DO FENCES MAKE GOOD NEIGHBOURS?
THE INFLUENCE OF TERRITORIALITY IN STATE-SAMI RELATIONS
by
Scott M. Forrest
B.A. , Simon Fraser University, 1996

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

© Scott M. Forrest, 1998
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
November 1998
All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy of
other means, without the permission of the author

LiBRARY

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11

Abstract
The Sami of northern Europe are divided among four states and have lost most rights to land and
resources in resources in their traditional area. This analysis seeks to determine whether territoriality
has been a significant source of conflict between the Sami and the Nordic states. In contrast to the
fixed and exclusive territoriality of the state, Sami concepts of territory have tended to be flexible and
diffuse. The contradiction between these two types of territoriality has manifested itself in the
following ways, which will be analyzed historically:
1.

Nordic states viewed the Sami as nomadic, thus having no ownership of their land.

2.

Traditional Sami activities, notably reindeer herding, were viewed as illegitimate or backwards,
resulting in the privileging of modern forms of land use such as agriculture.

3. Where states did feel an impulse to protect the Sami way of life, they viewed nomadic pastoralism
as economically non-viable, prompting systems of administration which increased state regulation
of herding.
These conflicts lie at the root of the issues which the Sami are struggling with today: rights to land and
resources, self-government, and self-management in herding. Just resolution of those issues requires
understanding and acknowledgement of the influence of territoriality in shaping the current situation.
This analysis attempts to break away from state-centric perspectives in international relations to ·
provide greater understanding and legitimacy to nations that have been unwillingly incorporated into
states through colonization.

111

Table of Contents
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................. 11
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................................... V
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE DISCIPUNE .. ............ ..... ....... ........ ... .... ................... ..... .................... ............... ... ............. 3
METHODOLOGY ...... ...... .... .. ...... .. .... ... .. .... .......... .............. .. ....... ... ... ........... .............. ............... ..... ...... ....... ..... .. 6
O UTLINE OF CHAPTERS ...... ....... .... ... .... ........... .. ....... ..... .. ....... ..... ..... .. ................ .. ..... ... ........ .... .... ..... ... .. ... .. ... .. 8

CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ..................................................................................... 12
TERRITORIALITY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY ....... ...................... ...... ......... ... .. ... ..... ... ........ .. . 13
INSIDE/ OUTSIDE THE DISCIPLINE ..... .................... ........... ........ .. ....... ...... .......... ........ ....... .... ........ ....... .. ...... .... 15
MODERN VERSUS ABORIGINAL TERRITORIALITY .................... .............. .. ...... ................ .. ........... .... ........... ... .. 16
TERRITORIALITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE .... .. ........ ........ ... ..... ... .. ............ ........... .... .............. .. ... .... .... ... .. ... 19
FOURTH WORLD THEORY ..... ....... ... ...... ............. ... ............. .. .......... ...... .. ... ... .... .......... ... .... ........ ........ .... .. .... .. 20
CONCLUSION ...... ......... ... .. ....... .... .. ......... ..... ...... ...... .. ......... ... ..... ....... .... .... ... ... ...... ...... ............ ..... .. ... .. ...... .. ... 22

CHAPTER 2: TRADITIONAL SAMI TERRITORIALITY ....................................................................... 24
PERCEPTIONS OF SAMI TERRITORIALITY ...... ..... ........... ............... ............... .................. ........ ........ .. ..... ...... .... . 25
BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SliD A ...... ............................. ........... ..... ....... .. ... ... ... ...... ...... ..... ..... ... ... .. ....... 26
FLEXIBILITY OF THE SIIDA SYSTEM ............. ... ........... ... .. ...... .. ........ .. .. ..... .......... ... .. ..... ... .......... ... ...... ..... ...... .. .. 29
NOMADISM AND PASTORALISM .. .. .... .... ......... .. .......... ...... .... ....... ......... ........ ........... .. ............. .. ....... ... ......... .... 30
HERDING ............. ... .... ................... .... .. ........... .. ............. ......... ............. ............ ........ ................. ....... ..... .. .. ...... 31
ECOLOGICAL DIVISIONS .... ..... .... ....... ... ............ .... ........... .. ... ... ..... ..... .......... .. .... ........... ...... .............. .. .. ..... ..... 34
CONCLUSION ................. ...................... .. ........... .. ............ ... ..................... ...... ... ....... ......... ...... ........... .... .... .. ... . 37

CHAPTER 3: THE DEVELOPMENT OF STATES IN THE SAMI AREA .............................................. 39
STATE-BUILDING ... .... .. ..... ... .... ... ......... ... .. .. ........................ .......... .. ... ... ........ .... ............ .... ... ....... .. ...... ..... .... .. .. 40

lV

SAMI 'NATIONHOOD ' ................ ..... ... .. .............. ........................................................... ...... .......... ..... .............. 42
EARLY FORMS OF STATE INFLUENCE (PRE-1550) .. ........... .......... ....... ........... ........... ...... ............ ........ .... .... .. .. .. 45
THE BEGINNINGS OF TERRITORIAL CONTROL (1550-1620) ...... ... ............................................. ..... .. ...... ..... .... 47
CONSOLIDATING CONTROL THROUGH SETTLEMENT (1620-1751) ..... ..................................... ...................... . 49
FINAUZING THE BORDERS (1751-1826) ... ......... ......... ...... ............ ........ ....................... .............. ....... ................ 52
CONCLUSION ..................... ............ ... ..... ......... .... .. .. ........................................ ..... ............... .... .... ........ ..... ....... 54

CHAPTER 4: EXPANSION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY ....................................................................... 56
NATIONALISM ................ ................ .......... ...... .. .. ... ............................. ........ .. ...................... .............. .. .. ... ........ 57
SOCIAL DARWINISM ... ... ............................ ............ .. ............ ...... ........ ................ ..... .. ...... ...... ..... .................. ... . 59
INDUSTRIALIZATION ................................................... ................................................................................ ... . 61
NORDIC SAMI POUCIES IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY .. .. .......... .... ........ .. .................... ............................. .. 62
NORWAY ...... ............... .......................... .......... .............. ........... ................... .. ... .. ..... ......... .......... .... ..... .. .. .. ..... 64
SWEDEN ....... ......................... ............... ......... .... .......................... ............. ......................... ......................... ... .. 66
FINLAND .. .... .. ............. .......... .. .................................. ........ .... ............. -... .... ... ................ ... .. ............................. 69
CONCLUSION ................. ................................................................... ...... .... ........ .... .... ............ ................... .. ... 71

CHAPTER 5 RATIONALIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF HERDING ................................... 73
RA TIONAUZATION ....................... .............. ..... ............ ..... ........ ... ............. ........................... ...... .... .. ...... .. ... .... 75
MITIGATION OF HERDER-SETTLER CONFUCT .................................. ....... .. .................................................... 80
PROTECTION OF HERDING AND SAM! CULTURE ... ......... ..... .... ........ .. ...................................................... ... ... . 81
PREVENTION OF OVERGRAZING ... .................................... ...... .... ............. .................... ........... ..... ...... ............ 85
CONCLUSION ................ ...... .... ... ..... ... ............ ............... ... ........ ...... ........ ............. ................ ... .............. .... .... .. . 89

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... .'...................................... 91
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................................... 96

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List of Figures
Figure 1: Sami and State Levels of Analysis ...... ........................................ ........ ..... .......... .......... .. .... .... ... 7
Figure 2: Example of Siida Migrations .................................. ............................................. ................. .. 27
Figure 3: Sami Dialect Boundaries ................................................... ..................................................... 44
Figure 4: Taxation Boundaries ................ ................................................ ....... ........................ .... ........... 45
Figure 5: Borders Across Sapmi ............................................................................................................ 53

1

"Power may be at its most alarming, and quite often at its most horrifying, when applied
as a sanction offorce. But it is typically at its most intense and durable when running
silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices."
-Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence

Introduction
Territoriality is a defining feature of the international system, yet its nature and importance are rarely
analyzed within the field of international relations'. Many political communities, aboriginal peoples in
particular, have very different conceptions of territoriality than those of modern states. The failure to
acknowledge territorialities other than the fixed and exclusive form of states effectively excludes
divergent territorial communities from consideration by international relations, and by extension
denies their legitimacy as actors in the international system. The promotion of a single view of
territoriality has reinforced and legitimated the systematic erosion of aboriginal societies through the
development of modern states. This paper examines one such case. The relationship between the Sami
and the states of Norway, Sweden, and Finland (including their historical antecedents) has been
defined largely by the states' bias towards a modern conception of territory. 2

This paper uses a definition of territoriality from Robert David Sack: " ... the attempt by an individual or group
to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a
geographic area" (quoted in Casimir, p. 19).
2
Russia will only be included in the analysis of the early political development of the region. The Sami of the
Kola Peninsula experienced a rather more comprehensive destruction of their traditional institutions under
Soviet rule, which together with a paucity of source material prevents a meaningful comparison with the other
three jurisdictions.
1

2

The Sami, the indigenous people of northernmost Europe, have been denied autonomy and land rights
through the processes of colonization and modern state building. The states that assumed control over
the Sami and their land came to reflect a view of territory characterized by fixed, exclusive,
geographically bounded space. Exact borders are defined which show where one territory ends and
another begins (R.uggie, pp.148-152). As the Sami are predominantly a pastoral nomadic people, these
absolute notions of territory are not suitable for a way of life characterized by collective organization,
seasonal migration, and flexible and adaptive land use.
The practice of reindeer herding has played a strong role in defining Sami territoriality, but has also led
to many misunderstandings. It must be understood that herding developed simultaneously with the
expansion of modern states over the past five hundred years (Paine 1994, p.11). In this sense, Sami and
state territoriality were each undergoing internal change at the same time as they were influencing one
another. Not all Sami adopted herding, some instead remained primarily fishers and hunters. Today
only a small minority of Sami actively practice reindeer herding. Notwithstanding these qualifications,
herding has an important territorial and symbolic value which makes it highly relevant to this analysis.
Reindeer herding has been the primary way in which the states have recognized a distinct Sami
identity, and the administration of herding through the control of territory has been the most
common instrument of state power over the Sami (Sillanpaa 1994, p.63).
A historical analysis of the expansion and intensification of state power over the Sami will show that
the territorial biases of the states have undermined the political, economic, and cultural basis of Sami
society. This conceptual conflict has manifested itself in three ways:
1.

The division and incorporation of the Sami and their land into the kingdoms of northern Europe
was justified on the basis that the Sami had no conception of ownership, and thus the territory was
free for the taking.

3
2. Sami economic activities, primarily reindeer herding, were viewed as illegitimate or backwards.

The states promoted the interests of modern or developed forms of land use (i.e., those based on
fixed and exclusive territoriality, such as agriculture), at the expense of traditional Sami activities.
3. Having undermined the territorial system within which Sami reindeer management operated, the
states used the theory of 'the tragedy of the commons' to justify greater state control over herding.
This theory promoted the idea that non-exclusive land use was inherently flawed, and ignored the
Sami's own resource management systems.
This examination will demonstrate the real world effects of theoretical concepts when they are
harnessed to the coercive power of the state. At one level, this paper hopes to add a new perspective to
the issues that now face the Sami in their quest for greater autonomy and rights to land and resources.

In a broader sense, this paper is a contribution to a body of critical theory in international relations
which examines the development of the international system.

Significance to the Discipline
The main contribution this work aims to make to the study of international relations and majorityminority relations is to highlight the importance of territoriality within these relationships. The trend
of political realism which has dominated international relations since the second world war has treated
its units of analysis (states) as functionally similar. Comparative studies would often take government
type or market system as the variable, but it was always assumed that all states occupied a fixed piece
of land, drew borders around that land, and exercised sovereign control within it. Yet, as this study
shows, there are other concepts of territory, and units other than states which can make claims to
legitimacy at the so-called international level. As religions and ideologies have forged clefts between
communities, differing views of territoriality can also create misunderstanding, mistrust, and messianic
impulses to impose one's own beliefs on the other. Territoriality is certainly not the only factor which

4

has f~d conflict in world history, nor even the most important, but it is one that has been neglected in
the scholarship to date. While territoriality is particularly salient with regard to understanding the
power relationships between dominant national groups and indigenous minorities, studies of
territoriality could also be expanded to other international relationships as well.
This paper also questions the ethical principles (or lack thereof) upon which much of the study and
practice of international politics is founded. Borders provide political elites and scholars with an
organizational tool to impose order on an essentially chaotic world. While they provide order, they do
so at the expense of a loftier goal: justice. Political realism divorces itself from questions of morality,
and instead substitutes power to determine the rules which provide order to the system. Since it is the
states which have determined the structure of the system, it is hardly surprising that they make efforts
to preserve their monopoly on power in the international system by denying legitimacy to those
actors which threaten not only individual states, but the very basis of the system. For example, those
actors which reject the state's claim to a monopoly on the legitimate use of force are termed terrorists,
or rebels.
Despite the dominance of power politics, certain notable theorists have campaigned to hold both the
discipline of international relations, and the practical application of statecraft to a higher standard than
simply preserving peace (the absence of conflict) or order (maintaining the integrity of the system).
From Immanuel Kant to Hedley Bull these authors have asked whether states should seek justice in
their relations both with each other, and with the other members of the global society, internally and
externally (Wheeler & Dunne, 1996, pp. 97-100). This analysis seeks that standard. It is perhaps naive
to believe that some degree of moral propriety could be introduced to a system ruled largely by the
unflinching pursuit of power. Yet, increasing recognition of human rights, and the willingness of states
to bend the sacred principle of sovereignty by becoming involved in human rights issues abroad leaves

some hope. For the sake of achieving just solutions to aboriginal rights issues on the agendas of so

5
many nations today, international relations (in theory and practice) must account for the injustices
inflicted through the processes of colonialism and state-building.
As the study of international relations has traditionally been limited to the study of states, there is very
little literature from political science or international relations perspectives on Sami territoriality, or
aboriginal territoriality generally. Lennard Sillanpaa's Political and Administrative Responses to Sdmi

Self-Determination (1994), Franke Wilmer's The Indigenous Voice In World Politics (1993), Bernard
Nietschman's "The Fourth World: Nations Versus States" (1994), Johan Eriksson's Partition and

Redemption (1997a), and Greg Poelzer's "Land and Resource Tenure: First Nations and Traditional
Territories and Self-Governance" have laid some of the basis for including aboriginal perspectives in
these fields. International relations theorists Kratochwil (1986), Ruggie (1993), and Ferguson &
Mansbach (1996) have also made strong contributions by considering the political units, or polities,
which preceded states on the international stage. State and state-building theorists such as Poggi (1990),
Badie & Birnbaum (1983), and Giddens (1987) have brought insight into the motives and processes
which created modern states. To broaden the understanding of territoriality in this literature, works
such as Casimir & Rao's Mobility and Territoriality: Social and Spatial Boundaries among Foragers,

Fishers, Pastoralists and Peripatetics have been used. The issue of Sami land tenure has been well
examined from a legal perspective by authors such as Korpijaakko-Labba (1993) and Svensson (1991,
1997), but they largely accept the legal framework of the states. The largest wealth of knowledge on
the history of the Sami relations with states exists in the fields of cultural anthropology and sociology.
The works of Aikio (1994), Ingold (1978), Paine (1994) and particularly numerous works by Hugh
Beach have been invaluable in fleshing out the details of Sami society. The composition of existing
literature has resulted in the inclusion here of a broad range of source material not often found in
traditional international relations analyses. Breaking down the hard boundaries of disciplinarity will
hopefully contribute to a more complete and sophisticated understanding of aboriginal-state relations.

6

Methodology
To accomplish this analysis a comparative case-study methodology will be used. Typical comparative
analyses in the social sciences seek to compare units of the same functional type. In political science
and international relations, the state is the most common unit of analysis. The very point of this study,
however, is to uncover certain differences between the state and the Sami. But who are the Sami, and
on what level can they be compared to the state? A category of analysis must be found in which the
territorialities of the Sami and the state can be explored. As this study will show, the organization of
Sami society does not fit well into the classifications of social or political units used by the social
sciences. While there is no precise unit within Sami society that has the same functional role as the
state, the concept of a political community or polity can be applied to both the siida and Sapmi.
The main unit of Sami social organization is the siida, a type of local band unit. While the majority of
what can be termed political functions were performed at the siida level, a shared identity across the
entire Sami settlement area (called Sapmi) and the inter-relationship between different siidas can be
seen as constituting a broader political community. 3 Some latitude must be given to the categorization
of these Sami political units, both because of the limitations of using modern concepts of political
organization and because of the disruptions to Sami political development resulting from colonization.
The state itself, should not be considered a static concept either. This study takes a historical approach:
there is considerable change in both the political units of the Sami and the Nordic societies. With this
qualification in mind, the analysis will use the political units (polities) of both the Sami (siidaiSapmi)
and the state (from kingdom to modern state) to uncover differences in how each group conceives of
and organizes territory, and how those differences affected the relationship between the two.

3

See Sami Nationhood, in Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the political organization of the Sami.

7
If territoriality is understood as a significant social phenomenon, as it is argued in this paper, then it
should be reflected at different levels within each macrosocial group. The Figure 1 shows a number of
possible levels at which territoriality may operate. Although the territoriality of each group will
primarily be explored at the level of the polity, the analysis will at times draw on other perspectives to
provide a greater understanding at the conceptual level.

Level of Analysis

Sami

State

Conceptual

Sami Territoriality( ies)

Modern Territoriality

System

Siida Network

Intl. System of States

Polity

Siida/Sapmi

State

Herding Area
Local
Figure 1: Sami and State Levels of Analysis

Farm/City

By taking a case study approach, it is not necessary that the chosen units be precisely defined or that
they are exactly like units. The primary reason that this methodology was chosen is because the
richness of the actors, concepts, motives, and relationships can be explored without reducing them to
overly simplistic classifications or explanations. Charles C. Ragin describes the advantage of
comparative case study:
Most comparativists, especially those who are qualitatively oriented, are interested in specific historical
sequences or outcomes and their causes across a set of similar cases. Historical outcomes often require
complex, combinatorial explanations, and such explanations are very difficult to prove in a manner
consistent with the norms of mainstream quantitative social science (Ragin, p .13).

The concept of territoriality and how it is reflected in both groups is complex and not easily assessed.
The case study method allows an understanding of each group's territoriality to emerge from
descriptions of its social organization, economic activities, political actions, and a variety of other
sources. The differences between the territoriality of the two groups is best seen in their
interrelationship as these concepts come into conflict. It is this conceptual conflict which is the issue
examined by this paper.

8

The historical and geographical scope of this examination will be rather broad. It extends over time
from the earliest records of contact between the Sami and the medieval Nordic kingdoms to recent
decades, and spatially covers the Sami settlement area, the current states of Finland, Norway, and
Sweden, and their historical antecedents. The main exclusion from this analysis is the state of Russia
and the Sami of the Kola Peninsula. While it may seem to be an artificial exclusion, there is
unfortunately insufficient information available on the case of the Sami in Russia to make a
meaningful comparative analysis.
The problem for investigation in this paper is whether territoriality has been a significant source of
conflict between the Sami and the Nordic states. Ragin states that "comparativists are interested in
identifying the similarities and differences among macrosocial units. This knowledge provides the key
to understanding, explaining, and interpreting diverse historical outcomes among macrosocial units"
(p.6). Towards that end, two fundamental questions must be answered: can Sami and state territoriality
be sufficiently differentiated, and is territoriality a convincing explanation of the relations between the
two groups? Together, these two questions can be used to test the hypothesis that incompatible
concepts of territoriality have played a key role in relations between the Sami and the Nordic states,
with negative consequences for the Sami.

Outline of Chapters
A common criticism of political realism is that it is ahistorical, that is, it treats the international system
as if it had always existed in its present form (Ferguson & Mansbach, p.261). For that reason, this
analysis aims to account for the development of the state system and its consequences for groups
excluded from the system, through a historical perspective. The relations between the states and the
Sami fall into the three broad themes outlined above, which follow a rough chronological sequence.
While the time markers of history have been adopted as an organizational device, the substance has
determined the structure rather than vice versa.

