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Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. 0-612-62536-2 Canada APPROVAL Name: Sean Connelly Degree: Master o f Arts Thesis Title: INTEGRATING CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: CO-MANAGEMENT OF THE GALIBI NATURE RESERVE, SURINAME Examining Committee: Ûi)nnL n & Chair: Dr. Deborah Vice-President (Academic) & Provost Acting Dean o f Graduate Studies A Supervisor: Dr. Heathe/Myers :atheyMyeri Assistant Professor, International Studies Program UNBC Member: Dr. Chris Opio Assistant Professor, Forestry Program UNBC CuWX: Committee Mehaber: Dr. Christopher Hannibal-Paci Instructor, First Nations Studies Program UNBC E.'^fêmW Examiner: Dr. Led Professor, Environmental Studies PTogram Regional Chair & Program Coordinator - Northwest Region UNBC Date Approved: Abstract The objective of this thesis is to examine co-management as a tool for the integration of conservation and development at the local level. Integrated conservation and development projects, decentralization, devolution and community-based management approaches are examined to identify how conservation conflicts are resolved. The co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve, Suriname, is examined as an alternative approach. The co-management arrangement is examined based on how it resolves the problems with conservation and protected area management: integrating conservation and development at the local level, involving local populations in conservation and development and integrating state views of environmental management with local common property resource (CPR) management systems. It is found that the Galibi co-management arrangement is effective at integrating conservation and development through the use of nature tourism. Local tourism developments are dependent on the successful conservation of the sea turtle. The co­ management arrangement is also effective at involving local populations in development and sea turtle conservation. Local participation is included beyond merely consultation, as in other approaches. Local objectives and concerns are incorporated into management decisions. The Galibi co-management arrangement has not been as effective at integrating state views of environmental management with CPR management. While the integration of local CPR management systems was not as important for sea turtle conservation, the integration o f local customs and values is important. The co­ management arrangement has been unable to integrate state views on property with local views on traditional land rights. Local views of traditional land include the Galibi Nature Reserve and traditional land rights are not legally recognized which is a source o f conflict in conservation and development. It is proposed that the co-management arrangement be strengthened by granting greater local control over conservation and development to local organizations, under the supervision o f the government agency responsible for protected area management. By granting greater local control over what is considered to be traditional land, the conflicts associated with differing views on property rights may be reduced. Ill List of Tables and Figures Tables Table I: Ladder of Citizen Participation 33 Table 2: Number of Nests per species, per year, in Suriname 70 Table 3; Organizations Involved in the Galibi Nature Reserve 83 Figures Figure I: Map of Study Area 60 Figure 2; Relationships between Government, NGO's and Local Organizations at 77 the Local and National Levels IV Acknowledgement I would like to acknowledge the support and advice that I received from my thesis supervisor, Dr. Heather Myers, and my thesis committee members Dr. Chris Opio and Dr. Chris Hannibal-Paci. This thesis would not have been possible without Canadian Crossroads International, which provided the opportunity for volunteering in Suriname. Most importantly, I would like to thank those people in Suriname who provided many opportunities, information and experiences. I would particularly like to thank Ferdinand Baal, the head of the Nature Conservation Division of the Suriname Forest Service, for providing time for questions and clarification. Raggie Slyngaard (STINASU manager for Galibi Nature Reserve) and Kris Mohadin (STINASU coordinator of sea turtle research) were also valuable in providing information regarding STINASU’s involvement in Galibi. In the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, I am indebted to Denis Kiba (chairman of STIDUNAL) and Captain Ramses for listening to questions and their thoughtful information. I am particularly grateful, not only for his willingness to help, but also for the excellent hospitality, of Captain Pane and his family. I would also like to thank Anne-Lise Vrendenburg for her work in accompanying me to interviews, translating and understanding the trials and tribulations of thesis research. Finally, I would like to thank Max Ooft, who took the time out of his busy schedule to introduce me to the village, to provide numerous insights and to provide much information from both a government and a local perspective. Table of Contents Abstract 11 List o f Tables and Figures iii Acknowledgement iv Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Development Theories 1.1 Modernization Theories o f Development 1.2 Dependency Theories o f Development 1.3 Marxist Theories o f Development 1.4 Feminist Theories o f Development 1.5 Feminist Framework for Participatory Development 7 8 9 12 13 15 Chapter 2 Conservation and Protected Area Management 2.1 Problems With Protected Area Management 2.2 Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 2.3 Decentralization, Devolution and Community-based Approaches 19 19 24 29 Chapter 3 Co-management 3.1 Definitions and Examples 3.2 Linking Conservation and Development 3.3 Local Participation 3.4 Common Property Resources 3.5 Problems Co-management Addresses 39 40 44 45 47 53 Chapter 4 Methods 4.1 Study Area 4.2 Rationale for Use o f Case Study 4.3 Key Theoretical Propositions 4.4 Data Sources, Scope and Limitations 59 59 62 63 64 Chapter 5 Case Study o f Galibi Nature Reserve 5.1 Galibi Nature Reserve 5.2 Marine Turtle Life History 5.3 Creation o f the Galibi Nature Reserve 5.3.1 History o f the Creation o f the Galibi N R 5.4 Environmental/Park Management Framework in Suriname 5.4.1 Role o f Government Organizations 5.4.2 Role o f hitemational Organizations 5.4.3 Role o f Local Organizations 5.5 Co-management o f the Galibi Nature Reserve 67 67 67 69 72 75 76 79 81 82 Chapter 6 Analysts of Case Study 6.1 Linking Conservation and Development 6.2 Local Participation in Conservation and Development 6.3 Integrating Common Property Resource Management 89 89 94 99 Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 7.1 Conclusions 7.2 Recommendations 103 103 106 110 References Appendix 1 Guiding Questions for Interviews 118 Introduction There have been many large-scale development projects, such as large scale dams funded by the World Bank (China's Three Gorges dam, Brazil's POLONOROESTE projects, India's Narmada Valley dams) which have been criticized for the low priority placed on environmental concerns and which have questionable development benefîts (Feamside, 1988). Based on these experiences, there has been a shift in development towards placing greater emphasis on the small scale, sustainable, grass roots, rural development projects. The shift to small-scale rural development projects has mirrored the efforts of large environmental organizations such as the World Wildlife Fund and Conservation International. In the past, while focusing on mitigating the environmental effects in rural and "pristine " habitats, they paid little attention to local development implications. While striving to protect rainforests or to conserve biodiversity, environmental organizations have promoted the creation o f parks and nature reserves to eliminate human impacts on the remaining natural areas o f the world (Wells and Brandon, 1992). These parks and protected areas formerly placed restrictions on local populations in the form o f fences and regulations that limit access to resources. However, such an approach has also changed to include the incorporation o f local development activities in and around protected areas. Many governments o f developing countries face tough decisions of either exploiting natural resources to increase foreign reserves or to satisfy stringent International Monetary Fund (IMF) reforms, or of conserving natural resources and watching passively as others pass them on the economic ladder. Often, governments seeking to eliminate poverty feel they must do so at the expense o f the environment. The inverse is also true. Governments feel the pressure internationally to be environmentally conscious, and do so, often at the expense of rural communities. These opposing options are an indication of the tensions created between the right of governments to exploit resources for their development and that of outsiders to deny the use of certain natural resources (Western and Wright, 1994). The conservation o f biodiversity in the form o f protected areas and nature reserves has the effect of limiting or controlling access to resources. Since most rural communities in the developing world (and to a lesser extent in the developed world) base their economies on subsistence agriculture or the use of natural resources (to varying degrees), it is those communities that suffer the effects of conservation measures. Therefore, their economic/development options are limited, and they are often forced into "illegal" behaviour in the form o f poaching and trespassing. In Suriname, the Amerindian and Maroon communities have practiced, and continue to practice subsistence economies; they use the forests as resources for gathering materials, for hunting and for agriculture, and the numerous rivers and swamps for Hshing. With the establishment of national parks and protected areas in Suriname beginning in the mid 1950s, Amerindian and Maroon communities were suddenly seen as intruders who were directly opposed to conservation values (Kloos, 1971). Their traditional activities were limited by rules imposed in Paramaribo, and the resulting restrictions caused a reduction in incomes and freedoms, that were only aggravated further by the failure o f the government to recognize their traditional land rights. Local people were not involved with the siting of national parks or protected areas and were not consulted in the park management process. Therefore, local people received very few benefîts through the conservation of resources and had little incentive for conservation. Their traditional activities were suddenly considered illegal and resulted in fines for trespassing and poaching. The Nature Conservation division of the Suriname Forest Service also had to invest in park guards and rangers to patrol and monitor such illegal activities, at a great expense. Attempts were made to provide jobs to rural residents in the forestry and mining sectors in an effort to integrate them into the national wage economy, but this had mixed results. The resulting state of conflict between park management and local residents in Suriname is, therefore, not surprising. Nor is it unique. The same conflicts have been occurring throughout the world. The number of examples of people-park conflicts is endless, regardless of the type of park (for examples, see Wells and Brandon 1992 among others). International conservationists and park managers acknowledged the conflict in the 1980 World Conservation Strategy that emphasized the importance of creating economic opportunities for local communities (lUCN, 1980). Since 1980, much effort has been placed on research into the integration of conservation and development initiatives in order to improve conservation outcomes. The balanced and integrated approach has also become the model for all international development activities. Efforts have been made to integrate local people directly into conservation and development activities through sustainable development. Numerous methods have been used to attempt to involve local people in conservation projects and in development projects. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) were seen as the most promising model to reduce conflicts between local people and park managers and to improve the protection of ecosystems. Governments, non government organizations (NCj O s ), conservation organizations, international development organizations, and private foundations have all attempted, with mixed results, decentralization and devolution of various aspects to the local level (Enters and Anderson, 1999). There have even been suggestions that what is needed is complete devolution to community management of resources, although very few actual working examples exist (Western and Wright, 1994). Co-management is another potential method to integrate development and conservation goals and to overcome conflicts. Co-management agreements have been used successfully to integrate government and local resource use objectives in the management of national parks (Hawkes, 1996; DeLacy, 1993; Davis and Weiller, 1992; Richardson, 1992), forest reserves (Matose, 1997; Bruce et al., 1993) and fisheries (Pinkerton, 1996). In each example, co-management allowed for the integration of the objectives of various stakeholders (to varying degrees) to allow for more equitable management decisions and reduced conflict over resources. With co-management, local people can be directly involved in the management process and they are more involved in determining the costs and benefits, goals and methods of conservation and development. The objective of this thesis is to examine co-management as a tool for the integration o f conservation and development goals through the involvement of local people. There exists a wide range of co-management agreements that vary greatly in terms of the resources that are managed, the degree to which participation is shared and the degree to which the co-management agreement is institutionalized. There is significant interest, for the future design of co-management arrangements, in what elements are important, in how the agreements have evolved, their outcomes and the potential lessons that can be learned from them. Through an examination of the literature, theoretical propositions will be examined that will then be used to assess the co­ management agreement that is in use for the management o f the Galibi Nature Reserve in Suriname. The relevance o f these theoretical propositions will be investigated through the 5 Galibi Nature Reserve example. It is my expectation that the co-management agreement for Galibi will provide incentives for both development and conservation goals to be achieved, thereby reducing the conflict between local residents and park management. There are three main questions that guide this thesis. The first relates to the effectiveness of co-management for the integration of conservation and development objectives. The second question refers to the ability of co-management to lead to greater local participation. The fînal question relates to whether co-management allows for the integration of classical environmental management with local common property resource management systems. Chapter One will examine modernization, dependency, Marxist and feminist theories of development with regard to participatory development. These theories of development provide the lens through which development activities take place and determine the goals and objectives o f development. Therefore, the framework through which development is viewed leads to different development approaches, such as macroand micro-economics, commodity production and community participation. In this chapter, a framework for analysis of participatory development will be suggested. Chapter Two will examine conservation and protected area management. The problems encountered with conservation will be discussed, as will attempts to overcome such problems, including integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), decentralization, devolution and community-based conservation. Chapter Three is a discussion of co-management. Co-management will be defined and important aspects o f co-management (linking conservation with development, local participation, common property resources and the problems co-management addresses) will be put forth as theoretical propositions. The methods in Chapter Four will outline the rationale for the case study approach and provide a brief description of the case study location, the case study protocol, the scope and the limitations. Chapter Five will be a description of the Galibi Nature Reserve as a case study. A history of the creation of the nature reserve will be followed by the park management framework in Suriname and a description of the co-management arrangement that exists for the nature reserve. The analysis of the case study in Chapter Six will be based on the theoretical propositions on development from Moser (1991) (Chapter One) and those based on co­ management (Chapter Three). The conclusions and recommendations in Chapter Seven will report the major findings of the thesis and suggest some recommendations. They will include both recommendations for government policy and local policy. Avenues for further research will also be recommended. Chapter 1 Development Theories The term "development" has been defined in numerous ways based upon different theories about development. The term has been used variously to describe improvement of basic human needs, of improvement in the social, economic, environmental or political situation. The definitions used by different development theorists are based on very different assumptions about the methods and goals of development. The purpose o f this section is to define development objectives and approaches based on the theory that is most suitable for participatory community development. Modernization, dependency, Marxist and Feminist theories of development will be examined briefly to demonstrate which theory is best suited for an examination of development at the local level. These four theories have been chosen because they are the dominant theories o f development that represent both the assumptions o f harmonic and discordant interests, animate and inanimate values and material and human resources (Black, 1991). These four theories are the major development theories that share common assumptions about the possibility and desirability of development but which differ drastically in terms of how development should occur. Modernization, for example, views national economic interests as being similar to those of class interests while dependency and Marxist theories view them as competing (Black, 1991). The four development theories discussed place differing emphasis on the role of the nation state, international pressures and the individual. They also place different emphasis on how results are measured and thereby provide a glimpse of the broad spectrum o f development theories. 