IMPACT AND BENEFITS AGREEMENTS:
DO THE ROSS RIVER DENA BENEFIT FROM MINERAL PROJECTS?
by
Doris Dreyer
B.Sc., University of Northern British Columbia, 2001

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
July 2004

Doris Dreyer, 2004

1^1

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Abstract
Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBAs) are arrangements between indigenous
communities and industry to secure long-term local benefits from resource development
projects. These local benefits include matters such as employment, training, economic
development, business opportunities, social, cultural and community services, environmental
protection, and cash payments. Despite the increasing use of IBAs in remote regions such as
Alaska and the northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia only limited information is
available about key requirements for successful IBAs. This thesis presents a case study
undertaken in collaboration with the Ross River Dena First Nation (Yukon). The study
analyses the success of two IBAs negotiated by the Ross River Dena for mineral projects,
through the use of a theoretical IBA framework developed from a review of current IBA
literature. As the two analysed IBAs differed in outcomes, it was possible to suggest criteria
for success and failure of the agreements. These criteria can be used as hypotheses in further
study and issues of caution for other indigenous groups entering IBA negotiations with
industry.

lU

Table of Contents
Abstract
Table of Contents
List of Tables
List of Figures
List of Abbreviations
Acknowledgement

iii
iv
vi
vi
vii
viii

INTRODUCTION_____________________________________________________________ 1
Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland ...
Definitions
Structure of Thesis

1
4
5

CHAPTER 1 : INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

6

Introduction
Concept of Development
The Fourth World
Modernization
Dependency
Indigenous Development

1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
1.5.
1.6.

6
7
9
11
15
17

CHAPTER 2: IMPACT AND BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.4.1.
2.4.2.
2.5.
2.5.1
2.5.2.
2.6.

Introduction
History
Definition
Rationale
Socio-economic, Cultural and Environmental Context
Legal and Policy Context
Emerging Theories
Process and Content
Experiences
Evaluation Framework

CHAPTER 3 : METHODOLOGY
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.3.1.
3.4.1.
3.4.2.

22
22
23
25
28
28
30
36
37
40
44
48

Introduction
Research Design
Methods and Samples
Archival Review
Partly stmctured Interviews
Open Interviews

48
48
51
51
52
53

IV

3.4.3.
3.4.4.
3.4.
3.6.

Survey with Community Members
Observations
Analysis
Limitations

54
54
55
56

CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY__________________________________________________ 57
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.3.1.
4.3.2.
4.3.3.
4.4.
4.4.1.
4.4.2.

Introduction
The Ross River Dena
Ross River Dena Experiences with Resource Development
Eur Trade
Canol Pipeline and Canol Road
Faro Mine (until 1992)
Ross River Impact and Benefits Agreements
Faro Mine Impact and Benefits Agreement
Kudz Ze Kayah Impact and Benefits Agreement

CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS
5.1.
5.2.
5.2.1.
5.2.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.5.1.
5.5.2.
5.5.3.
5.5.4.

Introduction
Success
Ross River Dena’s Evaluation of the Impact and Benefits Agreements
Comparison of Agreements’ Content with Benefits Received
Process
Content
Additional Influences
Project Related Influences
Community Related Influences
Industry Related Influences
Government related Influences

57
57
60
61
61
62
67
68
69
70
70
70
70
71
92
94
96
96
97
101
102

CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION AND RECOMMANDATIONS

104

Conclusion
Recommendations
Future Research

104
106
111

REFERENCES

113

APPENDICES

120

Appendix 1.1. Principles of the Four Worlds International Institute
Appendix 1.2. Common principles for indigenous development

121
122

Appendix 2.1. General Content of Impact and Benefits Agreements negotiated in
Canada
Appendix 2.2. Schedule 26-1 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
Appendix 2.3. Federal Russian regulation regarding resources development
Appendix 2.4. 'Cape York Model' for M ^or Project Negotiations
Appendix 3.1. Questionnaire for Partly Structured Interviews
Appendix 3.2. Survey for Ross River Dena Community Members
Appendix 3.3. Wage comparison of a Ross River Dena working at Faro and KZK
Appendix 4.1. Businesses of the RRDDC counted in 1998
Appendix 5.1. Evaluation of female versus male responses to satisfaction of
benefits received through Impact and Benefits Agreements
Appendix 5.2. Ross River Dena evaluation of their input to the negotiation of the
Impact and BeneGts Agreements

List of Tables
Table 1: Process and content related Impact and Benefits Agreement experiences
Table 2: Community, industry and government related Impact and Benefits Agreement
experiences
Table 3: Prq/fct rg/aW
Agrggmgnt
Table 4: Numbers and Type o f Ross River Dena Employment at Kudz Ze Kayah
Table 5; Numbers and type o f Ross River Dena employment at the Faro Mine
(October 1994-96)
Table 6: General overview o f the benefits received through the IBAs

List of Figures
Figure 1; Impact and Benefits Agreement e valuation framework
Figure 2: Traditional Territory of the Kasha Nation
Figure 3: Satisfaction o f the Ross River Dena with benefits received through the
Impact and Benefits Agreements
Figure 4:
work <fwruho/i between
River Dena o/W ot/ier
e/MpZoyee.y at rAe Faro Mine (October 7994-96)
Figure 5:
q/^Roa^a^ River Dena oW ot/ier inJigenoity empioyeej^ fOctober
7994-96)
Figure 6: 5^ari^ction q/^rTie Roa^.y River Dena wirA tene/ira^ receive<7 tArowgA TTwdz
Ze RayaA 7mpacr a/n7 Rene/ir.r Agreement
Figure 7: 5aii^ction q/'tiie Rosa^ River Dena wit/i 6ene/iü receive^i tTirowgA Faro
Mine 7/npact ami Rene/iü Agreement
Figure 8: RoM River Dena évaluation q/'t/ieir input to tiie negotiation q/^tTie Faro
Mine ami Rmiz Ze RayaA Agreement.^

VI

123
122
124
125
126
128
133
134
135
136

41
43
44
75
75
91

45
58
71

76
77
135
135
136

List of Abbreviations
BC

British Columbia

EIA

Environmental Impact Assessment

IBA

Impact and BeneGts Agreement

HBA

Inuit Impact and BeneGts Agreement

KMAO

Khanty-Mansij sk Autonomous Okrug

KTC

Kaska Tnbal Council

KZK

Kudz Ze Kayah

NWT

Northwest Territories

RRDC

Ross River Dena Council

RRDDC

Ross River Dena Development Corporation

SIWG

Sub-committee of the Intergovernmental Working Group on Mineral
Industry

TUS

Traditional Use Study

YTG

Yukon Territorial Government

Vll

Acknowledgement
First, I would like to thank the Ross River Dena Council for welcoming me to their beautiful
territory and for supporting my project throughout these past two years. I especially would
like to extend my thanks to Kaska Tribal Chief Hammond Dick for recommending the
project to the Ross River Dena Council, Chief Jack Caesar and his councillors for supporting
the project, Dorothy Dick and Kathlene Suza for their patience in helping to piece together
events that dated back as far as 10 years ago, and elder Arthur John Sr. and elder Charlie
Dick for lending their time and expertise to this project. Without your assistance this project
would not have been possible. Souga sinla.
Further, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Heather Myers and my committee members
Mr. Steven Kennett and Dr. Doug Baker for lending their advice generously and guiding me
throughout my undertakings. Heather, thank you for leaving me room to develop my own
project and giving me opportunities along the way to increase my horizons. It made my
studies an unforgettable experience.
This thesis was greatly supported by a number of friends who helped along the way with
their expertise and kindness. Ken Wilkening, Lynn Benn, Peter MacMillan, Nancy
Alexander, Roger Wheate; thank you so much for all the time you invested in this thesis.
I am grateful to the Northern Land Use Institute (UNBC, Prince George, BC) and the
Northern Research Institute (Yukon College, Whitehorse, YT) for the funding which enabled
this research project to be undertaken.
My love goes to my mom, sister and dad. Thank you for years of encouragement, support
and love. Eike, thank you for believing in me in times when nobody else would. Dankeschon.
George, thank you for your love and patience, your wisdom and your support. Lania ginslina.

viu

Für meine Mutti, der die Ausbildung
Ihrer Tôchter die Welt bedeutet.
Wir lieben Dich.

IX

Introduction
Northern Frontier, Northern Homeland ...
In his report i

V

o

/

f

norr/zem

TTig rgport q/^rAg Moctg/izZg

VhZZgy f ZpgZmg /nqwZr}', Berger (1977) explored the perception of remote regions as
'frontiers' versus 'homelands' where frontier was described as the last frontier waiting to he
conquered while also being the home of a people who are socially, culturally and
economically dependent upon the land. Berger went to northern indigenous communities to
learn about their concerns regarding the pipeline, as he set out to investigate the possible
environmental impacts of a proposed pipeline project crossing the North-American Arctic
from Alaska to the western Northwest Territories. Yet, Berger did not merely follow the
initial goal of assessing the direct environmental impacts of the pipeline. He expanded its
scope to include direct and indirect socio-economic impacts the pipeline would cause to the
northern people. As a result, Berger initiated a national discussion of the perceptions and
rights of the Canadian indigenous peoples living in remote northern areas. As such, this
inquiry started the development of a new understanding of the challenges faced by Canadian
indigenous communities when encountering large-scale resource development projects.
Berger concluded his report by suggesting a 10-year moratorium on the building of the
Mackenzie Valley Pipehne to allow for the settlement of land claims and thus, for indigenous
communities to gain control over their destiny.
Although written in the late 1970s, Berger's report has not lost its relevance to current
debates about resource development versus the protection of indigenous communities, not
only in Canada, but also other regions around the globe. These regions include, among
others, Alaska, northern Russia and northern regions of Australia. The indigenous people

living in these areas belong to culturally distinct groups, such as the Anindilyakwa (northern
Australia), Dene/Dena, Gwich'in, Inuit (northern Canada), Inupiat (Alaska), Khanty, Mansi,
Sami and Yukagir (northern Russia). Jackson (1991) states:
G eneralization [about indigenous peoples] should be m ade cautiously, given
the great variation in ecological setting, history and type o f contact
undergone ... N evertheless, all these peoples share a position at the end of
the scale o f socio-techno-political com plexity opposite from that occupied
by the vast state and m ultinational institutions contacting them . In many
respects this shared position m akes the crucial difference. (Jackson, J„
quoted in O ’Faircheallaigh, 1991)

This holds true for the above mentioned indigenous groups. While these groups are culturally
distinct, located in different ecological settings and situated within different nation states,
they tend to share similar experiences with resource development endeavours on their
traditional territories (O’Faircheallaigh, 1991). Reasons for these similar experiences are,
among other things, their shared standpoint within the greater nation state: being minority
groups in remote areas which have to stand up to government and industry to balance the
possible positive as well as negative resource development impacts on their communities and
lands.
Resource development is a double-edged sword for indigenous peoples in remote
northern regions. Often, it is the communities' only source of wage income. Wage income, in
turn, enables indigenous people to purchase hunting equipment (e.g. snowmobiles, gasoline,
guns and ammunition), and to finance traditional activities and ceremonies. Consequently,
from a positive perspective, resource development can increase and improve indigenous
communities' abilities to follow traditional activities. However, experiences in the past have
demonstrated that resource development, from a negative perspective, can cause tremendous
repercussions for indigenous peoples, for example the destruction of local traditional
economies, and the disruption of families and community ties. Thus, development activities

must be planned and guided from a community point of view, whereby negative impacts are
mitigated and positive impacts are reinforced.
Over the past six decades, the indigenous peoples of remote regions have experienced
different attempts to conduct resource development in an economically, politically and/or
culturally appropriate maimer with varying, but mostly limited success. The approaches
taken were dependent upon the political, economic, and social context of the time and place
(Alaska, northern Australia, northern Canada and Russia). At present, indigenous groups
throughout these regions are struggling for political and economic autonomy to create
development approaches which are more sensitive to their economic, social and political
culture. Presently, one of the approaches relied upon by many of these indigenous groups are
Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBAs). These agreements are commonly negotiated
between Indigenous communities and developers and aim to provide short and long-term
benefits for local residents from resource development projects located in the vicinity of their
communities. IBAs are widely used in the North American North and northern Australia, and
increasingly in the Russian North. Despite their frequent use by indigenous communities to
secure benefits from large-scale renewable as well as non-renewable resource developments,
little is known about the actual success of these agreements.
This thesis aims to increase the understanding of IBAs by examining two case
studies: the Faro Mine and Kudz Ze Kayah (KZK) IBAs negotiated in the 1990s by the Ross
River Dena. The Ross River Dena are an indigenous group located in a remote region of the
south-east Yukon Territory. As their traditional territory is rich in mineral resources (e.g.
gold, silver, lead, zinc, platinum, emeralds and possibly diamonds), the history of this
indigenous group is closely tied to different resource development endeavours. The objective

of the thesis is to investigate whether the IBAs negotiated by the Ross River Dena Council
(RRDC) for the Faro and KZK mines have been successful in providing short-term and long­
term benefits to indigenous residents. To measure the success of the IBAs, different methods
are used. First, a general framework is developed through a review of IBA literature. Then
the success of the IBAs is measured in two different ways: (i) through measuring Ross River
Dena perception of the benefits received from the IBAs, and (ii) through an analysis of the
benefits negotiated with the short and long-term benefits received. Finally, to analyse the
criteria for successful IBAs, they will be compared according to their commonalities and
differences, and placed within the IBA framework developed earlier. This comparison will
allow drawing a set of recommendations which then can be used for future resource
development projects of the RRDC. Further, these recommendations will assist in increasing
the knowledge about IBAs negotiated by indigenous communities who rely on non­
renewable resources development.
Definitions
The terms used to describe the original inhabitants in North-America, Australia and
Northern Russia are manifold and extend from Indians, Natives, Aborigines, First Nations,
and Aboriginal People to Indigenous Peoples. While in Australia, they are mostly referred to
as Indigenous Peoples and Aboriginal Peoples, in Canada they are called First Nations and
also Aboriginal Peoples. In the United States they are commonly referred to as Natives. The
smaller indigenous groups' located on Russian territory are officially called the 'numerically
small peoples of the north', while when talking about all original groups of the Russian North
the term 'Indigenous Peoples' is used. The term 'Indigenous Peoples' has also been adopted
by global organisations such as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Thus, this term
These include only groups up to 50,000 people.

will be used throughout the thesis to refer to the original inhabitants of North-America,
northern Russia and Australia. The term First Nation is used when referring directly to the
Ross River Dena First Nation.
The term 'industry' refers to large national and multinational corporations.

