POPULISM AND BROKERAGE POLITICS:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE
COOPERATIVE-COMMONWEALTH FEDERATIONNEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY
AND THE
REFORMPARTYOFCANADA

by
Robert Jason Morris

B.A., Simon Fraser University, 1995.

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS
m

POLITICAL SCIENCE

©R.obert Jason Morris, 1997
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
April17, 1997
All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or
other means, without the permission of the author.

11

ABSTRACT
The concepts of populism and brokerage politics have been applied to many different
settings, movements, and political parties. Their definitions, culled from a critical analysis of
relevant books, scholarly journals, and newspaper and magazine articles, are applied to two
different Canadian political parties, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation-New
Democratic Party (CCF-NDP) and the Reform Party of Canada. This application provides an
interesting comparative examination of the organization, policies and Constitutions of both
parties. It highlights the relationship between the two concepts concerning how a populist party
can become a brokerage party due to pressures such as those experienced when in power. The
application also displays the limitations with the definitions of populism and brokerage politics
that make it difficult to characterize definitively any political party as populist or brokerage. The
CCF-NDP and the Reform Party are neither completely populist nor brokerage.

From this

finding emerge several options for the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party to consider regarding
their future.

U1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract

11

Table of Contents

Ill

List of Tables

lV

Acknowledgements

v

INTRODUCTION

1

Chapter One

Populism and Brokerage Politics

2

1. Populism
2. Brokerage Politics
3. Conclusions

2
10
15

Populism, the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party

17

1. The Common People
2 . Power Blocs
3. Conclusions

18
24
39

Brokerage Politics, the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party

41

1. Policy Reversals
2. Expulsions and Party Discipline
3. Accommodation ofMaterial Demands
4. Conclusions

41

Chapter Two

Chapter Three

Chapter Four
Bibliography

Conclusions

43

51
57

59
64

IV

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1

Populism and Brokerage Politics Compared

16

v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Upon completion of this work, I wish to thank my professors at the University of
Northern British Columbia for making my studies so enjoyable. I a~ particularly grateful to my
thesis committee and its supervisor, Alex Michalos. I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Bob and
Arlene Morris, to my Grandfather, Bob Morris, and most importantly, to my wife, Rebecca.

INTRODUCTION
The Cooperative-Commonwealth Federation-New Democratic Party and the Reform
Party of Canada have been discussed and written about from many different perspectives.
However, the current understanding of both parties is enhanced by comparing them in the
context of populism and brokerage politics.
Chapter One sets out the tenets of populism and brokerage politics. Populism is then
applied to the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party in the second chapter. This application illustrates
the inherent limitations of populism, concentrating on the ambiguous nature of the common
people and power blocs. These limitations hinder definitive classification of the CCF-NDP and
the Reform Party as populist or not.
Similar findings are reported after applying brokerage politics to both parties in Chapter
Three. Alternative explanations for specific charges of CCF-NDP and Reform Party brokerage
aspects make it difficult to label decisively either party as brokerage or not. As well, political
rhetoric is a significant contributor to perceptions that certain parties are brokerage.
The conclusions presented in Chapter Four sum up the problems with classifying political
parties such as the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party as completely populist or brokerage. Those
findings that do target specific instances of populism and brokerage politics in both parties are
qualified by noting the disadvantages of comparing the CCF-NDP to the Reform Party. The
relationship between populism and brokerage politics is also discussed. Populism is considered
morally superior to brokerage politics. Brokerage politics is something that political parties can
devolve into when their populism dissipates. The sum of the research suggests the future options
for both parties.
This thesis represents an important contribution to Canadian political science. First, it
plainly defines populism and brokerage politics. Second, it illustrates the limitations with the
concepts of populism and brokerage politics by applying them to two case studies, the CCF-NDP
and the Reform Party. Third, this thesis develops a better understanding of the nature, history,
policies, organization and operation of the CCF-NDP and the Reform Party of Canada.

2

CHAPTER ONE: POPULISM AND BROKERAGE POLITICS
1. POPULISM
Populism is an ambiguous concept, having been applied to everything from Maoism to
Ronald Reagan's political style. I It has been indiscriminately used to describe such disparate
groups as North American cash-crop farmers and the narodniki of nineteenth-century Russia, as
well as to twentieth century rural and urban movements in Africa, Asia and South America.2
Populism is consequently a highly general concept that needs qualification. Nevertheless, the
features generally noticed when one uses the word "populist" can provide a suitable definition.
Populist political parties tend to arise in opposition to perceived minority elite groups in
which they feel power is concentrated. Such "power blocs," according to populists, always act
in their own self-interest to the detriment of ordinary citizens, the "common people" (defined
below).3

For this reason, populists blame the power blocs for the problems they identify.

Populists thus often locate power blocs outside the local society in which they live, to avoid a
conflict in defining themselves against their enemies, and to allow them to exaggerate their
malevolence. 4
Populist parties have identified numerous groups and institutions as power blocs,
including monopoly industry and finance, millionaires, industrial labour unions, interest groups,
elected officials, and even bureaucrats. This broad range of targets makes the use of power bloc
acceptable to describe them. A narrower term runs the risk of excluding potential power blocs
identified by populist parties, by not allowing for their special characteristics.

The prime

example of a Canadian power bloc is Central Canada, according to many Western Canadians.
Indeed, since the establishment of John A Macdonald's National Policy in 1879 that seemed to
make the West an agricultural hinterland for the export of resources to Central Canada, the West

1David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,

1990), 14; Andre Blais and Elisabeth Gidengil. Making Representative Democracy Work (Ottawa: Minister of Supply
and Services, 1991 ), 19.
2Peter R. Sinclair, "Class Structure and Populist Protest," in Riel to Reform, ed. George Melnyk (Saskatoon: Fifth
House Publishers, 1992), 198-199.
3Roger Gibbins, Conflict and Unity (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1994), S-6.
4 M.J. Bateman et. al., "Mad as Hell," in Braving the New World, eds. M.J. Bateman, Manuel Mertin and David M.
Thomas (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1995), 73, citing Peter McCormick, "The Will of the People," in
Canada and the United States, ed. David Thomas (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1993), 189.

3

has been a seedbed of populist movements blaming Central Canada for their problems. 5
However, what is considered a power bloc by populists, could be more perception than reality.
The alleged minority elite power bloc may not be a minority, nor be composed of elites, but
nevertheless is viewed this way by populists. Populist parties keep the defmition of power bloc
deliberately too broad, to cover its inconsistencies, and to appeal to a broader range of people. 6
As well, populists assume that their targeted enemies form a homogenous group. For
example, the Alberta Social Credit party of the 1930s identified banks and bankers as a power
bloc. Yet, it is inaccurate to assume that every banker was against the common people. Surely,
some common people work at banks. Furthermore, bonafide members of power blocs could
perceive themselves to be of the common people. The tension produced by a blurred distinction
between populists and power blocs may hamper the effectiveness and longevity of populist
parties.
Nevertheless, with power blocs not trusted, populism maintains a faith in the common
sense and ethical wisdom of the common people. The common people are all those outside the
power blocs who are not part of these scheming big interests. The common people have been
historically defined in an agrarian sense, a definition that has broadened to include modem
industrial workers.
Originally, farmers were seen as being most genuinely of the common people because
they fed and thus supported all the others.7

They did not use their capacity to exploit

opportunities and make money. Instead, they were content with honest industry, independence,
a frank spirit of equality, and an ability to produce and enjoy a simple abundance.s This agrarian
myth of the nobility of farmers encouraged these people to perceive themselves as separate from
the order of business enterprise and speculation that flourished in the cities. Rather, farmers
were the innocent pastoral victims of a conspiracy hatched in the distance by a power bloc.

5Chris Adams, "The Reform Party and the Roots of Western Protest," in Canadian Politics 91/92, eds. Gregory S.
Mahler and Roman R. March (Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., 1991), 175.
6Richard Hofstader, The Age ofReform (New York: Vmtage Books, 1955), 65.
7Laycock, 74.
8Laycock, 27; Hofstader, 8, 23 .

4

From this myth, the populist notion of an innocent and victimized populace was born that
continues with the contemporary meaning of the common people. 9
The common people are now defined in more industrial times as those outside power
blocs.

Consequently, the common people are free from the taint of corruption and class

privilege of the power blocs. In characteristic populist style, the common people are endowed
with common sense and a heightened notion of justice.10
Populism accordingly views the common people as virtuous such that they need only to
make their will effective for economic and social progress to follow.11 Thus, a party need only
to listen to their concerns to solve the problems of the country. They should avoid engaging in
political education that tries to teach the common people how their country should be. Power,
then, must be returned to the common people to ensure prosperity and a humane society.12 In
this sense, populism maintains a strong faith in democracy by advocating the political supremacy
of the will of the common people. This can best be achieved through a "direct" relationship
between the common people and leadership, unmediated by political institutions. 13 A populist
democracy then, is one in which the citizens control the legislator and actively engage in the
legislative process themselves.

This goal could best be achieved with direct democracy

(techniques advocated by the 1890s Populist movement in the United States). Direct democracy
would supposedly bring the full force of the popular will into a political arena needlessly
complicated by power blocs that ignore the common people. 14 In like fashion, then, central
planning can conflict with populism. Even when, in democratic versions, the central plan is
periodically ratified by the electorate, this system places too much authority in the hands of elite
planners. Populists fear that planners are not sufficiently accountable to the common people,
and could become corrupt.
9flofstader, 35.
10r.,aycock, 33 .
11 W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967 [1950]), 15; Blais and
Gidengil, 19.
12Robert Lapper, Populism in British Columbia (Victoria: University of Victoria, June 10, 1991), 6.
13 Sinclair, 199; Margaret Canavan, Populism (London: Junction Books Ltd., 1981), 58; Blais and Gidengil, 19.
14Walter D. Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), 10; Laycock, 37; David
MacDonald, "Referendums and Federal General Elections in Canada," in Democratic Rights and Electoral Reform in
Canada, ed. Michael Cassidy (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 303 .

5

Nevertheless, there are two problems with any definition of the common people,
concerning who is designated by this term, and its assumption of substantial consensus on key
issues among the common people. First, the common people could include almost everyone.
Indeed, a serious flaw of populism is that the notion of the common people, while providing a
fine rallying cry, lacks any precise meaning.

The common people can refer to farmers,

producers, consumers, non-elites, the electorate, to the nation, to everyone except one's political
opponents, or to no determinate group at all. 15 Just what do populists mean by the common
people? Who do they include and exclude?
While populist movements rarely explicitly define what they mean by the common
people, they mean something limited. The Russian narodniki, the peasant parties of Eastern
Europe, and the U.S. People's Party, all claimed to speak for the common people. However, by
this they meant something more restricted and definite than "everyone." Each had definite
commitments that could not be easily discarded to gain support. 16 It seems then, that who to
include as the authentic common people is left open to interpretation by potential supporters.
Instead, precisely defining the common people depends on ascertaining who supports (or has
supported) individual instances of populist political parties. This makes it difficult to determine
whether there is a critical size required before a group can be called the common people. Still,
part of the ambiguity with defining the common people is because they are not usually viewed as
a group. To think of them this way would make them seem to be a power bloc (which they
might be). As a rhetorical device then, to show they are somehow considering the interests of
each common person, populist parties try to set themselves up to listen to the common people as
individuals. This requires ignoring their various group memberships.
A second problem with defining the common people rests on the naive assumption that
this group thinks alike. Populist movements tend to assume that the common people are a
harmonious majority interest, united for like reasons against a power bloc. Yet, except in a
small, homogeneous society, the common people are diverse and may disagree on many issues.
In this sense, a coalition of the common people is rare, emerging only in times of war or another
15Canovan, 261 , 294-295 .

16Ibid., 274.

6

perceived grave crisis. Consequently there may be some overarching interests shared by almost
everyone, but these are more the exception than the rule; widespread agreement is unusual. 17
Considering this political pluralism, the populist dream of consensus about policy matters
seems illusive.1s Nevertheless, it is precisely this vagueness in defining the common people
(however divided they might otherwise be) that serves to unite them under a single, populist
banner. Thus, a main function of appealing to the common people is to gloss over existing
political divisions and to propose a coalition. 19 Populism then, is akin to a methodology or
process for discovering the will of a broad majority of people willing to unite under the general
rubric of the common people to overcome a perceived common enemy.20
In this sense, populism is not an ideology in the sense of fixedly occupying a particular
space on the political spectrum. Populism is not distinctively "conservative" or "liberal" then,
for example, although it can be at certain moments when these terms describe the common
people under scrutiny. This explains why so many disparate groups have been termed populist,
since its numerous manifestations are based on whatever happens to be "the common sense of
the common people" at a particular time and place. 21 The "common sense" is really a common
cause or purpose to which everyone in this group is committed. Of course, the ideological mood
of the common people can change. Thus to remain populist, a political party would have to
adjust.
Furthermore, populism can bring together different ideologies when the main focus is a
perception of opposition between the common people and a power bloc.22 Thus, populism can
appeal beyond ideological boundaries to individuals who perceive a kind of overarching sociocultural antagonism between themselves and some perceived or real power bloc.2 3 In this way,
populism represents an attempt to create a mass political movement, mobilized around symbols

17Tom Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave (Toronto: Stoddart Books, 1995), 26.
18Flanagan, 27; John Geddes, "Populism Stalls True Reform," Financial Post, 18 March 1995, 26.
19Canovan, 262.
2Dflanagan, 2-3.
21 Ibid., 22.
22 Ibid., 137.
23 Ibid., 16.

7

and traditions congruent with some relatively popular culture, that transcend ideology in favor of
expressing a group's perceived sense of threat from a power bloc. 24
A personable, strong, even messianic leader, someone who appears capable of uniting the
common people and seems to embody their concerns and ideals, is often required to bring the
different common people together. However, it is one thing for a leader to stand on the pulpit
and profess populism, but another to be really populist. William "Bible Bill" Aberhart claimed
to represent the common people, but kept tight control of the Alberta Social Credit party of the
1930s, even abandoning his populist promise of direct democracy. 25 Likewise, Juan Domingo
Peron, president of Argentina (1946-1955 and 1973-1974) enjoyed massive support of a populist
variety. Yet, Peron admired Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, acquired power through force, and
never hesitated to use force against the common people to maintain power. 26
There is more, then, to being a real populist leader than using an appeal to the common
people as an element of political strategy and rhetorical style. The populist leader's faith in the
common people must extend beyond crude symbolic mass manipulation that later becomes a
dictatorship over and against the common people. 27 The populist leader must represent the
common people more than lead them or enforce their subjugation.
However, a problem develops for populism in requiring a strong leader to help bridge
ideologies with an appeal to the common people. Populism risks bringing together the worst
parts of several views or ideologies. Thus, populism is often described as having a dark side. In
exhibiting a distrust of the educated members of power blocs and rising against their "betters,"
populists claim that whatever the common people want must be right. The fear, then, is that
populism can create a climate of absolutist enthusiasm bereft of compromise. The resulting
tyranny of the majority could entail the sweeping aside of bureaucratic professionalism,

24 Trevor Harrison, OfPassionate Intensity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 5.
25Canovan, 102. Huey "Kingfish" Long, 1930's governor and Senator for Louisiana, appeared populist, yet he was a

cynical manipulator who used this appeal to gain wealth and power, had no respect for law or constitution, and made
himself virtual dictator until assassinated.
261bid., 145; Microsoft (R) Encarta (Microsoft Corporation, 1994).
27Laycock, 15; Pierre-Andre Taguieff, "Political Science Confronts Populism," Telos 103 (Spring 1995): 15, 21 ;
Laycock, 15; Canovan, 261.

8

constitutional restrictions, human rights, and even due process of law.28 An unaccountable and
self-interested elite power bloc might be replaced by an unaccountable, self-interested and
demagogic coalition of the common people. Considering the dark side, then, it is crucial that
populist leaders know how to prevent populism from developing racist or other extremist
overtones.29 However, such actions might take the populism out of the coalition.
Populist parties are supposed to welcome controversy in order to bring unheard feelings
into the open.3°

This is because a populist party's initial success depends on it offering

something different. It cannot succeed simply by attaching itself to established ideas already
espoused by the other parties. In this sense, populist parties, even if they appear radical, can be
an important source of policy innovation.
Furthermore, in calling for "extreme" changes, populist parties also appear unwilling to
defer to the established system of representative government and the accompanying party system
that allegedly ignores the common people.31 Indeed, one of these "radical" changes that many
populist parties have called for is direct democracy that is largely incompatible with the
traditions and conventions of parliamentary democracy.32
Still, while populist movements have the capacity for extremism that can prevent them
from getting broad support necessary to win elections, they also have the potential to moderate
ideologues. In other words, "grassroots" views or views espoused by great numbers of people
can also serve as a moderating or tempering force in devising policies. This is because the
common people can have common or broadly shared and non-extreme views. 33 Therefore,
sometimes the political instincts of the "unwashed masses" are more moderate than their selfappointed spokespeople and would-be liberators. 34
28Canovan, 183, 203; Hofstader, 17. Such trampling of minority rights occurred in the United States, where the
populist 1840s Nativist movement burned convents and harassed nuns, believing that Roman Catholicism was an
international conspiracy orchestrated by the Pope. Later on, McCarthyist action against Communists in the 1950s-massively popular among Americans at the time--was made possible by the populist quality of U.S. political culture.
29preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: John Deyell Company, 1992), 25 .
30 Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, Storming Babylon (Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 1992), 144; Flanagan, 126.
31Canovan, 184; Paul Piccone, "Postmodern Populism," Telos 103 (Spring 1995): 76.
32MacDonald, 306.
33 Manning, 25.
34Canovan, 257; Christopher Lasch, The Revolt ofthe Elites (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1995), 27.
After all, a lot of the Nazi SS elite reputedly held Ph.D.'s.

