JAPAN, CANADA, AND THE U.S. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF MIDDLE-POWER RELATIONS WITH A SUPERPOWER by Mika Kamei B.A., Hiroshima Shudo University, 2006 THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA December 2010 ©Mika Kamei, 2010 1*1 Library and Archives Canada Bibliotheque et Archives Canada Published Heritage Branch Direction du Patrimoine de I'edition 395 Wellington Street Ottawa ON K1A 0N4 Canada 395, rue Wellington OttawaONK1A0N4 Canada Your file Votre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-75121-3 Our file Notre reference ISBN: 978-0-494-75121-3 NOTICE: AVIS: The author has granted a nonexclusive license allowing Library and Archives Canada to reproduce, publish, archive, preserve, conserve, communicate to the public by telecommunication or on the Internet, loan, distribute and sell theses worldwide, for commercial or noncommercial purposes, in microform, paper, electronic and/or any other formats. L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive permettant a la Bibliotheque et Archives Canada de reproduire, publier, archiver, sauvegarder, conserver, transmettre au public par telecommunication ou par I'lnternet, preter, distribuer et vendre des theses partout dans le monde, a des fins commerciales ou autres, sur support microforme, papier, electronique et/ou autres formats. The author retains copyright ownership and moral rights in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur et des droits moraux qui protege cette these. Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. In compliance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms may have been removed from this thesis. Conformement a la loi canadienne sur la protection de la vie privee, quelques formulaires secondaires ont ete enleves de cette these. While these forms may be included in the document page count, their removal does not represent any loss of content from the thesis. Bien que ces formulaires aient inclus dans la pagination, il n'y aura aucun contenu manquant. 1+1 Canada Abstract Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a significant and controversial security issue in the world today. The United States (U.S.) is the leader in BMD development and deployment. This thesis analyzes the differing orientations to BMD of two key U.S. allies, Japan and Canada. The central questions asked in the thesis are: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to formally join in 2005? What inferences can we draw about "BMD politics" from these decisions? These questions were answered in three steps. First, I developed an analytic approach inspired by Putnam's "two-level game theory." Second, I applied this approach to my two case studies. Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. BMD relations between 1983 and 2008 were analyzed at two levels, domestic and international, which resulted in identifying six international-related factors and two domestic-related factors influencing Japan's and Canada's BMD decision-making process. And third, the two case studies were compared and analyzed. I conclude that the basis for the two countries' foreign policy decisions was significantly different. Japanese foreign policy decision-making was rooted in realist thinking, while Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. n Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iii List of Tables vi List of Figures vii List of Acronyms viii Acknowledgements x Chapter I: Introduction 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 Context 1 1.3 Research Question 4 1.4 Methodology 5 1.5 Answers to Research Questions 7 1.6 Benefit of Thesis 8 1.7 Order of Chapters 9 Chapter II: Background - Understanding Ballistic Missile Defense 10 2.1 Introduction 10 2.2 Definition and Brief History 10 2.3 Ballistic Missiles in Global Perspective 15 2.4 Cooperation with U.S. BMD 18 2.5 Conclusion 21 Chapter III: A BMD Comparative Study - Literature Review and Methodology 22 3.1 Introduction 22 3.2 Literature Review 22 The Case of Japan 25 The Case of Canada 28 3.3 Methodology 29 3.4 Realism and Liberal Internationalism 32 3.5 Conclusion 33 in Chapter IV: The Case of Japan 34 4.1 Introduction 34 4.2 Chronology of Japanese-American BMD Relations 34 Period 1: Beginning of BMD Relations, 1983 to 1990 Period 2: Expansion of BMD Relations, 1990 to 2003 Period 3: Official BMD Relations, 2003 to 2008 Summary 4.3 Analysis of External Factors: International BMD Politics 35 36 39 41 43 Easing Economic Friction Resolving Alliance Dilemmas Serving to Develop Japan's Military Capability Responding to Missile Threats 4.4 Analysis of Internal Factors: Domestic BMD Politics in Japan Circumventing Constitutional Obstacles Smoothing Japanese Public Reaction 4.5 Conclusion 43 45 48 50 52 52 56 57 Chapter V: The Case of Canada 62 5.1 Introduction 62 5.2 Chronology of Canadian-American BMD Relations 62 Period 1: NORAD and the Beginning of BMD Relations, 1983 to 1990 Period 2: Lukewarm BMD Relations, 1990 to 2005 Period 3: Low-Level BMD Relations, 2005 to 2008 Summary 5.3 Analysis of External Factors: International BMD Politics 63 64 67 68 70 Protecting Canada's Long-Held Liberal Internationalist Reputation Protecting Canada's Freedom of Action in Foreign Affairs Experiencing Dual Economic Pressures Using the NORAD Connection Convinced by Missile Threats Support for U.S. Foreign Policy 70 71 71 73 76 77 5.4 Analysis of Internal Factors: Domestic BMD Politics in Canada Growing Public Opposition 79 79 5.5 James Fergusson's Canada and Ballistic Missile Defense, 1954-2009 81 5.6 Conclusion 84 Chapter VI: Comparative Analysis 88 6.1 Introduction 88 IV 6.2 Comparing the Histories - Japan's and Canada's BMD Relations with the U.S Period 1: Beginning of BMD Relations (1983-1990) Period 2: Reaching Different Decisions (Japan: 1990-2003; Canada: 1990-2005) Period 3: Aftermath of the Decisions (to 2008) 88 89 89 91 6.3 Comparing the Factors 92 6.4 Comparative Analysis of External (International) Factors 94 Economic and Financial Issues Military Capabilities Missile Threat Perceptions Alliance Issues Protecting National Image Protecting Sovereignty 6.5 Comparative Analysis of Internal (Domestic) Factors 94 95 96 97 100 101 102 Public Reaction Government's Legal and Political Adaptability 102 103 6.6 Conclusion 104 Chapter VII: Conclusion 107 7.1 Introduction 107 7.2 Contribution to the Study of BMD Issues 107 7.3 Limitations of My Research 108 7.4 Further Research 109 7.5 Conclusion 112 Bibliography 113 v List of Tables Table 2.1 Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles 16 Table 4.1 Chronology of Japan-U.S. BMD Relations 41 Table 4.2 Factors Explaining Japan's Decisions to Cooperate with the U.S. BMD Program, and their Historical Influence 60 Table 5.1 Chronology of Canada-U.S. BMD Relations 68 Table 5.2 Factors Explaining Canada's Decisions to Reject Formal Participation in the U.S. BMD Program, and their Historical Influence 86 Table 6.1 Comparative Factors Explaining Japan's and Canada's Decisions in BMD 93 VI List of Figures Figure 2.1 The Three Segments of Missile Defense System 13 Figure 2.2 Select Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles (2009) 18 Figure 2.3 Highlights of International Missile Defense Activity 19 vn List of Acronyms ABMT BMD BPG CCOMD CRS C2BMC DOD DPJ D.P.R.K. GBI GMD GPALS ICBMs IRBMs JASDF JCR JDA JGSDF JIIA JMSDF LDP MAD MDA MOD NAD NAFTA NATO NDP NDPG NDPO NGO NIDS NK NMD NORAD NORTHCOM NPR NTWD PAC-3 PKOs SALT SBX SDF SDI Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Ballistic Missile Defense Bi-national Planning Group Canadian