ethnic Groups," 122-135; The law on public associations outlined their legal status, provided a formula for their activities, rights and responsibilities, as weU as, their involvement with the international community. "On Public Associations," 16 October 1990, 3, translated in Cu/rgMi Drgesr tAe &»vret frevf 42:43 (28 Noveihber 1990): 18-21. See www.raipon.net/vasavev Vakhtin, 'Native Peoples o f the Russian Far North," 71-72; Yuri Slezkine, retie Mirror. Russia and tAe Rma/i Pecp/es of tAe AbrtA (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994), 384, 378. 81 Indigenous Peoples/^ Comprised primarily of indigenous mfe/Zigenrfin, the congress delegates presented a seemingly endless number of testimonials on the historic problems and current challenges facing the peoples of the north. Funded entirely by the state/Party ^paratus, and attended by President Mikhail Grorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov, the congress led to the establishment of the ^4.;^ociniion of iAe f eopZa; tAe iVbrtA (APN), later renamed the fgqpZ&y of tAe AbrtA, &Aenn rAe For tAe (RAIPON).^^ With Nivkh writer and activist Vladimir Sangi at the helm, RAJPON issued a set of general provisions, modeled after those of and the Saami Council, that articulated their mandate, guidelines for membership, the respohsibihties of the executive body, legal status, and sources of hnancing.^^ Vowing to protect the interests and lawftd rights of aH indigenous northerners to land, natural resources, self-govemance, and socio­ economic development, RAIPON sought to integrate modem and traditional approaches'^ to indigenous development. Central to this program of development was the revival of early Soviet era administrative bodies called tribal soviets and Elder councils, along with the adoption of new forms of self-govemance or co-management outlined in international Groups not included in the ofGcial list o f "Small Peoples" at the time of the conference were allowed to send observers; thus they could speak for their nation but could not vote. "The 26 Small Peoples o f the Soviet North," in/ndzgenowsPeop/gs c^iAg^'ovzgtA'brtA, IWGIA Document No. 67 (Copenhagen: Inly 1990), 12-14. "Association of die Peoples o f the North," fzvgstzza, 1 April 1990, 1, translated in TAe Cw/rgni Digest tAe 6'ovzetPres.y 42:13 (1990): 34. Sangi participated in the Khanty and Mansi national assembly o f August 1989 when the organizational structure of iÿasenzg IVgrz was formalized. Olzina, "On the Path to Rebirth," 2. RAIPON Vice President for Legal Affairs Mikhail Todyshev also noted that they learned dom studying the experiences of indigenous peoples in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the USA, and Canada. Mikhail Todyshev, "Indigenous Peoples - Partnership in Operation," in Tbwarzb a TVgwMzT/gnzzzzzm.- Tg/z Fgzzrs o f tAg Tndzggzzozzs AfbvgzMgzzt zn Rzzsfzo, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf, (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107, 2002) 62-65; For a copy of RAIPON's statute see: "Statute o f the Association o f the Small Peoples of the Soviet North," in TWzggnozzs Peop/gj: o f tAe &vzgf AbriA, 47-52. Referred to in academic circles as a "neotraditionalist" approach. See Alexander Pika, ed., AgoZrzzdzZzowz/üzM zzz (Ag Pzzsazzzn AoriA.- TnzTzggrzozzf Pgopfgs oW zAg Lggocy qfPergsZrozAo (Edmonton: Canadian Circumpolar Institute, 1999). 82 conventions and supported by organs of power like the United Nations/^ Woiking in conjunction with regional-level native associations, international organizations, legal experts and Soviet federal bureaucrats, RAIPON began preparation of draft legislation "On the Legal Status of the Indigenous Numerically Small Peoples," "On Guarantees of Rights of Indigenous Peoples," and "On Territories of Traditional Nature Use."^^ In the brief period between their inception and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Tugn and RAIPON were able to achieve a number of important symbohc victories in their struggle for indigenous rights to land, resources, and self-determination. First, they were able to convey a symbohc unihed hront in which to articulate common goals and development plans with the state and with industry, despite their disparate needs and opinions. Second, the development of draft legislation at both the regional and federal level asserted their symbohc rights to land, resources, and a traditional way of hfe. Third, both organizations secured status as legitimate conduits between the state, industry, and the native population through their transformation ûom informal groups to ofhcial pubhc associations. Finally, both organizations were able to establish relationships with national and international indigenous organizations, including the Reindeer Herding Association, Finno-Ugrian Organization, the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), the Saami Council, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. For cxairg)le, ILO Convention No. 169. Nikolai Vakhtin, "Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Far North: Land Rights and die Environment," fo/u r 22:2 (1998): 92-95; See also V.M. Yetylen's speech at the First Congress "SelLgovemment among the Small Peoples o f the Nordi," in MirtA, 83-94. Olga Murashko, "Introduction," in Towards a New 20-30. ^ Nikita Kaplan, "RAIPON Today," in Tbwarzk a New AfzZ/eMMZwm. Ten leurr o f tAe TAdzgenowf Movement in eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document N o.107, 2002), 30-34; Interview with Alexsandr Noviukhov, 9 June 2003 in Khanty Mansiisk. 83 Despite their accomplishments, real changes were slow to come. Indeed, the use and abuse of resources continued unfettered across the north, while their claims to sovereignty and inalienable rights fell on deaf ears. As hustration mounted across the north, rural Khanty, Mansi, and Nenets villagers, and some members of decided to take to the road in protest. CAwTMon the Road of Discord Being a ''patient people" the Khanty and Mansi had put up with a great deal since the onset of resource development and industrialization in KMAO, hut as Khant writer Yeremei Aipin noted for all things "there is a hmit."^^ That limit was reached the October 1990 when the Khanty, Mansi and Nenets ofVaryegan erected a cAw/» [pronounced choom], a conical shr^ed traditional tent made of reindeer hides, on the bridge of a busy Siberian highway. The Khanty and Mansi's road of discord began with the death of Elder herder Teklyu Khalovich's last reindeer on the infamous "road of death" a stretch of road linking the city of Raduzhny and the Zapadny-Varyegan oil Selds that had been the site of numerous deaths, rapes, beatings, and robheries.^^ On 31^ July 1990, just two months prior to the blockade, Teklyu had sent a telegram to M.S. Gorbachev expressing anger over the death of his last reindeer. Disillusioned at having received no reply, and unsure of how to live his life without reindeer, Teklyu told his family and Mends he was going to the road to die.^^ Instead, Teklyu was joined on the road by other Mistrated Khanty, Mansi, and Nenets herders who had come "not to die, but to survive."