Structure of Thesis
The thesis is divided into slx^ chapters. The first chapter gives an overview of the
ways in which international development theory informs decision-making about mining
developments in remote regions inhabited by indigenous peoples and concludes by
introducing current criteria for indigenous development. The second chapter introduces
IBAs, especially their history, nature and rationale. Chapter 2 will describe emerging IBA
theories and introduce a newly developed IBA framework, which will be used as a tool to
analyse the two case studies. The third chapter presents the IBA research project, including
its design, methods of data gathering, data analysis and limitations. Chapter 4 presents the
case studies and, as such, introduces the indigenous group negotiating the agreements, its
history of resource development and the general experience with the negotiation of IBAs.
The Bfth and sixth chapters provide respectively the analysis, conclusions and
recommendations for this research project.

Chapter 1 : International Development Theory
1.1.

Introduction
Non-renewable resource development projects are of great importance to indigenous

peoples living in remote areas throughout the world, including the northern regions of
Canada, United States (Alaska), Australia and Russia. While those nation states are
categorised as First and Second World countries, these remote regions are referred to as the
Fourth World. Among other criteria, poor living standards, high rates of un- and
underemployment, and lack of formal education define these regions as underdeveloped.
Development theory is a discipline which strives to offer ways to overcome
underdevelopment through theoretical discourses. As such, development theory has been and
still is used to inform governments and the public about ways in which resource development
projects ought to be undertaken to overcome conditions of underdevelopment, and thus
benefit indigenous people.
This chapter starts by outlining the evolution and meaning of the development
concept and its influence on indigenous communities located in remote, mineral rich regions.
Then, the central development theories of modernization and dependency will be examined,
as they have been used to inform and explain development approaches taken over the past 60
years. Finally, responding to the failure of traditional development theories, a communitydriven development approach is presented which aims to increase indigenous participation in
development activities and thus offers suggestions for how remote communities can achieve
successful development.

1.2.

Concept of Development
We embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. The old
imperialism - exploitation for foreign profit - has no place in our
plans. What we envisage is a program of development based on the
concepts of democratic fair dealing. (Truman, 1949 as quoted in
Esteva, 1992)

With this speech on January 20 1949, U.S. President Truman laid the foundation for the
dichotomy of developed versus underdeveloped countries, the modem versus the traditional,
the successful versus the unsuccessful. Currently, two-thirds of the world’s population are
positioned on the underdeveloped side of the planet (Esteva, 1992). Meanwhile, the term
development became a fashionable word, encompassing meanings that shifted according to
the needs of the actors from academia, government, non-governmental organisations and
industry (Knippers Black, 1999).
For instance, when first introduced in the late 1940s, the goal of development was the
rapid industrialisation of traditional economies through the provision of start-up capital.
Development, then, was defined as being the rise of a stagnant Gross National Product
(GNP) by at least 5 to 7 % a year (Todaro, 2000). Development was measured in economic
terms; "problems of poverty, unemployment, and income distribution were of secondary
importance to 'getting the growth job done'" (Todaro, 2CKX), p. 14). However, as
development efforts based on these premises failed to provide the anticipated economic
improvements, new approaches to development evolved. Instead of focussing on economic
issues, development goals broadened to include socio-economic matters, such as income
distribution, the elimination of poverty, the reduction of environmental degradation,
sustainability, women rights, cultural integrity (Finnemore, 1997). With the broadening of

development goals, the deAnition of development became more inclusive. One of the most
commonly used definitions for development is that of Todaro (2000) who states that
development is a:
process o f im proving the quality o f all human lives. Three equally
im portant aspects o f developm ent are (1) raising peo p le’s living levels their incom e and consum ption levels o f food, m edical services, education,
etc., through relevant econom ic grow th processes; (2) creating conditions
conducive to the grow th o f p eo p le’s self-esteem through the establishm ent
o f social, political and econom ic system s and institutions that prom ote
hum an dignity and respect; and (3) increasing p eo p le’s freedom by
enlarging the range o f their choice variables, as by increasing varieties of
consum er goods and services, (p. 739)

This definition, based on the notion of improving peoples’ quality of life, has been
accepted by a number of authors and organisations, such as the Conference Board of Canada
(2001), Elliott (1999), Dragsbaek Schmidt (1998) and others. However, this definition lacks
important components necessary for improving peoples’ lifestyle. For example, Todaro’s
definition does not consider the need for the preservation and revival of peoples’ culture and
the protection of their environment, as well as a consideration for the long-term effects
(positive and negative) development is imposing on communities and its inhabitants. As
early as 1978, Chance noted that development in Alaska would not occur if it focused singly
on the development of natural resources. Instead, development has also to address human
components, especially in view of indigenous peoples’ culture, in order to be successful.
More recently. Young (1995) states that because of the environmental and cultural
degradation experienced by indigenous people in association with development efforts, they
appreciate acceptable development as "a process which promotes not only economic
advancement but also their social and cultural vitality and which emphasises long-term
sustainability rather than short-term gain” (p. 1). It is peoples’ perceptions that count when
looking at development. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, development is deGned as a

community-based process which lastingly improves peoples' quality of life from a cultural,
social, political and economic commimity point of view.

1.3.

The Fourth World
Questions may arise about using development theory associated with Third World

countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America for conceptualising development of remote
aboriginal communities in First and Second World countries. As for the arctic regions,
Griffiths (1983) expressed and answered these questions as follows:
T h e in itia l re a c tio n to th e h y p o th e s is m a y b e o n e o f d is b e lie f, ‘T h ird
W o r ld ’ s u g g e s tin g tro p ic a l h e a t w a v e s a n d n e w ly in d e p e n d e n t or
n e o -c o lo n ia l sta tu s. U p o n re fle c tio n , h o w e v e r, it w ill b e re c o g n is e d
th a t th e te rm a lso c o n n o te s u n d e rd e v e lo p e d a n d d e v e lo p in g are as
w h o s e e v o lu tio n is s u b s ta n tia lly a ffe c te d b y th e d e c is io n s iss u in g
f ro m re m o te m e tro p o lita n c e n tre s, a n d w h o se p o p u la tio n s e x p e rie n c e
b o th an e ro s io n o f tra d itio n a l c u ltu re a n d a se n s e o f p o w e rle s s n e s s to
d e te r m in e th e ir o w n fu tu re in th e m id s t o f e x te rn a lly g e n e ra te d

change, (p. 350)

Osherenko and Young (1989), and Swiderski (1992) agree with Griffiths’ assessment. Young
(1995) further expands this statement to the northern regions of Australia by stating that their
experiences with development have been similar to those of Third World regions. Young
states "aboriginal peoples form a distinct group within these areas. Their difference in social,
cultural and economic terms, coupled with the paternalistic nature of the policies which have
dominated their administration for decades, have led to them being referred to as the ‘Fourth
World"'(p. 33).
Another concept used to describe Fourth World regions is that of remote regions.
According to Huskey and Morehouse (1992) remote regions are "physically, economically,
and politically distant from centres of wealth and power; they are culturally or ethically
diverse and sparsely settled; and they exhibit extreme limits on their autonomy, self­

sufficiency, and welfare" (p. 128). Northern regions of North America, Russia and Australia
At within this description. All of these regions, compared to the national average, are marked
by a high indigenous population, high rate of un- and underemployment, dependence upon
transfer and welfare payments, and little to no decision-making regarding their development^
(see Osherenko & Young, 1989; Young, 1995; Chance & Andreeva, 1995; Espiritu, 1997).
Similar to many Third World countries, the history of remote regions is bound to their
wealth of renewable and non-renewable resources, which attracted the attention of the
southern centres (Huskey & Morehouse, 1992). First, the northern regions of Canada and
Russia, as well as Alaska became known through their wealth of fur bearing animals, while
indigenous peoples in northern Australia experienced the in-migration of southern grazers to
take advantage of the “vast plains of splendid pasture” (Young, 1995, p.33). Further, remote
regions experienced the expansion of modem economies through the ‘discovery’ of non­
renewable resources, such as minerals (e.g. the Klondike Gold rush in the Yukon and the
Bauxite mine at Western Cape York, North Queensland) and oil and gas (e.g. North Slope
development in Alaska and the Berezovskoe gas fields in Western Siberia) (see Young, 1995;
Kauffman, 1998; Espiritu, 1997).
Today, non-renewable resources projects are the most dominant economic sector in
most of the northern regions of North-America, Russia and Australia. While Aom a corporate
and governmental perspective many of these developments have been economically
beneGcial, these developments had mostly disastrous effects on indigenous peoples, for
example through the destruction of arctic and desert environments, and the associated socio­
economic impacts on the people inhabiting these regions (Young, 1995). Thus, a main focus
^ N otable exceptions are, for exam ple, some o f A lask a’s Boroughs (i.e. N orth Slope B orough) w hich have
gained input into decision-m aking concerning their com m unities through the settlem ent o f land claim s as w ell
as significant econom ic developm ent through m ajor resource projects.

10

of indigenous development is to find ways to increase economic benefits for northern
residents, while mitigating the negative outcomes from resource developments. However,
this is challenging since indigenous communities not only have to defend their claims within
mainstream society, but also against multinational companies. Anderson and Bone (1995)
state:
In many ways, the circum stances faced by First N ations struggling to
achieve econom ic developm ent are sim ilar to those faced by T hird W orld
nations. For both, the objective is to im prove the socio-econom ic conditions
o f their people. To do this they m ust find a place in the global capitalist
econom y controlled by others, particularly large corporations. This suggests
that theories associated with T hird W orld developm ent m ight provide useful
insights into F irst N ations econom ic developm ent, (p. 123)

Likewise, Huskey and Morehouse (1992) acknowledge the general value of Third World
development theory in analysing indigenous development in remote regions; yet, they also
point out that "these are no substitutes for a focus on the "First World" relationships that are
directly at issue” (p. 129). However, no such theoretical framework for development of
remote regions in First World states has been built to this point in time. Thus, the remainder
of this chapter will focus on presenting main classic development theories and their
application in remote northern regions, and then introduce a new approach to economic
development based on current practices of indigenous peoples in remote regions of
developed countries.

1.4.

Modernization
Modernization theory arose in the 1950s and 1960s as a response to two factors: Grst,

the unexpected economic, technological and political growth of European countries after
World War Two, and second, the United States' fear of underdeveloped countries allying
themselves with the communist Soviet Union. Modernization theory is argued to be a tool
that promotes economic and political development, thus leading to stability. The main
11

recipients of modernizing development are traditional societies; the main objective is the
traditional society's need to overcome 'internal obstacles' such as traditionalism and
remoteness (Huskey & Morehouse, 1992) to advance to an industrialized level. The core of
modernization is the belief that traditional societies require outside assistance to start the
development process, which, once initiated, creates a self-sustaining ripple effect that
disperses development to society as a whole (Knippers Black, 1999).
Modernization is informed by evolutionary and functional theories. In accordance
with the evolutionary theory, modernization assumes “social change [that] is unidirectional,
progressive, and gradual, [and] irreversibly moving societies from a primitive stage to an
advanced stage, ... making societies more like one another as they proceed along the path of
evolution” (So, 1990, p. 33). It assumes that once the process of modernization is started, the
process will progress internally along a linear path without outside influence. Furthermore,
based on functional belief, modernization theory reflects the assumption of a systematic and
transformative process as it affects social changes in all social realms of society, and aims to
transform all traditional structures and values according to modem ideals (based on Western
standards) (So, 1990). One of the best known approaches to modernization theory is rooted in
economics: Rostow's Stages of Growth Model, which was prominent from the late 1950s to
the mid 1960s. According to Rostow's model, development continues along a linear path,
proceeding from a 'traditional society', to 'preconditions for take-ofT, 'take-off, 'drive to
maturity' and Anally to the 'age of high mass consumption' or development. Once the critical
stage, 'take-oA', was reached through Anancial and technological outside assistance, the
process would inevitably and spontaneously conAnue, and lead to the development and
modemizaAon of former tradiAonal countnes (EUioA, 1999; Todaro, 2(XX); Fheston, 1996).