9

The first chapter provides a introduction to the current state of international theory on territoriality
and on the origins of the international system. To that body of theory is added the Fourth World
perspective, which chooses nations, not states, as the main unit of analysis. These perspectives provide
a basis to understand the inherent conflict between the concepts of territoriality manifest in the state
system, and aboriginal notions of territory. The study aims to establish the modern nature of state
territoriality and the shortcomings of traditional international relations perspectives which assume the
universality of the state and its territorial basis.4 In addition to laying the theoretical foundations for a
Fourth World critique of the international system of states, the chapter defines key concepts of
modern versus aboriginal territoriality, nation, and state.
To understand precisely how aboriginal concepts of territory differ from that of modern states,
Chapter 2 examines traditional Sami territoriality. Using primarily anthropological sources, the
chapter seeks to discover the basis of Sami concepts and expressions of territoriality. In the Sami case,
territory is directly linked to both resource use and social organization. Therefore, the chapter studies
the relationship between the development of reindeer herding and Sami territoriality. This
introduction to the nature of herding provides an important basis to understand the impacts of later
state interference in that activity. What is apparent from this survey, is that there is not one traditional
form of Sami territoriality, but many.
Chapter 3 explores the first of the three periods of relations between the Sami and the states of
northern Europe. The roots of conflict between the two can be found even before the development of
modern states. This chapter examines the genesis of the modern state in the kingdoms of Denmark-

The use of modern in this paper is largely used to describe the spirit and philosophy of the period from the
scientific enlightenment to the industrial age in Western culture, though not necessarily the actual time period
this covers. Modernity captures the values of scientific progress, rational knowledge, capitalism, and
industrialization, with an underlying presumption that that which is new is inherently superior to that which
came before.
4

10
Norway, Sweden-Finland, and Russia. As these three empires developed the territorial control and
institutional authority of modern states the Sami and their land were divided between them. Through
the instruments of taxation regimes, border treaties, and settlement programs, the emerging states
extended their sovereignty over the Sami. The Sami's political autonomy and land ownership rights
were not recognized by these empires who claimed to be taking possession of ownerless lands.
In later periods, the modern states that took control over the Sami and their lands then increased that
authority. The fourth chapter examines the various ways in which the states exerted power over the
Sami. The states of nineteenth century were greatly influenced by the forces of nationalism,
industrialization and social Darwinism. Together they promoted decidedly modem notions on the
value of progress that relegate the Sami and their way of life to an inferior level. The states thus
justified their promotion of activities which served the institutions of the state and the majority
population. The primary way that this was achieved was through the regulation of reindeer herding.
This chapter analyzes the various methods which the states employed to promote activities based on
fixed and exclusive land use over the flexible, adaptive, and overlapping territoriality of pastoral
herding.
Finally, Chapter 5 explores the most recent phases of state-Sami relations into the twentieth century.
Shifting state interests and increasing pressure to recognize aboriginal rights resulted in better
intentioned, yet equally misguided policies toward the Sami. In their quest to save herding and Sami
culture the governments attempted to rationalize herding along scientific principles, without any real
understanding or appreciation of the traditional Sami herding system. At the root of this impulse was
the theory of the tragedy of the commons, which predicted overgrazing as an inevitable result of
common land use systems like Sami nomadic pastoralism. Without appreciating the management
functions of the Sami territorial system, the states further hindered herding through increased

11
administration and territorial control. The chapter will analyze the shortcomings of these approaches,
and the impact they have had on not only reindeer herding, but the overall survival of Sami society.

12

Chapter 1:
Theoretical Background
The modern system of states is based on a specific conception of territoriality, which undergirds the
system's fundamental principle: sovereignty. Sovereignty is strongly related to the territory of the state
as Poggi describes: "The basic implication of the sovereignty (or autonomy) of the state, is that the
state has exclusive control over a portion of the earth- its territory, over which it routinely exercises
jurisdiction and law enforcement, and whose integrity it is committed to protecting against
encroachment from any other political power" (p.22). Because it entails a state monopoly on power
within its borders, sovereignty requires exact boundaries which divide states in order to be a useful
concept. The dominant theories of international relations, especially neorealism, have focussed almost
exclusively on this system of states as if it had always existed, always would exist, and was based on a
single view of territoriality. This view has been criticized by theories of structuration and poststructuralism, among others. 5 While these critiques have been extremely useful in deconstructing the
myth of the universality of the state, an important aspect of the system's development continues to be
ignored. To date, the means by which a modern conception of territoriality was transferred from
(predominantly) European empires to the rest of the world through colonialism has not been fully
addressed. This issue is especially significant to aboriginal peoples whose conceptions of territoriality
are fundamentally different from that of modern states. Notions of territoriality were conveniently
used to deny rights and justify the conquest of these peoples at the time. Conceptions of international
relations which do not recognize forms of territoriality other than that of modern states legitimate and
perpetuate regimes of oppression which deny territorial rights to subordinate peoples. Using a

5

Definition of these theories from Hendrik Spruyt: "Structuration theory criticizes neorealism for not
accounting for the formation of structure ... " and "Post-structural theory views neorealism's particular depiction

13
perspective which takes these subjugated nations or political communities rather than states as its
focus, this analysis will examine the limitations of how international relations theorists have addressed
conceptions of territoriality in the development of the state system.

Territoriality and International Relations Theory
Traditional views of the international system within international relations theory are typified by
Kenneth Waltz and Robert Keohane. Both Waltzian neorealism and Keohanian liberal institutionalism
share similar assumptions about the international system, based on "an anarchic Westphalian world of
territorially bounded sovereign states" (Ferguson and Mansbach, p.261). The most striking aspect
about the subject of territoriality in mainstream international relations theory is that the subject is
virtually ignored. It is simply taken as a given that states exercise sovereignty over fixed, delineated
territories, which are distinct from one another.
A common criticism of such theories is that they treat the state as a universal. This assumption of the
universality of the state is seen clearly as Keohane summarizes Kenneth Waltz's analysis of
international systems:
International relations is an anarchic rather than hierarchic realm, populated by units (states) performing
similar functions. Thus any international systems that we analyze are 'ordered' by the principle of anarchy.
And in such systems we need not be concerned with the functions performed by the units, since they are
functionally alike. Thus the dimension of differentiation of units 'drops out ' (Keohane, p .14) .

Structuration theory and post-structuralism have mounted a sustained challenge to this ahistorical and
uniform view of the international system. Writers such as Friedrich Kratochwil (1986) , John Gerrard
Ruggie (1993), Hendrik Spruyt (1994), and Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach (1996) have sought
to analyze forms of political and territorial organization which preceded the modern state system.
Their analyses have questioned the realist view that the state is the only unit that should be considered

of international relations as a manifestation of a dominant conceptual framework. " Hendrik Spruyt, The
Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p . 13.

14
by international relations. For the most part even these studies have missed an important aspect of the
politics of territoriality. That is, they fail to examine the means and motives behind the expansion of
modern territoriality to other cultures through colonialism. The continued existence of a bias against
forms of territoriality other than that of the state within international relations theory manifests itself
in two key ways.
First, most depictions of the history of the international system take an 'evolutionary' approach which
explains the emergence of states, and the disappearance of other forms of political organization based
on their ability to compete. As Bateson remarks such views display, " ... a Darwinian vision that
emphasizes that certain forms of human organization have become dominant while others- although
conceivably viable in a less selective environment- have been progressively eliminated. These
comments conceal chauvinist value systems, notions of 'more highly evolved' and therefor better"
(Bateson, p.151). This approach parallels similar social Darwinist theories which were used to
legitimate notions of racial superiority, and also fails to appreciate the value of cultural and human
diversity.
Second, the process of the expansion of the state system outside Europe is virtually ignored. Examples
of Eurocentrism abound in the works of Ferguson and Mansbach (1989), Ruggie (1993) and Spruyt
(1994), which seem to indicate that the only worthy competitors to the state were European, such as
the Athenian polis, Holy Roman Empire, or Italian city-states (Spruyt, p.6). This conveniently allows
the authors to ignore how the system was 'forced' on the rest of the world, rather than being part of
some natural evolution. Failing to consider the world outside Europe means that aboriginal peoples are
denied consideration as units worthy of analysis.

15
Inside/Outside the Discipline

R.B.J. Walker (1993) teaches that even the way the discipline of international relations is structured has
been defined by notions of territory. Inside the boundaries of states exists the ordered world of the
political, and outside those boundaries is the anarchical world of international relations (Walker 1995,
pp.306-307). Borders do not just divide states, but they also divide the discipline. Where then do the
aboriginal nations of the world fit into this division? These peoples are not accorded legitimacy as
members of the international order. As Nietschmann notes, "Traditional studies interpret the world as
enclosed by a fixed, legal network of some 191 states that relegate people to the nationless status of
ethnic groups and minorities" (1994, p.226) . The only way in which these groups are considered by
international relations theory is in their relation to states.
Conceptions of territoriality play a significant role in determining which groups are granted
consideration as units worthy of study by international relations theorists. Groups that have territorial
expressions which conform, more or less, to ~d

ideas of spatial organization (fixed and exclusive)

are granted 'some legitimacy. Thus, groups like the Basques or Tamils are accorded some potential for
acceptance into the international system because they aspire to be states. As noted above, aboriginal
peoples typically have conceptions of territoriality which are neither exclusive nor fixed, and thus
conflict with the very way the modern state system is constituted. The only opportunity for
recognition is by accepting the territorial standards dictated by states. 6 Groups which do not fit neatly
into the territorial system of states, like the nomadic Sami, present a threat not just to individual states,
but to the basis·of the international system.
As they are excluded from consideration by the discipline of international relations, any detailed study
of nations beneath the state level is left primarily to anthropologists and ethnographers. Mary

16

Catherine Bateson, an anthropologist, notes that her field has focussed on groups thought of as 'less
advanced,' whose continued existence is threatened by cultural assimilation: "These are people trapped
willy-nilly in the politics of boundaries and central coercive power, no longer sovereign, but often
excluded from participation, dwindling at the mercy of larger entities" (Bateson, p.150). Bateson
believes that anthropology has much to offer to the study of international communities, such as its
celebration of the richness of cultural diversity, but she recognizes that breaking the stranglehold of
state-centric theories will be a great challenge (Bateson, pp.150-151) .

Modern versus Aboriginal Territoriality
The territorial expression of the modern state has been taken for granted within international
relations, and thus little effort has been given to articulating its particular characteristics. Recent
contributions, such as the work of R.B.J. Walker and John Gerrard Ruggie, have taken up this issue of
the modernity of state territoriality. Ruggie states, "The distinctive signature of the modernhomonomous [functionally similar]- variant of structuring territorial space is the familiar world of
territorially disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states" (Ruggie, p.151) . The
territoriality exemplified by states is delineated by exact boundaries, codified by international law, and
enforced by the principle of sovereignty which grants each state exclusivity within those lines.
Gianfranco Poggi similarly describes modern state territory as possessing, " ... geographically distinct,
fixed, continuous boundaries ... " (p.22). Walker reflects on the modernity of such notions, by drawing
parallels between "the invariant laws of Euclid, the segmented precision of the clock or the sovereign
claims of territorial states" (Walker 1993, p.S).

The current land claims process in Canada is evidence of these structural constraints. Settlements are based on
modern property rights, bounded, fixed, and exclusive. (Dyck, pp. 159-161).

6

17
Giddens also provides several ways of distinguishing the modern state from its predecessors, the tribal
and class-divided societies. With relation to territory he notes that pre-modern societies did not have
fixed boundaries, but instead were roughly divided by frontier areas (1985, p.79) . The territoriality of
the modern state also reflects the development of modern urbanism, forming a "created environment
in which the transformation of nature is expressed as commodified time-space" (1985, pp.192-193).
That is, rather than being a natural environment, space itself has become a component of state power
resources. As territory and the institutions of the state become bounded together, the former begins to
reflect the philosophy, interests and organizing principles of the latter.

If precise lines separating exclusive domains typify modern territoriality, what is an aboriginal
conception of territoriality? Quite simply, there is not one. There are many. Unlike the system of
states in which all units are functionally similar, the aboriginal world encompasses a multitude of
expressions of territoriality. Indeed, territoriality has been one way in which aboriginal societies have
been differentiated from modern ones. These groups have traditionally been described as 'uncivilized,'
'primitive' or 'less technologically advanced.' These descriptions exhibit a modern bias against that
which is different from our own. Territoriality cannot be divorced from the economic practices, social
organization and culture that comprise native existence, all of which have been thought of as
backwards in comparison to modern society. Thus, forms of territoriality based on non-exclusivity,
mobility, and flexibility were held to be inferior.
There are many examples of such pre-modern expressions of territoriality among the world's
aboriginal peoples. The Sami (formerly known as 'Lapps') of northern Scandinavia traditionally
practised nomadic pastoralism in their herding of reindeer. This activity required seasonal cycles of
migration in order to take advantage of different grazing areas. Herding was performed collectively
and rights to pastures were held at the village level (Beach, et. al., pp.54-59). The Beaver Indians of
northern British Columbia organized territories according to the economic activity pursued there, be

18
it hunting moose or beaver, berry picking, or fishing. Most of these territories overlapped, were often
separate from where the holder resided, and were structured to balance the needs of the community
with the available resources (Brody, pp.149-153). The marine Chukchi of Siberia lived in fixed
settlements along the Arctic coast, where they hunted marine mammals as their primary activity. The
resource territories of these settlements were separated not by fixed lines, but by flexible 'buffer zones'
in which a community could hunt or gather plants when needed (Krupnik, pp.34-39). In the case to be
examined in this paper, Sami territoriality is closely connected to semi-nomadic reindeer pastoralism
which involves flexible movement of people and animals, without clear territorial boundaries. The
mobility of the Sami puts their territorial practices at odds with the fixed boundaries of the states
which colonized them.
These are but a tiny sample of the many ways in which aboriginal peoples have organized territory,
but provide a good insight into how such methods differ from modern territoriality. 7 Some derivatives
of these of territorial forms survive today, but for the most part the imposition of modern territorial
organization has vastly eroded or eliminated traditional ones. While the disappearance of traditional
territoriality is significant in its own right, the above examples show the relationship between territory
and economic activity, and thus to overall cultural survival. Aboriginal peoples depend on the land
tenure systems which have managed their relationship with nature and its resources. When that
territorial system is removed, the group can no longer provide for its own needs, making it dependent
on the state and vulnerable to disintegration and assimilation. Or, as Franke Wilmer asks, "Can
political autonomy be enjoyed without its attachment to the means of physical survival? Cultural
survival is impossible without an economic base" (Wilmer, p.112) . The manner in which conflict

For further information on the variety of territorial forms practiced by indigenous peoples, see Brody (1988),
Casimir & Rao (1992), Krupnik (1993) .

7

19
between modern and aboriginal conceptions of territoriality manifested itself in the colonial
experience shows the importance of these ideas.

Territoriality in Theory and Practice
In the senses described above, the dominant theories of international relations can be seen as complicit

in legitimizing and reinforcing colonial practices. The transformation of indigenous forms of
territoriality must be seen as part of an overall process of colonization through the imposition of
power by states. Geography has played an important role in discourses of power. Maps shape our ideas
about our world and our place within it. In the words of Brian Harley, " ... cartography, like politics
itself, remains today a teleological discourse, reifying power, reinforcing the status quo, and freezing
social interaction within charted lines" (Henrikson, p.59). This conjuncture of geography and politics
is especially relevant to state relations with the aboriginal nations they usurped. An example of
colonial gee-graphing (or earth writing) can be seen in the denial of land rights to peoples without
fixed territoriality (6 Tuathail1996).
Since many aboriginal expressions of territoriality are based on mobility, these peoples were thought
not to have any sense of possession or ownership of the land on which they lived. This understanding
of ownership is itself premised on fixed and permanent notions of territory, which belie the actual
sense of connection that aboriginal peoples have to their land. The empires and states which expanded
their control over the Americas, Asia, and Africa did so without any regard for the native inhabitants
or pre-existing territorial composition. Examples of this attitude include the legal principle of terra
nullius ('ownerless land') which was applied to those parts of the globe that were not claimed by a

'modern' state, and the contention that Columbus 'discovered' America (Kratochwil, p.39). Terra
nullius denied the indigenous inhabitants of these regions all rights to land and resources, which were

appropriated by the colonial powers.

20

The pattern of assimilation and paternalism that characterizes state-aboriginal relations globally also
has a territorial dimension. Many forms of aboriginal land tenure are based on some variation of
common propeny. The theory of the 'tragedy of the commons' shows a territorial bias, as it believes
systems of common propeny management are inherently inviable, and thus require (state) regulation.
This view ignores the reality that such communities have their own means of resource management
(Casimir, pp.8-9). Nevenheless, many states saw it as their role either to 'modernize' communal
economies, forcing them into agriculture or industry, or 'protect' them through government
administration (Dyck, pp.56-60).
Arbitrarily drawn boundaries which divide once unified nations, the complete loss of land and
resources to outsiders, and systems of rule which slowly destroy cultures are all 'real world' effects of a
single-minded view of territoriality. The story does not end there, however. The study of international
relations has itself legitimated the process by which these nations were robbed of their autonomy and
culture.

Fourth World Theory

In response to the limitations of traditional theories of international relations in understanding the
territorial character of the relations between states and aboriginal minorities, the analysis takes a
Founh World perspective as its point of departure. The term Fourth World was first used to describe
the world's aboriginal peoples by Shushwap Chief George Manuel in his 1974 book The Fourth World:
An Indian Reality (Griggs 1992). Because the terms 'aboriginal' and 'indigenous' often lead to

confusion, misunderstanding and dispute this definition was broadened to, "Nations forcefully
incorporated into states which maintain a distinct political culture but are internationally
unrecognized" (ibid.). Fourth World approaches differ significantly from the traditional state focus of
international relations. Bernard Nietschmann's work, "The Fourth World: Nations Versus States"
provides much of the framework of this analysis. He asserts:

21
The fundamentally different starting point of Fourth World analysis is that it describes and maps
geography, history, and politics based on the world's 5,000 [to 8,000] nations, instead of focusing on states,
regions, blocs, and superpowers as traditional analyses do ... (Nietschmann 1994, p.225) .
The use and misuse of language, with its underlying assumptions and values, is very important to the
Fourth World movement. The term 'nation' is fundamental to this discussion and likely one of the
most misused and misunderstood concepts in the study of 'international' relations (even misused in the
name of the discipline). All too often the term 'nation' is used interchangeably with the term 'state.'
Nietschmann, however, defines nation in this sense: "The term nation refers to the geographically
bounded territory of a common people as well as to the people themselves." (1994, p.226).
The distinctions that not all nations are states, and that nations also have a territorial dimension
(though not necessarily defined by fixed borders), are both important. The territorial component of
the term 'nation' is not usually recognized within mainstream international relations, as the sovereign
state is held to be the only unit with a legitimate claim to occupy space. The territorial demarcations of
the modern state system are seen by Fourth World theory as artificially imposed boundaries which
deny excluded peoples their own nationhood (Nietschmann 1994, p .227). Theoretical models which
emphasize those boundaries are seen by the Fourth World as giving misplaced legitimacy to systems of
power which were established through genocide, cultural assimilation, and wholesale theft of land and
resources.
A complete analysis of the development of the state system globally from a Fourth World perspective
is well beyond the scope of this paper. 8 A brief look at the role territorial systems played in the
evolution of the modern state system, and a Fourth World critique of how international relations
theories have treated that process will highlight where the 'silences' exist and provide a starting point

For further information, see Griggs (1992), Ryser (1980, 1992, 1994), Nietschman (1985, 1994) and the Fourth
World Documentation Project website (http:! /www.halcyon.com/FWDP/).

8

22

for future research. The question of how modern views of territoriality differ from those of many
aboriginal societies must be addressed first .