^ Yeremei Aipin, "Chum on the Road o f Discord," ["Chum na doroge razdora,"] Moscow Aiews 41, 14 October 1990, 8-9. ^ Aipin, "Chum on the Road o f Discord," 8. Aipin, "Chum on the Road o f Discord," 8. ^ Aipin, "Chum on the Road o f Discord," 8. 84 Clothed in ornately embroidered traditional dress and carrying picket signs warning the "oil and gas monsters" to "keep their hands off Yamal," "stop the destroying of the graves of [their] ancestors," and "stop destroying [their] domestic reindeer," the natives of Varyegan shut down the bridge to tra@c for over five hours.^^ [Figure 3] Offering a warm Ere, tea, and Esh soup to the angry highway drivers, predominantly Russian oil and gas workers, the picketers described how decades of development and environmental degradaEon had leA them with "no place to go" and no way to hve.^ Sitting on the cold concrete bridge far removed Enm the tundra and taiga, the cAwm and the served as a powerful symbol of how their life and culture had been transformed and the means by which they were going to take it back. Following in the footsteps of the Elder Teklyu, and RAIPON members at the protest sent a joint telegram to President M.S. Gorbachev, and to the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Boris Yeltsin, outlining the events of the protest and demanding fundamental changes in the north. In addiEon to asking for the formal transfer of land and administraEve power to clan territones and clan councils, they reiterated demands for legally binding contracts regulating industrial enterprises and their relaEons with naEve communiEes. Failure to meet these demands, they argued, would result in the continued "block [of] aU work at oE and gas Eelds and timber-felling sites" [Figure 4].^^ While their symbolic protest succeeded in drawing aEenEon to their plight, and arguably to Nikolai Svarovskiy, "Piket," ["Picket,"] Proftory 39 (1991): 19-21. ^ Svarovskiy, 20-21; As Nenets historian Galina Haruchi has noted traditional hospitality is generally demonstrated in cAwms with participants treating each other to food, inviting strangers to share a meal, and meeting and getting acquainted with different nationalities. Galina Haruchi, "The Indigenous Intelligentsia," in Tbwordr a New MiZZenMium. Ten Tears o f zAe ZndZgenows AfdvemenZ in ZZassia, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf, (Copenhagen: IWGIA Docunent No. 107, 2002), 89-90. Aipin, "Chum on the Road o f Discord," 9. 85 that of other indigenous peoples hviug in the periphery, it was soon overshadowed by the political wrangling and instability unfolding in Moscow. Figure 3. Native protest at Varyegan, 6om 'Ticket," .ÿgvemye Trosfo/y 39 (March 1991) 18. 86 I l Copy: TELEGRAM . PRESJDEI^T OF THE USSR M. S. GORBACHFW THE KREMUN. MOSCOW _ \ CHA!RAL\N OF THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIFZr K YKL1%%N DURiNG THE YEARS OF DEVELOPfNü THE OIL MELDS 26 PERSONS FROM AMONG THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, INHABITANTS OF OUR RURAL SOVIET, HAVE DIED A VIOLENT DEATH ON ROADS AND NEAR THE DEPOSITS. HUNDREDS OF REINDEER HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, THOUSANDS OF SQUARE KILOMETRES OF REINDEER PASTURES. HUNTING AND FISHING GROUNDS, TENS OF SPAWNING RIVERS HAVE BEEN RUINED. IN PROTEST AGAINST THE RAPACIOUS DESTRUCTION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THEIR HOMELAND THE VARYEGAN BRANCH OF THE ASSOCIATION OF KHANTS AND NENETS CARRIED OUT PRELIMINARY PICKETING AND BROUGHT TRAFFIC TO A HALT FOR 5 HOURS ON OCTOBER I ON THE ROAD FROM THE CITY OF RADUZHNY TO THE ZAPADNY VARYEGAN OIL FIELD, THE SITE OF BARBAROUS KILLINGS OF DOMESTIC REINDEER BY MOTOR VEHICLES. WE DEMAND FIRST. TRANSFER THE LANDS OF OUR HISTORICAL IN 10 i t i f P K m - R T Ÿ O- AU: I N D I G K N U L 'S PFOPLF.S. SECOND, BUILD RELATIONS BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES AND CLAN COMMUNES ON A CONTRACTUAL FOOTING. THIRD, TRANSFER ALL POWER IN THE LOCALITIES TO THE CLAN COUNCILS BEINCPESTABLISHED. WE SUGGEST URGENTLY ADOPTING A PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ON SMALL PEOPLE) AND SETTING UP A SPONSOR AND COORDINATING GROUP OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH. IN THE EVENT OF CONTINUING THE PRACTICE OF RAPACIOUSLY AND BARBAROUSLY DESTROYING THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THEIR LANDS WE ARE RESOLVED TO BLOCK ALL WORK AT OIL AND G.AS FIELDS AND TIMBER. FELLING SITES. , ' THE INTERCLAN MEETING OF THE KHANTS AND NENETS BELONGING TO THE VARYEGAN BRANCH OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH. Figure 4. Translation of telegram to President Gorbachev, from Y. Aipin, "Chum on the Road of Discord," Mojccnv Aiew.; 14 October 1990, 8-9. 87 Soviet Collapse and the Troubles of Traoaitioru 1990-1996 By the fall of 1990, even Gorbachev was forced to admit that had not achieved its goals. Economic reforms had failed to create a viable market economy, ethnic conflict had reached "dangerous" levels, laws were being openly ignored, state institutions were discredited and genuine political pluralism had completely undermined attempts at Party-directed socialist plurahsm.^^ As the "three pillars" of the Soviet system - ideology, the CPSU, and a strong central state - began to crumble, herce opposition to Gorbachev's rule coalesced under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin.^^ A former party secretary in Sverdlovsk, Yeltsin was brought to Moscow by Gorbachev in the summer of 1985. Rising through the ranks of the CPSU to his post as First Secretary of Moscow, Yeltsin quickly gained a reputation as a political maverick for his controversial stance on reform. Party privileges, and corruption.^ Ousted hom this position in October 1987 after an impromptu speech attacking Gorbachev's 'cult of pemonahty' and the haphazard path of reform, Yeltsin made a stunning political comeback by winning a seat in the new USSR Congress ofPeople's Deputies in the elections of March 1989. Drawing on the popular support of the Soviet public, Yeltsin went on to win a seat in the RSFSR parliament and chairmanship of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1990. With Yeltsin at the helm, the RSFSR followed the lead of the breakaway Baltic Republics and issued a declaration of sovereignty 12^ June 1990.^^ ** "Report by M.S. Gorbachev, President o f the USSR," Provda, 17 November 1990, translated in Cwrrent Digavi tAe Sovietfre.M 42:46 (19 December 1990): 1-6. ^ Mike Bowker, "Introduction," in Rwaaio the CoM eds., Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 8. ^ Bowker, 8. "Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic," in 7%e Roviet tern in Cria», eds., Gail Lapidus and Alexander Dallin, 478-480. 88 AAer securing a strong ind^endent political base, Yeltsin continued to challenge Gorbachev's regime and the power of the Soviet center. Advocating a doctrine of sovereignty "&om the ground up" in which the lowest level of government delegates power to the next highest level and so on, Yeltsin urged the union republics and RSFSR regional elites to "take all the sovereignty you can swallow" and oppose centralized rule.