Campaign to Oppose Missile Defence Congressional Research Service Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications United States Department of Defense Democratic Party of Japan Democratic People's Republic of Korea Ground Based Interceptor (a ground launched anti-ballistic missile) Ground-based Midcourse Defense Global Protection Against Limited Strikes Intercontinental Ballistic missiles Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles Japan Air Self-Defense Forces Joint Cooperate Research Japan Defense Agency Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces Japan Institute of International Affairs Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces Liberal Democratic Party Mutually Assured Destruction U.S. Missile Defense Agency Japanese Ministry of Defense Navy Area Defense North American Free Trade Agreement North Atlantic Treaty Organization Canada New Democratic Party National Defense Program Guidelines National Defense Program Outline, Kokubo Keikakuno Taiko Nongovernmental Organization Japan National Institute for Defense Studies Japan New Komeito Party National Missile Defense North American Aerospace Defense Command U.S. North Command Nuclear Posture Review Navy Theater Wide Defense Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (an advanced surface-to-air missile) Peacekeeping operations Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Sea-Based X-Band (a floating radar station deployed in ocean waters) Japan's Self Defense Force Strategic Defense Initiative vm SM-3 SRBMs START THAAD TMD UEWR U.K. UN U.S. USFJ U.S.S.R. WESTPAC WMD WWII Standard Missiles-3 (a naval launched anti-ballistic missile) Short Range Ballistic Missiles Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty Terminal High Altitude Area Defense Theater Missile Defense Upgraded Early Warning Radars United Kingdom United Nations United States United States Forces Japan Union of Soviet Socialist Republics West Pacific Missile Defense Architecture Study Weapons of Mass Destruction World War II IX Acknowledgements Thanks to the consistent support and encouragement of Professor Kenneth Wilkening, my primary supervisor, I was able to complete my MA thesis. He has taught me how to think as a graduate student with his strict, straightforward and gracious advice. He taught me how to reflect on my research results, and how to put my reflections into writing. In the process, I learned the significance of being honest with myself. Ken-sensei, I will never forget the political science and life philosophy which you have taught me. Thank you very much. Professor Brian Job, my committee member from the University of British Columbia (UBC), gave me much valuable advice. When I was unconfident about my abilities to conduct my research, he taught me three factors of being successful as a graduate student: passion, interest and hard work. From him I gained the confidence to keep moving forward with my studies and research. Brian, thank you for your gentle and respectful guidance. I also thank Professor Heather Smith for being a member of my committee. Heather's course, Canada and the World, was the first international studies course I took after coming to Canada. I was impressed by her powerful and inspirational teaching style. Thanks to her, I became fascinated by "Canada and the world." This thesis is a product of that fascination instilled long ago. In addition, I appreciate her detailed critique of the final draft of the thesis. This helped to significantly improve its quality. I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Tsuyoshi Kawasaki from Simon Fraser University (SFU) for being the external examiner for my thesis defense. I was very pleased to have a Japanese scholar on my examining committee. Avery Poole, PhD candidate, Political Science Department, UBC, is my most trusted and favorite tutor. She tutored me from the time I moved to Vancouver. I am sure that she understands my English better than anyone else. She helped me make my English writing understandable to my professors. In that sense, she is my tutor and translator. Avery, thank you for sharing your intelligence and always being lovely & patient. It is not easy to write a Master's thesis in a non-native language. Tom Peotto, PhD candidate, History Department, UBC, was my proofreader. He corrected my grammar and suggested better phrasing for my thesis writing. I was very lucky to have such an able proof reader. He assisted me with respect and modesty. In addition, his humorous style made English editing not a pain but a pleasure. Tom, my thesis and I both thank you. Thanks to my alma master in Japan, Hiroshima Shudo University (HSU), where I received my Bachelor of Arts. It was here that I fell in love with Political Science. I will always remember how much I enjoyed learning at HSU. Special thanks goes to my fiance, Marcin Obidowski. When I was disappointed at having to work on repeated drafts of my thesis, and when I was happy to hear a good word from my professors, he was always there. Marcin, thank you for always being beside me and encouraging me every day. Last but certainly not least, very special thanks goes to my parents in Japan who always supported me from the other side of the Pacific Ocean. In our hearts, we were always together—fighting together, smiling together, and making my thesis together. I want to express my utmost appreciation to my dearest parents, Takeshi Kamei and Shizuko Masutani Kamei. *5:5S £ AA * 5 # & A A if 5 h fo <9 & t 5 „ >bfrb. xi ^itLTl^-fo Chapter I: Introduction 1.1 Introduction Ballistic missile defense (BMD) is a significant and controversial security issue in the world today. It is significant because missile proliferation activities, such as those of Iran and North Korea, can have a destabilizing influence on international relations, and it is controversial because even though supporters of BMD cite its importance in curbing arms races and preventing regional wars, critics describe it as unrealistic, comparing it to "hitting a bullet with a bullet."1 This chapter introduces the overall framework of this thesis. Section 1.2 presents the historical and political context of BMD issues. Section 1.3 presents my research questions. Section 1.4 presents the methodology I used. Section 1.5 presents the answers to my research questions. Section 1.6 presents the value or benefits of the thesis, and Section 1.7 presents the order of chapters. 1.2 Context The construction of ballistic missiles and missile intercepting systems dates from World War II (WWII). The first use of missiles in warfare occurred when Germany launched rocket attacks against France and Britain in 1944. Thereafter, missile attacks became a new military threat demanding new military strategies to counteract. In particular, the onset of the Cold War led the two main protagonists, the United States (U.S.) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), to rapidly develop not only nuclear weapons but also ballistic 1 Well Keener, "Hitting a Bullet with a Bullet," Sandia National Laboratories: Quarterly Research and Development Journal 5 (2004): 7. 1 missiles to deliver them. In turn, this led to the development of missile defense systems to protect against missile attacks. