Environmental Degradation in the Russian North:
A Security Threat to Canada?

by
Natasja Treiberg

B.A. , Carleton University, 1996

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
m

POLITICAL SCIENCE

© Natasja Treiberg, 1997
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
December 1997

All rights reserved. This work may
not be reproduced in whole or part,
by photocopy or other means, without
the permission ofthe author.

LQBRARY

ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the expansion of the concept of security to include environmental threats.
Contrary to conventional opinion the expansion of security can take place not only in terms of
global security, but also national security. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis studies the
threat posed to Canada from environmental degradation in the Russian North. This study
includes not only an analysis of the threats that exist to Canada, but also an examination of the
Canadian governments' responses to these threats. The analysis demonstrates that in most cases
the Canadian government has failed to properly identify and properly address these environmental
threats and thus there is a need for a re-evaluation of the scope of national security.

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page Number
Abstract
Table of Contents
List ofFigures
Acknowledgements

I.

11

111
VI

Vll

1

Introduction

A Methodology
B. Overview of the Chapters

4
6

II. Chapter One: Redefining Security to Include the Environment

8

A Definition of Security
1.Types of Security
a) Traditional Security
b) Non-Traditional Security
c) A Middle Ground

8
9
9
11
13

B. Three Different Security Paradigms
1. National Security
2. International Security
3. Global Security
4. Differentiating Between the Paradigms

15
15
17
19
21

C. Environmental Security
1. Conceptual or Human Security Argument
2. Theoretical Security Argument
3. Normative or Ecological Security Argument
4. Political Argument
5.Arguments Against the Concept ofEnvironmental Security
a) Dissimilarities Between Military and
Environmental Threats

21
22
23
24
25
26
27

D . Can Environmental Threats be Included in the National
Security Agenda?
1. Arguments Against Using the Nation as the Security Focus
2. Globalist Perspective
3. Nationalist Perspective

31
32
34
36

E . Conclusion

37

111

III. Chapter Two : How Marine Pollution from Russia Poses a Security Threat
to the Canadian Arctic

38

A. Nuclear Waste
1. Movement ofPollution through Arctic Waters
2. The Extent of the Build-up ofNuclear Waste in Russia
a) Solid Waste
b) Dumping
c) Liquid Waste
d) Major Sources of Arctic Contamination From Southern
Russia
3. Security Threat to Canada

39
39
41
42
45
47

B. Nuclear Submarine Accidents
1. The K-19 Accident
2. Komsomolets Accident
3. Accidents During Decommissioning and Refueling
4. Security Threat to Canada
5. Effects ofRadioactive Contamination

52
53
54
56
58
58

C. Non-Nuclear Pollution and the Canadian Arctic: National or Global
Security Threat?
1. Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
2. Why are POPs Global and not National Security Threats?

59
60
61

D. Conclusion

61

IV. Chapter Three: How Atmospheric Pollution from Russia Poses a Security
Threat to the Canadian Arctic
A. Nuclear Contaminants
1. Nuclear Testing
~T~B~OM

b) Underground Testing
2. Effects ofNuclear Contamination
3. Nuclear Power Plants
a) Kola Plant
b) Bilibino Plant
4. Effects ofNuclear Contamination
B. Other Types of Atmospheric Pollution in the Arctic
1. Heavy Metals
2. Arctic Haze and Acidification
a)Kola Peninsula and Norilsk
3. Are Northern Russian Industries A Threat to Canada?
lV

49
52

64
64
66
71
72
75
75
78
81
82
83
83
84
85
87

C. Conclusion

89

V. Chapter Four: Actions Taken by the Canadian Government to Address the
Threat From Russian Pollution to the Canadian Arctic

91

A. Addressing Environmental Threats: A Cooperative Endeavour

91

B. What Has the Canadian Government Said About Environmental Threats
From Russia?
94
1. Environmental Concerns V s Environmental Threats
94
2. Global Vs National Security Threats
97
3. National Security: Finally Getting it Right
98
C. An Examination of the Canadian Response to Nuclear and Non-nuclear
Threats
98
1. Marine Pollution From Nuclear Waste
100
2. Marine Pollution From Nuclear Submarine Accidents
103
103
3. Marine Pollution From POPs
4. Atmospheric Pollution From Nuclear Testing
104
104
5. Atmospheric Pollution From Power Plant Accidents
106
6. Atmospheric Pollution From Heavy Metals and Acidification
D . Conclusion

106

VI. Conclusion

108

VII. Bibliography

112

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Page Number

Maps
Map 2.1 Arctic Ocean Currents

40

Map 2.2 Map ofBarents Sea Area

43

Map 2.3 Solid Radioactive Waste Dump Sites

46

Map 2.4 Liquid Radioactive Waste Dump Sites

48

Map 3 .1 Arctic Air Circulation

65

Map 3.2 Northern and Southern Nuclear Test Sites at Novaya Zemlya

70

Map 3.3 Direction ofRadioactive Fallout From Chernobyl

77

Page Number

Tables
Table 3.1 Nuclear Atmospheric Tests at Novaya Zemlya

68

Table 3.2 Nuclear Underground Tests at Novaya Zemlya

69

Table 3.3 List of Accidents from 1991 to 1994 at Kola Plant

79

Table 4.1 Bilateral Agreements Between Russia and Canada Pertaining to the
Environment

99

Vl

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
There are a number of people who I would like to thank for their support and contributions to this
thesis. First and foremost I need to thank my supervisor, Dr. Greg Poelzer, who not only spent
endless hours reading and revising my thesis, but offered great moral support as well. Thank you
for all of your help . In addition to Greg I would like to thank Dr. Gail Fondahl who also spent
numerous hours helping me refine my work and who was able to discuss some of the more
"geographical" aspects of this thesis with me.
Thanks must also go to the other members of my committee Dr. John Young and Aileen Espiritu
who were also instrumental in producing the final product. Thanks as well to Dr. Alex Michalos
for chairing the defence.
On a more personal note I need to thank Dave for his never ending patience and moral support.
Thanks for helping me get through it all and a special thanks for your help with the defence
presentation and waiting for the verdict with me. Thanks love.
I want to thank my Mom for impressing upon me the importance of an education. Thank you for
your love and support. I also want to thank the rest of my family AI, Natalie, Nicholas and Jason
for just being there for me and encouraging me. To my extended family June, Matt and Bruce
thanks for the words of encouragement and all your prayers. Thanks also to Morfar and Anders.
I have two sets of friends to thank those from UNBC and those from the U of A. First of all I
want to thank the UNBC crew Ian, Mel, Shona, Tomas and Meryl for their support. Also a
special thanks to Pam for giving me a place to stay during the defence. I also want to thank my
new friends at the U of A Kim, Miriam, Laura, Gabs, and Christine for listening to me complain
about my thesis work. A special thanks goes to Sandra for helping out with my maps.
Finally, this thesis is dedicated to my Mormor who taught me to appreciate the opportunity to
pursue my education - an opportunity which she was denied. Because I know that you could
have had your own M . A. thesis I want to dedicate this one to you. Thanks for your undying faith
and support.

Vll

INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has not only eased military tensions, it has also provided the opportunity
to re-evaluate the issue of what exactly constitutes a security threat. This re-evaluation has led to
an expansion of the concept of security to include non-military threats such as economic
instability, food scarcity, and overpopulation. One of the most important non-military threats that
is gaining increasing attention and acceptance from scholars is the threat posed from
environmental degradation. However, redefining security to include environmental degradation
continues to meet resistance by those who feel that security issues should deal strictly with
military issues. This thesis investigates the question of environmental degradation as a security
threat through an examination of the marine and air transport of pollution from Russia to Canada.
The thesis challenges the conventional view of security and adds to the growing literature which
argues that the concept of security should be expanded to include environmental threats. It also
departs from the usual focus of environmental security as global security to argue that some
environmental problems are threats to national security. Thus, the thesis makes two primary
contributions to the current literature on security. First, it contributes to the scholarship that
suggests environmental degradation can be a security threat. Second, it makes an original
contribution in the use of national security, rather than strictly global security, as a focus for
environmental threats.

Understanding that all environmental problems are not necessarily threats to security, and that
there are many environmental threats to national security is critical if policy makers are to address
environmental threats effectively. While policy makers give threats like ozone depletion and
global warming greater attention at the global level, they largely ignore more national threats such
as the buildup of nuclear contaminants in Northern Russia. By properly identifying certain
environmental threats at a national level, we can make sure that different levels of environmental
security threats are properly addressed.

1

In the past the nation-state was the center of international relations. More recently, a number
of scholars have challenged the validity of the nation-state approach to international politics in the
face of the increasing interdependence of states and globalization forces. With the creation of
nuclear weapons the concept of international security emerged and in some cases replaced the
importance of national security. Many scholars suggested that all states were connected and there
was a need for co-operation and international institutions to deal with international threats. More
recently the focus has turned to global security; some even suggest that a world order or
government will be the result of an increased interdependence between states. Peace movements
developed this concept of global security which embodies a program of global co-operation and
peace. Some scholars view threats as international or global in nature, and suggest that the
international system is moving away from anarchy towards a world or global government.

While an increased interdependence among states has occurred, states have always interacted
with each other. Moreover, claims of global governance are largely exaggerated. Anthony
Giddens notes:
It might be thought that what we see emerging here is an increasing movement
towards 'one world', in which the nation-state form is likely to become less and
less significant in the face of global patterns of organisation .. .The sovereignty of
the nation-state, I have suggested, does not precede the development of the
European state system, or the transferral of the nation-state system to a global
plane. State authorities did not hold large areas of sovereign power destined to
become increasingly confined by the growing network of international connections
and modes of interdependence. On the contrary, the development of the
sovereignty of the modern state from its beginnings depends upon a reflexively
monitored set of relations between states ... 'International relations' are not
connections set up between pre-established states, which could maintain their
sovereign power without them: they are the basis upon which the nation-state exists
at all. The period of the burgeoning of international organisations, including the
League ofNations and the UN, is not one of the growing transcendence of the
nation-state. It is one in which the universal scope of the nation-state was established. 1

1 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1987), 263-264.

2

There has always been an international system of relations among modern states; in fact, the
nation-state was an outcome of international relations. It does not follow that increased
interdependence inevitably leads to a global system or world government. Rather the
international and nation-state perspectives have always existed together: they are two sides of the
same com.

While the idea of a global government has yet to really be taken seriously, the concept of a
global threat has become fairly prominent in ecological security circles. In fact, most debates
concerning environmental threats focus on global threats which can only be dealt with at a global
level. The reason for this is, of course, the global nature of some threats, such as the depletion of
the ozone and climate change (also known as global warming). The problem, however, is that
there are some environmental threats which threaten only one or a few countries directly. These
threats are better served by addressing them at national or regional level. This thesis argues that
the possibility of a positive response to such problems is greater if they are addressed at a national
level. Some might point out that most threats affect more than just one country and, thus, should
be addressed by all affected states. States do not preclude this option by defining a particular
threat as a national security threat; rather, the identification of specific national security threats
may inform other countries of the threat and allow them to address the concern as well. After all,
viewing military threats as issues of national security never restrained a state from addressing it
with the help of other countries. At least when addressed at the national level some form of
action could be taken, and it is hoped that this action would be in co-operation with the other
affected countries.

This thesis uses the threat faced by Canada from the ecological degradation in the Russian
North as a case study in order to examine the utility of viewing environmental threats at a national
level. Now that Russia has become a more open society, we have more knowledge than ever
before about the extent of the ecological damage caused by the arms race and the attempt to win
the Cold War. Ironically most Western citizens viewed the weaponry as the greatest threat during

3

this period, when, an even greater threat may have come from the effort to produce this
weaponry. The fact is that no Canadian has ever died from a nuclear bomb detonated by the
Soviets on Canadian soil; however, the waste and pollution created by the Soviet military
industrial complex has effected and will continue to effect Northern Canadians, as Chapters Two
and Three demonstrate. This thesis argues that the build-up of nuclear waste, aging nuclear
submarines, past nuclear tests and aging nuclear power plants in the Russian Arctic pose a direct
threat to the northern population of Canada as well as the whole of the Canadian population.

METHODOLOGY
To investigate the question of environmental degradation as a national security threat this thesis
uses the case study method and the public policy approach. The empirical case for the study is
the security threat that pollution in the Russian North poses to Canada. I chose this case study
because of the extent and degree of environmental degradation that exists in the Russian North.
More specifically, the nuclear contamination that has taken place in Russia is incomparable to
other areas. It is also a more regional type of threat. Furthermore, one can make a strong case
concerning the threat posed to Canada due to the extent of this contamination and the possibilities
that exist for transport in the Arctic. For this reason, if the case cannot be made here that
environmental degradation can pose a national security threat then, it probably cannot be made at
all.

The case study is a crucial-case study and more specifically a most-likely case study in terms
of Harry Eckstein's seminal classification of case studies.2 While the concept of the most-likely
case is usually used to invalidate theories, this thesis uses a variation of this case study in order to
help validate an expansion ofthe concept of security. The study uses the most-likely case to see if
the case can help confirm an expansion of the security concept. Confirmation does not mean that
2 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political

Science, vol. 7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley,
1975), 113-123 .

4

the expansion is automatically validated by the case; rather if this case fits then further cases can
be tested as well. However, if this case failed to confirm the expansion then there would be little
utility in pursuing the expansion of the concept of security (in the terms presented in this thesis)
further. By using a most-likely case study the failure to confirm a theory begins to invalidates it,
because if the most-likely case does not work than less-likely cases will probably not work either.

The case study investigates two propositions: (1) that environmental degradation can be a
security threat; (2) that environmental degradation can be not only a global security threat but
also a national security threat. The thesis uses the following criteria to make the distinction
between global and national environmental threats as well as to assess whether or not a national
security threat exists:
1. In order to be a national security threat an environmental problem must drastically
threaten the welfare of a nation.
2. A national security threat has sources from one or few states.
3. In order to be a national security threat the more extreme effects of the threat should
only threaten a single country or several countries of a region.

The first criterion establishes whether or not a security threat exists by determining whether the
welfare of a state is threatened. The use of the term welfare in this case is defined in terms of the
health of the population. If contamination leads to a substantial lowering of life expectancy or in
increased mortality and morbidity rates than this would be an attack on the welfare of the state.
The last two criteria distinguish national from global security threats. Global warming, for
example, is not a national security threat on the basis that it has multiple sources and affects all
states in the world.

Although this is not a normative theory driven thesis, normative concerns clearly underlie this
endeavour. The thesis considers environmental degradation and pollution as detrimental problems
in the world which need to be addressed. Furthermore, the Canadian government needs to

5

address these threats at a specific level if it is to effectively address environmental security
questions.

OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS
The main objective of the first chapter is to make the case for the inclusion of environmental
problems not only into the global security agenda, but also national security agendas. The first
section of the chapter examines the concept of security, including the debate between traditional
and non-traditional types of security. Then the chapter examines the different paradigms used in
international relations and security studies. The case is then made for the inclusion of
environmental issues into the security agenda. The last main section focuses on the debate
between globalists and nationalists with respect to environmental security. This section makes the
case for viewing environmental threats as national security threats as well as global threats.

The second chapter examines the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic from marine pollution in
Russia. It starts with an examination of the buildup of nuclear waste and then proceeds to a
discussion of nuclear submarine accidents. In addition to these sources of nuclear contamination,
the chapter also addresses the issue of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). The chapter suggests
that the possible nuclear contamination poses a security threat to Canada. On the other hand, the
chapter suggests that POPs are a global concern that states should address through global
cooperation.

Chapter Three examines the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic from atmospheric pollution
emanating from Russia. The first section of the chapter discusses nuclear bomb tests and the
threat they still pose. This is followed by an examination of the threat posed by aging nuclear
power plants in Russia. In addition to the threat posed by these problems, the chapter examines
the problem of arctic haze and acidification for the possible threat they may pose.

6

The responses made by the Canadian government towards the problems discussed in Chapters
Two and Three are the focus of the fourth chapter. The first part of the chapter examines the new
opportunity for cooperation with Russia that exists due to the end of the Cold War. Subsequently
there is an examination of Canadian policy statements with respect to the identification of
environmental threats to the Canadian Arctic. This is followed by an evaluation of the Canadian
government's actual policies and actions with respect to the threats discussed in Chapters Two
and Three.

7

CHAPTER ONE
The extraordinary international changes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union have led
not only to the end of the Cold War, but also to the opportunity to reassess the concept of
security. In the past the concept of security was applied to military threats to a state. This has
changed substantially since the end of the Cold War; in fact, an increasing number of scholars and
practitioners use the term security to encompass much more than just military security, and are
extending its use to such areas as the environment, population growth and poverty. The
expansion of the definition of security is gaining wider acceptance as concerns such as global
warming receive greater attention from governments and the general public. However, the
acceptance of the expansion of the notion of security is far from universal. As part of the debate
the thesis examines the utility of broadening the concept of security to include environmental
issues. This chapter begins by defining the concept of security in general, and then proceeds to
examine the different paradigms that are used in relation to this concept. The chapter then deals
specifically with arguments in favour of broadening the concept of security to include
environmental threats. The final section considers the arguments for viewing environmental
degradation as a national security threat.

DEFINITION OF SECURITY

One of the main limitations of the debate surrounding the concept of security is that a general
agreeable definition of security has been difficult to find . Marc A. Levy, suggests that the
literature has "... failed to offer definitions [of security] at all, or has offered plainly self-serving
and closed-minded ones ... ," and then he goes on to say that "ifthere is to be any serious
consideration of environmental threats by the security studies and security policy communities, we
need more thoughtful consideration of how to define the potential common ground. "3 Buzan

3 Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security 20, no.2

(Falll995): 37.

8

takes these comments a bit further by suggesting that not only is it difficult to find a simple
definition for security but that " ... the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed general
definition."4 While Levy's and Buzan's observations are not fully misplaced, a number of scholars
have attempted to produce an agreed upon definition of security. The problem in finding an
agreed upon definition reflects the different ideological camps that exist within international
politics. Many realists, for example, would offer a much more limited view of security than
liberalists and idealists. While acknowledging the difficulty in arriving at an agreed upon general
definition this chapter will examine recent definitions of security and then endeavour to offer a
working definition of security.

Types of Security
There are two main views of security: traditional and non-traditional. Traditional security focuses
on military security, while non-traditional security focuses on a broadened notion of security
which includes non-military sources. The traditional view of security was more prominent during
the Cold War; non-traditional security concerns have gained greater attention more recently.

Traditional Security
The traditional view of security was based on realism which focused on the nation-state and
power struggles between states as the driving force in international relations. Realism sees the
sovereign state as the primary unit of analysis and focuses almost exclusively on external military
threats to the state. As Harriet Critchley and Terry Terriffnote the traditional goal of national
security is "the protection of the territorial and political integrity of the state and its national
interests. "5 Accordingly, the main focus of national security programs is to protect the nation

4 Barry Buzan, People States & Fear (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 16.

Other
authors who also suggest that this is problem are: James DerDerian, "The Value of Security:
Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 28; Ronnie D . Lipschutz, "On Security," in On
Security, edited by Ronnie D . Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 7.
5 W . Harriet Critchley and Terry Terriff, "Environment and Security," in Security Studies for the

9

from external military threats. This concept of security gained greater prominence during the
Cold War and according to Gareth Porter it was viewed as "a function of the successful pursuit of
interstate power competition. n6 Within the pursuit of power "... states threaten each other,
challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their
independence and so on."7 Thus, scholars and policy makers saw military threats as the only real
threats to security.

The traditional view has received many challenges over the past two decades as scholars
endeavour to redefine the notion of security, in order to address new types of threats. New
challenges to the traditional concept of security are not limited, however, to redefining security.
They also included the critique that within the view of traditional security sources that were not
directly military were also addressed. For example Nathan Ruff, Robert Chamerlain and
Alexandra Cousteau suggest that "consideration of the natural environment and security together
is certainly not a new phenomenon. Natural resources and strategic minerals have long been
considered vital to a nation's security, and well within the realm of military attention."8 It is still
evident that national security was focused on military threats, but that if an issue had an effect on
military security, for example having access to uranium deposits, then that issue could also be
considered as part of national security.

1990s, Richard Shultz, et. al. eds. (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 327.
6 Gareth Porter, "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," Current History 94, no .

592 (May 1995): 218 .

7 Ole. Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, edited by Ronnie D.

Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 50.

8 Nathan Ruff, Robert Chamerlain and Alexandra Cousteau, "Reports on Applying Military and

Security Assets to Environmental Problems," Environmental Change and Security Project Report
no. 3 (Spring 1997): 82. See also : Eileen Claussen, "Environment and Security: The Challenge of
Integration," Environmental Change and Security Project no. 1 (Spring 1995): 42.

10

On at least on one occasion public pressure forced the American government to look beyond
military security to environmental security.9 This occasion was the limited nuclear test ban treaty
signed by the United States in 1963 . Franklyn Griffiths suggests that the treaty was actually the
first major act of the United States which could be termed environmental security. He argues that
the treaty was a response to public discontent with nuclear fallout and its possible health effects
from nuclear testing. 10 Nevertheless, for the most part traditional security was solely concerned
with military issues and it was seldom that other issues were viewed in the security context. For
example, while Griffiths suggests that the limited nuclear test ban treaty was an act of
environmental security, it is doubtful that in 1963 the term or even idea of environmental security
was used as a tool for signing the treaty. One can only debate the traditional concept of security
to a certain extent; the fact remains that the main focus of traditional security was the military
sector.