^'' The 'parade of sovereignties' that followed, whereby ah levels of autonomies Aom okrugs and oblasts to union republics asserted their independence, did just that. Over forty declarations of sovereignty were made, twenty-four of which came Aom those autonomous units within the RSFSR including Yakutia, the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Okrug and Chukotka. The Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, for its part, did not join in the parade of sovereignties. Recognizing that its posiAon extended little beyond that of an "an internal colony" and "mere source of raw materials" for the Union, leaders within the KMAO Supreme Soviet chose not proceed with a declaration of independence.^ However, like many other autonomous regions, KMAO did move to strengthen its local power base through legislaAve inidatives and regional charters on land, resources, self-government and economic autonomy. This gradual devolution of power after 1990, Aom the center to the Siberian periphery, was facilitated in part by the Siberian Agreement. The agreement was established ^ JcAKahn, "What is die New Russian Federalism?" in ConiemporoTy Russian foiiiics, ed., Archie Brown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 377; Gail W. Lapidus and Edward W. Walker, "Nationalism, Regionalism and Federalism: Center-Peiiphery relations in Post-Communist Russia," in New Russia; jyouhW Tran^rmaAon, ed., Gail Lapidus (Boulder: Westview, 1995), 82-83. It is worth noting however that both Yeltsin and Gorbachev "courted" regional elites. Kahn, 377; "Nenets Republic Proclaimed," /hfesA'ia, 15 November 1990, 2, translated in CuTreni Digest q/"tAe 5bvzei Press 42:46 (19 December 1990):23; "Yakutia - Sovereignty within Russia," fh/esAia, 28 Septeniber 1990, 3, translated in 7%e Current Digest o f tAe Soviet Press 42:39 (31 October 1990):21; "Chukotka Becomes a Republic," 6vesA'ia, 1 October 1990,1, translated in TAe Current Digest o f tAe Soviet Press 42:39 (31 October 1990): 21. ^ From an interview with Valery Churilov, Chair o f the KMAO Regional Soviet and RSFSR Peoples Deputy published in "Why Khanty-Mansiisk Isn't Participating in the Parade o f Sovereignties," NvesAia, 22 November 1990, 2, translated in TAe Current Digest o f tAe Soviet Press 42:47 (26 December 1990): 23-24. 89 with the speciGc purpose of ensiirmg that reform in the resource rich regions of the Union would be adequately and fairly dealt with by the powers that be in the Soviet center.^^ In an ef&rt to restore order and mitigate center-periphery political struggles, Gorbachev proposed the creation of a new Union Treaty. Grounded in the notion of a strong center and strong republics, the Union Treaty promised to enhance republic sovereignty, while also building a strong civil society that recognized human rights and civil liberties.^ Although scheduled to be ratihed 20*^ August 1991, the Union Treaty did not satisfy the demands of the periphery and was even rejected by members of his own entourage who believed it would lead to the disintegration of the USSR. Acting to avert possible "chaos, anarchy and a ûatricidal civil war" members within Gorbachev's circle initiated a coup the day before the treaty was set to be ratihed.^ Falsely citing Gorbachev's ill health as a motive, the emergency state committee led by Vice-President G.l. Yanayev quickly suspended regional laws and political entities found to be at variance with the USSR constitution and legislation including newly founded pubhc associations and political parties. As a result of their haste, the emergency committee had no real plans for how to proceed. Unable to generate widespread support 6om the CPSU or the mihtary, the coup collapsed in just three days' time, thanks in part to Yeltsin's dramatic pubhc protest against ^ James Hughes, "Regionalism in Russia: The Rise and Fall o f the Siberian Agreement," Ewrppe-Aïiu .ÿfwdief 46:7 (1994):1133-1161. ^ "Searching for a Formula for a Union Treaty," 6 September 1990, 2, translated in Current Digger (VrAe 5'owetfrgrf 42:36 (10 October 1990): 1-3; "Report by M.S. Gorbachev, President o f the USSR, "46; "Draft Treaty on the Union o f Sovereign Republics," frnvda. 9 March 1991, 1-3, translated in Cwrrent Digger o f tAgS'ovietfrgïf (17 April 1991):10-13. ^ "Resolution No. 1 of the State Committee for the State o f Emergency in the USSR," frovdo, 20 August 1991, 1, translated in ZAo Current Digg$t o f tAe .Sovzet Presj: 43:33 (18 Sqztember 1991):2-5; "Statement by the Soviet Leadership," /yovdd No. 197,20 August 1991, 1, translated in TAe Current Digest o f tAe 6'ovietA'ess 43:33 (18 September 1991): 1-2. 90 the coup leaders.^^ Although Gorbachev was returned to power, the pohtical chmate had been fundamentally altered. He resigned as General-Secretary of the CPSU days later and by 25*^ December 1991, in the wake of the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), he grudgingly resigned as leader of the Soviet Union.^ With the resignation of Gorbachev and the demise of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation began a difhcult transition to democracy under Yeltsin. Without a rival power to contend with in Moscow, Yeltsin expanded his pohtical base to incorporate regional elites, radical democrats, hberals, popuhsts, neoconservatives and even some members of the old guard. Once his power was consolidated, Yeltsin introduced a pohcy of fiscal shock therapy designed to overthrow the last vestiges of the Soviet command economy. Spearheaded by Yeltsin's new Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, shock therapy demanded the hberalization of prices and foreign trade, radical cuts to state spending, privatization and a process of Gnancial stabilization through monetary and Gscal pohcies.^°^ Shock therapy had an immediate, devastating impact on the economy and social welfare of the entire nation. Industrial and agricultural production declined by half inflation skyrocketed, privatization spawned a new generation of ohgarchs, maha operations expanded and the average Russian citizen was stricken by p o v e rty .N o t surprisingly, by 1992 shock therapy had created widespread discontent by the pubhc and in Yeltsin's own parhament. In addition to these troubles, regional sovereignty confhcts threatened to further undermine his ^ Demonstradng his ability to manipulate political symbols and political settings, Yeltsin stood on a tank outside the Russian Parliament buildings denouncing the conspirators and inciting the crowd. ^ "The Party has Played itself Out," AverAm, 26 August 1991, 2, translated in Cwrreni Digest o f tAe .^ovzet fr e sj 43:35 (1991): 8-9; "The President o f the USSR Resigns," RosstüAoya Gozeto, 26 December 1991,1-2, translated in Cw/TentD;gea^to/'tAe.9ovtetfrers 43:52 (29 January 1992): 1-2. ''''' Lilia Shevtsova, fieZtstn Rzzssm. and Rea/tty (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), 17-20. Anthony Phillips, "The Political Economy o f Russia: Transition or Condition?" in Rwjsm X/ier tAe Cb/d IKbr, eds., Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 123-128. PhilEp^ 123-128. 