1.1 Modernization Theory of Development Modernization theory arose from the hegemonic power of the United States in the post- Second World W ar years. Due to the success of the Marshall Plan in the reconstruction o f Europe, modernization was seen as a means for the Third World to develop. It was believed that the Third World could develop as quickly as Western and Eastern Europe had, immediately following the war. Its theoretical basis is structuralfunctionalist, with the belief that development will occur provided that the proper structures (capital, expanded trade and technical assistance) are in place for economic growth to occur (Preston, 1996). Modernization theory is best expressed in Rostow's "stages o f growth" model, which predicts that, once the proper structures are in place, development will progress through a linear path, from traditional society, to the pre­ conditions for take-off, to the take-off, to the drive to maturity and finally to the age of mass-consumption or development (Otubusin, 1992). Modernization theory views the Third World as traditional. These societies are based on spiritual values, not values of self-betterment that are needed for improvement or development (Isbister, 1993). The traditional societies lack capital, which is seen as a major inhibitor to economic growth. Much o f the early (1950-1970) development assistance that occurred in the third world was geared towards the generation of capital for domestic investment (Billet, 1993). As states become modernized, by accepting economic liberalism, Westem-style education and Western values, all sectors o f society were expected to be improved. Criticisms o f modernization have been made on moral, political, economic and historical grounds (Otubusin, 1992). One o f the major criticisms o f modernization theory is that it creates dichotomies: nations are developed or underdeveloped, modem or traditional. Modernization theory works from a technocratic point of view where development experts determine areas in need o f modernization. The degree of modernity is equated with development. With the focus on modernity, information and ideas are highly technical and they flow from the technocratic elite at the top of society to those at the bottom. The effects are evident where states have put modernization policies in place. These policies can be characterized as generating economic growth in the major cities which results in greater urbanization. This focus of economic growth and modernization in the major cities, has often ignored rural areas, which are often in the most need of development assistance. According to modernization theory, rural agricultural areas will never achieve development because they are traditional, which characterizes them as undeveloped from a modernization point of view. Modernization has been based on the assumption that recipients of development assistance are passive rather than active participants in the development process. Modernization theory does not acknowledge the different needs of rural areas in development. Its approach is strictly on a national level and it views each segment of a nation as needing to modernize their values in order to achieve development (Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1998). Therefore, the modernization theory of development is in direct conflict with the participatory approach to rural development. It limits participation to development experts, it focuses on modernization and urbanization to the exclusion o f rural areas, and it assumes that development assistance should be focused on aiding modernity. 1.2 Dependency Theory of Development Dependency theory has its roots in the United Nations Economic Commission for 10 Latin America in the 1960s and it is based on the work of economists there who sought to place attention on the deterioration in terms of trade for primary producers in Latin America (Black, 1991). While Marxist theories of development seek to explain why and how the dominant classes expand their spheres o f influence, dependency theorists examine what the relationship o f unequal bargaining and exploitation means to the dominated classes in the dominated countries (Black, 1991). Dependency theories of development are based on several major assumptions. Firstly, economic interests are the primary determinant of the distribution of power and status in the international arena. Culture and attitudes, what modernization theorists view as impediments to development, are irrelevant to dependency theorists (Nef, 1994). Secondly, the causes of underdevelopment cannot be determined by strictly examining processes at the national level. For dependency theorists, the root cause of underdevelopment is participation in the international economic system. The pattern of economic relations between dominant powers and their client states forces the latter to remain underdeveloped (Frank, 1992). Finally, contrary to the views of modernization theorists, the free market creates greater inequality rather than eliminating it. Trickledown or diffusion of wealth does not occur with the absorption of individuals into the modem sector, but will, rather, cause increased inequalities (Isbister, 1993). Dependency theories offer many examples of problems with modernization theory, yet there are no concrete approaches that are offered for development. Dependency theorists suggest a revolutionary break from the global economic system that is promulgating dependency as a solution. Dependency theorists, as do modernization theorists, offer a structuralist theory o f the causes of development and underdevelopment (Preston, 1996). They believe that the structural conditions of dependency will persist as 11 long as the underdeveloped countries remain within the global system. Dependency theorists propose macro-economic changes that would weaken the effects of multi­ national corporations and foreign governments. They also propose the creation of trade barriers and regional trading areas that would allow nationalist governments to pursue goals of national development. Presumably, with the dislocation from the global economic system. Third World governments could be free to pursue independent development projects that would involve rural populations and environmental conservation. However, the method that national governments use to pursue development is of little concern o f dependency theorists. The major concern is a critique o f modernization and an attempt to persuade Third World governments to remove themselves from the conditions that perpetuate underdevelopment and dependency on other states for trade and development inputs. Critics of the dependency approach to development point out that dependency theorists fail to demonstrate why the development of capitalism in the periphery will always result in an outflow o f capital rather than internal capital accumulation (Browett, 1985). Dependency theory has been seen as merely a description o f the uneven distribution of capital and not an explanation as to the cause of this inequality. It has never challenged the dynamic and progressive characteristics of capitalism as it behaves in the global arena (Scott, 1995). Therefore, for dependency theorists, politics at the periphery include only those attributes which link the periphery to the international system. The focus o f dependency theory on the macro-level linkages between nation states and the focus on independent national development make it irrelevant for participatory local development. The needs, desires and goals at the local level can vary greatly within a nation and dependency theory does not take such differences into 12 consideration. 1.3 Marxist Theory of Development While dependency theorists draw much of their conclusions from theories developed by Marx, and many would consider themselves Marxist, contemporary Marxist theorists of development are in disagreement with both modernization and dependency theories. The basis of Marxism is the analysis of the class structures of Third World societies rather than economic growth and modernity (as in modernization theory) or foreign domination (as in dependency theory) (Isbister, 1993). Marxist theories of development revolve around the forces and relations of production. Marxist analysis focuses on production relations that are the key structures, which determines how society functions (Peet and Watts, 1993). There are a number of fundamental differences between Marxist theories of development and those of dependency. First, Marxists see the fundamental forces for social change as being internal rather than external to Third World societies (Isbister, 1993). Secondly, Marxists argue that economic growth is possible for Third World countries within the global system. The neo-colonial forces, which dependency theorists see as perpetuating underdevelopment, can act in a manner that would actually propel Third World societies along the path towards capital growth (Isbister, 1993). Marxist analysis focuses on the primacy of the state in bringing about change. The analysis remains in an economic framework that places the instruments of change in the hands o f the state and in elites o f the South to counter the capital accumulation of the North (Braidotti et al., 1994). Essentially, for Marxist development theorists, the conflict between the capitalist and working class has been transformed into a conflict between North and South. 13 Marxism does not prescribe how development is likely to occur, but rather why social change will occur. It is believed that social change will create new structures that will incorporate a redistribution o f wealth and therefore, development. Social change is the result of conflict that arises between classes that have different relationships to the productive structure of society. Criticisms of Marxist theories of development occur along the same lines as those of modernization and dependency. Marxism promotes a re-ordering of the global economic system in favour of Third World countries as a result of changes in the capitalist production centre at a national level. Marxism, along with modernization and dependency, is a structural approach on a global level that does not account for changes in non-state organizations or changes in individuals. Therefore, the perpetuation of inequality and injustice is not addressed at these levels and there exists blindness towards the needs of grassroots and intermediary levels of change (Braidotti et al., 1994). With emphasis placed on the role of global capitalism, other factors that shape and determine local cultures and societies are ignored. Such factors include conflicts surrounding the low-level politics of rural inhabitants' struggles over access to environmental resources in their everyday lives. Macro-structural approaches dismiss local differentiation among resource users, differentiation that occurs along lines of class, ethnicity, age and gender (Moore, 1996). 1.4 Feminist Theory of Development Feminist theories cover a wide range of views and place importance on various elements and structures that determine how and where development occurs. Multi-lateral rather than unilateral models are used which define the interdependent linkages that exist both within and across national borders. Feminism represents a critique of prevailing 14 gender-based power structures and the accepted norms and values which are used to define women and men (Whitworth, 1994). At its fundamental root, feminism is directed at transforming the unequal power relationship that exists between women and men. Feminist development theorists define the economic, materialistic and positivistic approaches to development put forth by the dominant development theories as limiting development. Rather, feminist theorists believe that development analysis should begin with the micro-level experiences of poor women living in the Third World and that these experiences are linked to the macro-economic level. The assumption is that experiences at the micro-level should inform macro-level analysis (Braidotti et al., 1994). Feminist development theory is critical of other development approaches because of the lack of emphasis that is placed on those people on the margins, who are in the most need of development assistance. By examining how gender relations have resulted in current marginality, the linkages between local level and larger political and economic forces are revealed (Stivens, 1994). Examination o f these linkages results in a more encompassing theory of development that considers how development or underdevelopment affects those located on the margins o f society. The post-modern feminist approach to development offers new potential and direction to development because of its pluralist approach. The limits to modernization, dependency and Marxism have created a new interest in the informal sector, popular participation, female production and ecology - elements that have been ignored by previous development theories (Scott, 1995). This new interest has refocused attention on the dominant theories of development not as to how they "provide the answer or solution to the women question [but how the] dominant theories, and their implicit biases, are themselves part of the problem" (Gatens in Pearson and Jackson, 1998:12). 15 Feminist theories of development also place an increased importance on civil institutions. Their importance in development has been noted because of their ability to overcome the failings of authoritarian and bureaucratic development. The failings of the state are noted: "when the state fails to deliver public goods [or] minimum basic needs and democratic rights, civil organizations may fîll the vacuum" (Peet and Watts 1993: 236). It is not surprising therefore, that by replacing the state-centric focus of development with other internal institutions, a degree o f populism results. The appeal of populism results from its ability to work within any given structural framework to achieve a pragmatic, rather than solely a political agenda. It is in this area that feminist development theory possesses the greatest strengths. It is able to circumvent political structures in its focus of household-level development and its goal of development for the ordinary person. Feminist theories focus on individual level decisions, grass-roots civil institutions and public participation as the methods through which development should occur. Therefore, feminist theories of development provide the best framework through which to examine participatory development and conservation at the local level, which will be discussed in the following section. I J Feminist Framework for Participatory Conservation and Development Moser (1991) provides a feminist framework for planning in the Third World that can be applied to participatory local development and conservation. Within this framework, four elements are identified as important for effective development planning and they include: decision-making power, highlighting of complexities, differentiation between strategic and practical needs, and shift from welfare to empowerment in development. 16 Decision-making power is important for any participatory project. If decision­ making powers remain centralized in one state authority, it is inevitable that decisions will not reflect the needs of those who are affected by decisions. The importance o f decision­ making power is based on the assumption that development planning needs to be locally specific. The basis of this assumption rests on whether or not planning for development can be done generally, or if it is necessary to focus on locally specific rural development. The same assumption applies in conservation. Conservation programs can not be limited to parks and protected areas, but must also involve communities (Little, 1994). Decision­ making power is important at all levels of development planning. It is important to note who is determining what the specific requirements of development are and how those requirements will be implemented. The feminist framework argues that men and women have different roles in society and therefore they have different needs (Moser, 1991). The same is true for development and conservation on a local basis. Needs vary on a local level and therefore development can only occur when the people it affects participate in the design of proposed policies and where the model which is implemented corresponds to local people's aspirations (Peet and Watts, 1993). Another important aspect in the feminist framework for development that can be applied to participatory development and conservation is the aspect of simplifying relations so that methodological tools can be developed and implemented (Moser, 1991). Rather than highlighting complex relationships, focus should be placed on simplified connections between individuals and groups. By simplifying relationships, it can be determined who has power over decisions, who needs to have power and the connections and decision-making relationships become clearer. By knowing these connections, relationships can be understood and the development and implementation o f ideas can 17 proceed in any situation. A third aspect that is important in development planning is the differentiation between strategic and practical needs. While both needs must be satisfied for effective development planning, strategic and practical needs must be approached differently. Practical needs are those needs such as housing, services, food, shelter, access to resources, but which do not focus on challenges to the existing system. Strategic needs for development seek to overcome obstacles to development. It is only through the fulfilment of strategic needs that practical needs can be fulfilled over the long term. The Grameen Bank in Bangladesh provides an example o f how a practical need (employment for women) is met only through meeting the strategic needs (enabling women to control the loans they receive and to contribute to family support) (Hashemi et al., 1996). Focus on strategic needs aims at an alternative, more equal and satisfactory organization of society that overcomes the burdens that have prevented the realization of practical development needs in the past. The example that Moser (1991) uses is in the area of employment planning for women. It is insufficient to provide employment for women (a practical need) without providing for strategic needs such as a household and community support system that would allow women to enter the workforce. Finally, focus in development planning must shift from a welfare perspective to one o f empowerment. With the welfare approach to development planning, local people are seen as passive recipients of development assistance. Practical development needs are met through handouts o f technology (such as wells, fertilizer, pesticides, housing, etc.), that occur in a hierarchical, top-down nature. The welfare approach does not include any participation and does not challenge the existing structures that inhibit development. For successful participatory development, it is assumed that a shift from the 18 welfare approach to an empowerment approach must occur. The purpose o f the empowerment approach is for the residents o f tlie Third World to define their development needs. Such a goal is to be achieved through greater self-reliance. The empowerment approach seeks to meet strategic development needs through bottom-up mobilization around practical development needs (Moser, 1993). While elements o f a feminist development framework were used, it is not within the scope o f this thesis to undertake a gender analysis o f the Galibi case study. There are a number o f elements that can be extracted firom feminist development theory which are applicable to participatory conservation. The emphasis on the individual, on grass-roots civil institutions, empowerment and on public participation are all elements that are important in participatory conservation. These elements provide the fi-amework through which participatory conservation and development are examined. The following chapter examines the conflicts in conservation and protected area management with these elements in mind. 19 Chapter 2 Conservation and Protected Area Management When national parks and other protected areas (nature reserves, game reserves, conservation areas) were first created in Suriname, as elsewhere, the primary concern was with preservation o f the natural enviroiunent. In an attempt to save natural wonders, wildlife, biodiversity and ecosystems, protected areas were created which attempted to eliminate human impacts on the area. The preservationist paradigm which guided protected area management placed the activities o f humans in direct conflict with conservation objectives (Feamside, 1999). Over time, it was acknowledged that successful conservation efforts required the support and participation o f local people. With the change in perception o f local people, a number o f new models/paradigms for protected area management have been proposed (e.g. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects, decentralization, devolution, community-based management). In this chapter, the problems with traditional protected area management will be discussed as will the need for a more integrated approach to conservation. Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) are one approach that have generated much enthusiasm. The concept o f ICDPs will be examined, as well as attempts at decentralization, devolution and commimity-based management o f protected areas to overcome park management conflicts. 2.1 Problems with Protected Area Management: The basis o f traditional protected area management was the preservation o f the natural environment through the exclusion o f negative human impacts. Such a view is 20 evident through an examination of park management plans and the old defînition of protected areas by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (lUCN). The lUCN (1975) defined protected areas as large areas where ecosystems are not altered by human exploitation and occupation and where authority has been taken to eliminate exploitation and occupation and enforce effectively the respect of ecological, geomorphological or aesthetic features [emphasis added]. While there has been much effort on the part of organizations such as the lUCN to change the view of protected areas over the years, the idea o f preservation has remained at the forefront until recently. As recently as 1990, the Conservation Action Plan fo r Suriname (1990) for example, stated the purpose of conservation as to maintain biodiversity and to maximize tourism and scientific research. The emphasis is placed on guards, patrols, preservation and the exclusion of all activities unrelated to tourism or research. Traditionally, government-controlled protected area management excluded other stakeholders, objectives other than conservation, and social, political and economic forces (Wells and Brandon, 1992). In excluding all of the above, conflicts were created between park managers and local people who were only involved in park management activities to the degree that it was useful for park managers. Enters and Anderson (1999) describe why a more integrated approach to biodiversity conservation is needed. They are critical o f the vision held by developed nations of an untouched wilderness void of any human impact as the basis for global conservation policies. Under this conventional approach to conservation, local communities are considered threats to conservation and are treated as such. The implementation of management plans proceeds through a combination o f encouragement and more coercive activities aimed at limiting the actions o f local populations (Enters and 21 Anderson, 1999). Under such situations, the national government is seen as the guardian of biodiversity and it has complete sovereignty and control over all conservation activities. Bryant and Wilson (1998) criticize state-led environmental management because it allows for local participation and integration of local knowledge only if it can be controlled. A complete rethinking of the field is necessary that would include a broader understanding from a wider range of fields of knowledge so that humans are reincorporated into the environment. Bryant and Wilson (1998) describe how the technocratic field of environmental management focuses on providing technical information for practical environmental management with very little effort or attention paid to the understanding of cultural, political or economic considerations at the local level. As such, four main criticisms of state-led environmental management are that it often ignores the interdependency of the environment, it imposes top-down, bureaucratic solutions on people, it follows a positivist approach that only allows experts to define environmental problems, and it is based on the assumption that environmental problems can be solved through technology without any modification to broader social, political or economic forces. It is interesting to note that criticisms of environmental management parallel those of development as discussed above. In resource management, attention is focused on increasing the involvement o f the principal resource users, and therefore the major beneficiaries in critical resource management decisions (Doulman, 1993) while development has been focused on meeting locals needs through local participation (Little, 1994). There are two separate, but related issues that need to be addressed in rethinking environmental management. The first involves how the environment is viewed. While 22 the environment is no longer viewed as its own entity, but as a set of interconnected issues, state led environmental management has still maintained a functional approach aimed at resolving environmental problems (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). The technocentric approach to environmental management is based on the assumption that environmental problems can be solved without the modification of broader political, social or economic forces. It has become increasingly obvious that successful conservation measures must be linked to local development (Wells and Brandon, 1992), local people (Hackel, 1993) and local economies (Viet et al., 1995). The second issue that must be addressed in state-led environmental management relates to who controls and participates in environmental management. Environmental management is seen as a process in which experts apply their environmental expertise in the resolution of selected environmental problems. The view is that environmental management is a hierarchical process which needs to be imposed upon people living in a defined area (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). State-led environmental management is not interested in complete understanding o f specifically located situations, but in partial understandings of widely dispersed but similar situations that can be covered by broad policies (Kloppenburg, 1991). Therefore, it is viewed as a practice that can not be associated with stakeholders other than those in the bureaucracy and it ignores traditional or local environmental knowledge. Beckley (1998), while describing forestry management, describes the crisis that is occurring in management circles as one where greater accountability is being desired on behalf of the public, as well as a growing preference for broader management goals that allow for multiple benefits to multiple stakeholders. The problems that arise are based upon decisions being made at arms-length o f actual resource use, the decision making 23 structure is hierarchical and often does not allow for input from the local level and the scope of management objectives is narrow, often focused on a single issue. However, participation of other stakeholders has been deemed an essential component for successful environmental management. Gadgil et al. (1993) demonstrate the relationship that exists between local people and their environments. Local people depend on the ecological services provided by the environment, and therefore, have the knowledge and motivation to sustain them. Such a relationship between humans and their environment, however, has been excluded from state management systems. The exclusion o f local actors in environmental management often results in the implementation of policies and decisions by state decision makers who themselves rarely experience the effects of those decisions (Bryant and Wilson, 1998). As a result, decisions may be based on incomplete information about the locally specific environment, incompatible objectives and divergent ways of understanding the environment. Much of the criticism surrounding past environmental management rests on its failure to incorporate the environment into social, political or economic sectors and the failure to address the needs of local people. The obvious solution to such criticism is to create a management framework that incorporates more inclusive management, that integrates different management objectives and that allows for greater participation from all interested stakeholders in the management process. In many circles, the top-down exclusionary approach to management has been abandoned in favour of management procedures that place greater emphasis on local participation through integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs), decentralization, devolution, community management and co-management. However, the implementation o f such ideas/methods creates many new problems relating to who is involved, what people are involved with 24 and what the objectives are. While ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and communitybased approaches all deal with the same issues, they all place different emphasis on different elements, objectives and involvement, in order to remedy the current problems with environmental management. 2.2 Integrated Conservation and Development Projects: The strategy of linking protected area management with economic activities for local communities gained international acceptance with UNESCO's Man and Biosphere (MAE) project of the mid I970's and through the World Conservation Strategy in 1980 (lUCN, 1980). The MAE emerged as a follow-up to the International Biological programme sponsored by the International Council of Scientific Unions to promote further ecological research in order to better manage ecological resources (Francis, 1985). The MAE was an international programme of scientific cooperation dealing with peopleenvironment interactions through the whole range of global biospheres (Bâtisse, 1985). Through the MAE projects, there emerged a new concept in protected area management, the biosphere reserve. Bâtisse (1982) states the primary objectives of biosphere reserves as: 1) To conserve for present and future use the diversity and integrity of biotic communities; 2) To provide areas for ecological and environmental research; and 3) To provide facilities for education and training. From such objectives, it is obvious that the movement in protected area management has shifted from a strictly preservationist approach to one o f conservation, education and research. The biosphere reserve consists of a core, undisturbed area surrounded by a buffer 25 zone which is managed with minimal human activities. It is in these buffer zones where "area managers and local residents in or near the biosphere reserve should be involved in consultations... Managers and residents may also have to help with the implementation of research projects...(Francis, 1985: 26)." The type of benefits that were provided for local residents are focussed on scientific research. For example, socio-economic projects that have been carried out with close cooperation from local residents include soil, water and primary productivity analyses in the review by Francis (1985). The primary objectives of biosphere reserves, as stated by Bâtisse (1982), mention nothing about the integration of local communities except in ways that can aid scientific research. The overall approach of the MAE Programme was to associate local populations with the formulation and implementation of research projects. The biosphere reserve concept shows that: when the populations are fully informed o f the objectives of the biosphere reserve, and understand that it is in their own and their children's interest to care for its functioning, the problem of protection is largely solved. In this manner, the biosphere reserve becomes fully integrated - not only into the surrounding land-use system, but also into its social, economic and cultural reality (Bâtisse, 1982: 107). However, the MAB Programme did not adequately deal with the problems of local participation, top-down scientific approaches, the integration o f conservation into local social, political and economical sectors, or addressing the needs of local people. The MAB Programmes and biosphere reserves were considered a success when they produced biodiversity conservation results (Lasserre and Hadley, 1997). Local people were consulted or informed o f the objectives of biosphere reserves and were able to participate in research projects deemed important by the international scientific community. Local preferences are only considered if they match the pre-determined goals o f biodiversity 26 conservation. The MAB programme and the biosphere reserve concept reflect a more integrated approach to conservation that allows for the wise use of the environment, from the merely preservationist attitude. The more integrated approach is evident through the multiple objectives of biosphere reserves (conservation, education and research). However, the presence of continual conflict between local residents and protected area managers created a need for greater focus on local development. With the development of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) in the mid I980's, an attempt was made to actually incorporate development objectives within park management plans in order to reconcile conservation, social and economic objectives (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Integrated conservation and development projects can be defined as projects that link biodiversity conservation in protected areas with local socio-economic development (Wells and Brandon, 1992). The link between conservation and development is a result of providing alternative sources of income to discourage resource use. With ICDPs the primary objective is biodiversity conservation. Conservation objectives override local development objectives if there is conflict and ICDPs should be projects where almost all investments and activities should be directed at biodiversity conservation (Sanjayan et al., 1997). Ideally, ICDPs establish a pattern o f sustainable use o f resources so that pressures on protected areas from local residents are voluntarily reduced. Integrated conservation and development projects involve three different activities which portray their link to the MAB and biosphere reserve concept. The first activity is protected area management which includes biological monitoring and research, enforcement and conservation education. The second activity is buffer zone management around the protected area. Buffer zones are areas peripheral to a national park or reserve 27 where less stringent restrictions are placed on land use, which give an added layer of protection to the park or reserve while allowing for both conservation and development needs to be carried out (Slocombe, 1992). The third activity that ICDPs perform are local social and economic development activities. Such activities are similar to rural development projects and they rely on compensation to local populations for park management restrictions or substitution for traditional economic activities (Wells and Brandon, 1992). The main aspect that differentiates ICDPs from classical environmental management is ICDP s focus on poverty. The central assumption of ICDPs is that poverty leads to resource degradation by residents near conservation areas (Gezon, 1997). Therefore, the goals of economic development by ICDPs is twofold. The first goal is to create conditions where development can occur in peripheral zones which a positive influence on conservation and the second goal is to involve local populations so as to create partners in conservation. Peters (1998) describes an ICDP situated around Ranomafana National Park in Madagascar. The ICDP initiated a policy to share half of the national park entrance fees with local residents to demonstrate the benefits of conservation. The goal of the policy was to create new management parmerships between park management and local people and to make the conservation of nature economically beneficial to local people. In the beginning, however, local people were simply passive recipients of entrance fee revenues. The resulting situation could be described as the welfare approach to development where people are passive rather than active participants in development, and where the main method of implementation is the top-down hand-out o f goods and services (Moser, 1991). Local residents were merely compensated for the restrictions placed upon them by the 28 national park (although they are involved in decisions of what to do with their portion of revenues) and do not participate in the actual management decisions of the park. Many ICDPs treat local residents in the same way. In their review of fourteen ICDPs throughout the world, Weils and Brandon (1992) describe few projects that specifically outlined what was meant by public participation and most treated local people as passive beneficiaries rather than active participants. It is often the case that ICDPs use the lure of short-term benefits to obtain credibility which then substitutes for the more difficult process of involving communities in project design and implementation over the longer term (West, 1991). West (1991) notes that while there has been a move away from the preservationist and isolationist view of protected areas, the adoption of cultural preservation and eco-development has often been co-opted. In an overview o f tourism as a form of ecodevelopment. West warns against "the blind promises of economic development to local residents from tourism revenues without an understanding of the social conditions under which tourism can provide benefits to local people (1991: 390)." The promise of economic development through tourism is often used to sell the idea o f conservation to local residents. While the ICDP approach is an improvement over traditional park management techniques, it still isolates local people outside o f the core conservation zone by placing the greatest emphasis on biodiversity conservation (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Many of the problems with traditional protected area management have not been addressed. While the link has been made between conservation and development, many of the problems associated with traditional protected area management remain. Integrated conservation and development projects still rely on the trickle down theory of development and still 29 rely on the top-down approach where local people are given responsibility to follow conservation objectives but they are not involved in the determination of such objectives. The problems with traditional park management still exist, (exclusionary, top down, hierarchical) and they are incorporated into development models based on the same approach (i.e., modernization theory). It is still a technocratic process where participation is limited to involvement with conservation objectives driven by the conservation agenda of the organization/state. Goals, objectives and methods of implementation are still set by protected area authorities and local residents are given the opportunity to participate with the predetermined goals. The problem with ICDPs is that they do not try to involve local people in conservation, but rather attempt to involve them in other activities away from the core park area. The priority is still on protecting the park or reserve firstly, and benefiting local people secondly. Such a view highlights the key difference between a focus on development (improve living standards and eliminating poverty) and ICDPs (conserve biodiversity). The focus of the ICDP is of the management for the conservation of biodiversity while providing and defining limited opportunities for local development. The emphasis is placed on conservation that may have the spin-off effect of creating opportunities for sustainable development for local populations. Such an approach ignores both the desires o f local people and the need and potential for local development that could have the spin­ off effect o f conservation. When local people are left out o f the decision-making process, greater conflicts occur and neither conservation nor development objectives can be achieved. Such a problem is not isolated to ICDPs, but to the larger framework under which they operate. 