Non-traditional Security
Whereas traditional security tended to focus on military threats to security, more recent nontraditional security examines the utility of redefining the scope of security to specifically include
other types of non-military threats that are not even related to the military sector. Recent
attempts to redefine security are much more controversial and include several different
perspectives. In particular the emphasis in some of these new definitions has moved away from
the state to the individual. The more recent concept of security is based on the notion of "wellbeing." For example the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CliPS) defines
the security of a state as the ability "to be safe from threats to the well-being of one's state or
country. "1 1 The idea of "well-being" has become a popular term among environmental security

9 I use an American example here because for the most part security debates have been directed

by the United States.

°

1 Franklyn Griffiths, "Environment in the Security Debate: The Case of the Missing Arctic

Waters," Environmental Change and Security Project Report no . 3 (Spring 1997): 16.

11 Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, "Security: Canada and the Arctic,"

11

scholars. One of the main proponents of the concept of well-being is Norman Myers. Myers
believes that:
... security applies most at the level of the citizen. It amounts to human wellbeing: not only protection from harm and injury but access to water, food,
shelter, health, employment, and other basic requisites that are the due of every
person on Earth. It is the collectivity of these citizen needs - overall safety and
quality oflife- that should figure prominently in the nation's view ofsecurity. 12
For those who support the well-being concept, the issue of security is directed towards
individuals in society rather than states. Myers is not the only supporter of this view of security.
According to Pierre Pettigrew, one of the Co-Chairs of the National Forum on Canada's
International Relations, the top priority of Canadian foreign policy is "human security."13 The
concept of human security includes problems such as population growth, human rights, and many
argue environmental degradation.

Because the view of human security includes many different problems and issues, this new
approach to security is too broad in scope and now includes everything that could possibly pose a
problem for any individual in society. The result is that this approach makes it difficult to
distinguish between real threats to security and more general problems affecting men and women.
Waever suggests that the problem with such a broad definition is:
... deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a
synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable. How, then, can we
get any clear sense of the specific character of security issues, as distinct from
other problems that beset the human condition ... the individual has various needs
and can be hurt by threats to these needs, and this makes everything a potential

CliPS Factsheet no. 7 (March 1989): 1. Will be referred to as CliPS from here on.
12 Norman Myers, "Environmental Security: How it Works," in Ultimate Security (New York:

W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 31.

13 Canada. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons

Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the
Future (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, November 1994), 11.

12

security problem ... widening the term has the unfortunate effect of expanding the
security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda. 14
For authors such as Waever it is the survival of the sovereign state that is the only real security
issue. For them the protection of the state as a political unit has to be maintained in order for
other issues, such as the environment and the economy, to be addressed at all . 15 Thus, according
to Waever and other authors who challenge the broadening of the scope of the concept of
security, even if half of the population of a particular state were killed by an environmental
catastrophe this problem would not have constituted a threat if it did not threaten the "sovereignty
or independence of a state .... "16

Other authors, such as Kenneth Keller, also feel that the definition of security has become too
broad, but suggest that there is room for a reformulation of the concept as opposed to an
expansion of the term. According to Keller it would be more beneficial to simply identify
"... those environmental threats that may lead to traditional security problems and those that can be
responded to most effectively by military organizations."17 In either case, these two views have a
rather narrow concept of security studies and still focus on military threats. The fact is that there
are serious environmental threats which should be addressed for their own security implications,
rather than just their effect on military security.

A New Middle Ground
While authors such as Waever and Keller seek to limit the definition of security too much, others
like Myers expand the concept beyond any usefulness. In the case ofWaever and Keller their

14 Waever, 47-48.
15 Ibid., 53 .

16 Ibid.
17 Kenneth H. Keller, "Unpackaging the Environment," Environmental Change and Security

Project Report no . 3 (Spring 1997): 5.

13

limitations on the definition of security mean that only military threats can be taken into
consideration. Myers, on the other hand, expands the definition so much that almost any problem
or issue could be termed a security threat. This thesis suggests a middle ground between the two
positions that allows for new types of threats to be considered, while at the same time limiting the
use of the term so that the term security remains meaningful. One author whose definition of
security seems to achieve this goal is Jack Goldstone. He suggests that a national security issue is
any trend or event that:

(1) threatens the very survival ofthe nation; and/or
(2) threatens to drastically reduce the welfare of the nation in a fashion
that requires a centrall1 co-ordinated national mobilization of resources
to mitigate or reverse. 8
Goldstone's definition is broader because it includes the notion of the 'welfare' of the nation, yet at
the same time limits the use of the security concept to accommodate dire threats. He notes that
"while this seems common sense, it is clear from this definition that not any threat or diminution
of welfare constitutes a national security threat; what does constitute such a threat is a matter of
perception, judgment, and degree- and in a democracy, a legitimate subject for national
debate."19 In a democracy like Canada, for example, one would be able to argue that an issue (be
it military, environmental, economic, etc.) should be seen as a national security threat. If all issues
are "subject for national debate" then all issues have a fair chance ofbeing heard. Hopefully only
issues whose case could be proven to be urgent and extreme would be considered security threats.
At the same time, in contrast to Myers it is the welfare of the state and/or its population as a
whole that is considered. This definition does not omit environmental and other non-traditional
threats from the security realm. Rather, it allows for serious threats -- traditional or nontraditional -- to be addressed as security issues.

18 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Marc Levy, Gareth Porter, and Jack Goldstone, "Environmental

Scarcity and Violent Conflict: A Debate," Environmental Change and Security Project Report
no . 2 (Spring 1996): 66.
19 Ibid.

14

THREE DIFFERENT SECURITY PARADIGMS
One problem surrounding the concept of security is establishing an agreed upon general definition
of security. A second problem stems from the different paradigms used to approach security.
The second problem is related to the issue of defining security threats as national, international or
global. The main supporters, of an expanded definition of security are globalists who feel that
environmental problems are global security threats and thus can only be addressed adequately on
a global level. This thesis contends that environmental threats can also be considered as national
and/ or international security threats, and that some are actually dealt with more effectively at the
national level. 20 However, before the debate over national security can unfold it is necessary to
briefly explain the underlying assumptions of the three different paradigms.

National Security
The concept of national security has been the most prominent paradigm to emerge in the security
realm and is the basis for the traditional security view. According to Helga Haftendom the
concept of national security essentially emerged with the creation of nation-states in the
seventeenth century. It was during this time that Haftendom suggests that the idea of national
survival became pervasive.21 In this period the driving force behind national security was one of
territorial and political survival. In the 1940s, according to Haftendorn, the concept of national
security began to give way to the idea of international security as two new elements were added
to the view of national security. These two elements were the a renunciation offeree and a

20 Richard Shultz, et. al., "Introduction," in Security Studies for the 1990s, Richard Shultz, et. al.

(Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 1. The concept of regional security is also present but is really a
sub-category of international security. It is suggested by Helga Haftendom that each concept of
security corresponds to different theoretical and political assumptions and is linked to the
evolution of the international state system from the formation of nation-states to the modem state
system. Helga Haftendom, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in
International Security," International Studies Quarterly vol.35, no.1 (March1991) : 5.
21 Ibid

15

respect for human rights.22 In other words there was a more peaceful outlook and a step away
from military might, which helped foster the growth of international security as a paradigm.

Under national security the primary concern is for the survival of a particular state. This is
akin to the ideology of realism which views nations as the main political actors in the system.
Realism stresses the importance of sovereignty, the inevitability of crises and the dominance of
power in the pursuit of self-interest. 23 Essential to the realist paradigm is that politics is about
power, and only military strength can guarantee security. Barry Buzan suggests that from the
realist perspective the way to attain security is for a state to acquire "enough power to reach a
dominating position ... " in the world.24 As can be seen from these comments realism is primarily
focused on power politics between nation-states. Realists view national security in terms of
survival and thus, the acquisition of military power is essential. Under realism the focus of
national security is military security.

While theories about interdependence and globalization abound, realists argue that the nationstate is still the most powerful and prominent unit in the international setting. The fact that
nation-states are still the primary avenue for dealing with security issues is demonstrated by the
fact that most attempts at collective security arrangements have generally proven unsuccessful.

22 Ibid , 7
23 Ken Booth, New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: HarperCollins

Academic, 1991), 16; Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London:
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 3; John Vogler, "Introduction: The
Environment in International Relations: Legacies and Contentions," in The Environment and
International Relations, edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 110.
24 Buzan, People States & Fear, 2; Matthew Paterson, "IR Theory: Neorealism,

Neoinsitutionalism and the Climate Change Convention," in The Environment and International
Relations, edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 62-63.

16

Haftendorn suggests that both the League ofNations and the United Nations (UN) failed because
of the dominance of national security over collective security. 25

However, in the examination of the next two paradigms it will become evident that there has
been a shift towards the idea of greater international and global security. Some authors, such as
Michael Renner, even suggest that national security is an outmoded concept that neglects the idea
that security is increasingly attained through co-operation and non-violent dispute mechanisms.26
When Renner uses the terminology of co-operation and non-violent dispute mechanisms it would
seem most likely that any co-operation would be between nation-states, thus reinforcing the
dominance of national objectives. It is apparent that even within his view of security the idea of
the predominance of nation-states seems to be inherent due to the terminology utilized. While
realism and military security have been the focus of national security in the past, this does not
mean that now when new types of threats are emerging this focus can not be broadened to include
these new threats. The discussion of the following paradigms shows that to a large degree the
idea of environmental security has already been accepted into the global and international
paradigms. This thesis asserts, however, that some environmental issues are national security
Issues.

International Security
The liberalist paradigm in international relations offers the main critique of realism and the
concept of national security. The liberalist paradigm emphasizes the impact of international
institutions (as opposed to nation-states) in the international arena, and is the foundation for the
concept of international security.27 Within this paradigm there is a greater optimism concerning

25 Haftendorn, 8.
26 Michael, Renner, National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions

(Washington: World Watch Institute, May 1989), 64.
27 Haftendorn, 13 .

17

the possibility for greater cooperation in the international arena. The view of collective or
international security suggests that nation-states do not solely act in their own self-interest, but
actually cooperate with other states for a "collective good."

The concept of international security emerged from the possibility of a nuclear war. The
possibility of nuclear devastation meant that even a strong program of national security might not
be enough.28 This possibility forced countries to look at security in a broader context and they
began looking at their own security in terms of international security because it was apparent that
international security directly affected national security. According to liberal theorists one can
only fully understand individual national securities, when they are considered in relation to other
states and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole.29 Thus, an unstable
international system could endanger a seemingly secure nation-state. For example the United
States has taken a greater interest in international stability with the realization that growing
international instability can have direct implications on American security. This reflects the main
idea behind international security: the security of one state is interconnected with that of others. 30
Shultz suggests that the security of a state can be linked not only to other friendly states, but
possibly even to adversarial states.31 During the Cold War this was evident in the doctrine of
mutually assured destruction: one country could be deterred from starting a confrontation in the
interest of its own security because of the consequences of the threat of nuclear retaliation. Since
this applied to both the US and Russia, both countries had shared security interests.

28 Ibid. , 9.
29 Booth, 34.
30 Shultz, "Introduction," 2.

31 Richard Shultz, "Introduction to International Security," in Security Studies for the 1990s,

Richard Shultz, et. al. eds. (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 46.

18

Interestingly national security agendas can include the idea of collective security. The
Canadian Department ofNational Defence stated in its 1994 Defence White Paper, for instance,
that "Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies."32 States may
choose to cooperate in order to reach national security objectives more effectively, but
cooperation does not take away from the fact that more often than not states act in their own selfinterest and usually only cooperate when it is in their interest to do so. In other words
international or collective security is really only relevant, when national security agendas have
deemed it to be so. Accordingly for environmental problems to be addressed globally,
internationally, or nationally, national governments would have to decide that it is in their
countries' security interests to do so.

Global Security
The concept of global security is a further extension of international security and the idealist
paradigm. The main difference between global and international security is that global is inclusive
of all states or people within the world, while international can technically only include the
security of two or more states. The main foundation of global security originates from the
writings ofKant, which focused on morality, universalism and international organization.33
Global security is really a utopian vision which seeks to move beyond the nation-state to a world
order in which each individual enjoys justice and happiness. 34 While the achievement of global
security is at present doubtful, what emerges from the concept is the view that co-operation and
peaceful change are possible.

32 Canada. Department ofNational Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of

Supply and Services Canada, 1994), 12.

33 Shultz, "Introduction to International Security," 7; Haftendorn, 11 .
34 Haftendorn, 11 .

19

The thrust of the globalist argument is that there are greater and more significant threats to
peace and stability than traditional national threats. Michael T. Klare argues that many of the
"most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability are arising not from conflicts
between major political entities but from increased discord within states, societies and civilizations
along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines."35 These discords, he argues, are a
result of economic, demographic, sociological and environmental stresses which exacerbate
existing divisions within societies.36 In other words these new threats to security do not simply
affect one state, but all individuals in the world. Not surprisingly globalists suggest that solutions
to these problems are found within international organizations. Thus, globalists seek to move
beyond the nation-state focus and concentrates on a "global commons" or "global good."

Critics argue that the two main problems with the globalist approach are that it presupposes
strong institutions that have enforcement powers and it requires radical systems change. 37 While
in part these criticisms are valid, they discount the progress that can be made by simply
acknowledging that global issues exist and need to be addressed. While it is more difficult to
address global security problems this does not mean that they should not be addressed at all.
Even without enforcement powers gains can be made on global environmental issues through
voluntary cooperation among states.

This study does not argue that global environmental threats do not exist or that they should
not be addressed, rather, that global threats should be addressed separately from national or
regional threats. While global threats should be acknowledged and addressed, national threats
and the importance of the state in addressing global issues should not be neglected either. The

35 Michael T. Klare, "Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms," Current History 95, no .

604 (November 1996): 354.
36 Ibid.
37 Haftendorn, 12.

20

neglect of the role of nation-states and the failure to identify national threats is a limitation of the
globalist paradigm.

Differentiating Between the Paradigms
The three different paradigms can be useful tools in discussing security; however, there are also
some problems that arise with their use. One issue involves clearly differentiating between the
three different paradigms. International security, for example, can be seen as being overlapping
with either national or global security. While a country may designate a specific threat as a
national security threat, more often than not the method used to address the threat is through
international co-operation. Most threats, even traditional military threats, affect more than one
country and need to be addressed by more than one country. The main point of difference
between the two is that for realists states only chose to cooperate out of self-interest, while
according to liberals the basis for cooperation is motivated by idealism. By contrast, both the
globalist and internationalist positions have the same theoretical foundations and to some extent
both look at moving beyond the nation-state. There is an overlap between these paradigms and it
is difficult to draw a clear line between them. This thesis takes the view that while there may be a
fuzzy distinction between national/international or international/global, there is a clear separation
between the nationalist and globalist paradigms. Furthermore, it is not sufficient for a country to
simply take into account global or national security, it must have an integrated view of security
including, national and global issues.

ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
Up to now the chapter has examined the different types of security (traditional and nontraditional) and the different paradigms used in security studies. The discussion in the previous
sections sets up the background of the security debate in terms of what issues have been and
should be included in the security agenda and which different paradigms governments may adopt
to address security threats. The following specifically answers the question: Why should
environmental concerns be included in the security agenda? In answering the preceding question

21

Marvin Soroos identifies four types of arguments to consider when examining the linkage
between the environment and security: conceptual, theoretical, political and normative.38
Through an examination of each of these arguments the chapter suggests a case can be made for
viewing environmental problems as security threats.

Conceptual or Human Security Argument
The basis behind the conceptual argument is that the extent and seriousness of environmental
problems have forced a rethinking ofthe concept ofsecurity.39 The conceptual argument arises
by viewing security as implying freedom or protection from serious threats to human well-being.
Within this argument whatever poses a threat, including environmental problems, to human wellbeing becomes a security problem. Fauzya Moore contends that problems such as 11 environmental
degradation, the reduction ofbiodiversity, global climate change and pollution;.... 11 will affect the
well-being of every human if they are not addressed.40 Michael Renner also supports this idea
and notes that environmental degradation is not only a security threat but that in fact it is the
11

most fundamental aspect of security 11 because it undermines the support systems on which all

human activity depends.1141 The idea of human well-being has become one ofthe main arguments
used to add environmental issues to the security agenda. For example a 1996 report presented to
the Canadian ministers ofForeign Affairs, National Defence and International Trade states that
what should be pursued is
... sustainable human development as an overarching policy framework for Canada.
38 Marvin S. Soroos, 11 Global change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner's Dilemma, 11

Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 3 (August 1994): 318. The conceptual, theoretical and

normative arguments are also presented by Ruff, Chamerlain and Cousteau. See: Ruff, et. al., 83 .
39 Soroos, 318; Ruff, et. al. , 83 .

°Fauzya Moore, Beyond Development Cooperation, Report on a conference organized by the

4

Society for International Development, 15-16 October, 1993, Ottawa, Canada (Ottawa:
International Development Research Centre, 1994), 6.
41 Renner 29
'

.

22

Sustainable human development. .. ensures the effective stewardship of the global
commons through sustainable and equitable global resource management and
policies of ecological protection that respect the earth's carrying capacity.42
The idea of "sustainable human development" has become a popular term in Canadian foreign
policy and is meant to address environmental issues as well as other so called global problems.

The problem with the term "sustainable human development" is that it is unmanageably
inclusive of every possible threat and thus is not included specifically in the security agenda;
rather, it is used to define overall what Canadian foreign policy should encompass. It is possible
that this approach may be the best way in which to address global environmental problems such as
climate change and ozone depletion. However, in terms of national security this idea ofwellbeing should be qualified with Goldstone's more restrictive definition of security. Thus, specific
and serious environmental problems which pose threats to the well-being of a single country or a
specific region can be addressed more effectively.

Theoretical Security Argument
A second type of argument that can be used to justify the concept of environmental security
threats is a theoretical argument which is more traditional in its outlook. The theoretical
argument focuses on empirical cause-and-effect relationships. More specifically this type of
argument assesses the potential for environmental problems to generate conflict between states.43
For example, a nation whose environment is degraded by an outside force may become hostile
towards that force and the result is interstate conflict. Critchley and Terriff suggest that the
potential for conflict fits in well with the more traditional concept of security.44 One of the main

42 Canada. Report of the Second Annual National Forum to The Honourable Andre Ouellet,

Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Honourable David Collenette, Minister ofNational Defence; The
Honourable Roy McLaren, Minister of International Trade, International Institutions in the
Twenty-First Century: Can Canada Help to M eet the Challenge? (Toronto : Micromedia Limited,
Microfiche Number 96-03146), 8-9.
43 Soroos, 318 .
44 Critchley and Terriff, 332.

23

proponents of the theoretical argument is Thomas Homer-Dixon, who is well known for his
research in the area of resource scarcity and its relation to conflict. 45 The link, however, is often
tenuous and it is only when issues of resource scarcity combine with other problems that conflict
is likely to occur. Geoffrey and David Dabelko suggest that there appears to be little factual
evidence that supports Dixon's claims of the relationship between conflict and resource scarcity.46
Thus, present and past conflicts have not provided evidence to support the theoretical claim that
resource scarcity or environmental degradation alone can cause conflicts. With this said, it is
important to note that environmental problems can exacerbate existing tensions and problems
between states. Either way the theoretical argument does not expand the concept of security
beyond military issues, since the main focus is still the traditional security threat of conflict. This
argument does not take into account that environmental threats can be security threats
themselves; rather, it asserts that they are the cause of other military threats. Instead of viewing
environmental problems as sources of conflict they should be addressed for the threat they cause
in and of themselves. Dabelko and Dabelko state that "All issues of environmental degradation
should not be forced to fit into the matrix of security and conflict. The conception of security
must instead be changed to reflect the new threats of environmental degradation."47

Normative or Ecological Security Argument
The normative argument has as its main focus the primacy of environmental values. This
argument sees modern civilization as posing a threat to these values.48 Within the normative

45 Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity,"

Current History 95, no . 604 (November 1996).

46 Geoffrey D . Dabelko and David D. Dabelko, "Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and

Redefinition," Environmental Change and Security Project Report no . 1 (Spring 1995): 5.
47 Ibid. , 8.
48 Soroos, 319.

24

argument is the idea that the failure to properly consider environmental dimensions undermines
the realization of human security. The argument would seem to suggest that environmental issues
themselves deserve to be on the security agenda because they should have primacy over other
issues. This reasoning lacks a justified assessment of which specific issues constitute a security
threat. There also appears to be a minimization of the importance of military threats under the
normative argument and this minimization lacks justification. It is important to include
environmental threats in the security agenda, but military threats are just as important as in the
past if not more so. The goal ofthis study is to broaden the scope ofthe security agenda, not to
replace some threats with others.