12

However, in the 1970s it became obvious that despite the worldwide economic
growth measured in GNP, the anticipated beneAts of development have not been shared
equally among the nations, but lead to a widening of the gap between the developed and the
underdeveloped (Elliot, 1994; Brohman, 1996; Todaro, 2000). Consequently, models built on
modernization theory have become increasingly criticized because of their "misleading
evolutionary and functionalist assumption, methodological problems, and ideological biases"
(So, 1990, p. 59). For instance, Rostow’s economic growth model has been recognised as
suffering from overgeneralization and oversimplification as it insists on development
proceeding along a linear path (Fry & Martin, 1991), and omits differences within
underdeveloped regions with reference to history, location and culture (So, 1990; Swiderski,
1992). Being based exclusively on the interpretation of internal factors for development,
modernization failed to consider the devastating effects external factors can have on
developing regions (Todaro, 2000). Further, disregarding the importance of regionalism, the
modernization ideal is based on the assumption that the state will lead the development
process without active input from the recipients of development (top-down process) (So,
1990). Finally, as modernization relies strictly on economic factors, such as capital,
technology and management, it misses the importance of social factors for development, such
as training and education for the underdeveloped population.
Past development experiences in remote regions, which often are dominated by largescale mining developments, underline the accuracy of these critiques. Focussing on the
provision of start-up capital and substitution of infrastructure, federal governments have been
instrumental in facilitating mining projects in remote regions to gain national economic
benefits while aiming to bring long-term development to indigenous peoples. Assimilation of

13

indigenous people into the mainstream society was the cornerstone of this ^proach (Young,
1995; Elias, 1991; Fiideres & Gadacz, 2(X)1), as the 'modernization' of the people was equal
to their increased benefit to the national economy and their improved living conditions.
However, the benefits (mostly employment opportunities) received by indigenous people
through large-scale projects were short-term and limited (Stabler & Howe, 1990; Young
1995). Instead of modernizing remote regions, these mining developments had substantial
detrimental effects on the indigenous population of the regions through the degradation of the
land, and the disruption of the social, economic and cultural structure of the communities
(Whittington, 1986; Couchiching Study Group, 1978; Espiritu, 1997).
An example of the modernization approach taken by government is the Pine Point
Mine (Northwest Territories, Canada), which was built near the indigenous community of
Fort Resolution. Promoted by government with substantial subsidies such as infrastructure
and tax holidays, this mine opened in 1964. At this point in time, neither government nor
industry paid attention to the environmental and social impacts of the mine on the indigenous
population. No arrangements were made to facilitate the incorporation of indigenous people
into the workforce of the mine. Moreover the infrastructure built bypassed the community,
and thus enforced the already depressed local economy of Fort Resolution (MacPherson,
1978b). MacPherson (1978b) observed:
The native people had only limited access to employment in the attractive
sector, although they bore the brunt o f the negative effects from the
developm ent. All investm ents during the initial stages o f developm ent were
m ade solely w ith the objective o f bringing the m ine into production; no
significant expenditures were made to m axim ize the possible regional
benefits o f the project, or to m inim ize its adverse im pacts, (p. 102)

As a result, the community of Fort Resolution suffered social disruption and a severe decline
of the traditional and modem economic sector, and consequently became increasingly
dependent upon federal welfare payments.
14

This development initiative demonstrated that a simple infiltration of money,
technology and institutional structures from western centres was not able to start up a
development process which led automatically to 'modernization', bringing prosperity and
well-being to remote indigenous communities. Instead of promoting self-sustainable and
economically independent communities, state intervention in indigenous soeieties such as
welfare payments, and the degradation of the land base through large-scale non-renewable
resource projects created a dependent relationship between government and/or industry and
northern communities. This dependency will be further explored in the following section.
1.5.

Dependency
Dependency theory emerged in the early 1960s as a response to the deteriorating

effects of the Ameriean modernization school. While modernization presents a view of the
First World on development, the dependency school represents the Third World’s view of the
results of development activities. In contrast to modernization theory, which takes an
ahistorical approaeh to development analysis and focuses on the internal structures necessary
for development, dependency theory is built upon a historical investigation of external forces
that constructed economic, political and cultural dependencies between core and periphery
(Preston, 1996; Valenzuela & Valenzuela, 1998; Frank, 1967). Cores are economic centres
which become powerful by weakening the surrounding peripheries, also referred to as
underdeveloped areas. While the peripheries rely on inexpensively supplying primary
resources and low-tech products, the centre delivers highly priced high-tech goods.
Dependency theory maintains that this unequal economic exchange is the root of the
development conflict (Fry & Martin, 1991). It furthermore claims that the reason for the
underdevelopment of certain countries and regions is the direct result of global economic and

15

political structures, which are determined by Western states (Valenzuela & Valenzuela,
1998; Anderson and Bone, 1995). Thus, the problem of underdevelopment cannot be solved
unless international economic structures are tamed through national trade barriers, the control
of multi-national corporations, and the formation of regional trade structures which are
enforced through a strong state government (Preston, 1996). However, as national
governments traditionally have strong ties to core countries which are not easily untied,
"many dependency researchers propose that socialist revolution may be necessary ...to get
rid of old ruling elites” (So, 1990, p. 106).
One of the most renowned dependency theorists, Andre Gunder Frank, suggested the
above-described structural relationship of metropolis (core) and satellite (periphery) based on
his work in Latin America, (see Frank, 1967). In a study published in 1969, Frank used a
dependency model to describe regional relationships enforcing underdevelopment within
developed nation states, in particular Brazil. Frétés (1988) used Frank’s work to test the
usefulness of dependency theory in explaining underdevelopment patterns in the Canadian
Arctic. Drawing on historic events in the Canadian Arctic, such as the fur trade, the whaling
industry, the Klondike Goldrush and the petroleum boom in the seventies. Frétés compares
the economic development patterns of Brazil's and Canada's northern regions. He states that
the model presented by Frank applies equally to both areas and hence, concludes that
"[Frank's] model seems to help explain the nature of underdevelopment in the Canadian
North” (p. 115).
However, dependency theory is challenged by a number of authors based mainly on
two arguments. First, critiques state that the exclusive reliance on external influences gives
the impression of the periphery being passive and without any influence in decision making

16

(So, 1990). Second, a number of critiques question the ability of dependency theory to
provide solutions (Young, 1995; Fry & Martin 1991; Forbes, 1984). For example, given the
small population in the remote northern regions of Canada, Russia and Alaska, and its
general dependence on outside assistance (Gnancial as well as human resources) it is
questionable if a separation from the south through a socialistic revolution would assist
indigenous people in overcoming underdevelopment. Hence, Fry & Martin (1991) conclude
that dependency theory is "more useful as a method of critique and explanation than a set of
specific solutions. However, it has served to facilitate a deeper and more complete
understanding of the international political and economic system” (p. 98).
1.6.

Indigenous Development
Assimilation attempts initiated by federal governments through modernization

approaches, for example in Canada, Australia, the United States and Russia, have not been
successful in abolishing indigenous peoples’ culture. However, politics, education and media
have greatly influenced peoples’ perceptions of desired lifestyles, including possession of
amenities created in core centres (e.g. trucks, guns, ammunition and Nike apparel). This has
created a demand for wage employment which, in most remote regions, can only be filled by
government or mining related businesses (Whittington, 1986; Young, 1995). Hence,
economic development has become a central focal point of indigenous communities
(Newhouse, 1997; Elias, 1995). However, past development approaches proved to be
inappropriate to indigenous people as they first, marginalized indigenous people as havenots, second, disregarded the traditional economy as an important economic sector for
indigenous communities, and third, were based on top-down approaches without regard for
the communities’ views of their future or opportunities to share the development’s beneGts.

17

Thus, there arose a need to identify factors that promote long-term development of remote
indigenous communities while being "appropriate to their lifestyle and aspirations" (Young,
1995, p. 3).
Over the past two to three decades a vast body of literature, mainly produced by
development practitioners (such as indigenous and government officials working in the area
of indigenous development) has evolved, which promotes the idea of a bottom-up process to
development^. A bottom-up process gives communities the opportunity to create
development which is dynamic and sensitive in responding to communities’ particular needs
and desires. Due to the bureaucratic limitations, development agendas promoted by
government tend to divide activities according to the perceived problem areas (economic,
education, social, housing) (Dodson, 1985). In contrast, using a bottom-up process enables
planning from a holistic point of view, including economic, social, cultural, political and
environmental aspects of community life while considering communities’ knowledge from
past experiences and their future goals (Frideres & Gadacz, 2001). As such, this approach is
argued to stand in opposition to development characteristics promoted by modernization
theory and criticized by dependency theory (e.g. Young, 1995).
However, Anderson and Bone (1995) argue that the new approach stands not in
opposition to modernization or dependency, but rather is a contingency of the economic
regime in place. Anderson and Bone maintain that the bottom-up process is not as much a
change from the 'regime of accumulation’ (dominance of transnational corporations acting
on a global level), but rather a change of the 'social mode of regulation’ (established
structures of doing business located on all levels, from the local to the global). This, in turn,

^ The bottom -up process is also referred to as grass-roots developm ent, alternative developm ent, com m unity
em powerm ent, or in the context o f developm ent o f indigenous com m unities, aboriginal developm ent.

18

causes a change in the 'mode of development' (the approach taken to react to the regime of
accumulation and the social mode of regulation). As such indigenous development is not a
new development theory, but is a contingent response to the ongoing regime of
accumulation; hence he calls it contingency perspective. Anderson and Bone (1995) state:
A ccording to this perspective, com m unities, regions, and nations are all part
o f the global econom y and m ust accom m odate them selves to the
requirem ents o f the current dom inant regim e o f accum ulation. The approach
adopted tow ard that econom y (m ode o f developm ent) can reflect
local/regional/national characteristics and can m eet local/regional /national
needs. W hether it does so or not depends in large part on the presence o f an
active civil sector capable o f articulating those needs and a leadership
capable o f developing strategies and structures and negotiating
arrangem ents necessary to address those needs, (p. 126)

Indigenous development fits well within the contingency perspective as it explains why
indigenous communities are not ignoring large-scale economic development such as mining
projects, but seek partnerships with companies to share the economic benefits. The improved
bargaining position taken by indigenous people has a number of reasons, such as the
increased recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights by national and international
organisations and government"^ and the need for established transnational corporations to
display corporate responsibility to maintain stability on the market (Goodman, 2003). The
contingency perspective is positive about the potential success of the emerging indigenous
approach to development (Anderson, 1995). Based on the premise of active participation, the
contingency perspective outlines the necessity of 'various forms of partnerships and alliance"
with other indigenous and non-indigenous businesses.
Being stiU in its infant state, there is no universally agreed-upon set of principles for
indigenous development available in literature. This, arguably, is consistent with their
purpose: being flexible to communities' needs and aspirations. For example, the development
* Largely due to indigenous p eoples’ pressure at international forum s, such as the U N , as well as national

forums to recognize the right o f self-determ ination o f indigenous peoples (V enne, 1998).

19

principles proposed by the Fowr

/ntemahonaZ /fwntwtg (see Appendix 1.1.) are based

on traditional values such as holistic learning, the use of elders' knowledge and the
interdependency of spirituality and materialism (Croal & Darou, 2002). Meanwhile
development principles agreed by participants of a conference on indigenous resources
development^ are rather pragmatic as they focus on the requirements of planning processes,
technical assistance and cooperation with governments (see Appendix 1.2.). Focussing on
specifically economic development, Anderson and Bone (1995), state that indigenous
development is:
a collective approach ... that is closely tied to each First N ations’ traditional
lands and practices and its identity as a Nation. T his developm ent approach
serves three purposes:
1. T he attainm ent o f econom ic self-sufficiency as a necessary condition
for the realization o f self-governm ent at the N ation level.
2. The im provem ent o f the socio-econom ic circum stances o f the people of
the First N ations.
3. The preservation and strengthening o f traditional culture, values and
languages and the reflection o f the sam e in developm ent activities, (pp.
122- 123 )

Further, Anderson and Bone (1995) add that the key to achieving these objectives lies in the
realization of indigenous business ownership which is profitable in the long-term and which
is open to form alliances and joint-ventures with other indigenous and non-indigenous
partners. Despite the lack of agreement on a particular set of development objectives, some
universal ideas about indigenous development are recognisable. First, economic development
is seen as the main instrument for community development. Second, economic community
development is not the end, but the means to create the conditions for an holistic approach to
development, including social, cultural, spiritual and environmental goals and aspirations.
Third, economic development must be controlled by the communities to ensure that they are
appropriate to the needs and aspiration of a particular indigenous community or group.
^ International Conference, ‘Tow ards N ative Self-R eliance Renew al and D evelopm ent’ held in V ancouver,
A ugust 19-24, 1984).