91 regime. Indeed, his invitation to the regions to 'take as much sovereignty they could swallow' was proving to be problematic as more and more of the regions began to adopt constitutions, charters and legislation that directly challenged federal authority and Russian statehood. Yeltsin responded to regional sovereignty demands by pushing through a Federation Treaty, reminiscent of Gorbachev's ill-fated Union Treaty, in March of 1992 designed to secure internal borders and clarify center-periphery rights and responsibilities.T he large number of concessions made in the treaty negotiation process, however, only succeeded in exacerbating the asymmetry of the new federation to the beneGt of the resource rich donor regions. While the intense power struggle in the regions raged on, the executive and legislative branches fought their own war over the nature and direction ofYeltsin's reforms. Seeking an end to center-periphery strife and the resolution of parhamentary opposition, Yeltsin launched plans for a new constitution grounded in equalization of all of Russia's eighty-nine regions. The draft constitution, which was devoid of any reference to republic sovereignty or to special privileges guaranteed by the Federation Treaty, did not elicit overwhelming support in the regions or in the center. In fact, rising opposition forced Yeltsin to hastily For exangile, the Sakha Republic ratiGed a new consGtuGon in 1992 that stated its primacy over the laws of the federaGon. See Greg Poelzer, "DevoluGon, ConsGtuGonal development and the Russian North," f 36:4 (Apnl 1995): 204-212. The Geaty actually consisted of three separate agreements: the Grst signed by eighteen o f the republics on 13* March 1992, the second raGGed by the regional oblasts and krais later that week, and the third signed by the okrugs and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast the G)Uowing week. Cameron Ross, "Federalism and Regional PoliGcs," in Jfussnz tAe CoM fPor eds., Mike Bowker and Cameron Ross (Harlow: Longman, 2000), 87-89; Lapidus and Walker, 93-97; Kahn, 379-381. The division of powers between the center and the periphery were "purposeGdly ambiguous." Kahn, 374. For opinions Gom some of the republics see: Radik Batyshin, "The Provisions on Rq)ubhc Sovereignty is Stricken Gom die DraG ConsGtuGon," Guzeia, 23 October 1993,1, translated in Cwrreni Dzg&rt 45:43 (24 November 1993): 6-7; Vera Kutznetsova, "Yeltsin Closes down the Parade o f SovereignGes," Aezavirimaza GazeZtz, 4 November 1993, 1, translated in 7%g Czz?TeMtZ)zg6yt45:44 (1 December 1993):13-14; 92 dissolve parliament on 21^^ September 1993. Opponents reacted to Yeltsin's "democratic coup" by storming the White House and forming a provisional government under former Vice-president Alexander Rutskoi.'^^ Ironically, like the failed coup of 1991, the provisional government did not win widespread support and Yeltsin was able to crush his opponents through military force. Following his White House victory, Yeltsin pushed through his constitution and launched yet another parade. The "parade of treaties" saw the signing of over forty bilateral agreements between federal and regional executive elites beginning in 199^107 The events of 1993 appeared to confirm Yeltsin's victory over the opponents of reform; however, the next three years ofhis presidency pmved to be exceedingly difhcult. First, the reformists performed badly in the 1993 parhamentary elections and were unable to form a m^oiity in the new State Duma. While this did not jeopardize Yeltsin's power base, it did allow communist and pro-fascist parties to re-enter the post-Soviet pohtical scene. Second, Yeltsin's foreign pohcy - hom the war in Bosnia and Chechnya to NATO enlargement - led to a souring of relations with the West and a dechne in Yeltsin's popularity at home.^°^ Third, Yeltsin's bouts of drinking and depression became even more problematic and were compounded by two debihtating heart attacks in 1995, all of which compromised his ability to lead.^^° Finally, continued economic dechne in the 1990s contributed to nostalgia for the stabihty and relative prosperity of the Soviet period. These problems aside, Sergei Parkhomenko, "Quiet! They're Conferring on the Constitution Here - Well, Let Them go right Ahead," 26 October 1993, 1, translated in CwTTgntDig&rr 45:43 (24 November 1993): 7. Lapidus and Walker, 97-99. As scholar Jefhey Kahn has noted Yeltsin's new parade made "bilateralism, exceptionalism and hierarchy" the new norm and succeeded in creating a federal structure that was corrg)lex and "sometimes schizophrenic" in nature. Kahn, 379-380, 383. Bowker, 12-15 Bowker, 13-15; John B. Dunlop, "SiAing Through the Rubble o f the Yeltsin Years," f o f f osiComfMMMirm 47:1 (January/February 2000), 3-15. '^"Bowker, 12-15. 93 Yeltsin managed to win another term in the 1996 presidential election, in part because in spite of his flaws he was stül perceived as '% e best defender of democracy and reform in Russia."^ Devolution in the North For indigenous Siberians, the Srst few years of the Yeltsin regime were both promising and difficult. Although significant symbolic advances were made on the path towards securing indigenous rights, a number of Soviet 'legacies' continued to plague their success. First, the longstanding antagonistic and ambiguous nature of centre-periphery relations hindered the advancement of indigenous self-determination. In the Khanty-Mansiisk Autonomous Okrug, center-periphery struggles were also offset by power struggles with its 'host' region the Tyumen Oblast. Second, the transition to market-based economy had left the Khanty and Mansi, and other peoples of the north, in an unfavourable position. Fiscal shock therapy had not only drained them of the Gnancial and spiritual resources necessary for political and socio-economic survival; it also led to an increase in oil and gas exploration and extraction in KMAO to boost declining state revenues. New hope emerged however, with Yeltsin's edict "On Urgent Measures for Protecting the Places of Residence and Economic Activity of the Small Peoples of the North" dated 22 April 1992. Synthesizing and expanding on previous decrees regarding the juridical status of indigenous minorities, the April 1992 edict aimed to develop and preserve the traditional economic activities of indigenous peoples during the difhcult transition period. The edict Bowker, 15. Gary Wilson, "Matryoshka Federalism and the Case o f the Khanty-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug," foat17:2 (2001): 167-194. For a discussion on the ingiact o f democratic transition on the energy coiqplex see: Pauline Jones Luong, "The 'Use and Abuse' o f Russia's Energy Resources: Implications for State-Society Relations," in Rwi/dmg tAe RusaioM Riate. RwAtwAoMaZ Criîû owZ zAg gwayZTbr DemocraAc Govgmancg ed., Valerie Sperling (Boulder: Westview, 2000), 27-45. 