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. dramatically increased their inventory of nuclear weapons and number of ballistic missiles, and they tried to develop feasible missile defense systems. By the late 1960s, due to the dramatic increase in the number of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the two countries realized the necessity of arms cuts. They began disarmament talks that turned into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which included BMD. Anti-ballistic missile defense systems were developed to reduce an opponent's missile strike capabilities. However, the defensive use of missiles had the potential to trigger an increase in the number of ballistic missiles because both countries were afraid of losing their offensive missile attack capabilities, and hence would be likely to increase offensive missile numbers so as to overwhelm any defensive capabilities. To address this, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. concluded the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), which strictly regulated the number and location of U.S. and U.S.S.R. anti-ballistic missile systems. However, BMD research and development continued. The Ronald Reagan administration ushered in a new era of BMD development in 1983 when it introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) designed to defend the U.S. from Soviet nuclear attacks. Reagan's goal was to construct a military defense system to make nuclear weapons powerless and outdated.3 For that purpose, he sought support worldwide, including from Japan and Canada. 2 Tetsuya Umemoto, "Hondo Misairu Boei no Tenkai" (Development of National Missile Defense), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kbzu (Missile Defense: New Design for International Security) (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), 2002), 34. 3 Ibid, 38. 2 After the Cold War ended around 1990, the George H. W. Bush administration established the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) defense initiative, which focused on new potential ballistic missile threats, especially from the third world.4 GPALS included both ground-based National Missile Defense (NMD) and Theater Missile Defense (TMD) systems designed for intercepting shorter-range missiles, including short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),5 and prioritized security for U.S. foreign-deployed troops and U.S. allies.6 At first, the Clinton administration continued the concept of the GPALS; however, in the late 1990s emphasis was placed on NMD over TMD because countries like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) were constructing missiles that could potentially reach the continental U.S. NMD systems were designed chiefly for defending the continental U.S. In all these efforts, the U.S. collaborated with allied and friendly nations, such as Australia, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom (U.K.). In the 1990s, none of these countries faced urgent missile threats, except Japan. In the early 2000s, the U.S. BMD program underwent another significant change. The George W. Bush administration withdrew from the ABMT in 2002, which then permitted the U.S. to deploy BMD systems without strict restrictions. This move forced U.S. allies to decide whether or not to join the American BMD program. By 2010, six countries— 4 Michael Byers, Intent for a Nation: A Relentlessly Optimistic Manifesto for Canada's Role in the World (Vancouver/Toronto: Douglas & Mclntyre, 2007), 41. 5 James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 38. 6 RobertM. Soofer, "Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy," Joint Force Quarterly (1995): 71. 7 Takashi Kawakami and Ken Jinbo, "Dando Misairu Boei to Nichibei Domei," (Ballistic Missile Defense and the Japan-U.S. Alliance), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kbzu (Missile Defense: New Design for International Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 271. 3 Australia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Japan, and the U.K.—had formally chosen to participate in U.S. research and development, and fourteen countries and one international organization, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had chosen to cooperate o (informally participate) with the U.S. BMD program. Canada in 2005 declined to officially join in the program. 1.3 Research Question My general interest is in "BMD politics"; specifically, determining why countries decide to join or not to join the U.S. BMD program. This led me to analyzing in this thesis the differing orientations to BMD of two key U.S. allies: Japan and Canada. As a Japanese citizen, I was curious as to why the Japanese government gradually joined the U.S. BMD program and eventually became one of its most enthusiastic supporters. And, as a foreign student studying in Canada, I was also curious why Canada did not formally join and was not an overt supporter of the U.S. program. I therefore decided to conduct a comparative study of these two countries. The fact that both Canada and Japan are middle-power states with a strong and positive working relationship with the U.S. provided justification for comparing them. In other words, they are comparable case studies. During the 1980s, Japan and Canada had similar stances to the U.S. BMD program. Both governments were hesitant to officially join in SDI efforts. The only major difference was that Canada was connected to U.S. missile defense strategy through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). The NORAD relationship began in the late 1950s; 8 Missile Defense Agency (MDA), U S Department of Defense (DOD), "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview: 8th Annual Missile Defense Conference," (2010), http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/bmds_briefinglO.pdf (accessed April 29, 2010) Chapter II, Figure 2-3 (Highlights of International Missile Defense Activity) details these countries' BMD involvement 4 thus, Canada and the U.S. had a more advanced basis for their BMD relationship than was the case for Japan and the U.S. This was true through the 1980s. Starting in the early 1990s, though, Japan and Canada began to go in different directions and by the mid-2000s they had chosen opposite paths. In 2003, Japan formally joined the U.S. BMD program; in 2005, Canada decided not to participate in the program even while maintaining its NORAD connection after the non-participation decision. Why did these two middle-power states take different paths? The central questions asked in the thesis are: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to formally join in 2005? What inferences can we draw about "BMD politics" from these decisions? To answer the first question I needed to examine Japan and Canada's decisionmaking processes on BMD from 1983 (start of Reagan's SDI and start of both country's entanglement in the U.S. BMD program) to the 2000s because it turns out a complex historical layering of factors, rather than a simple set of factors that existed only in 2003 and 2005, explained the choices. Thus, in my thesis I trace the evolution of Japan's and Canada's involvement in the U.S. BMD program. For the sake of completeness, I continued my examination beyond the decision dates to 2008 (the end of the George W. Bush administration) to determine whether the nature of Japan's support and Canada's non-support changed after 2003 and 2005, respectively. 