9

Nevertheless, because populist movements are open to so many different strains of
thought, because they generalize about and stereotype power blocs, and because they
intentionally resist precisely defining the common people, they have traditionally not lasted long
and frequently imploded from internal conflict. 35 In this sense, populist parties seem to have a
relatively short lifespan. They attempt to fulfill a purpose and often die trying. To them, then,
politics is about more than being elected. The goal for populist parties is to represent people and
interests that the other parties have ignored, and try to effect change according to those concerns.
Thus, they may influence (or govern) the political paradigm for a time, but then usually die after
their job is done. 36 Of course, though, it is possible that a populist party could continue to find
new external threats with which to maintain its support and continue its mission.
In summary, despite populism being an amorphous concept, a general characterization is

attainable that can be applied to determine whether a political party is populist. One necessary
condition that a political party must exhibit to be considered populist is confidence in the
integrity, judiciousness and fairness of the common people. A party unwilling to trust the
common people only represents an elitist power bloc. In this sense, another necessary condition
for a populist party is that it maintains a strong faith in democracy by advocating the political
supremacy of the common people. Furthermore, it is necessary for a populist party to mobilize
the common people against a perceived outside threat of a power bloc. It also seems necessary
for a populist party to be quite generous or vague in its specification of the common people. The
clearer one is about who is or is not among the common people, the easier it becomes to target
them as a special interest group, and hence, a power bloc. Finally, populist parties have a
relatively limited lifespan. If the party can keep finding new populist moods or common causes
to champion, though, this condition may not apply. As well, while most populist parties have
been led by charismatic leaders, they could conceivably manage without one. Nevertheless,

35For example, in the United States, the People's Party (1892-1897) lasted long enough to give the American political

establishment a severe shock but then quickly faded away after the Democratic party undercut its support with a
candidate of populist style. Likewise in Canada, the Progressives of Alberta won enough seats in the 1921 Parliament
to form the opposition but were co-opted by the Liberal Party.
36Fianagan, 23 . Brokerage parties can steal a populist party's thunder that effectively kills them.

10

despite this elaboration, our concept of populism becomes a bit hazy when the concept of
brokerage politics is considered.
2. BROKERAGE POLITICS
The meaning of brokerage politics has often been taken as a "given" when discussing
other matters such as specific political parties. As well, brokerage politics is usually discussed
regarding the negative consequences for public policy and the political system that result from
its operation. Nevertheless, a plausible definition of "brokerage politics" can be ascertained
following a discussion of the general characteristics usually designated by the phrase.
Canada has always been a society beset with regional, cultural, religious and linguistic
diversity. Because of this pluralism, successful political parties have been those able to support
a wide variety of ideas and adherents. 37 Canada's federal political parties then, have been forced
to offer a little to everyone in all parts of Canada to avoid polarizing society and forfeiting
power.38
In this sense, the major political parties have, perhaps unconsciously, taken on an

additional role of social integration to get elected. Political parties realize there is a need to
harmonize and accommodate Canada's many cleavages into a stable voting coalition.39 In doing
so, they perform the daunting and heroic task of maintaining social stability in an otherwise
divided polity.40 The brokerage party then, aggregates a wide range of interests into a voting
coalition that serves an integrative function for the political system.4 1
This is such a difficult task that brokerage politics is not always successful.

To be

successful, brokerage parties must therefore be selective regarding the many interests they target.
Consequently, the number of voters within each group is relevant in determining whether an

37W.L. White, R. H. Wagenberg, and R.C. Nelson, Introduction to Canadian Politics and Government (Toronto:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Limited, 1990), 85.
381bid., 88.
391bid., 87.
40Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen," in Canadian Parties in Transition, eds. A. Brian
Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1996), 61.
41 Gibbins, p 364-365 .

11

interest will be accommodated. The brokerage party targets the biggest interests first, and
minority interests can be overlooked.42
Those playing the game of brokerage politics may lose their credibility if enough small
groups are repeatedly ignored. Consequently they may find themselves unable to hold together
potential coalitions. Brokerage politics is inadequate, then, when otherwise "normal politics" is
marked by severe disruptions, times of turbulence when the federal political parties find
themselves unable to generate a broad coalition under a single party banner. 43 For example,
Canadian federal political parties did not appear to be effectively responding to the social and
economic effects of the Great Depression.

The resulting vacuum of leadership spurred the

creation of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) that concentrated on helping
Canadians manage during this difficult time.

In turn though, brokerage parties clamor to

transform themselves into the terrain of the changed political landscape.44 Thus, following the
Depression, the federal Liberal Party "borrowed" many of the CCF's ideas to restore equilibrium
to the brokerage system and to build a viable electoral coalition.
Brokerage parties though, in constantly adapting to stay alive and avert coalition
breakdowns, have not strictly adhered to an ideology.

To do so could limit the amount of

interests they are able to bring together that would ultimately reduce electoral success.45 Thus,
insofar as political parties act as "brokers," they are essentially behaving like similar
organizations opportunistically appealing to a variety of interests. Consequently, ideology may
fail to distinguish either the party or its policy positions.46
Yet if ideological labels have to be attached, then brokerage parties could be called
"centrist" (i.e., the less in particular they stand for, the more people can be accommodated) for
occupying the middle of the political spectrum. Such centrism appeals to the largest groups in
society that ensures electoral success. In contrast, populist parties, with controversial policies
42Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis, Challenge and Change (Ontario: Methuen Publications, 1980), 4. There must

be a critical size for attention, which explains why Western separatists are ignored but not Quebec separatists.
43 Brodie and Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen," 62. For example (with redistribution), when the larger group feels
overtaxed.
44R.K. Carty, "Three Canadian Party Systems," in Party Politics in Canada ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (Ontario: PrenticeHall Canada, Inc., 1991), 133; Brodie and Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen," 63 .
4 5White, Wagenberg, and Nelson, 86.
46 Brodie and Jenson, "Piercing the Smokescreen," 59.

12

and a dark side, do not covertly target as many distinct interests as possible to increase their
support. They deliberately exclude interests that are considered connected to power blocs, and
can target the smaller, less powerful interests that brokerage parties ignore.
Brokerage parties, however, can swerve to the "left" or the "right" of the political
spectrum with the twists and turns of public opinion. Still, they never veer too far in either
direction to avoid losing the support that keeps them in power.47 Immortality is the aim, to win
as many elections as possible. Therefore, brokerage parties do not exhibit the relatively limited
lifespan characteristic of many populist parties. Likewise, then, brokerage parties differ from
populist parties concerning power versus change.
Brokerage parties consider achieving power to be the primary aim.

They are solely

dedicated to assembling coalitions of voters (whatever these people demand) to deliver them to
office: In contrast, populist parties tend to put effecting change ahead of winning power. In this
sense, brokerage parties, unlike populist ones, tend to accept the legitimacy of the current
political system (that is in large part designed to maintain their supremacy). They are thus
hesitant to advocate major system reforms.
Nevertheless, this pragmatic flexibility is often criticized for representing a politics of
convenience. Really, brokerage parties behave as if they are predominantly concerned with
doing whatever it takes to keep the ship-afloat. Thus, they constantly compete for the same
policy space and the same votes, and are seen as failing to provide much choice for voters.
Brokerage parties then, are similar "catch all" political parties often indistinguishable from one
another, like Tweedledum and Tweedledee.48
With few major differences between the brokerage parties (e.g., the Progressive
Conservatives favored a Canada-US Free Trade Agreement in 1988 while the Liberals worked
on extending the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1993, and both of these parties in
47H.D. Forbes, "Absent Mandate '88," in Party Politics in Canada, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (Ontario: Prentice-Hall

Canada, Inc., 1991), 255.
48Forbes, 256; Paul G. Thomas, "Parties and Regional Representation," in Representation, Integration and Political
Parties in Canada, ed. Herman Bakvis (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 193 . In one survey,
63% of respondents stated that political parties do not offer choice in elections because their policies are similar.
Harold C. Clarke and Allan Kornberg, "Evaluations and Evolution," Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVI: 2
(June 1993): 291.

13

1996 favor giving Quebec "distinct society" status), a negative consequence is the apparent
inability of Canada's party system to innovate and find solutions to new problems. 49 Since the
brokerage parties all offer similar platforms, they have become concerned mainly with
electorally salable images and quick fix solutions to ensure that voters choose them instead of
their near-identical competitors. 5o
Brokerage parties then, are afraid of new ideas and hesitate to enunciate clear policy
alternatives during election campaigns. This is because they are afraid of making mistakes that
could exacerbate the country's cleavages and cost them support. They thus engage in little more
than incremental short-term tinkering with their policies (in contrast to populist party platforms)
that can deprive the political system of an essential source of policy innovation. 51
With scant policy differentiation, brokerage parties often depend on accommodating
material demands, on making electoral appeals based on uncorrelated promises to various
groups. 52 In other words, brokerage parties often owe much of their success to the dispensing of
patronage, perks and pork barreling to the various areas or groups among which they seek
support. They become, in trying to be all things to all people, Santa Claus political parties
specialized in the distribution of election goodies with clear short-term payoffs and often
unexplained long-term costs. Indeed, the fiscal distress of the Canadian state regarding the
deficit and debt problem is partly attributable to the pathological brokerage system.53
When brokerage politics concentrates on gaining support from coalitions through various
promises, party loyalty is weakened.54 Unable to see fundamental differences between the
parties, voters have few reasons to develop long-term attachments. 55 This is because brokerage
politics does not tie voters in any stable way to parties, such as by ideology, principles or
49John Meisel, "The Dysfunctions of Canadian Parties," in Party Politics in Canada, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (Ontario:

Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1991), 244.
50porbes, 256. Policies taking more than one term to work, such as free trade or debt reduction, are consequently
avoided.
51 Forbes, 256; Joseph Wearing, Strained Relations (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 228; Maureen Covell,
"Parties as Institutions of National Governance," in Representation. Integration and Political Parties in Canad!!, ed.
Herman Bakvis (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 69.
52Forbes, 69.
53 John Deverell and Greg Vezina, Democracy. Eh? (Toronto: Robert Davies Publishing, 1993), 30.
54Meisel, 244; Elisabeth Gidengil, "Canada Votes," Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science XXV: 2 (June 1992): 231 ;
Wearing, 59.
55Forbes, 257.

14

policies, that a populist party counts on. Brokerage politics instead encourages voters to shop
around for the party that offers the best accommodation of their short-term interests. 56 Yet with
weak party loyalty, once in office a brokerage political party cannot always depend on a stable
basis of support for their policies.57 The different promises to different groups made by the
brokerage party can later collide and erode the party's broad support.

This makes them

dependent on the quality of their leadership to be able to get things done.
Indeed, another consequence of brokerage politics is that when political parties are
hesitant to offer new policy ideas and innovations, the focus shifts from issues to leadership.58 It
is the brokerage leader who must appear to embody the characteristics necessary to unite the
country. The brokerage politics leader, then, in contrast to the populist leader who is supposed
to follow the common people, must really lead to keep the country's numerous social cleavages
together. Differences in leadership style, then, become distinguishing marks of the competing
brokerage parties.

The result is that elections are often viewed as being about changing

personnel more than changing policies.59
In summary, brokerage politics is a strategy political parties use to gain and maintain
power. This is accomplished through mediating Canada's numerous complex cleavages into a
stable coalition. When successful, this strategy unites the country. When unsuccessful, minor
parties arise that represent ignored interests that the brokerage parties then consider including.
As well, brokerage politics, in emphasizing the need to get elected, has made parties
nonideological or "centrist." Being in power indefinitely is the aim (as opposed to the relatively
limited lifespan of populist parties), and therefore brokerage parties resist structural changes to
the political system that could upset their supremacy. They also rely on safe policy platforms, as
well as patronage, perks and pork barreling, to secure and maintain power. For this reason,
brokerage politics has helped create a volatile electorate who, like consumers, shop around for
the political party with the best "deals." This can mean extra attention is paid to the leaders of
the brokerage parties who often constitute the primary difference among them.
56Covell, 69.

571bid.
58Forbes, 257.
59Covell, 69.

15

3. CONCLUSIONS
The differences between populism and brokerage politics are set out in Table 1.

· compared
T abl e 1 Popu1·Ism andB ro kerage P0 rItlCS
Beliefs
Goal
Support

Ideology
Policy
Political
System
Leader
Lifespan

Populism
Faith in democracy and the common
people; opposition to power blocs; reject
planning and political education
Effect change
Can exclude certain interests, yet attract
intense support from loyal followers.
Also, seek to represent the interests
brokerage politics ignores
Can stick to one, or bridge several
Innovation (i.e., controversial policies,
dark side)
Critical of the current system and ways of
doing things
May have a strong, charismatic leader
Relatively limited

16

Brokerage Politics
Commitment to democracy and the need
to accommodate power blocs
Get elected
Appeal to as many interests as possible
(the largest ones that will secure
electoral victory) by bridging social
cleavages
Not ideological; "centrist"
Stagnation; accommodation of material
demands
Deference to the current system and
ways of doing things
May have a strong, charismatic leader
Relatively long-lasting

17

CHAPTER TWO: POPULISM, THE CCF-NDP
ANDTHEREFORMPARTYOFCANADA
The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) formed in 1932 as a confederation of
several urban and rural movements. 1 The CCF never won more than 15 per cent of the popular
vote federally (although found provincial success in Saskatchewan), and renamed itself the New
Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961. 2 The NDP increased its provincial success, but failed to

improve federally until the 1988 election, when it won 43 seats with 20.4 per cent of the popular
vote. 3 In 1993, the NDP won nine seats with 6.9 per cent of the total vote. 4 NDP supporters
(considering convention delegates) are predominantly middle-class, better educated than
average, anglophone, male and middle-aged.5
The Reform Party of Canada was born at a 1987 conference in Vancouver, and fielded
72 candidates in the 1988 federal election (receiving two per cent of the popular vote, and no
seats).6 In March 1989, Deborah Grey became the first Reform MP, winning more votes in an
Alberta by-election than all her opponents combined.? Reform won 52 seats in 1993 (19 per cent
of the popular vote), and placed second in 79 ridings.8 Supporters are urban and rural, better
educated than average, found in almost all occupations with varying average family incomes,
mostly middle-aged and male, largely English-speaking, and new to political activism.9
It is often assumed that the CCF-NDP is populist Yet, tension exists between the party's

education and central planning, and the populist faith in the common people and democracy.
The Reform Party tries to avoid the tension between by advocating direct democracy. The NDP

1Walter D. Young, Anatomy of a Party (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), 30.

2WalterD. Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), 78-79.
3Alan Whitehorn, "The NDP's Quest for Survival," in The Canadian General Election of 1993, eds. Alan Frizzell, Jon
H. Pammett, and Anthony Westell (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1994), 43 .
4Whitehom, 52.
5Alan Whitehorn, "The New Democratic Party in Convention," in Party Democracy in Canada, ed. George Perlin
(Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1988), 274-276; Donald E. Blake, R.K. Carty, and Lynda Erickson, Grassroots
Politicians (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1991), 59.
6 " 56 Reasons Why You Should Support the Reform Party of Canada," Reform Party of Canada, 1993.
7W.T. Stanbury, Money in Politics (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 188.
8The Reformer, November 1993, 1. Reform won 17 incumbent NDP seats and beat the NDP in 173 ridings. It's
second largest source of votes was former NDPers and Reform captured 200/o of potential NDP supporters. Reform
spent $1.5 million to the NDP's $7.4 million. Tom Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave (Toronto: Stoddart Books, 1995),
153; Jeffrey Simpson, "The NDP has an Opportunity to Learn," Globe and Mail, 12 October 1994, A20.
9The Reformer. September/October 1991 ; Peter McCormick, "The Reform Party of Canada," in Party Politics in
Canada, ed. Hugh G. Thorburn (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1991), 347; Flanagan, 44, 159, 160.