94 delineated and regulated industrial activities and environmental standards in the north by requiring regional organs of power to work together with indigenous associations to deGne these territories, and to ensure that any non-traditional industrial activity on the territories be subject to indigenous consent and an ecological impact assessment/^'^ Yeltsin's 1992 decree was bolstered by the ratification of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in 1993, which saw the adoption of indigenous legal rights and interests at a federal level. Three separate articles dealt specifically with cultural and human rights: Articles 26 and 68 guaranteed the right of all peoples to use their native language and to create the conditions necessary for its study and development, while Article 19 guarantees their equal rights regardless of race, nationality, language, and residence. Article 69 of the constitution also recognized that the rights of the numerically small peoples must be in accordance with the principles and standards of international law and any international treaties to which the Russian Federation has been a p a rty .A rtic le 69 coincided with key international developments, most importantly the United Nations decision to proclaim 1993 as the International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples. Aimed at negotiating new partnerships between indigenous peoples and nation-states, the international year also sought to enhance resources available to indigenous peoples to support health. Edict o f the President o f the Russian Federation, "On Urgent Measures for the Protection o f Places of Residence and Economic Activity o f Numerically Small Peoples of the North," excerpt in Pika, Aieoiraddona/wm in iAe Rnssian AdriA, 185-186; V. A. Kryazhkov, "Land Rights o f the Small Peoples in Russian Federation Legislation," Fo/ar 20:2 (1996):89. "Constitution of the Russian Federation RatiSed 12 December 1993" [online] httn://www.fincju/fiDc/constit/ (accessed Noveihber 2004). The Russian Federation, although not a party to ILO No. 169, was a party to the U.N. Covenant o f Civil and Political Rights (1976) which upheld certain social and political rights including that all peoples have the right to self-determination and rights as ethnic minorities to eigoy their own culture (including traditional economic activities), language and rehgioiL Gail Osherenko, "Indigenous Rights in Russia: Is Title to Land Essential for Cultural Survival?" Georgetown fhtemohono/ Environment^/Low Review, 13:3 (Spring 2001): 695-732. 95 education and cultural p ro je c ts.E v e n with this initiative, serious violations of rights continued to occur in Siberia and around the world, prompting the United Nations to proclaim 1995-2004 as the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples.'^^ Discord Revisited The formal recognition of indigenous rights in the 1993 constitution, while signiGcant, did not quell native discontent in the regions. Instead, concern over ecological degradation, economic mismanagement and native discrimination fuelled another cAw/» protest on a bridge over the Tromyugan River in Nizhnevartovsk. Led by local Tromyugan River Khanty and Mansi, the May 1993 protest targeted the environmental practices of industrial giant jMrgwmq/izga; in the Russkinskaya reg io n .^ L ik e the 1990 roadblock in Varyegan, the protest garnered the support of a few oü and gas workers who also worried about the damage caused by oil drilling. The conflict ended with the promise of in&astructure development, including new apartments and a school, and Gnancial compensation for the community of Russkinskaya. However, as Balzer has noted, the development beneGted nonNaGve residents as much as naGve residents, and the new school, which turned out to be constructed with contaminated products, ended up being useless. By 25* June 1993, violence erupted again in Russkinskaya at the Fourth IntemaGonal Finno-Ugnc People's Folklore FesGval over the ntual sacnGce of seven reindeer. The Estonian Society ofUgnans reported that following the Khanty and Mansi symbolic sacnGce, the shamans responsible for the ntual were savagely beaten by "miliGa" and the 117 «"Ytg United Nations and Indigenous Peoples 6om 1969 to 1994," [online] httD://www.uit.no/ssweb/dok/senes/n02/en/102daes.htin (accessed February 2, 2004). John Synott, T h e World Indigenous Movement Shaping the 21"* Century," 19:2 (2000): 28-34. Information on this protest, and several other protests, was coUected by anthropologist Marjorie M. Balzer in a series of interviews with Yuri VeUa, Joseph Sopochin, members of and a select group of Russian academic-acüvists, most notably Olga Balalaeva. Balzer, Tenacity ofBtAniczty, 150-153. Ibid, 152-153. 96 ceremonial structure was destroyed/^' Russian academic and activist Olga Balalaeva remarked that the act was a threat and "a symbolic way to show the locals they must give up land to Regardless of the motive, it is clear that symbolism and ritual continued to play a prominent role in Native-State and/or native-non-native relations in postSoviet KMAO. The next cAw/n protest came just two years later in April 1995. Launched in reaction to the illegal auction of Khanty, Mansi, and Nenets land for oil and gas development, Nenets reindeer-herder and activist Yuri Vella (Aivaseda) set up a cAum outside the KhantyMansiisk parliament building that was reminiscent of the Saami parliament protest of 1 9 Y 123 9 months prior to the protest, Vella had appealed to the administration to cancel the land auctions in a letter published in the local newspaper, in a television interview, as well as in a telegram sent to head of the administration. Vella warned the administration that unless their current path, which threatened to break the Aagile chain of "land, reindeer moss, reindeer, reindeer herder [and] reindeer herder's grandson" was halted, they would be forced to "take extremes."^^ Having received no reply, Vella and fellow Khanty and Mansi An excerpt 6om the Estonian Society of Ugra's report can be found in Balzer, Tienocity qfEtAnieity, 153. From an interview with Olga Balalaeva in Balzer, Tenacity o f 153 Vella, a forest Nenets, is married to a Khant woman and lives in Varyegan. Balzer, Tenacity ofEtAMzczty, 237, 265-266. See also Robert Paine, "Ethnodrama and the Fourth World: The Saami Action Group in Norway, 1979-1981," in/ndzgenoua Peoples tAe Ndtion-SAzte. FburtA IPbrWPoAtic; in Canada, /fuLStroZia and Norway, ed., Noel Dyck, (St. John's, NFLD: Institute o f Social and Economic Research, 1985), 190-229. Natalia Novikova, 'Trom the CAuzn in the Central Square to the Court," in Towards a New MdZennzion, 188189; Vella initiated another symbolic strategy at the same time in which he syinbolically gifted a reindeer to Boris Yeltsin with the idea that Yeltsin, having received such a gift, would take the necessary steps to ensure the health and safety o f his reindeer. Natalia Novikova, "How is the Russian President's Reindeer Living," in Tndzgenows RzgAtï and TAonon TügAü, MntA TntemadonaZ Con/êrence on Hwndng and GatAerzng Soczedes, TnsAtzzte ofEtAnoZogy andvfnz"ArqpoZogy, EztrrZan dcadezny ofEozonoar, Afdrcow [online] http://www.abdn.ac.uk/chags9/lnovikova.htm (accessed Noveniber 2004); Vella has been pushed to extreme by oil and gas conqzanies on several occasions, see: "With an axe against Lukoil," [online] httD://www.rainon.net/enElish/librarv/ipw/number4/article8.html (accessed October 1,2003) and "Yuriy Ayvaseda's nomad camp besieged," [online] httD://www.nDolar.no/ansmra/enslish/Items/Awaseda.html (accessed September 24, 2003). 