Political Argument
The political argument advances the idea that by using the term security one gives the problem a
"greater sense of urgency that elevates it to the realm of 'high' politics; and a place nearer the top
of national and internal agendas along with military priorities. "49 By viewing environmental
problems as security threats, one may be able to create a greater interest and sense of urgency for
these issues. Richard Shultz and Marc A Levy suggest that the positioning of environmental
issues as security issues is usually a veiled effort to receive greater prominence and financial
support for the issue.50 Even Homer-Dixon supports this suggestion and notes that some works
attempting to use the concept of security to give greater prominence to environmental threats
have an "underlying dishonesty and sloppiness."5 1 From the sources assessed for this work the
above statement appears invalid since most of the authors in favour of linking the environment
and security did not attempt to hide their agenda and were clearly advocating the inclusion of
environmental threats into the concept of security in order to both raise awareness concerning

49 Soroos, 319.
50 Shultz, et. al. , "Introduction," 1; Levy, 45 .
51 Homer-Dixon, et. al. , 49.

25

particular issues and to raise more funds in order to address new threats. Porter suggests that the
attempt to broaden the scope of security to give environmental issues greater respect, has been
anything but hidden or veiled. Furthermore, he suggests that "... proponents of environmental
security have openly called for changes in policy, institutional mechanisms or budgetary
allocations to reflect the new importance they argue should be accorded to global environmental
threats. "52 National security has always been a tool and a symbol of high politics and by
recognizing an issue as a national security threat it is given a greater importance which
"... overrides political and financial obstacles."53 Porter argues that to suggest that proponents of
environmental security should not try to ".. .influence that nation's policy and budget priorities by
broadening the definition of national security is to suggest that they would have to operate under
a set of rules that is different from that used by specialists for traditional security threats. "54 One
simply has to examine the amount of money spent by the United States and Russia on security to
realize that security issues are given a greater priority then other concerns. If environmental
threats can prove to be as threatening, or more so than military threats there is no reason to
exclude them from the security agenda simply because they are not the traditional type of threat.
Serious environmental security threats deserve as much attention as other security threats and
should be raised to the level of so called high politics.

Arguments Against the Concept of Environmental Security
Scholars have made several arguments against linking the concepts of security and the
environment. Daniel Deudney has outlined many of these arguments in his article "The Case
Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security." His first argument suggests
that it is misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat because the

52 Ibid. , 63 .
53 Ibid. , 62-63 .
54 Ibid. , 62-63 .

26

traditional focus of national security (military threats) has little in common with either
environmental problems or their solutions. 55 The dissimilarity with traditional threats supposedly
precludes environmental threats from being considered as a part of national security. Stairs adds
to the preceding argument by suggesting that although we may all be threatened by environmental
issues, our chances of survival are unlikely to be improved by "lumping our alliance policies into
the same pot as our approach to the international regulation of the use of pressure cans or
refrigerator gases. "56 There is some validity to this claim; however, simply because
environmental threats have some dissimilarities with the traditional concept of security does not
mean that they are not valid or important. Under a new expanded security "umbrella" policy
makers can identify and address different types of threats, and it should not seem strange or
unmanageable that these threats are not all the same. The changing world and the identification
of new types of threats have caused a change in the way we think about security: security is no
longer simply equal to military security. Although a discussion of the dissimilarities between
environmental and military threats will ensue it is necessary to point out that along with the
dissimilarities there are also important similarities which link traditional security and
environmental security. For example if an environmental problem is as destructive as a conflict
this would suggest that they do indeed have a great deal in common.

Dissimilarities Between Military and Environmental Threats
One ofDeudney's main points under this discussion is that war and the environment have little in
common. Although Deudney acknowledges the fact that war does have some environmentally
damaging effects he suggests that most of the world's environmental degradation is not caused by

55 Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National

Security," Millennium : Journal of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1990): 461-476.

56 Denis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues," Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and

Priorities for the Future Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons
Reviewing Canadian foreign Policy, (Ottawa: Public Works and Services, 1994), 5.

27

war or the preparation for war. 57 This view neglects the fact that specific degradation caused by
the preparation for war can cause specific security threats to specific countries. Deudney
however delves into further detail as to how dissimilar security-from-violence and security-fromenvironmental threats are by identifying three main dissimilarities.

The first major dissimilarity is that while both threats may kill people they are not
necessarily similar due to the fact that not all threats to life and property are threats to security.58
Deudney goes on to list other problems in society that cause death such as disease, old age, crime,
and accidents which are not considered security threats. He then suggests that if everything that
causes a decline in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any meaning or
analytical usefulness and becomes a "loose synonym of 'bad."' 59 Stairs also suggests that a flood
of other issues will also want to be included under the security umbrella and they will all be
neglected because none of them will be addressed properly.60 This work has already suggested
that security should not be a 'loose synonym of 'bad," and tried to address this problem through
the use of a more limiting definition. Obviously if the term security simply meant anything
harmful to a person this would make it impossible to efficiently identify and address security
threats. Porter takes this response a step further by suggesting that "... proponents of
environmental security would argue that the traditional definition of national security distorted
perceptions of global realities as well as policy priorities."61 Thus Porter believes that the agenda
should be broadened significantly and he disputes whether or not traditional concepts of security
ever were valid. Rather than totally dispute the traditional concept of security it is probably better

57 Deudney, 463 .

58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
60 Stairs, 5.
61 Porter, 218 .

28

to adjust it to suit new emerging problems. Goldstone's definition of security, for instance, does
just that. 62

The second difference stems from the degrees of intention involved in the threat. Violent
threats usually involve a high degree of intentional behaviour whereas environmental degradation
is largely unintentional. 63 Waever also makes this point and suggests that security has been:
... conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the
sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in
defence of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among
strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around
which the whole issue of security has been framed .64
There is really no way to dispute this assertion except when dealing with environmental
degradation caused intentionally by war. However, whether or not a threat is intended has little
bearing on the potential consequences of that threat and, therefore, the threat needs to be
addressed in either case.

The last dissimilarity is that the organizations that provide protection from violence differ
greatly from those in environmental protection.65 According to this view, there is an inability for
the security organizations to deal effectively with environmental problems. In addition, some
scholars fear that by associating traditional security with environmental security the result will be
a militarization of environmental issues.66 This perspective does not take account of the role that

6 2 This definition can be found on page 12 of this thesis.
63 Ibid.
64 Waever, 63 .
65 Deudney, 464; Keller, 13; Waever, 64; Hugh C. Dyer, "Environmental Security as a Universal

Value: Implications for International Theory," in The Environment and International Relations,
edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 23 .
66 Dyer, 23 .

29

defence organizations can play in addressing environmental threats because of their leading edge
technology and emergency response capability. Ruff, Chamerlain and Cousteau suggest that the
intelligence community and military establishment can play a major role in environmental
security. 67 More specifically the technological equipment, such as remote sensing, satellite
systems and underwater listening devices, possessed by these organizations could be very useful
in determining "ecological disaster areas, tracking of global geological processes, monitoring
pollution impact, [and] assisting in emergency clean-up situations .... "68 The United States'
Department ofDefense demonstrated the usefulness of traditional security organizations when it
sent military teams to Estonia and Lithuania to help clean up nuclear equipment and gas and oil
spills at former Russian military bases.69 When the Soviet troops left they badly damaged these
bases and the Baltic governments did not have the knowledge or trained staff to address the
environmental degradation caused by military activities at the bases. Obviously present defence
and security organizations cannot address all environmental security concerns, but their
technology and expertise would be of great benefit in addressing environmental security.
However, before military organizations could adapt to new threats, non-traditional security
threats need to gain wider acceptance.

Another argument that is made against environmental security stems from the theoretical
argument, discussed earlier in the chapter, in support of environmental security. The discussion
of the theoretical argument suggested that environmental degradation or resource scarcity, in and

67 Ruff, et. al., 86.
68 Ibid. , 87. This article also suggested that remote sensing activities could be used in Russia to

accomplish some ofthe following : tracking of impending ecological disasters, determination of
ecological disaster areas and land degradation, reaction to emergency situations, tracking of
global geological processes such as earthquakes, monitoring of forest diseases and pollution
impact on tree cover, monitoring surface and underground water pollution and the tracking of ice
floe movements.
69 Kent Butts, "National Security, the Environment and DOD," Environmental Change and

Security Project Report no. 2 (Spring 1996): 26.

30

of themselves, are not very likely to cause interstate wars.70 Most scholars agree that at the
present time environmental issues aggravate stressful situations, but do not directly cause
conflicts. Brian Shaw adds that there is still cause to assess environmental factors as variables
that lead to conflict even if they are not the only variable at play. 71 It seems only logical to assess
the role of environmental factors in a conflict just as other factors are assessed. For the purposes
of this thesis the role of environmental problems in conflicts is a side issue and the main concern is
whether or not environmental threats in and of themselves are security threats.

Denis Stairs proposes one last argument against the concept of environmental security: by
placing more items under the "security umbrella" there is a disservice done to all items.72 By
placing an environmental problem in the security agenda it has to fight against other security
issues for funds and attention as opposed to being on its own. Stair's reasoning may be mistaken
because often simply identifying an issue as a security threat gives it greater prominence on the
national agenda. Past experience has shown that governments give greater attention and funding
to matters of national security.

CAN ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS BE INCLUDED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENDA?
While global and international approaches to security have embraced the concept of
environmental security, the third approach, national security, has not been widely recognized as a
useful approach to environmental challenges. Some authors contend that the issue of
environmental security should not be included as a part of national security because global

70 Deudney, 461 .

71 Brian R. Shaw, "When Are Environmental Issues Security Issues?" Environmental Change

and Security Project Report no. 2 (Spring 1996): 40.
72 Stairs, 5.

31

security would be undermined.73 While there is a need to look at global environmental threats to
security, this thesis asserts that there is also a place for environmental security within the concept
of national security. The examination of environmental threats at a national level does not
necessarily undermine global environmental security. It is plausible that through examining a
specific environmental threat a state may suggest that the best forum through which to address
the threat is global. Less well known threats may even be given a greater opportunity to be
addressed at the global level through the above type of examination. In order to set up the debate
between the globalist and nationalist perspectives on environmental security the next section will
first examine some of the common arguments against using the national security approach to
address environmental issues.

Arguments Against Using the Nation as a Security Focus
Not only has the environment not been included in the paradigm of national security, but in fact
some scholars argue that it is not possible to reconcile environmental threats with national
security objectives. One of the main arguments against the concept of national environmental
security is that in attempting to promote environmental threats as national security threats
globalist political objectives are undermined. 74 There is no doubt that there are global
environmental problems that need global solutions; however, there is also a need to address
national environmental security threats which can not be addressed adequately at the global level.
EricK. Stern suggests that it seems likely that for the next 50 years at least there will be a mixed
system between national sovereignty and the international/global community.75 This would
suggest then that at the present time, in a world dominated by nation-states, there is a need for
both levels of threats. As Kent Butts argues "... while global security mechanisms are a desirable

73 Deudney, 461 .
74 Deudney, 461 .
75 Eric K. Stern, "Bringing the Environment In: The Case for Comprehensive Security,"

Cooperation and Conflict 30, no . 3 (1995): 224.

32

outcome, pursuing them to the exclusion of short-term state-centric options for addressing
environmental problems is short-sighted."76 The realities of the present situation demand that
threats be addressed not only at international levels but also at a national level. Having either a
global or a national environmental agenda is not presently sufficient: both are necessary.

A second argument against the use of national environmental security is that adopting a
nationalist approach to deal with environmental security threats is dangerous because it will help
reinforce militarism and foster prejudice.77 Furthermore, a nationalist approach is incompatible
with the environmental sphere because it may undermine the co-operation needed to deal with
environmental issues. Deudney goes as far as to say that a focus on nationalism could lead to
various types of interventions and a new imperialism. His argument, however neglects that
environmental problems have a history of cooperation that will not be abandoned simply because
governments identify them as national security threats. In fact Porter suggests that the concept of
environmental security actually produces responses that are co-operative and not conflictual. 78
The numerous agreements and treaties on the environment would seem to testify to that. If states
were to come into conflict over environmental issues the problem would more than likely become
worse and conflict would seem to be a self-defeating way to solve any environmental problem.

John Vogler presents a third argument against using the national security agenda to address
environmental threats. Vogler proposes that by trying to redefine national security to include
environmental threats there is a risk that environmental problems will be "... considered as an item
somewhere near the bottom of a list of militarized national security priorities."79 The argument

76 Butts 22

'

.

77 Deudney, 467; Soroos, 320.
78 Porter, 222.
79 Vogler, 10.

33

does not seem convincing in the present time, when the main military threat of the Soviet Union
has disappeared, and security organizations are actually looking for a new way in which to direct
their activities. If policy makers recognize environmental threats as security threats due to their
possible impact on a nation's population, then there is no reason to put them at the "bottom of a
list." Most environmental threats are presently not taken seriously enough; labeling them as
national security threats automatically elevates them to a higher priority. The political argument
addressed earlier in this chapter suggested that by placing environmental threats on the security
agenda we do not do them a disservice but actually give them the greater attention that they
deserve.

Globalist Perspective
The main focus of environmental security to date has been global environmental problems, such as
ozone depletion and climate change. Furthermore, proponents of the globalist perspective usually
view national security approaches as impediments to global security, because they reinforce the
prominence of the nation-state. Globalists argue that no single nation can protect itself from or
address by itself the challenges of global environmental problems. 80 What is needed instead is
"collective action on a global scale."81 This idea enforces the view that the traditional nationstate perspective is incompatible with the demands of global security. According to Myers, it is
not only necessary to expand the concept of security, but also to " ... adapt our policy responses by
placing greater emphasis on collective security."8 2 As can be seen by these statements the
globalist perspective is not solely concerned with acknowledging global environmental threats,
but more importantly with changing the present world system to a global order.

80 Myers, 24; Thomas, 123 .

81 Thomas, 5.
82 Myers, 24.

34

The single largest problem with this perspective is that the nation-state is still the dominant
force in the world. Arguments suggesting that the new interdependence of states is making way
for a global government of some sort are misleading, since states have always interacted with each
other. 8 3 Anthony Giddens argues that international relations are not the undoing of nation-states,
but actually the " ... basis on which the nation-state exists at all."84 Given this reality it is necessary
to find a way in which to work within the present system of nation-states. The result is not that
global threats will be neglected. Rather, since global threats affect all states, many states find it in
their national interests to address global threats through international conferences and agreements.
However, it is true that global environmental threats cannot be effectively dealt with through
individual action and need to be addressed by a large international response. It would be better to
set apart global environmental threats from national or regional threats stemming from the
environment in order to address each level of threat more effectively.

Another issue that arises from an analysis of the concept of global security is that the literature
does not discuss the source of a given threat in determining the level of analysis. Rather, the
focus up to now has been on the receiving state or states. With the new reexamination of security
there can also be a new consideration for the source of threats. This study suggests that the
source of a particular threat is also of importance when determining how to address specific
threats. Global threats are labeled "global" because they affect the entire globe. But is it not also
important that the source of many global threats is global? The fact that global threats very often
have global sources makes them vastly different from national security threats which are derived
from either one source or at the most a regionalized source that affects a regionalized group of
83 As was noted earlier the problems faced by the UN serves as an example of the remaining

prominence of nation-states. While at the present time there is a great deal of interaction among
states, it is not totally inconceivable that this trend could be reversed due to animosities between
rising and declining powers in the state system. For example if the United States began to decline
rapidly as a world power the result could be a retreat from the international arena into a more
isolationist policy.
84 Giddens, 263-264.

35

states. This is a new consideration that scholars and policy makers should take into account when
determining whether a threat is more global or national in nature.

Nationalist Perspective
While many arguments concerning environmental security suggest that it is now outmoded to use
the nation-state level of analysis, there is still room for a greater development of the concept of
national security itself It is not unrealistic to suggest that national security can also include
environmental threats. Although some environmental problems, such as the depletion of the
ozone layer and climate change, are global threats and need to be addressed at the global level,
there are other threats that affect only specific countries. If one can demonstrate that an
environmental problem drastically threatens the well-being of a nation there is no reason not to
identify it as a national security threat. Goldstone suggests:
The only thing that matters in the real world is whether environmental trends do
pose threats either to our survival or welfare that require large scale national
efforts to avoid, mitigate or reverse. If they do, they are ipso facto national
security concerns. If not, then not. ... That is, it is foolish to ask whether we do
or do not face environmental security problems. The sensible and immensely
valuable question is to ask which of these possible threats we currently face,
how severe each currently is, and how severe are they likely to become.85
If policy makers determine that an environmental security threat exists this does not mean that
military measures are taken. Rather, these new non-military threats need new responses.
Furthermore if policy makers address national environmental security threats, global threats are
not automatically neglected. Rather, policy makers need to differentiate between global and
national environmental security threats. If policy makers were to lump the two levels together
either one ofthe two would be neglected. For example, if policy makers include global threats in
the national security agenda, these threats would more than likely take a secondary seat to
environmental issues that were closer to home. On the other hand, if policy makers lump more
regionalized national security threats in with global threats the result would be the neglect of these

85 Homer-Dixon, et. al. , 66-67.

36

more local security threats. If, instead, policy makers separate the two levels they can hopefully
address both more effectively. Both levels ofthreats are pertinent to national security, since
global threats threaten all nations, but they need to be addressed through different strategies.
Policy makers can effectively address national environmental security threats through the national
security agenda, whereas global environmental security threats are better dealt with through
established international organizations such as the United Nations.

This thesis focuses specifically on Canadian national environmental security threats originating
from Northern Russia, and shows how they fit into the national security agenda. The thesis also
briefly examines some global environmental threats to demonstrate, first of all, the differences in
the two levels of threats-- national and global-- and secondly, that states therefore need different
forums to address these threats appropriately.

CONCLUSION
Although environmental security is usually discussed in the context of international or global
security, a strong case can be made that it is also relevant to national security. Obviously it is
necessary for a state to cooperate with other states when dealing with environmental threats. This
does not mean that a country cannot develop a national policy directed towards a particular
security threat. It would seem appropriate that any national policy towards an environmental
threat would include co-operation with other countries. Moreover, this is not all that different
from how policy makers have addressed military threats in that when national security is
threatened, many times the response has been to cooperate with other countries in trying to
address the source of insecurity. Examples of security cooperation are found in both world wars
as well as with NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In both situations alliances can prove to be useful
instruments, but they do not have to be the only instruments. In this context, the next two
chapters examine the potential security threat of environmental degradation in the Russian North
to Canada. The fourth chapter examines Canadian responses to these threats.

37

CHAPTER TWO
Although the Cold War is over, its legacy of ecological degradation from militarization and
industrialization lives on in Russia.86 It is only since the end of the Cold War that the severity of
the degradation has become widely known and, correspondingly, the threat posed from it became
evident. It is apparent that the degradation poses problems and threats to the population of the
Russian Federation; however, this thesis demonstrates that environmental degradation in Russia
also poses a threat to Canada and more specifically the Canadian Arctic. The focus of this
chapter is the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic via marine transport of pollutants from
Northern Russia. The two main types of marine transported pollutants examined are nuclear
contaminants and POPs. The discussion demonstrates that while nuclear marine contaminants
pose a national security threat to Canada, POPs are more of a global threat. While the nuclear
threat is not military in nature it has the potential to harm the welfare ofNorthern Canadians,
which is something that past Soviet military actions did not actually do. It is ironic that while
most people feared the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, it is actually the radioactive
waste associated with the production and testing of these weapons that poses a threat now.

This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section examines the extent of the
nuclear waste buildup in Russia. Within the section the case is made for viewing this problem as a
national security threat to Canada. The second section examines the national security threat
posed to Canada from accidents involving Russian nuclear-powered submarines. Finally the third
section studies non-nuclear marine pollutants and argues why they should be classified as global,
rather than national security threats. In all three cases the sections examine the problems in terms
of their origin, degree and possible effects on Canadian welfare.

86 Leigh Sarty, "Environmental Security After Communism: The Debate," in Environmental

Security and Quality after Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John Hannigan, (San
Francisco: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 20.

38

NUCLEAR WASTE
The following discusses the extent of the nuclear waste buildup in the Russian Arctic and argues
that the nuclear waste poses a security threat to the Canadian Arctic because of it potential threat
to the well-being ofNorthern Canadians. More specifically, this chapter argues that the
movement of pollutants through Arctic waters combined with the scale of nuclear waste created
and dumped by the Soviet Union pose a security threat to Canada.

Movement of Pollution through Arctic Waters
The fact that the Arctic marine ecosystem is intraconnected means that pollution taking place in
one area of the Arctic has a high probability of affecting other areas as well. In the case of
nuclear waste build-up there are concerns that the dumped materials will leak substantially and
that ocean movements will carry the waste to other areas. According to the Canadian Arctic

Contaminants Assessment Report, the usual route of pollutants from the regions in the Laptev,
Kara and Barents Seas is across the Arctic Ocean, exiting by the Fram Strait. There is also
evidence that "the Transpolar Drift can at times migrate toward the Canadian ·side of the Arctic
Ocean thereby delivering contaminated ice to the north of Greenland and into the Lincoln Sea. n8?
From there, according to DIAND, the ice could eventually end up in the Canadian Arctic, at
which time the ice "... melts completely releasing its contaminant burden to the water. "88 This
report is not the only source that suggests that nuclear contaminants from Northern Russia could
find their way into the Canadian Arctic. Other oceanographers have noticed that surface water

87 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canadian Arctic

Contaminants Assessment Report (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services, 1997), 85 .
Hereafter referred to as DIAND, Canadian Arctic .. .
88 The proposed route that the contaminated ice could travel in order to reach the Canadian

Arctic from the north the Lincoln Sea is as follows : The ice could travel south into Nares Strait,
west and then south into the Archipelago or further west to join the Beaufort Gyre. The transit of
ice through Nares Strait or the Archipelago would take a year or two and it is during this time in
which the ice melts and releases its contaminants to the water. DIAND, Canadian Arctic... , 85 .
Refer to Map 2.1 for a mapping ofthe possible movement ofwaters into the Canadian Arctic.