18

is also charged with being tied to several power blocs. However, because of the ambiguity of
definitions of the common people and power blocs, it is difficult to prove that the NDP is
dominated by power blocs. Reform is considered to be free from power bloc links, although it
ignores its potential connections.
1. THE COMMON PEOPLE
At first glance, the CCF-NDP seems to have faith in the common people. It was formed
by people who believed Canada needed an effective political instrument representing the people
to procure social changes. IO The CCF-NDP thus claims to be dedicated to Canada's ordinary
people. II However, the party's belief that people require education to see what is in their best
interests conflicts with the populist faith in the common people. Indeed, the CCF-NDP has
always believed that people are both rational and social creatures capable of creating utopia, if
they could see what was wrong with contemporary society.12 The party consequently assumed
that people could be taught to see what was best for them.13
What was best for the common people was socialism. Yet, since many of the common
people disagreed, the CCF-NDP reasoned it could convince them by presenting their alternative
vision.14 The party thus aimed to teach the uninformed common people the "truth" about
capitalist economic and bourgeois society.15 Mildred Fahmi, a CCF founding member, said that
one of the party's aims was not to acquire power, but to educate people about a new way of
looking at life and the rights of people.I6
Like all political parties spreading their message, the CCF printed newspapers and
distributed policy pamphlets. However, the CCF, perhaps because many of its leading figures
were teachers, academics and clergymen, took standard political propaganda further. The party
published study guides and reading lists of socialist books for potential converts, held
10Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1961), 32.
11 Knowles, 28-29, 46; Audrey McLaughlin, A Woman's Place (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 1992), 21- 22.

12Young, Anatomy of a Party, 45; Knowles, 12.
13 Y oung, Anatomy of a Party, 50, 52, 56; Alex Macdonald, 'My Dear Legs .. .' (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1985),
186; Judy Steed, Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit ofPower (Markham, Ontario: Viking, 1988), 98-99; Knowles, 12; "We
must systematically teach them to work out their own salvation"--1935 federal campaign riding report.
14Young, Anatomy of a Party, 11, 52, 53 ; Knowles, 12; Rosemary Brown, Being Brown (Toronto: Random House
of Canada Ltd., 1989), 134.
15Young, Anatomy of a Party, 52.
16George Ehring and Wayne Roberts, Giving Away a Miracle (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1993), 19.

19

correspondence courses, and organized study groups and ran summer schools for youth. 17 The
CCF always devoted a vast amount of time and money to a unique and extensive education
campaign. 18
However, tension exists between political education and populism. The CCF-NDP is
taking a managerial and potentially manipulative approach to politics, by trying to create a new
political community through teaching an allegedly unenlightened populace. 19 Yet, populism is
about listening and reacting to the common people's concerns. It is not about telling them what
should concern them. This view seems to contradict populism's faith in the common people,
maintaining that individuals must look for instruction and guidance from a political party, rather
than to rely upon their own resources.
Such education never gave the party much more support. 20 Yet, the CCF concluded in
1948 that they were failing because they were not providing enough educational opportunities to
develop socialists among newcomers. 2 1 The common people needed to be educated even more
about the merits of socialism. Thus, this education continues today with NDP governments, on a
smaller scale. In B.C., Premier Mike Harcourt's NDP government instituted mandatory "equity
awareness" sessions for staff with the 1995 Equity Plan, and developed training programs to
prevent homophobia.22

These examples show that the NDP is still interested in changing

people's minds with education. Yet such action, however well-intentioned, can backfire when
the state tries to impose codes of conduct on people. It is more populist to wait and let the
common people autonomously change their ways.
The Reform Party does not try to create optmons favorable to its policies through
educating the common people. It claims to search for what bothers the common people. It then
tailors its policies to these concerns. In this sense, Reform seems to believe that voters are
17Ehring and Roberts, 19; Young 51 ; Robert Tyre, Douglas in Saskatchewan (Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited,

1962), 148.
18Young, AnatomyofaPartv, 53, 125.
19Jrving Kristol, "Socialism: Obituary for an Ideal," in The Future That Doesn't Work, ed. R. Emmett Tyrell Jr.
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), 193 . Dave Barrett called opponents "Neanderthals."
2<>:Ehring and Roberts, 34; Young, Anatomy of a Partv, 128, 289, 290; Janine Brodie and Jane Jenson, Crisis,
Challenge and Change (Ontario: Methuen Publications, 1980), 3.
21 Young, Anatomy of a Party, 51 [Report of the Education and Information Division] .
22 Steve Vanagas, "An Obsession with Race, Sex and Disabilities," B.C. Report, 22 January 1996, 10; Daniel
Gawthrop, High-Wire Act (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1996), 60, 129.

20

capable of intelligently expressing their concems. 23 The CCF-NDP thinks people need to be
educated, while Reform claims to believe in the "common sense of the common people."
According to Reform, no expert or politician can gauge the interests of Canadians as accurately
as Canadians themselves can. Parties should "Let the People Speak" and ride the waves of
public opinion, instead of artificially creating support through education. 24 The differences in
the two parties'· attitudes toward the common people are further evident after considering the
CCF's central planning and Reform's direct democracy.
For the CCF, the primary duty of the state was to secure the cultural and material welfare
of the people in tangible forms such as health and education. 25 This could only be achieved with
the state developing the national resources of the country under a general economic plan, free
from the dictates of private interests. 26 Thus, the CCF called for a central government to set
national priorities and initiate national programs. This was because the party maintained that
central planning fosters both the most efficient development and the most equitable distribution
of society's resources.27 In short, the CCF believed that the state must always be able to
undertake major initiatives on behalf of the country.28
So, beginning in 1932, the Calgary Program of the CCF called for replacing the current
economic chaos with a "planned system of social economy for the production, distribution and
exchange of all goods and services."29 The founding document of the CCF, the 1933 Regina
Manifesto, proposed setting up a National Planning Commission. This body would include
economists, professors, engineers, statisticians and other experts, who, acting in the "public
interest," would plan for the production, distribution and exchange of all goods and services
necessary for the efficient functioning of the economy. 30

The 1956 Winnipeg Declaration

23 "Democratic Populism IT Task Force Report," (Reform Party of Canada, January 1996), 1.
24Flanagan, 38, 137; Jeffrey Simpson, Faultlines (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1993), 113; Preston Manning, The New
Canada (Toronto: John Deyell Company, 1992), 141.
25Young, Anatomy of a Party, 109.
26lbid. [The CCF Program Today].
27 Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 40; Dennis Gruending, Promises to
Keep (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1990), 13, 195.
28McLaughlin, 162-163.
~
Canadian Socialism, 37.
30Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 48; "The NDP: An Introduction," May 1991, 33-34; James McAllister, The
Government ofEdward Schreyer (Kingston, Ontario: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), 95 .

21

maintained that, "Private profit and corporate power must be subordinated to social planning
designed to achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living standards for all
Canadians." 31 The 1961 New Party Declaration proposed establishing an economic advisory
council that would engage in central planning.32 The 1983 New Regina Manifesto endorsed
central planning approved by the people and not imposed from above. 33 The 1995 Renewal
Conference called for the state to regulate economic activity and redistribute wealth. 34 Current

federal party leader Alexa McDonough says that the federal devolution of powers to the
provinces should be rolled back, since "tougher planning and stronger measures" enable nati'?ns
to manage their economies.35
Likewise, provincial wings of the NDP endorse central planning. After victory in 1971,
Saskatchewan NDP Premier Allan Blakeney established a task force on developing a central
planning unit. 36 Manitoba NDP Premier Ed Schreyer's three-volume 1973 report, "Guideline for
the Seventies," called for setting up a "concrete planning framework [with] substantive, rational
guidelines for the development of our province. "37
Central planning appears populist according to CCF-NDP rhetoric, insofar as it will
replace chaotic capitalism with a planned and socialized economy owned and controlled by the
people. However, central planning often involves an elite body establishing priorities and
methods that have a higher authority than those presented by the common people. 38

Its

complexity can require excluding the common people in favor of a small, elite group of
planners. 39 Periodic elections are held in which voters can approve or reject the actions of the
planners. Yet, this may not be enough to ensure accountability, and the populist, political
supremacy of the common people.
3I"The NDP: An Introduction," 43 .
32Whitehom, Canadian Socialism, 47, 53 .
33 Ibid., 64.
34Edith Bramwell and Len Taylor. Vancouver Renewal Conference: Partv Principles Draft Discussion Paper, 1995, 2
[http://www.fed .ndp.ca].
35Richard Starr, "Iron Angel," Canadian Forum, September 1995, 17, 18. This must go over well in Quebec!
36Gruending, 56, 88.
37McAilister, 71 . Schreyer's government also engaged in planning with Autopac and mineral exploration.
38David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990), 179; Blake, Carty, and Erickson, 6; Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 180.
~
Canadian Socialis!!!, 39; Robert Lapper, Populism in British Columbia (Victoria: University of Victoria,
1991), 18.

22

Indeed, countless examples in other socialist states show the danger of corruption and
excessive concentration of power with central planning. Likewise in Canada, 63.8 per cent of
federal NDP delegates at the 1983 convention felt that direct political action is sometimes
necessary in place of democratic, electoral politics.40 Earlier, Tommy Douglas tried to give
Department of Agriculture surveyors the right to enter any land in the province without the
owner's consent.41 In B.C., Dave Barrett's NDP in the early 1970s passed an order-in-council
"freezing" large sections of the province from being used for non-agricultural purposes. This
was criticized for violating the democratic right to hold and sellland.42
Still, the actions undertaken by NDP planners are not strictly decided by entirely
unaccountable elites. Party members, the NDP's common people, decide NDP policy every
second year at party conventions. The NDP Constitution affirms that the convention has final
authority over federal policy, programs and Constitution. 43

Yet, conventions are for party

members sympathetic to NDP goals. An NDP government must consider the interests of many
common people who are not NDP members. Besides, NDP convention delegates are not all
common people in the populist sense of joining the party as individuals. Representatives of
organized labour, for example, are guaranteed convention representation (discussed below).
These may be common people, but they attend because of their labour connection.
Reform Party policy conventions are also held biennially. 44 Riding associations submit
resolutions (in 1996, there were four constitutional resolutions and 49 policy resohttions) to be
voted on by all delegates.

With limited time, only six speakers are allowed to express

themselves per resolution.

This hurried pace (characteristic of all party conventions) may

inadequately let Reform's common people properly and democratically work out party policy.
Also, like CCF-NDP conventions, Reform policy may not accurately reflect the views of the
many common people not belonging to Reform. To overcome this, Reform supports direct

40Whitehorn, "The New Democratic Party in Convention," 290.
41 Tyre, 209.
42Lorne J. Kavic and Garry B. Nixon, 1200 Days (Coquitlam: Kaen Publishers, 1978), 98, 249.
4 3The Constitution of the NDP, 1993 [Art. V(2)].

44 The Constitution of the Reform Party of Canada, 1995 [Art. 7(b)].

23

democracy, including binding referenda on governments, for moral issues such as abortion and
capital punishment, and for constitutional change.45
Consequently, Reform claims it will put its policies on the line with direct democracy. A
referendum could have stopped the Reform-supported 1988 Free Trade Agreement that was,
according to some polls, only supported in three provinces. Likewise, referenda could work
against the interests of less populated regions. This could violate Reform's belief in provincial
equality.46 These examples show that citizens not supportive of a Reform government would
have the opportunity, along with elections, to override the preferences of the common people
who make Reform policy at its conventions. Unlike the CCF-NDP, then, Reform seems populist
for deferring to the will of all the common people, despite its policies.47

The CCF-NDP,

alternatively, has often been reluctant to allow its policies to be overturned. For example, the
B.C. NDP, not favoring direct democracy, refuses to submit to referendum the secretly
developed 1996 Nisga'a Agreement in Principle land claims deal. 48 NDP Aboriginal Affairs
Minister John Cashore said a province-wide referendum on such a complex agreement would be
a divisive, destructive exercise.49
Nevertheless, considering the great number and variety of issues facing contemporary
governments, it is unclear how well such direct democracy could perform in assuring the
political supremacy of the common people.

Critics of direct democracy say it can be

manipulated by elites. Who decides what questions are put to referendum? Who decides the
wording of the questions? Could special interest groups hijack the referendum process? Reform
has to prove these concerns do not reduce the populist sovereignty of the common people. It
tries to do this, by favoring the use of initiative.

45 "Democratic Populism ll Task Force Report," 3, 6-7; "56 Reasons"; "Platform and Statement of Principles of the
Reform Party," 1988, 11 ; Flanagan, 26. A referendum requires a simple majority of voters, plus a simple majority in
at least seven provinces. Reform called for a referendum on the Meech Lake Accord.
461bid.
47The exception: Manning's equality of individuals policy. This is addressed in Chapter 3.
48 Steve Vanagas, "A Race-Exclusive Para-State," B.C. Report, 26 February I996, 8. Glen Clark opposes referenda
because "substance is everything." Bob Rae wouldn't allow another Charlottetown Accord referendum because it was
"out of control. " Rick Hiebert, "Two Cheers for Direct Democracy," B.C. Report. 13 May 1996, 11 ; Susan
Delacourt, United We Fall (Toronto: Penguin Books, I994), 120.
49Terry O'Neill, "The NDP Obviously Thinks," B.C. Report. II March 1996, 2.

24

According to Reform's initiative, three per cent of eligible voters of Canada can sign a
petition requesting that a question or legislative proposal be placed on the ballot as a referendum
at the next federal general election.50 With initiative, Reform seems populist for letting the
common people help set the policy agenda.

Conversely, Harcourt's B.C. NDP, forced by

referendum to introduce initiative, made it practically impossible to use. 51 For this, the NDP
appears hesitant to let the common people set the government's priorities. (.Still, initiative, like
referenda, could be overused, contributing to voter bum-out and apathy. Initiative could also be
abused by the common people. It could allow them to force their "pet projects" onto a national
agenda (the dark side of populism).

Special interest groups could use initiative against the

common people. Also, one region could force a national referendum on an issue detrimental or
unimportant to the rest of Canada. This is because Reform's initiative does not specify where the
three per cent of voters must live. The common people cannot be entirely politically supreme
with Reform's initiative until these problems with it are overcome.
2. POWER BLOCS

The CCF power bloc was plain to see--the men who controlled the fmancial structure of
Canada, those who suffered little during the depression. Capitalism was the cancer eating at the
heart of society, and CCF members blamed it for the social order's most alarming ailments,
proclaiming that no CCF government would rest until it had "eradicated capitalism."52
The Conference Resulting in the Formation of the CCF reported that the Great
Depression was due to the inherent unsoundness of the capitalist system. 53 The 1933 Regina

Manifesto called for replacing the "capitalist system with its inherent injustice and
inhumanity. "54 The 1956 Winnipeg Declaration described capitalism as "immoral. "55 Future
party leader Edward Broadbent in 1970 called for abandoning the "moral hogwash" that is
50 "Democratic Populism n Task Force Report, II 6; "56 Reasons. II 3% is the usual American standard.
51 B.C. NDP initiative requires 10% of eligible voters in all 75 Tidings, who must sign the initiative in 90 days. Then,

the initiative is put on a ballot and needs a double majority (a simple majority plus a majority in two-thirds of the
Tidings). The NDP then still does not have to enact the initiative proposal into law. Steve Vanagas, "Digging in
Against Direct Democracy," B.C. Report, 6 December 1993, 6.
52Young, Democracy and Discontent, 63; Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1964), 37; Laycock, 164; Young, Anatomy of a Party, 44.
53 Young, Anatomy of a Party, 42. Note that it is big business and monopolies the CCF was primarily against.
54"The NDP: An Introduction," 33 .
55Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 47.

25

capitalism.56 The NDP today, to a lesser degree, still targets capitalism as a power bloc. For
instance, the 1995 Renewal Conference reported that unrestrained capitalism produces
intolerable levels of social and economic inequality. 57
The CCF-NDP has consistently seen "Big Business" and capitalism as power blocs. Yet,
Reform charges that the NDP is not populist, because it is connected to several other power
biocs (labour, special interest groups, Charlottetown Accord elites, Quebec, Central Canada, and
high taxes). 58 For this, the NDP loses some populist, direct connection to the common people,
but is not dominated by any power blocs. The perception of captivity is largely due to the
ambiguous definitions of the common people and power blocs. Reform works hard at keeping a
direct link between itself and the common people, but ignores its potential links with power
blocs, including Western Canada.
One reason for creating the NDP from the CCF, was that the party had not found a large
and growing audience. 59 As well, membership fees and subscriptions from the common people
did not provide the CCF much money, and election campaigns were getting expensive.60 So,
after the 1958 Progressive Conservative-John Diefenbaker landslide and resultant CCF
disappointment, the party thought it needed formal labour support. 61 Luckily at this time, the
Canadian Labour Congress had just formed from the Canadian Congress of Labour and the
Trades and Labour Congress.

This new body officially agreed to join the fight against

capitalism with the CCF, now rechristened the NDP. 62 Hence today, organized labour has a
position of influence within the NDP.
The federal NDP's Constitution guarantees representation to organized labour. Article
Ill(2) allows affiliated membership with trade unions. 63 The party's Federal Council, which runs
the party between conventions, reserves about ten per cent of its seats for labour (not including
56Ed Broadbent, The Liberal Rip-off (Toronto: New Press, 1970), x .
57Bramwell and Taylor, 2.
58 Act ofFaith (Vancouver: B.C. Report Magazine Ltd., 1991), 59, 176.
59Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 51 .
60Joseph Wearing, Strained Relations (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990), 187; K.Z. Paltiel, Political Party
Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Company of Canada Limited, 1970), 48.
61 Imperfect Union, National Film Board, 1989 [video]. The CCF won 8 seats (9.5% total vote) in 1958.
62Knowles, 14, 18.
63The Constitution of the NDP.