1.4 Methodology My thesis is a comparative study. My central questions were answered in three steps. The first step was to develop a method for the study. To my knowledge, there are no comparative studies in the BMD literature of the sort I undertook in this thesis. Since there 5 was no method that I could imitate, I developed one using Putnam's "two-level game theory" as a starting point.9 Because I could not find in the BMD literature a systematically laid out set of variables that might explain BMD decisions, I decided to follow an inductive approach. In other words, rather than beginning with a comprehensive framework of variables, I systematically extracted variables from the case study literature and then at the end organized them into a framework. Thus, rather than starting with a detailed framework and applying it my case studies, I started with the case studies and derived from them a detailed framework. I did, however, develop an overarching organizing structure to apply to the case studies which had two elements: (1) codification of historical trends, and (2) division into two classes of variables based on Putnam's work, international and domestic variables. Putnam suggests "a conceptual framework for understanding how diplomacy and domestic politics interact" based on observing both the international and domestic levels of a political decision-making process.10 I chose this theory because in BMD politics, in most cases, including those of Japan and Canada, governments are placed in complicated dilemmas domestically and internationally. Putnam's theory emphasizes this duality and seeks to explain how the domestic and international levels are linked and how the linkages influence decision-making processes and final decisions by nation-states. It is reasonable to assume that a state's final decision on whether or not to join the U.S. BMD program is influenced by both domestic and international factors. At the domestic level, states deal with 9 Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42 (1988). 10 Ibid, 430. 6 internal political factors and actors related to BMD. At the international level, they negotiate with the U.S. and determine whether participation would be beneficial to them. Therefore, my research analyzed BMD issues between Japan-U.S. and Canada-U.S. from two perspectives: international (external) and domestic (internal). The second step of my method was to apply my Putnam-inspired approach to the case studies of Japan and Canada. Each case study is presented in three sections of analysis. The first introduces historical trends and tendencies in terms of bilateral relationships with the U.S. over BMD politics during three periods from 1983 to 2008. The second section presents the inductively derived international variables/factors, and the third section presents the inductively derived domestic variables/factors. And, the third step of my method was to compare the two case studies. I needed initially to create a consistent set of factors applicable to both cases. These factors were derived from an examination of the commonalities in the factors derived from the two case studies. For the international perspective, I identified six categories: economic and financial issues, military capabilities, missile threat perceptions, alliance issues, protecting national image, and protecting sovereignty. For the domestic perspective, I identified two categories: public opinion and government's legal and political adaptability. Not all of factors however were relevant to each case. Then based on the aforementioned eight categories of factors I compared the case studies. Results of this comparison yielded the answer to my central questions. 1.5 Answers to Research Questions My central research question is: Why did Japan choose to join the U.S.-led BMD program as an active cooperative country in 2003, while Canada chose not to formally join in 7 2005? Based on application of the above methodology, I found that four factors at the international level and two factors at the domestic level influenced Japan's BMD politics; especially, three main international factors directly explain Japan's decision to join: strengthening Japan's military capability, responding to missile threats in Northeast Asia, and resolving alliance dilemmas with the U.S. These factors suggest that Japanese foreign policy decision-making was rooted in realist thinking. I found that six factors in the international level and one factor in the domestic level influenced Canada's BMD politics; especially, five main international factors and one main domestic factor directly explain Canada's decision not to formally join: protecting Canada's long-held liberal internationalist reputation, protecting Canada's freedom of action in foreign policy, being unconvinced of missile threats, opposition to U.S. foreign policy under George W. Bush, using the NORAD connection, and public opposition to BMD. These factors suggest that Canadian foreign policy decision-making was rooted in a combination of liberal internationalist and realist thinking. 1.6 Benefit of Thesis My comparative analysis will broaden understanding of international responses to BMD, in particular bilateral relationships between the U.S. and middle-power allies. In addition, I set forth a method that seems to be new in the BMD field. Most research on BMD has focused on the U.S. BMD program alone or bilateral relations with the U.S. The majority of Japan's and Canada's BMD research is no exception; it chiefly focuses on bilateral relations and negotiations with the U.S. at the international level. In addition, although many scholarly books and articles focus on the U.S. and seek to explain the influence of the U.S.-led BMD program on world affairs from a practical military 8 viewpoint, few consider the political relations between the U.S. and its allies relative to BMD. Thus, my research provides fresh perspectives for policy-makers; especially, by shedding light on overlooked parts of middle power states' political concerns regarding BMD issues. In the end, my hope is that my research will contribute to informed debate on the merits and demerits of BMD. 1.7 Order of Chapters This thesis consists of seven chapters, including this introduction (Chapter I). Chapter II provides background. The concept of missile defense is defined and the historical development of BMD from the 1950s to 2008 is explained. Chapter III contains a review of the literature on BMD, and a more detailed explanation of my methodology. Chapter IV is the Japan case study, and Chapter V is the Canada case study. Chapter VI is the comparative analysis of Japan and Canada, bringing together the material of Chapters IV and V. This analysis provides the answer to my central question as to why these two countries chose opposite paths in their relationship to the U.S. BMD program. In Chapter VII (Conclusion), I review of my research, discuss its limitations, make suggestions for future research, and briefly look at changes in BMD politics since the election of President Obama. 9 Chapter II: Background - Understanding Ballistic Missile Defense 2.1 Introduction This chapter provides background on BMD issues. Specifically, Section 2.2 defines BMD and offers a brief history, focusing especially on the U.S. Section 2.3 presents ballistic missiles in global perspective. Section 2.4 outlines cooperation with U.S. BMD program. Lastly, Section 2.5 wraps up and provides a lead-in to the literature review in chapter 3. 