97 protesters 6om surrounding villages and &om took to the central square in protest. Drawing on a Nenets ritual of the cAwm as a grave, Vella placed an ef5gy, perso n if^g the KMAO administration, inside the cAw/Mwith warning signs announcing the "tentative diagnosis, oil plague?" and the "final diagnosis..." left for the area administration to decide. Vella argued that if the administration decided to cancel the land auctions, the protesters would consider the patient cured. If not, the patient would be considered dead and the chum's entrance would be turned to the 'dark side' and left in the square. Although the protest was only able to halt the auctions for a brief time, the symbolism inherent in the ritual act was far more important. Indeed, as ethnographer Nataha Novikova has suggested, the cAwm protest was less about trying to stop oil development all together, than about trying to "shape the political culture in forms close and familiar to them."^^^ Using a cAwm, a symbol of their ancient reindeer-herding culture, in pohtical protest actions enabled them to "protest not [just] in word, but in deed", thus expanding the boundaries of political inclusion and creating a new political culture. Savins Yusra? By the mid 1990s, the Khanty and Mansi movement and the association yhgn were showing signs of strain after several tumultuous years of restructuring, Soviet coU^se, economic dechne, and democratic transition. The Grst real indication of trouble was the nulUGcation ofKMAO's rodbyye wgocfm legislation in 1994 as part of the 'war of laws' that was being fought between the centre and periphery. The 'war of laws' was a direct result Novikova, Trom ihe CAwm in the Central Square to the Court" 188-189; Novikova, "How is the Russian President's Reindeer Living" 3-5 Novikova, "From the Chum in the Central Square," 189. Novikova, "From the Chum in the Central Square," 189; Novikova, "How is the President's Reindeer Living", 3-5. 98 of Yeltsin's 'parade of treaties' after 1993, which saw the signing of over forty bilateral agreements with varions regions and led to the proliferation of thousands of new regional laws and constitutional clauses dealing with land, resources, and other issues that directly contradicted the constitution and federal law.^^^ Yeltsin responded to the 'war of laws' by declaring all regional laws not in keeping with federal law or the constitution to be null and void. The loss of the rWovye wgoffzu legislation was, as founding member Nadezhda Alekseyeva recalled, a "very painful" time for Khanty and Mansi. However, new legislative initiatives were put forth after 1994, including a move towards oZzsAcAmu (communes) and territories of traditional nature use (TTP), all of which could incorporate rWcnyg ugoc/m lands. Joseph Sopochin, Khant activist and Surgut, came to see Tugn director in development as a better strategy, largely because they were self-governing bodies that would put the Khanty and Mansi in a more favourable position in which to negotiate with oil and gas com panies.A nticipating the new legislative trend, Sopochin learned everything he could about forming ohsAcAmu and Armed his own in the late 1990s called KhanA.^^^ Kahn, 370-383. Interview with Nadezhda Alekseyeva, founding member o f Spasenie Yugri and Deputy in the KMAO Duma, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk. New legislative initiatives were aided, in part, by public legal associations such as Ecojuris and Rodnik Legal Center. See: Galina Diachkova, "The Ecojuris Institute," ÆVSZPJM RwlkA» 8 (Decemher 2002):5-7 and Yuliya Yakel, "Rodnik Legal Center, a regional public organization," Ru/Jehn 10 (December 2003):18-19; Khant activist Joseph Sopochin led a movement towards obshchina after 1994. "Uiü 1 Ostatsia," ["To Leave and to Stay,"], 38-41. For details on the problems and prospects o f TTP legislation see: Olga Murashko, "Why is the Federal Law on Territories o f Traditional Nature Use not Working?" vfAS/PJM RwJfeZin 10a (January 2004): 8-10; Anatoli Raishev, "Establishment o f Territories o f Traditional Nature Use in the Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okmg: E:q)erience, Problems, Prospects," AAS/PJM Rw/Zeiz» 10a (January 2004): 10-13. "Uiti 1 Ostatsia," ["To Leave and to Stay,"] Revemye frosiozy 1:2 (2003): 38-41. Ibid, 38-41. Interview with Khant woman, 12 June 2003 in Lyantor, KMAO. 99 Legislative difSculties in the post-Soviet period were also compounded by numerous problems internal to the association First, although enze ^ Arst president Tatiana Gogoleva was popular amongst the Khanty and Mansi populaAon, she was known to conflict with RAIPON leaders on several occasions.Anthropologist Marjorie Balzer has also noted that having "a young, attractive, articulate woman" at the helm created "some controversy."^^^ Gogoleva stepped down in 1994, but aAer two years of contenAous leadership under former Khant CPSU functionary Valentin Molotkov, Gogoleva was re­ elected and remained in power unAl she was replaced by Alexsandr Noviukhov in 2001. Second, because ^ayezzze f^grz was only one of the many manifestations of Khanty and Mansi poliAcizaAon, its role in the community as a whole was not always ideal. Indeed, a noAceable divide emerged between the Khanty and Mansi community and j^pzMezzze f^grz elites in the years following the Soviet collapse. Part of this division is undoubtedly a consequence of the poor communication between »%%zfg7;ze Kxgrz elites who live and work in the ciAes, and the remote hunting, herding, and Ashing communiAes residing in the rural areas. Historian Aileen A. Espiritu noted this commuincaAon breakdown in her Aeldwork dating back to 1993, and indeed by 2003 several of the rural Khanty interviewed for this research remarked that they had never tried to contact, or been contacted by, 5)%zseMze Tzzgrz before, and in some cases, they did not even know what the associaAon was.^^^ Finally, the mulAtude of disparate social, cultural, economic, and environmental issues throughout the region limited the success of Khanty and Mansi pohtical mobihzaAon Interview with R. Olzina, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk. Balzer, TenaoZy 150; Many o f diose interviewed felt Tatiana Gogoleva was one o f the only reasons the association survived in its formative years. Interview with several Khanty women in Russkinskaya, Lyantor and Khanty-Mansiisk in June 2003. Espiritu, 178-180; Interviews conducted with Khanty in die villages o f Sytomina and Russkinskaya in June 2003. 