30 2.3 Decentralization, Devolution and Conununity>Based Approaches There have been many attempts to achieve greater involvement of local populations in conservation and environmental management. The terms decentralization, devolution and community-based management appear frequently in discussions about policies and practices aimed at sustainable development (Fisher, 1999). Each approach exists on a continuum of local participation, from strict government control to complete community control, that is best represented by Amstein's (1969) "ladder of citizen participation " and modified by Berkes et al., (1991) and Matose, (1997) (Table 1). In Amstein s model, the levels o f local participation are represented as rungs on a ladder ranging from non-participation, to tokenism and to degrees of citizen control. While decentralization, devolution and community-based management are used to generate greater local participation, what they actually achieve vary with regard to the involvement o f local people, the objectives, the outcomes and the associated problems in each approach. Decentralization is one method used by government park policy makers to overcome the problems created by management decisions made at a great distance from parks. Decentralization implies the de-concentration of authority to lower levels within the government structure in order to bring government managers closer to resource users (Otto and Elbow, 1994). It engages local government authorities to legitimate management regimes, adjudicate disputes and enforce decisions with greater knowledge about the local situation. Any effort to increase local participation in policy decisions usually requires some form o f decentralization (Little, 1994). With decentralization, management functions are shifted from a central bureaucracy to regional or local offices o f the same bureaucracy. 31 While decentralization does increase local participation by informing and consulting local people, it often results in tokenism. The decentralization of authority occurs, but the decision-making power remains at the centre which results in continued control by the centre as central authorities carry out policies and programs through representatives in local areas (Little, 1994). In an example of protected area management in India (Badola, 1999), decentralization has led to local people being responsible for the protection of resources but they are not given access to them or the ability to change the rules of protection. Such is a common criticism of decentralization. The tendency has been for governments to pass responsibility for conservation to local governments, communities or bureaucracies without the authority to make independent decisions or to take action outside of the parameters and objectives set by the central government (Fisher, 1999). Local resource users lose confidence and trust in state and local institutions abilities and interest to regulate resource use. With the adherence to state and local resource use institutions, the influence o f traditional common property resource (CPR) systems is reduced. With the loss o f confidence in state and local resource use institutions, there is no other resource management system to rely on which can lead to open access to resources. This results in the degradation of common property resource systems to open access systems, which leads to further environmental degradation (Little, 1994). In order to overcome such problems, it is necessary to determine to what degree decentralization occurs. Indicators of genuine decentralization include; the extent to which decisions are given to local authorities, the extent to which the community has authority to negotiate with external bodies and the extent to which the community has power to exert sanctions and to reward resource users (Little, 1994). These indicators 32 denote the level to which decision-making power has been decentralized to local users. Decentralization of authority to more local levels of government is not the same as the devolution of rights to communities (Feldmann, 1994). The distinction between decentralization and devolution centres on the element of empowerment. In many cases where decentralization has failed, it has been as a result of the reluctance of central government authorities to relinquish real power (Fisher, 1999). Devolution is the actual transfer of power away from central authorities to local authorities. The goal of devolution is to overcome the problems of decentralization by transferring not simply responsibility for resource management but also the ability to make real input into the setting of objectives and the defining of priorities. It is a step up on Amstein's ladder of citizen participation (Table 1). With actual devolution, local communities and government authorities enter a partnership that enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs to achieve desired objectives (Berkes, 1991). The same process is involved with devolution as with decentralization, however, authorities at the local level have greater power in decision making, in setting objectives and in defining priorities. The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) is one example where devolution from national/territorial government resource management to community hunting and trapping organizations has occurred through the NWMB for the management Beluga whale quotas. The NWMB has the responsibility and authority to make decisions on Beluga whale quotas and the local hunting and trapping organizations allocate the quota to community hunters (Rodon, 1998). While the ultimate authority for wildlife management rests with the governments o f Nunavut and Canada, the NWMB is the decision-making Table 1: Ladder o f Citizen Participation (adapted from Amstein, 1969; Berkes et al., 1991 ; Matose, 1997) D egrees o f Cii izen Power Com m unity Control Citizen em pow erm ent Em powered Control Partnership A dvisory Panel D ecentralization/ Tokenism V oice Inform /Educate N on-participation Characteristics Local com mim ity governs the program and is in charge o f policy and m anagerial aspects; m echanism s exist for consultation w ith central authorities but ultim ate authority rests with local institutions. Com plete com m unity control o f resource m anagem ent Local com m unity has opportunity to set its ow n objective and im plem ent its ow n plans. Institutionalized m echanism s exist for consensus decision-m aking w ith governm ent authorities. Pow er is redistributed through negotiation between goverrunent and local com m unity who share jointly in planning and decision-making. Local corrunimity concerns are sought and considered in m anagem ent, local participants are included in plarming yet governm ent retains the right to ju d g e plarming decisions. Local participants have an opportunity to voice opinions about m anagem ent decisions but there is no guarantee that those opinions will be considered. Goal is to educate local residents o f the rules and regulations and to inform them o f their options. Local participation is excluded from m anagem ent decisions. Type o f M anagem ent Comm unity-based managem ent based on com m unity traditions, values and objectives. Devolution D ecentralization Strictly governm ent m anagem ent based on governm ent values and objectives. C o­ management can encompass any o f these types o f management depending on the particular agreement. 34 body and the government's role is to carry out NWMB decisions (NWMB, 2(X)l). The management of the Beluga whale harvest has been completely devolved to the local level. The NWMB is responsible for the use of scientific and traditional research to set quotas, to allocate the quotas and to enforce the quota levels. Since devolution involves the potential for changes in objectives at the local level, the central government authority must be willing to accept such changes and even modify their own objectives. In order for the acceptance of changes by the central authority, a significant degree of trust in local management must exist. It is not only decision making power that must be devolved but also accountability. If local communities are to participate in decision-making roles in resource management, they must be prepared to accept long-term accountability for the state of those resources (Feldmann, 1994). Devolution involves people in all elements of management, from the definition of priorities to the implementation of programs. With the devolution of power to local authorities, central authorities must not be left to simply set the rules of management or to judge the abilities of the local authority. While local authorities remain accountable to the central authority, the inverse must also be true. Central authorities must also be held accountable to local communities and organizations in order for trust to be built on both sides. The objectives may differ greatly with devolution. With the empowerment of local communities, predefined priorities of the central authority may be rearranged. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is one example where devolution to the local level led to a re-arranging of priorities. CAMPFIRE'S concern with resource tenure was linked to broader issues of representation, economic participation, communal area governance and collective 35 decision-making rather than solely issues of sustainable use of wildlife (Metcalfe, 1994). With CAMPFIRE, the empowerment of local communities was considered a precondition to wildlife conservation. The rearranging of the centrally held assumption that conservation may lead to local development was changed to local development that may help wildlife conservation. Many criticisms of devolution result out of challenges to the assumptions that: 1) local residents are skilled in sustainable resource use and conservation, 2) contemporary rural communities are homogenous and stable, and, 3) local, community-based tenurial, knowledge and management systems are uniquely suitable for conservation (Enters and Anderson, 1999). While these assumptions may or may not hold true (or even be important), they cannot be used as excuses to prevent devolution to the local level, especially when current resource management approaches are not working. The real problem behind these assumptions is based on the lack of control by central authorities. Once again, trust is an important issue, and in many instances, devolution does not occur because of the perceived (or real) lack of the capacity for local institutions to undertake effective management. Meaningful devolution requires both that local-level managers (either local government or local communities) have the capacity for resource management and that those with the current authority to make management decisions be prepared to transfer that authority (Fisher, 1999). Levels of trust in local management must be built through building local capacities and providing examples of effective local management to demonstrate improved local capacities (Fisher, 1999). Community management o f resources is even further along the continuum of participation than devolution and it also involves many aspects o f decentralization. It has 36 been discussed widely as an ultimate ideal, although actual working examples o f complete community management are few (Fisher, 1999). While local residents have been making decisions for centuries regarding who may take resources, how, when and where those resources may be used, it has only been recently that such local management arrangements have been recognized by national or Western management authorities (Johannes, 1998). Community-based conservation directly involves the integration of rural development and conservation. It can be defined as "local, voluntary initiatives involving a minimum of several households in which at least one of the outcomes of local management practices is either the maintenance of habitats, the preservation o f species, or the conservation of certain critical resources and another outcome is the improvement of social and economic welfare (Little, 1994, p. 348)." There exist many different methods by which local initiatives are integrated into conservation and development schemes. Community resource management has been described as a management framework that is based on community development through multiple uses o f resources, where community forces drive land- and resource-use decisions, and where the community is satisHed with its involvement and benefits from the use of surrounding land and resources (Little, 1994). One area of community-based resource management for which there exist numerous examples in the literature is common property resource (CPR) management systems. Berkes (1989), Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1992) provide various examples of differing resources that are managed based on community knowledge about the resource and community customs and traditions that govern resource use. Many of the problems associated with devolution are also present with 37 community-based conservation, such as lack of faith in community management capacities. Due to the global nature of the environment and the increasing number of international environmental agreements, it is difficult for community-based conservation to exist in isolation. There are increasing pressures from governments and international organizations to meet global conservation standards. However, there is much support for the belief that community-based management systems provide a modem management alternative by ensuring equitable access and by managing and enforcing conservation measures to ensure sustainability (Ruddle, 1998). In the area of fisheries management in particular, effective management of smallscale, near-shore fisheries using conventional Western methods has failed (Johannes, 1998). With the recognition of this fact, governments have begun to look towards community-based fisheries management's ability to meet government conservation standards (Johannes, 1998). The main problem with community-based resource management is the difficulty encountered with the integration of govemment control. When govemment resource management initiatives are introduced, community customs are eroded, which decreases and illegitimizes the community resource management system. In an example from Indonesian fisheries, centralized conservation policies, combined with collusion and selfinterest have combined to threaten both resources and the community resource institutions that have sustained resources over centuries (Thorbum, 2000). In order to overcome such problems, a resource management arrangement is needed that is able to balance the needs o f govemment authorities with those of local resource users. What is needed is a genuine sharing o f power over the management o f the resource, in decision-making, planning and implementation. Co-management is one such 38 approach that attempts to incorporate elements of ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and community-based approaches into a partnership where governments and local communities share authority and responsibility for resource management (Pinkerton, 1989). In the next chapter, co-management will be examined further with regard to how it allows for the integration of development and conservation with the full participation of local communities. 39 Chapter 3 Co-Management As previously discussed, ICDPs, decentralization, devolution and communitybased management are all genuine attempts at integrating conservation and development at the local level. However, conflicts continue to arise over local development and resource management issues. Conflicts arise because local communities feel as though they are excluded from conservation and development activities (govemment control and decentralization) or because govemment resource managers feel as if national conservation and development objectives are threatened (community-based management). The above approaches have been unable to achieve the necessary balance between stakeholder involvement, national conservation and development objectives and local conservation and development objectives. Co-management is a further approach that attempts to combine elements from the above approaches to generate a management regime that is more suitable to all parties. In this chapter, co-management will be deflned and it will be discussed on the basis of how it addresses the key problems in integrating conservation and development at the local level. There are three key issues that will be dealt with: I) how the differing values and objectives o f conservation and development are addressed, 2) how local participation and empowerment are included, and 3) how common property resource (CPR) management systems are included. These three issues form the basis o f the main questions of the thesis: I) the effectiveness o f co-management at integrating conservation and development, 2) the ability for co-management to allow greater local participation, and 3) the ability of co-management to allow for the integration of conventional, state-led 40 environmental management with local CPR management systems. 