39

Map 2.1
Arctic Ocean Currents

Surface
---

~

s.A>·lurface cutr<tflt\

\

\

'\.
'

~

'

'

f·

. . tt.;,...

~

;

.

,/

<

Source: Futsaeter 1991, 282.
Cited in: Stokke, 5.

40

w

from the Russian Arctic slowly circulates in a clockwise manner that tends to push pollutants
toward Greenland and Canada.89 Any large leakages in the future could carry radioactive
materials to the shores of the Canadian Arctic, contaminating the water, wildlife and people of
this region. The situation would be made even worse if the ocean currents carried the actual
containers used for dumping to the Canadian Arctic. Since US scientists feel that the Arctic ice
pack could gouge the sea bottom and break up the containers this is a real concern. What makes
this even more alarming is that many of the containers are lying in shallow waters and the

°

possibility of movement and transport is very real. 9 Furthermore, the scenario could prove even
more lethal if transported containers were to start leaking or rupture once they had reached the
Canadian coast. It is necessary to keep the very real possibility of transport in mind when
considering the extent of the nuclear waste buildup in Russia.

The Extent of the Build-up of Nuclear Waste in Russia
The most telling feature in terms of the amount of nuclear waste created in the former Soviet
Union is the extent to which the Soviet Union used the practice of dumping. While several
countries have dumped nuclear waste into the seas and oceans of the world, none have used the
practice as much as the former Soviet Union. In the 1960s the USSR began the regular practice
of dumping large amounts ofliquid and solid radioactive waste in the area of the former USSR
and more specifically in the Russian Arctic.9 1 For example in the provinces ofMurmansk and
Arkhangel'sk the radioactivity dumped constitutes almost two-thirds of all radioactive waste ever

89 Hal Bernton, "Russian Revelations Indicate Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants,"

Washington Post, (5 May 1993): A3 ; Olav Schram Stokke. Beauty and the Beast. Lysaker:

FridtjofNansens Institutt, 1994, 5.

90 Kirsti-Liisa Sjoeblom and Gordon S. Linsley, "International Arctic Seas Assessment Project

(IASP)," in Environmental Radioactivity in the Arctic, edited by Per Strand and Andrew Cooke,
(Norway: Scientific Committee ofEnvironmental Radioactivity, 1995), 16.
91 Jason H. Eaton, "Kicking the habit: Russia's addiction to nuclear waste dumping at sea."

Denver Journal of International Law and Policy no. 23 (Spring 1995): 292.
41

dumped in all the oceans ofthe world.92 In all Russia has dumped between 115, 000 TBq (3.1
million Ci) and 333 ,000 TBq (9 million Ci) at sea. During the same time period all other
countries combined have dumped 46,000 TBq (1.24 million Ci).93 This demonstrates the extent
to which the Soviets used the practice of marine dumping. It also supports the assertion that the
main source of nuclear contamination for the Arctic is Russia. Thus, by addressing the problem
of nuclear waste in Northern Russia the risk of nuclear contamination for the Canadian Arctic is
greatly lowered, because the main source of the threat has been addressed. The best way for the
Canadian government to address the threat of nuclear waste, due to the fact that the source is
easy to ascertain, is by viewing it as a national security threat and seeking bilateral or multilateral
cooperation with Russia and the other Arctic states.

Solid Waste
Russian nuclear propelled ships, particularly the nuclear reactors form these ships, are the main
sources of solid nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic. The Northern Fleet operates nuclearpowered ships and submarines from five naval bases on the Kola Peninsula: Zapadnaya Litsa,
Vidyaevo, Gadzhievo, Severomorsk and Gremikha.94 The main problem contributing to the
92 The province ofMurmansk covers the whole of the Kola Peninsula, as well as the eastern areas

stretching northwards from Kandalakshya Bay to the Pechyenga Valley. The province of
Arkhangel'sk encompasses the area to the south and east of the Kola Peninsula, including Novaya .
Zemlya. See: Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, Sources to radioactive contamination in
Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk counties, Bellona Report vol. 1 (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1994),
12. Refer to Map 2.2 for a depiction of the area in question.
93 Nilsen and Bohmer, 95 . The level of radioactivity in a source is measured in bequerel (Bq).

The number ofbequerel is equal to the number ofradioactive reactions (disintegrations) per
second. One curie (Ci) marks the radioactivity of 1 gram radium, and is equal to 37 billion Bq.
Radioactivity itself is the process in which a disintegrating (decaying) atomic nucleus rids itself of
excessive energy by emitting high energy radiation. For the full discussion of what radiation is
and how it enters the human body refer to : Nilsen and Bohmer, 151 . Another good source
describing radiation is: Rosalie Bertell, No Immediate Danger? (Toronto: Women's Educational
Press, 1985 .)
94 Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Alexander Nikitin. The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of

Radioactive Contamination, Bellona Report, vol.2, (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1996), 86. Refer
to Map 2.2 for the location of these bases.

42

Map 2.2
Map of Barents Sea Area

Kara Sea

Kolgojev

Source: Nilsen and Bohmer, 14

43

build-up of solid waste at these bases is the slow rate at which Russian authorities can
decommission old submarines. The slow rate of decommissioning has caused the accumulation of
old submarines at the bases, which has led to the Kola Peninsula (where the bases are located)
being described as "... a nuclear rubbish dump and an environmental horror story."95 The amount
of radioactive material on nuclear submarines in one city alone, Severodvinsk, is twenty times
greater than the radioactivity released by Chernobyl. 96 The main threat from a city like
Severodvinsk stems from the sheer amount of the nuclear waste that could possibly contaminate
Arctic waters.

The Andreeva Bay, located on the northern tip of the Kola peninsula, is also home to a great
deal of radioactive waste. The waste includes 21 ,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and about
12,000 cubic meters of solid and liquid radioactive waste.97 At this site there is a special area for
solid radioactive waste located 200 meters from the sea, where Russian officials have stored half
of the waste in a concrete bunker, while the rest is stored in an open area beside the bunker.
Officials have only placed one third of the waste in the open area into containers.98 In total the
Russian government stores about 6000 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste at this site and the
area surrounding the storage facility is contaminated.99 The lack of proper precautions aptly
demonstrates the need for more funding and storage facilities.

95 Sally Bogle, "Kola: it's the real thing." Energy Economist (May 1996): 13 .
96 Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime

(New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 48 . As of 1995 these facilities contained
12,530 cubic meters of solid radioactive. See Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 119.
97 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 95 .

98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.

44

Dumping
The build-up of nuclear waste described above led the Soviet Union to dump large amounts of
nuclear waste into the Arctic seas. For example the Soviet Union has sank around 17,000
containers, laden with radioactive waste, reactor parts and other radioactively contaminated
equipment, directly into the Kara and Barents Seas. 100 Most alarmingly, the Soviet Union
dumped a number of reactors and containers in the shallow waters offthe coast ofNovaya
Zemlya. Six of the reactors contained spent nuclear fuel which is highly radioactive. 101 While
the Soviets filled these reactors with a hardening mixture, which was designed to prevent saltwater exposure to radioactive sources for up to 500 years, these measures along with others are
suspect and thus create a concern. 102 In fact, according to Rob Edwards, an unpublished report
by the International Atomic Energy Agency's marine laboratory reveals that the waste containers
have already begun to leak. Although the report admits that there is not a significant radiological
leakage, the assumption is that they will continue to leak in the future, thus increasing the
radioactivity in the area. 103 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Russians dumped
many of the containers and the reactors in shallow bays that range from depths of 20 to 50
meters. 104 While a recent joint Norwegian-Russian group found only low level localized
contamination near the dumped wastes, concerns centre around the possibility of large leaks in the
future, as well as the movement of containers from this area to other parts of the Arctic. 105 As
was discussed above there is a very real possibility that some of the containers and any
100 Thomas B. Cochran, RobertS . Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin. Making the Russian Bomb.

(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) 219; Nilsen and Bohmer, 98, 103 . Refer to Map 2.3 for detailed
look at the dumping sites.
101 Rob Edwards, "Northern Exposure," New Scientist no . 1994 (September 9, 1995): 32.
102 Eaton, 293 .
103 Edwards, 32.
104 Sjoeblom and Linsley, 15 .
105 Ibid., 16 .

45

Map 2.3
Solid Radioactive Waste Dump Sites

"' .... _, ________....

,,, _ , ___

"

........ ....................------- ·-·····

SRW dump sues

e

Ottit-' .,. ptOpOftJONIIo •IMI"*-tfW w•sce ~~ ~

•

Wrrtft(Ci)

Re•ctor witn lPMt nuclear fuel dispow.l

.,, . t i 10th ll'lt! we of the lowM"d

~

~

~ ( ..1:eoqoty.

+ Rextor w1tt1aut

~

nuclear fuel alsposa:

I:J E.xt@'f'tt ol dump

T~
Ulformauon
~
~
~
date, radtoactwe •mount, ot containe-n.
#
~
~
• of uunled
~
•nd depth of dump

<•

200 m•tr• oeoth i ne btlow ,.. I<WI

6

A II E • .
" T J

~

Source: Cochran, 226-227.

46

radioactivity released from the containers could find their way to the Canadian Arctic. The
greatest threat to Northern Canadians comes from the possibility of the actual containers being
transported to the Canadian Arctic and then exposing their radioactive materials. If the
radioactivity within the containers was released once it reached the Canadian Arctic, the result
would be a much larger dosage of radioactive exposure for Northern Canadians.

Liquid Waste
Since 1959 the Soviet Union has dumped liquid radioactive cooling water from ship reactors at
sea. The last known dumping of liquid radioactive waste by the Soviets was in November of
1991. During this period the Soviet Union dumped at least 3.7 TBq (100 Ci) ofliquid radioactive
waste in the White Sea, 451 TBq (12, 171 Ci) in the Barents Sea, and 315 TBq (8,500 Ci) in the
Kara Sea. 106

The main reason that the Soviets dumped the waste instead of storing it is that every refueling
of a nuclear submarine produces about 10 cubic meters of high level radioactive waste 107 and
there is a lack of adequate storage facilities for this waste. In order to demonstrate the extent of
the problem it is interesting to note that at the present time the Northern Fleet stores more than
7,000 cubic meters ofliquid radioactive waste at naval bases and yards. The Fleet has stored
liquid waste in either floating tanks, tanks on shore or on board service ships which are all nearly
full and some are close to overflowing. 108 For example the storage capacity on the Kola
Peninsula for liquid radioactive waste is full and new facilities must be built to accommodate the

106 Nilsen and Bohmer, 12. Refer to Map 2.4 for a detailed look at the dumping site locations. It

is important to note that these figures do not include any accidental leakages, only planned
dumpings.

107 There is also large amounts of low and medium level radioactive waste produced. (Nilsen,

Kudrik and Nikitin, 88.)
108 Ibid.

47

Map 2.4
Liquid Radioactive Waste Dump Sites

..

··

LRW dump sites
Sanctionf:d disposals
+ Unsanctlonf:d disposals
~
... pll)I)Ot\ion.;toradlol<tivw

D

wast• in Cutriti (CO

~ ot dump

j •

I ;

Text information lncludH the location, ·- ...•.. ...
date, radioactive amount. volume and
"- -f-----..!.
depth ol dump

___ ____________

.. · 200 ~

........

depth line below sea level

..

8 A II

' ···

~

•£ 1,¥ T s

·-.......
~~

···-----:
1

r~

i · ..

~ ~ ... ~~ ..
.. ~~

~ ....

.. ·.' w tl

~ ... ·-· Pi--· .-.

.
0..
~

I •

·,

•. 1 .... - -

\I . I.:.,.

(. I

~

~

Source: Cochran, 224-225 .

48

~ ~

... ~ •..

: ! -

yearly accumulation of waste. The lack of adequate storage facilities may mean that the Northern
Fleet may resort to dumping liquid radioactive waste directly into Arctic waters again. This
would once again increase the amount of radioactive contaminants in the Arctic, which combined
with other threats of radioactive contamination, pose a threat to the welfare ofNorthern
Canadians.

Major Sources of Arctic Contamination From Southern Russian
While the main focus of this chapter is concerned with pollution from the Russian Arctic, there
are some sources from within the Russian interior that pollute rivers that flow into the Arctic
Ocean and thus can pose a threat to the Canadian Arctic. One of the more disturbing sources of
radioactive contamination from the interior of Russia is the discovery that the former Soviet
Union has injected liquid radioactive waste directly into the ground for over three decades. In
fact the Soviet Union has injected an estimated 3 billion curies of nuclear waste into three sites in
Russia. 109 It is interesting to note, as a point of comparison, that Chernobyl only released 50
million curies of radioactivity and Three Mile Island released just 50 curies. This method of
disposing of nuclear waste violates the accepted rules for waste disposal, which requires states to ·
isolate nuclear waste in impermeable containers. However, Russian scientists claim that the
practice is safe due to the fact that they have injected the waste under a layer of shale and clay. In
theory the shale and clay should cut off the wastes from reaching the Earth's surface. 110
Unfortunately wastes at one site have already leaked beyond the expected range and have spread
across an unknown distance. Since two of the injection sites are located near rivers running into
the Arctic Ocean the unexpected leakage is cause for concern. 111 These two sites are near

109 William Broad, "Pumping poison," Vancouver Sun, 24 December 1994, B6.
110 Ibid
111 Ibid

49

Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, not far from the Ob and Yenisei rivers respectively. Any potential
spreading of the waste at these sites could contaminate the Arctic through these rivers.

The injection of nuclear waste into the ground is not the only threat posed to the Arctic from
southern sources. Another threat originates from two of the main nuclear weapons production
facilities in Russia. The Chemical Combine at Seversk, near Tomsk, has released contaminated
cooling water into the Tom river, which drains into the Ob, since 1956. 112 The main source of
concern stemming from Seversk is that storage ponds might fail to contain the nuclear waste and
thereby contaminate ground water. 113 The result of a broken dam or accident at the site could be
a sudden large release of radioactivity, which would be transported to the Arctic.

The Mayak Enterprise near Chelyabinsk is also another source of concern, since it has
accumulated over 120 million curies of radioactivity, mainly from nuclear bomb construction, in
holding reservoirs. These reservoirs are in danger of overflowing into rivers which drain into the
Arctic Ocean. 114 Radioactive elements from Mayak have penetrated the northern rivers and pose
a problem for the Arctic Ocean. The problem was even worse when the Mayak operation was
first set up between 1949 and 1951 , and these reservoirs were not even present. Instead Mayak
officials simply poured the radioactive liquid waste directly into the Techa River, which is a
tributary of the Ob River. 115 A recent study of the population living along the Techa River has

112 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic

Environment Report (Oslo: AMAP, 1997), 115 . Hereafter referred to as AMAP .
113 Ibid., 115-116 .

114 Peter Gizewski, "Military Activity and Environmental Security: the Case ofRadioactivity in

the Arctic," Northern Perspectives 21 , vol. 4 (1993-1994): 17. A more recent version is found in
Environmental Security and Quality After Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John
Hannigan, San Francisco : Westview Press, 1995 .
115 Mark Chao, "Report from Chelyabinsk," New Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and

Occupational Health Policy 3, no . 3 (Spring 1993): 62.

50

tentatively shown that there was a "statistically confirmed increase in total cancer mortality during
the period 1950-1982 ... ," in exposed residents ofthe region. 116 While the estimates were lower
than those for atomic bomb survivors, this appears to be due to the prolonged exposure of the
Techa river population in comparison to the acute high dosage of atomic bomb survivors. The
study concluded: "In general, the risks per unit absorbed dose for the Techa riverside populations
are comparable for the selected solid cancers to those from their Hiroshima-Nagasaki cohorts."117
The study significantly demonstrates that there are links between radioactive contamination and
cancer rate increases that can result from nuclear waste build-up and accidental or intentional
dumping of waste.

The present and future threat for the Arctic is that the present storage ponds at the Mayak
facility will fail to contain the waste. AMAP suggests that a total dam failure is a possibility and if
this were to occur the radionuclides would flow into the Asanow Swamp and then into the Techa
River and eventually into the Arctic Ocean via the Ob. 118 Another possible threat, according to
AMAP, could come from the drying out of the Asanow Swamp due to a drought, which followed
by floods could wash the radionuclides into the Ob. 119 Once radionuclides have reached the
Arctic there is the possibility that they will reach the Canadian Arctic. In all three of the above
cases it is the amount of waste along with the possibilities for Arctic contamination that pose a

116 The study of the Techa river population comprised 28,000 persons exposed to radiation on

the banks of the Techa river. Mira M. Kossenko and Marina 0 . Degteva, "Cancer Mortality and
Radiation Risk Evaluation for the Techa River Population," The Science of the Total
Environment 142 (1994) : 88 .
117 The estimates of the relative risk for cancer of esophagus, stomach and lung were found to

not be substantially different from the corresponding values for atomic bomb survivors. In
addition to this incidents ofleukemia for the Techa River population, while lower than atomic
bomb survivors, were estimated to be greater for the exposed population. Kossenko and
Degteva, 83 , 88 .
118 AMAP

' 115 .

119 Ibid.

51

threat to the Canadian Arctic. If the amount of contamination were minimal a threat would really
not exist to the Canadian Arctic (there would still be a threat to local communities); however, the
amount of nuclear waste is anything but minimal and thus does pose a threat to more than simply
local areas in Russia.

Security Threat to Canada
The massive build-up of old submarines and nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic poses a threat to
the entire Arctic region, including the Canadian Arctic. Besides the fact that the Soviet Union
dumped large amounts of waste into the Arctic Ocean, there is also a concern over the safety of
the storage devices used by the Soviets. The best example of reasons for uncertainty over the
safety of the containers comes from the first dumping missions in the 1960s. On these dumping
missions many of the containers did not sink and the crew members aboard the boats shot the
containers to facilitate sinking through the seepage of water into the containers. 120 There have
also been repeated finds of radioactive containers floating in the Kara Sea or washing up on
shore. There are also concerns about the thickness of the containers. It is thought that because
the containers were so thin that it might be possible for radioactive material to reach the ocean,
through erosion, within 10 years of dumping. 121 The combination of large amounts of waste,
inadequate storage facilities and devices and the possibility for marine transport to the Canadian
North present a very real threat to the health and welfare ofNorthern Canadians. Since, Russia is
the largest and main source of nuclear waste in the Arctic, the threat can be dealt with bilaterally
or better yet multilaterally and does not need a global forum .

NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS
Accidents involving nuclear-powered submarines could transport radioactive contaminants in a
similar route to the discussion of the possible movement of nuclear wastes to the Canadian Arctic
120 Nilsen and Bohmer, 103 .
121 Eaton, 293 .

52

via water currents. In addition to this, both of these threats have one main source (Russia) and
have the possibility of seriously harming the welfare of Canadians. In terms of nuclear submarine
accidents the greatest threat stems from the possibility of an accident in Canadian waters, because
this would increase the dosage of radioactivity felt by Northern Canadians and thus also increase
the damage to their health and welfare.

The spectrum of nuclear submarine accidents includes accidents at sea as well as accidents
during refueling or decommissioning. The Bellona Foundation suggests that the Russian Navy's
Northern Fleet has had several accidents during both situations and that their facilities and
equipment are in a catastrophic state. 122 The equipment includes some 182 working nuclear
reactors and 135 non-functioning reactors in the Arkhagel'sk-Murmansk region. The large
number of reactors found here, combined with their age and poor condition, has led authorities
such as Murray Feshbach to suggest that the aging nuclear fleet is a potential time bomb for the
Arctic Ocean. 123 According to Feshbach there have been "more than fifty 'serious accidents'
during the operation and maintenance of the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet. 124 In fact,
between 1989 and 1993 alone the Northern Fleet experienced ten accidents on board their nuclear
submarines. These accidents are potential sources of nuclear contamination and thus are
discussed more thoroughly in the following section.

The K-19 Accident
It is appropriate to start out the examination of nuclear submarine accidents by discussing the
story ofthe first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine, the K-19, in the Soviet fleet. The
story is particularly interesting because it sets the stage for the long list of accidents and problems

122 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin.
123 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 45 .
124 Ibid

53

experienced by the Russian Fleet. During one of its voyages the K-19 had a nuclear reactor
cooling accident which threatened to incinerate the ship. 125 The crew members quickly welded a
new cooling system which saved the submarine but exposed them to extreme amounts of
radiation. Of the twenty two men killed, six were rumored to be so radioactive that officials
secretly entombed their corpses. 126 Thus began the program of the nuclear-propelled ballistic
missile submarines in Russia. Since then the nuclear propulsion program has ballooned
immensely: Russia now has around 235 nuclear-powered warships; 13 icebreakers with reactors;
230 nuclear-powered submarines and an additional 100 submarines waiting for
decommissioning. 127

Komsomolets Accident
The most recent submarine accident to spark interest in the media and abroad was that of the
Komsomolets. Whereas the K-19 survived, the Komsomolets actually sank about 300 miles off
the Norwegian coast in 1989. 128 In this accident not only were there environmental concerns but
41 crewmen lost their lives. The main source of environmental concern was the fact that when
the submarine hit the ocean floor at a depth of 5, 525 feet it exploded and the explosion breached
the titanium hull and damaged two nuclear torpedoes. 129

Estimates predicted that water would

reach the plutonium in the torpedoes within five to six years. One study, performed in the early
1990s, warned that corrosion of the warheads would lead to an "uncontrolled" and "impulsive"
leak of plutonium by 1996-1997. 130 A major source of concern was the possible contamination

125 Eaton, 287.
126 Ibid
127 Ibid, 290.
128 Ibid , 293-294.
129 Ibid, 293 .
130 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 44.