2.2 Definition and Brief History BMD is a military system whose objective is the detection, tracking, interception and destruction of airborne missiles. As the term is used today, it refers to not only a technical system used against ballistic missile threats but also a military strategy embodying the notion of "strategic defense power."11 In the Cold War era, military strategy was evaluated primarily in terms of the strength of nuclear attack capabilities, chiefly between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. However, in the post-Cold War period the focus has shifted from offensive to defensive capabilities, (i.e., deterring nuclear attacks by using military defense systems) such as BMD. The concept of BMD originated as early as in the 1950s. Motivated by Germany's use of V-2 rockets against France and Britain in 1944, the Eisenhower administration (19531961) began BMD research and development in 1955. At the beginning of the Cold War, American researchers focused on intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which were used for delivery of nuclear weapons from the U.S.S.R.13 However, this research " Satoshi Morimoto, "Misairu Boei to Anzen Hosho" (Missile Defense and Security), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu (Missile Defense: New Design for International Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 4. 12 Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2002), 6. 13 Morimoto, Missile Defense, 4. 10 and development lasted for only a short period of time, first, because developing BMD systems was technologically difficult and costly, and second, because their development was contrary to the concept of "mutual deterrence", a military strategy in which countries are inhibited from attacking each other by placing themselves in mutually vulnerable positions, which means that even in the case that one country is attacked by the other, the country still maintains enough capability to retaliate for the enemy attack. The concept of mutual deterrence applied especially to nuclear weaponry between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War, and eventually resulted in the military strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Under MAD, BMD was interpreted as a theoretically dangerous concept because BMD could potentially neutralize ballistic missile attacks.14 BMD systems reduced an opponent's missile strike capabilities. As a result, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concluded the ABMT in 1972, in order to maintain the MAD structure. Under this treaty, the two countries agreed to limit deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems. The treaty was in force for thirty years until the U.S. withdrew in June 2002. The Ford administration (1974-1977) and the Carter administration (1977-1981) continued research and development but neither administration prioritized BMD due to the ABMT.15 From the late 1970s to the early 1980s, however, opposition to MAD increased on the U.S. side.16 This resulted in a major change in BMD policy. The Reagan administration (1981-1989) proposed the SDI, dubbed "Star Wars", in 1983. This initiative was based on the military concept of "strategic defense." In order to protect the U.S. from Soviet nuclear attacks, a "defensive umbrella of satellite detection systems" and "space-based futuristic 14 Helen Caldicott and Craig Eisendrath, War in Heaven: The Arms Race in Outer Space (New York: The New Press, 2007), 8. 15 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 38. 16 Ibid. 11 technologies" were envisioned.17 Reagan's goal was to construct a military defense system to make nuclear weapons powerless and outdated.18 Work continued on SDI for the remainder of the 1980s. The end of the Cold War caused a major change in U.S. BMD policy. In the early 1990s, the George H. W. Bush administration (1989-1993) established the GPALS defense initiative, which focused on new potential ballistic missile threats, especially from the third world.19 GPALS included ground-based NMD and TMD systems designed for intercepting shorter-range missiles including SRBMs and IRBMs,20 and prioritized security for U.S. foreign-deployed troops and U.S. allies.21 At first, the Clinton administration (1993-2001) accepted the concept of GPALS; however, its BMD strategy was eventually altered in the late 1990s. In the late 1990s, the U.S. began to see ballistic missile development by third world countries, such as the D.P.R.K., as posing threats to the continental U.S.; ballistic missile attacks reaching the U.S. from such countries were no longer unthinkable. Under increasing domestic pressure, especially from the Republican Party, Clinton decided to shift its priority from TMD to NMD to protect the U.S. in the event "rouge states" developed missiles capable of reaching the U.S.22 In 1999, Clinton signed the National Missile Defense Act to deploy NMD systems as soon as they proved technologically feasible. During his presidency, however, NMD systems were never deployed, not only because the technical feasibility 17 David Rudd, Jim Hanson, and Jessica Blitt eds., CISS Annual Spring Seminar 2000, Canada and National Missile Defense (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2000), 9. 18 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 38. 19 Byers, Intent for a Nation, 41. 20 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 38. 21 Soofer, "Joint Theater Missile Defense Strategy," 71. Kawakami and Jinbo, Missile Defense, 271. 12 remained unproven, but also because Clinton was worried that the system would potentially violate the ABMT.23 In the early 2000s, another major change in U.S. BMD policy occurred. The trigger was the decision of the George W. Bush administration (2001-2009) to withdraw from the ABMT in 2002, which then permitted the U.S. to deploy BMD systems. The Bush administration based its BMD program on Reagan's SDI framework; hence, it is often referred to as "son of Star Wars."24 Both programs employed the concept of the "multiplelayered defense" in which the anti-ballistic missile system is designed to intercept missiles during any one of three phases: boost, midcourse or terminal (Figure 2.1).25 Bush promoted BMD research and development for near future deployment and, by the mid-2000s, BMD was gradually positioned at the center of security thinking in the U.S. Figure 2.1 The Three Segments of the Bush Administration Missile Defense System26 Bush's multiple-layered defense system integrated NMD and TMD in order to be able to intercept ballistic missiles in all three phases, especially the boost phase.27 Focus on the boost phase increased the probability of shooting down a missile because a warhead is still 23 Umemoto, Missile Defense, 50-51. Byers, Intent for a Nation, 68. 25 Ibid, 39-40. 26 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf (accessed July 6, 2009), 7. 27 Shinichi Ogawa, "Beikoku no Seniki Misairu Boei Keikaku," (The U.S. Theater Missile Defense Plan), in Satoshi Morimoto ed., Misairu Boei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu (Missile Defense: New Design for International Security) (Tokyo: JIIA, 2002), 76. 24 13 attached to the ballistic missile in the boost phase; thus, a BMD system would not be confused by decoys. If the boost phase intercept fails, the system still has chances to try again in the mid-course and terminal phases.28 The U.S. thus sought to build integrated and global network of ballistic missile defense systems in cooperation with other countries, in large part because boost phase interceptors must be based close to potential launch sites.29 Between 2004 and 2008 (when President Obama was elected), the following BMD systems were deployed by the U.S.30 • 26 GBIs (Ground Based Interceptors) placed in silos in Alaska and California (a ground launched anti-ballistic missile) • 32 SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) sea-based interceptors (a naval launched anti-ballistic missile) • 3 Navy Aegis destroyers (which are equipped to shoot down missiles in the midcourse phase) and 15 destroyers capable of engaging short- to medium-range missiles and performing long-range surveillance and track missions • 635 Patriot Advanced Capability -3 (PAC-3) missiles (an advanced surface-to-air missile) • A Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radar system (which is a floating radar station deployed in ocean waters) 28 Ibid. David Martin, "DandoMisairu Boei," (Ballistic Missile Defense), Embassy of the United States in Japan (2002), http://japan.U.S.embassy.gov/j/p/tpj-j20030530d2.html (accessed January 12, 2009); MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf (accessed January 12, 2009), 7. 