20

Fourth, indigenous communities need to establish partnerships with government and industry
to pursue their community development objectives.
Six elem ents o f such co-operation are:
indigenous peoples .. .decide w hat is important, and why;
all parties identify objectives o f their work;
developers and indigenous peoples w ork together
to respect each
other's needs;
indigenous peoples have a key role in project m onitoring and followup;
planning allow s scope to use indigenous know ledge in envisioning the
project results and benefits;
indigenous peoples are enabled to u se their traditional know ledge, not
ju st talk about it. (Croal & D arou, 2000, pp. 15-16)

The realisation of indigenous development is challenging as it must respond to a
variety of limitations. How, for example, can traditional values, environmental health and
modern economic necessities being merged with western ideals of development in a
meaningful way? Given the social, economic and educational limitations faced by many
remote indigenous communities, how can indigenous people prepare for economic
opportunities? Considering that most mining developments are undertaken by multinational
corporations, how can small indigenous groups be enabled to take an efficient position in
negotiating development outcomes desired for their communities? The key issue recognized
in literature is the necessity for long-term capacity-building in indigenous communities
through the allocation of appropriate funding and conditions by government and industry,
and the creation of an understanding and appreciation of traditional culture, economy and
knowledge by community outsiders, such as government, industry and the general public.

21

Chapter 2: Impact and BeneGts Agreements
2.1.

Introduction
The previous chapter presented development theories and their impacts on

underdeveloped remote regions inhabited by indigenous people. It recognised development
as being a community-based process which lastingly improves peoples’ quality of life from a
cultural, social, political and economic community point of view. Further, Chapter 1 pointed
to the importance indigenous people place on economic development to achieve community
development. Part of economic development is the building of partnerships to take full
advantage of economic opportunities. This chapter will introduce one tool used to achieve
economic development through partnerships with mineral resources companies: Impact and
Benefits Agreements (IB As). These agreements are used to mitigate negative development
impacts while enhancing positive mining outcomes for indigenous communities. Depending
upon the location, purpose and time of development IB As are also referred to as socio­
economic agreements^, participation agreements^, economic agreements,* Inuit Impact and
Benefits Agreements (IIBAs)^, mining agreements

and others.

This chapter will give a brief overview of the history, structure and use of IBAs in
Alaska and northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia. Further, using literature on
IBA theory and experiences, this chapter presents an IBA framework which will be used to
analyse factors for their success. As IBAs can vary tremendously in terms of their regulatory
context, the parties involved, and the impacts caused by the development, this thesis wiU
focus on discussing a particular set of IBAs: those that have been negotiated directly between
^ Com m only used for agreem ents negotiated betw een governm ent and industry in Canada.
^ This term refers to specific IB A s under the Inuvialuit Final Land C laim A ct (Canada).
®Com m only used for agreem ents negotiated in Russia.
’ U sed for agreem ents negotiated under the N u n av u t L and C laim A ct (Canada).
Term used in A ustralian literature referring to IBA s (see K auffm an, 1998).

22

indigenous peoples and industry for large-scale hard mineral projects in remote regions of
Alaska and Northern Australia, Canada and Russia.

2.2.

History
Today’s IBAs are a result of evolution. It is difficult to determine when the first IBA

was signed. In Canada and Australia, early IBAs were signed between government and
industry to negotiate employment opportunities (in Canada) and royalty payments (in
Australia) for indigenous people. For example, the Anvil Agreement^ ^ signed in 1967
between the federal government and industry confirmed subsidy payments by government
for the development of the Faro Mine. In return, industry agreed to set employment quotas
for Yukon First Nations. The first IBA in Australia was signed between the Commonwealth
of Australia and the Groote Eylandt Mining Corporation (a subsidiary of BHP) for a
manganese mine on Groote Eylandt, Arnhem Land. This agreement confirmed royalty
payments to trust funds for the benefit of indigenous peoples affected by mining (Kauffman,
1998). Since the negotiation of these agreements, the negotiating parties of these agreements
have changed. In Australia, agreements negotiated in the 1970 were signed between
government and indigenous councils, and since the 1980s directly between industry and the
affected indigenous groups (Kauffman, 1998). In Canada, most of the IBAs negotiated since
the 1990s have been negotiated directly between industry and indigenous communities with
little or no direct interference by governments. Also, the content of IBAs became more
complex over time. While early IBAs in Canada focussed almost exclusively on training,
employment and business opportunities and in Australia on royalty payments, more recent
IBAs include a wide variety of benefits, including support for social and cultural programs,
royalty and equity payments, educational and scholarship programs, and measures for the
A greem ent betw een H er M ajesty the Q ueen ... and A nvil M ining C om pany L im ited ... 21 A ugust 1967.

23

protection of environmental and culturally significant areas (Kauffman, 1998; Kennett,
1999a).
The history of IBAs in Alaska and Russia differs from those of Canada and Australia
due to the differing systems of land ownership and perception of indigenous peoples' rights.
For instance, there is virtually no information available regarding the history and present use
of IBAs in Alaska, as they are perceived as being private agreements between industry and
the Native corporations (R. Caulfield, personal communication, August, 2003). Further, there
are no indications that the government has negotiated any agreements with industry for the
benefit of Alaska’s indigenous population; the settlement of land claim sb efo re opening the
first major non-renewable resources enterprise'^ seemed to have eliminated the obligation for
government to negotiate in the interest of the indigenous peoples. Also, little is known as to
whether or how the content of IBAs has changed over time. However, recent agreements
(such as the IBA between the NANA Corporation and Cominco) tend to be similar in content
to these of Canada and Australia'"'.
As for Russia, there are no accounts about IBAs negotiated before the 1990s. In fact,
the first documented IBA in English written literature is an economic agreement negotiated
in 1991 in the Khanty-Mansijsk Autonomous Okrug (KMAO). This agreement was signed
between the Khanty of the lower Trom-Agan and Yuganskneftegaz (gas company). The
beneEts negotiated include consultation, compensation, environmental protection measures,
the provision of working clothes, payments for higher education, summer vacations and

T he Alaska Native Claim s Settlement A ct (ANCSA) w as signed in 1971 (Caulfield, 2003).
Prudhoe Bay was discovered in 1968 and the associated T rans-A laska oil pipeline was built from 1974-77
(Caulfield, 2003).
T he benefits included the IB A betw een N A N A and C om inco “provides for royalty paym ents and profit
sharing, the establishm ent o f jo in t m anagem ent and advisory com m ittees, the developm ent o f tribal m em ber
training and em ploym ent program s, and for the protection o f the environm ent” (M cLean & H ensley, 1994).

24

medical care, assistance for building of a kindergarten and a clinic, and the sale and exchange
of local food products to the company in return for money and equipment (Wiget, 2000). The
information provided by Wiget (2000) suggests that the content of IBAs in Russia varies
greatly depending upon the negotiating power of the indigenous group. However, Veselov
(2003) states that there is a general trend in the KMAO to improve the agreements by
learning from each other's successes and mistakes. Besides the IBAs negotiated in the
KMAO, there are no indications of IBAs in other regions of Russia (Veselov, 2003).
2.3.

Definition
IBAs are arrangements that establish a formal relationship between the parties

involved in renewable as well as non-renewable resource development projects. IBAs are
complex and generally unique to any p ro jectC u rren tly , most IBAs are signed between two
parties: the indigenous community affected by a particular project, and the company
developing the project. Exceptions are IBAs signed between government and industry*^, and
IBAs signed by indigenous people, industry and govemment(s)'^. IBAs serve different
purposes. Indigenous people and government use IBAs “to address the concerns of
indigenous people and other local residents regarding the adverse effects that large-scale
mineral development may have on their communities, culture, way of life, natural
environment and land-based economic activities" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 1), and to secure local
short-term and long-term benefits from those developments (Keimett, 1999a, pp. 1-2).
Industry increasingly accepts IBAs “as one element of the complex set of regulatory.

A lthough, increasingly standard IBAs are produced by different indigenous groups and organisations to ease
the negotiating process and create transparency for com m unity m em bers and industry.
For exam ple the A lyeska Pipeline's Federal R ight o f W ay agreem ent (A laska) and E kati M ine S ocio­
econom ic A greem ent (Canada), Both A greem ents have been negotiated for the benefit o f all state/territory
residents.
The Sa D ena Hes A greem ent w as negotiated in 1991 betw een C om inco, the Liard F irst Nation, the K aska
Nation, and the territorial and m unicipal governm ents.

25

community relations, technical, and economic considerations that must be addressed if a
m ^or mining project is to progress smoothly from the initial planning stages to final
approval and operational status" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 1-2).
To this point in time, no universally agreed-upon definition of IBAs has been
developed. The definitions offered are limited and even contradictory in current IBA
literature. For instance, O'Reilly and Eacott (1998) state "Impact and benefit agreements are
intended to ensure that Indigenous peoples benefit from mining projects and are compensated
for the negative impacts of mines on their communities, their land, and their traditional way
of life” (p. 1). However, IBAs are not only intended to compensate indigenous peoples, but
to foster northern development through offering economic opportunities to local people.
O’Faircheallaigh (1995) describes IBAs as:
M ineral developm ent agreem ents are defined here as contractual
arrangem ents entered into by A boriginal organizations or com m unities
under w hich they agree to support, or not to oppose, exploration or m ining
activity on land they ow n or claim , and in return are offered defined benefits
w hich w ould not accrue to them as a result o f standard com m ercial
transactions or o f general governm ent policy (p. 19).

As with the definition by O’Reilly and Eacott, O’Faircheallaigh’s definition is based on the
premise of compensation. Further, this definition states that IBAs are used to secure project
support from indigenous peoples. Yet, Sosa and Keenan (2001) state "the inclusion of such
clauses should be avoided, particularly where IBAs are negotiated at an early stage of a
project when information about its predicted impacts may be insufGcient or uncertain" (p.
10). Moreover, Article 29 of the Nwnavwt Law/

Agrgemgnt clearly prohibits clauses

that inhibit indigenous peoples' rights to participate "freely in regulatory proceedings in
relation to proposed projects" (Kennett, 1999a, p. 46). Hence, O'FaircheaUaigh's deEnition is
not sufficient in deEning IBAs as used throughout remote regions. In the absence of other
deEnitions, IBAs, for the purpose of this thesis, are defined as arrangements negotiated
26

between indigenous communities (or other governments) and industries, which aim to
mitigate adverse development impacts on indigenous communities and their traditional ways
of life, their culture and their environment, while providing local short and long-term benefits
to the affected indigenous communities, and thus stimulating their economic development.
Local benefits are usually considered to include "employment, training and business
opportunities that flow to the community as a result of a mineral development project"
(Keeping, 1999, p. 3). These refer to subjects that indigenous communities identify as being
useful to overcome negative development impacts, and create long-term cultural, political,
and economic security and stability. This list of local benefits provided by Keeping can be
expanded, as demonstrated by Kennett (1999a), who built a comprehensive list of local
benefits that have been negotiated in Canadian IBAs. The list comprises more than fifty
items, which are categorised under the following main sections: employment and training,
economic development and business opportunities, social, cultural and community support,
financial provisions and equity participation, and protection of the environment and cultural
resources (see Appendix 2.1.).
The legal nature of IBAs is unclear because of their hybrid character between contract
and regulatory tool. Framed as contracts, IBAs often serve regulatory functions, such as
specifying under which conditions a project can go ahead. Furthermore, their vague language
as well as their primary intent of building good neighbouring relations inhibits the
enforceability of the agreements (Kennett, 1999a). As there is no information about judicial
interpretations of these agreements, Kennett (1999a) cautions us to perceive IBAs simply as
"analogous to legal binding private contracts" (p. 27).

27

2.4.

Rationale
IBAs emerged slowly over the past 50 years, responding to the severe socio­

economic, cultural and environmental impacts caused by mining developments in the vicinity
of indigenous settlements and the increased recognition of indigenous peoples' rights around
the globe. These two factors provide the rationale for IBAs and are further explored in the
following section.

2.4.1. Socio-economic, Cultural and Environmental Context
As discussed in Chapter 1, the northern regions of Australia, Canada, Russia and the
United States (Alaska) which are rich in non-renewable resources, have been used
extensively by national interests to provide resources and income to southern centres. The
indigenous peoples living in the North were left with the negative impacts of these
developments on their land and their communities. These impacts have been documented in a
variety of empirical studies, many of which were summarised by O’Faircheallaigh (1991) in
an attempt to build a universal framework explaining resource development impacts on
indigenous communities throughout the world. The studies reviewed for this article include,
among others, examples of mining developments in Australia, Canada, Greenland, Indonesia,
Libya, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russia and the United States. O’Faircheallaigh
argues that despite differences of indigenous people’s economic, social and cultural
backgroimd, indigenous people experience similar impacts from large-scale mineral
developments'^. To ease the categorisation of development experiences O’Faircheallaigh
proposes three groups of positive and negative development impacts: economic, social and

' O ’Faircheallaigh uses the term mineral developm ent for hard m ineral projects, as well as oil and gas projects.

28

cultural, and environmental. According to these, negative resource development impacts
experienced by indigenous groups include, but are not limited to:
•

the loss of land, and thus the base of their traditional economic and cultural activities;

•

the in-migration of an outside labour force, causing, for example, loss of self-esteem,
alcohol and drug abuse, and family violence; and

•

environmental degradation of the land, animals, plants and people.

Positive development impacts possible through resource developments include:
•

monetary income through wage employment, which in some cases has led to the
strengthening and revival of traditional activities;

•

royalty and equity payments to indigenous groups;

•

training and other education programs; and

•

increasing political presence of indigenous peoples.