3.1 Co-management Definitions and Examples: Decentralization, devolution and community-based resource management have all been shown to exist on a continuum of community participation. Co-management is an approach that uses various elements from the above approaches in an attempt to generate a more suitable management arrangement capable of recognizing differing management cultures. Co-management is a term that is widely used in resource management, yet it is not precisely defined in the literature. It has been defined as a "process of shared decision making between decision-makers and resident shareholders who seek to optimize mutual good and to plan for the long term" (Reed, 1995, p. 133). Such a definition places the emphasis on the participation of local resource users in state-led management. It is important to recognize that within this defînition, a distinction is made between the decision makers (i.e. govemment) and resident stakeholders (i.e. local people). The degree to which decision making powers are actually shared between these two groups depends on the agreement made (formal or informal) and the particular situation. Co-management can be more broadly defîned as various levels of integration of local- and state-level management systems (Berkes et al., 1991; Pinkerton, 1992; Notzke, 1995). Integration is the key element that allows for the combination of various techniques, values and approaches in order to achieve management objectives. This more broad definition incorporates not only the elements of participation, but also the integration o f different management systems. It is unnecessary to precisely define co­ management because of the wide range o f management schemes that fall under the co­ management framework, and examples o f co-management exist that cover broad ranges of participation and integration. For the purposes of this thesis, co-management can be 41 defined as an arrangement where decision-making powers are shared between government and local resource users which allows for the integration of different objectives, values and approaches to resource management. Co-management allows for the sharing of decision making powers between groups that may have different styles of resource management, such as the state/bureaucratic style and common property resource management style (Beckley, 1998). That is why a precise definition of co-management is difficult. In fact, a continuum of co-management agreements exist, ranging from arrangements where local people are merely consulted to those where local populations have all o f the management power and responsibility (B erkesetal., 1991). There are numerous examples of co-management agreements, both in Canada and internationally that have achieved varying degrees of success. In Canada, co-management has been used to manage resources jointly between government and Aboriginal groups (Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996). Probably the most well known international co-management agreements are found in Australia, where much has been written about the co-management agreements between Aboriginal people and the government to manage national parks (De Lacy, 1993; Davis and Weiller, 1992; Richardson 1992). Co-management agreements also exist for the management of forest reserves in Zaire (Matose, 1997; Bruce et al., 1993), India (Corbridge and Jewitt, 1997) and in Samoa (Cox and Elmqvist, 1997), among others. Co-management has been developed as a potential method to integrate common property resource management practices with those that are state-controlled. By creating a partnership where authority and responsibility for resource management is shared between local and state management systems, it is more likely for common property 42 resource institutions to remain intact in the face of government control and integration into capitalist systems of production and trade (Thorbum, 2000). Co-management agreements have evolved into a method to deal with the above mentioned conflicts in environmental management. Since the goals and values of state resource departments and those of local groups are often quite different, the framework of co-management can allow for the incorporation of both sets of values into the management of the resource. When diverse groups are included in co-management process, they are able to articulate their diverse values. Government agencies based their policies on traditional western notions of conservation. These policies, based on the view of nature as "an untouched and untouchable wilderness", ignored the "historical relationship between people and their habitats and the role people play in maintaining biodiversity in forests and savannas" (McNeely in Cox and Elmqvist, 1997, p. 85). In many developing countries, rural inhabitants view the land and the resources as communal property that can neither be individually owned, nor traded, as in the case with private or government-owned land. A major feature in many rural resource systems is communal control of the resource. Co­ management allows for sharing of control over common property resources between government and local users. Enforcement of norms, rules and regulations must be based on a community value system that is agreed upon by all of the group members and government (Berkes et al., 1991). One o f the most important reasons for co-management is to provide a means for different stakeholders with conflicting values to share a resource and participate in its management (Notzke, 1995). By agreeing to a management system that allows for jointuse of a resource, it is likely that conflicts will be reduced. If members of all the 43 stakeholder groups can agree upon and coordinate a management scheme, there is greater potential for sustainable use of the resource. Co-management allows for bilateral and multilateral agreements between local residents, government officials and non­ government organizations so that conflicts can be resolved while maintaining sound environmental management. With co-management, local bodies can make locally appropriate decisions and reduce state/local conflicts that result from state decisions that are made thousands of kilometres away (Pinkerton, 1996). The assumption is that local bodies have greater flexibility to design appropriate local regulations and offer a greater chance of compliance than state regulations that originate at a distance (both physically and by way of understanding local conditions). However, in order for the assumption to hold, local bodies must have the authority, power and competence to do so. Enforcement is also most likely to succeed if such activities are shared between the state and local users (Hawkes, 1996). In theory, the possibility of voluntary compliance increases because local resource users have a say in how the resource is managed. Local management bodies, run by local citizens, also have a vested interest in the sustainable use of resources and therefore, are more considerate of the long term benefits of resource management (Pinkerton, 1996). Local resource users have the benefit o f participating in decisions that affect their access to resources while government managers have the benefit of greater acceptance and compliance with government regulations (Berkes, 1994). Based on the above definition and experiences, co-management has the potential to be used as an effective tool in overcoming conflicts with local development and conservation. Co-management has the potential for linking conservation with local development, for increasing local participation, for integrating common property resource 44 management systems and for the integration of local social, economic and environmental objectives. 3.2 Problems That Co-Management Must Address Co-management provides a potential approach to integrating conservation and development with the involvement of local people. It allows for conflicts that result out of conflicting views to be resolved by integrating local resource management techniques, values and customs with those of government-led conservation. Based on the above discussion of co-management, there are a number of aspects that must be considered when examining a particular co-management agreement. It has been suggested that in order for conservation to be successful at the local level, it must be linked with a development component. Economic incentives must be generated for conservation that promote sustainable use of resources, social health and cultural sustainability. Another important aspect is local participation. Local participation refers to the degree to which local people are empowered to make conservation and development decisions, the stages at which decisions are made (planning, design and implementation) and the manner in which participation is sustained through local institution building. When these three aspects are combined, can co-management be effective at integrating conservation and development? A fînal aspect that must be considered with co-management is common property resource management systems. In order for co-management to be successful, existing traditional and local strategies for the environment, economy and society must be considered. These strategies need to be integrated into any new management arrangement that includes local values with government values. 45 Therefore, by examining the integration of conservation and development initiatives, local participation, and local common property resource management systems, the appropriateness o f co-management arrangements can be analyzed. 3.3 Importance of Linking Conservation and Development Conservation is of secondary importance to most rural inhabitants in the Third World. While there are numerous linkages between rural livelihoods and the environment, the primary concern for rural residents is to create conditions in which they can satisfy their basic needs for survival (Hackel, 1993). The satisfaction of such needs deals primarily with the alleviation o f poverty and, therefore, is often the focus of development projects. Rural residents generally view conservation as a worthwhile goal yet they believe that it should not take precedence over people (Hackel, 1993). Wells and Brandon (1992) describe successful cases of rural resource management that meet two objectives: to increase the income o f individuals through access to the resources, and to conserve the resource base. They include projects associated with tourism revenue development in Amboseli National Park in Kenya, collection of non-timber resources in Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, and local income- generating activities such as agroforestry, reforestation and ecotourism in the Osa Peninsula, Costa Rica (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Such an approach demonstrates the importance o f dealing with issues of social security as well as dealing with resource management or conservation issues. Many rural communities in the developing world either maintain subsistencebased agricultural systems or are dependent on the natural resource base as their primary source o f income. For them, employment offers an increase in security or a cushion for the inevitable instances where agriculture fails due to natural phenomena such as drought or disease. Therefore, rural populations view employment opportunities as much more 46 important than conservation (Hackel, 1993). The difficult dilemma o f economic development over conservation is common in most poor rural areas and poses difficult problems for conservationists. Unless local populations see themselves as deriving direct benefits from conservation, it is unlikely that they will take measures or be enthusiastic about actions in that direction (especially if conservation limits their access to resources). Therefore, successful conservation projects must involve an integration of rural economic development and conservation. Unless projects generate higher revenues through economic opportunities, higher yields for sustainable practices than unsustainable ones, and resource based activities that remain in the hands of local people, sustainable development will not be profitable and conservation efforts will be bound to fail (Viet et al., 1995). These issues deal primarily with measures that would alleviate poverty. By increasing revenues generated at the local level, economic incentives can be created that do not necessarily involve environmentally destructive behaviour. However, sustainable rural development is bound to fail if greater benefits can be obtained by unsustainable practices. Social conditions must be improved and the linkage between increasing economic welfare, local participation and conservation must be demonstrated for any conservation effort to be achieved. The time frame over which profits from conservation and development are generated Is also important. When the economic situation is precarious, people are more likely to support projects that generate revenues in the shortest time period, regardless of long term consequences. They do not have the flexibility to make investments in the future. For example, leaving valuable timber in a forest increases the value of the timber over time, however, that fact is not o f concern to someone who needs to capitalize on that value in the present (Feamside, 1999). 47 Ideally, the co-management framework (through local participation in all activities) provides opportunities to generate economic incentives for local people in a sustainable manner. The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe is an example o f a co-management arrangement where authority, management, production and benefit are all primarily situated with the local producer community (Metcalfe, 1994). The Gwaii Haanas Agreement in Canada allows for local community development and livelihood security in conjunction with national park management (Hawkes, 1996). Co-management can promote ecologically sustainable use of the environment, social health and cultural sustainability of the local population and direct economic benefits (Berkes et al., 1991). It can, therefore, effectively link conservation to local development by allowing for participation of both resource managers and local communities. 3.4 Importance of Local Participation One of the key elements of integrating conservation and development is the involvement of local people. Local participation is now seen as one of the most important ingredients that allows for the successful implementation o f integrated conservation and development projects (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Effort to increase local participation in conservation and development has arisen out of the problems encountered with highly centralized and non-paiticipatory programs o f the past (Little, 1994). Therefore, if the co­ management approach is to be used, an examination of the importance o f local participation and the potential for co-management to create opportunities for local participation must be included. This section discusses the importance o f local participation and how co-management provides opportunities for greater local participation. 48 Any examination of participation must include an examination of the degree of local involvement, the stages at which participation occurs and how local participation is linked to the sustainability of programs. These factors are all significant in influencing the success of integrating conservation and development programs, and co-management provides the opportunity to address them. Without local participation, the potential exists for greater conflict between local people and conservation managers regarding desired goals, values and desired outcomes. The various degrees to which local participation occurs are best illustrated the typology of citizen participation developed by Amstein (1969) and adapted by Berkes et al. (1991) and Matose (1997) for co-management of resources (Table 1). In this diagram, the levels of participation range from non-participation to full participation. Participation refers to the means to which "have-nots" join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, programs are operated and benefits distributed (Amstein, 1969). Local participation is measured in this method by degrees of authority or power that local people have and it refers to the means by which they can influence change. Depending on the co-management arrangement, the level of local participation can fall anywhere on the ladder, which reflects the variability of different arrangements to generate genuine participation. Greater local participation in co-management may or may not result in more efficient management of the resource but it will certainly be more compatible with local needs (Berkes et al., 1991). It is insufficient to examine participation by itself, the examination must also include how people participate and what authority their participation includes. By examining the authority vested in local people, the element of empowerment is introduced. Empowerment refers to the ability o f one group to make institutions 49 responsive to their views, aspirations and needs (Amstein, 1969). In the context of resource management, empowerment has been defined as the ability of local communities to have control over and shared benefits of local resource initiatives (Scheyrens, 1999). Regarding participation without including an examination of empowerment misses the point because there are many instances where people have participated a great deal in a project but they have no real power in what goes on. Co-management arrangements can involve the full delegation of real decision-making power to local people (Hawkes, 1996), thereby empowering local communities. Another important aspect of local participation in need of consideration is the area in which local involvement occurs. Ideally, local participation would occur throughout, however, this is rarely the case. Kiss (1990) identifîes three areas where local participation is particularly important; participation in benefits, participation in planning and design and participation in implementation and management. Local participation in benefits is important because it is necessary to obtain local support for conservation and to compensate for the potential costs of conservation such as the loss o f access to resources or the limiting of activities. The benefits may be direct, such as increases in income, or indirect, such as improved sanitation or nutrition, but the benefits must be directly linked to the conservation objectives (Kiss, 1990). There are numerous examples where local participation in benefits from conservation is enhanced through co­ management arrangements. Local communities have participated in benefits through tourism (Prystupa, 1998), wildlife management (Metcalfe, 1994) and park management (Notzke, 1995). Local participation in planning and design is also important. Involving local populations at the beginning o f a project allows for local views and perceptions, needs. 