30 MDA, DOD, "TESTING: Building Confidence," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/2009MDAbook.pdf (accessed July 12, 2010). 29 14 • Upgraded Early Warning Radars (UEWRs) in California and the U.K. and an upgraded Cobra Dane radar in Alaska • Two Forward-Based X-Band Radars deployed in Japan and Israel • Elements of a C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications) system to support five Combatant Commands and the National Military Command Center. Although no BMD system will reach a guaranteed 100 percent interception rate, BMD's accuracy and technical feasibility are key factors in its acceptance as a military system. The U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA), established within the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), states that the current system can only intercept one, or at maximum two, "unsophisticated threat" missiles without decoys and countermeasures, such as those manufactured by Iran or North Korea.31 Thus, the U.S. BMD system is currently incapable of protecting the U.S. and its allies from most ballistic missile attacks. In particular, the system is vulnerable and ineffective against attacks from major countries such as Russia and China. Regardless of present technical limitations, keen attention is paid to U.S. BMD because it has the future potential to tip the nuclear balance of power in America's favor. 2.3 Ballistic Missiles in Global Perspective Approximately 40 countries possess ballistic missiles (Table 2.1). As can be seen in Table 2.1, most countries possess short-range missiles, and only five countries currently have the technical capability to launch long-range missiles: China, France, Russia, U.K. and U.S.32 The U.S. sees Russia and China as the main threats. The D.P.R.K., Iran, and Syria are 31 Philip E. Coyle, and III and Victoria A. Samson, "Taking Aim at Missile Defense," Bulletin ofAtomic Scientists 64 (2008): 4. 32 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 52. 15 assumed threats due to their unclear intentions. However, it will likely take at least fifteen years for these "rogue states" to develop intermediate and long-range missiles capable of reaching the U.S.34 Table 2.1 Countries Possessing Ballistic Missiles35 Countries possessing only short-range missiles (<600 miles) Afghanistan Algeria Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Belarus Congo Czech Republic Egypt Georgia Greece Hungary Iraq Kazakhstan Libya South Korea Slovakia Syria Taiwan Turkey Turkmenistan United Arab Emirates Ukraine Yemen Hideaki Kaneda, Dando Misairu Boei Nyumon: Arata na Kaku Yokushi Senryaku to Waga Kuni no Dando Misairu Boei (Introduction to Ballistic Missile Defense: New Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence and Japan's BMD) (Tokyo: Kaya Press, 2003), 82-88. 34 Lindsay and O'Hanlon, Defending America, 50. 35 Table adapted by the author based on Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project, "The World's Ballistic Missile Arsenals," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2003), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/resources/ballisticmissilechart.htm (accessed June 29, 2010). 16 Countries possessing short- and intermediate-range missiles (600-3500 miles) India Iran Israel North Korea Pakistan Saudi Arabia Countries possessing short-, intermediate-, and long-range missiles (>3500 miles) China France Russia United Kingdom United States Of the countries in Table 2.1, some potential adversaries of the U.S. have active ballistic missile programs, for example Iran and North Korea (Figure 2.2). Accordingly, the U.S. is seeking to "increase the breadth and depth of our missile defenses by adding more forward-deployed, network sensors, and additional interceptors based at sea and on land" through working with other countries and regions.36 In 2009, eleven countries were cooperating with the U.S.-led BMD program, or had agreed to cooperate in the near future, and nine countries have expressed interest or begun discussions on BMD issues with the U.S.37 36 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http //www mda mil/mdahnk/pdf/bmdsbook pdf (accessed January 12, 2009), 7 37 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for National Defense University Breakfast Seminar," (2009), http //www mda mil/mdalink/pdf7bmds_bnefing09 pdf (accessed July 30, 2010), 2. 17 Figure 2.2 Select Countries Possessing Ballistic Missile (2009)38 Belarus Scud B SS2 Syria Scud B C D SS21 Ukraine Scud B SS21 Turkmenistan SCodB Kazakhstan Scua B SS21 Libya Scud B Al Fatah North Korea Scud B C \ C 1 M D ni EflVPt ScudB •» U- T 1 '-t, Ir-c' e Iran Fateh 1 0 Scud B'C CSS 8 » 1 O "> 1 t Saudi Arabia 'RB' Rest of World Force .evels 2008 SRBM 5 500 VRBW 350 Totals 5 900 " UAE - Scud B Yemen Scud B SS21 Pakistan Hatf 1 Ghazn Shaheen 1 India Prithvi 1 2 lanush Agni Vietnam Scud B ojgirka 2.4 Cooperation with U.S. BMD There are many controversies over BMD, for example, high cost, unproven effectiveness, and high political risks due to the potential of BMD systems to alter the current power structure, especially if the feasibility of missile defense systems is proven However, as illustrated in Figure 2 3, a number of nations have been participating in the U S -led BMD program or have at least shown interest in it. Why? 38 Ibid 18 Figure 2.3 Highlights of International Missile Defense Activity R&D Cooperative Efforts Foreign BMTJProjects / Interests Netherlands PAC-3, Maritime BMD Cooperation ^ i * i ? 4 UK Fylingdalcs UEWR, Joint Project t&t JI."-* Arrangements lor Cooperative Projects France Cooperative project potential ' Italy MEADS partner Poland Agreed to host Ground Based Interceptors, potential RDT&E cooperation Oe'iawrk Upgrade Thule Early India Have had discussions on RDT&E Warning Radar Russia Strategic cooperation /transparency dialogue Australia Advanced technology cooperation United Arab Emirates Request for THAAD (^ Japan Forward-based X-Band radar siting, 2 1 " Missile Development Israel Arrow Deployed, Arrow System Improvement Program, development of short-range BMD, Upper Tier program Czech Republic. Agreed to host ] midcourse radar; some RD7&E cooperation • Q * ROK Missile Defense * * I discussions, Request for BMD requirement analysis • H | | f Germany MEADS partner, laser cross-link technology Ukraine 1 Saudi Arabia Requested BMD requirements analysis Kuwait Expressed interest in missile defense Conducting a missile defense project, RDT&E I NATO Completed tasking to explore architectures to supplement I European Site Working with ALTBMD to demonstrate connectivity between NATO and U S systems agreement being staffed Bahrain Request for BMD requirements analysis • Qatar Expressed interest in missile defense First, overt or potential threats due to worldwide missile proliferation have dramatically increased in recent years. Ballistic missile tests by North Korea in the 1990s caused great anxiety in Japan.40 Arms proliferation, especially in third world countries, is a major concern. A black market in weapons has been expanding among not only nations but also non-governmental actors such as terrorist organizations.41 39 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview for National Defense University Breakfast Seminar," (2009), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmds_briefing09.pdf (accessed July 31, 2009), 7. 