O’Faircheallaigh clearly demonstrates that while positive development outcomes are
possible, most of the experiences of indigenous peoples in the past were overwhelmingly
negative.
Considering the demographic profile of these remote regions, which generally
features a high percentage of indigenous people, a demographic pyramid favouring young
people, and extremely high levels of unemployment (see Sub-committee of the
Intergovernmental Working Group on Mineral Industry [SIWG], 1996; Frideres, 1998;
Young, 1995; Agitaev, 2002), indigenous communities have the potential of benefiting from
mineral developments through employment, training and education programs, and other
proceeds, such as royalties and equity payments. However, taking advantage of positive
development effects requires the mitigation of potential negative impacts while encouraging

29

positive development outcomes. These tasks are accomplished through the negotiation of
IBAs. Yet, the negotiation of these agreements does not happen in a vacuum, but is guided
directly or indirectly by regulations and policies which establish formal relationships
between the parties involved in resource developments: industry; the indigenous group
and/or community; and governments.

2.4.2. Legal and Policy Context
The judicial*^ and legal^° recognition of indigenous peoples’ title to unsurrendered
lands has been instrumental in demonstrating to government the right of indigenous peoples
to negotiate agreements concerning resource development projects affecting their lands. Yet,
the differences in indigenous peoples’ title to land have implications on their statutory right
to negotiate IBAs. While some indigenous groups have settled their land claims, others are
still in the process of obtaining these. Further, while some countries (or regions within
countries) have policies and regulations directly addressing the need to negotiate IBAs with
indigenous communities, others only indirectly promote the negotiation of agreements.
Finally, even in the absence of land claims and regulations, indigenous peoples seem to gain
greater influence in conveying their interest, partly because of companies' requirements to
portray corporate responsibility and partly because of the opportunity for cost reduction.
In Alaska, land claims were settled in 1971 with the AW&n Aahve LanJ
Act which extinguished indigenous rights in exchange for a monetary payment
and private land title to 14% of Alaska's land area. Thirteen Native regional corporations
were created as economic engines for some 200 village corporations. As private land owners,
Alaskan indigenous people have the right to negotiate any agreement with industry wishing

See Mabo (1992) and W ik (1996) (Australia), and Delgam uukw (1997) (Canada).
^ The N ative Land C laim A ct from 1971 (U nited States, A laska)

30

to pursue mineral developments on their lands (R. Caulfield, personal communication,
August 2003). As these agreements are private and usually subject to confidentiality, little
information is available about their content and success^'. Despite the lack of information,
these agreements play an important role in the development efforts of Alaskan Native
corporations (B. Charles, Vice President of the Calista Corporation, personal communication,
August 2002).
In Australia, the legal and regulatory background of IBAs varies according to the
ownership of the land, the regulatory framework of the region and the interpretation of
judicial decisions in the 1990s. Until 1992 indigenous rights were not confirmed by the
Australian government, and thus only through explicit legislation could IBA negotiations
occur. For instance, the 1976 Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act opened an
avenue for indigenous land councils to negotiate with government royalty payments for
indigenous groups affected by development. Similarly, Queensland’s Mineral Resources Act
from 1989 enabled the indigenous council of the region (Cape York Council) to enter IBA
negotiations which provided substantial benefits to their indigenous communities
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2000a). Today, most of Australia is covered by indigenous land councils
representing the interest of the indigenous groups in their region^ (Kauffman, 1998);
however, the success of these land councils in providing benefits to their communities varies
greatly (O 'Faircheallaigh, 2(XX)a).
In 1992, the Mabo decision by "Australia's High Court overturned earlier judicial
rulings by determining that indigenous ownership of land, in the form of native title, survived

One exception is the agreem ent(s) negotiated betw een the N A N A corporation and Com inco for the R ed D og
M ine w hich has been published extensively.
“ However, the presence o f an aboriginal land council does not autom atically translate into the negotiation of
successful IBAs.

31

the imposition of British rule in 1788" (O'Faircheallaigh, 2000a, Ï 3). This decision caused
two reactions: first, indigenous people increasingly requested the recognition of their
traditional lands; and second, the federal government introduced the 1993 Nahwe Tit/e Act
"which provided for the exercise of a right to negotiate by native title holders in relation to
certain future acts, including granting of mining leases” (O’Faircheallaigh, 2000a, | 3). A
court decision in 1996 (Wik) further strengthened the rights of indigenous people to their
traditional lands; however, the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 decreased the
effectiveness of the Mabo and Wik decisions as it:
substantially toughened the registration test for native title claim ants and
rem oved or dim inished indigenous procedural rights in relation to areas
such as renew al o f m ining leases, developm ent o f private m ining
infrastructure, and m ineral exploration. T he new act also conferred on state
governm ents, traditionally enthusiastic supporters o f large-scale resource
developm ent, the capacity to develop alternative regim es to the right-tonegotiate provisions o f the N ative T itle A ct 1993 (O ’Faircheallaigh, 2000a,

Ï4 ).

Since then, IBAs have still been negotiated and continued to provide (at least some)
indigenous groups with substantial benefits; however the Native Title Amendment Act has
toughened the IBA negotiating climate in Australia (O ' Faircheallaigh, 2000a).
With the settlement of indigenous land claims in the Canadian North, the legal
structure for the negotiation of IBAs changed. Compared to the Alaska land claim settlement,
in Canada all land claims are unique, and offer different sets of statutes and regulations. It is
outside the scope of this paper to review these in detail^how ever important differences wdl
be highlighted. Land claim agreements have resulted in the designation of variations of land
rights: surface rights, surface rights and subsurface rights, and, in one case, only subsurface
rights. These variations of land rights trigger different constellations for the negotiation of

^ For a detailed discussion on legal and policy requirem ents see K eeping (1999) and H enderson (2001).

32

IBAs. First, if the indigenous group owns both surface and subsurface rights, it is up to their
discretion to negotiate IBAs (sitnilar to the Alaskan model) (Henderson & Voogd, 2001;
Kennett, 1999a). In the instance of mineral development occurring on lands where
indigenous people only obtained surface rights, IBA negotiations can, according to the
respective land claim agreement, be part of the regulatory requirements to access land. For
example, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement states that a participation agreement must be signed
when industry accesses Inuvialuit lands to carry out resource development. The Sahtu and
Gwich’in Final Agreements are less specific in terms of requiring the negotiation of IBAs for
access to crown-owned resources (Kennett, 1999a). The most specific and comprehensive
sections regarding provisions for the negotiation of IBAs are included in the Nunavut Land
Claims Agreement; Article 26 outlines “clear substantive and procedural obligations
regarding the negotiation of HE As for major development projects” (Kennett, 1999a, p. 20)
including a section listing matters that are appropriate to consider when negotiating an DBA
(see Appendix 2.2.). Although Article 26 has become an example of a statutory regime in
Canada, its actual effectiveness in providing benefits to local communities is still uncertain
(Kennett, 1999a).
For indigenous groups without a land claim, the legal requirements for negotiating
IBAs for hard mineral developments are less determined as the federal and territorial statutes
regulating hard mineral developments on Crown lands do not require the negotiation of IBAs
(Henderson & Voogd, 2001; Keeping, 1999)"^. On the contrary, based on the free entry
system, the statutes encourage individuals and companies to freely enter Crown land, claim

An exception is N unavut w here, by statute, IIB A s are a requirem ent for obtaining perm issions for large-scale
resource developm ent projects.

33

minerals and proceed with mining activities'^ (Barton, 1997; Henderson, 2001; Henderson &
Voogd, 2(X)1). However, the lack of statutes and regulations has not hindered the negotiation
of IBAs. The negotiation of IBAs has been encouraged, for example, through ad-hoc
approaches taken by government and courts, and through the recognition of the need for
shared benefits for the partners included in a development project. For instance, in the case of
the Ekati Mine (NWT), the federal government made the approval of a water hcense
application by the developer Broken Hill Proprietary Limited (BHP) dependent upon the
substantial progress in the negotiation of IBAs with four affected communities during a 60day period. Although appreciated as an important step towards a federal requirement of IBAs
for large-scale mineral development projects, Keeping (1999, pp. 14-19) cautions that the
approach taken by the federal government probably would not be sustained in court, which
has implications on the enforceability of the IBAs negotiated (Keeping, 1999). Further, the
requirement to gain substantive progress within a 60-day period had negative implications on
the negotiation process; first, because of intensive time pressure, and second, because of
uncertainties about the definition of ‘substantive progress’ and the repercussions if such
progress could not be reached within time (Bielawski, 2003)^^.
The Faro Mine IBA, signed in 1994 between the Ross River Dena Council (RRDC)
and Anvil Range Mining Corporation, appears to be influenced by an order of the Ontario
Court of Justice, which states:
TH IS C O U R T ORDERS that the Interim R eceiver is to request any
proposed purchaser o f the Faro mine to negotiate in good faith and
reasonably a social and econom ic benefits agreem ent reasonably
satisfactory to the Ross R iver D ena Council and to report on such to the

U nder the free entry system , the state can only w ithdraw lands from staking; otherw ise, if claim ants follow all
regulatory procedures, a claim ant can decide “ w here m ineral exploration occurs, w here claim s are located, or
w here producing m ines m ay be developed“(Barton, 1997, p. 89).
^ A detailed discussion o f the IBA s negotiated for the E kati M ine can be review ed in K eeping (1999), C hapter
8 and 10.

34

Court upon any motion for approval o f sale. (R. v. Curragh Inc.; May 7,
1994, point 4)

Achieving the negotiation of IBAs directly through court cases has not yet been documented
in literature, and thus seems to be a new phenomenon. Finally, the current move by the
federal, provincial and territorial governments to consulting indigenous communities
regarding the issuance of water licenses for projects on their traditional territory has placed
responsibility upon industry to create good relations with indigenous groups. This need for
creating good relations (Kennett, 1999b) as well as the increasing pressure of transnational
companies to demonstrate corporate responsibility (Goodman, 2003) seem to have led to a
increase in the negotiation of IBAs in Canada.
To this time, no indigenous land claims have been settled in Russia. Still, there have
been important movements in the recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights to land and their
traditional activities since the opening to the western market. Fostered by the severe
ecological damage by northern resource developments on the land, at least one regional
government (the Council of People’s Deputies of the KMAO) took action by issuing in
February 1992 Regulations concerning the status o f kinship communities in KMAO^^, and a
decree CoMcgmmg lAg
ki/wAip

in

AppZymg lAg jRegwluhoM coMcgmmg fAg

o/"

aiming to regulate industrial development on traditional

indigenous territory^^. About the same time, federal law set out that local self-governments
can exist within the federal state, and thus "set in motion a legal process of formally dehning
the boundaries of family hunting territories" (Wiget & Balalaeva, 1997, % 16). According to
article 21 of the above mentioned regulations "acquiring ... [a] parcel of land on the territory

^ Polozhenie o statuse rodovyx ugodii v Xanty-M ansiiskom avtonomnom okryge

^ O mgjwiûmf vngdneniyo Po/ozAeniya o jfafuje rodoyyz
29

w

In the case o f the K M A O , these are m ostly oil and gas developm ents.

35

avfono/wiom ot/yge

of kinship lands [for industrial purposes] can be carried o u t... only with the consent of the
owner of the kinship land, and also native residents whose interests are involved in this
taking" (Wiget & Balalaeva, 1997, i 17). Further, article 22 of the same legislation:
required a clear econom ic agreem ent, approved by the appropriate
adm inistrative authority, betw een the ow ner o f the land and the com pany
developing the land, specifying ( I ) the terms and conditions of
developm ent, and providing (2) full com pensation for all losses in
connection with developm ent, (3) an agreed-upon share o f the profits from
the developm ent o f this land, as well as (4) a lease paym ent for the use o f
the land. (W iget & Balalaeva, 1997, % 19)

These regulations were further sustained by a federal decree Concerning Urgent Measures
fo r Protecting Places o f Living Economic Activity o f the Native Minority Peoples o f the
North (see Appendix 2.3.). Yet, the federal government has not provided the regulations
necessary to implement the decree. Thus, especially regions that have no recognised major
indigenous population base face tremendous challenges with the implementation of the
decree (Kirillin, 2002). This may explain why, besides the KMAO where negotiations of
IBAs are ongoing and, from a legal point of view, improving, there is no information
available about the negotiation of IBAs in other regions of the Russian North (Veselov,
2003). However, the legal awareness of the rights of indigenous peoples, especially regarding
industrial development on their traditional territory, is steadily growing and resources are
increasingly developed to further support indigenous organisations in the Russian North (see
Veselov, 2001; Kirillin, 2002).

2.5.