54

offishstalks used by N01wegian and Russian fishers . One Russian expert estimated that the
possible loss to the fishing industry could amount to $2 (US) million for the Russians and $2(US)
billion for the Norwegians.131 Other estimates suggested that ifthe nuclear materials were
released slowly, the toxicity would be harmless due to the movement of the seas. 132 However,
no one wanted to take a wait-and-see approach to a possible environmental catastrophe. Under
great public and international pressure the Russian government commenced securing the
Komsomolets with cement in June of 1994.133 They finished cementing the Komsomolets in
August of 1994 and most experts believe that the sunken submarine no longer poses a threat. 134
However, this accident does demonstrate the threat posed from submarine accidents and serves as
a good example of the possibility of these accidents occurring. If the Komsomolets had sunk in
Canadian Arctic waters the threat of contamination would have involved Northern Canadians as
opposed to Norwegian and Russian citizens. The inability to predict where the next accident of
the Northern Fleet will occur means that most of the countries in the Arctic, including Canada,
are at risk of contamination.

The two accidents discussed above are probably the best known accidents, but it is important
to remember that they are only two out of a total of 50 serious accidents concerning the Northern
Fleet. Four other serious accidents merit mention as a further illustration of the dangers posed
from this fleet:
1. An emergency on a nuclear submarine in July 1989, when cracks appeared in the casing
for the reactor's cooling system.
2. Two fires aboard a nuclear submarine moored at Severodvinsk in December 1990
3. A fire aboard a submarine in the Barents Sea in May 1992
131 Ibid. , 45 .
132 Ibid. , 44.
133 Ibid. , 45
134 Radio Moscow, "Sealing ofKomsomolets Nuclear Sub Completed," August 1, 1994,

transcribed in FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-94-147, August 1, 1994, 20.

55

4. Two fires on Northern Fleet submarines as recently as 199313 5
These recent accidents demonstrate that the problem is not going away and may in fact be getting
worse due to the aging of the fleet. In fact the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme's
1997 report suggests that nuclear powered vessel accidents pose a risk to the Arctic and need to

be addressed. 136

Even though other countries have nuclear submarines, the age of the Russian Northern Fleet
and the numerous accidents that the fleet has experienced suggests that it is more dangerous than
other fleets . Since the Northern Fleet operates mainly in the Arctic the threat posed by the fleet is
limited to the Arctic countries, of which Canada has the second largest area. Thus, the threat is
national or regional in nature as opposed to global.

Accidents During Decommissioning and Refueling
Two of the most problematic tasks involved in servicing nuclear submarines are the refueling and
decommissioning of the submarines. Since these procedures take place in Russian waters they
pose a risk to surrounding areas, but are not as great of a threat to Canada. The following
examines the dangers involved with refueling and decommissioning, but suggests that they are
more local threats and not as pertinent to Canadian security as accidents happening in Canadian
waters.

The highest risk work is the refueling of submarine reactors. 137 Russian officials perform the
refueling process at shipbuilding yards and on floating bases. The most dangerous operation
involved in the refueling process is the removal of the reactor lid. Past accidents during this
procedure have shown that significant amounts of radioactivity can be released into the air and
135 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 45 .
136 AMAP , 124 .
137 Nilsen, Kudrik, and Nikitin, 37.

56

water. 13 8 According to AMAP this spread of radioactivity is fairly localized. 139 Thus, the threat
to Canada is less than in some of the other cases discussed earlier.

Another process that can cause accidents is the decommissioning of nuclear submarines. The
process is dangerous under normal circumstances, but in Russia there appears to be an even
greater danger. The problem is that Russia lacks essential facilities for the dismantling of the

°

vessels and the storage of the nuclear wastes. 14 Furthermore the staff performing the process
are not always properly trained in safety measures. Making the situation even worse is the lack of
funding available to the Northern Fleet. According to the Russian Ministry ofDefence, at the
present level of funding it will be impossible to solve any of the problems facing the Northern
Fleet. 141 At the same time the number of submarines in need of decommissioning increases every
year. As the age of the fleet increases, so does the possibility of further accidents. The authors of
the Bellona Foundation Report on the Northern Fleet suggest that the situation is urgent and that
action must be taken quickly. 142 At the present time a lack of funds and adequate technology
means that the Northern Fleet decommissions less than one and a half submarines a year. 14 3 As it
stands now naval yard authorities feel that it will not be possible to have safe decommissions of
nuclear submarines in Russia for at least another five to seven years, and only then if they receive
adequate funding . 144 The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme report views the
disposal of old nuclear submarines as a major problem for the future, due to the lack of storage
138 Ibid
139 AMAP , 124 .

140 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 128.
141 Ibid 22.
142 Ibid
143 Eaton, 291.

144 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 128.

57

sites and the problems with decommissioning. 145 Accidents involving decommissioning only
involve a fairly localized area, and the main threat to Canada caused by the decommissioning of
nuclear submarines stems from the nuclear waste created, as discussed earlier.

Security Threat to Canada
The possibility of nuclear-powered submarine accidents in the Russian Arctic poses a threat to the
entire Arctic region, including the Canadian Arctic. The pollution from any submarine accidents
within Arctic waters could possibly be transported to Canadian waters. This of course includes
accidents during refueling and decommissioning which can also spread radioactivity. An even
greater threat comes from the free movement of nuclear submarines in Arctic waters, including
Canadian waters. Since Canada has no way of really monitoring its Arctic waters it is difficult to
detect where nuclear submarines are. It is very likely that Russian and American nuclear
submarines have entered and continue to enter Canadian Arctic waters. Any type of accident
within these waters would pose an even greater security threat to the Canadian Arctic, due to the
increased load of radioactivity that would be felt with an accident in such close proximity to
Canadian land and people. Since, it is impossible to determine where the next accident will take
place the whole issue of nuclear submarine accidents and their operating safety in the Arctic poses
a threat to Canada.

Effects of Radioactive Contamination
The previous sections demonstrated the possibility for the nuclear contamination of the Canadian
Arctic, via marine transport, from the buildup of nuclear waste and the possible nuclear submarine
accidents. The threat of contamination is very real, but what are the implications of radioactivity
on the population and territory of the Canadian Arctic and why can this be seen as a national
security threat? The effect of elevated levels of radioactivity on the health of populations has
been hard to substantiate. This of course does not include strong radiation doses, known as acute

145 AMAP 124
'
.

58

radiation illness, which can cause death within 48 hours due to the destruction of the central
nervous system. 146 Long term effects of elevated levels of radiation, which some scientists have
linked to different types of cancer and genetic alteration, is also a source of concem. 147 Thus the
spread of nuclear contaminants from the Russian Arctic could result in an increase in cancer
patients and birth defects in the Canadian North. Furthermore, it threatens the wildlife and
territory of the Canadian Arctic, which many Canadian Northerners rely on for subsistence. The
fact that possible nuclear submarine accidents in Canadian waters and the transport of nuclear
waste containers to the Canadian Arctic could result in even stronger doses of radioactivity calls
for large-scale action by the Canadian government.

Obviously the threat of contamination is not present solely to the Canadian Arctic, but rather
affects the entire Arctic population. This does not however, mean that the Canadian government
cannot view the problem of nuclear contamination from Russia as a threat to Canadian national
security. What is necessary is that the Canadian government should seek to cooperate with other
Arctic countries in meeting the challenges of this threat. The multilateral approach is similar to
the strategy taken concerning military threats to Canada. For example the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was a similar type of response to what was seen as a national security threat, the
Soviet Union, to several countries.

NON-NUCLEAR POLLUTION AND THE CANADIAN ARCTIC:
NATIONAL OR GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT?
This section discusses non-nuclear threats to the Arctic in order to demonstrate the differences
between global and national security threats. The main difference that can be ascertained is that
most of the non-nuclear threats originate from southern areas and need a global forum in order to
146 Nilsen and Bohmer, 151.
147 Ibid.

59

be addressed properly. When differentiating between a global and a national security threat it is
necessary to determine the source of the threat. If the threat comes from a specific and defined
area then it is easier to address as a national security threat; however if the threat is due to the
actions of many states there is a need for a more global response. Thus it is not only the localized
nature of a threat that determines it to be a national security threat, but also the source of the
threat.

Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs)
Recently persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have surfaced as a major concern for the global
environment. Global water circulation brings organic pollutants to the Arctic over long distances
causing effects on the health of animals and people in the Arctic. 148 Two of the better known
organic pollutants are DDT and PCBs. PCBs, for example, became an issue for the north in the
late 1980s, when human mother's milk at Broughton Island in the Northwest Territories was
found to contain enough PCBs to cause concern about the possible health effects. 149 Scientists
have also found DDT in the Arctic and since the circumpolar countries restricted its use twenty
years ago, the presence ofDDT in the north is attributed to southern uses. Southern Asia, Africa,
Central and South America and Europe still use DDT for pest control. 150 Some Russians still use
DDT in Siberia, but it appears that most of the DDT is transported into the Arctic via both water
and air currents from the south. 151 In fact the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report

148 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, The Arctic Environmental

Strategy: An Action Plan, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 4. Hereafter referred
to as DIAND, The Arctic Environmental. ..
149 AMAP 72

'

.

150 Ibid., 74 .
151 Ibid. I have chosen to include POPs under marine transport because they are transported by

both water and air, while the non-nuclear contaminants discussed in the next chapter are
transported almost solely by air.

60

suggests that the majority ofPOPs originate from sources external to the Arctic. 152 Since the
exact origins ofPOPs are difficult to document they are best dealt with at the global level.

Why are POPs Global and not National Security Threats?
The fact that most POPs cycle around in the global environment before they reach their
destination makes them a threat that affects almost every state. 153 In addition to this L. A.
Barrie, et. al. suggest that POPs are a " .. .truly global problem" since they are " ... capable of reentering the atmosphere once deposited to the Earth's surface [or waters]. " 154 Since POPs have
the ability to circle the planet, they affect nearly every state in existence. POPs not only affect
several countries, but also originate from several countries. There may be some significant
sources ofPOPs within the Arctic region; however, they are not the only or even the greatest
sources of these pollutants. The Canadian government requires a different approach in order to
deal with these truly global threats. Global threats need an international solution, which would be
sought through large international organizations such as the United Nations. While it may be
difficult at the present time to address these global threats, due to the primacy of the nation-state,
large scale international co-operation is possible and should be attempted for these types of
environmental issues.

CONCLUSION
The build-up of radioactive contaminants in the Russian Arctic contains both long term and
immediate threats to the Canadian Arctic. According to Feshbach, reports of radioactive caribou
in the North American Arctic demonstrate that the nuclear contamination in the Russian Arctic

152 DIAND, Canadian Arctic... , 419 .
153 AMAP 76

'

.

154 L.A. Barrie, Gregor B. Hargrave, R. Lake, D. Muir, R. Shearer, B . Tracey, and T. Bidleman,

"Arctic Contaminants: Sources, Occurrence and Pathways," The Science of the Total
Environment 122 (1992) : 64.

61

has already made its way into the Canadian border. 155 The Canadian government should assess
and address the potential environmental threats to Canada before the nuclear contamination
becomes too great.

The biggest security threat, via marine pollution, for the present time stems from the use of
nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic. Any type of nuclear-powered submarine accident in
the Arctic would contaminate local areas and possibly other areas as well. If an accident were to
occur in Canadian Arctic waters the contamination would be even greater and thus more harmful
to northern Canadians. The Canadian government needs to take preventative action with respect
to the use of nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic. The biggest future threat posed to the
Canadian Arctic by marine pollution comes from the massive build-up of radioactive waste in the
Russian Arctic seas and territory. The possibility of radioactive containers being transported is
fairly high and only time will tell whether the containers will continue to separate their radioactive
contents from the seas in the future. Any massive radioactive contamination would seriously
threaten the lives of northern Canadians as well as the Canadian Arctic ecology. This external
threat is similar (although to a lesser extent) to the threat of nuclear war with Russia in the past, in
terms of the radioactive contamination that would result. The fact is that Canada was not
contaminated by radioactive active materials due to a hit from a nuclear strike from Russia during
the Cold War. Now the possibility of nuclear contamination, from the pollution ofthe Russian
Arctic, may prove to be the first nuclear "hit" (unintentional) on Canada from Russia.

Although no one can say for sure if serious contamination will occur there is one thing that is
known. The fact is that radioactive contamination has lasting effects which harm present and
future generations. Even a decade after the Chernobyl fallout health and economic problems due

-

to the accident are still emerging and growing. 156 It would seem imperative that for its own
155 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 43 .
156 Anthony Tucker, "Once and Future Shock; Secret Chernobyls." Index on Censorship, no . 25

(January/February1996) : 87.

62

security the Canadian government should provide financial support to help clean up the nuclear
waste dumped in the Russian Arctic. Furthermore, open political support of moderates in Russia
is needed on the international stage. Any retreat to a Cold War mentality could cause even
greater harm to befall the Russian Arctic and thus the Arctic region as a whole.

63

CHAPTER THREE
Marine pollution from Russia is not the only threat to Canadian national security. No less
important are the contaminants that are transported by air. This chapter focuses on the
atmospheric pollution emanating from Russia and assesses both the sources of the pollution and
its potential threat to Canada. The examination involves two types of nuclear sources (nuclear
testing and nuclear plants) and two types of non-nuclear pollution (heavy metals and arctic haze
and acidification). The first main section examines the nuclear pollution and suggests that this
problem does pose a security threat to Canada. The next section examines non-nuclear pollution
and suggests that while these are problems and may pose security threats to other countries, such
as Finland and Norway, they are not security threats to Canada.

NUCLEAR CONTAMINANTS
Russian nuclear testing and the possibility of accidents at Russian nuclear power plants are both
potential sources of nuclear contamination for the Canadian North. The main reason for this is
that air circulation from Russia during winter usually swings over the pole and any contaminants
fall most heavily around Greenland, Spitsbergen and Canada. The fallout is due to the intense
Siberian high pressure cell which tends to force air northward from Russia, during the winter and
then the air is driven out of the Arctic southward over North America. 157 In the summer the flow
of air is clockwise which also means that contaminated air from Russia can reach the Canadian
North. 158 Thus, radioactive contamination from nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya or possible
reactor accidents in Russia can be transported to the Canadian Arctic via air transport. In
157 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, Canadian Arctic

Contaminants Assessment Report (Ottawa: Minister ofPublic Works and Services, 1997), 41.
Hereafter referred to as DIAND. Canadian Arctic.. ; Hal Bernton, "Russian Revelations Indicate
Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants," Washington Post, 5 May 1993, A3. Refer to Map 3.1
for a diagram of the air circulation in winter months.
158 Ibid.

64

Map 3.1
Arctic Air Ciruclation

The Westerlies blow in an anticlockwise direction almost
parallel to the contours at a speea propomonar w mt: yradient.

Source: Sugden, 46.

65

addition to the dispersal of the radioactivity is the problem of the long life of many radioactive
elements. Fallout from all past atmospheric weapons testing is still a major source of plutonium
isotopes in the Arctic. 159 The long term aspect of radioactivity means that the contamination
will be a concern for years to come.

The circulation of Arctic air along with the poor condition ofRussian nuclear power plants
and past Soviet nuclear testing pose a security threat to Northern Canadians due to the possibility
of radioactive contamination. In both of these nuclear cases the source of the threat comes
directly from Russia and an even greater threat in the case of nuclear reactors comes from
reactors present in the Russian North. While other countries have nuclear power plants and have
tested nuclear weapons, none of these countries can compare with Russia in terms of possible
accidents and the magnitude of tests. Moreover, in terms of the north, Russia is the only real
threat. For this reason it is easier for the Canadian government to address this threat through
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, than by viewing the issue as a global environmental threat.

Nuclear Testing
At the present time Russia is a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which
disallows any type of nuclear tests. This means that the present threat from nuclear testing in the
Arctic has diminished; however, a threat of nuclear contamination from past testing does exist due
to the magnitude ofthe previous tests and possible venting of radioactivity due to seismic activity.
The threat also exists that military establishments in Russia will convince the government (or a
new hard line government will come to power) to recommence testing at Novaya Zemlya. Either
way there is a possibility for the Canadian North to be hit by nuclear contaminants. This in turn
would potentially cause the health and welfare effects that Chapter Two discussed.

159 Peter Gizewski, "Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case ofRadioactivity in

the Arctic," Northern Perspectives (21 April 1993-1994): 17. A more recent version is found in
Environmental Security and Quality After Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John
Hannigan, San Francisco : Westview Press, 1995 .

66

Both the United States and the USSR performed several nuclear tests in the Arctic, at
Amchitka Island (US) and at Novaya Zemlya (USSR), as a part of their military program during
the Cold War. 160 There is little public information available on the American testing at Amchitka
Island, but fortunately a good deal of information exists on the Soviet testing. Between 1949 and
1990 the Soviet Union performed 715 nuclear test explosions, ofwhich 215 were detonated in the
atmosphere (1949-1962) . The rest were underground tests except for three underwater tests. 161
These tests mainly took place at two centres in the former Soviet Union. One was at
Sernipalatinsk (in what is now the independent country of Kazakhstan) and the other was at
Novaya Zemlya (now in the independent Russian Federation).

The Soviet Union detonated the first nuclear explosion on Novaya Zemlya in September of
1955; since then it has detonated 132 nuclear bombs at the island. 162 In comparison to
Sernipalatinsk the Soviet Union did not detonate as large of a number of bombs at Novaya
Zemlya. However, the combined explosive force of all Soviet detonations is approximately 500
megatons, and the Soviet Union detonated 470 of these megatons at Novaya Zemlya. 163

160 Ibid.
161 Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and

Arkhangel'sk Counties, Bellona Report vol. 1 (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1994), 120. For a
detailed list of the nuclear tests refer to Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
162 Nilsen and Bohmer, 120-121. Murray Feshbach suggests the number oftests is 118 as

opposed to 132. Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the
Soviet Regime (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 43 .
163 The explosive force of a nuclear bomb is measured in kilotons or megatons. A kiloton

corresponds to the explosive force of 1,000 tons of TNT. See: Nilsen and Bohmer, 120.
Peter Gizewski suggests that the total megatonnage for all nuclear tests at Novaya Zemlya is
estimated at 273 megatons as opposed to the 470 suggested by Nilsen and Bohmer. However he
comes up with the same percentage of94%. See: Gizewski, 17.

67

Table 3.1
Nuclear Atmospheric Tests at Novaya Zemlya

Atmospheric test explosions over Novaya Zemlya (1957-1962).
No.

Date

Mt -size

41

27th of October 1961

08.30

Unknown

42

30th of October 1961

08.33

58 Mt

Small

43

31st of October 1961

08.29

Several Mt

Mt -si ze

44

31st of October 1961

08.38

1 Mt

Mt -size

45

2nd of November 1961

08.41

Large

46

2nd of November 1961

.

Small

>1 Mt

47

4th of November 1961

07.20

Several Mt

Small

48

5th of August 1962

09.09

30 Mt

Medium

49

1Oth of August 1962

09.00

1 Mt

20th of August 1962

09.02

Several Mt

No.

Date

Time

Explosive
force

24th of September 1957

09.00

2

6th of October 1957

08.58

3

10th of October 1957

06.55

4

23rd of February 1958

5

27th of February 1958

07.59

6

27th of February 1958

10.24

7

14th of March 1958

8

20th of March 1958

9

22nd of March 1958

10

20th of September 1958

11

30th of September 1958

.

so

Time

Explosive
force
Small

Small

07 .50
30th of September 1958 09.55

Medium

51

22nd of August 1962

09 .00

Mt

12

Medium

52

25th of August 1962

09.00

Several Mt
Several Mt

13

2nd of October 1958

08.00

Moderate

53

27th of August 1962

09.00

14

2nd of October 1958

09.01

Moderate

54

1st of September 1962

12.40

15

5th of October 1958

06.00

55

2nd of September 1962

16

10th of October 1958

07.51

Large

56

8th of September 1962

17

12th of October 1958

07.53

Mt -size

57

15th of September 1962 08.02

18

15th of October 1958

07.51

Mt -size

58

16th of September 1962 10.59

Several Mt

19

18th of October 1 958

09.51

Mt -size

59

18th of September 1962 08.29

A few Mt

20

19th of October 1958

07.27

Small

60

19th of September 1962 11 .00

20 Mt

21

20th of October 1958

08.20

Mt -size

61

21st of September 1962 08.01

A few Mt

Mt
10. 18

Mt -size
Several Mt

22

22nd of October 1958

08.21

Mt -size

62

25th of September 1962 13.03

25 Mt

23

24th of October 1958

08.03

Mt -size

63

> 30 Mt

24

25th of October 1958

08.20

Large

64

27th of September 1 962 08.03
7th of October 1962
16.32

25

10th of September 1961

09.00

65

22nd of October 1 962

09.06

Several Mt

26

10th of September 1961

.