50 traditions, constraints and expectations of the resources in question to be included. If this occurs, it is more likely that desired benefits to local populations will be obtained and therefore, conservation will be successful. Finally, it is important to include local participation in the implementation and management of the project. The implementation of conservation projects requires organizational, technical and managerial elements. In order for conservation projects to remain sustainable over the long term, local participation must be included in all of these aspects (Little, 1994). There are many instances where projects run smoothly through the implementation phase, yet it becomes unlikely that project activities will continue because of over reliance on donor funding or field staff (Wells and Brandon, 1992). In order for this to be avoided, many conservation and development projects involve a training aspect in which local residents are able to acquire technical, managerial and organizational skills. One example of such a case is in Kakadu National Park in Australia, where a co-management agreement outlines the obligation to train local Aboriginals in skills necessary for them to participate in park management. Local members o f the various Aborigines communities that comprise the Gagudju Association were involved in an Aboriginal ranger training program that involved local residents in conceiving, planning and implementation of management techniques (Hill, 1983). Local participation can be seen as both a goal and as a means o f achieving goals (Little, 1994). Participation allows communities to have greater control over resources and decisions that directly affect their lives. It also provides a means to achieve social and economic objectives. It is for these reasons that local involvement in resource conservation is a primary objective o f current conservation movements. The most important area in which local involvement is sought is in the area of determining goals 51 (Uphoff et al., 1998). Unless resource management goals match those of the local resource users, constant conflict will result. The determination of goals hinges on the aspect of participation in decision making. Local people can only have their objectives heard and considered if they are a part of the decision making process. Closely associated with decision making power is local empowerment. The ability to make locally specific decisions with regards to the environment, society and the economy is important. It includes the ability to resist the infringement of others onto economic or cultural interests that are valued by the individual or community and the ability to promote those interests in which others are willing to accept (Uphoff et al., 1998). This allows local interests to influence resource management regulations and the planning process. In order for conservation and development projects to remain sustainable over the long term, all o f the elements of local participation must be maintained (Little, 1994). Local level participation must be promoted from the beginning in the design, implementation and management of projects at the local level. There are two ways in which organization for continued participation can be achieved. The first involves the use of agents of change, who are described as field workers or extension workers that are employed for implementation of the project and for mobilizing the community around the project (Wells and Brandon, 1992). This approach achieves results quickly, however, there is no organizational structure to support the project activities once the agents of change are removed unless some sort o f local structure that existed previously is able to take over. The second approach for organizing for local participation involves the recognition or creation of local institutions. The Nyaminyami Wildlife Management 52 Trust in Zimbabwe, is one example where a local institution was created with aid from local residents, local government and the national government parks department, with the specific goal of participating in conservation and development projects (Metcalfe, 1994). In another example from Suriname, the Foundation for Nature Conservation Alusiaka (STIDUNAL) arose in a time of civil conflict and it was subsequently used for participation in conservation and development at the village level. Either way, institution building has been argued as more effective in sustaining local participation than relying on individual agents of change (Wells and Brandon, 1992). Institution building has been defined as "the creation of procedures for democratic decision making at the local level and the involvement of local people in these procedures to the extent that they regard them as the normal way of conducting community affairs (Midgely in Wells and Brandon, 1992: 82)." With the use of local institutions, project activities are incorporated into the manner in which the community functions. Project decisions are not seen by the community to be authoritatively imposed by outsiders and enforcement is more likely. Once project activities become part o f the community, they are likely to be self-sustaining when funding for the project inevitably runs out. While the local institution building approach is much more time consuming than the use of agents of change, the potential for greater benefits over the long term exists. From the literature on local participation it is evident that numerous aspects are important. Successful community based conservation and development projects must have high degrees of local participation. This participation refers not only to the depth of participation but also to the breadth of the community that participates. The stages at which participation occurs is another critical element. Successful local participation programs involve local residents at all levels of the planning, implementation and 53 managing stages. Participation is also important as both a goal and as a means of achieving goals. It allows for specific goals to be achieved, goals that are often simply for empowerment, or being able to control the conditions which affect day to day life. Finally, it is important to obtain sustained participation. Sustained participation can only be achieved if local institution building is incorporated into project activities so that they become a part of community activity. 3.5 Importance of Common Property Resource Management Most rural communities in the developing world base their economies on subsistence agriculture or the use of natural resources, to varying degrees. Such activities involve the joint use of communal property in which many families share resources. There exists a wide range o f common property resource systems that vary greatly in the resources that are used, the manner in which resource decisions are made and how the management of the resource is maintained. Therefore, in many situations, co­ management arrangements will need to consider the reasons for common property resource systems, the types of resources that are managed communally, the way that these elements affect the manner in which local resource decisions are made and the way that resources are traditionally managed. Hardin (1968) described, in a simplified manner, the "tragedy of the commons” using an example of grazing land. Without privatization or government control, the resource is expected to become depleted because users receive individual benefîts with over-exploitation, while the costs are shared with all other users. The limitations to this theory have been often cited (Burger and Gochfeld, 1998; Feeny et al., 1990). The major criticism of the "tragedy o f the commons" is that its impeccable logic applies to few actual cases, of which Western European communal property systems are one such case. 54 Stevenson (1991) defines common property resources as "a form of resource management in which a well-delineated group of competing users participate in the extraction or use of a jointly held, fugitive resource according to explicitly or implicitly understood rules about who may take how much of the resource (p. 46)." Essentially, the number of users is limited to those who are members of the defined group, each user has knowledge about their rights and limits, and decisions are made as a group process. Common property resources are an example o f resources that are managed directly by local groups. There are two main concepts that can be derived out of Stevenson's (1991) definition. The first concept refers to the physical and environmental aspects of the resource and the human pressures placed upon it. The second concept refers to the rules governing the use of the resource. The rules that govern use are an indication of management decisions that are made to control access to, or use of, the resource. A relationship exists between physical aspects o f common property resources (such as resource scarcity) and the level to which communal resource management decisions are institutionalized. The physical and environmental aspects of the resource are of little consequence in this discussion about resource management. It is the way that resource decisions are made, who makes them and how those decisions are made that is of interest. The main point that must be made is that the resource in question is indeed a common property resource (or was prior to conservation intervention) and that a management system is necessary. Common property resource management systems have been identified as a potential area for development assistance for the rural poor. CPR management systems 55 are seen as providing a more equitable distribution of the benefits of resource exploitation through the controlled extraction of local resources for local benefit (Thorbum, 2(XX)). Common property resource management systems are also an area of great interest for conservation. The emphasis that has been placed on participatory development and the potential benefits of common property resource strategies suggest that there is a need for examination of the relationships between the environment, the economy, social systems and resource management systems because of participatory developments broad scope (Jodha, 1992). There is a need to integrate such systems within Western notions of resource management in order to avoid conflicting views on the way resources are used. Before development initiatives are implemented where CPR management systems exist, the impacts of external involvement (through regulation) on resource management systems should be considered. The implementation of overly strong, centralized institutions has the effect of eroding existing local institutions (formal and informal) and further degrading the resource (Jodha, 1992). However, if the management system does not have a strong institutional base, resource degradation may also occur. A fine balance exists between the organization of society around a resource system and the successful management of the resource (Jodha, 1992). Therefore, there is a need for some type of management regime, where genuine power sharing allows for the integration of communal property systems with those of the state, such as co-management (Sekhar, 2000). Runge (1992) describes three main factors that lead to common property resource management systems: poverty, dependence on natural resources and uncertainty. Poverty limits the opportunities for individuals to take advantage of privatized resources. The act of creating the institutions for private property is very expensive. It is expensive to survey 56 land, to have courts that respect land titles and monitor for compliance of obedience to private property rules. Moreover, local beliefs or customs may not recognize property rights in the Western sense, but recognize the right for all to use the land and its resources (Berkes, 1994). For those individuals who live on a subsistence level, communal use is a necessity and a way of life. The dependence on natural resources is another factor that leads to the development o f common property resource management. The distribution of natural resources and the natural phenomena upon which they are dependent occurs in a random pattern over the landscape. Such conditions make it extremely difficult to assign exclusive use rights to a certain area equitably. Common property institutions tend to reduce the environmental uncertainty faced by resource users (Runge, 1992). Uncertainty is the final factor that leads to communal management of resources and it is a direct result of the previous two factors. Where poverty exists, the options available for subsistence are limited to the use of the natural resources in the surrounding area. When entire livelihoods are based on resources that are affected by the randomness of the environment or require collective effort (i.e., rice fields and irrigation agriculture), people tend to coalesce into groups. Communal management allows users to share in the benefits of resources and to distribute the losses equitably. Such behaviour is a hedge against uncertainty, where, instead of acting like rational individuals, people will accept less than a best case scenario in order to avoid a worst case scenario (Runge, 1992). The solution for the management o f common property resources is to place the property rights of the resource in the hands o f certain users. Common property resource (CPR) management does this within the framework o f group control. Other important considerations with common property resources are the t>pes of 57 resources and conditions under which they can be managed through group control. There are many examples of common property resource management systems that cover many different resources, such as water, forests, wildlife, Hsheries and grazing lands (Cousins, 1996). Common property resource institutions rely on local beliefs and customs to provide the various rules and conventions regulating the use of these resources (Sekhar, 2000). Common property resource (CPR) management systems have been successful in managing natural resources and protecting biodiversity in numerous situations (Berkes, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1992). However, increasing pressures on resources through the extraction of raw materials, expanding modification of the environment and the erosion of traditional values and norms has led to the intervention of the state in the management of CPRs. In many cases, CPR systems have become impractical as a result of new challenges from a more integrated society where communal values are not as strong. This has resulted in attempts at state control where further degradation to the resource has often occurred due to the failure of the state to consider local management approaches and policies (Sekhar, 2(KX)). Both of these issues suggest the need for a type of management regime that allows for the sharing of decision-making powers between communal property resource management systems and state control (Pinkerton, 1994). In Indonesia, the local management of marine resources provides an excellent example of a CPR management institution where both the resource and the institution have been threatened by centrally-imposed state management techniques (Thorbum, 2(XX)). Attempts are now being made to use a mutually beneficial co-management regime that could serve the interests and employ the inherent knowledge o f local communities, resource users and 58 government agents in Indonesia (Thorbum, 2000). Another example is of the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) that uses both scientific knowledge and traditional Inuit knowledge in its co-management arrangement and addresses the diminishing communal values with state control o f resources (Rodon, 1998). While the management of resources communally has been successful in the past, the integration of state-led management should continue to include such approaches where they still exist through the use o f co-management. Co-management has become increasingly significant in the contemporary world where local-level traditional controls to resource management alone are no longer sufficient as a result o f increasing national and international pressures on resources (Berkes, 1989). In many instances, the integration of scientific knowledge with traditional knowledge has improved resource management systems. Therefore, co-management should include not only the sharing of decision-making responsibility and authority, but also the integration o f different resource knowledge systems (Rodon, 1998). 59 C hapter 4 Methods The co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve was used as a case study to determine the ability of co-management: to address conflicting conservation and development issues, to increase local participation in resource management and to integrate state resource management systems with conunon property resource management systems. This chapter will outline the methods by which the information for the Galibi case study was collected. It will begin with a description of the study area, followed by the rationale for the case study approach, the theoretical propositions that guide the research and finally will conclude with the data sources, scope and limitations. 