Emerging Theories
IBAs evolved as a pragmatic approach rather than a theoretical discourse to steer and

control the positive as well as negative development impacts. This is reflected in current IBA
literature, which generally is sporadic and limited in volume as well as content. Two trends
in IBA literature are apparent: literature describing IBA experiences of indigenous

36

communities from mineral developments, and literature analysing governmental regulations'
potential for enhancing the success of IBAs. Yet, only a small body of analytical literature
about IBA experiences is available. This lack of analytical and additional descriptive IBA
literature has been observed by a number of authors (Kennett 1999a; Keeping 1999; Sosa &
Keenan, 2001; O ’Faircheallaigh, 2004). The reason for the lack of IBA literature is directly
related to conhdentiality provisions of most IBAs, the limited time and opportunities
available to people typically involved in IBA negotiations to publish their experiences
(O’Faircheallaigh, 2000b), and the short lifetime of some mines which inhibits actual IBA
evaluations (see Keeping, 1998). The lack of IBA literature results in a patchwork of
information.
An exception is the work undertaken by Ciaran O’Faircheallaigh. Studying IBAs for
more than 12 years, O’Faircheallaigh is a leader in the comprehensive and systematic study
of IBAs. O’Faircheallaigh worked nationally and internationally on different structural parts
of IBAs; their socio-economic background (see section 2.3), and their process and content^®
(see section 2.5.1).

2^.1

Process and Content
The process and content of IBAs are the main structural elements of these

agreements. While some analysts of IBAs mix the two elements when describing IBAs (e.g.
Sosa & Keenan, 2001; Kennett, 1999a), O'Faircheallaigh (1995, 2000b, 2004) clearly
distinguishes between these two. For instance, in 1995, O'Faircheallaigh stated that the
outcome of IBAs is determined by the bargaining power an indigenous group possesses (i.e.
ownership to land, the legal context, and the specific nature of the project) and the ability of

^ Currently, O ’Faircheallaigh is w orking on a com parison o f IB A contents in A laska, A ustralia and Canada.
The data are not yet available. The earliest possible publication date is late 2004.

37

the indigenous group to maximize it through appropriate processes and structures. Further,
O'Faircheallaigh describes key elements for such process, such as the establishment of
community goals, the need for access to information and resources, the necessary
institutional structures, the development of effective relations between technical staff and
community leaders, and appropriate agreement implementation (1995).
In 2000, O ' Faircheallaigh (2(XX)b) expanded his observation regarding appropriate
processes and accompanying structures of IBAs with the ‘Cape York Model’, which reflects
approximately eight years of negotiating experience between the Cape York Land Council
(Northern Territory, Australia) and mineral developers. The Cape York Model is a sevenstage linear IBA planning model consisting of the following steps: initiation of process,
creation of framework for negotiations, information gathering and community consultation,
establishment of a negotiating position, conduct of negotiations, endorsement and signing of
a final agreement, and implementation. For each of these stages O ’Faircheallaigh specifies
sub-stages, outlines important tasks, and identifies key players (community, specific
community members, indigenous specialists, non-indigenous specialists) and their role
within the process (for the main structure see Appendix 2.4.). While this model has been
applied by the Cape York Land Council with great success, O’Faircheallaigh states that this
model does not represent a single best practice in the negotiation of IBAs, but reminds us that
when evaluating a process one has to take into consideration the actual "contexts in which
Indigenous people find themselves, the range of the projects about which Indigenous groups
have to negotiate and the diverse objectives they may wish to pursue” (2000b, p. 2).
It is outside the scope of this thesis to discuss the model in detail; however, there are
key features of relevance to the following case studies. For instance, O’Faircheallaigh points

38

to the importance of conducting an anthropological study as well as a socio-economic
assessment for the project so that the community, on one hand, understands the impacts of
the mine and, on the other, has an opportunity to express their aspirations and concerns in
relation to the proposed project. These studies then can be used as baseline information to
establish a community negotiating position. The set of established community goals will be
used in a variety of ways: first, as an initial negotiating offer at the outset of the negotiation;
second, as reference throughout the process for community negotiators and residents to
review the progress of the negotiation; and third, before signing the agreement as reference
for the community to evaluate the success of the negotiation.
Current work of O’Faircheallaigh concentrates on the analysis of IBA content. He
argues that the analysis of IBA content is one way of analysing the overall success of IBAs.
For that O’Faircheallaigh (2004) proposes eight standardised criteria of evaluation:
environmental management, cultural heritage protection, rights and interests in land,
financial payments, employment and training, business development, Indigenous consent
and support, and implementation measures^ \ However, measuring an IBA solely on its
content can lead to incorrect results. O’Faircheallaigh acknowledges that the criteria
described may not be enough to encompass all benefits received. Further, the content of IBAs
may not reflect the context under which an agreement was negotiated. An agreement which
may appear weak in terms of its content may be a m ^or achievement for an indigenous
community (O’Faircheallaigh, 2004). Finally, my own observations in the field have
demonstrated that the beneOts received from a mineral project are not necessarily limited to
the benefits outlined in an IBA (see Chapter 5), but go beyond those.

F or a detailed description o f these criteria see O ’F aircheallaigh (2004).

39

This demonstrates that the analysis of IBA outcomes based on an IBA s content is
insufficient. Thus, O'Faircheallaigh describes three other ways for analysing IBA outcomes
based on: (i) the process of negotiating the IBA, as "outcomes may arise before an agreement
is signed and indeed may occur even if the parties fail to reach an agreement" (2004, p. 4);
(ii) the benefits received directly from the development (short-term benefits); and (in) the
benefits received through investment and improvement of financial and human communitybased resources (long-term benefits)^^. However, O'Faircheallaigh states that while looking
solely at IBA content comprises limitations, it would be impractical to take a more detailed
approach to analyze and compare a large number of IBAs because of the need for intensive
field-based research.
2.5.2. Experiences
As established above, the two factors for a successful IBA are an appropriate process
used to negotiate, implement and monitor the agreement, as well as a content that
corresponds with the community goals for the project. However, process and content are not
the only factors influencing IBAs. IBAs are highly complex concepts constructed from a
great variety of variables influencing their success (Kennett, 1999a). Some variables can be
categorized as specifically process or content-related. However, other variables are more
difficult to place as they may affect both process and content (e.g. limited human resources
available in a community will influence both the process and content of an agreement) or
neither of them (e.g. the early closure of a mine). As there is no literature addressing the
nature of outside influences in a systematic manner, an inductive approach to theory building

T he kinds o f analysis described in points tw o (short-term benefits) and three (long-term benefits), will be
used to analyze the case studies o f this thesis.

40

has been employed to determine factors influencing the success of IBAs. IBA experiences

33

have been catalogued and then categorised according process, content and other common
characteristics.
Table 1:

a/W confgnt rg/aW Impact owf Bgn^ta^ Agrggmgnt gjrpgngncg.^

P rocess R elated E xperiences

Content Related Experiences

S eparate political and business objectives throughout
the negotiation and im plem entation process (W olfe,
2001).

D o not negotiate confidentiality clauses as it is to the
disadvantage o f indigenous com m unities. It inhibits
com parison and learning from each other (Sosa &
Keenan, 2001; O ’Reilly & E acott, 1998).
D o not com prom ise governance pow er and the ability
to m onitor and challenge m ine operators (O ’Reilly &
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

Include m em bership actively in the IB A negotiation
otherw ise they m ay not understand the agreem ent
they have to sign at the end (O ’R eilly & Eacott,
1998).
E ncourage com panies to talk to com m unities
(O ’Reilly & E acott, 1998).

A llow for flexible w ork tim es for traditional activities
(e.g. hunting) (O ’Reilly & E acott, 1998; Sosa &
K eenan, 2001).

A llow for periodic evaluation and, if necessary,
adaptation o f the agreem ent (O ’R eilly & Eacott,
1998).

C onsider actual level o f com m unity m em ber’s
education and m ining w ork experience when
developing the IB A content (A boriginal E conom ic
D evelopm ent, 1998).
Provide cultural aw areness program s and policies to
avoid conflicts betw een indigenous and nonindigenous w orkers (O ’R eilly & E acott, 1998;
A boriginal E conom ic D evelopm ent, 1998; SIW G,
1996).
A llow for non-specific em ploym ent provisions (16,
24), but ensure detailed provisions for financial
com pensation to allow for enforceability (O ’R eilly &
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & K eenan, 2001 ).
D o not state in an IB A that its purpose is to receive
com m unity support for the project (O ’R eilly &
Eacott, 1998; Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

Consider that confidentiality issues can cause
problem s in im plem entation o f an agreem ent.
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).

Specify the use o f T raditional K now ledge when
negotiating m onitoring provisions for m ine site
(O ’Reilly & Eacott, 1998).

Develop effective implementation plans. (Kennett,
1999b).

Include dispute resolution m echanism s and avoid
provisions for penalties (O ’R eilly & Eacott, 1998).

Build com m unity consent for IB A before signing it.
(O ’ReiUy & Eacott, 1998).

Use clear and sim ple language so people can
understand the agreem ent (O ’R eilly & E acott, 1998).

Sign the IB A before the E nvironm ental Im pact
A ssessm ent (EIA ) to ensure that com m unity will be
consulted. IB A and E IA should reinforce each other
(O ’Reilly & E acott, 1998; Sosa & K eenan, 2001).
E nsure the com m unity is united and com m itted for
the im plem entation and enforcem ent o f an IBA
(O ’R eilly & Eacott, 1998).

Ensure project funding (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

M ost o f these experiences are from descriptions o f C anadian IBA negotiations because o f available literature.
Despite the regionally lim ited scope o f the inform ation available, it is believed that C anadian IB A experiences
can give insights into general key factors that contribute to the success or failure o f IBAs.

41

D evelop negotiating position through community
consultation for future review o f the negotiation
progress, and m ake sure to clearly outline nonnegotiable m atters (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

C onsider IB A im plem entation w hile negotiating set unam biguous roles and responsibilities (Sosa &
K eenan, 2001).
E stablish early m echanism for IB A im plem entation
and allocation o f cash paym ents (Sosa & Keenan,
2001).
D evelop a good plan. M ake sure com m unity
understands m ining im pacts. T ake tim e to consult
w ith com m unity (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).

Set clear objectives and roles fo r negotiating parties
(K ennett, 1999b).

Establish conflict resolution m echanism s to avoid
the use o f radical and costly m easures such as
litigation or strike (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

Include in introduction a description o f project, its
phases and duration, estim ated size and required
infrastructure or refer to docum ent including these
provisions to have a point o f reference for
com m itm ents related to the different projects and
project stages. D escribing planned w ork in detail will
allow recognising if an IBA has to be negotiated and/
or renegotiated (Sosa & K eenan, 2001 ).
A ccount for difficulties o f indigenous people entering
m ining w orkforce, such as lacking experience,
cultural barriers, and differing educational
backgrounds (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).
Take into account financial lim itations w hen
negotiating for contents that aim to im prove capacity
building and econom ic diversification (Sosa &
K eenan, 2001).
Seek environm ental standards that reflect
com m unities’ needs, and incorporate these within the
IBA. E xisting regulations m ay be weak or unclear,
focus on ‘urban life’ and change over tim e due to
pressure from m ining industry (Sosa & K eenan,
2001).
K eep long-term perspective in m ind - do not settle
for few jo b s and recreational program s at the expense
o f neglecting provisions for environm ental protection
and com m unity developm ent. R ather ensure that the
IBA provides for training, skills developm ent and
econom ic diversification (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).
Provide for statem ent that specifies that the
agreem ent will be honoured even if the m ine w ill be
sold (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).

Besides IBA experiences clearly concerning process or content, other experiences
cannot be placed within this structure presented above as they relate to both process and
content or neither of them. However, these experiences share other common characteristics in
form of whom they concern: indigenous communities, industry and governments. The
following table gives examples of clustering experiences according to these categories.

42

Table 2: CommwMzfy,
Community Related
E xperiences
D evelop a long-term vision about
m ineral developm ent and think
about how it can contribute to the
future generations (W olfe, 2001).
A ccept the financial realities o f
m ining com panies (W olfe, 2001).

C onsider that if C h ief and
Council signs an IB A and
afterw ards settles land claim s, the
IBA m ay not be legally binding
anym ore (O ’Reilly & Eacott,
1998).
Start training for m ining jo b s as
early as possible. Start before
m ining operations com m ence
(O ’R eilly & E acott, 1998).
Prepare and train people early for
m ine w ork to be able to take
advantage o f jo b s (Sosa &
K eenan, 2 0 0 1).

govemme/if rg/afecf /mpacf onJ
Industry Related Experiences
Build good long-term working
relations w ith indigenous
com m unities. (O ’R eilly & Eacott,
1998)
A pproach the com m unities early
in the process. (O ’R eilly &
Eacott, 1998)
Provide indigenous com m unities
with access to inform ation. (Sosa
& K eenan, 2001)

Provide funding for indigenous
com m unities to pursue
independent studies (O ’R eilly &
Eacott, 1998).
C onsider differences in language
and culture (A boriginal
Econom ic D evelopm ent, 1998).

E ncourage indigenous
com m unity m em bers to stay in
school (SIWG, 1996).

Agregmg/if

Government Related
E xperiences
C onfirm indigenous rights if no
regulations for IB As are in place.
(O'ReiUy & Eacott, 1998)
E stablish param eters for IBA
negotiations. Do not allow for
confidentiality clauses. (O ’Reilly
& Eacott, 1998)
Ensure that indigenous
com m unities have adequate
funding to respond to
developm ent proposal. (O ’Reilly
& Eacott, 1998)
Take ad-hoc approaches to assist
indigenous com m unities in
im proving their negotiating
position. (Kennett, 1999a)
Provide funds for program s
supporting indigenous
com m unities (e.g. training,
em ploym ent and social support)
(Kennett, 1999a).
A llow for com pletion o f E IA s as
it enables indigenous
com m unities to include those into
IB A negotiations (Kennett,
1999a).
A ssist during IB A process
through guiding industry early in
process, providing financial
assistance to indigenous
com m unities and take facilitating
positions through provision o f
inform ation. It may save tim e and
money (Kennett, 1999a).
C onsider to be involved in
negotiating process if public
interest is at stake (Kennett,
1999a).