26

labour members not designated as such). 64 Article X establishes a Council of Federal Ridings
that promotes the federal NDP in the provinces and territories. This body is guaranteed labour
representation, with the amount determined by the council. 65 Trade unions also receive one
convention deiegate per 1000 members, under Article V(4).66

Thus, labour deiegates at

conventions typically constitute about 25 per cent of total delegates (not including the many
labour members who are not classified as "representatives" oflabour unions). 6 7 Labour can also
submit policy resolutions to conventions. 68 Within the party, union representation constitutes 20
to 25 per cent of executive and officer positions. 69 Also, labour is provided access to caucus
meetings that other parties keep closed. 70
Labour also provides the NDP with much-needed funds. During federal election years,
trade unions contribute between $1.5 million and $2.1 million to the federal NDP.7 1 This does
not include unreported financial donations to the NDP's federal office, and does not place a
dollar value on many in-kind contributions. 72 Financial support from labour to the federal NDP
in non-election years (from 1974-1990) has accounted for up to 20 per cent or total revenue.7 3
Furthermore, Article IV(3) of the NDP Constitution allows the party to receive $0.20 per month
from participating union workers belonging to NDP-affiliated unions. 74 This accounted tor 11
percent of the party's federal budget in 1990.75
Provincial NDP governments also receive substantial labour funding. In 1969, actual
expenditures by Ed Schreyer's Manitoba NDP totaled $45,321 when actual revenue was $30,761:
unreported labour donations made up the difference. 76 Likewise, the B.C. Liberal Party released
64lbid. [Art. Vll(l)(f)]. Labour gets one member for each of the 15 unions with the most affiliated members.

65 lbid.

66lbid. Each federal riding gets one voting delegate for every 50 members.

67Keith Archer, "The New Democrats, Organized Labour and the Prospects of Electoral Reform," in Canadian

Political Parties, ed. Herman Bakvis (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 316, 321; Keith Archer, "The
NDP: A Trade Union Party?" in Canadian Political Party S)!stems, ed. R.K. Carty (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview
Press, 1992), 390.
68The Constitution of the NDP [Art. V(4)(1)].
69Archer, "The NDP: A Trade Union Party," 392.
70Archer, "The New Democrats, Organized Labour," 316, 321.
71Archer, "The NDP: A Trade Union Party," 395 .
72 lbid.
73Archer, "The New Democrats, Organized Labour," 335 .
74The Constitution of the NDP.
75 Archer, "The New Democrats, Organized Labour," 335; Stanbury, 167.
76McAllister, 135.

27

a list oflabour support for Glen Clark's 1996 B.C. NDP leadership campaign. The party alleged
that Clark (not denying the charge) received $1500 each from 64 union locals.77 For the May
1996 election, Elections Canada revealed that Clark's NDP received $735,000 from unions.78

Vancouver Sun columnist Vaughn Palmer claims that further labour contributions of $650,000
are not included, because they were directly donated to NDP candidates.79
These links to labour seem to prevent the NDP from being thoroughly populist. The
party appears formally and structurally linked to labour as a power bloc.80 It seems to take its
cues from the labour movement instead of the common people. 8 1 Indeed, the NDP focused on
free trade in the 1993 election after being chastised by labour for not doing so in 1988.82
However, this is only a perception of captivity to a labour power bloc. Organized labour does
not dominate the NDP. Indeed, union affiliation rates have never been substantial, comprising
14.6 per cent of unions in 1963, and only 7.3 per cent in 1984.83

While the NDP gets a

significant amount of money from unions, it also has other revenue sources.

Besides, all

unionists and labour leaders may not be united in opposition against the common people.
Really, there are many common people in unions. Thus, a labour link would connect the NDP

with many common people. Reform critics would be ignoring these common people in spurning
such a tie.
Yet, the NDP has never attracted much "grassroots" labour support. It mostly receives
support from labour leaders.84 A 1962 Gallup survey after the recent federal election found that
voters from trade union homes split 23 per cent for the NDP and 68 per cent for the Tories and

77 Steve Vanagas, "Names the NDP Doesn't Want You to Know," B.C. Report, 25 March 1996, 9.

78 "Labour, Business Take Sides," B.C. Report, 16 September 1996, 10. Individuals gave $2.8m, business: $120,000.

79Ibid.
80 Imperfect Union [Jo Surich]; Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 15; Lapper, 13 . Canadians fear "Big Labour" even

more than "Big Business" that the CCF-NDP rallies against.
81 Macdonald, 68. Hazen Argue left the NDP in 1962 due to labour domination. Joyce Meissenheimer of the S .C.
NDP's provincial executive said in 1972 that, "We elected [an NDP] government to legislate on the side of labour."
Harcourt's B.C. NDP had a union-only Vancouver Island Highway upgrade in 1994. Its Fait Wage Policy forces
contractors on public construction jobs to pay union rates. Tyre, 96-97; Kavic and Nixon, 65; Tom McFeely,
"Actions Speak Louder than Words," B.C. Report, 29 April 1996, 8; Vanagas, "Names the NDP Doesn't Want You
to Know," 8.
82Ehring and Roberts, 7, 19, 221 , 333; "Issues: A Voter's Guide," Vancouver Sun, 23 October 1993, AlO.
83Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 15.
84Jmperfect Union.

28

Liberals. 85 The 1993 federal election saw an exodus of rank-and-file union members from the
NDP to Reform.86 Overall, most trade unionists--the common people in labour--do not vote
NDP. 87 Besides, populist parties are supposed to be set up to listen to the common people as
individuals, not as members of a group such as labour. Yet, the NDP Constitution guarantees
organized labour special influence.
Nevertheless, the NDP maintains its connection with labour that is in tension with
populism. It has embarked since 1995 on a national affiliation drive. 88 New leader Alexa
McDonough says that, "Our brothers and sisters in the labour movement are part of our family
and there ain't going to be no divorce."89 In contrast, the Reform Party has explicitly avoided any
formal link with labour. Reform's Constitution only allows individuals to join. 90 Furthermore, it
does not have quotas for convention delegates representing certain interests such as labour.
Delegates are chosen by one delegate per 40 riding members up to 240 members, then one
delegate for each additional100 members.9I
Reform may have no connections to labour, but Audrey McLaughlin claimed that Reform
is tied to the "corporate agenda" and oil companies.92 Yet, Reform also tries to avoid being
linked to business as a power bloc. Reform promises to eliminate grants, handouts, and tax
concessions to private corporations. 93 Of course, Reform has to fulfill these populist promises if
it ever forms a government.
Besides, the NDP accepts corporate cash.

In 1974, the NDP received $14,204 in

corporate contributions, and in 1988, raised $262,524 from corporations. 94 In 1995, corporations
gave the NDP $425,000 for only 9 MPs.95 However, the party claims to ensure that such
8 5Steed 94

86Aiexa' ~

and Ray Whitehead, Vancouver Renewal Conference: Party Relations Draft Discussion Paper,
1995, 2 [http://www.fed.ndp.ca].
87Jack MacDonald, "The New Democratic Party," in The Canadian Voter's Guidebook, [no ed. given] (Toronto:
Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, 1972), 49; Imperfect Union.
88McDonough and Whitehead, 4.
89 starr, 11.
90The Constitution of the Reform Party of Canada, [Art. 2(c)] .
91 Ibid. [Art. 7(d)].
92 Act ofFaith, 113 . Statement by McLaughlin made in 1990.
93 Act of Faith, 113; "Principles and Policies of the Reform Party," 1995, 12; "56 Reasons"; Deborah Grey, "Security
at Home and Work are Reformer's Themes," Vancouver Sun, 27 February 1996, Al3.
94Stanbury, 170, 489-91 .
95Ciyde Graham, "Corporate Canada Bankrolls Liberals," Prince George Citizen, 6 July 1996, 5.

29
donations (to provincial wings) are from businesses with good labour practices that also agree
with NDP policy. 96 As well, in several cases, NDP party policy forbids the acceptance of any
funds from corporations (or at least from "large" corporations). Still, to get around this, the B.C.
I

NDP in the 1970s accepted corporate money through non-profit societies. 97 Ed Schreyer's
Manitoba NDP promised not to accept corporate donations above $500, and was bound by the
Manitoba Election Act to refuse any corporate contributions for election campaigns. 98 Such
money, then, was simply not reported. It was laundered through a trust fund or "donated" by the
federal NDP.99 As well, dozens of party members resigned from the Ontario NDP in protest of
that party's proposal to accept corporate donations. 100 Bob Rae's NDP received 57 corporate
donations of$2000 or more in 1991.101
Reform, then, can charge that the NDP has an anti-populist link to corporations. Reform
typically receives about 90 per cent of its funds from supporters. 102 The NDP usually gets about
40 per cent of revenue from individuals, yet two-thirds of these are extracted from union dues
and payroll deductions.103 Still, Reform accepted $570,000 from corporations in 1994 (10 per
cent oftotal revenue), and $815,000 in 1995 (nearly double the federal NDP total, with not even
being government).I04 To be completely populist, Reform and the NDP would have to reject all
corporate money. Still, the amount of corporate donations received by the NDP and Reform
may not compare to the much larger amount of donations accepted by other parties.
Besides a labour link, the NDP began looking for new ways to increase its support. This
is exemplified by the selection of Audrey McLaughlin to replace leader Edward Broadbent in
1989. McLaughlin, by her own admission, had little support or ties from the labour wing of the

%Stanbury, 169.
97Terry O'Neill, "The NDP's Corporate-cash Ban Reveals a Neanderthal Mindset," B.C. Report, 8 Aprill996, 2.
98McAllister, 13 7.
99Ibid. In 1975, the federal NDP "transferred" $252,421 to the Manitoba NDP.
ICJO:Ehring and Roberts, 89.
101 Ian McLeod, Under Siege (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Ltd., 1994), 11.
102The Reformer, September 1995, 4; Lome Gunter, "Put Your Money Where Your Vote is," B.C. Report, 27 July
1992, 13.
103 Stanbury, 193; Gunter, 13; "Corporate Donors Cold-Shoulder Reform," Vancouver Sun, 10 February 1996, A4.
104Graham, 5; "Corporate Donors Cold-Shoulder Reform."

30

party, and had little background in the trade union movement. 105 She appeared more linked to
the next set of power blocs that the NDP aligned itself with, environmental and feminist
organizations.
The NDP's Constitution allows affiliated membership with farm groups, cooperatives,
women's organizations and other groups that abide by the NDP's principles.106 Thus, the party
supports special interest groups playing a consultative role in developing party policy, and
endorses alliances with them in obtaining mutual objectives. 107 Audrey McLaughlin said she
welcomes special interest groups, because policy is improved when more "interests" are brought
into the decision-making process.I 08 Special interest groups can be permanent or temporary,
single issue pressure groups.

Their functions include representing issues that parties or

governments ignore, policy advocacy, and policy participation.
So, the NDP of the 1990s focuses on the concerns of various special interest groups,
particularly concentrating on feminist and environmental issues. For instance, the 1983 New
Regina Manifesto states that ecological priorities should guide technological and economic

decisions to ensure natural resource conservation. 109 Thus, Harcourt's B. C. NDP introduced the
toughest pulp mill pollution laws in Canada, protected millions of hectares of wilderness, and
planned to double the proportion of provincial park lands by 2000 to include 12 per cent of
Vancouver Island. 110
In taking up feminist issues, Dave Barrett's 1972-1975 B.C. NDP was the first provincial

government to fund rape relief centres, transition houses and women's health collectives, and
even created a committee to eliminate sexism in textbooks and curriculum. III In Saskatchewan,

105McLaughlin, 59, 76. McLaughlin was possibly chosen as a "special interest." Nelson Riis said "it was time to
choose a woman." Delegates were called "sexist" for supporting a male leader. Dave Barrett and William Miller,
Barrett (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 1995), 85, 170, 183; Whitehorn, "The NDP's Quest For Survival," 48.
106The Constitution of the NDP [Art. ill(2)].
107McDonough and Whitehead, 2.
108McLaughlin, 22.
I09wrutehorn, Canadian Socialism, 62.
llOGawthrop, 128, 129, 185.

111 Brown, 99, 130, 132, 138. Still, Barrett is not known for respecting the opposite sex. Rosemary Brown said the
Premier often made sexist remarks (he once called reporter Marjorie Nichols a "venomous bitch"). Barrett even won
a Male Chauvinist Pig award. Barrett and Miller, 85 .

31

Alan Blakeney instituted major social programs concerning affirmative action for women during
his 1978-1982 term.m
The federal NDP has also taken up the concerns of feminist special interest groups. The
1983 New Regina Manifesto calls for addressing gender discrimination and inequality, and
violence against women. 113 The party has a detailed affmnative action policy that requires
female candidates in at least 60 per cent of the ridings where the NDP might win. 114 Audrey
McLaughlin also said an equal Senate must have half the seats held by women. 115 As well, there
is a Participation of Women Committee to encourage female involvement in the NDP. 116
Focusing on the concerns of various special interest groups appears to move the NDP
further away from populism. It appears that the NDP takes its policies from whatever group is
protesting in front of the legislature. 117 The NDP seems to listen to the power bloc of special
interest groups, instead of the common people. However, this perception ignores the common
people in special interest groups.

As well, since special interest groups engage in policy

advocacy, it is natural that they would try to get parties like the NDP to promote their causes.
Besides, the link to the NDP could be coincidental. Some special interest groups and the NDP
may have much in common in their goals and policies. Conversely, there are special interest
groups, REAL Women, for example, that are not associated with the NDP.
It cannot be proved, then, that special interest groups dominate the NDP. Still, the

populist requirement of autonomy from power blocs is broken because the NDP Constitution
allows for affiliated membership with special interest groups. Except for this, the charge that the
party is captive to special interest groups is a rhetorical tactic of Reformers trying to demonstrate
their relatively more "pure" link to the common people.

112Gruending, 218.
113Wbitehorn, Canadian Socialism, 62.
114"New Democratic Party Nomination and Affirmative Action Policy," 26 May 1996. In 1993, a similar policy
barred men from nomination in some ridings.
115McLaughlin, 165.
116Wbitehorn, "The NDP's Quest for Survival," 49; McLaughlin, 54.
117Desmond Morton, "The Bitter Fruit of Power," Maclean's, 12 July 1993, 20; Paul Piccone, "Postmodem
Populism," Telos 103 (Spring 1995): 53 .

32

Indeed, the Reform Party has always claimed to have no formal links to special interest
groups, which they call "special interests."IIs

Reform sees "special interests" as minority

organizations pushing their "radical" views onto the silent majority of unsuspecting common
people. The party does not consider the many common people belonging to these organizations.
So, Reform promises to end all government spending on them. 119 According to Reformers,
special interest groups should question their existence if they cannot find fmancial support from
those they purport to represent.
For this, Reform does not appear to be coupled to special interest groups. It is instead
picketed by them. The Coalition Against the Reform Party, for example, is solely dedicated to
denouncing Reform. Yet, the members of Reform could be in some ways construed as a special
interest group. For instance, many Reformers resent gun control and belong to firearms' groups.
Could they thus be perceived as being tied to the gun lobby? Also, is Reform wedded to market
capitalism, social conservatism, the pro-choice movement, or leader Preston Manning's religious
beliefs? These accusations are as hard to prove as arguing that the NDP is dominated by "special
interests." Yet, Reform defines a "special interest" as those groups not fitting its world view. It
does not examine its own possible connections to special interest groups as power blocs. Still,
such links to Reform are not formal affiliations with the party.

Members join Reform as

individuals. With the CCF-NDP Constitution, special interest groups can have formal affiliation.
Reform, though, could still be taken informally hostage by special interest groups, if enough
members joined from one group.
Special interest groups have also focused on constitutional reform. The NDP has taken a
similar interest, by supporting the Charlottetown Accord.

On September 24, 1991, the

government tabled in the House of Commons the Canada Round package of constitutional
proposals. 120 The proposals were discussed and debated, in typical Canadian fashion, by a
committee. This was followed by a few open public forums that were superseded by closed-door
118David Laycock, "Reforming Canadian Democracy?" Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVII: 2 (June 1994):

217; Richard Sigurdson, "Preston Manning and the Politics ofPostmodernisrn," Canadian Journal of Political Science
XXVII: 2 (June 1994): 267.
l1 9"Principles and Policies," 11 ; "56 Reasons" ; Simpson, 123 .
12<>:Brooke Jeffrey, Strange Bedfellows. Trying Times (Toronto: Key Porter, 1993), 45.

33

agreements among provincial premiers (three of them NDP), who constructed a deal to be
approved or rejected on October 26, 1992. 121
The NDP, provincially and federally, decided to support the Accord.