Conclusion

What can a Fourth World perspective offer that other theories in international relations have not? .
There are many lessons that we modern thinkers can take from aboriginal ideas of territoriality, as
"Every isolated example of a band or a tribe or island settlement that has ordered its affairs differently
is an example of possibility" (Bateson, p.151). Kratochwil notes that one advantage of the exclusive
principle of territorial sovereignty is its simplicity (Kratochwil, p.SO). But is simple always best? How
is it that modern minds are so reluctant to envision systems of organization that are complex, fuzzy,
and multi-layered? Yet aboriginal peoples were able to manage such complex systems of overlapping
jurisdictions, usually without the benefit of written records let alone modern electronic systems of
communication and GIS technology. Are we too limited in our thinking to imagine such complexities,
or are we just unsure of how we would draw it on a map?
A transformation of this kind which gives aboriginal views of territoriality greater legitimacy also has
direct implications on aboriginal rights, especially the settlement of native land claims. Making
governments aware of the different ways in which aboriginal peoples express territoriality will allow a
better understanding of claims based on particular land uses. Furthermore, it should lead to an
acceptance of settlements that do not delimit exclusively aboriginal lands from exclusively public and
private lands. Arrangements which allow some sharing of land and resources, consistent with
traditional usage patterns would serve the needs of both indigenous peoples and the rest of society. By
taking a broader conception of territoriality, one which does not require exclusion, states may realize
that settling aboriginal claims is best accomplished through co-governance and sharing territory rather
than dividing it between aboriginal and state spheres.

23
Finally, breaking the state-centric view of the world within the study of international relations may
have a parallel effect on foreign policydecision makers. The present international system which is
based on the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention while upholding a peoples' right to selfdetermination (UN Resolution 1514) is internally contradictory (Nietschmann 1994, p.230).
Understanding the manner in which most states were imposed on unconsenting 'nations' will lead to a
greater understanding of the relative legitimacy of states and nations. Evaluating the claim of the
peoples of Irian Jaya C:W est Papua) to form their own state requires a knowledge of how Indonesian
territoriality came to subvert West Papuan territorialities.
This analysis shows that Fourth World theory and aboriginal conceptions of territoriality have much
to offer the discipline of international relations. The modern international system is based on a specific
notion of territoriality. Even those theorists who purport to challenge the underlying basis of the
system still do not fully transcend that assumption. Shifting our unit of analysis from the state to the
nation allows a much more sophisticated understanding of variations among territorial systems, and
how those systems came to be transformed. This is particularly relevant to those nations whose
territoriality differs most from that of the modern state: aboriginal peoples. These groups have suffered
most by the extension of the state system over their homelands, because the modern sense of
territoriality was antithetical to their own. As the survey of current theory on the development of the
state system has shown, this injustice has been compounded by modes of thought which continue to
deny legitimacy to their expressions of territoriality. In this sense, the reification of the territorial state
has been an example of what Steve Smith described: " ... in the name of enlightenment and knowledge,
international theory has tended to be a discourse accepting of, and complicit in, the creation and recreation of international practices that threaten, discipline and do violence to others" (Smith, S., p.3).

24

Chapter 2:
Traditional Sami Territoriality
What is Sami territoriality, and how is (or was) it different from the territoriality embodied in the
state? Given the cultural, geographic, and economic diversity among the Sami it would be a gross
oversimplification to try to define their territorial views in concrete terms. The degree of
heterogeneity is further compounded by the transformation of Sami culture over time and in response
to interaction with other groups. With these limitations in mind, the following chapter's aim is not to
present a definitive model of Sami territoriality. Instead, a variety of factors which have influenced
Sami conceptions and expressions of territory will be examined. What becomes rapidly apparent is
that there is no single form of Sami territory, but a broad range depending on a number of variables
(ecology, geography, state authority, and historical period).
This chapter is thus a rudimentary exploration of both the diversity and common elements of Sami
territoriality prior to the expansion of states into their traditional areas. This starting point we can use
to compare with later transformations to Sami territoriality by the Nordic states. The key component
to the understanding of Sami territoriality is the siida.
The siida is the most basic social organization of the Sami. Although the term siida has been used to
refer to the territory controlled by such a social group, it is properly the social unit only (Aronsson,
p.llO). While the siida's main role is commonly seen as economic organization (subsistence), nearly all

" organized at the siida level (Beach et. al., 1992;
aspects of Sami social life and decision-making were
Ingold, 1978a). The categorization of the siida's activities into social, political, or economic spheres is
rather misleading in this sense, as these are modern concepts which were not compartmentalized in the

siida. As the siida formed the focal point for nearly every aspect of Sami life, it can be seen as a parallel
political community to the state.

25
By applying Franke Wilmer's definition of political community from The Indigenous Voice in World
Politics, both the siida and the state can be seen as units which can be used to compare traditional Sami

and modern forms of territoriality:
a political community consists of participants who (1) self-identify themselves as community members, (2)
recognize common interests, (3) relate to one another according to a rule of reciprocity, and (4) pursue
shared interests through collectively sanctioned decision-making institutions. (p. 44)

This definition does not exclude the Sami as a whole from also being considered a political
community. Wilmer herself recognizes the possibility of such coexisting political communities, such as
the state and the world system. For the purposes of the comparison of territorial concepts in this
chapter, the siida will be the unit of analysis. The territorial characteristics of the siida will be
contrasted with that of the state to form a basic understanding of the differences between traditional
Sami and modern territoriality.

Perceptions of Sami Territoriality

"Tell them we don't just wander," a Sami herder implores ethnographer Robert Paine (Paine, p.ll) .
This beautifully captures the frustration of the Sami with the myths of their nomadic lifestyle held by
outsiders. Outsiders commonly perceive Sami as randomly following reindeer wherever the herds care
to tread. The implication of this view is that the Sami do not have any sense of possession or belonging
to the territory on which they herd. This is incorrect. In fact, the Sami have a well developed and
complex sense of territoriality. Nomadic peoples, especially pastoral nomadic peoples such as the Sami,
most certainly have a sense of territory as the pasture is the most important resource in herding.
Nomadic pastoralism involves a rare combination of seasonal migration and collective herding of
animals (Paine, p.lS). The "logic of territoriality" is different from that of agriculture, or other land
uses defined by distinct, bounded, and exclusive spaces (Paine, pp.lS-16).
How has Sami nomadic pastoralism shaped conceptions of territoriality, and how have these
conceptions conflicted and changed with the encroachment of states which expressed their own ideas

26
of territoriality? Much of the information on the territorial organization of the Sami focuses on the
importance of reindeer herding to Sami territorial patterns and ideas. From this, one might assume
that the nomadic and flexible form of territoriality practised by the Sami developed because of the
resource activity of herding. Although herding is a relatively recent phenomenon, the basic structure
of the siida, the main unit of Sami organization, predates the development of herding (Svensson 1997,
p.38; Ingold 1978a, p.147; Odner, p.76). Although the transformation from the hunting of wild
reindeer to reindeer pastoralism over the last five hundred years has certainly changed the Sami's
relationship to the land and the seasonal cycle, the basic elements of their territoriality (flexibility and
mobility) remained.
While herding certainly played an important role in shaping the territorial character of the Sami
between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, one should be very cautious that it is not treated as the
only explanation of that transformation. The bonds of commonality and great variations, both
between Sami groups and across time, can be discovered through an exploration of the siida, which lies
at the heart of the Sami's territorial expression, with its "recognized territorial base" and discernible,
but flexible, membership (Sillanpaa 1994, p.38).

Basic Characteristics of the Siida

Mindful of the many differences in siida structures, one can still discover certain shared characteristics
of traditional Sami organization. The most notable aspect of siida social structure its flexibility in
group membership, common to many Arctic peoples. This flexibility is evident in the way that groups
of families merge or divide during different parts of the year (Beach 1981, p.53 , 59; Bjorklund, p.81;
Aronsson, p.109). At the lowest level of Sami social organization is the nuclear family. Up to five of
these families would form a local band which lived and moved together during the year. An example
of a siida structure is provided by T egengren. The Inari siida in the eighteenth century consisted of 27

27
hous..eholds, which were divided into four groups for hunting. Each family provided one adult male
hunter, and thus each of the four hunting teams consisted of seven to eight men (Odner, pp.28-29) .
During the spring and summer the local bands
separated and migrated to exploit "dispersed and sparse
resources," but they would come together in winter,
when resources were less abundant, to minimize risks
through collective cooperation (Ingold 1976, p.l;
Aronsson, p.109). In wintertime, roughly from
December to April, all the local bands which made up
the siida, totalling perhaps five to forty families,
gathered in the winter village (Odner, p.76) . Figure 2
Sko lt Simi aocio-cc:rricories around 1920.
Source: Oduc:r, p.224.

Figure 2: Example of Siida Migrations

shows an example of a Skolt Sami siida and the
different areas which are used by component hunting
groups during the year. This map indicates the kind of

territorial complexity which the siida system can entail, but it is still limited by the need to represent
territory in a static two-dimensional manner. This winter village often also served as a trading centre
for other siida and non-Sami traders (Beach 1981, p.65).
The siida annual cycle, having small groups migrating around during spring and summer, then
converging to a central winter village, also provides a useful image of what the physical structure of the

siida territory might have looked like. The siida territory would likely cover 4 broad area, including a
variety of ecological zones which could be exploited for different purposes throughout the year. The
major divisions between siida territories would be marked by prominent features in the landscape
(mountains, rivers, etc.). These divisions did not form linear boundaries so much as serve to denote the
transition from one area to another. It was possible for more than one siida to occupy a single

28

territory, or more commonly, share territory in the boundary zones between one another (Odner,
p.88) .

The physical shape of a siida's territory was largely a combined function of the local geography and the
type of economic activity practised. When hunting was the primary activity of Sami groups, the
winter village was more-or-less a permanent settlement with hunting teams migrating within round,
cellular territories (Ruong, p.154). By the seventeenth century, pressure from outsiders brought an end
to hunting as the primary Sami resource mode, resulting in "widely divergent adaptations according to
prevailing ecological conditions" (Ingold 1976, p.2). Siidas in lowland areas turned to agriculture, those
near the coast and rivers were primarily fishers, while in the mountains and inland forests reindeer
herding developed (ibid.). The agriculturists (and later the fishers) eventually lost the siida structure,
being assimilated by new settler cultures. Although the development of reindeer herding certainly
changed the territorial structure of the siida, the herding siidas retained both their territorial integrity
and cultural individuality much later than the other groups. For this reason, the practice of reindeer
herding is critical to understanding the territorial relationship between the nomadic Sami and the
Nordic states during the period of colonization.
Despite the many forces that have transformed Sami culture and social life a continuity can be traced
between the traditional siida structure and modern Sami herding territories (Bergman, p.65). The
herding districts created by government administrators in all three states were usually created in
relation to an existing siida group. The boundaries of those districts then became a fixed part of the
legal domain of the state and subject to its interests rather than to those of the siida. Modifications to
herding boundaries were made due to border changes, to reduce herder-settler conflict, and later as part
of state herding management strategies. While herding Sami were able to maintain some links to
traditional siida structures through the herding districts non-herding Sami largely lost this form to
pressures of external contact (Ingold 1976, p.2).

29
Flexibility of the Siida System
The Sami had a definite concept of territory and of each siida's rights of access, but it was a more
elaborate and flexible system than the hard lines which divide modern states and nations. The siidas
managed these territorial relationships and settled disputes that might arise without the intervention of
outside authorities (Odner, p.26) . The characteristics of overlapping boundaries, or non-exclusive
territory, clearly separates Sami concepts of territory from the "the familiar world of territorially
disjoint, mutually exclusive, functionally similar, sovereign states" (Ruggie, p.151).
From the information known about Sami territorial organization before the nineteenth century, it is
clear that it represented a very different form of territoriality than that held by Nordic colonizers. In
the preceding chapter, the assertion was made that the discipline of international relations has wrongly
assumed the universality of a single concept of territoriality. The work of Knut Odner illuminates that
anthropology has suffered from a similar belief. Odner claims that the works of Vaino Tanner,
Helmer T egengren and 0rnulv Vorren, though among the most important anthropological and
ethnographical contributions on the Sami, mistakenly put Sami concepts of territory into "a metaphor
of national states" (Odner, pp.87-88). That is, real concepts of ownership and land use were not
recognized because they did not conform to the idea of permanent settlement in a fixed area.
The investigations Odner carried out into the territorial behaviour of the Varanger Sami highlight the
fundamental differences between Sami and state concepts of territory. The complexity of Sami
territorial arrangements can be seen in examples of shared or overlapping land use. These shared access
arrangements demonstrate that there was not a simple one-to-one, parallel relationship between the
social group and its territory. In the modern context state borders contain both the membership and
territory of the state. Other types of political communities could have a definitive membership

30

"without regard to territorial boundaries" and could share territory with other similarly organized
groups (Aronsson, p.111). 9
Odner notes that Sami from other siida had "residual rights" in the Varanger siida. The Inari and
Utsoki Sami who stayed in the Varanger area had rights to fish and were not viewed as trespassers
(Odner, pp.87-91). Numerous other accounts of Sami territorial behaviour reinforce the point that "a
single geographical territory can be utilized by a number of demosocial groups" (Aronsson, p .lll) . In
Norrland, Mountain and Forest Sami had their winter pastures in the same areas as settled
agriculturists (Aronsson, p.lll). Although co-existence between the Sami and non-Sami settlers could
have been more problematic given the conflicting territorial uses, as long as settled areas were small the
mobile groups of Sami could move among them (Zachrisson, p.13). Evidence of shared territory, or
overlapping boundaries is more common between siidas, such as the common off-shore fishing rights
between the Varanger and Neiden siidas (Odner, p.27) . It is clear that the Sami had a well-developed
sense of territory, but one which included flexible boundaries and some non-exclusive land and
resource use.

Nomadism and Pastoralism

The territorial expressions of the siida clearly have a strong relationship to subsistence activities.
Nomadism plays a key role in the link between the two, and represents the clearest distinction
between modern and traditional Sami modes of territoriality. Sami nomadism is today widely
understood to mean the practice of reindeer herding, yet the Sami practised a form nomadism long
before they began travelling with domesticated herds .. Because herding was

~ d as a unique Sami

trait by both states and anthropologists, it became difficult to separate the identity of the Sami from

Organisms defined by territory are called geosocial, while those defined by membership are called demosocial
by Russian anthropologist Juri I. Semenov (Semjonov) . See Semjonov, 1947.

9

31
the practice of reindeer herding. While this has been advantageous in that the Sami have resisted
cultural assimilation due to the persistence of herding, it has also caused many misconceptions and
tensions among the Sami. The exaggeration of the cultural importance of reindeer herding belies the
fact that it only developed over the past five hundred years. For the purposes of the current discussion
what is most important to understand is that nomadism did not develop because of reindeer herding,
but the nomadic form of the siida preceded the development of herding.
During the period when hunting and fishing formed the primary resource activity, the Sami practised
what is generally referred to as semi-nomadism. As defined by Hansegard, semi-nomadism involves
"migrations between a small number of places of sojourn conditioned by the food available for hunters
and fishermen at the various grounds during the various seasons" (pp.22-23) . In this early stage only a
few domesticated reindeer were used for transportation or decoys. It is likely that in this stage, prior to
the Sami's transition to reindeer herding, the winter village was a permanent home for much of the
group. Teams of hunters would migrate with wild herds during part of the year. Full-nomadism is
considered to be when the entire group migrates with semi-domesticated herds for most of the year,
with no permanent settlements (Rtiong, p.153). These terms are not absolutes, but rather delimit a
range based on the degree of seasonal movement practised by the group. During the eighteenth
century mountain Sami were the most nomadic, while forest Sami were still considered to be seminomadic (Beach 1981, p.69).

Herding

The practice of reindeer herding is often viewed as the defining feature of Sami culture, and the force
which determines their migratory and settlement patterns. Although the basic foundations of Sami
territoriality clearly pre-date its development, herding both transformed and reinforced those
foundations (Svensson 1997, p.38; Ingold 1978a, p.147; Odner, p.76). The territorial implications of
herding, with its seasonal migrations to take advantage of different ecological conditions, marked the

32

most significant difference between the Sami and the Nordic states that would come to occupy their
territory.
Herding has probably been the most-studied aspect of Sami life, and a weighty body of theory and
terminology has been created to describe it. Although it is not the aim of this chapter to go into great
depth about different herding methods, migration patterns, and the like, some familiarity with these
concepts is useful to understand the territorial significance of herding. This basic introduction will also
be of value in later chapters as herding legislation and other state-based reindeer management policies
are analyzed.
The transition from the hunting of wild reindeer to reindeer herding during the seventeenth century
marks the first major shift in Sami territorial organization. If one accepts the assertion that these
changes were brought about because of pressure on lands and resources from colonists, then this
episode may be seen as the first conflict between Sami and modern territorial forms (Ingold 1976; p.2,
Beach 1981, p.66). Aronsson identifies several possible factors influencing this transition. The advent
of herding might be part of "a long cultural development in human adaptation and utilization of the
landscape" (Aronsson, p.16). Another explanation is that the increasing scarcity of wild reindeer forced
the Sami to turn to herding. Building on that idea, Lundmark blames the disappearance of wild herds
on taxation policies which promoted the exploitation of natural resources in the pursuit of revenues

(ibid.).
It is not entirely clear to what extent these changes were due to indigenous or external factors. Some
accounts claim that once herding began to be adopted, the wild herds were intentionally killed off to
prevent mixing (Beach 1981, p.68; Aronsson, p.30). Moreover, much of the external factors that
contributed to the development of herding were not due to the territorial differences between the Sami
and the states. The adoption of milking and pasturing methods from agrarian settlers, for example,
seems rather benign. This early territorial transformation (or, economic transformation with

33
territorial implications since the two are inherently related), should thus be seen instead as
foreshadowing the real structural changes that would take place under the power of the state.
The advent of herding, whatever its cause, should not be viewed as a sudden transformation, but rather
as a gradual development from the hunting of wild reindeer. The connection between hunting and
herding can be seen in a number of ways. In early times, wild reindeer migrated naturally, and Sami
hunters followed the herds. The migration routes of domestic herds follow the old routes of the wild
herds (Odner, p.28; Aronsson, p.32) . Changes to migration patterns have evolved based on the mutual
relationship between the herders and the reindeer (Paine, p.14).
Another way to view the transition from hunting to herding is along an axis of degree of herd control.
This continuum usually ranges between extensive and intensive herding methods, but hunting can be
viewed as a point involving even less control than extensive herding. Extensive herding involves large
herds and loose control with the animals largely left to find their own pastures. Under intensive
herding, the herds are smaller and are under almost constant control. Intensive herding requires
families to move with the herds, while in extensive herding the herds need only be gathered for
marking, castrating, separating and slaughtering (Beach, p.35; Hansegard, p.24). In its most extensive
form, herding is only slightly removed from hunting. The earmark which establishes ownership marks
the only difference (Beach 1981, p.35; Aronsson, p.14).
Despite the similarity of the extensive form of herding to hunting, it was actually the intensive form
which developed first. One reason for the development of intensive herding was that the existence of
wild herds and predators necessitated close control over the herds to prevent losses. Only later as herd
management techniques changed, wild herds and animal predators were eliminated or drastically
reduced, and technology like fencing became more widely used could herds be safely allowed to
wander extensively (Beach 1981, pp.39-52). Another reason why intensive herding developed first was
a very territorial one. Facing competition for land and resources from settlers and state authorities, "A

34

herder actually occupying a tract of land with his herd establishes a far better claim over the area than
would a herder with his herd spread thinly everywhere" (Beach 1981, pp.66-68). In this sense, intensive
herding can be seen to be a response to colonial ideas of land-ownership.
The transition from hunting to intensive herding to extensive herding was by no means uniform
across the Sami culture area, with some groups retaining the intensive form longer. However, by 1900
the development of extensive herding with large herds had forced an end to intensive herding as most
of the herds were intermixed (Hansegard, pp.24, 102). The decreased control of extensive herding
allowed Sami herders more time to pursue other activities. The seasonal rounds that are described
below are typical of the intensive period. As large-scale migrations became less common due to the
development of extensive herding, summer settlements gradually shifted towards spring/ autumn
settlements. This resulted in a two-settlement system, one for winter and one for summer (Hansegard,
p.102) .