100 and activities. Individual and community needs varied considerably across KMAO, making it dilBcult for native activists to tackle any one particular issue effectively. Moreover, financial shortfalls also hindered the success of the association, making it virtually impossible for Tugn to operate independent of government funding. Thus, by the onset of Boris Yeltsin's second term in ofhce in 1996 the sustainability of the Khanty and Mansi movement, and arguably that of other social movements, was being called into question. Although the Khanty and Mansi have clearly not been as successful as other indigenous peoples in the international arena at securing rights to land, resources, and selfdetermination, their symbolic political initiatives have achieved considerable success when compared to the level of representation, legislative status, and pohtical powerlessness of the past. First and foremost, they have survived as an organization despite the overwhelming social, pohtical, and economic upheavals of the post-communist democratic period that effectively dismantled other social movement groups.S econd, even with the nulhhcation of the legislation, Tugri and KMAO have led the way in the post- Soviet period in terms of estabhshing relatively "progressive" local and regional native rights legislation in areas such as language, territories of traditional nature use, and economic activities. Third, Twgri has put forth a number of economic agreements regulating For more on the limitations o f other social movement groups see Evans, 332-342. The challenges facing social movement groups are extensive. See, Ruth Mandel, "Seeding Civil Society," in /deuù, Afeo/ogfes, and FYucAcgy m Eurasia (Routledge: 2002) 279-296. "Sbomik Zakonov KMAO, Reguhryiushchikh Prava Korennykh Malochislennykh Narodov Severa, Prodiivauishchikh na Territoiii KMAO," ["Collection o f Laws KMAO Regulating Rights of the Native Small Peoples of the North Inhabiting the Territories o f KMAO,"], (Duma Khanty-Mansiiskovo Avtonomnovo Okiuga, Izdanie, 2001); O Realizatsü Zakona KMAO, "O Yazikakh Korennykh Malochislennykh Narodov Severa, Prozhivauishchikh na Territorii KMAO," [On Realization of the Laws o f KMAO "On Languages of Native Small Peoples Inhabiting Territories o f KMAO,"], (Duma Khanty-Mansiiskovo Avtonomnovo Okruga, Izdanie, 2003); "O Sokhranemhi Mest Traditsiormovov Prozhivanniya i Khozyaistvennoi Deyatelnosti Korennykh Malochislermykh Narodov Severa KMAO," [ "On Preservation o f the Places o f Traditional Living 101 industrial development on native land, a considerable feat given the enormous scale of oil and gas development in KMAO.^^^ Fourth, the Khanty and Mansi have secured representation in the KMAO Duma through the establishment of 6ve indigenous seats in parliament and, importantly, they are the only native group in the Russian Federation to achieve this level of representation/'*^ Finally, they have attracted valuable allies and promoted their cause by establishing links with organizations such as IWGIA and the Arctic Network for the Support of Indigenous Peoples of the Russian Arctic (ANSIPRA), as well as, through eflbrts to enhance their own media sources/'** Through these key achievements, among others, the Khanty and Mansi have attracted attention to their cause, increased their level of support, and improved their political representation in KMAO and in the Russian Federation. Thus, since the onset of reform in 1985, they Khanty and Mansi have undoubtedly succeeded in renegotiating their role in the Soviet and post-Soviet political landscape. and Economic Activities o f Native Small Peoples o f the North KMAO,"], (Duma Khanty-Mansiiskom Avtonomnom Okruga, Izdanie, 2002). See, Alexsandr Veselov, "Economic Agreements between Indigenous Communities and Industry in KhantyMansiyskiy Autonomous Okrug: A Legal Assessment," [online] http://www.raiDon.orE/enEli8h/librarv/inw/number4/article9.html (accessed 17 September 2003). Statue 37 of the Regulations o f KMAO No. 4-03 guarantees hvc native duma representatives. "Statya 37. Duma KMAO. Sostav i Poryadok ee Formirovannya," ["Statue 37 o f the KMAO Duma. Composition and Procedure of Formation,"] in "Sbomik Zakonov KMAO, Reguliryiushchykh Prava Korennykh Malochislennykh Narodov Severa, Prozhivauishchykh na Territorii KMAO," ["Collection o f Laws o f the KMAO, Regulation Rights o f the Native Small Peoples o f the North Living on the Territories of KMAO,"], (Duma Khanty-Mansiiskom Avtonomnom Okruga, Izdanie, 2001), 6-7; For information on indigenous participation in regional governing bodies see Sergey Haruchi, "Our Life and Future are in Our Hands," in Tbwordis' a /Vrnv Thn Fewj o f iAe VhdrggMonr RigAü Afbvemeni in Rztrfin, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107, 2002), 34-49; The Maori o f New Zealand have adopted a similar strategy in terms o f parliamentary representation, see Alan McRobie, "Ethnic Representation: The New Zealand Eqrerience," Siotar (1981): 2-14. ANSIPRA is a communications network linking Russian indigenous peoples' organizations with intemational organizations, httD://www.nDolar.no/ansiDra. See also "Ob Usilenii Roh Natsionalnykh SMI v Osveshchenii Politicheskikh i Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskikh Vosrosob Zhiznedeyatelnosti Obskikh Urgov," ["On Strengthening the Role o f National SMI (Sources o f Mass Information) in Providing Information on the Political and Socio-Economic Problems o f the Livelihood o f Ugrian People o f the Ob region"], (Duma KhantyMansiiskom Avtonomnom Okruga, Izdanie, 2003). 102 Conclusion: Whither Social Movements? As anthropologist Bruce Grant argued, indigenous peoples habitually rest "at the periphery of other people's social [and political] orders"^ The indigenous peoples of the Russian Far North and Siberia, physically and conceptually occupied this sphere throughout the Soviet period, deprived of m e aningful consultation and representation. However, with the advent of g/afMost a n d i n 1985, they were given an unprecedented opportunity to voice their discontent and grievances after nearly seven decades of Soviet repression and alienation. The Khanty and Mansi rose to the occasion, pioneering a native rights movement in the north and establishing the first native association in the Soviet Union in 1989 called My study concentrates on the origins of Khanty and Mansi political mobilization, and the methods they employed in their political struggles bom the Soviet 'rebirth' of 1985 to waning of the movement by 1996. As this thesis demonstrates, Khanty and Mansi political ferment is deeply rooted in their past and has been inspired, in part, by their experiences of Sovietization in the 1920s and 1930s and, in part, by the industrialization and degradation of their land and livelihoods since the 1960s. Moreover, their political mobilization has been played out at a symbolic level, with the Khanty and Mansi incorporating symbols of their culture into their activities and discourse, and interjecting these into the public political arena. While the Khanty and Mansi have clearly not been as successful as their indigenous counterparts in Western democratic nation-states at obtaining rights to land, resources, and self-determination, their symbolic political initiatives did bring their issues 6om out of the ' Bruce Grant, A (Ae 1995), 156. o f Cw/ture. X CenAoy offeraytroi&H (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 103 background to the fbre&ont of Soviet and post-Soviet politics enabling them to gain valuable support for their cause, and successfully renegotiated their place in the political landscape. In the daily struggle for economic survival in the post-Soviet world, political mobilization and activism have become a luxury and not a right. The sustainability of political movements and organizations, particularly those of the northern minorities, has been confounded by numerous factors including economic coUapse, privatization, environmental degradation, legislative stagnancy, internal divisions within movement groups and, since the ascendancy of President Vladimir Putin in 1999, the growth of pseudo-democratic totalitarianism.