C ooperate w ith governm ent in
e.g. environm ental m atters as
they set the regulations and they
have the com petence and
resources to assist (O ’Reilly &
Eacott, 1998).

Form a good negotiation team
that represents all interests in the
com m unity as well as experts on
environm ental, legal and m ining
issues (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).

A last category for summarising IBA experiences includes variables Aat are project
related. Kennett (1999a) highlights the importance of considering the project related
variables of IBAs as they can significantly shape an agreement. Again, some of these
43

experiences overlap with process and content; however, they are not limited to just one of
these factors.
Table 3: frq /ect

fmpoct amZ

Agrgemgnt experience.;

P roject R elated E xperiences
C onsider other docum ents negotiated which include typical IB A -related benefits provisions (Keeping,
1998).__________________________________________________________________________________________
N egotiate pro ject specific benefits (K eeping, 1998).
B e aw are o f lim ited tim e fram e for IBA negotiation due to project lim itations (Sosa & Keenan, 2001).
B ear in m ind a possible short m ine life (Sosa & K eenan, 2001).
T ake into account that in the absence o f policy related factors, project related factors may drive IBA
negotiation (K ennett, 1999a).
R ealise that IB As can be influenced significantly by different econom ic as well as other characteristics o f a
project (K ennett, 1999a)._____________________________________________________________________________

Although not comprehensive, these experiences give clear indications about common factors
related to the success or failure of IBAs. The following section presents a general IBA
Aumework and discusses the main theoretical components of it.
2.6.

Evaluation Framework
The IBA framework developed in this chapter illustrates the key factors and

components for successful IBAs and demonstrates their relationship. The base for this
framework is the work of O'FaircheaUaigh and IBA experiences cited in current IBA
literature (section 2.5.). According to these, there are two main factors, the process and
content of IBAs as well as four additional components: community, industry, government
and project related influences. As discussed earlier, in some cases these components can be
related to both process and content, in others to neither of them. Hence, these components
must be treated separately from process and content.

44

Figure 1: /mpacf a/wf

AgreeoigMf gvaZwario» yrwMgwort

CONTENT

SUCCESS
IBA

PROCESS

This evaluation framework identifies the main IBA-influencing factors and
components, and demonstrates their relation to each other. Process and content are central
within the framework, illustrating their importance to the overall success of an IBA to
provide local benefits. Both process and content strongly influence each other. For instance,
the effectiveness of the process used in articulating community goals on the negotiating table
win influence the content of the IBA, while the IBA's content can include the need to
renegotiate an IBA if certain criteria are met, thus influencing the process. The four
components (project related, community related, government related and industry related) are
added as a secondary layer to the framework, as they, directly and indirectly, can influence
process and content, as well as the success of IBAs. These four components cannot only
merge with both process and content, but also fuse at occasion with each other. For instance,
a negative project history may be accounted as a project related factor; however, it also
45

influences a community's perspective on a project and thus may shape their actions regarding
the project. In this case, a factor can be project as well as community related.
Although the body of descriptive as well as analytical literature is slowly increasing,
there have not yet been criteria developed which would lead to successful IBAs. The IBA
experiences listed above are based on the execution of only a few IB As. Thus it would be
presumptive to create a set of defined criteria for the IBA factors of the proposed IBA
evaluation framework. However, in the absence of such criteria the use of this framework is
ambiguous and in its execution may depend upon subjective use. Further, as every IBA is
different and dependent upon a complex net of variables, there is no single ‘right’ approach
to the negotiation of IBAs. Neither process nor content can be predefined for any given
resource development project. More accurately, IBAs are instruments that need adjustment to
the respective user and project. Referring to his Cape York Model, O’Faircheallaigh (2000b)
states:
resource developm ent projects are also highly varied in their scale, their
proxim ity to Indigenous com m unities, their likely profitability, their
duration, their potential im pact on the environm ent and on cultural heritage,
the tim e constrains faced by developers and the nature o f the corporate
structure they em ploy. A gainst this background it w ould be futile and
counterproductive to prom ote a single, universal model. R ather, accounts
and critical analyses o f a large num ber o f alternative approaches would
allow Indigenous groups a w ide range o f options w hich can be adapted to
suit their particular circum stances and objectives, (p. 2)

Thus, the proposed IBA evaluation framework may seem too vague to draw definite
conclusions about the success of an IBA. However, given the current lack of frameworks for
evaluating IBAs, this model may assist in improving the identification of variables for an
IBA's success. Moreover, the application of this model enhances awareness of the m ^or
factors and components of IBA success and their interrelations. The IBA evaluation
framework developed in this chapter wiU be used in the remainder of the thesis to evaluate

46

the success and failure factors of two IB As negotiated by an indigenous community in the
Yukon Territory (Canada).

47

Chapter 3 : Methodology
3.1.

Introduction
The past chapters have concentrated on describing the development paradigms used

over the past 50 years to overcome underdevelopment (Chapter 1), discussing some of the
impacts of these paradigms on remote indigenous communities affected by mineral
developments and presenting a new approach: using IBAs to secure short and long-term
benefits from resource developments (Chapter 2). This chapter presents a research model
designed to investigate and evaluate the success of IB As. This model is based on the
theoretical assumptions proposed in the first two chapters. In this chapter, the research
design, the data gathering methods and the sample selection criteria will be discussed. The
chapter will conclude by explaining the techniques used for data analysis, and the
methodological limitations of this research project.
3.2.

Research Design
The question this study aims to answer is whether the IB As negotiated by the RRDC

have provided them with satisfying short-term and long-term local benefits. For the purpose
of this study, local benefits are defined as being positive results (e.g. employment, training,
advanced education, social/cultural support with long-term positive consequences) which are
enjoyed on a community level. The measures of satisfying benefits are first, community
members' perceptions of the received benefits ('subjective' measure) and second, the match
of IBA content with the actual benefits received by the community ('objective' measure).
Measuring the success of the IBA in these independent ways allows for a triangulation of
different data sets such as comparing the perception of community members versus
information available from government and industry (Singleton & Straits, 1999).

48

There are challenges to answering these research questions. Separating the actual
negotiation of an IBA from the broader outside context in which the project is situated
(Chapter 2) is impossible. Thus, in order to evaluate IBAs, a wide variety of different data
sources and data types must be evaluated. Beside the complexity of the IB As, the partial lack
of data (such as relating to the process of the IBAs), and the inherent subjectivity of the data
(perception of participants in the process), pose additional challenges. To accommodate for
these, a case study approach has been chosen, as it allows for the evaluation of complex
processes and offers high validity of the research results. A case study, as Yin (1994) notes
“is an empirical inquiry th a t... investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real
context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and
in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (p. 13). The objective of this study is to
describe and evaluate the success of IBAs in providing benefits for an indigenous community
from mineral development. Babbie (2001) refers to this kind of case study as evaluation
research or program evaluation, and adds that this research type focuses the research design
on the “purpose rather than a specific method. This purpose is to evaluate the impact of
social interventions .... Many methods - surveys, experiments, and so on - can be used in
evaluation research" (p. 332). Similar to Yin's (1994) statement. Babbie underlines the
importance of using multiple kinds of data.
While case studies have several advantages, such as analysing complex phenomena
and offering high validity of the research findings, this tool also causes disadvantages due to
its generally low reliability (ability to generalize the research results), and the biases case
studies are exposed to. However, no research approach is fully reliable and free of biases
(Yin, 1994). To minimise the disadvantages of case study approaches, it is thus important to

49

rigorously structure and perform the research project ,and to be open minded about one's
biases.
For the purpose of this project, studying IBAs has been divided into a five-step
process, which has been completed for both IBAs separately. First, the content was identified
(review of IBA). Second, the process used to negotiate and implement the IBAs was
investigated (interviews with process participants). Third, other factors determining the
success/non-success of the IBAs were determined (interviews with process participants and
others, review of documents). Fourth, to allow for triangulation, the success of the IBAs was
measured in two ways: through a survey of community members’ perceptions of the success
of the agreements (survey questionnaire), and through a comparison of the benefits
negotiated as outlined in the agreements (review of IBAs) and the actual benefits received
(interviews with process participants, benefits listed in survey, review of documents). Fifth,
as the success of the IBAs was not identical, differences in content, process and other
influences were analysed and evaluated as contributing to the success or non-success of the
IBAs. Comparing the two agreements eased the task of separating causes and effects. For
example, if a variable was different, but the outcome was the same, it could generally be
assumed that this variable was of no consequence to the research project; however, if the
variable as well as the outcome was different, the variable could be of significance.
Information gained through interviews with directly as well as indirectly-involved IBA
participants were used for triangulation to ensure the causality of dependent and independent
variable. Further, this additional information from interviews was also used to analyse
variables which were similar for both cases, but seemed to inhibit the success of the IBAs
negotiated.

50

33.

Methods and Samples
The data gathering methods used for this study included a variety of techniques, such

as archival review, partly structured interviews, open interviews, a survey, and participant
observations. The variety of methods was necessary to allow for triangulation. Moreover, as
will be discussed at length in section 4.4, the data for this project are widely dispersed and in
many instances incomplete. Therefore, using a variety of methods was important to fill data
gaps.
Similar to the need for employing a variety of methods because of the lack of
comprehensive data, sampling for the interviews, the survey and conversations has been
broad. The survey sample included every Ross River Dena member as well as other
community members that were affected by, or directly involved with, the IBAs. As the partly
structured interviews mainly focussed on the process and content of the negotiated IBAs, the
sample included anybody who had been involved with negotiating and/or implementing the
agreements. The sample for open interviews included governmental officials, industry
managers, former employees of the Faro Mine, and consultants of the RRDC. These
interviews were undertaken to close knowledge gaps, and receive outside views about the
IBAs and how they affected the Ross River Dena.

3.3.1. Archival Review
The overall access to information about the IBAs negotiated by the RRDC was
strongly limited in terms of interview data as well as in documentation. For example, the
federal as well as the territorial government had no documentation which directly addressed
socio-economic aspects of the Faro and the KZK mines, such as employment and training of
Ross River Dena at these mines. An exception was correspondence between the Department

51

of Education of the Yukon Territorial Government (YTG) and the RRDDC, which speaks to
training funds made available to Ross River for mine employment. However, part of this
documentation acknowledges the overall lack of information available on matters concerning
this training fund.
Thus, an array of archival documents was sought as additional sources of information.
These documents included reports, articles, videos, newspaper articles, radio interviews and
news coverage, as well as statistics and files of the indigenous, federal and territorial
governments. Some of these archival records gave insights on the history of the Faro Mine,
while others were more contemporary, and addressed matters of the Faro Mine and KZK
agreements, issues addressing Ross River Dena participation in resource developments and
recent developments of the RRDC.

3.4.1. Partly structured Interviews
The partly-structured interviews (for the protocol see Appendix 3.1.) with key people
involved in the negotiation and implementation of the IBAs were important as these were
structured to answer complex questions about the process, content and success of the
agreements. It was planned that, given their knowledge about the process of negotiating and
implementing the IBAs, as many key people as possible would be selected for this interview
to receive a clear picture about the events surrounding the IBA processes. Unfortunately,
only a limited number of people participated in this interview:
Dorothy Dick

Mining Liaison Manager of the KZK Mine and Manager of the
RRDDC

Kathlene Suza

former Mining Liaison Manager of the Faro Mine

Testloa Smith

Land Use and Resource Development Officer of theRRDC

52

Mike Rawlings

former CEO of the RRDDC and active negotiator of the IBAs

Of these interview participants, only two were able to answer most questions relating to the
process used to negotiate the IBAs. The other two interview participants were not able to do
so, because they started at a later stage of the IBA process (implementation). Consequently, I
did not receive sufficient data to entirely rebuild the IBA processes. The overall low number
of participants in the partly structured interviews can be related to the financial breakdown of
the RRDDC, which was managed by two different teams. Uncertainties about who got the
company into financial difficulties, and why, led community members to be cautious about
the topic. Hence, many of the people directly involved in the negotiation and implementation
of the agreements were unwilling to participate in the partly structured interviews; however,
three of these people agreed to informal talks about their views on the success of the IBAs.

3.4.2. Open Interviews
Open interviews were held with 34 individuals representing the RRDC/RRDDC,
government and industry who had insights on the IBAs negotiated by the RRDC and other
IBAs negotiated in the Yukon. These insights partly came through work on the IBAs and
partly through work with the Ross River Dena which were affected by the IBAs. The insights
of all of these people were extremely valuable. People involved in the process commented on
the process as they perceived it. Other people offered explanations for the problems and
challenges encountered while working on the IBAs. The interviews were kept open to
accommodate for the specific knowledge participants had regarding the IBAs. The questions
covered in the interview focused on the success, and the two initially identified factors of
success; process and content.

53

3.43.