In addition to degree of control and nomadism, other factors which determined the type of herding
practised were geography and ecology. It has already been mentioned how different local conditions
resulted in differences between farming, fishing, and herding Sami. On a finer scale, among the herding
Sami these differences also manifested themselves into ecological divisions such as mountain Sami,
forest Sami, and coastal Sami.

Ecological Divisions
Both forest and mountain Sami are types of reindeer herding groups (indeed, their differentiation arises
from the type of herding practised), and have been well documented in the literature. The coastal, or
sea Sami have also kept small herds, but by the 1800s were primarily fishers. The territorial differences
between the forest and mountain groups will be analyzed primarily in relation to their herding
pracuces.

35

It should be noted that there is no real cultural meaning in the categories forest, mountain, or coastal
(Beach 1981, p.70). These divisions are only meant to describe the modes of resource exploitation and
geographic location of the different groups. Prior to the eighteenth century, there was no real basis for
separating forest Sami from mountain Sami (Beach 1981, p.69) as both practised similar forms of
herding. However, over time these differences have been reinforced by the legal structures imposed by
the state.
The division between mountain and forest Sami is based on differences in settlement areas and
migration routes (Bergman, p.60). Both groups use the same boreal forests for their winter pastures,
but the mountain Sami herders migrate to the mountains in summer while the forest Sami herders
remain in the forests (Arorisson, p.29). The degree of nomadism is also a factor in separating these two
groups, as mountain Sami are the most nomadic, making long-distance migrations between the
mountain and forest pastures. Forest Sami are usually described as being semi-nomadic, making only
small migrations within the forest zone.
The development of herding in the Swedish mountain regions transformed the traditional round siida
territory into long narrow strips which followed the migration of reindeer from the north-west to the
south-east (Beach 1981, p.71; Ruong, p.154-155) . The territorial division of mountain Sami siidas
became known as vuoma, " ... a geographical area seasonally occupied and migrated through by several
bands ... " (Beach 1981, p.71). The mountain ranges form natural divisions between the territories. The
shape of these territories is still evident in the present-day Swedish reindeer districts. Rounded herding
territories were more or less maintained among forest Sami in Sweden, Finland, and Norway where
the geographic features do not form such marked boundaries(Ruong, p.154-156).
Another way in which the territorial system of the Sami underwent change through advent of herding
was the break-up of the winter village. Herding, especially in winter, required space for grazing.
Whereas the sub-groups of the siida had once come together to make use of common resources in the

36
winter, herders now had to spread their herds out when snow-cover made vegetation hard to find. The

siida structure was thus split up into smaller units to pursue migratory herding (Beach 1981, p.66). This
was true of both mountain and forest Sami. The cycle of agglomeration in winter and dispersal in
spring and summer which typified the hunting siida was replaced with new patterns of seasonal
migration.
Although the forest Sami historically outnumbered the mountain Sami, their vast migrations made the
mountain Sami more interesting research subjects (Aronsson, p.28). Unlike the mountain Sami, the
areas of the forest herding provided sufficient variation in vegetation within a small area. Thus the
forest herders can make their seasonal migrations within a much smaller area. Aronsson notes, "Forest
Saami reindeer herding in its typical and traditional form was characterized by migrations between a
number of semi-permanent settlements (usually three to seven) during the summer, and migration
with tent dwellings (kator) on the winter pasture grounds" (Aronsson, p.28).
The work of Beach (1981) provides a detailed description of the seasonal round of mountain Sami
herders in the 1870s in the Tuorpon district of Sweden. The pasturelands and herding activities can be
divided into spring, summer, autumn, and winter seasons. These long-distance migrations took place
along the mountain valleys which run from the high Scandinavian mountains in the west (summer
pastures) to the forests and coastal lowlands near the Gulf of Bothnia (winter pastures). In spring the
herds would begin heading for the low foothills where the first bare patches would appear on sun and
wind exposed slopes. Pregnant cows were particularly eager to find good grazing land before calving
(Beach 1981, pp.83-85). As migrations became more regularized the spring camps were used as depots
where winter sleds could be stored for the return to the forests in the fall. In summer, herds clustered
even higher in the mountains to avoid being ravaged by insects. Green vegetation was the main food
for the reindeer, and milking was the primary summer activity of the herders. Milking could last as
long as green vegetation was available, then the herds would slowly return eastwards in autumn as the

37

vegetation began to disappear from the higher elevations. Autumn was also the time to castrate those
bulls that would be slaughtered in winter, and keep some tame animals for transport. Also in the fall
different herds would be allowed to mix for mating before being separated for the winter. The
flexibility of herding group membership is evident here as the siida composition first conglomerates
for mating, then separates into its smallest units in winter (Bjorklund, p.81, Beach 1981, pp.87-92). The
herd is at its most vulnerable in winter from predators and weather. The herds must be small to take
advantage of winter grazing conditions (Beach 1981, p.66).
Unlike the differentiation between forest and mountain Sami, the division between coastal Sami, and
the other Sami groups pre-dates herding, likely taking place between the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries (Odner, pp.29, 97) . The coastal Sami mixed wild reindeer hunting with fishing and even
hunting for sea mammals such as whales, seals, and walruses. In the case of the Varanger Sami, a
coastal Sami group in northern Norway, nomadic herding of reindeer began in the latter half of the
seventeenth century, with migrations between the summer pastures on Varanger peninsula and winter
pastures in the forests of northern Finland (Odner, p.17). Coastal herds were typically much smaller
than those of forest and mountain herders. This led to conflict and the end of herding in Varanger in
the eighteenth century when the much larger mountain herds began to compete for pastureland with
the smaller coastal herds (Odner, p.17). The end of herding did not, however, mean the end of
migratory settlement patterns for the coastal Sami. Most families continued to keep at least two
habitation sites: a coastal site for summer and spring fishing, and winter site further inland (Odner,
p.25).

Conclusion
Even without completely understanding the complexities of the different herding methods, or the
social structure of siida, one can appreciate from this presentation that the Sami had very real and
complex connections to the land. The Sami did not simply roam wherever they or the reindeer cared

38
to tread, but had well-developed systems, organized at a group level, which ensured access to
important resources throughout the year. The siida structure represented the main method of Sami
political, social, economic, and territorial organization as we understand those terms today.
The picture which the siida system presents is very different from the political structures we are
familiar with in the modern age. The mobility, flexibility and diffuse boundaries of the siida were
clearly discordant with the fixed and linear notions of borders that would later be imposed by the
states both at the level of the herding district and the state. Despite the great variation among the
different groups of Sami, and the transformations that took place over time (particularly in the
transition from hunting to herding), the general territorial character of the siida is clearly differentiated
from that of the state. Different groups may have been more mobile, had greater flexibility in use of
resource areas, or have had greater overlap with their neighbours, but these variations are minor in
relation to the fundamental differences that separate them from the territoriality of the state.
These differences significantly affected the relationship between the Sami and the states which exerted
control over the area. In the first place, the political forces which competed for power over the Sami
area did not recognize Sami territoriality as a basis for legitimate occupation of the land. As those
kingdoms developed the modern expressions of territoriality inherent in the state system the mobility
of the Sami presented a challenge to their need to stake firm claims of sovereignty. Sami expressions of
territoriality were systematically subverted by colonial power, as they were anathema to both the
philosophical basis and practical interests of the states.

39

Chapter 3:
The Development of States in the Sami Area
At the dawn of the middle ages the region of Fennoscandia was home to the Sami as well as three
kingdoms which began to expand their influence. The Sami, and the kingdoms of Denmark-Norway,
Russia, and Sweden-Finland did not then have the characteristics of modern states, especially with
regard to their territorial manifestation. Like other European monarchies in this period, the three
kingdoms would evolve over the course of the thirteenth to nineteenth centuries into territorial states
with fixed and exclusive borders. The Sami and their lands became the figurative, and sometimes
literal, battleground on which the three kingdoms competed for power and territory (Sillanpaa 1994,
p. 38; Salvesen, p. 109). Neither the integrity nor autonomy of the Sami was ever recognized by the
emerging states, but the land was rather seen as ownerless, free to be claimed. The reason that the Sami
were not considered to have a right to possess the land then, as now, is largely attributable to a
prejudice against indigenous systems of territoriality.
The period examined in this chapter is the era of territorialization in Europe, when competing powers
began to draw lines on maps representing where one exclusive domain ended and another began. The
concept of sovereignty upon which these arrangements were based was also used to justify rule over
other nations, as in the case of the Sami. The means by which the nascent states of Fennoscandia came
to integrate the Sami homeland into their own territory is placed in the larger context of the territorial
struggle between the Sami and the Fennoscandian states. The state-building model of Anthony
Giddens and the nation development model of Anthony D. Smith provide useful bases from which to
analyze this parallel process in the case of the Sami and the states of northern Europe.

40
State-Building
The means by which states extend and consolidate their power is the theme of Anthony Giddens'
work, The Nation-State and Violence, which provides a state perspective on the emergence of modern
states upon pre-existing lands and peoples. Giddens differentiates between two types of states,
'traditional' (or 'non-modern') and 'modern,' and examines the transition process between the two.
Unlike many authors who have written on the origins of the state, Giddens appears to recognize that
the modern state system was created by the systematic dismantling of a previous order: "In a period of
three hundred years, an insignificant slither of human history as a whole, the face of the earth has been
wiped clean. That is to say, traditional societies of all types have become more or less completely
dissolved" (Giddens 1987, pp.33-34).
Giddens' typology is more appropriate to the kingdoms of Denmark, Russia, and Sweden, than to an
understanding of the Sami political community. His work provides a valuable insight into the
processes by which these 'traditional states' evolved into 'modern states.' Especially relevant to our
discussion of territoriality is the means by which these states expanded and consolidated their power
by dividing and swallowing the Sami and their lands. He makes reference to three components of this
process which will be analyzed in this chapter: taxation, border formation, and settlement. He
describes a general pattern, which well describes the early stages of the colonization of the Sami by the
three kingdoms:
In conquest empires it was generally the case that indigenous populations would be left to carry on their
pre-existing patterns of conduct - even their established administrative system being left largely
untouched - so long as they paid their taxes or delivered the necessary tribute. But quite often the newly
arrived conquerors made systematic attempts to displace some segments of the population and settle the
area with others. (Giddens 1987, pp.Sl-52)

In building a general understanding of the state-building process, Gianfranco Poggi complements
Giddens by examining the characteristics which make a state a state, and the historical stages of its
evolution. The process which Poggi describes, from feudalism through absolutism to the modern state,

41
fits well with the ideas of Giddens and provides a useful measure with which to check the development
of the Nordic states. His work does much more than just describe, however. He gives great insight
into the nature of the state which helps explain why, not just how, the state came to dominate other
forms of human organization.
Just as Giddens does, Poggi sees the state as fundamentally concerned with violence, and identifies two
types: "those pertaining to inter-state relations; and those pertaining to keeping control of the
population and maintaining order within individual states" (p.65). Revenue was needed to pay for the
armies, and the armies enforced the extraction of those revenues from the population (the building of
what Giddens calls authoritative and allocative power resources (1985, pp.7-8)). For Poggi, this cycle
explains the development of states historically:
they established agencies which systematically monitored the changing demographic and occupational
composition of the state's population, and sought to improve its health and its education and to promote
and regulate modernisation. A bigger, busier, more productive, better educated, happier population would
yield greater revenues, and thus indirectly increase the state's military might (p.66).

This pattern is consistent with Durkheim's description whereby the modern state, "progressively
extends a more compact system over the whole surface of the territory, a system more and more
complex with ramifications which displace or assimilate pre-existing local organs" (Badie & Birnbaum,
p.13). It is at this stage that the state truly becomes modern, in the territorial sense. The traditional
state (or kingdom) did not need to exercise territorial control to meet its needs. The character of the
modern is exactly that it demands an exclusive territorial claim: "the state does not have a territory, it

is a territory" (Poggi, p.22). This change can be seen in the Sami case as the states made the transition
from taxation through intermediaries to direct administrative and territorial control.
Initially the Sami were able to positively contribute to the states' needs through taxes and, ironically,
by their very presence on the land. The taxation of the Sami did not produce enough revenue for the
increasingly large and expensive military campaigns the states waged in the middle ages. The transition

42
from frontiers to national borders gave the states direct access to resources and provided a legal
justification for the exercise of military power. 10 As the scale of administrative control elevated,
however, the Sami territorial and economic system became increasingly in conflict with the modern
'bigger, busier, more productive' society the states desired. At that point it became necessary for the
states to use the coercive and administrative power at their disposal to remove obstacles to
modernization. More productive forms of economic activity were encouraged though the settlement
programs, forcing the Sami to adapt or perish. This analysis will show that the instruments of taxation,
border formation and settlement placed Sami expressions of territoriality firmly in conflict with those
of the state.

Sami 'Nationhood'
While Giddens and Poggi provide a very useful perspective from which to understand the behaviour of
the states, they are insufficient for understanding the Sami polity. It is difficult to know, in social
science terms, how to treat the Sami as a group. Too little is really understood about the political
organization of the siida system, or how relations were constituted between different siida. Should the
Sami be treated as a cohesive nation or a collection of loosely organized tribal groups? The works of
Anthony D. Smith and Franke Wilmer provide a basis from which to approach this difficult subject.
A common theme in recent texts on Sami history (and one consistent with a Fourth World
perspective), is that the Sami nation was divided and parcelled out by the medieval kingdoms of
Denmark (-Norway), Sweden (-Finland), and Russia (Muscovy, Novgorod, and Karelia) (Sillanpaa
1994, pp.37-38, Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.77). Terming the Sami of that era a nation serves the purposes of

Giddens describes the difference between frontiers and borders: "In all cases, 'frontier' refers to an area on the
peripheral regions of a state (not necessarily adjoining another state) in which the political authority of the
10

43

the present-day Sami political movement, but perhaps gives the impression of a more cohesive and
homogeneous community than actually existed. The previous chapter depicted some of the many
divisions among Sami groups, by geography, language, and economic activity. Although Nietschmann
and other Fourth World scholars prefer the term nation when referring to groups sharing a common
identity and territory, the nation and nationalism is as much a modern construction as the state
(Nietschmann, p.226; Smith, A., p.ll) .
Instead of nation, Smith prefers the term ethnie to describe the "collective cultural units and sentiments
of previous eras" as he traces their transformation into modern national units (Smith A., p.13). Smith's
criteria are for ethnie are: a collective name, a common myth of descent, a shared history, a distinctive
shared culture, an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity (pp.22-31). These
criteria can be compared with those of Wilmer's political community: a self-identifying group,
common interests, reciprocal relations, and collectively sanctioned decision-making institutions.
The commonalities of language, religion, dress, art, music, social organization and the like provide
considerable evidence of shared culture. The sense of solidarity and decision-making institutions are
more problematic. While a national (in the sense we know it today) identity did not develop among
the Sami until after the second world war, the Sami were indeed a collective community, with an
overarching sense of identity even before the middle ages (Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.82). Just because a
Sami's primary identity in the absence of external pressure (an 'other' to engender the 'we') likely
rested at the siida level does not invalidate the existence of a collective identity. Furthermore, it makes
little difference if we choose to look at the Sami as a whole or smaller groupings, since "even on a
subethnic level, identity cut across rather than follow along state boundaries" (Eriksson, J. 1997b,

centre is diffuse or thinly spread. A 'border', on the other hand, is a known and geographically drawn line
separating and joining two or more states. (1987, p.49)

44
p.l63) . State borders did not just divide Sapmi, but language groups and siida territories as well, as
shown in Figure 3.
It is not reasonable to expect the Sami political community
of pre-modern times to reflect modern ideals of
organization. Smith and Wilmer's criteria must be applied
with an understanding of the historical context. While no
collective institution was responsible for political decisionmaking for all of Sapmi, it must be remembered that the
Soipmi and ~ Simi Dialecc Boundaries.
So urce: Eriksson, J. 1997b, p.163.

Figure 3: Sami Dialect Boundaries

political communities which would become states lacked
real political cohesion themselves. To make a fair

comparison, the siida system and the principles which regulated relations between different siidas
constituted as much of a decision-making institution as the European feudal system (Poggi, p.36) .
The political units that existed in Northern Europe during the middle ages were considerably different
from the centralized, territorial states which would emerge by the eighteenth century. Just as the Sami
themselves were a loose assortment of regional sub-groups, the states were likewise a weak and diffuse
collection of kingdoms, city-states, principalities, estates, etc. At that time, these polities lacked the
characteristics of modern territoriality (described in Chapter 1) just as much as the Sami. Thus Sami
autonomy was able to exist in reality, despite being partitioned and subsumed on paper, because
" ... state sovereignty and the associated domestic-international divide were neither established political
ideas nor reflections of reality. At this time, polities overlapped, autonomies >yere incomplete, and
loyalties were divided" (Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.41-42). These nascent states, however, would gradually
began to procure the trappings of modern states as they expanded both their geographic scope and
magnitude of authority. This examination traces the early history of state-building in the Sami area,
and the shows the role of territoriality in the colonial process.

45

Early Forms of State Influence (Pre-1550)
Like elsewhere in Europe, the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries were politically turbulent in the
Baltic, Scandinavia, and Russia. Shifting alliances, frequent wars, and power struggles between nobles
all created great upheavals and resulted in many changes in the regional balance of power. 11 While
most of the activity was limited to the southern lands around the Baltic, the Arctic coasts around
Varanger and the Kola peninsula also became the site of rivalry over trade routes. The borders that
divided the claims of the kingdoms to the Sami lands initially did not have much real significance, as
state authority did not penetrate very far into the interior of the Lapland 'wilderness.' This would soon
change as the borders stabilized, the central authority of the states increased, and they consolidated
power over their domain.
The earliest way in which the medieval kingdoms exerted control over the Sami and their lands was
through trade and taxation. The political objective at that time was not the ownership of territory, but
economic control. The crowns granted intermediaries, such as the birkarler in Sweden-Finland and
Karelian traders in Russia, the right to
collect taxes on behalf of the state in
exchange for access to trade and a share
of the taxes. The spheres of influence of
these groups are shown in Figure 4.
Access to trade with the Sami,
particularly in the Varanger region, was
Habitation,
d
~
Source: Odncr, p.208.

tax2tion ca. 1.300-1500.

of great economic value to the kingdoms

Figure 4: Taxation Boundaries

For a thorough discussion of the political history of the region in this period, see David Kirby's Northern
Europe in the Early Modern Period: The Baltic World 1492-1772, London: Longman Group, 1990.
11

46
and created much tension, especially between Sweden-Finland and the Russian city-state of Novgorod.
The two signed the Treaty of Noteborg in 1323, which "was the first attempt to delineate the frontier,
but its terms were extremely vague and imprecise ... Neither traders from Karelia, nor settlers from the
Finnish side paid much heed to it" (Kirby, p.25). Other attempts to divide the Sami area into taxation
zones followed. In a 1326 treaty Novgorod agreed to Norway's (under Swedish rule since 1319)
ownership of Finnmark, but maintained some overlapping taxation rights (Odner, pp.10-11).
The character of these tax regimes should be noted. Rather than being taxes based on territorial rights,
the taxes imposed were more like trading dues as the only penalty for non-compliance was the denial
of access to important trade markets (Salvesen, p. 110). As the institutions of the European kingdoms
were largely based on a feudal order with an economic foundation in agriculture, the nomadic huntergatherer structure of the Sami posed something of a puzzle. Affairs in the Baltic region captured most
of kingdom's attention, and so long as they kept receiving taxes from trade, the crowns were satisfied
to leave the northern wilderness to their agents. The eventual development of centralized states based
on control of territory would later change this relationship, and institutions were created that reflected
the ideals of private property, serving the interests of the states (Salvesen, p. 113).
The formation of the Kalmar Union in 1397 created an alliance between the crowns of Denmark,
Norway, and ostensibly Sweden. The Union was fraught with internal division and rival claims to its
rule. Denmark effectively secured control of Norway, but efforts to force Sweden to submit to its rule
produced repeated conflict between the two kingdoms, with Sweden finally leaving the Union in 1523
(Kirby, pp.41-64; Odner, pp.10-11). 12 The intervening years not only produced war between DenmarkNorway and Sweden, but the Finnish-Karelian frontier continued to be disputed between Sweden and
Novgorod. The expansion of another Russian city-state, Muscovy, eventually gained control of both

47
Novgorod and Karelia (Kirby, pp.51-57). Amid this political upheaval, and often armed violence, the
Sami communities that lay in the disputed territories suffered at the hands of tax collectors and soldiers
from all sides.