4.1 Study Area Suriname is located in tropical South America, on the North-East coast between French Guiana and Guyana (see Figure I). Formerly a Dutch colony, this relatively small, sparsely inhabited country gained its independence in 1975. Of the approximately 425,(XX) inhabitants, 70% are concentrated in and around the capital city of Paramaribo, 25% in small towns along the coastal plain and 5% in the Savanna belt and the interior along the Marowijne, the Suriname and Saramacca rivers. With such population concentration in the city, the remaining 90% of the country has a very low population density. The majority of the country is covered by a vast expanse of tropical rainforest and is largely untouched by humans. While lowland tropical rainforest makes up nearly 90% of the landmass, there exists great diversity ranging from swamps and mangrove forests in the coastal region, to forested highlands along the Guyana Shield with forested and 60 Figure 1: Map of Study Area SURINAME CAKOM UNStA M'Y' M IM m C O C SAN C U rA N A Elianti Beach Atlantic Ocean ' Gaiibi Nature Reserve /Baboensanti Beach 5*^ T Galibi Beach Galibi Christiaankondre Langamankondre Passikoncb'e>^[ ^ 4" French Guiana 5 Erowarte Road Pierrekondre dorp S t Laurent SauRerGovtmnKitt ofSuriname 1971 /] Scak 1:200 000 ^ Albina Town ChristiaankofKke Amerindian Village %. Galibi Abandoned Amerindian village 61 swamp savannas interspersed throughout (Baal, 1999). These various ecological areas are intersected by numerous rivers. As can be expected with the diversity in landforms, both flora and fauna species diversity is great. It has been estimated that there exist 138 unique tree species in the lowland forest portion of the Guyana Shield alone and the overall level of plant endemism is estimated at 40% (Conservation International and Government of Suriname, 2000). The peoples of Suriname are very diverse as well. There are numerous ethnic groups that inhabit the capital and coastal towns, however, in the more isolated regions of the interior, the population consists mostly of Amerindian or Maroon communities (approximately 12% of the total population). Such communities range from those that are completely isolated and rely solely on hunting, fishing, shifting agriculture and non­ timber forest products to those that are well integrated into the national wage economy. The specific study area includes the Carib villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, and the Galibi Nature Reserve (see Figure I). These two traditional Amerindian villages comprise approximately KXM) inhabitants who use the surrounding area for subsistence activities such as hunting. Ashing, agriculture and gathering o f timber and non-timber resources. Traditional tribal societies have faced radical change since the 1980s, much of it brought about by the expansion of logging, mining and other natural resource exploitation in the interior, bringing the government into conflict with the indigenous tribal communiAes. Between 1986 and 1992, the Government o f Suriname and the tribal communities o f the interior were in a state of civil war. Rapid expansion into the interior without recognition o f traditional land rights was one of the main causes of the conflict. The conflict illustrated the degree to which various groups felt threatened by the 62 expansion of forestry and mining concessions in the interior. The peace accord that was signed in 1992 recognized the right of citizens of tribal communities to secure communal land title and the right to pursue economic activities in an economic zone surrounding those communities. However, the agreement has yet to be implemented, economic development in the interior proceeds in an ad hoc manner, and traditional land rights have yet to be formally implemented. Therefore, trust between local communities and government is an important issue. 4.2 Rationale for Use of Case Study: The method that is used in any study is dependent on the questions that are asked and the conditions under which such questions are asked. The case study approach was considered in this study because it represents the best method for guiding contemporary questions in which there is very little control over behaviourial events (Yin, 1989). The case study allows for the detailed examination of a particular situation that can then be used to examine general theoretical problems. The case study approach is also flexible in nature so that the research can respond to evolving events. Critiques of the case study approach are commonly based on the lack of rigour or bias of the researcher, the difficulty in maintaining external validity and that such an approach is too time consuming. These problems can be addressed with a rigorous research design and a well organized approach to research. The research began with an extensive review of co-management, conservation, development and common property resources in the literature to identify research questions which served to anchor the case study research. Canadian Crossroads International provided the opportunity for obtaining volunteer work experience in Suriname. Through contacts with work placement at the Association o f Indigenous 63 Leaders of Suriname, the efforts for conservation and development at the Galibi Nature Reserve became evident and were the impetus for the case study location. Since the focus of the case study research was on the ability of the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve to integrate conservation and development through the involvement of local people, reliance on qualitative data was necessary. While it would have been possible to quantify reaction of individual village residents to the co-management arrangement through a close-ended questionnaire, it was felt that this would not provide an accurate picture of the situation. By allowing interviewees to frame the problems, solutions and responses through open-ended questions, the research was able to proceed beyond the rigid structures of quantitative data based on questionnaires. External validity is a common concern with case study research. External validity was addressed in this study through a thorough literature review prior to beginning the study that provided the background that enabled similarities and differences to be identified which could then be generalized to the wider field of conservation and development. Attempts were made to corroborate all information through the use of various sources of information. 4.3 Key Theoretical Propositions Based on the literature review, three key theoretical propositions were examined that were deemed to be essential for co-management o f the Galibi Nature Reserve and they have already been described in previous sections (Chapter 1 and Chapter 3). A feminist framework for participatory development provides the rationale for the inclusion of local people in development and conservation. It focuses on micro-level decisions, highlighting of complexities, differentiation between strategic and practical needs and a shift from welfare to empowerment. The discussion on co-management focused on the 64 issues of linking conservation and development, local participation and local common property resource systems which follow the suggestions from feminist development literature. These two sections can be combined to create three key theoretical propositions and they are as follows: 1) in order for conservation to be achieved it must be linked to local, micro-level development activities, 2) local people must be able to participate and have the authority and power to participate in the decision-making, implementation and management processes (which is a shift from a welfare to empowerment), and 3) common property resource management systems must be integrated with state management systems (which highlight the complexities of local resource management). The co-management agreement that exists for Galibi Nature Reserve for the conservation of marine turtles is examined below with regard to these propositions. 4.4 Data Sources, Scope and Limitations Data sources for the case study included both written material (such as government and NGO documents), interviews with key informants and observations. The written documents provided crucial background information and detailed the manner in which environmental management proceeds in Suriname from the govemment/NGO perspective. The documents provided the legislation, mandates and regulations that demonstrated the way things were intended and provided contrast to what was actually occurring. Information at the local level relied more on interviews and observations and provided the material needed to determine what was occuring at the local level. Interviews were conducted during the months of May through August 2000, and involved members of government, environmental NGOs, village leaders from Langamankondre and Christiaankondre, and tour operators involved in the conservation 65 o f marine turtles in and around Galibi Nature Reserve as well as related tourism ventures. Many of the interviews at the local level relied on the use of translators. Two reliable translators were used who were both well recognized and respected in the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre. The interviews always included some basic questions and followed a general framework (see Appendix 1) but were informal in style. Rather than adhering to a standardized survey-style format, the unstructured approached allowed the interview to pursue unanticipated issues and questions. The specific questions varied with regard to how the interviewee was involved in Galibi Nature Reserve, but generally dealt with how the stakeholder or interest group they represented was involved (goals, activities and degree of involvement) in conservation and development in Galibi. Detailed notes were kept of all questions asked and of all responses and respondents understood the purpose of the research and were assured of anonymity. Written sources, interviews and observations were combined to provide a clearer picture of the potential barriers and incentives to the development of a co-management approach for conservation and development in Galibi. The data was summarized based on the source o f the information and how it fit with the case study protocol framework that provided the guiding questions for interviews. The scope o f the research was an examination of the management arrangements for the Galibi Nature Reserve. The focus included the various interactions at the local, national and international level that influenced how management of the nature reserve proceeded. While it was important to understand the context under which conservation and development proceeded, the main conservation goal o f the Galibi nature reserve was the conservation o f marine turtles while the main source o f development was through 66 ecotourism development. Two resource limitations that were encountered were language barriers and available time. The official language o f the country is Dutch, the majority o f the population speaks Surinamese, and in the villages o f Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, the predominant language is Carib. There was, thus, significant reliance on translation in interviews, documents and of secondary sources. There was an attempt to use reliable translators, who were well informed o f the research objectives and o f the study community, to overcome the obstacles o f translation. As with any interview, bias on the part o f the interviewee and the interviewer were introduced, but this was held to a minimum by corroborating evidence with multiple sources. At the local level, there was reluctance to discuss anything about the specifics of the village way of life. This included any talk o f specific tourism revenues from the arrangement with STINASU (the semi-government organization responsible for nature tourism). The reluctance was a result o f previous experiences with ethnographic research in the village and it was necessary to stress that the focus o f this research was on the management o f the Galibi Nature Reserve and not intrusive research regarding the village way o f life. It was also impossible to obtain specific revenues from STINASU, or the amount that was returned to the village for local development projects. Therefore, there was a gap in information regarding the frill impacts o f tourism. The length o f study was limited to the 4 month period of May to August, 2000, as a result o f the overseas placement with Canadian Crossroads International. In such a short period o f time, it was important to balance the need to gather as much information as possible with the concerns people might have over providing the information and building their trust 67 Chapter 5 Case Study of Galibi N ature Reserve In this chapter, the Galibi Nature Reserve is examined. A brief discussion of marine turtle biology is included to provide an idea o f the difficulties encountered in conservation. The process by which the Galibi Nature Reserve was created is discussed, the organizations involved at the national, international and local level are examined and the co-management arrangement for the Galibi Nature Reserve is described. 5.1 The Galibi Nature Reserve The Galibi Nature Reserve is located in the North-East comer of Suriname where the Marowijne River meets the Atlantic ocean (see Figure I). The mixing o f the fresh water with the ocean and the large sand bars and sandy beaches makes it one of the most significant marine turtle nesting sites in the Western Atlantic (Reichart, 1992). The 4,000 hectare reserve (4 km long by 1 km wide), contains the greatest biological diversity that can be found along the Suriname coast. While the entire Nature Reserve is protected under the 1954 Nature Preservation Law, its primary concern is to protect marine turtles and their nesting beaches. By creating the Galibi Nature Reserve in 1969, the government of Suriname made an important contribution to international marine turtle conservation efforts. 5.2 Marine Turtle Life History There are four marine turtle species that use the Galibi beaches as nesting habitat, the olive ridley (Lepidochelys olivacea), green turtle {Chelonia my das), the leatherback {Dermochelys coriacea) and the hawksbill {Eretmochelys imbricata). They range in average size from 45 kg for an adult olive ridley to 900 kg for the leatherback (Meylan 68 and Ehrenfeid, 2000). The various species exhibit similar life histories. The females of the species bury clutches o f 100 eggs on coastal and estuarine beaches. The mature males and females gather off of the beaches to mate in the early part of the year and the females return to the beaches to lay between 1 and 10 clutches of eggs per year during the months of May through September (National Research Council, 1990). After nesting, the females return to the open ocean for a period of 1-4 years before mating again at the same site. The turtle eggs are laid in a hole dug in the sand and they incubate for approximately 2 months. After the incubation period is over, the hatchlings dig their way to the surface and make their way to the water. The hatchlings spend their early years in the off-shore waters, feeding off the surface. The majority of the hatchlings activities during these years remain a mystery and are thus called their "lost years" (Meylan and Ehrenfeid, 2(KK)). After an unknown period of time, they reappear in the coastal zone, bays, river mouths and estuaries where they spend their juvenile life eating and growing until they reach maturity, which can take between 10 and SO years, depending on the species (National Research Council, 1990). The life span of marine turtles ranges from 50 to 75 years or more. Such a long life span and a long period to reach maturity poses many difficulties in assessing the status of populations and conservation efforts (Meylan and Ehrenfeid, 2000). Adult marine turtles that are observed nesting today, hatched decades ago when conditions were quite different. Therefore, it is very difficult to determine the effects of egg harvesting on populations when adult females continue to return to nest for 50 years, which gives the impression that populations are stable. Meanwhile, populations may be progressively depleted o f hatchling, juvenile and young adults (Meylan and Ehrenfeid, 2(XX)). Marine turtle populations are difficult to estimate as a result o f their cyclical 69 nesting patterns in which they may spend 1-4 years in the open ocean (National Research Council, 1990). Estimates are often based on the nests laid on a particular beach over time. However, there is no explanation for the considerable fluctuations recorded in the yearly number of nests (Schulz, 1982). In Suriname, there is very little data on the number of nests a female lays per nesting season and the length of the non-breeding cycle, therefore, it is very difficult to estimate population size (Schulz, 1982). The wide fluctuations are evident in Table 2, which shows the numbers o f nests over the years. Data collection is incomplete and sporadic since 1990 as a result of the civil conflict. However, the population of olive ridley's appears to have declined significantly while the green and leatherback turtles have increased, with the exception of 1990, the beginning of the civil conflict (see table 2). 5.3 Creation of the Galibi Nature Reserve The process by which the Galibi Nature Reserve was established is an important starting point. In the early 1960s employees o f the Forest Service noticed large groups o f olive ridley marine turtles nesting on the Elianti and Galibi beaches. This was the first report of large groups of olive ridleys nesting in the Western Atlantic and it prompted further scientific observation. It was determined that the area around the mouth of the Marowijne river was an important nesting site not only for these turtles (Lepidochelys olivacea), but also for the green turtle (Chelonia mydas) and the leatherback (Dermochelys coriacea) (Reichart, 1992). Since virtually all marine turtle species are threatened with extinction, the Suriname Forest Service proposed that all of the Galibi beaches (Elianti, Baboensanti and Galibi) be accorded protected area status. 70 Table 2: Number o f nests per species, per year, in Suriname (Reichart, 1992; Reichart et al., 2000). year olive ridley leatherback green 1968 2875 200 5000 1970 1750 255 3115 1972 1270 380 6885 1974 1080 785 7465 1976 1160 670 8080 1978 870 2160 8465 1980 1020 1300 4510 1982 1045 3680 4180 1984 944 7291 7546 1986 537 3599 5879 1988 563 11436 6776 1990 175 1182 1524 1999 136 7524 7524 71 Under Suriname's Nature Protection Law o f 1954, an area can be designated as a protected area if it is "deemed to possess varied nature and landscape beauty or because of the presence from a scientific or cultural point of view, important flora, fauna or geological objects" (Government of Suriname, 1954). The Nature Protection Law and the Game Law (both from 1954) provide the legal basis for nature reserves, and in 1969, the Galibi Nature Reserve was formally created. Since the creation of the nature reserve, there have been numerous conflicts between park managers o f the Forest Service and the local Amerindian population that live near the Galibi Nature Reserve area. The conflicts usually revolved around issues relating to access to the reserve for subsistence activities and the collection of turtle eggs (Kloos, 1971; F. Baal, personal communication, June 23,2000; R. Slyngaard, personal communication, June 21,2000; anonymous interviewees). The Amerindian population currently inhabiting the area are of Carib descent (see Kloos, 1971 for an ethnography of Carib society in Suriname). While there are no longer any permanent settlements in the Galibi Nature Reserve, there are numerous fishing camps, agricultural plots and the abandoned village of Galibi from which the reserve gets its name. Approximately 1,(XX) people live in the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre, a few kilometres to the south of the nature reserve. Prior to the establishment of the reserve, the inhabitants of both villages used the reserve for traditional subsistence agriculture, hunting, fishing and the collection of turtle eggs for consumption and for sale. Much of the area around the villages, including the nature reserve, are considered by the village inhabitants as traditional lands and, therefore, nature reserve regulations were seen as an infringement on their rights (anonymous interviewees). The fact that tribal (or village) land claims have not been legally 72 recognized by government further adds to the tension relating to the management o f the nature reserve. Under the Surinamese constitution, Amerindian and Maroon rights are not property rights but customary law rights which can be superseded by statute constitutional law. Presidential and ministerial decrees, resolutions and regulations. Customary law only applies to villages and adjacent agricultural land, not to hunting, fishing or other resource use lands. According to this law, Amerindian and Maroon village and agricultural land rights will be respected unless there is a conflict with the general national interest (Government of Suriname, 1982). General national interest includes any project within the framework of an approved development plan such as mining, logging, tourism and conservation. Therefore, Amerindian and Maroon land rights are weak and subject to compromise from a number of different "national" objectives. 