^ Although the "heady days of demands and manifestos" ^ characteristic of the joereftrofAu era has diminished since 1996, indigenous symbolic political activism persists and has continued to influence native-state relations in the north.'* For this reason, local-level associations and activists still provide the best possible representation and outlet for indigenous rights movements in the north. As the pioneers and "bearers of civil society"^ in the Russian Federation, Twgri, RAIPON, and other indigenous movement groups have created a lasting legacy that will hopefiilly be carried on by future generations.^ ^Winifred Dalhnann, "Russian Policies Put offlndigenous Peoples," ÆVS/PA4 11-12 (July-December 2004): 3-4. ^Piers Vitebsky, "The Northern Minorities," in JViationahYzea guesAon in (Ae Post-Soviet States, ed. Graham Smith, 94-112 (New York: Longman, 1996), 103. ^For exang)le see recent protests by the Nivkh people, "Indigenous People Protest Against Oil and Gas Projects," 7%e SAAAo/in /Ad^pemient 1:48,12 January 2005, [online] http:www.Sakhalinindependent.com (accessed January 19, 2005). ^Laura Henry, "Sponsored Democratization: Environmentalist as Bearers o f Civil Society in Russia," Paper presented at die 2001 Annual Meeting o f the American Political Science AssociadoiL (San Francisco, August 30-September 2,2001). ^Vladislav Peskov, "The Indigenous Youth Movement," in Tbwordk a Aew AfiiZgnnium. Zbn Tears o f tAe JAdigeoous Afovement in Russia, eds., Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf (Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107, 2002) 78-86; "Resolution o f the Intemational Youth Conference 'Indigenous Peoples of Russia's North: Their Present and Future' 14-17 February 2002, Moscow," [online] httn://www.rairx)n.net/enE]ish/librarv/iDw/uumber9 10/article4.html (accessed 18 February 2005). 104 Bibliography Unpublished Primary Sources All of the oral interviews, except one, were conducted by Aileen A. Espiritu and responses were translated to the author, Donna Atkinson, by Russian translator O. Isakova. The remaining interview was conducted by O. Isakova, and the responses also translated by O. Isakova to the author. The interview questions were entirely composed by the author, Donna Atkinson, and were ^proved by the UNBC Ethics Board as part of the author's ethics review. The author takes sole responsibihty for the interpretations of interview material. Interview with Olkhov, Nikolai. 6 June 2003, in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Glukhikh, Albina. 7 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Alekseyeva, Nadezhda, 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Merkyshina, Tatyana. 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Novuikhov, Alexsandr. 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Olzina, Ronalda. 9 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Salovar, Valentina. 9* June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Raishev, Anatoli. 10 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Timoshkov, Sergei. 10 June 2003 in Khanty-Mansiisk, KMAO. Interview with Khant woman. 12 June 2003 in Lyantor, KMAO. Interview with Khant man. 13 June 2003 in Russkinskaya, KMAO. Interview with Khant woman. 13 June 2003 in Russkinskaya, KMAO. Interview with two Khanty women. 13 June 2003 in Russkinskaya, KMAO. Interview with Khant woman. 15 June 2003 in Sytomina, KMAO. Interview with Khant man. 15 June 2003 in Sytomina, KMAO. Interview with Khant woman. 15 June 2003 in Sytomina, KMAO. Interview with Nenets woman. 15 June 2003 in Sytomina, KMAO. Interview with Cheikashin, Sergei. 16 June 2003 in Surgut, KMAO. 105 fugn 15-16 Marta 1991 g. Osnovanie GAKMAO 418:17, 1- 8 . Published Primary Sources Aipin, Yeremei. "I've Got My People Behind Me: Interview with Anatoly P. Kaurtaev.' In 2bwar(6 a Afz/ZeMMmm; Te» Pear.; q/"^Ae .Aif/fgemoo:; Movement, ed. Thomas Kohler and Kathrin Wessendorf^ 94-102. Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 107,2002. . "Chum on the Road of Discord." ["Chum na doroge razdora."] Aewf 41,14 October 1990, 8-9. . "Not by Oil Alone." Afb.;co}v Aewj, 8 January 1989, 8-9. Andreyeva, Nina. "I Cannot Forgo my Principles." In 7%e jbvzef m C w ff.-^4 ReofJer of IPey^erM aW 5'oviet Piew.;, ed. Alexander Dallin and Gail Lapidus, 338346. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991. "Anxious North Group." In^d/rnowa^ AbrtA.- TWigenowj PeqpZeg m S'ovzet and defected Doewme/it;, Zetfers^ and .drtzcZe;. eds. Alexsandr Pika, Jens Dahl, and Igno Larsen. 95-103. Copenhagen: IWGIA Document No. 82,1996. "Association of the Peoples of the North." Jzvaydm, 1 April 1990,1, translated in 7%e Cw/TgMf qf^Ae Jovier /Y&yf 42:13 (1990):34. Azarov, V. "Preserve and Multiply." Provdd, 2 September 1977, 3, translated in Cw/rewt Digest qf fAe Soviet f r a ; ; 29:35 (September 28, 1977):22. Baiduzhy, Andrei. "The End of the Century in Russia will be a time of Catastrophes." Aezovüimqya Gozeta, 7 July 1993, 6, translated in 7%e CwrreMt Dzgej^t qf tAe Po.;r-^ovzet Pr&yj: 45:27 (1993):17-18. Batyshin, Radik. "The Provisions on Repubhc Sovereignty is Stricken 6om the Draft Constitution." Aezovüi/Maio Gozeta, 23 October 1993,1, translated in CwrreMt Digegt 45:43 (24 November 1993):6-7. Bromlei, Yu. "National Processes in the USSR - Achievements and Problems." Pravda, 13 February 1987,2-3, translated in TAe Cwrrenr Dfgeri qfrAe fr&yf 39:7 (18 March 1987): 1-4. "Chukotka Becomes a Repubhc." Jzvgjfdm, 1 October 1990,1, translated in TAe Cwrrenr Dige^r qf rAe .Soviet fre^; 42:39 (31 October 1990):21. Constitution of the Russian Federation RatiGed 12 December 1993" [online] httn://www.Gnc.ru/Gpc/constit/ (accessed November 2004). 106 Cox, Bob. 'Talestiniaos Would Salute Native Struggle; Similarities Seen in Conflicts." Jbwma/, 4 August 1990, 3. Dalhnann, Win6ed. "Russian Policies Put off Indigenous Peoples," ÆVSZP7L4 12 (July-December 2004):3-4. 11- Dalhnann, Win&ed and Helle Goldman. "Indigenous - Native - Aboriginal: Confusion and Translation Problems." AASZPÆ4 9, (June 2003):4. "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia, 2 [ 15] November 1917." In A DocMPienru/y JTürory q/"CommwMZSM m From Zenm to Gor&zcAev. ed. Robert V. Daniels, 66-67. Hanover: University Press of New England, 1993. "Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federation Socialist Republic." In 7%e 6"ovier in Crüü.' A Ran/ers q/^ fPesiem nnff ^'oviei Fiews. eds. Gail Lapidus and Alexander DaHin, 478-480. Boulder: Westview, 1991. Edict of the President of the Russian Federation. "On Urgent Measures for the Protection of Places of Residence and Economic Activity of Numerically Small Peoples of the North." Excerpt in Aeoirof/iiona/ùm in iAe Fwssian AbriA." Jh(iigenoMS FeqpZes an