The party

consequently placed itself on the same team as the mainstream political parties including the
Liberals and Conservatives, all the provincial premiers and territorial leaders, aboriginal leaders,
most special interest groups, business groups (so much for the capitalist power bloc), labour
leaders, the media, and the cultural elite.I22
Unfortunately, according to conventional interpretation, the common people did not
identify with the "Yes" side. They did not buy their scare tactics (Bob Rae called detractors
"snake-oil salesmen"; Glen Clark felt "fear for the future of this country" if the Accord failed). 123
As a result, 54 per cent of Canadians--the common people with home-made signs and little
coordinated campaigning, spending a fraction of the $10 million spent by the other side--ignored
the advice of the political parties, all 11 governments, the media, banks, labour, every
established authority, and voted "No."l24
The NDP quickly found it was out of touch with ordinary Canadians. In the NDP's
Western heartland, the vote was massively "No," especially in British Columbia where the
federal NDP had 19 seats.12s Audrey McLaughlin's Yukon riding voted massively "No," as did
many other NDP strongholds. 126

Thousands of NDP members and 58 per cent of NDP

supporters voted against their own party.I27
Again, the NDP did not appear populist. The Accord was a complex agreement that
Canadians defeated for many different reasons. Yet, it came to symbolize a massive rejection of
the so-called elites of the country that supported the deal. 128 The NDP found itself belonging to
121 Ibid., 45-54.
122Ehring and Roberts, 314; McLeod, vii; John Deverell and Greg Vezina, Democracy. Eh? (Toronto: Robert Davies
Publishing, 1993), 105; Lawrence Leduc and John H. Pammett, "Referendum Voting," Canadian Journal of Political
Science XXVII: 1 (March 1995): 9, 11 ; Delacourt, 71 ; Brooke, 115, 128, 129, 148, 194.
123Brooke, 170; Steve Vanagas, "Big Labour's Best Bet," B.C. Report, 22 January 1996, 9.
124Brooke, 1, 2, 114-115, 134; Ted Byfield, "Harcourt Misuses Power of Law," Halifax Daily News, 16 June 1995,
26; Gawthrop, 79.
125Whitehorn, "The NDP's Quest for Survival," 48; B.C. voted 68.3% against, the highest in Canada.
126Brooke, 6.
127Ehring and Roberts, 316; McLeod, 62; LeDuc and Pammett, 26.
12llNorman Penner, "The Past, Present, and Uneasy Future of the New Democratic Party," in Canadian Parties in
Transition, eds. Brian A Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1996), 100.

34

this spurned power bloc, when it could have been the champion of the common people by
supporting the "No" side.
However, the perception that the NDP is tied to this power bloc of Canadian elites is
easier to feel than to prove. It is naive to assume that Accord rejection and support was
polarized between the common people and the elites. Some common people probably liked the
agreement. Also, people from labour or special interest groups voted against the Accord. The
NDP cannot be totally captive to these power blocs by campaigning against many of their
members. Furthermore, Canadians did not consider party allegiance when deciding which way
to vote. 129 The Accord, then, may be better seen as non-elites versus elites, rather than the
common people versus a power bloc.
The Reform Party, however, strategically argued that the Charlottetown Accord showed
how the other parties, including the NDP, were out of touch with the common people. However,
Reform, like the NDP, also had a difficult time determining its position on the agreement.
Manning initially hesitated to join the "No" side after pledging an end to "constitutional
wrangling. "130 As well, there was significant initial support for the deal based on early polls.m
Yet, instead of jumping on the "Yes" side like the NDP, Reform opted for a more careful and
populist approach. Reform decided to find out from its supporters and other Canadians what
side to take.
Telephone "hotlines" and party member mail-outs started overwhelmingly shouting "No."
Thus, Reform decided to become the only federal party against the deal, the only party
supposedly representing the common people.132 As well, 96 per cent of Reform Party identifiers
voted "No."133 Unlike the NDP then, Reform did not appear to link itself with this power bloc of
elites. Of course, this was mostly a power bloc that Reform helped create to display its alleged
populist virtues.

129arooke, 6.
130flanagan, 28, 102, 103, 107.
131LeDuc and Pammett, 9.
132Flanagan, 104.
133LeDuc and Pammett, 26.

35

The Charlottetown Accord was one attempt of many for bringing Quebec into the
constitutional fold and reducing the separatist threat. Yet, by this time, many common people
were tired of national politics being dominated by constitutional issues. They were fed up with
political parties devoting what they perceived to be excessive resources to Quebec's demands.
Despite this populist mood, the NDP has long placated Ia belle province. It set the
standard, endorsing a constitutional resolution giving Quebec "special status" in 1967.134 Later,
the party supported the 1987 Meech Lake Accord (with Ed Broadbent signing). 135 This deal tried
to give Quebec constitutional recognition of "distinct society," a constitutional veto, the right to
opt out of federal spending programs with full financial compensation, a role in appointing
Supreme Court judges, and more control over immigration. 136 As well, the NDP, in designing
and supporting the Charlottetown Accord, endorsed a document that again tried to give Quebec
constitutional "distinct society" status, plus a guarantee of one quarter of House of Commons
seats. 137
However, in treating Quebec as a province unlike the others, the NDP appears linked to
Quebec as a power bloc that prevents it from adequately listening to the common people from
other regions.

Of course, though, there are many common people in Quebec who are also

federalists. The vague definition of power bloc overlooks this inconsistency. Yet, considering
the constitutional deals the party supported, the NDP created an image for itself that it is captive
to the intelligentsia of Quebec, the ones who are calling for special status. As well, the NDP
Constitution allows for closely connected provincial NDP parties. 138 Yet, the Quebec wing gets
separate mention in Article Xlll, where federal NDP involvement in Quebec is also affirmed.I39
Deliberate sections for Quebec in the party's chief document show how the NDP focuses on one

134Steed, 117. This convention resolution resulted in a shower of attacks on the NDP for giving in so easily to

Quebec, and prompted Eugene Forsey, a former research director of the CLC, to quit the NDP.
135 Sydney Sharpe and Don Braid, Storming Babylon (Toronto: Key Porter Books Ltd., 1992), 154; Act of Faith,
243; Steed, 302; Delacourt, 105.
136F. L. Morton, "The Living Constitution," in Introductory Readings in Canadian Government and Politics, eds. R.
M. Krause and R. H. Wagenberg (Mississauga, Ontario: Copp Clark Pitman Ltd., 1991), 62. The NDP supported this
deal made in secret, with no public input allowed since it was a "seamless web" not amenable to any changes.
137Consensus Report on the Constitution, 1992 [The Charlottetown Accord]. Sections 2(c) and 21(a).
138The Constitution of the NDP [Art. XII].
139Ibid.

36

province, as a potential power bloc, when the populist mood resents catering to any provinces,
especially Quebec.
Unlike the NDP, Reform opposed the Meech Lake Accord and the Charlottetown
Accord.140 Reform also has a "Plan B" for Quebec separation that dares to ask what will happen

if Canada fragments.I 4 1 In place of appearing to cater to every demand made by Quebec, then,
Reform argues that concessions tear the country apart. Instead, it is time to call separatist bluffs.
This tough stance strikes a responsive chord in many common people, even if others insist it may
drive Quebec out of Confederation. I42 Not appearing captive to one province like the NDP,
then, Reform policy affirms a commitment to Canada as one nation, as a balanced federation of
equal provinces.143 To ensure provincial equality, Reform favors the Triple 'E' Senate (equal,

elected, effective), and even won an anomalous Senate seat by election in 1988.144 An equal
Senate will provide for regional representation in a federal system. It would also give a voice to
the many common people who believe that Canadian politics are dominated by Central Canada
and Quebec. However, it could allow a tyranny of the minority in which the interests of all
common people are not considered. The common people in a sparsely populated region might
be able to block or delay policies supported by the population-based, majoritarian House of
Commons. In this sense, Reform's Triple 'E' Senate could, in anti-populist and undemocratic
fashion, give a minority of common people in a small province equal status with the majority of
common people in the larger provinces.
Nevertheless, the NDP has never been as concerned with provincial equality in
Parliament. It would eliminate the Senate. Saskatchewan NDP Premier Blakeney feared an
effective upper house would delay important changes that Parliament wanted to make.1 45
Ontario NDP Premier Bob Rae delayed Senate reform talks during the formulation of the
140Sharpe and Braid, 154; Manning, 243; The Reformer, June 1994.
l41"20/20: A Vision for the Future of Canada," Reform Party of Canada, 1996.
142Act of Faith, 76, 80; Chris Adams, "The Reform Party and the Roots of Western Protest," in Canadian Politics
91/92, eds. Gregory S. Mahler and Roman R. March (Connecticut: Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., 1991), 176;
Norm Ovendon, "Deficit, Unity Remain Reform's Key Cards," Edmonton Journal, 30 December 1995, G2; Dale
Eisler, "Reform Says What Canadians Think," Calgary Herald, 15 December 1995, Al9.
143 Act of Faith, 11 0; Manning, viii; Trevor Harrison, Of Passionate Intensity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995), 146; "56 Reasons"; "Principles and Policies," 10; Assembly '96 affirmed the belief in provincial equality.
144McCormick, 345-346; Hugh Wmsor, "Reform Band Tunes up for Big Show," Globe and Mail, 4 May 1992, AI .
145Gruending, 202.

37

Charlottetown Accord, and publicly chastised NDP colleague Roy Romanow for supporting such

reform. 146
The NDP's desire to abolish the Senate displays its apparent disinterest in enhancing the
voice in Ottawa of other regions like the West, despite what the common people there have long
demanded. Indeed, Ed Broadbent supported Prime Minister Trudeau's freeze on the price of
western-owned oil and natural gas in the 1970s. This resulted in more than $60 billion of
Western petroleum income being expropriated by the federal government (despite natural
resources being a provincial jurisdiction), and spurred the creation of Western separatist
movements. 147 Here, it seems that the NDP is captive to a Central Canada power bloc despite
the common people elsewhere. Yet, the NDP may have been taking a more "national" view of
Canada's resources by supporting Trudeau's move. It may have been representing the majority of
common people outside the West on this issue, instead of only taking its cues from Westerners
suspicious of any actions by Central Canada or Ottawa. Reform, in detesting such a measure,
may seem captive to Western Canadian interests, despite many common people elsewhere.
Thus, if Reform can accuse the NDP of being tied to Quebec, or Central Canada, then the
NDP can charge Reform with appearing to be tied to a power bloc of Western Canada. Reform
champions Senate reform and responds to feelings of Western alienation, it has only one seat
east of Manitoba, and is unpopular in Quebec and the Maritimes. From its inception, however,
Reform has aimed to be a national party. As well, Reform in 1993 finished second in 56 Ontario
ridings.148 It may be on its way, then, to becoming a party with national support. Nevertheless,
the vague definition of power bloc allows a populist party to target an "enemy." Yet, their
political opponents can creatively accuse them ofbeing linked to other power blocs.
Another perceived contemporary power bloc is to be a party favouring high-taxes.l 49
Today, many common people are fed up with taxes (even if they still expect constant levels of
public service provision). However, the CCF-NDP has always believed that taxation is the
146Manning, 204; Delacourt, 107, 109, 110.
147Rick Hiebert, "Two Cheers for Direct Democracy," B.C. Report, 13 May 1996, 11.
148The Reformer. November 1993, 1.
149Alan Whitehorn. "The CCF-NDP and the End of the Broadbent Era," in Party Politics in Canada, ed. Hugh G.
Thorburn (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1991), 337.

38
solution for many of society's problems. With more public revenue through taxation, the NDP
could redress inequality, create economic opportunity, and redistribute wealth and power more
fairly.Iso This would allow the party to stop the "slash and burn" tactics of the other parties with
their "attacks" on social programs that are a "war on the poor."
Thus, Tommy Douglas in Saskatchewan established 600 new taxes and levies and
increased 600 others during his administration, and his "free health services for all" promise
required hikes in the sales, income and corporation taxes, along with annually increasing family
premiums.Isi

Ed Schreyer's Manitoba NDP raised personal and corporate income taxes to

national highs while the importance of these sources as revenue in other provinces was
declining.1s2 Saskatchewan NDP Premier Roy Romanow imposed tax hikes on everything from
retail sales to cigarettes.I53 Bob Rae in Ontario racked up four billion in raised taxes during his
1990-1995 term.I54 The B. C. Harcourt NDP, according to B. C. Report newsmagazine, increased

taxes by $670 million to cover an annual operating budget increase of more than $1 billion (5.7
per cent). ISS Selected Recommendations for the Reform ofthe System ofTaxation, the report that
helped the B.C. NDP determine it's 1993 budget, advocated higher taxes on mcomes,
inheritances, gifts, corporations, luxury goods, lottery winnings, accounting services, dry
cleaning, restaurant meals, advertising, photocopying, golfing, sporting events, cultural events,
architects, video rentals, accountants, civil and business litigation, wealthy seniors, and small
businesses.156 For the 1993 federal election, the NDP promised a new two percent tax on
business, a higher minimum corporate tax, more income tax for the wealthy (McLaughlin would
raise it 13 per cent to 40 per cent, not including provincial income tax), and a new "Fair Wealth"
tax on large net worths to access inherited or unearned wealth and capital. 157 For the next
150McLaughlin, 21, 22, 164; Broadbent, ix.
151Tyre, 18, 21-23, 29, 185, 211.
152McAllister, 41.
l53Mark Nemeth, "Roy Romanow's NDP Wms a Second Term," Maclean's, 1 July 1995, 46.
154Jim Coyle, "Rae's Final Days in Ontario," Montreal Gazette, 28 February 1995, B3; Ehring and Roberts, xv, 304;
Patrick Monallan, Storming the Pink Palace (Toronto: Lester Publishing Limited, 1995), 175.
155 Steve Vanagas, "A 'Revolting' Budget," B.C. Report, 12 April1993, 6.
156Vaughn Palmer, "Will the Middle Class Be Courted," Vancouver Sun, 2 February 1996, [page unavailable].
157Julie Davis and Lome Nystrom, Vancouver Renewal Conference: Economic Policy Draft Discussion Paper, 1995,
10 [http://www.fed.ndp.ca]; "An NDP Sneak Preview," Maclean's, 11 March 1993, 40; Steve Vanagas, "Countdown
to an Election," B.C. Report, 11 October 1993, 11.

39

federal election, the NDP promises more taxes on the rich for social programs. 158 All this has
given the party a high-taxing reputation that makes it appear out-of-step with the contemporary
populist mood. Of course, the precise extent to which the CCF-NDP is part of a high-taxing
power bloc must be evaluated considering the taxing records of different Canadian governments
and parties. Still, looking at the 23 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development in the 1965-1983 period, David R. Cameron found that "leftist parties," moreso
than "non-leftist parties," typically impose relatively high taxes--especially taxes on personal
incomes and wealth. 159 The Reform Party thus plays up this high-taxing record of the NDP, to
present itself, in populist fashion, as the most credible voice for the common people
contemplating tax revolts.
Reform promises to reduce or eliminate taxes and cut government spending, in areas
including Parliament, government administration, grants to special interest groups, subsidies to
business and political parties, and funding for bilingualism and multiculturalism. 160 Reform also
pledged for the 1993 election to balance the budget in three years and eliminate the debt by
cutting $19 billion in spending, or resign. 161 Of course, Reform only appears populist here, for

promising fiscal responsibility. It must prove this populism in power (although voters have a
guarantee with Reform's direct democracy, including recall).
3. CONCLUSIONS
Few deny the populist nature of early agrarian movements like the CCF.I62 However, the
CCF-NDP is not completely populist. 163 Populist parties trust and defer to the common people
and have faith in democracy. Yet, tension exists between the CCF-NDP's education and central
planning and these aspects of populism. As well, populist parties detest power blocs. The NDP
158"NDP Plays Old Song: Tax Rich," Prince George Citizen, 5 September 1996, [page unavailable].
159oavid R Cameron, "Does Government Cause Inflation," in The Politics of Inflation and Economic Stagnation,
eds. L.N. Lindberg and C.S. Maier (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1985), 260.
160 "Principles and Policies," 14; Richard Mackie, "Manning Hears What Ontario Really Wants," Globe and Mail, 22
September 1993, A7; "Reform Rides No-Tax-Hikes Platform," Calgary Herald, 11 January 1995, A3 ; "56 Reasons."
161 "56 Reasons"; Flanagan, 127; "The Only Deficit Plan We've Seen," Globe and Mail, 23 September 1993, A18.
l62J.F. Conway, "Populism in the United States, Russia and Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science XI: 1
(March 1978): 119.
1630nly 1% of delegates to the 1983 B.C. NDP convention considered themselves populists. 52% of 1987 B.C. NDP
convention delegates said they didn't "trust the simple, down-to-earth thinking of ordinary people rather than the
theories of experts and intellectuals," while 60% of the electorate begged to differ. Whitehorn, "The New Democratic
Party in Convention," 279, 290; Blake, Carty, and Erickson, 67, 133.