Several Mt
Some Kt

66

27th of October 1962

07 .35

Medium

27

12th of September 1961

10.08

67

29th of October 1962

07 .35

Medium

28

13th of September 1961

.

Several Mt
Small

68

30th of October 1962

29
30

14th of September 1961
16th of September 1961

09.56
09.08

Several Mt
Medium

69
70

1st of November 1962
3rd of November 1962

06 .30
08 .31

Medium
Medium

Medium

Medium

31

18th of September 1961

07.59

Mt

71

3rd of November 1962

Medium

32

20th of September 1961

08. 12

Mt

72

18th of December 1962

Medium

33

22nd of September 1961 08.01

Mt

73

18th of December 1962 -

Medium

34

2nd of October 1961

10.31

Mt

74

20th of December 1962 •

Medium

35

4th of October 1961

07.30

Several Mt

75

22nd of December 1962 •

Medium

36

6th of October 1961

07 .00

Several Mt

76

23rd of December 1962 11 . 1 5

A few Mt

37

8th of October 1961

Small

77

24th of December 1962 10.44

Unknown

38

20th of October 1961

Several Mt

78

24th of December 1962 11 . 1 1

20 Mt

79

25th of December 1962 13 .35

A few Mt

39

23rd of October 1961

08.31

25 Mt

40

25th of October 1961

08.33

1 Mt

Mt=megaton(s)

Source: Sovi et Nuclear Weapons Databook. Volum IV

Kt=kiloton(s)

Cited in: Nilsen and Bohmer, 123 .

68

Table 3.2
Nuclear Underground Tests at Novaya Zemlya

I
/ No.

Underground test explosions on Novaya Zemlya
Date

i1

Time

18th of September 1964 07.59
2
27th of October 1966
05.57
3
21st of October 1967
04.59
4
7th of November 1968 10.02
5
14th of October 1969
07.00
7
27th of September 1971 05.59
8
28th of August 1972
05.59
9
12th of September 1973 06.59
10-12 27th of October 1973
06.59
13
29th of August 1974
14.59
14
2nd of Novemberr 1974 04.59
15
23rd of August 1975
08.59
16
21st of October 1975
11.59
02.59
18
20th of October 1976
07.59

Explosive
force
2 Kt
422 Kt
93 Kt
119 Kt
140 Kt
586 Kt
329 Kt
2 Mt
4 Mt (/3).
497
2 Mt
477 Kt
497 Kt
70 Kt
13 Kt

No.

Date

19
20
21
22
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34

1st of September 1977 02.59
9th of October 1977
10.59
10th of August 1978
07.59
27th of September 1978 02.04
18th of October 1979
07.09
11th of October 1980
07.09
1st of October 1981
12.14
11th of October 1982
07.14
18th of August 1983
16.09
25th of September 1983 13.09
25th of October 1984
06.29
2nd of August 1987
01.59
7th of May 1988
4th of December 1988
24th of October 1990
16.00

Time

Explosive
force
55 Kt
4 Kt
89 Kt
44 Kt
70 Kt
55 Kt (/2)
113 Kt
44 Kt
89 Kt
70 Kt
89 Kt
70 Kt

Source: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume IV.

Mt=megaton(s)
Kt=kiloton(s)

Cited in: Nilsen and Bohmer, 124

Thus 94 percent of the combined explosive force of Soviet nuclear detonations took place at
Novaya Zemlya. It should be obvious that although there may have been fewer tests at Novaya
Zemlya they were of a much greater magnitude and therefore a greater environmental threat.

The Soviet Union has used two sites on Novaya Zemlya for nuclear testing. One at Chernaya
Bay on the southern island, known as the southern field. The other by the Matotchin Straight on
the northern island, known as the northern field . 164 While the Soviets used both sites as testing
areas for underground tests, they performed all of the 86 atmospheric tests at the northern test

164 Nilsen and Bohmer, 122. Refer to Map 3.2 for a view of the two sites.

69

Map 3.2
Northern and Southern Nuclear Test Sites at Novaya Zemlya

Source: Nilsen and Bohmer, 122.

70

site. 165 The Soviets also performed three underwater tests in the Arctic: one in the Barents Sea in
19 55; and two others off the coast of N ovaya Zemlya in 19 57 and 1961 . 166 Elevated levels of
some radioactive elements in the lower sediments of the Barents Sea test site still present
today 167 are an excellent example of the longevity of nuclear waste in the environment.

In August of 1963 the Soviet Union along with Great Britain and the United States signed the
Moscow Treaty which banned test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater.
The treaty became effective in October of 1963 . 168 However, before the treaty came into effect
the Soviet Union detonated the most powerful hydrogen bomb ever (58.5 megatons) above
Novaya Zemlya in 1961 .

The Big One
The 1961 test at Novaya Zemlya was 3,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima
explosion. 169 It sent shock waves that shattered glass 700 krn away from the site. 170 In fact the
shock wave was so powerful that it went three times around the earth and the mushroom cloud
extended almost 60 kilometers into the atmosphere. 171 Scientists measured the resulting fallout

165 Nilsen and Bohmer, 122. Peter Gizewski suggests the total of atmospheric tests is actually

90. See: Gizewski, 17.

166 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 43 .

167 The main elements still found are cesium-137, plutonium-239 and plutonium-249. Nilsen and

Bohmer, 127.

168 Nilsen and Bohmer, 125 .
169 Y ereth Rosen, "USSR Leaves Radioactive Legacy," Christian Science Monitor (26 August

1992): 9.

170 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "Future ofNovaya Zemlya Test Site Viewed." ( 5 November 1991): 7,

trans. in FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-91-216, (5 November 91) : 74.
171 Nilsen and Bohmer, 124.

71

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---

--- -

from the explosion over the entire northern hemisphere. 172 Not only was the fallout a problem at
the time but specialists believe that the combined fallout from all nuclear explosions at Novaya
Zemlya will have medical, biological and genetic consequences for the next 5,600 years. 173

Underground Testing
When the Soviet Union halted atmospheric and underwater testing it began to increase the
number ofunderground test explosions. The main positive aspect of underground tests was that
there was not supposed to be a release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. 174 However,
there are problems associated with underground testing as well. One problem is that underground
explosions create significant earth movement. For example in September of 1970 the explosion of
a one megaton bomb on the northern field created earth movements that traveled straight through
the earth. Scientists registered the earth movement between New Zealand and the Antarctic as
well as in Canada as it returned. 175 This would seem to create obvious problems for the whole
earth and there is really no way of knowing what kind of damage was made in performing such a
test. There seemed to be an obvious concern about the use of such large tests underground since
in July of 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty banning explosions with a
force of more than 150 kilotons_l76

Another problem associated with underground testing is the venting of radionuclides. There
have been times when radioactive gases have leaked out from the ground due to seismic activity
(or another nuclear test) and this continues to be a concern. In 1987 venting at Novaya Zemlya

172 Ibid.
173 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 74.
174 Nilsen and Bohmer, 125 .
175 Ibid. , 126.
176 Ibid., 127.

72

reportedly released the highest ever recorded amounts of radioactivity throughout Sweden, aside
from the Chernobyl accident. 177 The venting was not an isolated incident: three years later a
similar event occurred again. In addition to seismic activity the re-commencement of nuclear
testing at N ovaya Zemlya would result in further venting, as it is estimated that every fifth
underground test explosion in the Soviet Union has resulted in the venting of radioactive
gases. 178 At present the possibility of venting presents the greatest threat from these past nuclear
tests. Any large venting could be transported to the Canadian North and cause elevated levels of
radioactivity in the area.

In addition to nuclear testing for military purposes, the Soviet Union detonated 41 nuclear
bombs for civil purposes. 179 The Soviet Union used nuclear explosions in the civil sector in the
Arctic mainly in relation to mining. In addition to mining the Soviets used civil explosions in
attempts to stop oil rig blow outs. 180 Many of these practices were largely unsuccessful and only
succeeded in increasing the amount of radioactive contamination in the Arctic.

A main concern has been that Russia will recommence nuclear testing in the Arctic. Russia
has not performed a test in the Arctic since 1990. However, the closure of the main test site at
Semipalatinsk (and the fact that it is no longer located in Russia) has put increased pressure on
using the Arctic for testing. Fortunately, there is now less of a concern since both the United
States and Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996.181 The

177 Gizewski, 17.
178 Nilsen and Bohmer, 127.
179 Ibid
180 Ibid , 129.
181 Daily Highlights, http ://www.un.org/plweb_cgi/idoc.pl?323+unix+_free_user_+www.un.

org .. 80+un+un+web+web++CTBT, September 24, 1996.

73

treaty prohibits nuclear explosions for either military or civil purposes. Hopefully both countries
as well as others will continue to abide by the treaty in the future.

Unfortunately, there are still strong pressures from military personnel to resume testing in both
the United States and Russia. 182 One of the arguments for resuming nuclear explosions at
Novaya Zemlya suggests that the explosions could be used for dealing with nuclear and chemical
waste. The idea is to bury large quantities of nuclear and chemical waste in a shaft a kilometer
long and explode a nuclear device, which would fuse the waste and rock together. 183 The main
force behind the idea is that it is less expensive than conventional methods of dealing with highlevel nuclear wastes. The idea may become more appealing as there is less and less money to deal
with the growing amount of radioactive waste discussed in Chapter Two. However, at the
present time the risk associated with this type of a project remains too high. If the plan were to
be put into action one could only image what kinds of problems would be associated with the
combination of nuclear waste, chemical weapons and a nuclear explosion. Not only could nuclear
contamination of the Arctic be a result, but chemical weapons fallout would also be a possibility.
It is imperative that Western governments, including Canada, support and fund other means of

disposing of nuclear waste in order to avoid the possible fallout from the application of such a
plan.

There is also a possibility that Russia will resume nuclear tests for military purposes. This
threat is directly related to the domestic government in Russia. If hard-liners or old communists
were to regain power in Russia, they could chose to resume testing again for security purposes.
The resumption of testing would not only be a direct threat due to the radioactive fallout, but it
would also increase the possibility of venting from past nuclear tests as well. It is for this reason

182 Gizewski, 17.
183 "Russians Plan Nuclear Explosions," Economist Newspaper Limited, London (3 March 1994):

4.

74

that it is important not only to supply funds to help with the cleanup of the radioactive materials,
but also to show political support for moderates in the Russian government.

Effects of Nuclear Contamination
The last chapter discussed the effects of nuclear contamination on health to help demonstrate the
threat posed to northern Canadians from the dumping of nuclear waste and nuclear submarine
accidents. These effects on health are the same as they would be for nuclear contamination
spread through the atmosphere. The main difference is that when the radioactivity is transported
through the air there is not as great a threat of acute radiation sickness, which would be the case
in the transport of actual containers to the Canadian Arctic or a nuclear submarine accident in
Canadian Arctic waters. However, other health problems associated with radioactivity are still a
concern. For example the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) has estimated
that bomb fallout in the Arctic will contribute to 750 cases of fatal cancer in the Arctic
population. 184 This number is an estimate; the actual effects of the radioactivity released by the
numerous nuclear tests are hard to substantiate due to other factors that contribute to cancer
rates. However, this does not dismiss the threat that nuclear contamination via air pollution
poses. The contamination can endanger the lives of northern Canadians and thus requires action
on the part of the Canadian government.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
According to Andrei Yablokov some accounts of former Soviet nuclear reactors suggest that they
are 100-200 times more dangerous than those in the West. 185 Soviet reactors are thus much
more likely to have accidents than Western reactors and therefore this work considers Soviet

184 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic

Environment Report (Oslo: AMAP, 1997), 13 . Hereafter referred to as AMAP .

185 Andrei Yablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia," Environmental Policy

Review 16, no 2 (1992) : 6.

75

reactors to be security threats, while not suggesting that the same is necessarily true of all nuclear
reactors. Any type of accident similar to the Chernobyl accident could result in significant
radiological contamination ofthe Canadian North. 186 As was noted in the previous section the
air circulation in the Arctic moves from Northern Russia upwards into the Arctic and then south
through North America. Thus, the potential for contamination from former Soviet reactors,
particularly Russian reactors in the North, is a threat to the Canadian North and Northern
Canadians.

In 1986 one of the most famous nuclear accidents occurred within Reactor Four at Chernobyl
in which an estimated 20,000 cleanup workers died and over 10 million people were affected. 187
The accident brought into question the use of nuclear energy not only in the former Soviet Union,
but also around the world. Groups in opposition to nuclear energy have held up Chemobyl as the
example of what can happen when dealing with nuclear power. The fact that the contamination
spread so far and had such large effects on different populations demonstrates the threat posed by
old Soviet reactors. Russian reports blamed the Chernobyl accident on the workers, but other
reports (mainly Western) suggest that the real culprit was Socialist technology. 188 Since sixtytwo Soviet-designed power reactors still operate within the area of the former Soviet Union a
threat still exists. Of the sixty-two reactors, fifteen are similar in design to the Chernobyl

186 DIAND, Canadian Arctic ... , 157.
187 "Chernobyl10 Years Later: Tragedy's Toll Mounts," Current Digest: Post Soviet Press 17,

vol. 48 (1996) : 12; Anthony Tucker, "Once and Future Shock," Index on Censorship no.25
(January/February 1996): 87. Refer to Map 3.3 for the directions in which the radioactivity from
Chernobyl was carried.
188 William E. Burrows, "Nuclear Chaos," Popular Science 245, no. 2 (August 1994): 56.

76

Map 3.3
Direction of Radioactive Fallout from Chernobyl

.

.

.,,.

.
...
.
-.
U.SSil .
...

~

. .
•

,

Source: Trafford and Wellborn, 19.

77

..

,

~

~

.. "f/' .

..
I

•

reactor and Western officials consider them to be very dangerous. 189 The other forty-seven are
pressurized water reactors called VVERs. They are more similar in design to the Western
reactors, but lack real containment barriers and emergency core cooling systems. 19°

There is also a problem with inadequately trained workers at the Russian nuclear power plants.
For example, in 1993 the chairman ofRussia's Atomic Industry Inspectorate reported 20,000
safety violations. Furthermore nearly 10% of 5, 000 workers flunked a test on safety rules. 191
These figures plus the age and design of the Russian reactors are a cause of concern in Canada
and the United States. In particular there are two nuclear plants in the Russian Arctic that could
prove to be the greatest threats due to their proximity to the Canadian North. The following
discusses the Kola and Bilibino plants with respect to the threats they pose.

Kola Plant
The Kola Nuclear Power Plant is situated on the Kola Peninsula in the Northwestern Russia. The
electric energy from this plant supplies local heavy industry as well as exporting energy to Karelia,
St. Petersburg and Finland. 192 The plant holds two VVER-440/230 type reactors and two
VVER-440/213 type reactors. The main difference between the VVER-440 reactors and
Western type reactors is the degree of safety containment surrounding the reactor tank. 193 The
volume of the containment structure on the VVER-440/230 is too small to relieve any pressure
arising from a breach which occurs in a pipe of more than 32 mrn in diameter. While the VVER-

189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid, 56-57.
192 An estimated 60% of the production went to local industry and the other 40% was exported.

Nilsen and Bohmer, 108.

193 Nilsen and Bohmer, 108.

78

440/213 is an improved version of the 23 0 model, it is still not on par with Western style
reactors. 194 This is a concern due to the large number of accidents that take place at the Kola
plant. For a list of the more serious accidents at the Kola plant from 1991 to 1994 please refer to
Table 3.3 below .
TABLE 3.3
List of Accidents from 1991 to 1994 at Kola Plant195

September 12, 1991

Leakage of radioactive water at Kola nuclear power plant

December 7, 1991

Failure of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant

December 11, 1991

Human error causes failure of automatic reactor shut-down equipment at
Kola nuclear power plant

December 16, 1991

Technical failure at Kola nuclear power plant

January

19, 1992

Radioactive leak, reactor shut-down at Kola nuclear power plant

March

9, 1992

Fire at Kola nuclear power plant

April

16, 1992

Technical failure of reactor shut-down system at Kola nuclear power plant

April

18, 1992

Technical failure during refueling at Kola nuclear power plant

May

16, 1992

Reactor shut-down at Kola nuclear power plant

June

8, 1992

Failure of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant

February 2, 1993

Breakdown of cooling system for two hours at Kola nuclear power plant

May

27, 1993

Reactor shut-down due to breakdown of cooling system at Kola nuclear
power plant

March

2, 1994

Breakdown of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant

194 Ibid
195 These accident were taken out from a list of nuclear accidents on this site. http://www.

greenpeace.org/~

chernob/rep02.htrnl

79

During 1992 there were actually 39 incidences at the Kola plant and in February of 1993 the
oldest reactor was but short time away from a melt-down. 196 The potential for future accidents
and even a melt down seem to be fairly high. This potential is demonstrated even more when, for
example, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) discovered 1,300 items relating to
safety at the Kola Plant during inspections. In fact the IAEA has estimated the chance of a
meltdown in the two oldest reactors at the Kola Plant as 25% over 23 years. 197 Since the two
reactors have been in operation for 20 and 21 years and are planned to stay in operation until
2002 and 2003 , the potential for a meltdown is real. When the Bellona Foundation performed an
inspection of the reactor rooms, it found several problems as well as a general disorder. Included
in the disorder were loose cables and wires, radioactively contaminated equipment in a corner of
the hall separated by a string, warning lamps for elevated radiation levels that were constantly on
and little fire extinguishing equipment. 198 In addition to the lack of fire extinguishing equipment
(sometimes only shovels and rusty buckets) officials allow smoking in the control rooms and the
reactor halls. All of this combines to make the potential for a serious accident very high.
Furthermore, a lack of funds means that it is difficult to address the situation.

In the case of a serious accident at the plant the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Programme
has determined that the "... present technical and protection devices are not adequate to retain the
radioactive products inside the plant. " 199 Western officials suggest that the best solution is the
implementation of Western style reactors and equipment, since it has been agreed that it is
virtually impossible to upgrade the plant to Western safety standards.200 Others would suggest

196 Ibid , 110.
197 Ibid , 111.
198 Nilsen and Bohmer, 112.
199 AMAP , 124 .
200 Ibid , 110.

80

that nuclear energy itself is the problem and that safer more environmentally friendly methods of
generating power need to be found . However, at this point in time the power that these plants
supply is very necessary and has no substitute. Thus it is even more difficult for Russia to address
the situation at all .

Bilibino Plant
The proximity of the Bilibino plant in Chukotka (in northeastern Russia) makes it the most
threatening to the Canadian North. Dan Jaffe has shown, through the use of wind direction
models, that a nuclear accident at Bilibino would impact Alaska, and shortly thereafter Canada, in
four days.201 While the plant is smaller and may not have as great of a potential release as other
plants its proximity makes it more threatening. With this said other larger plants such as the Kola
are also in close proximity to the Arctic and could release large amounts of radioactivity.

The Bilibino nuclear plant is a small 44 MW nuclear power station that Soviet officials opened
in February of 197 5 in order to supply energy to the Magadan region.202 It has not been plagued
with the same number of problems as the Kola plant. Even though it is not as accident prone as
the Kola plant it is still a concern for the Canadian North due to its proximity. Furthermore it has
not been completely accident free . In 1991 the plant had two serious accidents. One involved the
leakage of radiation, the other, a malfunction of the automatic shut-down system.203 More
recently officials had to shut the plant down due to a crack in the cooling system in March of
1996 _2°4 This recent accident has caused a great deal of concern in North America about the

201 Murray Feshbach, "Environmental and Health Problems in the Former Soviet Union: Do They

Matter to the United States?" Environmental Change and Security Project Report, no. 3 (Spring
1997): 181-182.
202 http ://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/reactors.html
203 http ://www. greenpeace.org/-comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html
204 "Nuclear Plant Shut Down in Russian Far East," http ://www.newstimes.com/archive/

mar0596/ing.htm, March 5, 1996.

81

possibility of future accidents.205 Since the plant is not scheduled for decommissioning until
between 2004 and 2006 an even greater concern exists for the future.

Effects of Nuclear Contamination
The effects of radioactivity on the health of humans is varied and differs with the dosage received.
For example fire fighters at Chernobyl during the accident and residents ofHiroshima and
Nagasaki in 1945 received a high level of exposure that in many cases led to radiation sickness
and death.206 In areas receiving fallout there were also increases in cancer and death rates among
their populations. Contaminated areas of Belarus, from the Chernobyl accident, saw the incidence
of cancer of the thyroid gland among children rise to 50 times what uncontaminated areas
were.207 Furthermore, the most contaminated areas of the Bryansk Province in Russia saw a 200
percent increase in the number of children born with convulsive syndrome and a 120 percent
increase in the number of children with delayed mental and speech development. 208

While these areas were in close proximity to the accident other areas should also be concerned
about the health effects on their population for accidents of this kind. For example northern parts
of Scandinavia were also adversely affected by the Chernobyl accident. The greatest threat to the
Canadian Arctic comes from the Bilibino plant due to its proximity. The Kola Plant also poses a
threat since it is larger and still located in the Arctic region.

205 http ://www.ra.anl.gov/INSP/neisb/NEISB _3 .l .html
206 AMAP

' 112 .