The Beginnings of Territorial Control (1550-1620)
The character of these kingdoms began to change in the sixteenth century. Protracted wars forced
both Sweden and Denmark to institute numerous administrative and economic reforms to avoid
bankruptcy, thereby increasing centralized power and developing professional bureaucracies (Kirby,
pp.97-101). While this development began during the reigns of Gustav Vasa in Sweden (1523-1560) and
Frederick II of Denmark (1559-1596), it would not be until Peter I (the Great)'s unification of Russia in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before it could be called a centralized territorial state in any
real sense (Kirby, pp.299-307). With the concentration of power in the monarch and a regularized
system of rule, the political entities of Sweden-Finland, Denmark-Norway, and Russia had become
absolutist states, "the first major institutional embodiment of the modern state" (Poggi, p.42) In
concert with these organizational changes, the new states began to change their objectives towards the
sami.
The wars that were taking place were no longer simply disputes over access to trade and taxation, but
over tangible possession of territory. For instance, Sweden assumed direct control of trade and
taxation from its birkarler agents around 1550 (Odner, p.13). The existence of birkarler trade was then
used to justify Sweden's sovereignty over the territory. Muscovy attempted to exert its own authority
in the area with the construction of a monastery in Petsamo in 1556 by Ivan IV (the Terrible), which
became the centre of substantial trading activities (Odner, p.13). While the profits from trade and

12

Norway officially came under control of the Danish Crown in 1536.

48
taxation were certainly a strong consideration, they alone did not represent a significant enough
resource for Sweden and Muscovy to go to war. Sweden's decision to invade Russia in 1589 had a
territorial objective (Odner, p.14). Sweden declared as much, seeking to establish control over Karelia
and the Kola Peninsula (Kirby, p.l19-120).
Sweden managed to sack the monastery at Petsamo, but fell short of conquering the rest of its
objectives. The Treaty of Teusina in 1595 brought an end to conflict between Sweden and the Russian
kingdoms, and created the first real border between Finland and Karelia. The two empires agreed to
split the region between them, with the border running all the way from the White Sea to the Karelian
Isthmus. Sweden abandoned its claims to the Kola and Karelia, and Muscovy recognized Sweden's
ownership of Lapland in return. Muscovy also gave up its Baltic territories of Narva and Estonia
(Kirby, pp.119-121; Odner, p.13).
Following Teusina, civil war broke out in Muscovy and by 1611 Sweden's armies were once again in
Russia. Denmark took advantage of the situation to launch a war on Sweden's other flank. The treaties
which ended these wars in 1613 (with Denmark) and 1617 (with Russia) altered the political landscape
in the European Arctic once again (Kirby, p.121). Sweden lost its claims to the Arctic coastline in
Varanger, and a system of overlapping taxation zones were drawn up. This was particularly difficult
for the Inari Sami who were in some cases simultaneously taxed by all three kingdoms (Odner, pp.1314; Sillanpaa 1994, p.38).
These overlapping taxation zones might have actually benefitted the Sami by forestalling real partition
by preserving weak and permeable boundaries (Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.84). However, increased state
authority over the administration of taxation had tangible effects on the Sami. In all three jurisdictions,
the creation of taxation districts was the first step in the 'territorialization' of the Sami by the states.

49
That is, by delineating specific areas corresponding to specific groups of Sami, the states begun the
erosion of traditional Sami territorial units, and their replacement with state-defined territories
The Swedish tax law of 1605 recognized traditional forms of Sami economic activity, such as reindeer
herding, as the legal form of land use north of the Lapland Boundary, while agriculture was reserved
for the South (Aikio 1993, p.16) . This differentiation is somewhat laudable, as it appears to grant
legitimacy to Sami forms of land use and territoriality. However, the system defined taxation districts
(taxlands) which did not coincide with the Sami's own siida territories. The collective basis of
territorial 'ownership' was also changed from the siida to individuals, which was completely at odds
with the Sami pastoral herding system. (Beach, et al, p.67).
The manner in which the kingdoms assumed control over the Sami territory is rooted in the
territoriality of the two groups. Because the Sami were migratory, their system of social organization
and economic activity depended on the seasonal use of land, rather than its permanent possession. The
European feudal system was based on agriculture, and therefor required tangible occupation to
establish rights of ownership. In the Sami system land was held by the siida, whereas private
ownership by local lords had been the norm in Europe since medieval times, creating a further
division between Sami and state concepts of territoriality. In extending their control over the lands of
the Sami, the states claimed that they were taking possession of ownerless lands. (Sillanpaa 1994, p.41).
This rationale for the appropriation of territory has had great significance for the Sami's current
struggle to reclaim rights to land and resources.

Consolidating Control through Settlement (1620-1751)

From 1620 to 1751 the boundaries of Fennoscandia remained largely stable, and the nation states
began consolidating their gains internally. The clearest and most effective method of establishing
control, or sovereignty, over a newly colonized area is through settlement. By encouraging members

50
of the dominant populations to move into the areas of the Sami homeland, the states of Sweden and
Denmark-Norway promoted land tenure systems based on private property and agriculture (Sillanpaa
1994, 44).
By granting legitimacy only to systems of private ownership and denying collective land rights to the
Sami, the states began to distribute sections of land in Sami territories to southern farmers, without
regard for the pre-existing systems of land tenure by the Sami. Territorial systems based on individual
ownership of fixed plots clearly do not mesh well with systems of collective ownership with flexible
and adaptive boundaries. Competition for land and resources between settlers and the Sami was
widespread (Kvist 1994, p.32). The governments, which were actively encouraging settlement and
farming for their own economic and political interests, were clearly biased in favour of the former in
settling these disputes (Salvesen, pp.126-127). Many Sami gave up their traditional lifestyles to become
farmers, a victory for the assimilationist policies of the states.
Considerable Norwegian settlement occurred in the Varanger fjord in the early sixteenth century, but
this was largely independent of a deliberate state policy. Most of the settlers went to take part in the
prosperous trading and fishing in the area. Rivalry between Sweden and Denmark-Norway over the
oth to promote settlement in the area to reinforce their respective claims (Odner,
p.13) . The 1613 treaty which settled the Varanger dispute in favour of Denmark-Norway allowed the
two empires to concentrate on more pressing matters in the Baltic and central Europe.
Full-scale settlement programmes in Sweden-Finland began around 1670 with Lapland governor Johan
Graan advocating agricultural settlement in his county, which he felt could co-exist with traditional
Sami land use (Kvist 1994, p.32; Svensson 1997, p.43). This so-called parallel development theory
would form the basis of much of Sweden's administration of Lapland into the twentieth century as it

51
tried to manage relations between increasingly incompatible modes of land tenure and economic
act1v1ty.
Swedish settlement proclamations in 1673 and 1695 revealed the state's bias towards an agricultural tax
base. As Lapland was ill-suited to farming, and new settlement disrupted a well-established source of
revenue for the state (Sami trade goods) the promotion of farming over herding did not necessarily
serve the states' economic interests. Few southern farmers were interested in settling in Lapland,
despite the incentives offered by the Crown. Full scale colonization in Sweden-Finland would not take
place until the eighteenth century (Kvist 1994, pp.32-34; Sillanpaa 1994, p.39) .
To implement the new settlement programmes, the states began a process of translating their de facto
jurisdiction over the Sami area into ownership under law. Until roughly the mid-seventeenth century
Sweden-Finland and Denmark-Norway had granted some recognition to Sami rights to their lands,
whether as ownership or some other status. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, 'nationalizing' the
Sami through taxation and trade regimes was the best way for the kingdoms to make a claim of
sovereignty. Creating relationships between the crowns and the Sami whereby taxes were paid in
exchange for rights to resources presumed the state's authority over the land. Since 1550 Swedish law
had recognized Sami rights to land and hunting and fishing in Lapland, but this began to change in the
late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Sillanpaa 1994, p.42). In the 1760s Sweden declared land that
had once been regarded as the property of the Sami were owned by the Crown (Kvist 1994, p.33).
A similar pattern of extinguishment of Sami rights to their land through state-sponsored settlement
occurred in Norway. Increased Norwegian settlement took place in the eighteenth century, but was
still largely limited to coastal areas where settlers engaged in trading and fishing (Sillanpaa 1994, p. 45).
The Sami of Norway are divided between those on the Arctic coast who are primarily fishers, and
reindeer herders in the interior. Norwegian settlers in these counties paid land taxes and were

52
considered tenants on Crown land. In the northern counties of Norway, the Sami had paid a 'Lapp
tax' instead of the land taxes paid by Norwegian settlers. Although both Sami and settler lands in the
area were considered crown land, the Sami were granted inheritance rights for the lands they used.
Progressively, these special Sami rights were removed between 1661 (in the county of Nordland) and
1775 (in Finnmark) (Sillanpaa 1994, p.45) . The state claimed that this act extinguished any Sami land
rights.
By the mid-eighteenth century the Sami had lost any pre-existing rights to land and resources, and the
states had asserted their ownership of the region through legal declarations and settlement. Yet, until
1751 there was still no official boundary between Norway and Sweden and the Sami were largely able
to hold off state authority by maintaining mobility. The Treaty of Stromstad signalled the end of the
ambiguous nature of the Sami territory. Land became either the domain of the Swedish or Danish
crown, the Sami became either Swedish or Danish subjects.

Finalizing the Borders (1751-1826)

Sweden had spent the better part of the seventeenth century rising to the status of a European great
power, but was in serious decline at the dawn of the eighteenth century. Russia had re-emerged as a
dominant force in the region due to the internal reforms and military gains of Peter I (the Great)
(Kirby, p.318). In the first half of the eighteenth century Sweden was repeatedly at war with both
Russia and Denmark over territories in central Europe and the Baltic, but these conflicts spread to the
north. The Great Northern War saw Sweden lose Finland temporarily to Russia, and suffer two great
losses in attempting to invade Norway in 1715 and 1718 (Kirby, pp.295-332).

53
Forced to concede its dominant status and seek stability in the region, Sweden negotiated the Treaty of
Stromstad in 1751, which defined the Norwegian-Swedish border (Figure 5 shows this and the
subsequent borders which divided Sapmi). An addendum to the treaty, the Lapp Codicil, is perhaps
the most significant document concerning Sami
territorial rights, often referred to as the Sami
Magna Carta. Many involved in Sami rights
issues today feel that the Codicil does more than
just secure Sami rights of access across the
border. Being an instrument of international law,
Fennoskandia: lmemacional Borders on the Northern Cap
1751 The border between Sweden and Norway finally de<ermined. Norway <ook over Karujok, ~
and Ursjoki on <he nonh side of the
River Tana (Polmak). The rat of the common area went to Sweden.
1809 Sweden pvc up Finland which hearne a Grand Duchy under Russia.
1826 The border between Ruuia and Norway finally determined. The
common areas 10uth :and cas< ofVar.ongcr were shared.
1914 finland's border with the Sovic< Union r<"ised. Pc<samo and Suenjcl ,
which had belonged to Finland since 1918. were lost to the Soviet Union.

some scholars and Sami politicians claim that its
language binds the states of Norway and Sweden
to guarantee the cultural survival of the Sami
(Sillanpaa 1994, p. 47).

Source: 0114r, No. 84, 1975, p. 41.

Figure 5: Borders Across Sapmi

The Lapp Codicil's importance stems from its

recognition, in a legal international treaty, of the right of the Sami to continue to cross the border as
part of their seasonal migration of reindeer herding. The text of the Codicil states:
The Sami need the land of both states. Therefore, they shall, in accordance with tradition, be permitted
both in autumn and spring to move their reindeer herds across the border into the other state. And
hereafter, as before, they shall, like the state's own subjects, be allowed to use land and share for themselves
and their animals, except in the places stated below, and they shall be met with friendliness, protected and
aided .. . (quoted in Sillanpaa 1992, p.6).

The Codicil shows a remarkable level of understanding of Sami interests. This level of commitment to
the survival of the Sami and their way of life would decline in later state legislation. In light of other
state policies at the time, the Codicil must be seen as something of a victory for the Sami. One must
not forget, however, that the border treaty still represented a restriction on the mobility that the Sami
enjoyed before the treaty, though a lesser one than without the Codicil. Stri::imstad established the

54

authority of the states to regulate the migratory activities of the Sami. This opened the door to
increasing state interference in their daily lives thereafter, especially with regard to the regulation of
reindeer herding. The treaty also forced the Sami to choose citizenship in either country, further
fracturing the integrity of the Sami.
On the other side of the Sami territory, the Varanger region continued to be an undefined frontier
between Norway and Russia until1826, with the land south of the Varanger Fjord held in common by
the two countries (Salvesen, pp. 110-112). This region was home to the Skolt Sami, who were not
reindeer herders like those along the Norwegian-Swedish border, but primarily gained their livelihood
from hunting and fishing. In 1826, the Skolt Sami were made citizens of either Russia or Norway,
based on whether they were identified as Orthodox or Evangelical-Lutheran, respectively (Salvesen, p.
112). Other disruptions and separations occurred with the Napoleonic wars in the early nineteenth
century. Finland was ceded from Sweden to Russia in 1809, becoming an semi-autonomous region.
Likewise, Norway became a semi-autonomous region of the Swedish monarchy in 1814 (Sillanpaa,
1992, p. 3).

Conclusion
By the early nineteenth century, the Sami and their land were under the authority of institutionalized
states. Taxation regimes, border treaties, settlement acts, and land proclamations were the
administrative instruments by which the states introduced and strengthened their control, backed up
by coercive threat of force. In this sense, the processes of state-building exhibited in northern Europe
are consistent with those described by both Giddens and Poggi. From a Fourth World perspective,
these processes must be seen as destructive, as well as constructive. Despite the notion of terra nullius,
states never develop in a vacuum. Rather, they are built on top of pre-existing societies like that of the

55

Sami. The history of colonization in the Sami area affirms that the process of state-building is also a
process of nation-destroying.
While the recognition of the Sami as a nation is by no means clear, they were nevertheless a
functioning society with a recognizable culture and forms of social, economic and territorial
organization. It is reasonable to believe that the partition of the Sami, and their incorporation into the
emerging states of northern Europe occluded the development of that disparate and diffuse community
into what we would recognize as unified nation. Indeed, the emergence of a united Sami political
movement has still not overcome their division amongst states, as most activity is still organized on a
country-by-country basis. The nationalizing processes of the states have largely supplanted Sami
identities with Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish and Russian ones.
Their partition by the states impeded the ability of the Sami to constitute an autonomous society and
mount any effective resistance to their assimilation. The states themselves also underwent considerable
change over this period, with their institutions and organization increasingly reflecting concepts of
territoriality originating in the feudal agricultural system of central Europe. Territorial organization
based on exclusivity became increasingly necessary for the states to secure their economic and political
objectives. The expansion of the administrative power of central governments allowed the states to
extend their control to frontier areas for the first time, requiring defined borders. In the period of
peace that followed Stromstad, those borders provided stability which enabled the northern states to
consolidate their sovereign powers through legislation and other institutional processes.

56

Chapter 4:
Expansion of State Sovereignty
Having established their legal authority over the Sami lands and instituted the beginnings of state
administration in the Sami settlement area, the Nordic states consolidated this control in the
nineteenth century. Three dominant social forces of the age, nationalism, industrialization and social
Darwinism, would shape relations between the states and the Sami. Nationalist movements in Nordic
Europe promoted the interests of the majority cultures, while excluding the Sami and others from the
new societies. Social Darwinism provided a scientific rationale for policies which allowed the states to
promote the interests of the dominant culture over the Sami. As they were considered to be on a lower
level in terms of race and culture, the Sami could not have the same privileges as Norwegians or
Swedes, nor could their backwards ways be allowed to stand in the way of economic development.
The Nordic states needed the natural resources of the Sami traditional area. To gain access to these
resources and to create the developed and productive societies they desired in the North the states
undertook a process of dismantling the siida territorial system and replacing it with modern state
forms.
The main focus of this chapter is on the latter half of the nineteenth century, during the height of
nationalism and social Darwinism in the political culture of northern Europe. During this time the
states built on the processes of taxation, settlement, and border treaties described in the previous
chapter to consolidate territorial control over the Sami lands through legislation. Norway, Sweden,
and Finland began comprehensive state administration of reindeer herding management through the
introduction of legislation, which was the primary means of advancing their territorial interests. The
extension of state control over this activity, fundamental to Sami cultural survival, is likely the
strongest example of the states' determination to impose their own view of territoriality on the Sami.
Social Darwinism provided a scientific legitimation for policies which diminished the status of the

57
Sami in order to promote the industrial and nationalist interests of the states. An introduction to the

political environment in nineteenth century northern Europe provides the context in which this
process took place.

Nationalism

The nineteenth century was a pivotal period in the political development of western Europe. The
Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the century shifted many borders, and threatened the
integrity of the vast multi-ethnic empires, such as Austro-Hungary. Riding the wave of liberalism,
nationalist movements began to emerge all across Europe, culminating in widespread revolutions
against the old monarchies in 1848-1850. Nordic Europe was not immune from these forces, as
Sweden played the great power game, losing Finland to Russia in 1809, but acquiring Norway
from Denmark in 1814. Norway and Finland in turn began their own nationalist campaigns to
escape the influence of Sweden.
Nationalist policies were already evident in Sweden and Norway in the previous century with
settlement laws designed to establish a Nordic presence in the northern wilderness and assert each
nation's claim of sovereignty (see chapter 3). Following the Napoleon{c wars, Sweden, Norway,
and Finland could all be termed states, although the latter two were still legally bound to the
Swedish and Russian crowns respectively. With the final borders being established (SwedenFinland 1809-24, Norway-Russia 1826, and Finland-Russia 1829-33) and the institutions of central
government being created in Oslo and Helsinki these once amorphous regimes were truly
becoming modern states (Aikio et. al., p.37; Salvesen, p.123).
The new political units which were taking shape during this period since the Peace of Westphalia
in 1648 were in the form of nation-states, that is, based on an ideal of single national identities.

58

Unfortunately, the ethnic composition of the world has not neatly arranged itself into discrete
and viable groups of nations around which borders can be drawn. Thus, the sovereign aims of one
group often came into conflict with another. Nietschmann reminds us that, "one-nationality
states (the nation-state) are rare (Iceland), while the drive to create on territory and one people out
of many nations and peoples (ironically termed 'nation-building') is a primary cause of half the
world's conflicts" (1985, p.4). The break-up of Yugoslavia was a bleak demonstration of the
tenuous character of states which try to suppress or ignore internal tensions among national
groups. Perhaps because of this artificial basis one should not be surprised that, "more than ninety
percent of all states that have ever existed ended in collapse" (Griggs, 1996).
The question of which nations had the right, or the ability, to achieve self-government has by no
means been straightforward. Achieving political independence has depended on a number of
factors, including a strong national culture, and support from a great power unfriendly to one's
current political master. It was clear, however, that to be a candidate for independence one had to
fit the characteristics of the rest of the club. So-called primitive peoples like the Sami were never
given consideration as nations capable of becoming self-administering, but were instead resigned
to a subservient status, to be cared for (or abused) by more developed cultures. That their
territorial organization differed from the ideal of the state guaranteed that the Sami could not fit
into the international system.
The very process of nation-building needed to acquire or consolidate

~

independence

required the perpetuation of a mono-cultural myth. Other ethnic groups had to be absorbed into
the mother/fatherland. The Sami were just one such national group that became a victim of
determined nation-building. The effects were less in Sweden, which had already established a

59
dominant nation and state, but the political viability of Norway and Finland depended on their
creating strong national cultures.