40

has joined several with constitutional links, even though it is not dominated by them. This
misperception is due to the ambiguity of the definition of power bloc, and to the successful
rhetoric of competing parties.
Currently, the Reform Party is largely populist. The party has faith in the common
people and tries to ensure their supremacy with direct democracy (that also displays the populist
desire for changing the political system). As well, Reform works at not being connected to any
power blocs. However, Reform ignores its own potential links to power blocs. It has also not
had the opportunity as government to fulfill its promises and prove its populism.

41

CHAPTER THREE: BROKERAGE POLITICS, THE CCF-NDP AND THE REFORM PARTY
1. POLICY REVERSALS
To broaden its electoral appeal, the CCF-NDP appears to have reversed many of its
earlier policies. First, the NDP seems to have changed its attitude towards its old power bloc of
capitalism.

The number of negative references to capitalism slipped to one in the 1956

Winnipeg Declaration from 17 in the 1933 New Regina Manifesto. 1 The 1996 Party Principles

document, despite calling for a "just and equitable distribution of wealth," does not mention
capitalism. 2 Likewise, the NDP's 24 page 1988 election platform does not mention socialism. 3
Moreover, Ed Broadbent says that the debate between capitalism and socialism is over, that,
"Market economies have been responsible for the production of more goods and services since
the Second World War than were produced in all of human history." 4 Also, the Ontario NDP's
1979 "New Directions for Ontario's Political Economy" advocated improving international
competitiveness and liberalizing trade--hallmarks of the "Right's" 1980s economic strategy.5
Second, the NDP now appears committed to reducing government when it often used to
expand its size. Tommy Douglas tripled the size of the Saskatchewan bureaucracy when the
population grew by only 70,000 (eight per cent). Ed Schreyer's Manitoban public service grew at
twice the national average.6 Dave Barrett in B. C. increased the bureaucracy by 25 per cent when
the population grew by ten per cent. 7 According to B. C. Report Magazine, Harcourt inflated that
amount by 15 per cent, when other Canadian governments were cutting back. 8 However, the
NDP record of government expansion must be compared to that of the other parties and to
citizen demand and need for services.
Yet today, the NDP looks at reducing the size of government. Bob Rae abandoned
provincial car insurance and promoted privatizing other government property. 9 Glen Clark
1

Alan Whitehorn, Canadian Socialism (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 50.
Partv Principles. New Democratic Party, 1996.
3
George Ehring and Wayne Roberts, Giving Away a Miracle (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press, 1993), 219.
1an McLeod, Under Siege (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, Ltd., 1994), 6.
~
and Roberts, xv, 63 .
6
James McAllister, The Government of Edward Schreyer (Kingston, Ontario: MeGill-Queen's University Press,
1984), 38.
7
Lorne J. Kavic and Garry Brian Nixon, The 1200 Days (Coquitlam: Kaen Publishers, 1978), 53.
8
Tom McFeely, "Actions Speak Louder than Words," B.C. Report, 29 April1996, 8.
~
and Roberts, xv, 305, 311.
2

42

vowed to reduce the public sector by 2,000 positions and promised $96 million in tax reductions
that would, he claimed, enhance government efficiency. 10 The federal NDP now advocates
decentralized forms of community involvement and local economic development in place of
government being the service provider. 11 However, CCF-NDP government reduction could be a
response to revenue shortfalls or a perceived inflated bureaucracy, not necessarily a policy
reversal.
These policy reversals make the CCF-NDP appear as a brokerage party.

Instead of

calling for major change and being a source of policy innovation, the party may now contribute
to brokerage policy stagnation. It then appears ideologically ambidextrous. The NDP seems
committed to assembling a voting coalition with more "centrist" policies to win power by
bridging social cleavages. This often requires a charismatic, brokerage leader.
However, it is one thing to appear brokerage with policy reversals, and another thing to
be brokerage. CCF-NDP policy reversals may not compare with the records of the other parties.
As well, many of these policy reversals occurred when the NDP was in power. It may be the
constraints of public office that have forced the NDP to move away from its socialist origins.
Besides, policy reversals may show that the CCF-NDP has become populist. It now represents
issues that engage Canadians and recognizes that an ideology must change or recede into
quixotic scholasticism and irreverence.12
These exceptions to the charge that the CCF-NDP has become brokerage through policy
reversals show the difficulty in definitively characterizing a party as brokerage. The CCF-NDP
has changed many of its policies. Yet, these actions do not necessarily indicate a shift to
brokerage politics. Furthermore, the perception that the NDP has become brokerage could be
due to the rhetoric of other parties. For instance, Reform has a relatively clean backtracking
record. It thus tries to display its alleged purity by accusing the NDP of being brokerage.

10

Steve Vanagas. "The Looming Labour-Policy Showdown," B.C. Report. March 11 , 1996, 8; "Clark Sworn in Amid
Scandal," Prince George Citizen, February 23, 1996, I.
11
Whitehorn, 247; Audrey McLaughlin, A Woman's Place (Toronto: Macfarlane Walter & Ross, 1992), 191 , Dave
Barrett and William Miller, Barrett (Vancouver: Douglas & Mcintyre, 1995), 86.
12
Whitehom, Canadian Socialism, 13. "I became leader because people saw that we had to become more mainstream
and broaden our base and get rid of a lot of the old dusty policies that were out of date" --Harcourt.

43

Indeed, Reform has only appeared to waffie on whether to support the Goods and
Services Tax and the Charlottetown Accord. Yet, it came out on the populist side of both issues.
Consequently, it seems to have usurped the CCF-NDP's role of providing a venue for voters
disaffected with the standard brokerage parties with all their policy reversals. The party thus
benefits by responding to popular alienation from politics as usual. 13 However, Reform may only
have kept its promises because it has not had the opportunity to break them (although it supports
recall as a guarantee). Unlike the older CCF-NDP, Reform has existed for only a decade. It has
not faced the pressures of government that often result in parties scrapping their idealistic
pledges in favor of "centrist" compromises.
2. EXPULSIONS AND PARTY DISCIPLINE
Besides apparent policy reversals that might signal a brokerage image, the CCF-NDP has
looked internally for ways to increase its appeal. First, the CCF-NDP does not always tolerate
internal dissent. A few months after the founding of the CCF, the entire Ontario wing was
disbanded by the national executive after farmers accused the labour section of being
communists. 14 In the early 1950s, Ontario NDP leader Stephen Lewis expelled the League for
Social Reconstruction (LSR) for its "extremism." The LSR included Frank Underhill, principal
author of the Regina Manifesto, who then quit the party and likened it to a "sect whose leaders
are mainly interested in maintaining at all costs their own authority within the sect. "15 Lewis
then later expelled the provincial "Waffie" in 1972 for its "extremism. "16 Also in the early
1970s, federal NDP leader David Lewis banished the Quebec wing of the party that he feared
had been taken over by separatists. 17 In 1969, the federal "Waffie" group of socialist New
Democrats, including future leader Ed Broadbent, were purged by the NDP worried that their
intemperance would divide the party and reduce electoral support. 18 The "Waffle's" precursor,

1

:navid Laycock, "Reforming Canadian Democracy," Canadian Journal of Political Science XXVII:2 (June I994):
2I4.
~
and Roberts, II ; Walter D . Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: Ryerson Press, I969), 2.
15
Ehring and Roberts, I2.
16
1bid., II.
17
Jack MacDonald, "The New Democratic Party," in The Canadian Voter's Guidebook, [no editor given] (Toronto:
Fitzhenry and Whiteside Limited, I972), 45.
18
Dennis Gruending, Promises to Keep (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, I990), 56, 59.

44

the "Socialist Fellowship," formed in B.C. in the 1950s, was also banished by CCF leader MJ.
Coldwell. 19
Second, the CCF-NDP has used party discipline along with expulsions to reduce the
autonomy of its elected representatives. As a result, CCF-NDP MPs appear to owe their
allegiance more to their party than to their constituents. Indeed, the founding convention of the
B.C. CCF in 1935 restricted the independence of MLAs by stressing their accountability to the
mass organization, and a special examining board was empowered to test their knowledge of
socialism.20
Carrying on the West Coast tradition, cabinet solidarity in B. C. was mandatory under
Dave Barrett. To oppose the government was dangerous, even though Barrett had trumpeted the
merits ofthe U.S. legislative system where legislators are not as bound to vote on party lines. 21
Instead, party discipline was compulsory, free votes were rare, and a powerful speakers'
committee supervised public speeches to ensure that members did not engage in utterances
inimical to the party platform. 22 Later in B.C., Premier Harcourt fired cabinet minister Joan
Smallwood who hinted that Harcourt should resign (which he did) for the "Bingogate" scandal. 23
In Saskatchewan a decade earlier, each Cabinet minister's report on nationalizing the potash
industry had a different misspelling in it to allow NDP Premier Blakeney to trace leaks and know
who to chastise. 24 Federally, Ed Broadbent promised disciplinary action for caucus dissension on
the party's Meech Lake Accord position (as he did during the 1982 patriation process). He then
stripped MP Ian Waddell of his caucus role as culture critic for opposing the Accord. 25 Later,
leader Audrey McLaughlin castigated MP Svend Robinson for "interfering" in Jim Fulton's B.C.
riding during a logging protest, and then removed finance critic Steven Langdon from his top
position for publicly criticizing Bob Rae's deficit reduction plans.26
19

Judy Steed, Ed Broadbent: The Pursuit ofPower (Markham, Ontario : Viking, 1988), 142.
'l<avic and Nixon, 63 . A failed proposal at this convention recommended institutionalizing MLAs by requiring them
to live in a CCF house under disciplinary control.
21
Ibid., 50, 60-61.
22
Ibid., 50, 63 . Barrett often chastised one MLA who regularly consulted his constituency to determine his position.
23
Steve Vanagas, "Layers and Layers of Secrecy," B.C. Report, 13 November 1995, 14.
24
Gruending, 144.
25
Steed, 251, 321; Robert Fife and John Warren, A Capital Scandal (Toronto: Key Porter Books, Ltd., 1991), 5.
26
Steed, 321; Norman Penner, "The Past, Present, and Uneasy Future of the New Democratic Party," in Canadian
Parties in Transition, eds. Brian A. Tanguay and Alain-G. Gagnon (Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1996), 96.
2

45

The expulsions and party discipline make the CCF-NDP seem brokerage for trying to
ensure a non-ideological or "centrist" image.

The party, by not always tolerating dissent,

appeared to be shedding its idealistic roots in favor of becoming a brokerage party primarily
dedicated to achieving power. Wanting to be a source of safe policy that would, in brokerage
fashion, bring more votes, the party could often not tolerate any alleged ginger groups or
perceived "radicals." This required a powerful, brokerage-type leader to enforce the "safe"
image of the party.
Still, the amount of CCF-NDP expulsions and party discipline may not compare to the
record of the other parties. Additionally, there are examples ofNDP tolerance of internal dissent
and free voting in the legislature. Besides, imposing discipline on renegade members may not be
brokerage in the sense of vote-seeking. The purpose may be to ensure the party keeps promises
that its members voted for at conventions and that voters supported at elections. Also, Canada's
parliamentary system often requires successful parties to present a unified front. Party discipline
and cabinet solidarity are not unique to the NDP, then, but are traditions Canada adopted from
Britain.
Despite these caveats, the Reform Party claims to reject this allegedly brokerage party
discipline that can force MPs to vote against their electors. Reform says it believes that
politicians must be free to vote the interests of their constituents, without defeating the
government or excommunicating themselves from their party.27 Thus, Reform favors free votes
in Parliament, and the Reform caucus passed a private members' bill for more such votes in
1994. 28 A Reform free vote has MPs voting according to their constituents' wishes, even if that
conflicts with party policy. This might mean Reform stands only for procedural democracy, its
policies irrelevant.

Reform then appears to out-brokerage the brokerage parties, by not

committing to any policies beyond open-ended rule by majority. Yet, a Reform MP will vote
according to party policy or personal judgment when there is no consensus in their riding.29 To
27

Act ofFaith (Vancouver: B.C. Report Magazine Ltd. , 1991), 178. "Why should we vote for you when you won't
vote for us?"--Manning; "We're working for you, not a party"--Manning.
28
"Principles and Policies of the Reform Party," 1995, 41 ; Preston Manning, The New Canada (Toronto: John Deyell
Company, 1992), 134, 144-145; The Reformer, August 1994, 1.
29
"Direct Democracy Task Force Report," (Reform Party of Canada, January 1996), 2, 7.

46

find that agreement (if it is ever attainable), Reform MPs conduct frequent surveys, along with
town-hall meetings and televised phone-in polls.30 These methods, though, must be conducted
properly. Otherwise, Reform MPs may misrepresent their constituents and defeat the purpose of
their free votes. The methods should also be scrutinized to ensure that they are more than
political ploys to make the party appear populist.
Still, Reform has met its promise of voting the wishes of its voters and not the party.
MPs Ian McClelland and Ted White went against their party position without punishment and
supported the Liberal's 1996 gun control bill after consulting their constituents.31 Even leader
Preston Manning says he would vote for legalizing assisted suicide, although he personally
opposes euthanasia.32

Reform then, seems to believe in the accountability of elected

representatives to the people who elected them, rather than the brokerage politics way of
politicians appearing indebted to their party. Of course, Reform could be impotent with free
votes, unable to be united on major legislative issues.
Nevertheless, if Reform MPs ignore their constituents in favor of party policy or personal
belief, voters have a further accountability check with recall.

Reform advocates letting

constituents initiate a recall procedure against any MP.33 This mechanism aims to ensure that
politicians owe their loyalty to the people who elected them, not to their party with party
discipline. However, Reform is still developing the precise requirements for their recall. They
could make it too easy, or too difficult, to use. Reform's "A Fresh Start for Canadians," states
vaguely that the threshold for recall must be high enough to discourage abuse while still
allowing citizens to recall an MP who has clearly lost voter confidence. 34
The CCF-NDP has never been committed to recall. Tommy Douglas promised in 1944
that his Saskatchewan government would resign if a single farmer was evicted from his or her
land. 35 Yet, from 1945 to 1959, there were 1,931 farm foreclosures, 354 evictions and 1,066
3

0oirect Democracy Task Force, 9; Flanagan, 9.
"Two Reformers With Guts to Represent Constituents," Edmonton Journal, 27 April 1995, A18 [Bill C-68).
32
Flanagan, 9, 171.
33
"Democratic Populism II Task Force Report," (Reform Party of Canada, January 1996), 10; "56 Reasons Why You
Should Support the Reform Party," 1993 .
34
" A Fresh Start for Canadians," (Reform Party of Canada, 1996), 23.
~
Tyre, Douglas in Saskatchewan (Vancouver: Mitchell Press Limited, 1962), 91 ; Gruending, 99.

31

47

cancellations of agreements for sale, and no resignations.36 Also, recall was demanded by B.C.
voters in a 1991 referendum. However, the NDP stalled its implementation for two years and
then made it difficult to use.37
With free votes and recall (despite its current vagueness), Reform attempts to minimize
the brokerage politics intolerance of dissent and party discipline.

Such mechanisms make

Reform seem populist, not brokerage, for wanting to change the way the Canadian political
system operates by trying to increase political accountability. Free votes and recall also present
Reform as a non-brokerage source of policy innovation in Canada (although these direct
democracy mechanisms are not new elsewhere). Still, the following examples show that Reform
may have slipped concerning expulsions and party discipline. This reinforces the charge that the
party is controlled by its leader.
Critics claim that if maverick party members rebel, Manning will quash their uprising.
Indeed, in January 1992, Manning subdued several members in Manitoba who had been
questioning party policy and accusing their leader of ignoring the "grassroots. "38

Thomas

Flanagan, Reform strategist and Manning advisor, was dismissed for being "negative" and
criticizing party operation.39 Jim Conrad resigned as president of a Toronto Reform riding,
charging that the party was too dominated by Manning.40
Despite this criticism, Manning consistently receives an approval rating topping 80 per
cent at Reform conventions. Many Reformers feel, then, that Manning's iron hand is the creation
of a hostile media that believes that Reformers are, in Dave Barrett's words, "right wing wackos,"
or, according to Rosemary Brown, "racists."41 It is thus not surprising that Reformers mistrust
the media.
36

Yet, this paranoia has created internal tensions precipitating apparent further

Tyre, 91.
Steve Vanagas, "Digging in Against Direct Democracy," B.C. Report, 6 December 1993, 6; Terry O'Neill, "The
NDP's Anti-Democratic Bent," B.C. Report, 12 July 1993, 2. B.C. recall requires the signatures of a simple majority
of all eligible voters in each riding from the last election, in 60 days, providing the MLA has served 18 months.
38
Mario Cernetig, "Flag-Stomper May Get the Boot," Globe and Mail, 18 January 1992, AS .
39
Steve Vanagas, "Countdown to an Election," B.C. Report, 11 October 1993, 13; Lome Gunter, "Preston, Where
Are You Going," B.C. Report, 20 February 1995, 10.
~a
Steinhart, "Reform is a House Divided," Prince George Citizen, 25 May 1996, 4.
41
Ted Byfield, "Dave Barrett Put the Case for the Reform Party in a Nutshell," B.C. Report, 18 October 1993, 44;
Michael Jenkinson, "Too Large a Target to Hit," B.C. Report, 25 October 1993, 10. The NDP funded "Reform
Watch," an anti-Reform newsletter, through the Douglas-Co/dwell Foundation and the Action Canada Network.
37

48

instances of brokerage-type enforcement of party discipline to clean up Reform's "reactionary"
Image.
Reform MPs Bob Ringma and David Chatters made homophobic remarks in April 1996.
They were then suspended from caucus by Manning for "violating Reform's belief in equality,"
and for portraying Reform as being "rife with extremism."42 Concurrently, Manning suspended
MP Jan Brown, who was publicly complaining that Reform was too reactionary. Manning then
declared that the next MP to disagree publicly with or misrepresent the party's equality policy
would be suspended or should leave. 43
The dilemma for Reform openly disciplining MPs is that it considers itself a populist
party that encourages MPs to speak their minds and champion the causes of constituents. Yet, in
suspending renegade MPs, Reform appears brokerage, valuing a mainstream image to win
elections. As with NDP expulsions, though, brokerage vote-seeking may not be the aim of the
suspensions.