207 "Chernobyl10 Years Later:...", 12
208 Ibid., 13 .

82

OTHER TYPES OF ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION IN THE ARCTIC
While POPs are transported through air as well as water, they will not be addressed here since
they were addressed in the last chapter and most of what was said with respect to the type of
threat they pose is the same for their transport via the atmosphere. Simply as a demonstration of
this, Murray Feshbach points out that environmental pollution of the land and atmosphere by
DDT, PCBs and dioxin in Russia is mostly a local problem and that it does not pose an
"immediate ecological threat to Europe or nearby Asian countries."209 Thus the following will
only examine the atmospheric pollution of the North from heavy metals, sulfur and nitrogen.

Heavy Metals
A great deal of the heavy metals found in the air in the Arctic originates from Eurasia. Scientists
see Russian sources as relatively important to the Arctic due to their location in the far north and
the air pressure system which drives the pollution north in the winter. 210 However, while
emissions of heavy metals from the Urals and Norilsk contaminate the air over Alaska and Arctic
Canada, emissions from North America contaminate the Subarctic areas of northern Canada.211
Thus, emissions of heavy metals in the North have more than one main source, while radioactive
contamination has the greatest potential of originating from one source (Russia). There are
however, areas in which heavy metals have caused a threat to local populations. For example on
the Kola Peninsula and in the Norilsk region of Russia local smelters have severely damaged the
soil and ground vegetation in the areas surrounding the smelters.212 The main concern with the
smelters is local since most of the smelter emissions are deposited very close to their source.
Since some of the worst polluting plants are near the Norwegian border this does also pose a
threat to the area of Scandinavia.
209 F eshbach' "Environmental ... ," 181 .
210 AMAP 98

'

.

211 Ibid.
212 Ibid., 109 .

83

While local areas around the northern Russian smelters have cause for concern for the
public's health, the heavy metals emitted from the smelters alone can not be seen as a security
threat for Canada. On a global scale the heavy metal emissions may be a source of concern in
terms of global security, but it is difficult to address as a national security issue due to the fact that
most countries have releases of heavy metals. Further illustrating this is the fact that the most
concern caused by heavy metals is from cadmium and mercury, neither ofwhich cannot be
attributed to any one main source: thus the effort to address the heavy metal threat may be better
suited to a more global perspective.

Arctic Haze and Acidification
The phenomenon known as arctic haze has become a concern for many of the arctic countries.
The main source of the haze appears to be industrial effiuents (mostly sulfur and nitrogen),
aerosols and gases from Eurasia and North America.213 The sulfur and nitrogen together with
the aerosols, over time transform into particles of sulfuric and nitric acids, which are similar to
acid rain and cause a haze to appear in the Arctic, effectively reducing visibility and causing
concern for possible health effects.2 14 At present the concentrations of pollutants are
comparatively small, but there is a concern for their long-term accumulation in the food chain.215
Scientists have made a connection between the Eurasian sulfur and nitrogen emissions and
elevated levels of their oxides in the Canadian Arctic air, as well as the Arctic as a whole.216
21 3 J. G. Roederer, "Understanding the Arctic: Research Policies and Responsibilities," in

Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York: Elsevier Science
Publishers, 1991): 3; J. M. Pacyna, "Chemical Tracers of the Origins of Arctic Air Pollution," in
Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York: Elsevier Science
Publishers, 1991): 99.
214 Pacyna, 99; David Phillips, "Long-distance Pollution Soils Our Arctic," Canadian Geographic

115, no 3 (June 1995): 25 .

215 Roederer, 3.
216 L. A Barrie and J. W. Bottenheim, "Sulphur and Nitrogen Pollution in the Arctic

Atmosphere," in Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York:
Elsevier Science Publishers, 1991): 179.

84

However, North American emissions of sulfur and nitrogen create enhanced levels in the air and
precipitation ofNorth Atlantic air entering Europe.217 So while Canada receives pollution from
Eurasia it in turn emits pollutants that pollute Eurasia. Thus, the reason that North American
emissions are not contributing to Arctic haze as much as Eurasia is simply due to the fact that the
prevailing winds carry North American pollution east as opposed to North.218 For this reason,
the problem of sulfur and nitrogen pollution appears to be more of a global threat than an isolated
threat.

It is still necessary to examine some of the more serious polluters in the Russian North and

assess the threat they pose to the Arctic specifically. The two main areas that need to be
examined are the Kola Peninsula and Norilsk, which both contribute to the presence of nitrogen
and sulfur in the Arctic atmosphere.

Kola Peninsula and Norilsk
The Kola peninsula is a source of large amounts of sulfur emissions. Sulfur dioxide emissions
from the Kola are around 700,000 tons, which is twice as great as those from all ofFinland.219
These massive amounts of emissions have created a type of industrial desert, covering an area of
100,000 hectares, in which there are practically no living plants.220 In addition to this an area of
about 5 million hectares has experienced tree defoliation and changes in the composition oflichen

217 Barrie and Bottenheim, 179.
218 Phillips, 25 .
21 9 D . J. Peterson, Troubled Lands, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993): 41 ; Alex Yu. Roginko,

"Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic and the Fate of Northern Natives," in The Soviet
Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics, edited by John Massey Stewart (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 215 .
220 Roginko, "Environmental Issues ... ," 215 .

85

and moss species.221 The health consequences stemming from the sulfur emissions are that up to
60 percent of the local population suffers from respiratory and other environment-connected
diseases.222

Another large emitter of pollution in the Russian North is the nickel production at Norilsk,
which emits about 2.5 million tonnes of sulfur dioxide a year (almost the same as the amount for
the whole of Camida). 223 Norilsk is the single greatest source of atmospheric sulfur emissions in
the world.224 The result has been a sky that is perpetually stained yellow, the destruction of2.6
million hectares of surrounding tundra, a high rate of respiratory and other diseases, and an infant
mortality rate that exceeds the already high Russian average by 20 to 30 percent. 22 5
Furthermore, attempts to transplant coniferous trees in the city have ended in failure due to the
large amounts of pollution. 226 Obviously there have been significant effects on local areas, but
the Arctic as a whole or the Canadian Arctic is not directly threatened by these emissions. This
however, is not the case for Scandinavia.

Due to the proximity of the Finnish-Russian border large amounts of air pollution cross over
into Finland and other parts of Scandinavia from the heavy metal industry on the Kola Peninsula.

221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.

223 John Massey Stewart, "Air and Water Problems Beyond the Urals," in The Soviet

Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics, edited by John Massey Stewart (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 226; Alan Saunders, "Poisoning the Arctic Skies," Arctic
Circle, (September/October 199): 29.
224 Andrew R. Bond, "The Russian Copper Industry and the Noril'sk Joint-Stock Company in the

Mid-1990s," Post-Soviet Geography and Economics 37, no 5 (1996): 306-307; Peterson, 32.
225 Stewart, 226; Bond, 306-307.
226 Bond, 306-307.

86

One Finnish diplomat suggested that the pollution from the Kola peninsula has reduced the forest
in parts ofLapland to a lunar landscape.227 Finland is not the only Scandinavian country that is
concerned about the extent ofthe pollution, Norway has also been an active participant in the
effort to reduce emissions from industries in the Russian North. Since the late 1980s the
Norwegian government actively pressed for an intergovernmental agreement on pollution control,
due to the risk posed to its northern population from the Russian industries.228 The result is that
on March 26, 1996 Norway and Russia signed an accord in which Norway will provide $47
million towards the reconstruction of the Nikel smelter on the Kola peninsula. Norwegian
officials have estimated the total cost of the project at $280 million; the additional funds will be
supplied from the Russian Federation and from revenues derived from the exemption of customs
duties on nickel exports from the Kola.229 The Norwegian government's actions demonstrate
that for Norway the problems associated with the pollution emanating from northern Russian
industry was a serious source of concern, so much so that it negotiated a bilateral arrangement in
order to address the situation. For Norway the situation was seen as a national security issue, in
that the emissions were affecting not only the wildlife and land but also the health of the
Norwegian residents. The Norwegian government thus chose to act on the issue in order to help
protect its population.

Are Northern Russian Industries a Threat to Canada?
There are a number of reasons why this chapter views air pollution by heavy metals, nitrogen and
sulfur in the Russian North not to be national security threats to Canada. While there is proof that
Russian sources do contribute substantially to the problem of Arctic haze, evidence also exists
that other substantial sources contribute to high levels of sulfur dioxide in the Arctic during the

227 Peterson, 41 .
228 Bond, 307.

229 Ibid.

87

winter months.23 0 North American emissions cannot be forgotten simply because they do not
generally blow directly into the Arctic but rather flow towards Europe. In fact even the Kola
Peninsula is a victim of sulfur dioxide emissions from Europe.231 Furthermore, the health effects
of Arctic haze are questionable since the sulfur compounds are much lower than those found in
heavily polluted cities, and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme suggests that "due
to low deposition rates, the haze causes neither adverse effects on plants and animals, nor direct
health problems in people."232 The cases in which adverse effects on plants, animals and people
are felt is in areas that are in close proximity to the source of the pollutants. Northern
Scandinavia, for example, has experienced some serious problems due to its proximity to the large
smelters on the Kola peninsula.233 The truth is that the overall average amount of emissions of
acid rain precipitators in Russia in no higher than in many Western European nations. The
problem is that many specific plants and areas are large polluters causing problems in the local
areas surrounding them.234 In general the sulfur deposition in northern Canada is low compared
to regions of northern Russia and emissions seem to have only a moderate influence on
precipitation in areas farther than 20-50 kilometers from the smelters.235 Thus, emissions of
heavy metals and the phenomenon of arctic haze are really more global issues, while the extreme
pollution emanating from industries in the Russian North may be security threats for Scandinavia,
but not Canada.

230 In fact a 1997 report from the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme suggested that

most of the sulfur in Arctic air comes from industrial areas further south. Specifically, Eurasia
contributes approximately 40 percent, eastern North America 20 percent and a large part of the
remaining global emissions occur in the Far East, particularly China. AMAP, 130-133 .
231 AMAP

' 133 .

232 Ibid., 135 .
233 Feshbach, "Environmental... ," 180.
234 Ibid., 181 .
235 AMAP

'

134 .
88

CONCLUSION
The most immediate threat to the Canadian Arctic from the air transport of pollutants seems to
come from the aging and poorly designed Soviet nuclear power plant reactors in the Arctic. The
threat poses a concern for all of Canada in that air circulation could transport radioactivity from
an accident in the Russian North to first the Canadian Arctic and then farther south. While the
greatest effects stemming from an accident would be in the area directly surrounding the plant,
there could be adverse effects, such as increased cancer rates, on the health of northern
Canadians.

Nuclear testing is also a threat that has the possibility of affecting southern as well as northern
Canadians. It was a large source of contamination in the past and will hopefully not be a major
threat in the future, ifRussia remains a signatory of the CTBT. However, there is still the threat
ofventing from past underground tests due to seismic activity. It is not however, seen as
immediate a threat as the nuclear power plants.

Whether it is via marine or atmospheric transport nuclear contamination of the Russian North
is a real threat to Canada. The fact remains that:
A large number of radioactive sources are present in the Arctic: storage
of spent nuclear fuel, decommissioned nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors
on land and on board ships, and contained sources in the environment. This
concentration of potential sources and risks for releases cause concern,
especially together with the fact that the uptake and transfer of radionuclides,
and thereby the potential exposure of people and biota, is much higher in the
Arctic terrestrial environment than other areas.236
The possible consequences of nuclear contamination call for it to be identified as a national
security threat and addressed as a national security threat. Since the source of the nuclear
contamination is clear and singular, it is easier to address as a national security threat than as a

236 Ibid., 127 .

89

global threat. Other issues such as POPs, global warming and ozone depletion are not easily or
effectively addressed at national levels and thus need a more global action. However, nuclear
contamination in the Arctic is derived from one main source and affects relatively few countries
directly. It is advisable for the Arctic countries to cooperate in addressing this issue much as they
would have to address a military issue. The differences are that military action is not required and
the country from which the threat is emanating is also a necessary and welcome participant in this
cooperation.

90

CHAPTER FOUR
The previous two chapters argued that the radioactive contamination of the environment in the
Russian North is a national security threat to Canada. This thesis now turns to an examination of
Canadian foreign policy to determine how Canada is and is not addressing the environmental
threat from Russia as a national security threat, both in policy statements and in actions. While
Canadian policy directly acknowledges the threat posed by aging nuclear power plants in Russia,
it has not identified or addressed the threats posed by nuclear submarines, nuclear waste and
nuclear testing. This chapter argues that one of the main reasons the Canadian government does
not adequately address many of these threats is because it does not distinguish between global and
national environmental threats.

The chapter starts by examining the context in which Canadian foreign policy towards Russia
has been allowed to evolve due to the changes in the international setting. More specifically the
first section examines how the end of the Cold War caused a greater openness in the Russian
Federation, which in turn has allowed greater cooperation concerning all issues, including the
environment. The chapter then examines the Canadian responses -- policy statements and actions
-- to the nuclear threats. The analysis focuses on both bilateral and multilateral responses and
assesses whether or not they properly identify and address existing threats. An important
criterion of this assessment is to see if the responses reduce the threat posed to the well-being of
Canada.

ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS: A COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOUR
The radical changes that occurred in the period leading to the collapse of the Former Soviet
Union (FSU) and the end of the Cold War were fortuitous not only for redefining security to
include the environment, but also for the opportunity to be able to address these new threats
through cooperation. One cannot overstate the importance of this new era of cooperation, since
the ability to cooperate with the country from which an environmental threat originates is key to
91

addressing that threat. It is important to keep this in mind in the following discussion of the
changes not only in Canadian foreign policy, but also in Russian foreign policy.

The cooperation that we now witness on environmental issues between Russia and the West
was not possible during the Cold War. 237 Due to their shared interests in the Arctic, Canada did
seek a special bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, but the hostilities of the
Cold War made this goal unattainable. Not only were relations between the two countries
restricted in the past, but also no state placed environmental concerns at the top of its priority list.
The lack of concern over environmental issues was an additional obstacle to overcome in terms of
cooperation on the issue of environmental security.

In Russia the policies of perestroika and glasnost began to change attitudes on both
cooperation and the environment. On October 1, 1987, then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev,
made a speech in Murmansk which signaled a radical departure from past environmental and
foreign policies. In his speech Gorbachev specifically addressed environmental degradation and
the need for countries to cooperate in order to deal with this growing problem:
We attach special importance to the co-operation of the northern countries
in environmental protection. The urgency of this is obvious. It would be well
to extend joint measures for protection of the marine environment of the Baltic,
now being carried out by a commission of seven maritime states, to the entire
oceanic and sea surface of the globe's North. The Soviet Union proposes
drawing up jointly an integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural
environment of the North. The North European countries could set an example
to others by reaching an agreement on establishing a system to monitor the
state of the natural environment and radiation safety in the region ... .238
237 John M . Lamb, 11 Canadian Relations with the New Russia: Security Concerns and Policy

Responses, 11 Canadian Foreign Policy 2, no.1 (Spring 1994): 79.

238 Mikhail Gorbachev, address in Murmansk, October 1, 1987. In Foreign Broadcast

Information Service (FBIS)-SOV-87-191 , October 2, 1987, quoted in Report of a Working
Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute oflnternational Affairs, The
Arctic Environment and Canada's International Relations (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources
Committee, 1991), 55 . Hereafter referred to as CARC.

92

Gorbachev's speech reflected a much more open foreign policy than what existed during the Cold
War. Alexei Yu. Roginko views the Murmansk initiatives as the turning point in Soviet Arctic
policies. He suggests that the most striking feature of these initiatives was "... that they
represented an authoritative exposition of a unified approach to Arctic policy by the Soviet
Union, bringing together security, resources, scientific and environmental issues." 239 The proof
that the Murmansk speech was more than simple rhetoric stems from the fact that since the
speech participation in environmental concerns by Russia has greatly increased and Russia has
given the Arctic one of the highest priorities in Russian foreign policy. 240 The result is that
Canada and other states are now in a position to cooperate with Russia on issues of
environmental degradation. Since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1991, there has been an
even greater acceleration in the growth of relations with Russia. 241

While Russia is more open and willing to cooperate, the transition to a market economy means
that the Russian state continues to sacrifice the environment in order meet the everyday needs of
the Russian people. With an economy strapped for hard currency, fossil fuels in the Russian
Arctic continue to be an important resource. Russian officials have given the Arctic and its
resources a high priority in an attempt to maximize income from oil and gas exports in this
area.242 The new problem that exists is the conflict between building a new economy and
protecting an environment under pressure. At the present time the primary goals of the Russian
government are to meet the daily living needs of Russians and to achieve economic stability.243

239 Alexei Yu. Roginko, The NSR in the context of Arctic Military and Ecological
(Environmental) Security INSROP Working Paper No. 13-1995, IV.2 .1 (Russia: The
International Northern Sea Route Programme, 1995), 11.
240 Ibid.
241 Lamb, 79.
242 Roginko, The NSR ..., 12.
243 Igor I. Altshuler, Yuri N. Golubchikov and Ruben A. Mnatsakanyan, "Glasnost, perestroika

and eco-sovietology," in The Soviet Environment: problems, policies and politics, John Massey
93

Unfortunately this means that environmental issues are of a secondary concern for the Russian
government. The duality of change in Russia means two things: one, cooperation with Russia on
environmental concerns is possible; two, Russia needs cooperation from other states in terms of
funding to help address environmental concerns.

WHAT HAS THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SAID ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL
THREATS FROM RUSSIA?

Increasingly the Canadian government accepts that environmental degradation is a security threat.
Its increasing acknowledgment, however, is flawed in two ways. First, the Canadian government
takes a blanket approach to environmental issues which does not distinguish between national and
global security threats. Second, the Canadian government does not distinguish between serious
environmental threats and environmental concerns. The conflation of all environmental issues
mixes environmental security threats with other less serious environmental issues and thus makes
it more difficult to properly address the actual threats to security. However, the Canadian
government does treat one area -- nuclear power plant safety -- specifically as a national security
threat.

Environmental Concerns vs Environmental Threats
Many of the Canadian policy statements with respect to environmental degradation conflate
serious environmental threats with all environmental issues. The Canadian Arctic Environmental
Strategy (AES) is the main document addressing the Canadian government's policy with regards
to the Arctic environment and its contents demonstrate this problem of identification. For
example the goal of the AES is to "preserve and enhance the integrity, health, bio-diversity and
productivity of our Arctic ecosystems for the benefit of present and future generations. "244 This
Stewart, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 209.
244 Nigel Bankes, Terry Fenge and Sarah Kalff, "Toward Sustainable Development: Policies and

International Relations," in Canada Among Nations 1993-94 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press,
94

is a very broad and general statement which demonstrates that the Canadian government fails to
make the distinction between environmental threats and environmental concerns. The following
five main objectives of the AES further illustrate this problem:
1. To ensure the health and well-being of Arctic ecosystems;
2. To provide for the protection and enhancement of environmental quality and sustainable
utilization of resources, including their use by indigenous peoples;
3. To ensure that indigenous peoples' perspectives, values and practices are fully
accommodated in the planning, development, conservation and protection of the Arctic
reg1on;
4 . To ensure better decision-making through integration of local, national and
international interests as part of new legal, constitutional and co-operative
arrangements; and
5. To develop international agreements and arrangements to use, conserve and manage
resources and protect the circumpolar Arctic environment. 245

While the identification of the environment (in the AES objectives) as an important part of
ensuring the "health and well-being of the Arctic ecosystems" demonstrates the partial acceptance
by the Canadian government of identifying environmental degradation as a security threat there is
no real identification of national environmental security threats. Why, for example, is there no
objective that has as its main goal the implementation of an environmental security program that
assesses environmental threats for their security implications and finds ways in which to address
these threats?

Even when Canadian policy identifies a threat, it still uses labeling that does not differentiate
between serious threats and other environmental degradation in general. For example the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has recognized that environmental
degradation in Russia is a "direct threat to Canadian well-being. "246 This statement suggests that
Year), 17 5; Canada. Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, The Arctic Environmental
Strategy An Action P/an (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991 ), 2. Hereafter referred
to as DIAND, The Arctic Environmental. ..
245 Canada. Department oflndian and Northern Affairs, The Arctic Environmental Strategy: Five

Years of Progress (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1996), 6.
Hereafter referred to as DIAND, Five Years ... See also Bankes, et. al., 175 .

246 Canadian International Development Agency. Central and Eastern Europe Branch, Canadian

95

all environmental degradation in Russia is a threat to Canadian security when what it should be
suggesting is that there are specific problems of environmental degradation that are security
threats to Canada, while others are not. The difference may seem slight, but actually is important
since the identification of specific threats means that there is a clearly defined problem for which
the Canadian government has to find a solution, as opposed to a general statement which can be
addressed through a general, but not too involved, policy.