Social Darwinism

The liberal culture of science and reason of this time encouraged ideas of development and progress in
which "races and ethnic groups were ranked and their cultural state seen as an expression of inherited
traits" (Kvist 1994, p . 34). Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and their respective majority cultures, saw
themselves as taking their place among the culturally civilized and economically developed states of
Europe, and the backwards Sami would not be allowed to stand in their way.
Lawmakers in Scandinavia were very much influenced by the latest views of social Darwinism,
espoused by social philosophers such as Herbert Spencer (Eriksson, G. 1982, p.89). Darwinist theories,
applied to cultural development, gave rise to ideas of a linear sequence of social evolution, with
modern industrial civilization at the top of the ladder. The colonial policies of European states,
notably Britain, have often been seen as reflecting social Darwinist values, as "the Victorians were
confident that their industrial progress indicated a higher level of intelligence for the white race and
they were anxious to find excuses for their conquest of other peoples. The concept of 'survival of the
fittest' was used throughout Europe to "legitimize the policy of displacing other races from territory
which- by the standards of industrial society- they could not exploit properly" (Bowler, p. 190-195)
Social Darwinist thought played a strong role in Sweden and Norway, especially where relations with
the minority Sami were concerned. This situation of Finland is somewhat different as it had been
ceded from Sweden in 1809 to become a Grand Duchy under the Russian empire. Instead of conscious
expressions of superiority over the Sami, an attitude of general neglect towards the Sami seemed to
· prevail in Finland, which in the end had similar results (Korpijaakko-Labba, p.17). It is easy to see how
theories which provided scientific justification for the aggrandizement of the majority culture over the

60
Sami would find a welcome home. Such views were particularly evident in the very forums which
were tasked with guiding state policy on the Sami.
The 1870s mark a distinct shift in attitudes with regard to the Sami from moderate views towards
racial determinism in Sweden and later in Norway. The policies introduced in the 1880s reflected the
racial philosophy of Spencer, and the German evolutionist Haeckel who spurred his country's colonial
movement (Svensson 1997, pp. 100-105). Swedish writers like von Duben and Retzius began a trend in
anthropology that would lead to the foundation of Uppsala's Institute for Race Biology in 1922, which
aimed to keep the Swedish race pure from Finnish and Lappish blood (Beach 1981, p. 279).
Those directly responsible for Sweden's policies regarding the Sami were themselves strong advocates
of such social Darwinist thinking. Growing conflicts between settlers and the Sami prompted the
establishment of the Sami Law Committee in 1882 to develop new legislation to mitigate these
conflicts. An ardent social Darwinist, H.A. Widmark, governor of Norrbotten, was largely responsible
for the work of the committee. Widmark also had the additional incentive of wanting to secure access
to mineral rights in his county by reducing Sami land rights (Beach 1981, p. 79).

The Sami Law Committee's work would lead to the development of special laws to regulate reindeer
herding. Supreme Court Justice Knut Olivecrona was instrumental in drafting the 1886 Reindeer
Pasture Law (RBL). Ostensibly, the aim of the Swedish government at the time was to find a way for
Swedish farmers and Sami herders, fishers, and hunters to co-exist in the northern provinces.
Olivecrona's public statements leave little doubt about the actual agenda ... "Those folk groups which
do not wish to leave the nomadic life must necessarily remain on a lower level of culture, step aside for
the more civilzed settled groups and finally, after a gradually ebbing life, die out ... " and, " ... it is the
duty of the State to encourage the higher civilization and culture which alone has the future in its
arms, which is opposed to the lower culture struggling to its last breath." (Beach 1981, p.311; Svensson
1997, p.102).

61
Racially-motivated policies were equally prominent in Norway, especially in the years leading up to
the dissolution of the union with Sweden. Although it retained a considerable degree of autonomy,
Norway had been forced into a 'personal union' with Sweden in 1814. The factors contributing to the
Norwegian nationalist movement will be examined later. It is clear, though, that racial attitudes which
characterized this movement were of a similar social Darwinist bent. Its assimilationist policy of
Norwegianization was imbued with language opposing European civilization to "Eastern barbarism,
culture versus chaos; law versus anarchy; progress versus 'backwardness; Germanic race versus
Mongolian race, etc." (Niemi, p.75).
Norwegian social Darwinists such as Peder Kjerschow were responsible for recommendations to
eliminate Sami rights to land and water under Norwegian law (Cramer 1994, p.54). Norwegian laws to
regulate Sami reindeer herding were certainly not intended to protect this way of life in perpetuity.
Rather, Norwegian lawmakers viewed herding as "some form of historic anachronism which would
soon disappear in the natural order of progress" and that the laws were designed to cover a "winding
up period" for this activity (Sillanpaa 1994, p.70).

Industrialization

Another factor which must be considered in the formulation of Nordic Sami policies in this period is
simple self-interest. Gaining possession of the lands and resources in the Sami settlement area was a
powerful motivation for the states. The forces of liberalism, nationalism, science, and industrialization
all fed off each other in nineteenth century Europe. While the Nordic states would not undergo the
kind of industrial revolutions that were taking place in England and central Europe, the raw materials
to feed European industrialization were highly valued and abundant in the Sami areas (Kvist 1994,
p.31; Magga, p.14).

62
In all three jurisdictions denying Sami rights to land and resources was materially advantageous to the

state. Sami tax revenues, especially in Sweden (including Finland), had ceased to be profitable by this
time, creating a need to replace that revenue with other sources. Farming by settlers was seen as a
more advantageous source of tax revenue. Finally, clearing Sami title to land allowed the Nordic states
to pursue exploitative resource development in its northern colonies. Mining in northern Sweden and
Norway, fishing in Norway, and Lapland forests in the Grand Duchy of Finland were all handy
sources of revenue for states anxious to take part in burgeoning European industrialization. Accessing
these resources· required the States to secure land rights in the North, and to ensure that activities such
as herding did not infringe on more profitable pursuits (Sillanpaa 1994, pp.44-46) .
Racism and economic self-interest cannot be separated from one another, but rather are mutually
enforcing. As Hugh Beach explains, racial stereotypes provided a legitimation for the policies that
would best benefit the majority population and the governments themselves:
It generally seems to be the case that people let their prejudices form according to what is materially
profitable for them to believe. It is much easier to avoid a lot of ethical dilemmas by enslaving 'smart
monkeys' than by enslaving human beings. Similarly, it is easier to deny ownership rights to Sami nomads
whose brains are proclaimed to be abnormal than to deny such rights to fully developed biological and
'cultured' humans. (Beach 1981, p.278)

The denial of Sami ownership rights in this sense allowed the Nordic states to treat their northern
regions as wilderness or resource frontier, ready for exploitation by the civilized society. Subsistence
activities such as reindeer herding, and the territorial systems on which they are based were relics,
from the viewpoint of the states, and were to be phased out to make way for modern economic
activities.

Nordic Sami Policies in the Nineteenth Century
Given the general attitudes which prevailed towards the Sami in this period, the kinds of legislation
that were developed are unsurprising. Beginning with the assumption that traditional (read inferior)
Sami culture and economy cannot survive of their own accord two administrative policies were

63

possible: assimilation or paternalism. The first strategy sought to encourage the transition of the Sami
from pastoral nomadism to modern economic pursuits. Assimilation was often mixed with some
degree of paternalism, bringing the fading culture under the (often misguided) care of state
administration.
While this combination of cultural displacement and protection may seem contradictory, it must be
stressed that the laws and lawmakers of the time did not aim to save Sami culture for perpetuity.
Rather they sought to reduce conflicts between herders and settlers, and mitigate the inevitable
problems of the transition from herding to more developed economic activities (Sillanpaa 1994, p .64,
p.70). The protection was not so much for the Sami culture, or even the single activity of herding. The
lawmakers saw themselve·s as saving the physical lives of the Sami. The difference between protecting
the Sami as people and protecting the Sami as a people is seen in the words of Swedish M.P.
Waldenstrom, "Those Lapps who become sedentary will continue to exist, those who persevere as
nomads are doomed to die out. No legislation can ever prevent this evolution." (Svensson 1997, p.102).
Waldenstrom does not appear to recognize that a Sami ceases to be a Sami once the culture is lost.
The most obvious way that this underlying racism manifested itself in government legislation was
through the privileging of settled forms of land use (agriculture, forestry, mining) over Sami forms of
land use such as reindeer herding, hunting, and fishing. The herding policies of Norway, Sweden and

.

Finland demonstrate the motives of the states towards the Sami. Norway and Sweden took similar
approaches as the Lapp Codicil and Nordic Union required co-ordination of trans-boundary herding.
Finland, part of Sweden until1809, went in a different direction while it was part of the Russian
Empire.

64

Norway

Norway's policy towards the Sami in the nineteenth century must be placed in the context of its union
with Sweden and increasing Finnish immigration. Although Norway had its own government and
could make its own laws, Sweden played a stewardship role over its affairs. The rise of a strong
Norwegian nationalist movement in the latter half of the nineteenth century is evident in the backlash
against Finnish immigrants. While the nationalist policies of Norwegianization which took place in
this period were primarily targetted against the Swedish overlords and the Kven (Finnish immigrant)
population, the Sami were caught in this tide of ethnic politics and racially motivated legislation
(Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.88).
Since the time of the Lapp Codicil of 1751, Sweden and Norway had shared responsibility over the
movement of Sami herders across the border. The 1814 Treaty of Kiel transferred control of Norway
from Denmark to Sweden. After a brief fight for independence, Norway was forced into the Nordic
Union. Cooperative action on herding was understandably facilitated by joint-rule. Norway, however,
became increasingly reluctant to live up to the terms of the Codicil and sought ways to limit grazing
rights (Salvesen, p.128) . Norway's motivations for wanting to limit Sami herding rights were the same
as Sweden's. As settlement increased in Norway's northern territories, the need to protect the
economic interests of Norwegian farmers, foresters and fishers dominated any instinct to protect the
Sami way of life. The Reindeer Herding Acts (RHA) of 1854 and 1933 were designed to ensure that
herding did not interfere with the development of other "culturally and economically superior" land
uses (Sillanpaa 1994, p. 70) . That social Darwinism was dominant in the Norwegian political climate is
evident from such laws and policies which viewed herding as an anachronism which "would be
tolerated only so long as it did not hinder the development of agriculture" (Sillanpaa 1994, p. 70).
Growing dissatisfaction in Norway with its subservient relationship with Sweden reached a peak at the
end of the nineteenth century. Sami herders became a target of Norwegian nationalism as "Swedish

65
Lapp traffic" was cited as another form of pervasive "Swedish penetration" (Eriksson, J. 1997a, p.88).
The Lapp Codicil, which guaranteed the Sami access to pastures across the Swedish-Norwegian border,
was seen as a tool of Swedish control over Norway. Finland, which had been part of Sweden when the
Codicil was signed, was ceded to Russia in 1809. The border between Finland and Norway was closed
in 1852. Since Sami from Norway could no longer migrate to pastures in Finland, Norway felt it was
getting less benefit from the treaty. "The Norwegians were unanimous in wanting to leave the Union
without any future obligations to Sweden" and this included 'Swedish' Sami grazing on Norwegian
land (Salvesen, p.128).
The influx of Kvener immigrants from Finland to Norway created a further problem for the Sami.
These migrations put increased population pressure on the land base in northern Norway, and fuelled
racial stereotypes which not differentiate between Sami and Kveners. The cultural and language
policies that were enacted to protect Norwegian interests against this foreign invasion were decidedly
assimilationist (Niemi, p.71). Norway's indiscriminate strategy of Norwegianization is evident in a
1902law which granted land ownership only to Norwegian speakers (Skotvedt, p.167).
Attempts have been made to explain away overtly racist policies by claiming they were in the interests
of defence against a security threat from Russian-controlled Finland (Skotvedt, p.167). However,
Niemi contends that "recent historical research has shown that such a menace in reality never existed"
(Niemi, p.72). In other words, the Norwegian government created a scapegoat to justify heavy-handed
assimilationist policies in its northern territories in order to bring the Kvens and Sami into the cultural
fold.
Norway clearly had both a political and an economic desire to force the Sami to assimilate into the
majority culture and abandon their traditional activities. The erosion of Sami land rights and cultural
survival would have likely been carried even further had it not been for the Lapp Codicil and the
Nordic Union. These two legal instruments allowed Sweden to exert some influence in how herding

66
rights would be regulated in Norway. Both nations had a shared interest in limiting Sami herding
rights and strengthening the position of settlers in their northern counties. Norway, however, would
likely have done away with these rights altogether, but was restrained by a more liberal Swedish
government. The result of negotiation between Sweden and Norway was the Joint Reindeer Herding
Legislation of 1883 which placed the first limitations on the transborder migration of reindeer as
stipulated in the Lapp Codicil of 1751. The regulations included, "detailed rules for dividing up the
various areas, controlling the migratory routes along which the reindeer passed, and compensation for
damage caused by reindeer" (Salvesen, p.127; Sillanpaa 1992, pp.10-13) .
When Norway finally secured its independence from Sweden in the dissolution of the Union in 1905,
it was able to pursue a much stricter policy towards the regulation of herding. Norway had already
instituted more restrictive herding regulations in 1897, but they could not be fully implemented while
the terms of the 1883 agreement were operative. Norway pushed to have the terms of the Codicil
abolished, but Sweden would not allow it. The Karlstad Treaty which formally ended the Union
between the two countries included the Convention Relating to the Pastoral Sami Right to Reindeer
Grazing Lands, etc. (Salvesen, p.128; Sillanpaa 1994, p.48). Norway was forced to recognize the rights
of the Sami nomads and cross-border migration continued, but in a much restrictive form. The
Reindeer Convention of 1919, further regulated available pasturelands on the Norwegian side of the
border.

Sweden

The Swedish taxation system known as taxlands had made Sami herding economically beneficial to the
Swedish Crown. The development of agricultural settlement in the area was not seen as a threat to
herding. The government felt that herding and agriculture could peacefully coexist, as each was suited
to different terrain separated by the Lappmark border. But by the end of the nineteenth century, taxes
from herding were insignificant and conflicts between herders and farmers increased. This created a

67

situation in which, "the State, faced with decreasing herder-settler compatibility, might be increasingly
willing to undermine the value of herding rights ... " (Beach 1981, p.311). The policies and legislation
ilL
enacted by Sweden in the 1880s and 1890s show a declining interest /the protection of herding. Instead,
social Darwinism and economic development (more so than nationalism) combined to create a regime
that promoted the interests of agriculture, forestry and mining to the detriment of herding and Sami
culture.
Sweden's policies followed a mix of assimilation and paternalism by protecting some rights to land and
resources only for those Sami who actively participated in herding. Sweden's parallel, or compatibility,
theory created two legal frameworks, one for a Sami livelihood, and one for settled agriculture. The
herding acts of 1886 and 1898 entrenched this economic definition of ethnicity into Swedish law.
Those who participated in a 'traditional Sami' livelihood (primarily reindeer herding) were classified as
Sami while those who pursued agriculture were considered Swedes or Finns (Kvist 1994, p.35). A Sami
could no longer mix herding and farming. The problem was made worse as rights to hunting and
fishing were only extended to Sami herders. Those who had once pursued a mix of activities were now
denied any means to supplement their income (Beach 1981, p.312).
Non-herding Sami, denied any rights or protection of their culture, were generally assimilated into
Swedish society. Herders, on the other hand, remained the only legally recognized Sami, but were
brought under a system of paternalist state control of herding management. The long term effect of
these instruments has been the erosion of Sami culture and identity, and factionalism between herding
and non-herding Sami.
The 1886 Act also affected the structure of Sami territorial organization. As the Act was developed to
reduce conflict between herders and settlers, the boundaries of herding districts were amended in some
cases, and generally 'solidified' (Sillanpaa 1994, p.64) . The relationship between herder, pasture, and
animal was again changed from the system that existed under the taxlands. Herding rights became

68
collectivized. This was contrary to Sami custom as animals had always been the property of individual
herders and their families. The main aim of this collectivization action was to create a legally
responsible entity, the Lapp village, to pay compensation to farmers where the guilty party was
uncertain (Sillanpaa 1994, p.64). The 1886 and 1898 Reindeer Herding Acts also specified that the
Sami's right to the land was usufruct (right of use), not ownership (Kvist 1994, p.36).
The 1898 Act did not so much change the boundaries and territorial systems of herding, as introduce
state-based resource management, which would dominate reindeer herding in the Nordic countries to
the present. New regulations introduced at this time "stipulated the manner of control, number
engaged in herding, scheduling and a number of other aspects of herding operations" (Sillanpaa 1994,
p.64). This was the most paternalist character of state-Sami relations in Sweden, as Sami herders began
to be excluded from the management of their own herds. The Lapp Sheriff administration, which had
been created in 1760 to supervise the taxlands system, now shifted its role. Under the new herding
acts, the Lapp Sheriffs were given the responsibility to settle disputes between herders and agricultural
settlers, and generally enforce the new herding regulations (Beach 1981, p.78) .
The restrictions on Norwegian pasture lands available to Sami herders from Sweden had a significant
impact on herding patterns in Sweden. Following the Joint Legislation of 1883 and the Karlstad Treaty
of 1905, many Sami herders in northern Sweden were forced to relocate southward to find alternate
pastures. As the northern herders practised a much more extensive method of herding than their
southern counterparts, there was much conflict resulting from this movement (Sillanpaa 1994, p.65) .
This upheaval of vast numbers of herders and animals had a much greater disruption to traditional
patterns of Sami herding than the incremental changes that had taken place because of reforms to the
taxlands system.

69
Finland

Finland, until its loss to Russia in 1809, had been part of Sweden and Finnish Lapland had been part of
the taxland system and subject to all other policies of the Swedish Crown concerning land and herding
rights up to that point. Finland, upon becoming a Grand Duchy under the Russian Empire in 1809,
began to experience its own political, cultural, and economic awakening. These developments,
however, were largely at the expense of Sami rights, which were eroded through both general neglect
and conscious intent by the new Finnish administration.
Although technically part of the Russian Empire, Finland enjoyed considerably more autonomy and
liberalism than any other part of the Tsar's domain. Finland retained Swedish civil and criminal law,
and was given its own central administration in the new capital of Helsinki (Klinge, p.57). In effect,
Finland was becoming its own state and thus began the process of building a national identity. The
Finnish language began to predominate in the government and civil service (which had been
dominated by Swedish). Heretofore, Finland had had no national culture or history of its own, distinct
from Sweden. Its new political independence encouraged a growing nationalist movement through the
publication of poetry by J.L. Runeburg and Lonnberg's collection of national myths in the Kaleva/a
(Klinge, pp.63-65). Just as in the case of Norwegianization, creating a Finnish national identity
required the subjugation of other cultures within its territory, namely the Sarni.
The taxlands system, despite its intrusive nature, had at least offered Sami herders in Finnish Lapland
some legal basis for the right to use the land where they lived for herding. Once cut off from Sweden,
the administration of the land system was effectively lost. Records remained i.p. Sweden, and the circuit
courts which had regulated land rights under the taxland system ended. Any registration of Sami title
to their lands was lost (Korpijaakko-Labba 1993, p.17) . There was no reason for the new Finnish
administration to take action to protect these rights, as the elimination of Sami rights to land served
their national interests.