As well, Manning's control over his ostensibly populist party is justified as

necessary to prevent the dark side of populism from emerging. 44 Indeed, Reform has a vibrant
dark side out of step with politically correct times.
Reform has had several candidates deemed extremist. Doug Collins, whose Vancouver
newspaper columns are criticized for their intolerance of non-white immigrants and Jewish
people, was selected to run for Reform in the 1988 federal election.4s John Beck, 1993 Ontario
candidate, made racist remarks concerning how Jewish people are running and ruining Canada. 46
Ron Mix, 1993 candidate for Edmonton, said that a woman is wholly responsible for unplanned
pregnancies after she "lays with the man."47 Hugh Ramolla was to run for Reform in 1993. He

42

Anne Mcllroy, "Reform Suspends Alberta MP," Globe and Mail, 31 May 1996, Al ; Tom McFeely, "A Forced
March Toward Chaos," B.C. Report, 20 May 1996, 19; Peter O'Neill, "Manning Ejects 3 MPs from Caucus,"
Vancouver Sun, 8 May 1996, Al.
43
Peter O'Neill, "Jaded Reformer Considers Future With Party," Vancouver Sun, 4 May 1996, Al ; Preston Manning,
"Preston Manning Writes," Vancouver Sun, 7 May 1996, All ; Peter O'Neill, "Manning Ejects 3 MPs," Al ; IfBrown
wanted Reform to be less "extreme," why didn't she support the Liberal's gay rights bill?
44
Flanagan, 29; Jeffrey Simpson, Faultlines (Toronto: Harper Collins, 1993), 122.
4
sAct of Faith, 60.
~ a a a 152; Brian Bergman, "The Crusader," Maclean's, 25 October 1993, 14.
47
Cernetig, Mario, "Reform Party's Many Faces," Globe and Mail, 14 October 1993, AS.

49

allegedly told a colleague to hit an obstinate female NDP candidate who was, ironically,
discussing violence against women.48
Reform has also had members considered reactionary, including Doug Christie, a lawyer
who has defended Holocaust-deniers, and William Gairdner, an author considered to have strong
nativist sentiments and an aversion to Asian immigration. 49 Ontario Reformer Gordon LeGrand
burned the Quebec provincial flag in a 1989 demonstration against provincial bilingualism. so
Still, Reform has consistently done something about its dark side. For its founding
conference in 1987, a delegate selection committee was established to keep out the "fringe
element. "s 1 As well, none of the aforementioned extremist candidates eventually ran for Reform.
The party now has an exhaustive candidate recruitment package.

Likewise, many of the

"reactionary" members have been removed from the party. Instead of membership being open to
anyone, anytime, Reform screens its members. One employee makes sure applicants do not
belong to the white supremacist Heritage Front.s 2
Reform feels, like the CCF-NDP in some cases, that expelling reactionary members and
preventing new ones from joining is acceptable to ensure its policies are accurately represented.
Besides, today, rigorous candidate selection and removing extremists may be populist. Voters
are extremely distrustful of politicians. They might appreciate greater scrutiny of the selection
process to ensure that only upright candidates are selected. sJ As well, Manning claims that
Reform is not trading populism for brokerage politics by cracking down on its "extremists."
These individuals, Manning says, are moving Reform away from the big, populist issues that are
crucial to its support (although these issues could be confused with brokerage policies appealing
to the greatest amount of people). s4

48

Edward Greenspon, "Tories Hunting Flawed Reformers," Globe and Mail, 15 October 1993, AI.
Greenspon, AI ; Kenneth Whyte, "Reform Storm Blows in Ontario," B.C. Report, 24 June 1991, 20.
~ a a a 92; Cemetig, "Flag-Stamper Gets the Boot."
s1Act of Faith, 18. In contrast, CCF candidates with extremist positions often rose to the top. Tommy Douglas and
Agnes Macphail wanted to sterilize "sub-normal people" and segregate them on state farms. Robert Eady, "Canadian
Socialists Also Had Mean-Spirited Attitudes," Toronto Star, 1 August 1995, A12.
s2Paul Gessell, "Extremism Divides Reformers," Prince George Citizen, 18 March 1996, 4. Reform also hired a
detective in 1995 to see if a spy was leaking damaging reports to the Conservatives.
sJ Act of Faith, 129. But who scrutinizes the scrutineers?
~ a a a 9; Steve Mertle. "Reform Must Decide if it Wants to Govern," Prince George Citizen, 5 June 1996, 6.
49

50

Still, Reform's success may be due to its political incorrectness, for daring to say what
many of its common people are thinking.ss Thus, Reform may be mistaken in covering up its
dark side. Indeed, Reform was chastised by the media for opposing on-duty Sikh RCMP officers
wearing turbans. Yet, 75 per cent of Canadians were also opposed to this policy according to an
April 1990 Environics poll. 56 Reform MP Herb Grubel was called a "racist" for stating that
Ottawa acts like a "rich uncle" to natives by paying them to do nothing and letting them live on
"tropical island resort" reserves. Yet, Grubel says that about 90 per cent of calls to his office
supported his comments. 57 Reform MP Paul Forseth prompted a media attack for telling the

Vancouver Sun in March 1995 that gay relationships are often violent. He then claimed to
receive only positive calls to his office. 58 Reform MP Art Hanger was criticized for his planned
visit to Singapore in May 1996 to study caning as a deterrent to crime. Yet, Hanger says he had
a mandate for this trip from his constituents. 59 Even Bob Ringma received a standing ovation
from delegates at Reform's June 1996 Assembly, and claims to be well supported by his
Nanaimo constituents for his homophobic remarks.
These examples show that much of Reform's support may depend on its dark side
constituting a distinct policy alternative. In silencing these voices, Reform may be shedding
some of its populism in the brokerage quest for power, bridging social cleavages instead of
deliberately "turning off' some of the electorate with its dark side. This is because Reform
cannot defer to the wisdom of the common people and muffle their sometimes ignoble
sentiments. This would require admitting that majorities (the common people) can be wrong.
To be completely populist then, Reform must without heed always follow the advice of the
common people. Reform may thus have set itself poor options. It can be principled but evil
with a dark side, or unprincipled (which it also considers evil), by becoming brokerage.

55

Steve Patten and Reg Whitaker, "Learning From Mr. Right," Canadian Forum, July/August 1995, 22. "These
criticisms for being politically incorrect help us with the rank and file and the public"--Manning.
56
Act ofFaith, 107; Simpson, 123 .
57
"Mr. Manning and his Caucus," Globe and Mail, 7 May 1996, A22. Yet, he may only have received a few calls.
58
Peter Verburg, "Bad Press But Not Bad News," B.C. Report, 10 April1995, 11.
5
9peter Verburg, "Lashed By Moderates," B .C. Report, 1 April1996, 28-29. A 1994 Reader's Digest poll found that
50% of Canadians support corporal punishment for sexual predators ofwomen and children.

51

3. ACCOMMODATING MATERIAL DEMANDS
The CCF-NDP became less ideologically distinct from its competitors after policy
reversals in several areas and some expulsions and party discipline. To distinguish itself from
the other parties, then, it now sometimes uses the brokerage politics tactic of accommodating
material demands. Thus, the NDP occasionally uses patronage, perks and pork barreling to
reward loyal supporters and to win over voters unable to find fundamental policy differences
between the NDP and its adversaries.
First, a common brokerage tactic to gain support despite a lack of policy differentiation
with the other parties is through patronage.

Thus, during the 1944 election campaign,

Saskatchewan CCF candidates exposed the sinful practice of patronage. Yet once in power, its
Civil Service Commission was staffed with friends and supporters. Even its head, whose role

was to hire socialists, was president of the Moose Jaw CCF Association. Unfortunately, the
commission's mandate was to ensure that government appointments follow the merit principle. 60
Likewise, the government's major health care initiative was to be run by a non-political body.
Yet, it too, was staffed with party faithful. 6 1 Premier Douglas also made sure that provincial and
federal defeated CCF candidates all found jobs in his government. 62
B.C. New Democrats carried on the Saskatchewan CCF's patronage tradition.

Dave

Barrett always found government jobs for party members, defeated NDP candidates and
campaign workers. 63

Harcourt's NDP, which in opposition professed to abhor patronage,

appointed supporters to high positions once in power.64 Likewise, according to Vancouver Sun
columnist Vaughn Palmer, Glen Clark and his NDP caucus began finding jobs for defeated
colleagues after being elected in May 1996. 6s NDP MLA Lois Boone hired a losing candidate as
her special assistant, giving her an annual salary higher than she would have received if elected
(although B.C. MLA's are not paid extravagantly). 66
60

Tyre, 24-25, 146, 150; Gruending, 26.
Ibid., 187-188, 190.
62
Ibid., 52. Blakeney continued this tradition in Saskatchewan for more than a dozen defeated NDP candidates.
Jeffrey Simpson, Spoils ofPower (Ontario: JCS Publications Inc., 1988), 269-270.
63
Kavic and NIXon, 56.
~
Beyer, "What Happened to NDP's Lofty Ideals," Prince George Citizen, 15 April 1996, 4.
6
sVaughn Palmer, "How Big is Mr. Clark's Shovel," Vancouver Sun, 8 May 1996, A10.
66
"Boone Gets Helper," Prince George Citizen, 24 July 1996, 3.
61

52

Still, the CCF-NDP has accepted patronage for its own from other sources. Stephen
Lewis, while receiving pension benefits from being NDP leader in Ontario, accepted Brian
Mulroney's offer to be Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations in 1984. Mulroney wanted
to appoint a New Democrat to blunt criticisms of his more partisan appointments. Lewis' job
included a $75,000-$89,000 annual salary, an entertainment allowance, a Park Avenue
apartment, and a chauffeured limousine.67 Also, Rosemary Brown was a B.C. NDP MLA and
federal NDP leadership contender. The self-described visible minority and social activist for the
poor was in 1993, claims B.C. Report Magazine, the appointed head of the Ontario Human
Rights Commission ($122,450 annually), the federal Security Intelligence Review Committee

($42,500 a year, plus expenses), and the Judicial Council of B.C. ($250 per day).68 Ed Broadbent
accepted Mulroney's offer of a $150,000 per year job in 1989 as President of the International
Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) after reviling Tory patronage

as NDP leader.69
Yet, patronage is not sufficient to accommodate material demands.

Second, good

behavior and loyalty are rewarded and enticed from members and elected representatives with
perks. Thus, the CCF-NDP accepts the public pension plan that offers benefits much more
generous than the pensions received by other Canadians.70 Broadbent pockets a $50,000 annual
MP pension besides his patronage post pay. 71

Rosemary Brown receives a fully indexed

provincial pension of $30,000 per year along with her patronage job wages. 72 Also, all the
current nine NDP MPs will enjoy the federal pension plan.73 Dave Barrett says that attacking
pensions is dangerous; B.C. NDP MLA Corky Evans wants pension increases. 74

67

Fife and Warren, 206; Simpson, Spoils of Power, 359; David Frum, What's Right (Toronto: Random House of
Canada, 1996), 213 .
68
Steve Vanagas, "The Color ofMoney," B.C. Report, 14 June 1993, 17.
6
9pife and Warren, 5, 200, 206; Michael Jenkinson, "Failure is Lucrative," B.C. Report, 3 June 1996, 24.
~
a Campbell, "Harvest from the Hill," Globe and Mail, 10 February 1996, D3 ; The Reformer, April1995. MP
pension credits are earned at the rate of 4% a year, compared with 2% in private plans. The average Canadian works
35 years to collect 70% oftheir annual salary. MPs collect 75% of their salary after 19 years. Pension benefits for
MPs also increase with inflation, unlike 80% of private plans.
71
Jenkinson, "Failure is Lucrative."
72
Vanagas, "The Color ofMoney"
~
and Roberts, 7.
7
4yaughn Palmer, "Corky Evans Has a Game Plan," Vancouver Sun, 27 January 1996, A16; Barrett and Miller, 153.

53

Nevertheless, along with pensiOns, the NDP enJoys the high pay provided elected
politicians through public funds when they are available. Audrey McLaughlin received $29,500
besides her MP pay and a large expense account for representing her Yukon riding (all totaling
more than $125,000), and a large office budget of$1.2

~

As well, Dave Barrett doubled

politician's pay when he was B.C. premier, claiming that the legislature was sitting more often. 76
NDP politicians have also enjoyed numerous miscellaneous perks, such as travel freebies
and exceptional health care. MPs Derek Blackburn and John Brewin, official party critics on
defence policy, were frequent flyers with NATO (when an NDP advocated withdrawing Canada
from this organization). 77 Ed Broadbent took 247 expensive jaunts abroad with the ICH.RDD to
promote "democratic development" in Third World nations.

Yet, an independent 1996

evaluation report prepared by London, Ontario consultant Jack Sterken, criticized the ICH.RDD
for poor organization and for lacking a "clearly articulated common vision." 78 As well, the NDP
champions the values of one-tiered Medicare. Yet, in 1990, the NDP caucus made 18 visits to
the National Defence Medical Centre (NDMC).

This centre costs more per patient than

facilities available to regular Canadians, and has no waiting lists. 79
Patronage and perks are fine for rewarding the loyal. Yet, third, pork barreling is also
required to accommodate the material demands of undecided voters. The CCF-NDP has never
enjoyed this benefit federally, but has used it provincially. Glen Clark's NDP in B.C., for the
1996 election, ignored provincial legislation that caps election spending and restricts campaigns
to 28 days. According to various media sources, Clark promised voters approximately $1 billion
in spending, in areas including education, school construction (in incumbent NDP MLA ridings),
youth employment initiatives, programs to combat prostitution, health care, child care, and
$500,000 to help women and minorities use the Intemet. 8° Clark also vowed to freeze
~
and Warren, 109.
<i3arrett and Miller, 84.
77
Fife and Warren, 153.
78
Jenkinson, "Failure is Lucrative." Broadbent has since stepped down as ICHRDD head.
~
and Warren, 100-101.
80
John Pifer, "A Dollar Today for a Vote Tomorrow," B.C. Report, 22 April 1996, 9; Palmer, "How Big is Mr.
Clark's Shovel"; Ian Haysom, "Buoyant Clark Gets Ready for Election," Prince George Citizen, 23 April 1996, 4.
Plus, $500,000 for a Bureau of Legal Dentistry, $11.9 million to the Legal Services Society, $1.8 million for 18 tax
licenses to a Clark-linked Richmond firm that previously had these refused by the Motor Carrier Commission.
7

54

automobile insurance, B.C. Hydro and post-secondary education tuition rates for one year, to
create 10,000 jobs for welfare recipients, and pledged $96 million in tax cuts.8 1 Clark's NDP was
elected based on these promises, but has reneged on many of them with a capital spending freeze
after "realizing" its budget surplus was a large deficit.
Overall, NDP patronage, perks and pork barreling makes the party seem brokerage for
sometimes relying on accommodating material demands to overcome its lack of policy
differentiation with the other parties. NDP leaders consequently increase in importance. They
must possess enough charisma to get voters to choose their party's promises instead of their
competitors. Accommodating material demands also displays the NDP's brokerage reluctance to
introduce change to the political system, for accepting the established "rules of the game."
However, NDP accommodation of material demands must be evaluated considering the
actions of other parties who may have worse records of using patronage, perks and pork
barreling. In other words, this is something that all parties seem to become guilty of once in
power. It may be the political system and not the party that explains the accommodation of
material demands. It may also be the assumption about motives and interpretations put on the
activities of politicians that creates the impression of accommodating material demands. For
instance, what appears as patronage could be coincidental. The most qualified person for the job
may have also had party connections. What appears as perks, such as generous pensions, could
be necessary to attract high quality candidates for public office, and to compensate politician's
job instability and low salaries as compared to the private sector. What appears to be pork
barreling could be an elected party fulfilling its promises.
Still, the NDP could have distinguished itself from the other brokerage parties by
avoiding this brokerage tactic. Then it would not, in brokerage style, contribute to weakening
party loyalty when voters develop little long-term attachments to a party but instead support ones
that offer the best accommodation of their short-term interests. This only gives Reform the
chance to say it is offering distinct policies by claiming to reject the accommodation of material

81

Palmer, "How Big is Mr. Clark's Shovel"; Bruce Strachan, "Clark in Driver's Seat," Prince George Citizen, 19 April
1996, 4; Pifer, 9.