40 Hiroyasu Akustu, "Kitachosen wo Meguru Kokusai Kankei: America no Senryaku to Nihon no Anzen Hosho," (International Relations over North Korea: U.S. Strategy and Japanese Security), in Masahiro Sakamoto and Tadamasa Fukiura eds., Atarashii Nihon no Anzen Hosho wo Kangaeru (Consider New Japanese Security) (Tokyo: Jiyu Kokumin Press, 2003), 361. 41 Izuru Sugawara, "Tai-tero Senso to Iraku Senso," (Anti-Terrorism War and Iraqi War), in Sakamoto and Fukiura eds., Consider New Japanese Security, 87. 19 Second, the concept of deterrence has been shifting from traditional "offensedominant deterrence" to "defense-dominant deterrence."42 In the post-Cold War era, the U.S.'s perception of missile threats has shifted from the U.S.S.R. to regional challengers such as "rogue states." The U.S. used to focus on "nuclear deterrence" to defend itself from the U.S.S.R.'s nuclear attacks. However, due to the threat shift, "denial deterrence", defined as a type of a strategy that minimizes antagonists' attack effectiveness by strengthening defense capabilities, has become a central military strategy.43 The tipping point is considered to be Iraq's use of theatre ballistic missiles in the Gulf War.44 BMD is a key element of denial deterrence.45 The U.S. 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) states "defensive systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles may reduce the necessity for nuclear weapons to hold at risk an adversary's missile launchers."46 Third, the September 11 terrorist attacks prompted the U.S. and other countries to strengthen their "defensive power" for protecting their homelands. These terrorist attacks using commercial airplanes exposed the vulnerability of U.S. defense capabilities to protect its homeland. Because missile proliferation has been increasing and missile acquisition is easier, and because some international terrorist groups are gaining in military power and influence, it is wise planning to assume those groups may try to obtain missiles and use them against their perceived enemies. In this regard, in order to prepare for the worst case scenario—namely, international terrorist groups gaining access to ICBMs to attack the U.S. 42 Taku Ishikawa, "Reisengo no Yokushi Taisei to Dando Misairu Boei" (Deterrence Posture in the Post-Cold War and Ballistic Missile Defense), in Satoshi Monmoto ed , Misairu Boei Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu {Missile Defense New Design for International Security) (Tokyo JIIA, 2002), 217-218 43 Tadashi Kawata and Hideki Ohata, eds , Kokusai Seiji Keizai Jiten (Dictionary of International Politics and Economics) (Tokyo Tokyo Shoseki Press, 2003), 735 44 Ishikawa, Missile Defense, 212-213 45 Keith B Payne, "The Case for National Missile Defense," Orbis 44 (2000)- 193-194. 46 "Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report [Excerpt]," Global Security org (2002), http //www globalsecunty org/wmd/hbrary/policy/dod/npr htm (accessed February 25, 2009) 20 or its allies/friendly countries—the George W. Bush administration urged other countries to strengthen their defensive power, and promoted cooperation with its allies and friends to this end.47 2.5 Conclusion BMD has a history of more than fifty years. In particular, the U.S. has been working on developing BMD since the end of WWII. Today, the number of the countries involved in BMD issues is increasing. This is worrisome because BMD is not simply another military system; it has the possibility to alter fundamentally the balance of power and military strategies that depend on nuclear weapons. 47 Joseph Cirincione, "Political and Strategic Imperatives of National Missile Defense," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2000), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=614 (accessed January 14, 2009). 21 Chapter III: A BMD Comparative Study - Literature Review and Methodology 3.1 Introduction This chapter presents a review of the BMD literature and explains my methodology. The literature review describes the two major research perspectives on BMD issues— technological and social scientific—from which I drew materials for the two case studies, and situates my research within the BMD literature. The methodology section outlines my approach to my comparative study, and explains why I used Putnam's two-level game theory as the basis for structuring the comparison. 3.2 Literature Review BMD is a relatively new topic of research among international relations scholars. It began around the middle of the 1980s. Even after 20 years of research, there are few scholarly social science studies that comprehensively cover the full range of perspectives related to BMD—historical, technological, political, economic, and military. Overall, the field is dominated by technological literature. This literature primarily examines engineering-related issues such as technical feasibility and effectiveness; for example, the mechanical structure and effectiveness of PAC-3 systems. I referred to this type of material to understand the technology of BMD systems, using especially those documents that lay-translated technical information. Some of the technological literature discusses the political implications of BMD technology. Works of this orientation that I drew upon for my research include Nobuyuki Nose's IT 5 1 M / ^ f f : 0 ^ t t # J ^ if 5 iLhftfr 5 B£$tf$«B& : i i f Pf <£>#f fc t£i£:f£ 1Slf/i J , Nihon no Boei Senryaku: Jieitai no Arata na Ninmu to Sobi (Japan's Defense Strategy: Japanese Self-Defense Force's Future Duties and Organization); Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense published by the U.S. Congressional Budget Office;50 and various U.S. MDA publications including "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview."51 A smaller portion of the BMD literature revolves around social science research. This is the literature that I drew upon most heavily. Most social scientific research concentrates on American BMD policies, including analyses of decision-making processes, alliance issues with the U.S. over BMD policies and strategies, perspectives on the threat of missile attacks, and international and regional relations as they related to BMD systems. The focus on the U.S. is not surprising because the U.S. was the first to develop BMD systems and possesses the most sophisticated systems today. Some of the key works in this literature are the following. Frances FitzGerald's Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War focuses on a history of BMD politics, especially Reagan's SDL52 Earnest J. Yanerella's The Missile Defense Controversy: Technology in Search of a Mission introduces the origins of ABM systems up to the ABMT. He points out that the same scenarios have 48 Nobuyuki Nose, Misaim Boei: Nihon wa Kyoi ni doTachimukaunoka (Missile Defense: How should Japan Defend against Threats) (Tokyo: Shincho-sha Press, 2007). 49 Kensuke Ebata, Nihon no Boei Senryaku: Jieitai no Arata na Ninmu to Sobi (Japan's Defense Strategy: Japanese Self-Defense Force's Future Duties and Organization) (Tokyo: Diamond-sha press, 2007). 50 Congress of the United Sates, Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Boost-Phase Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: National Government Publications, 2004). 