5.3.1 History of the Creation of the Gaiihi Nature Reserve By 1967, numerous scientific surveys of nesting marine turtles had begun on all of the Galibi area beaches and it was determined that the local amerindian population harvested a significant number of eggs that would soon result in the local extinction o f the Olive Ridley species. Since the local population were identified as a threat to the survival of the marine turtles as a result o f over-harvesting of eggs for sale, their cooperation was sought in protecting the nesting sites. Village meetings were held to determine if the villages would cooperate in the 1967 project, funded in part by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname (STINASU). The project would require village inhabitants to mark and claim nests and they would be compensated at a rate of $0.01 (U.S.) per egg (approximately $1 per nest). Dissent was raised over such issues as the validity o f the threat of marine turtle extinction, the amount 73 of money paid as compensation and the interference in their territory. Conflict between the perceptions of local resource users and government resource managers over resource abundance reflect the difference in perceptions and values between western scientific knowledge and traditional local knowledge. In the end, the village agreed to cooperate. Through the project, 2500 guilders ($700 U.S.) was paid to 32 collectors, a number of villagers were hired as labour to build camps for biologists, and to rebury turtle eggs either in their original nests, or elsewhere for safe hatching. Similar projects were initiated in 1968 and 1969 where villagers participated in marking nests and were paid $1.50 U.S. per nest in both years. While plans were under way for the development of the area as a nature reserve throughout the late 1960s, representatives from the villages were not involved in the process. They were first notifîed of the reserve by a sign on the beach and immediately jumped to conclusions, some erroneous, some not, about how the reserve would restrict their economic activities. It was felt that they would lose the right to hunt, fish, practice agriculture and collect turtle eggs in the vicinity (Kloos, 1971). While turtle eggs are used as a source of food, their most important use is as a source of income through sale to the urbanized public where they are considered a delicacy. Village inhabitants were also informed of the construction of a guest house on the reserve, which was an attempt by park management to boost nature tourism in the area. Village concerns regarding hunting and fishing rights, infringement on what they considered their territory and the concern over the effect of increased tourism were not heard and were not included in the process o f the creation of the nature reserve. As a result, there was strong resistance to the nature reserve from the beginning. Through village meetings, a resistance approach was decided upon where local people would 74 ignore nature reserve regulations and over-charge for tourist transport to discourage tourism to the reserve. Eventually, through a series of meetings between forest service representatives and village leaders held in the early 1970s, it was agreed that residents of the local communities could continue to use the reserve for subsistence purposes (plant collecting, hunting, fishing, agriculture). STINASU obtained permission from the Forest Service to control the turtle egg harvesting with the cooperation o f the local Amerindian community. Through the turtle egg conservation program, STINASU assumed ownership of all of the turtle nests and eggs. They then contracted out the collection of eggs from endangered nests to local Amerindian harvesters. The eggs were then sold, by STINASU, to the urban public in Paramaribo, where they are considered a delicacy. Amerindian harvesters were paid a fee for collection and a fee for transportation of the eggs to the market in the city. Such a program allowed for government control over the turtle egg market and ensured that only eggs from endangered nests (resulting from high tides or beach erosion) were collected. Village residents were also allowed to collect eggs from nests outside of the nature reserve, but for consumption purposes only, and not for sale. However, in the mid 1980s, based on research on turtle populations, it was determined that greater effort was needed to ensure the survival o f the marine turtles locally. Therefore, the number of eggs that could be collected had to be significantly reduced to protect the species. The eggs in endangered nest sites (due to tides, beach erosion or high water levels) were no longer collected for sale, but were reburied in a safe location. The reported causes of continued population decline were continued poaching of eggs and turtle mortality as a result of off-shore fishing nets. With the pending elimination o f turtle eggs as a source of income, greater emphasis was placed on nature 75 tourism to create other economic opportunities at both the national and local level. In the midst of the civil conflict in the eastern portion of Suriname and in the interior (1989-1992), the nature reserve was occupied by local Caribs and both the Forest Service and STINASU were denied access to the area. Under such conditions, all turtle conservation programs ended, as did nature tourism to the area. It was also during this time that the Galibi Management Plan was created without input from the local level, as a result o f the occupation of the nature reserve. However, one of the goals of the management plan is to increase local involvement in the management of the nature reserve (Reichart, 1992). The resolution to the conflict in 1992 began a new series of discussions and agreements on land rights nationally and on the sharing of benefits and costs o f the nature reserve locally. The new partnerships in conservation and development have evolved from such negotiation and will be discussed below. In order to examine the conservation and development situation in the Galibi Nature Reserve area, it is important to examine the post-civil conflict framework for environmental management in Suriname and all of the actors and organizations at the local, national and international level with interests in the Galibi Nature Reserve. 5.4 Environmental/Park Management Framework In Suriname With approximately 90% of its original forest intact (Baal, 1999) as a result of the concentration o f population and economic activities along the coast and in the capital city of Paramaribo, the potential for nature conservation in Suriname is considered to be among the best in South America. As such, there is recognition on the part of the Government o f Suriname and o f international environmental organizations that the future of economic development rests with appropriate balance between use and conservation of natural resources. Policies and legislation regarding protected areas play an important 76 role in achieving such a balance. 5.4.1 Role of Government Organizations in Galibi Nature Reserve The Nature Preservation Law and the Game Law, both from 1954, form the basis of protected area legislation and management in Suriname. Based on those laws, the protection of the natural environment is needed for science, recreation and educational purposes, subject to ethical, aesthetic and economical considerations. To be designated a nature reserve: the area has to satisfy the following requirements: that it deserves protection by the Government because of its varied nature and scenic beauty; and/or because o f the presence of - from a scientifically or culturally significant point of view - important flora, fauna, or geological objects (Government o f Suriname, 1954). Once an area has been declared a nature reserve and receives protected area status, the management for the area falls under the direction of the Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service, a subdivision o f the Ministry of Natural Resources (see figure 2). The Forest Service is the ultimate authority with complete control over all activities that occur in the nature reserves. The Nature Conservation division o f the Forest Service is responsible for the development o f management plans, patrolling and enforcement of rules and regulations in the nature reserve and nature reserve maintenance. Each protected area or reserve has its own manager who reports directly to the head of the Nature Conservation. The manager of the nature reserve is responsible for the day to day management activities and for ensuring that the mandate o f conservation set out by the Forest Service is followed. The government approach to nature reserve management appears to be very centralized. However, in the mid-1990 s the Nature Conservation division instituted a two-track approach to nature reserve management. The change in approach resulted out Figure 2: Relationships betw een G overnm ent, N G O ’s and Local Organizations at the Local and National Level National National Environment Council NIM OS N ature Preservation Commission com posed o f governm ent officials appointed by President National Assembly President Council o f Advice Vice President ■All other ministries •M inistry o f Natural Resources STINASU ' Director o f l a n d Affairs D irector o f STINASU / nature tourism Sub-director o f forests I. \ sea turtle research & conservation education w ithin N.R. Forest Service — production t development 1 nature conservation division I M anager Galibi N.R. Biotropic Local Christiaankondre Langamankondre village council — Board o f directors a^( council village Ciq>tam Captain STIDUNAL local governm ent Consultation Commission District Commissioner STINASU N ature Conservation Forest Service Fisheries Capt. o f Christiaankondre Capt. o f Langamankondre D istrict Commissioner T local tourist organizations UNDP-GEF Consultation Comm ission NOO = non-governmental organization NIMOS = National Institute for Environmental Management STINASU = Foundation for Nature Preservation Suriname STIDUNAL = Foundation for Sustainable Nature Conservation Alusiaka N.R. = Nature reserve Capt. = Captain UNDP-GEF = United Nations Development Programme - Global Environment Facility 78 of the recognition of the desire of local communities to have greater involvement in the management of nature reserves and over the conflicts between long-term objectives and short-term benefits. The two-track approach has both a long term and a short-term focus. The long­ term focus is on management plans and relies on input from local communities, rules of agreement and on consultation committees composed o f government and local community officials. It fits into the model of decentralization discussed in Chapter Two, where greater local involvement is achieved in decision-making but the ultimate authority rests with the Forest Service. The short-term focus is on specific projects where greater authority is devolved to the local level for individual projects. It relies on lower level consultation between individual park managers and all of the local stakeholders that strive to meet the objectives of the management plan while providing benefits to local stakeholders. The Foundation for Nature Preservation in Suriname (STINASU), a semigovernment organization founded in 1969, also plays a significant role in the Galibi Nature Reserve. When the numerous nature reserves were being created, the government wanted to ensure that the reserves be used in order to justify their protection. STINASU was founded with the mandate to ensure that the goals of nature reserves (to promote scientific research, nature education and nature tourism) are achieved. While the management and protection of nature reserves rests with the Nature Conservation Division of the Forest Service, STINASU was created to oversee research and nature tourism in the reserves. STINASU, a non-profit organization, enjoys the benefits of government support through wages to employees, the use o f government infrastructure such as office space, trucks and boats and the exclusive right to nature 79 tourism within nature reserves in Suriname. Being a semi-govemmental organization, STINASU is also in a much better position to receive funding from international conservation organizations. It is also able to avoid the bureaucratic tangles that allow it to provide more efficient services to tourists, to access supplies and to finance its own projects. STINASU is run by a board of directors, of which the Minister of Natural Resources is the chair (the other board positions are filled by various ministers and directors o f government departments). The board appoints a director who is responsible for the supervision of the three aspects of STINASU’s work: nature tourism, marine turtle conservation and research and education within the nature reserves. STINASU operates a guest house in the Galibi Nature Reserve and controls all tourism to the reserve. Interested tourists contact STINASU at their Paramaribo office and STINASU makes arrangements for travel, accommodation and meals. Apart from nature tourism in the Galibi Nature Reserve, STINASU is most active in marine turtle conservation and research. Therefore, the Nature Conservation division o f the Forest Service is responsible for all nature reserve activities such as patrol, enforcement and maintenance while STINASU is responsible for all activities that occur within the nature reserves, mainly tourism, research and education. 5.4.2 Role of International Organizations There are numerous intemational organizations which sponsor and/or take part in conservation activities in the Galibi nature reserve. The WWF is the most prominent organization because o f its interest in the protection o f the endangered marine turtle species. They act as a broker that influence national and local organizations to promote 80 nature conservation and sustainable resource use. They provide the funding and the expertise for the development of management plans that meet the conservation objectives of the WWF. As such, the goal of WWF is to simply provide funds and technical expertise for marine turtle research and encourage national and local organizations to carry out the projects. Under those circumstances, WWF commands significant power over national and local organizations that must meet WWF objectives to adhere to funding requirements (Drijver et al., 1997). It is also the WWF that coordinates intemational efforts for sea turtle conservation. They are in the process of developing a regional sea turtle conservation program for Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana that focuses on protecting nesting habitat, reducing the threat o f fisheries and improving regional cooperation in conservation. Biotopic (a Dutch conservation organization) is also involved directly in the Galibi Nature Reserve, although to a lesser extent. Since 1995, Biotopic has carried out numerous studies on marine turtle populations as well as promoting conservation programs. They are currently executing a conservation program in cooperation with STINASU and STIDUNAL which includes field research, an awareness program and stimulation o f intemational cooperation. Finally, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Global Environment Facility (GEF) is active in the Galibi Nature Reserve as part of its biological diversity conservation program. The GEF Small Grants Program provides grant support to local NGOs and community-based organizations, aimed at the implementation o f communitylevel activities that provide economic altematives to unsustainable resource use (UNDP, 81 2000). In the Galibi area, GEF grants have been provided to village groups to outfit boats for tourism; allowing for greater participation in nature tourism, and increasing the economic benefits of marine turtle conservation. Therefore, they indirectly influence the use of tourism as a source of sustainable economic development at the local level. 5.4.3 Role of Local Organizations After the resolution of the civil conflict in 1992, the villages of Christiaankondre and Langamankondre created the Stichting Duurazaam Natuurbeheer Alusiaka (STIDUNAL) (Foundation for Sustainable Nature Conservation Alusiaka) in order to cooperate directly with STINASU. STIDUNAL is an organization that is made up of a chair and board members who are elected by village councils. The stated objective of STIDUNAL is to represent the local indigenous community in the participation in the preservation of biodiversity and to stimulate local social, educational and economic development. In such a position, STIDUNAL promotes biodiversity research, nature tourism and organizes the lodging and recreational facilities in the village. STIDUNAL acts as the only broker between STINASU and the village. It is through STIDUNAL that the village negotiates and receives the benefits of tourism to the nature reserve. When STINASU has tourists that need to get to the Galibi Nature Reserve, STIDUNAL is contacted and they arrange for one of the various community tour groups operating in the village to transport the tourists from Albina to Galibi. STIDUNAL is responsible for ensuring that the village tour boats provide formal and professional service for tourists and that they meet the standards set by STINASU. The money that STIDUNAL receives from STINASU for tourist transport is distributed to the various organizations in the village (who are represented by the various tour operators). There are no private, independent tour operators. Tourism transport is a communal 82 village activity. The revenue from transport does not go towards individual tour operators, rather tour operators are paid a portion for their time and the remaining revenue goes towards village projects. STIDUNAL is also responsible for marine turtle conservation training and education programs in the village. They ensure that all of the tour operators are knowledgeable about turtles and that they know how to approach them safely without endangering the nesting process. STIDUNAL also promotes turtle conservation programs in the village through education programs aimed at school children. Finally, when STINASU requires labour for maintenance or construction projects in the nature reserve, it is STIDUNAL that recruits labourers from the village. STUDINAL has the authority to control the local economic benefits and it participates with other government and intemational organizations in the nature reserve management process. Table 3 and figure 2 provide a summary o f the organizations involved in the Galibi Nature Reserve and their interactions at the national, intemational and local levels. 5.5 Co