70
Finland's national awakening also included something of an industrial revolution, as transportation
networks of canals and railways were built to promote economic development (Klinge, p.73). Most
significantly for the Sami, the forests of Lapland were seen by Helsinki as the key to the country's
growth. With a rise in the value of wood in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 'green gold' of
Lapland made forestry a more important economic activity than agriculture, let alone herding
(Korpijaakko-Labba, p.18; Klinge, p.77).
As a result of the boom in Finland's forest economy, the Ministry of Forests became the de facto land
owner of public land in Lapland, which included the traditional lands of the Sami. Although no special
legislation was passed on the regulation of herding or other traditional subsistence activities of the
Sami until1898, the forest administration acted to deny land rights to the Sami in order to promote
forestry (Korpijaakko-Labba, p.18) . The cultural distinction between the Sami and Finns in Lapland
began to blur as many Sami went to work in the forests and Finnish farmers started herding to
supplement agriculture.
The traditional siida system in Finland, already largely already forgotten in the legal and administrative
sense, was completely eliminated by an 1898 decree. This decision stated that herders must be
members of a reindeer herding association, or paliskunta, and created new herding districts prescribed
by the state (Sillanpaa 1994, p. 73). To have grazing rights herders were required to be registered in one
of these districts. This arrangement also gave the state the right to limit the number of reindeer in each
district (Aikio 1994, p.17). Just as was the case in Norway and Sweden the objective of this
administrative restructuring of Sami territory was to provide a system of compensation for damage
done by reindeer (Sillanpaa 1974, 73-74). Although herders continued to practice reindeer husbandry
generally in the same areas as before, the territorial system of the siida no longer functioned to regulate
that practice. The new state territorial system took herding management away from the herders
themselves and gave it to government administration.

71

Conclusion

By the end of the nineteenth century the Nordic states had firmly established their own modern
territorial forms in place of traditional Sami ones. The territorialization of the Sami area that began
with the establishment of national borders spread inwards as the states began to extinguish Sami rights
to lands and resources to make way for modern economic production. Dividing the Sami territory
into new discrete and structured units allowed the states to incorporate them into their political
administration. By compartmentalizing herding and assuming control over its management, the states
guaranteed their access to important resources and space for modern economic development in their
northern regions.
These actions left only a tightly regulated form of reindeer herding as the basis of Sami cultural
survival. Assimilationist policies had fractured and destroyed Sami traditional economic activities,
social organization, language and religion, and appropriated their land base for the state or settlers.
Non-herding Sami, denied any legal recognition, became the easy targets of assimilation through
nationalism and economic development across northern Europe.
Herding became the only means by which a Sami identity could survive, distinct from the majority
populations in the Nordic countries. The importance of reindeer herding in this cultural struggle is
recognized as some Sami expressed during the Taxed Mountains case (in which Sami land title was
debated in the Swedish courts): "We conceive of the reindeer as a key factor to our culture. Without
the reindeer our culture is gone, as too little remains then... The reindeer represent an immense value
to us Sami. And I am not thinking of the reindeer as a source of capital, but the reindeer have a value
which is far more than just money." (Svensson 1997, p.ll original emphasis) .
The role of modernist thought is considerable in these processes. Social Darwinism, nationalism, and
industrialism all reflect modernist principles of scientific rationalism, the value of progress, and
hierarchies of culture and development. The promotion of modern forms of territoriality was but a

72

part of this larger pattern. The thinking that dominated state policies in this era would remain
unchallenged until the world wars. The cataclysmic events of the mid-twentieth century would shake
the world's absolute faith in progress. The technologically-driven mass killing of the First World War
and the ultimate horrors of racial ideas manifested in Nazism and the Holocaust would force states to
reconsider such principles. The post-war era would mark a significant change in the relations between
the Sami and the states. Although the motives of the states changed to reflect a greater respect for the
interests of the Sami, the means by which they acted to protect that interests were still based on the
primacy of civilized culture and western science.

73

Chapter 5
Rationalization and Modernization of Herding
Until the twentieth century, despite the many incursions of the state into the affairs of the Sami, the
day-to-day practice of herding was ultimately left to the herders themselves (Bjorklund, pp.77-78) . As
state interests began to change with the decline of agriculture, and with a fundamental shift in the role
of government towards its citizens after the world wars, even this last vestige of autonomy was taken
into the domain of the state. Although the efforts by the states to manage herding were perhaps better
intentioned than the self-serving policies of previous centuries, the results were no better for the Sami.
The three governments attempted to manage herding without a full understanding of the resource
system they were trying to 'fix.' This lack of knowledge was further compounded by a bias towards
scientific solutions and consequent delegitimation of Sami herding practices.
State policies towards the Sami in this period are almost invariably related to the rationalization of
reindeer herding management. Essentially, the states adopted the role of guardians over reindeer
herding (and by association Sami culture) and set their rapidly expanding bureaucracy to work finding
ways to make herding more productive and profitable. That is, government rationalization policies
tried to transform herding into a modern commercial industry in the fashion of Henry Ford's
assembly line.
Rationalization was the common instrument, yet it was employed to achieve a variety of goals. The
objectives of rationalization have shifted over the course of the late nineteenth to twentieth centuries.
At least three different goals of rationalization can be identified over this period: constraining herding,
promoting Sami socio-economic welfare, and preventing overgrazing resulting from a tragedy of the
commons. All of these goals can be viewed in the context of the contradiction between Sami and state
concepts of territoriality. The creation of distinct herding units and associations meant that Sami

74
territories were fixed and bounded just as were states. By acting to improve the economic situation of
reindeer herding without understanding the territorial system upon which it is based, the states
embarked on numerous misguided policies which only served to worsen the situation. Most
prominently, the theory of the tragedy of the commons is a perfect illustration of a modern bias
against unfamiliar systems of territoriality and resource management.
The earliest rationalization efforts evolved from the states' desire to mitigate conflict between herders
and settlers, as discussed in Chapter 4. The transformation of Sami herding units into compensation
collectives can be seen as a first step in herding rationalization. T awards the same goal, measures were
also taken to reduce contact between the two groups. Limitations on herd sizes were imposed with a
view to reducing the extensivity of herding which was causing damage to agriculture in the herding
areas.
As agriculture declined in the North after World War II the states lost the economic incentive in
continuing to promote it over herding. The living conditions in Sami communities also began to be
seen as incompatible with the principles of human rights and equality characteristic of the Nordic
social welfare states. From these considerations developed a new imperative to raise the living
standards of herders by modernizing herding. The added justification that the protection of herding
was vital to the survival of the Sami culture was often cited as well. However, the relationship between
state-prescribed herding and Sami culture is by no means a direct one. The results of employing
herding policies to address issues of Sami culture were often highly detrimental to both.
Finally, since the 1970s and into the current decade, the states have been possessed by the desire to
prevent disasters of overgrazing as predicted in Garrett Hardin's 1968 work, "Tragedy of the
Commons." Hardin's theory postulated that in a commons situation, where people are given free
access to a resource, individual interest will deplete that resource even though that would be against
their common interest. The Sami herding system was not in fact a commons, but this was not

75
recognized by modern states which did not understand the Sami management system and viewed only
their own scientifically-based management solutions as legitimate.
The states' failure to understand or give legitimacy to the Sami territorial system was to severely
damage that system and substitute an artificial state model in its place. As the survival of reindeer
herding and Sami culture generally are largely linked with control over and access to land, these
changes limited the ability of the Sami to be self-sufficient and make decisions for themselves. The net
effect of rationalization policy this century has been to force the Sami collectively into a dependant
relationship with the state and to institutionalize that relationship.
The overwhelming problem with all government rationalization measures, regardless of what objective
they served, is that they interfered with a (still) functioning system of resource management. The
territorial system of the Sami, as outlined in Chapter 2, represented the means by which the
relationship between herd, pasture, and herders had been managed. The dismantling of that system
through centuries of increasing interference by states brought herding to a point where it was nearly
impossible to continue past management practices . When policies were applied to this system without
a real understanding of its nature, or the effects of previous interference, they inevitably made the
situation worse rather than better. The problems that resulted were then used to justify even more
state intervention and the blame was ascribed to the 'stubborn' Sami who refused to give up their
outdated ways rather than to the state's own actions (Beach 1981, p.281).

Rationalization
To understand the thinking behind these policies and the reasons they failed, one must know what is
meant by rationalization. This introduction to the term rationalization, as it is used in the context of
herding management, will also serve to illustrate the various methods that have been used in all three
states. The rationalization methods described below reflect the continuing importance of territory in

76

relations between the Sami and the states. Many methods are directly territorial in nature, such as
those controlling access to pasture or creating fences between herding areas. Others are related to the
fundamental structure of the Sami territorial system by creating territorial units (herding districts) with
the same territorial characteristics as the state but on a different scale. In these ways, the state was able
to co-opt the Sami territorial system, remake it in its own image, and finally integrate it with its own
institutional framework. All of this was done in the name of rationalization, which promised to save
both herding and Sami culture.
In the literature on the herding management the term rationalization usually implies both a western
scientific basis and that the source of rational herding policy is the state. While this has been true for
much of the recent changes to herding policy which is the subject of these works, it must be stressed
that there is nothing inherent in the terms rational or rationalization that makes them the particular
domain of the modern, or the state (Beach 1981, p.286). Sami herding practices can be just as rational
as those advocated by the state. To understand the difference, Hugh Beach's definition of rationality is
of use: " ... what is 'rational' in herd management can refer to any innovation - technical, medical,
organizational and legal- aiding the cause of herding profitability" (ibid.) . The difference between
traditional Sami herding strategies and those encouraged or imposed by the state, is found in the
question of profitability for whom? When examining the herding policies that have been recently
implemented in Sweden, Norway, and Finland, the answer to this question is, invariably, the state.
Despite the various claims to improve conditions for herders, protect the herding industry, or preserve
Sami culture, the economic interests of the state have been foremost in the formulation of any
rationalization policy.
The following list gives a broad overview of the types of rationalization measures that have been
. attempted to regulate reindeer herding. Where possible, some information is included on how such
measures were applied and resultant problems has been included. What is clear from this list is that the

77

measures imposed by the state usually ran counter to traditional Sami herding practices, causing
resistance, alienation, and further erosion of a once functional and adaptive resource management
system. It also is clear that these measures very rarely worked as intended.
Probably the most common form of rationalization, limiting herd size through forced slaughters,
quotas, taxation, etc., has been part of almost every reindeer herding act introduced this century.
Reducing herds has been used to satisfy a number of goals Gimiting incursions into farmland, achieving
maximum efficiency for available pastureland, or preventing overgrazing) . Even before the
rationalization period, limits were placed on herd size in Sweden and Norway to serve political
motives within the Nordic Union in the nineteenth century. When the Swedish government imposed
limitations in 1944 to reduce conflicts with settlers, "many herders preferred to let their animals 'go
wild' rather than pay extra tax or submit to forced slaughter," thus actually increasing the problem of
stray reindeer (Beach 1981, p.319).
Related to herd size, the rationalization of herd composition has been attempted mostly through
slaughter policies to achieve proportions of certain types of deer. To maximize meat production it is
preferable to slaughter calves, as they gain the most weight in the first year without placing a burden
on the pasture. Selective breeding has also been introduced to develop the best mother cows, the best
quality meat, the quickest growing bulls, etc. These measures were initially strongly resisted by Sami
herders as early calf slaughter goes against past practices, and selective breeding is quite an alien
concept (Beach 1981, p.339).
Limiting the number of herders allows remaining herders to be more profitable and aims at the most
efficient number of herders. This is usually achieved by licensing arrangements, association
membership, voting systems, and quotas. The problems of reducing the number of herders to improve
the herding economy or promote Sami cultural survival will be discussed later.

78
The use of fences facilitates extensive herding, and requires less direct control of herds. There is
probably no better symbol for the imposition of a system of fixed territoriality upon a formerly
permeable and flexible one. In all three countries the new state-prescribed herding districts had defined
membership and territory, unlike the traditional siida. It thus became possible to fence off these areas
from each other. Fences were also useful in limiting damage to other land users in herding areas, and
internally to separate seasonal pastures. With this final solidification of territorial boundaries, the
geographic flexibility of the herding system ceased to exist, and the adaptive functions it served had to
be substituted with ad hoc solutions from the state.
The creation of parallel herding districts and herding associations allowed the state to tinker with the
structure of herding units to make the most efficient use of herd, pasture, and herders. A hybrid model
of an economic cooperative replaced the old herding arrangements within the siida. To maximize
efficiency of labour, herding was to be conducted at the collective level rather than based on
traditional relationships between herders. This new situation created a contradiction between
cooperative herding management and individual reindeer ownership which problematized the conduct
of herding activities (Beach 1981, p.327).
The introduction of wage structures have also been used to encourage rational herding. Finnish

paliskunta system follows a wage model, which has also been partially used in Sweden. Because the
practice of herding had been collectivized, an individual reindeer owner could avoid his own herding
responsibilities and still have his herd brought to slaughter with all the rest. By charging owners a fee
per head within the cooperative and from that paying herders a daily wage it was hoped to solve that
problem. This solution caused problems of its own, as a per diem wage meant herders were paid more
the longer the work took, creating a disincentive to efficient herding.
Broadly speaking, the commercialization of the herding industry is perhaps the most systemic form of
herding rationalization. Many government efforts have focussed on making herding into a commercial

79
venture. This has included marketing reindeer domestically and internationally as an exotic delicacy,
the development of export controls, health and quality standards for meat, developing new products,
and measures to increase price for meat. In 1976 Norway nationalized the meat production industry,
with all meat bought by the state at a set price (Sillanpaa 1994, p.76).
Finally, the introduction of mechanization and communications can also be viewed as a consequence
of rationalization. Since the 1960s reindeer herding has been revolutionized by the use of
snowmobiles, motorcycles, walkie-talkies, and even helicopters. Although use of new technology
would likely have been adopted anyway, government loan programs and subsidies accelerated its
introduction. The commercialization of meat production also forced herders to mechanize to keep
competitive and profitable. Government regulation of meat quality also meant the use of modern
slaughterhouses, and other facilities. Use of technology has had many impacts on how herding is
performed, and has also raised a number of environmental concerns such as wildlife disruption and
land erosion (Beach 1993).
The above synopsis of rationalization methods reflects the lack of a defined strategy of herding
management within any of the three governments. Instead, it seems that the measures were adopted
reactively in response to shifting state interests, and as band-aid solutions to problems created by

previous policies. Despite the apparent lack of foresight or a coherent strategy, the actions of the state
clearly indicate their ongoing territorial inclination. As will be seen below, rationalization efforts
contributed strongly toward the erosion of traditional territorial systems and their replacement with
modern state-inspired ones. An examination of the three main phases of state rationalization of
herding management also reveals that the states' territorial bias led them to apply solutions with
unclear or contradictory objectives and without a sound understanding of the system.

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Mitigation of Herder-Settler Conflict
The earliest attempts at herding rationalization can be seen as an outgrowth of earlier state measures to
mitigate conflict between herders and settlers. In the first half of this century the economic interests of
the states were still best served by the promotion of agriculture over herding, as it contributed more to
the national revenue. This would later change as northern agriculture declined after World War II. In
the beginning, however, all three states endeavoured to protect farming by restricting the practice of
herding.
With the decreasing persuasiveness of a purely economic motivation, policies which promoted fixed
forms of land tenure (sedentary agriculture) over diffuse and flexible ones (nomadic reindeer herding)
are further evidence of the states' territorial impulse. Measures taken in the name of rationalization
were designed to keep herding and farming apart, and to direct herding towards forms of land use
more consistent with the territoriality of the state. This was accomplished in two ways: through the
creation of discrete herding units with a single defined membership and territory, and by changing
herding practices to discourage extensivity.
All three states had different organization structures for their herding districts/ associations. 13 Common
to all was the goal of creating physical separation between herders and other land users (agriculture,
but increasingly forestry, mining and other interests) (Kvist 1994, p.36). The boundaries of herding
territories were solidified and codified by the state. Socio-economic structure and territory had finally
become parallel for the Sami as the herding collective was placed on a one-to-one relationship with its
territory. The stated reasons for equation of single territories with single collective herding units was

The boundaries of Finland's palisknta system were created in 1898, and the 1948 Reindeer Herding Act made
the paliskunta into a collective herding association, and its members shareholders in the cooperative. Sweden's
Grazing Act of 1928 gave the state control over the internal affairs of lappby districts. The 1971 Reindeer
Herding Act made lappby into sameby, also adopting a cooperative herding model. (The Norwegian herding act
of 1933 made herding districts legally responsible for damages. The 1978 Act gave the state greater powers to
13

81
to make herding more rational, i.e., the herding process becomes more efficient through collectivescale action, and creating herding relationships based on more rational relationships than traditional
family or small scale social connections (Beach 1981, p.326). The true purpose, though, was to create a
single entity which would be legally responsible for damage compensation within its territory
(Sillanpaa, pp.73-74).
Secondly, the rationalization of herding in the beginning of the twentieth century involved a
movement towards intensive, rather than extensive, herding methods. This is a reversal from earlier
periods when greater extensivity was more rational as it required less labour. Intensive control, was
required to introduce numerous other rational methods to herding. Creating herding associations, each
with a specific territory fenced off from the others, gave the state a vehicle through which to carry out
its herding policies. Limiting extensivity was also an important means to limit herder-settler conflict.
The perception was that greater extensivity in herding results in more animals straying into farmland
and causing damage (Beach 1981, p.318) .
The events of the two world wars caused a dramatic shift in state interests vis

avis herding in the latter

half of the century. Northern agriculture was no longer sufficiently productive to justify government
efforts to sustain it. Instead, ensuring the survival of a healthy herding industry began to make better
economic sense. A growing consciousness of human rights and the status of minorities arose from the
events of the world wars, and forced the Nordic states to look at the situation in their own backyard.

Protection of Herding and Sami Culture
The post-war era is largely recognized as an important phase in the development of the state (Poggi,
pp.109-110). This was truly the age of the welfare state, when government control began to establish

regulate internal affairs within the district) . Finland's system departs most from the traditional siida structure,

82
its presence in all aspects of its citizens' affairs. A number of objectives of the post-war welfare state
directly concern the administration of herding by Finland, Norway, and Sweden. These are: a desire to
ensure a basic standard of living for all citizens, a need to secure state control of resources to ensure
economic development, the need for a stable tax base, and an interest in protecting the rights of
minority ethnic groups. The unifying element in these and many other new areas of responsibility that
the state created for itself in this period, is the belief that control, management, or protection (i.e.,
rationalization) by a central government better serves the interests of the common good.
Therein lies the crux of the conflict. The actions undertaken by the states in the post-war era in
herding management were done not in the interests of Sami herders or Sami culture generally, but for
the benefit of the state or the citizenry. The fundamental problem with state herding policies in this
period is the failure to recognize how the interests of the state as a whole differed from those of its
various subgroups. In justifying new initiatives to rationalize herding management, stated objectives
included raising the living standard of herders, protecting herding, and preserving Sami culture.
Unspoken, but underlying these aims, was the goal of securing access to lands and resources to
facilitate large-scale economic development projects such as forestry, mining and hydro-electric dams.
On the surface, the stated aims seem like worthy and reasonable objectives: having more profits for
herders promotes the survival of herding, the survival of herding promotes the survival of Sami
culture. A more careful consideration of these goals reveals profitability and cultural survival are very
rarely compatible objectives. Because of a lack of understanding of the systems they were rationalizing,
and because a failure to recognize potential conflicts between the various interests involved,
government rationalization efforts quite often had the very opposite effect than was intended.

while traditional structure has been maintained to a degree in Norway (Berg, 83).