51 MDA, DOD, "Ballistic Missile Defense Overview," (2008), http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/pdf/bmdsbook.pdf. 52 Frances FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon & Schuster Press, 2000). 23 repeated through the Reagan to the George W. Bush administrations. He believes that U.S. BMD systems are not technically advanced nor feasible, and that the U.S. passion to build a BMD system is similar to a neurotic quest.53 William Dudley's Missile Defense focuses on the combined factors of the technological feasibility and geopolitical ramifications of BMD systems.54 These authors and other social scientists researching BMD issues tend to focus on variables related to the origin of BMD under the Cold War structure, on analysis of missile defense technologies and their political implications for world affairs, on theoretical analysis revolving around deterrence theory, and on geopolitical, diplomatic and military relations between the U.S. and other countries. Majority of these scholars are critical of U.S. BMD policy and the impact it will have on international society because they tend to believe that BMD will deteriorate into an arms race and destabilize the balance of power in international politics. There are also social science studies focusing on other countries such as Australia, China, Europe, India, Russia and South Korea, besides Canada and Japan. For example, Sam Roggeyeen discusses Australian missile defense based on the U.S. BMD strategies;55 Brad Roberts investigates Chinese BMD issues;56 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek have written on long-range BMD issues in Europe;57 Ashley J. Tellis covers India and BMD;58 Miriam D. 53 Yanerella, The Missile Defense Controversy. William Dudley, Missile Defense (Chicago: Greenhaven Press, 2002). 55 Sam Roggeveen, "Missile Defense: The Australian Angle," The Interpreter, (2009), http://www.lowyinterpreter.Org/post/2009/09/l 8/Missile-defence-The-Australia-angle.aspx (accessed April 1, 2010). 56 Brad Roberts, "China and Ballistic Missile Defense: 1955 to 2002 and Beyond," Institute for Defense Analysis (2003), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/bmd.pdf (accessed April 9, 2010). 57 Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Ek, "Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe," Congressional Research Service (2009), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34051.pdf (accessed April 9, 2010). 54 24 Becker analyzes BMD issues between Russia and the U.S. ; and Jenny Shin focuses on South Korea and BMD issues. ° Other works with a focus on more than one country include: Yoshihide Soeya et al. who cover the triangular relationship between the U.S., China and Japan,61 and Stanley Sloan who examines BMD in relation to Europe and NATO.62 In this thesis, I conducted a comparative study: U.S.-Japan compared to U.S.-Canada. There does not seem to be any such scholarly analysis of this type in the BMD literature. To my knowledge, the research in this thesis is the first such comparative analysis. In the two sections below, I briefly review the BMD literature related to Japan and Canada. The Case of Japan In Japan, regional and international military issues were taboo topics after the defeat of WWII. This taboo more or less continued until the end of the Cold War. Thus, Japanese BMD research from a social science perspective is very recent, beginning only in the early 2000s. For the Japanese case study, I relied mainly on documents from four organizations: the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), the RAND Corporation, and the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA). The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, when it covers BMD issues, tends to focus on the technological Ashely J. Tellis, India and Missile Defense (Washington D.C.: Camegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007). 59 Miriam D. Becker, Strategic Culture and Ballistic Missile Defense: Russia and the U.S. (California: Naval Postgraduate School Press, 1993). 60 Jenny Shin, "The Concern with South Korea's Missile Defense System," Center of Defense Information (2009), http://www.cdi. org/program/document.cfm?documentid=4537&prograinID=6&from_page=../friendlyversion/pr intversion.cfm (accessed April 9, 2010). 61 Yoshihide Soeya, Jianwei Wang and David A. Welch, "A New Look at the U.S.-China-Japan Triangle: Toward Building a Stable Framework," Asian Perspectives 27 (2003). 62 Stanley R. Sloan, NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Challenged (New York: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005). 25 aspects; however, their writing is accessible to a lay audience. The authors in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists tend to concentrate their analysis on governments or ministries, such as Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD) or the U.S. DOD. Generally, they are skeptical of governments' BMD policies and decisions. The CRS produces analyses of contemporary and emerging issues for members of the U.S. Congress. It has published on the implications of BMD policies and decisions for U.S. national security, including U.S.-Japan relations. They have deep connections with the U.S. government and tend to be rooted in realist thinking. The CRS reports also provide reliable coverage of a wide range of public opinion polls. The RAND Corporation, a non-profit institute originally established by the U.S. Air Force, conducts a wide range of research primarily focused on national security issues, including those related to Japan.63 Its military-related articles and reports are solid and tend toward realist thinking. The JIIA is a research institute associated with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that produces and publishes pieces related to Japanese foreign policy and international relations.64 It is generally considered a trustworthy think tank offering comprehensive scholarly works to the Japanese public. However, because the JIIA has a strong connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in many cases, its articles and books are supportive of the governments' positions. For my research, I drew extensively from two books published by the JIIA. The first was r ^ i M / H & f i S : f f L l ^ [ S ^ ^ ^ f £ P i < 7 ) f S 0 J , Misairu Bdei: Atarashii Kokusai Anzen Hosho no Kozu {Missile Defense: New Design for International Security), edited by 63 The RAND Corporation, "History and Mission," (2010), http://www.rand.org/about/history/ (accessed April 17,2010). 64 JIIA, "About Us," (2010) http://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/aboutus/index.php (accessed March 10, 2010). 26 Satoshi Morimoto and published in 2002. Morimoto is a professor of international security at Takushoku University. The book contains fifteen chapters, of which seven were relevant to my research theme. The book's basic premise is that BMD is important for Japanese national security; hence, comprehensive analysis on BMD should be conducted but it is as yet insufficient.66 The authors do not analyze and evaluate from a wide range of perspectives regarding the types of positive and negative political impacts that would result from joining the U.S. BMD program and deploying BMD systems. They argue that BMD systems are necessary for Japan to defend itself, and that cooperation with the U.S. and the U.S.-led BMD program needs to be a central strategy for Japan. The book supports a realist position relative to Japan's security and BMD. The second book I drew from was IT 0 #