To some extent the Canadian government did acknowledge the significance of environmental
threats by placing them in the 1994 White Paper. The following quotation from the 1994 White

Paper discusses the role played by the Department ofNational Defence with respect to
environmental threats:
The Department ofNational Defence has concluded a memorandum of
understanding with the Department of the Environment with respect to the
use of the Canadian Forces in environmental surveillance and clean-up. The
agreement sets out the role of the Department and the Forces in assisting the
Department of the Environment in the event of a serious environmental
incident. In addition, as the Forces carry out their routine surveillance mission,
they will seek to identify and report potential and actual environmental
problems."24 7
While the report does identify that a role exists for the DND with respect to the environment it
really only addresses responses to catastrophes that have already happened as opposed to
addressing present threats in order to avert a catastrophe. Furthermore there is no direct
identification of environmental threats as security threats. In contrast to this the American
government has done a better job in terms of identifying that environmental threats do exist. For
example, the White House issued a National Security Strategy paper which acknowledged that
environmental concerns should be included in the national security agenda:

Cooperation with Russia (Project Listing as of February 28, 1997), 6. Hereafter referred to as

CIDA.

24 7 Canada. Department ofNational Defence, 17-18.

96

Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most
relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make
the most difference .. .In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on
what best serves our own long-term interests. Those interests are ultimately
defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical
defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as
well as the security of values achieved through the expansion of the community
of democratic nations.248
The above quotation not only demonstrates the acceptance of environmental security, but also
confirms that the environment is an integral part of American national security. While the
Canadian government has identified environmental problems as a concern, it has usually done this
in terms of global issues and has not directly identified that there is a need to address
environmental threats that threaten national security.

Global vs National Security Threats
In addition to conflating environmental threats and environmental concerns, Canadian policy also
conflates national and global environmental threats. In most cases global threats like POPs and
national threats like nuclear waste are included in the same category. For example the AES does
not have an objective that acknowledges the importance of distinguishing between national and
global threats. 249 Furthermore, most of the programs that Canada is involved in, for example the
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) do not differentiate between global and
national threats.

National Security: Finally Getting it Right
The one area in which the Canadian government comes the closest to actually identifying an
environmental threat as a national security threat is with the threat posed by nuclear reactors in
Russia. In 1991 the Canadian technical assistance program for the FSU identified that the safety
248 United States, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington,

D .C. : The White House, 1995), 1 and 7, cited in Griffiths, 17.
249 DIAND, Five Years ..., 6; Bankes, et. al. , 175 .

97

ofRussian nuclear power plants is a security concern for Canada. In this program the Canadian
government has placed the threat posed by Russian nuclear power plants under the specific sector
of security.250 By placing the threat from aging plants under the sector of security the Canadian
government has been able to give it greater attention and funding . This is also the area where
disastrous consequences have already been faced as a result of not addressing the threat soon
enough. The Chernobyl accident and its fallout made the safety ofRussian nuclear plants a
readily acknowledged security threat because the results of an accident have actually been
witnessed and deemed to be horrific. The identification of nuclear power plants as a security
concern has meant that this threat has received a great deal more attention by the Canadian
government than other environmental security areas.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR AND NONNUCLEAR THREATS
To address national security threats, states often employ the instruments ofbilateral and
multilateral agreements. For example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are bilateral and multilateral responses
to the former military threat posed by the USSR In a similar fashion the Canadian government
uses bilateral and multilateral agreements to deal with environmental issues. The Canadian
government has entered into several broad bilateral agreements with Russia, which include
environmental cooperation, technical support, technical exchanges and financial support, in order
to address the environmental threat to the Arctic.251 In addition to this the Canadian government

250 Lamb 81
'
.
251 Report to Ministers AMAP Interim Report to the Third Ministerial Conference, Arctic

Environmental Protection Strategy, Inuvik, Canada, By the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment

Programme Working Group (AMAP Report 96 :1, March 1996) 26-27. Hereafter referred to as
AMAP 96 :1. Refer to a Table 4.1 for a list of some ofthe more important bilateral agreements
between Canada and Russia.

98

has entered into several multilateral agreements that address environmental degradation in the
Arctic.

TABLE 4.1
Bilateral Agreements Between Russia and Canada Pertaining to the Environment
April 16, 1984 -- Protocol of Canadian-Soviet Consultations on the Development of a
Programme of Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Arctic and the North 252
April20, 1988 -- Protocol on Problems ofMonitoring and Environmental Protection with the
USSR 253
November 20, 1989 -- General Agreement on Arctic Cooperation with the Soviet Union 254
June 19, 1992 -- Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the
Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North 255 (replaced 1989 Agreement)
June 19, 1992 -- Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between Canada and the Russian
Federation 256
1993 -- Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russia
Federation concerning Environmental Cooperation 257
The bilateral and multilateral agreements are important cooperative attempts to address the
problems with the Arctic environment. Not surprisingly, however, given the Canadian policy
252 CARC, 52.
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
2 55 Canadian Government, Agreement between the Government of CANADA and the

Government of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North (with
Annex) Treaty Series 1992, no. 18 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1992) 8.
256 Canadian Government, Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between CANADA and the

RUSSIAN FEDERATION Treaty Series 1993, no. 23 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1994), 10.
257 Canadian Government, Agreement between the Government of CANADA and the

Government of the RUSSIAN FEDERATION concerning Environmental Cooperation Treaty
Series 1993, no . 7 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1993) 6.

99

statements, these agreements fail to distinguish between global and national environmental threats
and actually refer to environmental protection as one large overlapping objective.

Marine Pollution From Nuclear Waste
For the most part the Canadian government has failed to properly address the threat posed from
nuclear waste because it does not directly identify that the threat exists. The Canadian Nuclear
Safety Initiative (CNSI) is supposed to include nuclear waste concerns, but really only
concentrates on the safety of nuclear power plants. The only other agreements Canada is
involved with concerning the monitoring of radioactive dumping are found in the Arctic
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program
(AMAP) and the Arctic Council. 258 These agreements involve the participation of all eight Arctic
countries and provide an opportunity for these countries to work together in dealing with
environmental problems in the Arctic.

Under the AEPS and AMAP, Canada has been a participant in an ongoing assessment of the
extent of radioactive contamination and the potential risks.259 In 1995 AMAP opened a Data
Centre which monitors the type and levels of radioactive contamination in the atmosphere and the

25 8 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, "Environment and

Renewable Resources: Cooperation with Russia concerning Circumpolar Environmental
Problems," in report given at An Information Sharing Workshop on Canadian Technical
assistance and the Russian Environment Sector on April13, 1993 ; The AEPS was signed in June
of 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland and is also know as the Rovaniemi Initiative. Lassi Heininen, "An
Introduction," Arctic Environmental Problems, Lassi Heininen, 2nd ed. (Tampere: Tampere
Peace Research Institute, 1990) 16; CARC, 57; Bankes et. al., 177; AMAP is a part ofthe
accomplishments the AEPS it was also initiated in 1991 and the first phase of AMAP was devoted
to establishing a monitoring program for the Arctic. AMAP 96 :1, 21 ; The Arctic Council was
established in September of 1996 in order to facilitate co-operation in protecting the Arctic
environment. Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Counci/1996, 1;
Arctic Council, 1. See also "Canada and the Arctic Council," Global Agenda 4, no.3 (December
1996): 1-2.
259 AMAP 96 ·1 50
. '
.

100

ocean.260 While this is definitely a step forward in terms of monitoring the radioactive
contamination there have been little gains made in the actual clean-up of the waste. Furthermore,
the problem with AMAP is that it spreads its resources too thin by dealing with a broad range of
issues including its priorities of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), certain heavy metals and
radionuclides.261

This also is a good example of how a global threat like POPs has been lumped together with
the more national threat of radionuclides. The problem with doing this is that by addressing POPs
through AMAP some progress may be made, but the problem will not be adequately dealt with
because it is a global threat. On the other hand AMAP would be a good forum for addressing the
issue of radionuclides in the North, because the main threat of radioactive contamination
originates from one ofthe Arctic states (Russia).

There are other possible ways through which the Canadian government could address the
threat posed by nuclear waste from Russia. One option for addressing the threat, after it has been
identified as one, would be for the Canadian government to create a new section for the CNSI
that specifically deals with the nuclear waste threat. John M . Lamb suggests that this is one of the
solutions that Canada could use to improve the safety of nuclear storage facilities in Russia.262
Another option would be for Canada to seek greater involvement with the Barents Euro-Arctic
Council's initiatives in the cleanup of the nuclear waste threat. The Council is one multilateral

260 Ibid.
261 Report to the Ministers Update on Issues of Concern to the Arctic Environment, Including

Recommendations for Action, By the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Task Force (AMAP
Report 93:4, September 1993) 59. Hereafter referred to as AMAP 93:4; Canada. Department of
Indian and Northern Affairs. Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report, edited by J.
Jensen, K. Adare and R. Shearer (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services,
1997), 21.
262 Lamb, 102-103 .

101

agreement that specifically addresses the threat posed by nuclear waste in the Arctic. The
priorities ofthe Council are nuclear safety, decommissioning of nuclear submarines, handling and
transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, and the storage of radioactive waste and
spent nuclear fuel. 263 Further to this the Council has even made recommendations concerning
radioactive pollution in the Arctic and supports the establishment of an IAEA contact expert
group to deal with the management and storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel. 264 In
addition to this the Council has acknowledged that Russia, alone, is not able to deal with the
elimination of the effects of nuclear dumping in the Arctic and thus it is necessary for other states
to aid Russia in addressing these nuclear threats. 265 The Council has shown, by far, the most
concern and understanding, among all international organizations, towards the threat of nuclear
contamination in the Arctic. Roginko suggests that the Council:
... represents the first authoritative international forum that operates
in the most politically and environmentally sensitive region of the Arctic.
Since the mandate of the Council includes comprehensive coverage of the
issues of both environmental security and navigation along the NSR, its
activities may become most instrumental, particularly in providing institutional
and financial bases for effecting changes in the economic and other activities
which threaten the environmental security of the Arctic.266

Given the Council's focus on nuclear contamination, it is surprising that the Canadian government
has not been a more active member of the Council. Although Canada has observer status on the
Council it should pursue a more proactive role on it.

263 AMAP 96 .·1, 29 .
264 Ibid.
265 Alexei Yu. Roginko, "Arctic Environmental Co-operation: Prospects and Possibilities," in

Arctic Environmental Problems, Lassi Heininen, ed., 2nd ed. (Tampere: Tampere Peace Research
Institute, 1990), 8 7.

266 Roginko, "Arctic Environmental..." 87.

102

Marine Pollution From Nuclear Submarine Accidents
The Canadian government has not adequately identified the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic
from possible nuclear submarine accidents in Canadian Arctic waters and thus can not even begin
to find a solution to this problem. The Canadian government has examined different options with
which to patrol its Arctic waters, but has not found an agreeable arrangement. At least if the
threat were identified there could be a serious attempt made to address the issue, whether it
means patrolling Canadian Arctic waters with our own submarines, suggesting proposals to
reduce the number of nuclear powered submarines that Russia and the US have or spending
money to help decommission more of the aging Russian Northern Fleet. The main problem is that
the Canadian government has not properly identified this threat and thus has not addressed it.

Marine Pollution From POPs
With respect to the global threat ofPOPs, the Canadian government has been partially successful
in identifying and addressing it as a global threat. The Canadian government has used multilateral
agreements within the United Nations (UN) and AMAP to address the issue ofPOPs. In 1991
Canada and Sweden led the way in the development of a protocol concerning long-range
transboundary air pollution in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.267 In
addition to this Canada co-hosted an international meeting on persistent organic pollutants in
Vancouver in June of 1995 .268 Canada's enthusiastic participation in these UN negotiations to
some extent demonstrates that it acknowledges the issue as global in scope. However, the
problem is that the Canadian government also uses AMAP as an instrument to address POPs.
The use of AMAP to address POPs means that a great deal of the energy and funds for AMAP
(which could be spent on nuclear threats) are spent on the POPs issue, when the Canadian
government and other governments have clearly in other cases addressed it as a global threat. It

267 DIAND Five Years ... , 40.
268 Ibid., 41 .

103

would seem to make more sense to spend more AMAP resources on the nuclear threats, while
more actively pursuing POPs at global forums such as the UN.

Atmospheric Pollution From Nuclear Testing
The Canadian government has not identified or addressed the possible re-commencement of
nuclear testing in the Arctic as a national security threat. While Russia has signed the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Canadian government should be acknowledging the
need to support democratic changes in Russia so that the Russians do not start nuclear testing in
the Arctic again. Any change in leadership or foreign policy could mean that the CTBT could be
discarded since it has no enforcement mechanisms. Up to this point the Canadian government
seems to have ignored this possibility and has not addressed or even identified this threat.

Atmospheric Pollution From Nuclear Power Plant Accidents
The Canadian government has been more successful in addressing the threat from aging nuclear
power plants in Russia because it has singled this area out and adopted a program specifically to
cope with this issue. When the Canadian government included the CNSI program under the
sector of security in its technical assistance program, there was a specific recognition of the
national security threat posed from nuclear power plants in Russia. The result of this recognition
is that the CNSI had a starting budget of over $30 million and had as its sole purpose making
"... Canadian expertise available to the nuclear power industry in Russia and other countries to
help alleviate the risk of nuclear accidents at Soviet-designed nuclear power stations."269 The
attempt to alleviate the risk of nuclear accidents included safety assessments, the operational and
design upgrading of specific plants and the enhancement of nuclear safety regulations as well as
scientific training sessions by Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board staff 270 As can be seen

269 CIDA, 44; Lamb, 81.
270 Atomic Energy Control Board, "Demand Increasing for Foreign Training," AECB Report

(Fall 1994): 2.

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from the comments above the CNSI deals with most of the main problems that exist with the
aging nuclear power plants in Russia.

In addition to the CNSI, Canada also contributes funds to the Nuclear Safety Account
established by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 271 Furthermore, CIDA
also has two projects that deal with nuclear power plant safety. The first program is designed to
improve nuclear safety at RBMK plants in Russia.272 The Canadian government, in cooperation
with Russian officials, will design specifications for safety modifications, improved operational
procedures and training in safety design and operations.273 The other project is designed to
"... enhance the capacity of training institutions to provide their own nuclear safety-related training
program and train the trainers at these training institutions to ensure the sustainability of AECB
training programs ... "274 As can be seen by these programs the Canadian government is not only
addressing the issue of poor technology, but also poor training and safety standards. In
comparison to the other threats the Canadian government has responded to a much greater extent
to the nuclear power plant threat. Greater action on this issue is probably due to the identification
of this threat specifically as a security threat. This would not have happened if the Canadian
government had not witnessed the devastation caused by the Chemobyl accident. Perhaps the
Canadian government won't take action on the other issues until an accident involving nuclear
waste or a nuclear submarine causes extensive devastation.

271 CIDA, 44.

272 Ibid., 46 .
273 Ibid.
274 Ibid., 45 .

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Atmospheric Pollution From Heavy Metals and Acidification
The problems posed by heavy metals and acidification are complex. For Canada these problems
should be dealt with at the global level, as they do not pose a national security threat. However,
for Norway and Finland, the pollution caused by industries on the nearby Kola Peninsula does
pose a national security threat. The Canadian government has addressed these threats mainly
though the AEPS . While this regional approach shows concern for this form of environmental
degradation, the Canadian government should really pursue these issues at the global level where
more progress can be made.

CONCLUSION
While this thesis has argued that there are similarities between environmental and 'traditional'
security issues there is one large difference. Environmental threats require cooperation from the
state from which the threat originates. The cooperation on behalf of the source state is crucial to
a successful solution to the problem. With the end of the Cold War the possibilities for
cooperation with Russia greatly increased and the Canadian government has performed admirably
to make sure that the lines of cooperation remain open. Unfortunately it has not performed so
admirably in the identification of environmental threats.

The Canadian government has failed to adequately address most environmental threats, largely
because of its failure to acknowledge them as national security threats. However, the Canadian
government has also taken a number of measures that demonstrate its concern for the
environment. This concern, however, does not address the issue that by not distinguishing among
dire national threats, global threats and environmental concerns serious environmental threats are
not dealt with properly. The end result is that nearly all of the nuclear threats remain inadequately
addressed. The exception to this is with the threat posed from the aging nuclear plants in Russia.
The Canadian government has specifically identified and addressed this threat as a security threat
and thus it has also given this threat more funding and attention. Thus, the political argument
made in Chapter One has some merit: by placing this threat on the security agenda, the Canadian

106

government focused more attention and funding on it. While the Canadian government has not
properly identified and addressed the other nuclear threats, the identification of the nuclear power
plant threat as a security threat opens the door for other environmental issues to be included
specifically in the national security agenda. Furthermore, the notion that POPs are global
security issues is demonstrated by the different approach that the Canadian government, for the
most part, has taken with respect to POPs. The Canadian government's use of global forums and
the United Nations supports the suggestion that the best way to address POPs is through global
initiatives and not national security agendas. Furthermore multilateral programs like AMAP
would be more useful if they placed most of their energies on more regional threats.

If governments are to address environmental threats properly they must first identify them
properly. It is no longer enough to have blanket environmental policies. There are different types
of environmental threats which require different solutions. Scholars and governments should
acknowledge that not only do global environmental threats exist, but national environmental
security threats also exist.

107

CONCLUSION
In the past governments viewed security issues as purely military threats to a state. In recent
years the focus on military security has expanded to include other types of threats to security.
Now policy makers examine issues such as overpopulation, food scarcity, and economic security
for their security implications. In addition to these issues scholars and policy makers are
increasingly concerned with the threat posed by environmental degradation. The thesis examined
the link between the environment and security using the case study of environmental degradation
in the Russian North. The thesis argued that not only could environmental degradation be seen as
a security threat, but in specific cases it could be seen as a national security threat.

Most research on environmental security takes a global perspective. Many scholars suggest
that environmental threats can only be addressed through global cooperation, as a consequence,
they downplay the role the nation state. These scholars view national security objectives as being
in direct contradiction with global security objectives. While there is a need to address global
environmental threats, there is also a need to address national threats. The nation-state still exists
and is not likely to disappear in the near future. If states only identify and address global
environmental threats, they neglect national environmental threats -- each requires different
responses.

The case study of the environmental degradation of the Russian North demonstrates that both
national and global threats exist. The nuclear contamination in the Russian North, for example,
poses a national security threat to Canada and other nearby states, while Russian and European
emissions that contribute to the problem of Arctic haze, represent a global security threat. The
Canadian government needs to address each of these threats, and policy makers need to
distinguish between global threats that need global solutions and national threats that need
national or regional solutions.

108

Up to the present time the Canadian government has only properly identified and addressed
one of the environmental threats from the Russian North-- nuclear power plants. One can
wonder as to whether or not the Canadian government would even have acknowledged the threat
from nuclear power plants if it were not for the Chernobyl accident. Canadian policy makers need
to properly identify other threats such as nuclear waste buildup, nuclear submarine accidents, and
nuclear testing as national security threats in order to address them effectively. The question
remains as to whether or not there will have to be another devastating accident from one of the
other nuclear threats before the Canadian government takes them seriously.
The results of this study suggest problems for further research. The study of environmental
degradation in relation to security reveals a need for further investigation of the definition of
security with the aim of achieving a sharper refinement of this important concept. Further
research is required, for example, to establish criteria to clearly distinguish between environmental
threats and environmental concerns. Such refinement is necessary to determine whether issues
such as overfishing and sealing are environmental threats or environmental concerns.

A second area for investigation regarding security is the problem surrounding defining national
and global environmental threats. At the start of this endeavor it was expected that all of the
instances of environmental degradation examined would prove to be national security threats.
However, in the process of the analysis it became clear that there were differences between the
nuclear threats and non-nuclear threats that stemmed both from the sources of these threats as
well as the number of countries affected by these threats. The result was the realization that a
distinction had to be made between global and national threats in order for governments to find
effective strategies for addressing each level of threat. This was not the only unexpected finding .
Another area for examination that arose from the study was the concept of regional security.
Throughout the course of the study regional security began to appear as an area that merited
further investigation. The key question is whether regional security is simply an extension of
national security or if it requires investigation as an alternative security choice. Is regional

109

security a possible middle ground between national and global security which could address both
national and global threats?

Chapter One argued that this thesis was a variation of the most-likely case which if proven true
could be the basis for further studies. Since the case substantiated the claim that environmental
degradation can be seen as a national security threat this paves the way for further test cases. In
the course of this study other possible case studies were brought to light. For example the threat
posed to Scandinavia from heavy metals and sulfur emissions may prove to be another case that
substantiates the claims made in this study. In addition to this it would be useful to investigate
other regions in order to assess whether or not similar cases can be made. A comparative study
of several different types of environmental degradation in several different regions may be the
next step towards further research in this area. In addition to this it may be necessary to further
investigate the links between health effects and pollution in order to better substantiate the threat
posed by environmental degradation.

A final area of research that emerged from this study was to look at what tools Canada and
other countries might use in order to address new threats to security. Whether or not the
identification of threats makes a real difference in policy requires further investigation. The first
step in this process is to differentiate between national and global threats as well as concerns and
threats. After this there are many different policies and tools that the Canadian government could
use. For example determining whether bilateral or multilateral negotiations are necessary. In the
case of the nuclear threats to Canada from the Russian North one possible response could be
similar the CNSI. In other words a specific program could be set up not only to analyze what the
specific problems associated with the threat are, but also to search for strategies to effectively
address the threat. The goal of these strategies should always be to lessen the threat that exists to
the Canadian population. The main observable response that the identification of a national
security threat gives is in terms of dollars. Since funds are a main issue in addressing most of
these threats this is not an insignificant immediate response. However, further research could
110

delve into greater detail on what specific policies the Canadian government could pursue with
respect to the threats outlined in this work as well as others.

111

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