83
An example of how these interests can collide is provided by Beach's "The Swedish Dilemma: Sami
Rights and the Welfare State." (Beach 1983). The Swedish government sought to increase the
productivity of herding and provide herders with a level of income similar to those of Swedish
farmers. The solution was to increase the profitability of herding through various rational
management practices (selective breeding, grazing rotation, and calf slaughter) and to reduce the
number of herders, thereby providing a better income for the remaining herders (Beach 1983, pp.1213). Not only did this policy not succeed in achieving its stated objectives, it did serious damage to the
integrity of the Sami in Sweden. As Sami identity in Sweden is defined occupationally under law, those
forced to abandon herding lost the only rights they had. Having to find work outside the Sami
traditional areas, these people were also unable to maintain a Sami cultural identity. Furthermore, to
be a herder under Swedish law required having a grandparent who herded. In this way, once a herder
left the profession it also effectively eliminated his descendants from herding. Reducing the number of
Sami with both de jure and de facto Sami identity in Sweden completely undermined the viability of
the Sami as a whole.
Reindeer herding in Finland illustrates another way in which state policies have different impacts on
herding and on Sami culture, and should not be treated as parallel. Finland's paliskunta system is often
considered to be the most rationalized form of reindeer herding, especially in terms of structural
rationalization. The paliskunta is a legal corporation with its members all being shareholders, with
voting rights weighted by the number of reindeer owned (Ingold 1978b, p.107). Actual husbandry
decisions are left to each paliskunta, but herding activities are conducted towards the production of
meat for a well-developed domestic and export market.
The 1948 Reindeer Herding Act allowed any Finnish citizen, Sami or non-Sami, to practice reindeer
herding as a member of a paliskunta (Sillanpaa 1994, p.74). Thus, herding management policies enacted
by Finland largely avoided the question of protecting Sami culture. Rationalization measures were

84
enacted only as a means to promote herding as a commercial activity. Unlike in Sweden and Norway,
herding in Finland is not reserved as a special right of the Sami. This situation, despite its detrimental
effect on Sami land rights, reveals an ironic difference between the promotion of herding and the
promotion of Sami culture. Although the Sami make up a minority of herders in Finland, a much
greater percentage of Sami in Finland practice herding than in Sweden or Norway, where herding is
reserved as a Sami right (Sillanpaa 1994, p.76). 14 This is because the herding in Finland is more open to
both Sami and non-Sami alike. It is much easier for a non-herding Sami in Finland to take up herding
than in Sweden or Norway, which have restrictive rules for who can be a member of a herding
collective.
Given the growing divergence between the interests of reindeer herding as an economic activity and
Sami rights and culture, treating them as mutually beneficial may actually do serious harm to both.
Some believe that herding should be treated solely as an industry, separate from the issue of Sami
culture (Ingold 1978b, 128). This argument makes some sense as only a minority of Sami actively
practice herding, and in Finland the majority of herders are non-Sami. However, herding continues to
have cultural significance to the Sami beyond the actual numbers of herders, and Sami identity in
Sweden and Norway is recognized only in relation to herding. For these reasons herding cannot so
easily be divorced from the broader questions of Sami culture or rights. The relationship between the
two is not parallel, and state policies which do not recognize the complexity of the connection have
invariably failed.
The development of a strong Sami rights movement in the 1960s and 1970s prompted the governments
to give the Sami more control over their own affairs, holding out some hope that herding could be

About 25-30% of Sami in Finland practice some herding rather, compared with 10% of Norwegian or Swedish
Sami (Sillanpaa, 75). Sami typically have much larger herds than Finnish 'hobby' herders, and 40% of Finland's
herds are located within the traditional Sami areas, 85% of those owned by Sami (Sillanpaa, p.75).
14

85
brought into harmonization with the overall objectives of promoting Sarni rights and culture. Other
developments interceded however, prompting the government to react even more strongly to
rationalize herding.

Prevention of Overgrazing

The philosophy behind government rationalization of herding management since the 1970s was a
product of Garrett Hardin's theory of the tragedy of the commons, published in 1968. The subsequent
acts and policies were enacted with the express intention of averting the kind of tragedy of overgrazing
which Hardin describes (Hardin, 1968). According to the theory, in a situation where pastures are held
in common while animals are individually owned (such as in reindeer pasto;alism), "every single herder
will try to maximize individual gain by putting more animals on the pasture, and this ultimately leads
to overgrazing, diminishing herds and economic loss for all herders" (Bjorklund, p.75). Recent state
regulation of reindeer herding has been based on the belief that individual herders will overgraze
common pastures for their own benefit, to the detriment of the group.
Such a philosophy, and its subsequent adoption within state administration, is tangible evidence of the
states' lack of comprehension for Sami territoriality. The very notion that Sami herding areas are
commons shows the inability of the state to recognize territorial systems other than its own. Lack of
appreciation for the Sami's own resource management has resulted in ill-conceived state regulations in
the name of scientific rationalization of the reindeer industry.
Tim Ingold's 1978 article, "Rationalization of Reindeer Management Among Finnish Lapps" is an
example of this kind of scientific thinking which dominated herding management in the 1970s. This
philosophy sees pastoralism as inherently self-destructive and "ecologically unstable" and requiring
centralized (read 'state') scientific rationalization to prevent catastrophic overgrazing (Ingold 1978b,
pp.104-106). Ingold's scientific perspective is evident from his language:

86
Given that a deer needs to consume 1500-2000kg (fresh weight) of lichen per winter, and that the optimum
productivity of grazed lichen is around 120-160 kg/ halyr, it follows that about 10-12 ha of pasture are
required per deer, or 2 ha per year allowing for a five-year pasture rotation cycle (Ingold 1978b, p.116) .

Such thinking formed the basis of paternalistic herding management policies which were enacted in all
three states during this period (Sillanpaa 1994, 65-75). 15
What Ingold and the state biologists, economists and bureaucrats were reacting to was not Sami
reindeer pastoralism, but a corruption resulting from centuries of state interference in the Sami
territorial structure. The previous chapters of this paper have outlined the repeated incursions the state
has made into Sami territorial organization. The states failed to recognize that that the traditional siida
system was the basis of Sami reindeer herding management. Husbandry decisions, herd composition,
access to pasture, and many other aspects of herding are (or were) integrated into the siida structure.
By undermining that system, traditional herding management began to break down. Yet it was more
convenient for the state to blame the Sami or their ways for this failure than admit to any blame
themselves. Ingold, in fact credits state intervention with actually delaying reindeer pastoralism's
"inevitable self-destruction" (Ingold 1978b, p.123).
Recently, however, there has been a growing opinion among some social scientists that the commons
metaphor is entirely inappropriate for Sami reindeer herding (Bjorklund 1990; Paine 1992; Berg 1996).
The situation which Hardin describes is actually not a commons, but one of free and open access
where there are no limitations on a herder's access to pastureland. This is not the case in the tr; ditional
Sami herding system, however, where the siida acts to regulate access to pastures among groups of
herders (see Chapter 2). As Bjorklund asserts, pastoralism is a situation where ."humanity is mediating
the relation between land and animals, while the paradigm adopted by conventional quantitative-

15

Norwegian Reindeer Husbandry Act of 1978, the Swedish Reindeer Herding Act of 1971, and the Finnish
Reindeer Breeding Act of 1990 (having its origins in a 1973 parliamentary report).

87
oriented science presupposes a social vacuum where the only relation of interest is the one between
animals and pasture" (Bjorklund, p.76).
One of the most important functions (if not the main function) of the siida system has been the
regulation of grazing. The special characteristics of the traditional siida reserved most pastureland for

siida members, involved a complex seasonal migration and division of herds to prevent overgrazing,
and allowed access to herds from neighbouring siida when their own pastures were insufficient. All of
these functions entail human management of the relationship between pasture and herd (Bjorklund,
p.76). Since the situation of open access does not exist in the Sami herding system, that calls into doubt
the appropriateness of the regulations enacted by the states to provide a new form of herding
management. Views of resource management based exclusively on scientific rationalization, such as
tragedy of the commons, ignores this human element. 16
The results of Norway's efforts to avoid a tragedy of the commons and improve the profitability of
herding illustrate the perils of such strategies. The 1978 Reindeer Management Act aimed to halt
overgrazing and raise herding income by reducing both herds and herders. Government subsidies were
designed to replace herding income, but in fact made it unnecessary for herders to slaughter the
animals. The total number of reindeer actually increased from 48,110 in 1975 to 112,00 in 1989 (Berg,
pp.78-79). In this case state actions backfired on a grand scale because the government did not take a
fundamental principle of Sami herding culture into account, that herd surplus is insurance for a rainy
day, or money in the bank.
Despite the misunderstandings inherent in tragedy of the commons theory, there are increasing signs
that reindeer pastures are showing signs of deterioration, but not yet on a scale that could be called a

88
'tragedy' (Berg, p.83). This raises a point of contention among those who reject the tragedy of the
commons metaphor. Debate centres on the question of whether the traditional system of Sami
resource management still continues to operate, or whether it has been crippled by encroachments and
government interference.
Disruptions caused by encroachments and restructuring of boundaries gradually made it impossible for
many aspects of herd management to function. Nevertheless, herders continued to adapt to the new
conditions. The development of the siida from its origins as a hunting organization to various forms of
reindeer herding demonstrate its flexibility and adaptability. Examples of numerous cases of
government rationalization efforts gone awry indicate that external corrections to the system have
been more likely to cause it to break down than any inherent flaws of pastoralism or the recalcitrance
of herders. The cycle of increasing state interference may have reached the point where the traditional
herding system began to break down entirely. Herders, or the system itself, can no longer adapt
quickly enough because the state has assumed so much control of herding management. The herding
system of the Sami is based on the herder regulating the relationship between pasture and animal. If
the herder has been replaced in this arrangement by legislation or bureaucracy, it is unlikely that that
relationship can be effectively managed. Only herders who spends most of their time with their herd,
on the land, can have the necessary awareness and respond quickly enough to maintain the careful
balance between herd size and pasture capacity.
The theory of the tragedy of the commons and the policies which followed it are based on false
assumptions and ignorance about the Sami territorial system and conviction in the superiority of
modern forms of territorial organization. The inability of the state administrations to think beyond

In fact, the situation on which Hardin bases his theory, the English sheep commons, is also misunderstood as
one of open access. The English shepherds had social relationships to regulate access to the pasture, just as the
16

s.lmi.

89
their own concepts of territory prevented them from realizing the value of Sami modes of territoriality
and their own culpability in the breakdown of the herder-herd-pasture relationship.

Conclusion

The failures of government approaches to reindeer herding management indicate that, contrary to
their belief, government bureaucrats do not know what is best for herding or for Sami culture. In
implementing rational herding policies, the states acted to serve their own interests with an underlying
bias towards modern forms of organization. The belief that farming was a more advanced (or civilized)
activity than reindeer herding, prompted governments to promote agriculture over herding even as it
became an economic drain on the state. The very idea that herding or Sami culture could not survive
on its own without the benevolent protection of the state also reveals this bias. Prejudice and
ignorance often go hand in hand. Because traditional systems of territorial organization and resource
management were thought to be 'simplistic' or 'backwards' no real attempt was made to understand
their inner workings. Thus governments had only their own scientific theories to tell them how their
rationalization policies would work. Flawed initial assumptions based on incomplete knowledge meant
they had no real way of knowing the effects their modifications would have in the real world. The
states' efforts to avert a tragedy of the commons, their failure to acknowledge the existence of a Sami
form of resource management, and the role that the territorial system plays in that management, are
classic examples of such misguided thinking.
This chapter presents the natural result of the systematic erosion of the traditional Sami territorial
system through the construction of the apparatus of the modern state. By the turn of the century,
encroachments by settlers and the transformation of Sami territorial models into modern forms based
on fixed and delineated concepts of territory had done serious damage to the functionality of herding.
As traditional Sami herding began to suffer, the states were quick to find the root of its problems
within herding itself, failing to recognize the external forces which had crippled much of herding's

90
adaptive functions. The expansion of state control over herding is consistent with overall trends in
state-building in the post-war era. Seemingly from their own inertia, states vastly expanded their
internal structure and extended their spheres of control over almost every aspect of society.
The impacts of state (mis)management of herding have not only done damage to herding, but have
caused collateral damage as well. Sami collective integrity and culture have suffered due to loss of
autonomy over their own resources, worsening economic conditions in Sami communities, and the
loss of herders and their families to non-Sami areas. State policies have even done damage to their own
interests, as they have had to shoulder the economic costs of supporting herding, developing new
strategies to make it sustainable, and providing welfare support for those forced to leave herding. It is
conspicuous that government rationalization efforts have hurt precisely those interests which they
were meant to serve.

91

Conclusion
The preceding examination shows the tremendous influence that many concepts which are taken for
granted actually have.in practice. At a superficial level, a discussion of culturally-defined concepts of
territoriality may appear to be little more than a theoretical exercise for academics. If one thing is
clearly demonstrated in the experience of the Sami it is that mere ideas can have significant impacts
when they are backed up by the power of the modern state. The ubiquitous presence of the state in all
corners of society allows it to exert profound influence through seemingly innocuous incremental
changes. These actions rarely provoke attention, let alone resistance, until the damage is too far
advanced to halt. Recall Giddens' words presented at the beginning of this paper, "Power may be at its
most alarming, and quite often at its most horrifying, when applied as a sanction of force. But it is
typically at its most intense and durable when running silently through the repetition of
institutionalized practices" (Giddens 1987, p.9).
Unlike the Incas or the Zulus, the Sami did not face the state's open 'sanction of force' through armed
genocide. Instead the Nordic states gradually extended their power over the Sami through the
'repetition of institutionalized practices' such as taxation regimes, border treaties, and especially
reindeer herding policies. One reason that these institutionalized practices were dangerous to the
integrity of the Sami nation is because they were rooted in modern concepts of territoriality which
were incompatible with pre-existing Sami forms. To fully appreciate the significance of this
incompatibility, one can examine the current state of Sami society. Culturally, politically,
economically, and legally the Sami nation has been fractured by territorial borders imposed by the
state.
This paper demonstrates the importance of an indigenous or Fourth World perspective on the
development of the international system. Chapter 1 shows that the dominance of statist analyses in

92
international relations serves to deny legitimacy to indigenous nations, and help perpetuate the
colonial processes by which they came to be incorporated into modern states. Territoriality plays a
significant role in this matter, as the state embodies a universal concept of fixed bounded space which
is too often assumed to be the only way of conceiving territoriality.
The discussion of Sarni territoriality in Chapter 2 discredits this assumption by showing the varied
ways in which territoriality of the Sarni siida system significantly differed from that of the state. Far
from being a homogenous unit, the siida was a complex entity which differed both between different
groups of Sarni, and over time. Nevertheless, the examples of diffuse boundaries, shared land rights,
and seasonal variation mark Sarni territoriality as distinct from the modern territoriality of the state.
Thus, the first condition of the hypothesis, that the two forms of territoriality are significantly
different, is passed. The remaining analysis focuses on the second question: the importance of
territoriality to understanding the relationship between the Sarni and the state. In doing so, it also
reinforces the verity of the first condition.
The expansion of state sovereignty over the Sarni and their partition among the medieval kingdoms of
northern Europe, as examined in Chapter 3, has a very real connection to the Sarni's current struggle
for land rights. From the legal perspective of states, the Sarni hunting, fishing, and herding culture was
not developed enough to constitute land. Only their own '"civilization' - that is, one based on
agriculture" was considered sufficiently developed to acquire land title (Korpijaakko-Labba, pp.8-9) .
The land laws of Sweden (and Finland) are perhaps the most tangible evidence of the existence of the
territorial bias of the state, as they demand that the states must have "defined boundaries" and have an
individual owner to be considered private property (that is, anything else would be considered the
property of the Crown) (Korpijaakko-Labba, p.12). The states continue to use the legal justification
that they took possession of ownerless lands in order to enforce their claim to the Sarni area. The

93

defence that the Sami were incapable of forming a conception of ownership continues to be upheld
today to deny land rights to the Sami.
The incorporation of the Sami into states and their progressive assimilation into majority cultures has
served to fracture Sami identity and supplant it with new Swedish, Norwegian, or Finnish ones. As a
result, the Sami have been prevented from developing into a cohesive political community. Only since
the 1960s have the Sami begun to reintegrate their activities and organization across state borders.
Most of the main Sami political organizations, such as the Sami parliaments, are constituted on a
country-by-country basis. Despite a desire to foster a sense of pan-Sami unity, divisions between
Swedish Sami, Norwegian Sami, and Finnish Sami identities often preclude full cooperation.
At a local level, the transformation of the siida through tax laws, herding legislation and other
instruments of the state has nearly destroyed the old socio-territorial institutions of the Sami. The siida
system represents a mode of territorial organization which was also the means of political, social, and
economic organization. The actions of the state to undermine these traditional institutions and replace
them with state-derived forms impaired the ability of the Sami to determine their way of life and
forced them into a dependent relationship with the state. Chapter 4 describes how the promotion of
agriculture over herding, and the belief that herding was an economically and culturally inferior
activity caused many Sami to abandon traditional subsistence activities. Many Sami were force to leave
their communities to find work and take up employment. Without any cultural connection this
economic transformation became de facto cultural assimilation. In Chapter 5 we see how the effects of
state efforts to save herding and Sami culture actually caused further harm. Because government
actions were based on biased notions of the Sarni herding system, the resulting rationalized herding
industry was not viable without continued state support and was largely stripped of any cultural
relevance for the Sami.

94

Overall these chapters illustrate that territoriality has indeed played a significant role in the
relationship between the Sami and the states. Territoriality, often assumed to be a constant or a nonfactor, is in this relationship a significant variable and has proven to be a useful explanatory device to
understand the development of that relationship. Besides satisfying the second condition of the
hypothesis, the significance of territoriality in this case can likely contribute to an understanding of
other cases. This same kind of analysis could be applied to the colonial histories of other indigenous
peoples. The Sami were well suited to this approach because of the still-existing remnants of nomadic
pastoralism and their partition by four different states. Even cursory examinations of Fourth World
literature indicate that this is not an isolated case, and the territorial concepts of other indigenous
nations have also influenced, and been transformed by, their colonization by states.
As a pastoral nomadic people, the Sami's relationship with the land is the key to all aspects of their
societal organization. The states' rejection (or ignorance) of Sami concepts of territoriality resulted in
the dismantling of the territorial basis of that society. By removing that lynchpin, the structure of the
society was severely weakened, allowing the states to divide up the pieces, and replace previous
structures with their own. These effects are not trivial, nor are they entirely matters of historical
record. The issues outlined above are the fundamental issues with which the Sami are struggling:
political autonomy, rights to land and resources, economic self-determination and herding selfmanagement. Understanding the importance of territorial ideas and biases in producing the current
state of affairs is essential for a just settlement of these matters.
Although it has been argued that the territorial concepts of the Sami and the states have been in
conflict throughout the history of their relationship, this does necessarily mean that conflict is the
only possible result in practice. The experiences examined in this study show that the greatest
problems arose not simply because of the inherent incompatibility of the two concepts but because the
states treated their own view of territoriality as universal and were blind to how Sami concepts

95

differed. The realization that there are differences between these views of territoriality provides hope
that both parties can come to better understand each other and seek ways to mitigate the impact of
those differences.
How then can paying attention to territoriality help to achieve a better relationship between the Sami
and the states, and perhaps compensate for previous harm? The current Sami political movement and
struggle for self-determination could benefit tremendously from a broader understanding of
territoriality. If legitimacy can be given by the states to Sami concepts of territoriality, however the
current Sami political communities choose to define or articulate them, that will go a long way to
ensuring the continued cultural, economic, and political viability of the Sami. The interconnectedness
of the Sami territory, livelihood, and culture makes it necessary for them to have a greater degree of
control over the land to provide a material basis for cultural survival.
The current reindeer herding legislation in all three countries should be revisited to encourage Sami
self-administration of the herding system, insofar as possible in the current circumstances. The
recognition that territoriality can be both flexible and non-exclusive opens up many possible new
territorial arrangements that might be negotiated between the Sami and the states. Instead of seeing
territory as either ours or theirs, cooperative arrangements could be sought to accommodate a number
of different stakeholders, legal regimes and land uses, rather than drawing hard boundaries. Ideally,
such arrangements would promote cooperation rather than competition, since the groups (indigenous
and majority culture) would be working to benefit the same area of land.
While differences between concepts of territoriality have had a negative impact on past relations
between the Sami and the states, this analysis may be a first step in building a relationship where those
differences are recognized and mutually respected. From this basis, the Sami and the states can build a
future where there is space for the values and interests of both.

96

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