55

demands. For this, Reform does not appear brokerage, but populist, by responding to public
resentment towards politicians.
Concerning patronage, Reform says it will eliminate partisan appointments. Government
jobs and contracts will be awarded based on fairness and normal commercial criteria of price
and quality.82 Still, if a Reformer is the most qualified candidate for a government job or offers
the best bid for a public contract, the other parties will accuse Reform of patronage. Reform
also promises to end pork barreling. However, it has to fulfill this promise in power before
being decisively considered not brokerage.

Besides, Reform's policies of lower taxes and

eliminating the debt and deficit with reduced government spending could be construed by its
detractors as pork barreling for promising voters more jobs and more disposable income.
Nevertheless, Reform really attempts to display its rejection of accommodating material
demands by eliminating perks. Every Reform MP (save one) opted out of the federal pension
plan.83 All Reform MP's volunteered a 10 per cent pay cut to go to debt reduction or charity,
including Manning, who also agreed to a 23 per cent reduction in his Leader's Office budget. 84
Also, Manning did not take an official car and chauffeur, and eschewed the large, elaborate
room once occupied by Audrey McLaughlin to take the tiny office in Parliament once used by
her chief aide. 85 As well, Reform declined use of the many miscellaneous perks--subsidized
liquor, massages, picture-framing, hairdressing, shoeshines, the National Defence Medical
Centre--enjoyed by the other parties including the NDP. Reform vows to privatize these services

(and hopefully not, in patronage fashion, reward the contracts to Reformers) and pay for them
privately at real market prices.86
Reform may appear sanctimonious regarding perks because it is young and has not
governed. Yet, it still does not have a perfect no-perk record. Manning accepted a $31,000
clothing allowance in December 1993 (although this is party-funded), and he enjoys the standard

82

"56 Reasons."
" 56 Reasons." Reform would end the plan's full indexation and postpone its eligibility until MPs reach age 60.
84
Flanagan, 170; "Is the Reform Party Abandoning Their No-Perks Agenda," CTV NEWS : Canada AM, 1 August
1995; The Reformer, January 1994.
85
The Reformer, January 1994; Susan Delacourt, United We Fall (Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994), xiii.
86
The Reformer, January 1994; CTVNEWS: Canada AM.
83

56

leader's expense allowance.87 Yet, Reformers appear brokerage for accommodating their own
material demands when they benefit from perks that they chastise use of by the other parties.
Still, Reform perks, as with NDP perks, may not represent brokerage politics. Additionally, the
perks may be legitimate investments in the party and leader's future success. Nevertheless,
Reform has realized that, despite wanting to do politics differently, it must still be heard. It has
thus adopted a combative approach in Parliament.
The original role of the Reform caucus in Parliament was not to act like the traditional
opposition and brokerage parties by focusing on exposing government corruption and
incompetence. It was to present politely constructive alternatives to the proposed legislation of
the other parties, including even supporting some acceptable government initiatives.88

So,

breaking rank with previous party leaders, Manning did not sit in the front row (thus forfeiting
the ideal grandstanding position for a more reserved view of the proceedings). 89 As well,
Reform MPs were not given critic positions to allow them to pounce on government ineptitude.
They instead assembled in "friendly clusters."90 Moreover, in place of hammering away at
government incompetence during "Question Period," Reform MPs nicely read questions sent in
to them by fax from constituents.91
Reform, though, soon found its neighborly approach was not allowing it to bring much
attention to its messages. The party then abandoned politeness. It found that virulent attacks on
government provided the crucial press to disseminate Reform ideas. 92 Thus, Reform designated
specific critics, made them better briefed and more visible to the media, and created a "posse" to
uncover government wrongdoing.93
The consequence of this shift was that Reform, in the way it practiced politics, appeared
brokerage for focusing on the shouting matches and confrontation it went to Ottawa to eliminate.
87

Fianagan, 176-178; Sheldon Alberts. "Manning the Troops," Vancouver Province. October 22, 1995, A42. Also,
some Reform MPs dropped their pay cuts to opt out of the pension plan.
88
Fianagan, 167.
89
Alberts.
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Norm Ovendon. "Deficit, Unity Remain Reform's Key Cards," Edmonton Journal. December 30, 1995, G2; Paul
Gessel!. "Reform Party Dropping Nice-Guy Image," Edmonton Journal. September 16, 1995, B5 .
93
Flanagan, 193; "Reform Stumbling," Edmonton Journal, 15 August 1995, A6. The posse was disbanded, though.

57

Indeed, Reform MPs now bicker with the best. They heckle so much that Parliament's House
Affairs Committee studied a proposal to impose sanctions on inappropriate behavior. 94 For

example, Reform Health Critic Grant Hill said in 1995 that talking to federal Health Minister
Diane Marleau was like "talking to a two-by-four. "9 s Hill also said he would do anything to get
his point across in Parliament, even stand on his head and hold his breath! 96 Reformers also
made headlines for throwing the Liberal Red Book of campaign promises to the floor of
Parliament, and for accusing the Prime Minister of making a "bald-faced lie" about his promise
to abolish the GST. 97 With all this confrontation, former Tory MP Harvie Andre noted how
Reform went to Ottawa to change it, and Ottawa changed them.98 Still, being confrontational in
Parliament and behaving like the other parties do not necessarily equal brokerage politics.
Reform may have only changed tactics, not principles, to ensure success.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The CCF-NDP gradually came to resemble, in several aspects, a brokerage party in
search of more provincial success and a federal breakthrough.

Its policy reversals and

occasional expulsions and party discipline seem to have moved the party to the ideological
"centre" that features the power ofthe leaders. Bridging social cleavages to win power appears
to have usurped effecting change, and Canada's political system may have lost an important
source of policy innovation. Now, the NDP often plays it safe, with policy, and must sometimes
accommodate material demands through patronage, perks and pork barreling to distinguish itself

I

I

from its brokerage competitors who have some similar policies. This can weaken party loyalty,
providing room for the Reform Party.
Reform, to date, does not have a record of policy reversals in quest of appearing
ideologically neutral (although it has not experienced power). Reform has tried to avoid
bridging social cleavages with a populist dark side it is currently debating whether to maintain.
However, Reform may risk sacrificing some of its populism for brokerage politics, by
94

Alberts.

Slbid.
96
Ibid.
9

97
98

Sheldon Alberts. "Chretien Branded 'Liar' for Failing to Scrap GST," Prince George Citizen. April25, 1996, 6.
Alberts, "Manning the Troops."

58

suspending and disciplining rebellious members.

This possible attempt to present a more

moderate, brokerage image highlights the leader's power. It also detracts from Reform, with its
direct democracy and fiscal policies, appearing as a source of policy innovation in Canada
(although these "innovations" are not new elsewhere). The party may also appear brokerage
when it accepts some perks and behaves confrontationally in Parliament.
Despite these claims though, it is difficult to categorize definitively either party as wholly
brokerage or not. Falling firmly into one category such as brokerage politics is not necessarily
the explicit aim of any party. As well, counterexamples to instances where a party is charged
with being brokerage suggest that the concept's components are hard to apply precisely. The
exceptions may also show that being labeled brokerage may be partly engendered by the
successful use of rhetoric by competing parties. Yet, the opposing parties may present false
assumptions about the motivations and actions of the allegedly brokerage aspects of their
competitor. This concentrates attention on the negative aspects of brokerage politics, such as
accommodating material demands.

The benefits, including allowing for compromise m a

divided polity through bridging social cleavages, are pushed aside.

I

I

II
I

I

I

I

59

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSIONS
The original question this thesis set out to answer was whether the CCF-NDP and the
Reform Party are populist or brokerage. This required defining populism and brokerage politics.
Limitations in the definitions of these two concepts hinder precise categorization of any political
party as populist or brokerage.
First, classifying a political party as populist or not is a matter of degree. On what counts
is the party populist, on what counts is it not? As well, a party could consider itself populist but
may not be, on all counts, theoretically populist. The party might be ignoring its anti-populist
aspects. It may have only adopted the populist tenets useful for its aims. Such selectivity,
though, could help to minimize the accumulation of anomalies produced by the inconsistencies
of populism. These inconsistencies, such as problems with defming and identifying the common
people and power blocs, can contribute to the limited lifespan of a populist party.
Second, as with populism, classifying a party as brokerage is a matter of degree. In some
respects a party may be brokerage, in some respects, not. This is due to difficulties in precisely
applying the tenets of brokerage politics to a party. For specific charges of instances of
brokerage politics, a potentially alternative explanation can sometimes be given. Thus, much of
what appears to be a party exhibiting brokerage characteristics may instead be due to false
assumptions about the actions and motivations put on the party by its competitors. Still, parties
tend to acquire brokerage aspects over time, especially after winning power.

Becoming

brokerage, then, is often not a deliberate decision made by a party, but an incremental one
influenced by external factors.
These limitations in the definitions of populism and brokerage politics affect the
conclusions this thesis can draw. Both the CCF-NDP and Reform cannot be neatly described as
either populist or brokerage. Rather, the possible populist or brokerage aspects of each party can
be presented.

Consequently, the CCF-NDP and Reform can simultaneously exhibit certain

populist and brokerage characteristics.

Either party, then, may have roughly more or less

populist than brokerage characteristics. Neither is purely populist or brokerage.

60

The CCF-NDP is not populist insofar as it minimizes its populist faith in the common
people with its political education and central planning, and for appearing to be connected to
several power blocs. The party also seems to have become brokerage with policy reversals,
expulsions and party discipline, and accommodating material demands. However, again the
ambiguous nature of the concepts at hand and the difficulty in applying them makes it hard to
label conclusively the CCF-NDP as anti-populist and brokerage. First, the supposedly antipopulist CCF-NDP political education and central planning do not consider that some common
people (unless they are formal representatives of labour or special interest groups) at CCF-NDP
conventions decide party policy and how other common people at elections endorse these
policies.

Second, the power blocs to which the CCF-NDP is allegedly captive can include

common people as members (although the party has constitutional links to power blocs). Third,
the CCF-NDP's policy reversals may be due more to the pressures of being in power than
deliberate brokerage pragmatism. Forth, its expulsions, party discipline and accommodation of
material demands may not have brokerage vote-seeking as the aim. Fifth, the CCF-NDP's image
as anti-populist and brokerage may be partly attributable to the use of rhetoric by its competitors,
including Reform.
The Reform Party of Canada considers itself populist and appears to meet most
requirements. It has faith in the common people, opposes power blocs, aims to be a source of
policy innovation (for instance, with direct democracy), and is critical of the operation of the
political system. However, Reform takes advantage of the ambiguity and inconsistencies of
populism for political advantage.

First, Reform glosses over its potential anti-populist

connections to some power blocs (for example, its acceptance of corporate donations). Second,
the party does not consider the membership of common people in power blocs. Third, Reform
largely assumes the common people are homogenous and, for the most part, accept the Reform
vision.

Forth, the party is selective regarding the populist tenets it follows (for example,

covering up its dark side). Fifth, Reform downplays its potential brokerage characteristics such
as recent expulsions and party discipline. However, there are alternative explanations for these
brokerage allegations.

61

The application of populism and brokerage politics to the CCF-NDP and Reform
illustrates the relationship between the two concepts. Populism is regarded as an aim to strive
for by parties while brokerage politics is considered, especially by populists, as something
political parties should avoid.1 Populism, then, appears to be granted moral superiority over
brokerage politics. For instance, to be populist is to be principled, to be championing the
concerns of the forgotten common people against malevolent power blocs. However, to be
brokerage is considered to be unprincipled. Attaining power is the ultimate aim. This can
include following power blocs to the detriment of the interests of the common people. Yet, this
perception of the moral superiority of populism over brokerage politics ignores the potentially
evil dark side of populism that taints this concept's purity. The view also concentrates on the
negative aspects of brokerage politics, including policy stagnation, weakened party loyalty, and
accommodating material demands (among others).

However, the benefits from brokerage

politics are ignored, including bridging social cleavages in a divided polity.
Still, the perception that populism is morally superior to brokerage politics nevertheless
allows political parties to juxtapose their allegedly principled populism against the supposed
brokerage pragmatism of their competitors. These populist parties criticize brokerage parties for
abandoning the righteousness of their populist ideals for the "win at all costs" focus of brokerage
parties. In doing so, the populist parties often view brokerage parties as a power bloc. 2 Thus,
Reform consciously labels the CCF-NDP as brokerage and presents itself as sanctimoniously
populist.
There is, though, a bias in comparing the degree of populism and brokerage politics in
these two parties. First, Reform is young, while the CCF-NDP has existed for much longer.
Second, the CCF-NDP has governed; Reform has not. Third, the CCF-NDP exists both federally
1M.J. Bateman et. al., "Mad as Hell," in Braving the New World, eds. M.J. Bateman, Manuel Mertin and David M .

Thomas (Scarborough, Ontario: Nelson Canada, 1995), 76, 79; David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought
in the Canadian Prairies (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 49, 113; Preston Manning, The New Canada
(Toronto: John Deyell Company, 1992), 19; W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1967 [1950]), 121 ; Margaret Canovan, Populism (London: Junction Books Ltd., 1981), 9, 286;
Walter D. Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), 4. These sources identify the
brokerage politics tenets that numerous populist political parties claim to reject.
2A power bloc of the Alberta Progressive Party was the party system. Reform refers to brokerage parties as "oldline" parties.

62

and provincially with various links of interdependence. Reform has no provincial wings. These
differences between the CCF-NDP and Reform qualify the conclusions regarding comparing the
amount of populism and brokerage politics in each party. The CCF-NDP has been more exposed
to conditions that could minimize its populist aspects and enhance the degree to which it appears
brokerage. The young, out-of-power, and federally unitary Reform is less susceptible to forces
that might reduce its populist elements and heighten its brokerage characteristics.
Nevertheless, the instances where the CCF-NDP and Reform are populist or brokerage-or appear populist or brokerage--suggest future options for these parties. The NDP, first, could
continue to become brokerage and give up its socialism. This has worked provincially. Yet
federally, the NDP has struggled competing with the other brokerage parties. Second, the NDP
could return to its socialist roots. This would provide a much-needed venue of expression for its
traditional supporters. However, it might entail the party receiving a smaller proportion of the
popular vote (although it could campaign for proportional representation). Third, the CCF-NDP
can be credited with being the impetus for the creation of Canada's welfare state, even if from
the sidelines. It might therefore consider accepting the limited lifespan aspect of populism and
rest content after a job well done. However, the NDP may wish to continue to fight what it
views as threats to the welfare state from the Reform Party.
Reform, first, could try to replace the Progressive Conservatives as Canada's only "Party
of the Right." Reform officially rejects a merger, yet has been overtly attempting to recruit
disaffected Conservatives through telephone campaigns, regularly establishes a presence at Tory
functions, and forged an alliance on an issue-by-issue basis with Ontario Conservative leader
Mike Harris. 3 An amalgamation or coup d'etat could be populist if Reform's common people
fear a split of the "right wing" vote bringing the brokerage Liberals to power. Such a union,
though, could also water down Reform's populist policies. Second, Reform could try to replace
the NDP as Canada's "Party of Conscience" by being the party of "Common Sense." It could
then concentrate on getting the job done in opposition instead of gaining the glory through
3Preston Manning, "Preston Manning: An Open Letter to the Federal Tories," Globe and Mail, 22 August 1996, A19;

Susan Delacourt, "Charest Hopes to Avoid Feud at PC Meeting," Globe and Mail, 21 August 1996, A4; Michael
Jenkinson, "The Conservative Death Rattle," B.C. Report, 29 April 1996, 16; Bob Cox, "Manning, Harris Form
Reform-Tory Alliance," Vancouver Sun, 30 August 1995, A4.

63

winning power. This would help keep brokerage politics away. Besides, being in opposition
may be the best place for a party that is supposed to be opposed to government and politics as
usual. Third, Reform can hope for more populist waves to maintain its support or bring power
without becoming brokerage. However, this tack may fail if the brokerage parties latch on to the
new political climate and steal Reform's thunder. Forth, if Reform cannot successfully replace
the Tories or the NDP, if there are no populist crises to champion, or if it loses the battle against
brokerage politics, then it should consider the "sunset clause" in its Constitution (with a
November 2000 deadline) and accept a limited lifespan.4

4Tom Flanagan, Waiting for the Wave (Toronto: Stoddart Books, 1995), 23 .

64

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