Survey with Community Members
The survey (for copy see Appendix 3.2.) was designed to gain a greater understanding

of four issues: benefits Ross River Dena members received; their perception of the success or
non-success of the agreements; their evaluation of the input community members had
regarding their concerns and wishes while the IBAs were being negotiated; and their opinion
on how to approach resource development in the future in order to increase benefits flowing
to the community. The survey was kept as straightforward and simple as possible to allow as
many people as possible to participate in it. In a limited number of cases it was necessary to
further explain the questions. Most of the surveys were completed while I was present. Only
one survey was completed without my presence and sent to Prince George, as I had to leave
the community. The sample was made up of all community members over the age of 24; this
was the age group which could have worked in the mines while the IBAs were ongoing^'^.
Among the survey participants were two non-indigenous participants, who were included
because they both worked with the RRDC on implementing the IBAs. Overall, 31 individuals
participated in the survey.

3.4.4.

Observations
The task of observing the study subject can take different shapes. While participant

observation In the traditional sense entails that the researcher participates directly In the topic
of study, they can also participate by smdylng the topic directly at the scene of action after
the action has been completed. Babble (2001) refers to that kind of observation as one part of
Geld research and adds that there are "varying degrees of 'particlpantness' - that is, the
degree of actual participation In daily life" (p. 278).

^ The original sample was m ade up o f all com m unity m em bers over the age o f 25. H ow ever, som e youth o f the
age o f 24 had already w orked under the IB A s, and thus the sam ple group has been low ered to age 24.

54

During my five month stay in Ross River I participated increasingly in the daily life
of the Ross River Dena. I had many opportunities to observe the life, culture, politics and
administration of the First Nation, as I lived in Ross River Dena households. I took part in
traditional activities, such as hunting, gathering and playing handgames, and I attended
several meetings of the RRDC and the KTC, especially on resource development related
issues. Furthermore, I had the chance to participate in the water license renewal process for
the Faro Mine (more particularly, the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act process),
which started in the spring of 2002. Taking part in these activities enhanced my
understanding and appreciation of the Ross River Dena’s traditional way of life, and their
decision-making processes within the community and the Kaska Nation. In particular,
observing and participating allowed me to be aware of the obstacles and problems faced by
this First Nation concerning resource development decisions. As matters concerning the
IBAs were sensitive, staying for this length of period and participating in different aspects of
community life was necessary to gain the trust of the people regarding the research project.

3.4.

Analysis
The total time span of the data gathering stretched over a period of 18 months and

included the collection of qualitative as well as quantitative data. To analyse the wealth of
information, the qualitative data have been coded according to categories arising out of the
IBA framework (e.g. success, process, content and outside influences) and the content items
of the IBAs (e.g. commitment, employment, training and scholarships). The data were colour
coded according to the association of the informant (e.g. RRDDC, Ross River Dena
members, industry and government). Then, the data were placed in a matrix to build clusters
of related information. This practice facilitated the triangulation of data. Quantitative data.

55

arising mainly from the survey with community members, were put into spreadsheets and
analysed according to their frequency. Following the analytical strategy of explanation
building, the research results have been used throughout the process to revise initial
theoretical statements and propositions. Yin (1994) points to the danger underlying this
approach: drifting off the actual research topic. This has been avoided by constantly referring
to the original research question, and the development and constant adaptation of a list of
necessary interview participants and questions to carry on the research process.

3.6.

Limitations
The study faces a variety of limitations. First, as this project is being performed with

only one community, the conclusions are not universally applicable. Instead, the results
gained in this study should be used to build hypotheses for further projects. Second, the
project focuses strongly on the involvement of the indigenous community. Within this
research project only limited attention is paid to views, challenges and limitations
encountered by the developers or government. Third, the case study does not investigate the
negative impacts the development posed upon the indigenous community, but solely
concentrates on the benefits the IBA provided. Fourth, as the content of IBAs is confidential,
there are limitations regarding its publication or public exposure. The RRDC as well as Teck
Cominco agreed that the content of the IBAs can be used for the project; however, Teck
Cominco decided that the specific content of the KZK agreement could not be published.
Therefore, the argumentation about the benefits received through this IBA is reduced to
information that is already in the public domain.

56

Chapter 4: Case Study
4.1.

Introduction
This chapter will introduce two case studies that will be used to investigate the

theoretical propositions of Chapter 1 and 2 which outlined the theoretical conditions for
indigenous development and presented one of the currently prevailing tools for indigenous
people to obtain economic development through mining projects. The case studies used were
chosen according to three eriteria: (i) remoteness, (ii) the availability of funding, and (iii) the
negotiating parties of the IBA (indigenous community and industry). The Ross River Dena
were a perfect fit for this set of criteria. Located in a remote region of the Yukon Territory,
this indigenous group had decades of experience with mineral development and more than 10
years of experience with negotiating IBAs directly with industry. Unfortunately, all of their
IBAs were relatively short lived (which tends to be typical in the Yukon Territory). Thus, the
IBAs chosen as case studies were of speeial significance because of the size of the projects
and the length of the agreement: the Faro Mine and the KZK Mine. This chapter will start by
introdueing the Ross River Dena and their experience with resource development in their
area. Then the RRDC’s experiences with IBAs will be described and the two ease studies
presented.

4.2.

The Ross River Dena
The Ross River Dena are part of the Kaska Dena; the Kaska, linguistically, are part of

the Athabaskan language group. The Kaska Dena traditional territory stretches from the
MacMillan Pass in the Yukon Territory to the Northwest Territories (NWT) border to
Williston Lake in British Columbia (BC) (see Figure 2).

57

Figure 2:

Tgrnfofy

ÆajAzz ZVafio»

Ak
/Fspo Wne

Kaska Nation
TracWtional Territory

s

^Faro
\

,jL #R oss River

\

)

A

KudzZaKeyah
Mine

\ Uppg[.,Uer(^; Wa:son
fr y
) Lower P o st'- '

/

!
\

!
!

d

.'3
'
*1

Legend
Kaska Community
*
Mine
Otlier Community
Alaska Highway
Campbell Highway
Canol Road
Cantung Road
®
S ) Gassier Highway

Good Hope Lake

r

Dease Lake
Kwadacha
(Fr. Ware)

\V.

\/

V

100 km

The political organisation of the Kaska Dena is the Kaska Tribal Council (KTC). Besides the
Ross River Dena First Nation the KTC consists of the Liard First Nation (Watson Lake,
Yukon), Lower Post First Nation (Lower Post, BC), Dease River Band (Good Hope Lake,
BC), and the Kwadacha Band (Fort Ware, BC). Each of these communities has their own
Council (Chief and councillors). The traditional territory of the Ross River Dena is located in
the southeast comer of the Yukon with transboundary claims in northern BC and the NWT^^.

As Kaska elders opposed the idea o f creating separate territories for the liv e Kaska communities, ± e r e are no
m aps with distinct RRDC boundaries.

58

This First Nation consists of a group of at least five distinguishable family groups from Blind
Creek, Ross River, Sheldon Lake, Pelly Banks and Frances Lake^.
The community of Ross River is located about 360km northeast of Whitehorse at the
confluence of the Pelly River and the Ross River, 10km from the crossing of the Canol Road
and the Campbell Highway. It is situated in the midst of the mineral rich Tintina Trench
which stretches from the northern end of the Rocky Moimtains (southeast of Watson Lake) to
Yukon, Alaska (northwest of Dawson City). The community consists of about 335 people,
whereof approximately 80% are Indigenous and 20% are of other ancestry. (Aboriginal
Population Profile 2001, 2003)^’. The largest source of employment is the governmental
service sector (federal, territorial and First Nation administration). Jobs in the construction
sector are dependent upon the projects of a particular year, but tend to be strong overall^^.
Furthermore, transportation, retail, accommodation, and food services provide employment.
Employment through mining development varies greatly, depending upon metal prices, and
the number and status of mining developments (Yukon community profile 1999, 2002).
Many of the jobs in the government (federal and territorial) and in the private sector are taken
by the non-indigenous population. An unemployment rate for the indigenous population of
44.8% (Profile of Yukon Aboriginals 2001,2003)^^ compared to an overall 36.8%

^ B y the 1940s, the trading posts at Pelly Banks, Sheldon Lake and Frances Lake were closed, so people tended
to m eet in early sum m er near the Ross R iver trading post to trade fur and w ait for anim als to recuperate from
the stress o f w inter tim e. M eanw hile the fam ily groups w ould m eet to exchange news, gather inform ation about
anim al populations, m ake w ildlife m anagem ent decisions, entertain them selves with m usic, dances and
handgam es, get m arried and so on (A rthur John Sr., personal com m unication, 2002). W hen governm ent
introduced services to the area, it assum ed all o f these fam ily groups w ere one indigenous group and term ed
them the “Ross River B and” .
W hile the indigenous population o f Ross R iver stayed relatively constant from 1996 to 2001, the overall
population decreased by approxim ately 4.3 percent, indicating an out-m igration o f the non-indigenous
population. This statistic coincides w ith the closure o f m ines in the late 1990s.
F or example, in sum m er 2000 the new school/college building was finished w hich created em ploym ent for
Ross River residents; how ever, since then only sm all projects such as single fam ily houses were com pleted.
A ccording to the sam e statistic, Ross R iver has the highest unem ploym ent rate for indigenous residents o f all
Y ukon indigenous com m unities.

59

unemployment rate for all Ross River inhabitants (Community Profiles 2001, 2(X)3) gives an
indication of the disproportionate allocation of jobs in the community.
Community statistics indicate that, compared to the Yukon average, Ross River has a
high percentage of young people (14 and younger) and older people (65 or older). The
working age population is relatively low compared to the Yukon average (Yukon
Community Profiles, 1999). In its recent publication "Yukon Community Profiles", Human
Resources Development Canada argues that the relatively small working age group of the
indigenous population may be an indication of people moving outside of town for
employment opportunities. However, it may also be an indication of the high death rate of
the adult population related to drug abuse and suicide (see Dimitrov, 1984, p. 89, table 4.1;
own observations in the field). These statistics give some indications of the challenges faced
by the Ross River Dena, such as lack of employment opportunities in the community, the inand out-migration of non-indigenous populations, according to the jobs available, and the
multiplicity and severity of social problems faced by the indigenous population. As in other
remote communities, many of the social problems faced by the Ross River Dena can be
traced back to resource development experiences introduced by non-indigenous (see Chapter
1 and 2). While some of these experiences were positive, many of them had severe
consequences for the community.

43.

Ross River Dena Experiences with Resource Development
The history of the Ross River Dena during the past century has been closely linked to

resource developments on their traditional territory. For the purpose of this study, the
following section will concentrate on describing the three most important stages of change:

60

(i) the fur trade from the 1840s onward; (ii) the building of the Canol Road and Canol
Pipeline in 1942-44; and (iii) the development of the Faro Mine (Sharp, 1977).

43.1. Fur Trade
Traditionally, the local economy was based on hunting, fishing, trapping and snaring
activities as well as the gathering of plants and building materials. The Ross River Dena had
a long trading tradition with the Tlingit through Tagish middlemen. In the 1800s, fur trade
started with non-indigenous people, initiated through the establishment of trading posts on
Ross River Dena traditional territory (Weinstein, 1992). Building on skills and activities the
people practiced for many centuries, trapping‘s did not extensively change their traditional
lifestyle (T. Smith, personal communication, January 2004). Instead, the fur trade catered to
the indigenous economy in terms of the goods produced as well as the products traded
(Weinstein, 1992). While the fur trade led to “shifts in land use and the Indian economy to
accommodate an increased focus on fur bearing animals ... the limited information
[suggests] that dislocations [of people] were minimal” (Weinstein, 1992, p. 50).

4.3.2. Canol Pipeline and Canol Road
The traditional Ross River Dena lifestyle continued fairly unchanged until the
building of the Canol Road and the Canol Pipeline in 1942-44, which transported oil from
Norman WeUs (NWT) to Whitehorse in order to provide resources for anticipated World
War Two activities in the North PaciBc. However, the war concentrated in the South, and the
pipeline was found to have extensive leakages, making it an expensive and environmentally
damaging project (Grant, 1988). The sudden influx of more than three thousand American
soldiers into Ross River influenced the community considerably. The sudden exposure of the

Traditionally, the Ross R iver D ena used non-m etal traps such as dead falls. W ith the opening o f trading posts
in the area, RR D gained access to metal traps.

61

formerly isolated community to a large number of outsiders brought diseases and death to
many Ross River Dena, mostly children and elders (Charlie Dick, personal communication,
2002), and exploitation of local women (Weinstein, 1992). One community member, elder
Arthur John Sr., worked as a guide on the Canol pipeline. He finally had to quit his work
when his children got seriously sick in Ross River. Arthur John Sr. further remembers that
many local people worked when the pipeline was constructed; mostly wood cutting (Arthur
John Sr., personal communication, December 29, 2003). Indirect impacts occurred through
the connection of the community by road to the Alaska Highway, which facilitated the
provision of governmental welfare to the community.
4.3.3. Faro Mine (until 1992)
As in other communities, residential schools in the 1950s and day schools in the
community in the early 1960s changed the former subsistence lifestyle of the Ross River
Dena, as it was no longer possible to live in the bush all year round (Miller, 1971). However,
the most important impact on the traditional lifestyle had probably the development of the
Faro Mine in the mid-to-late 1960s.
The Faro Mine"*^* was a lead and zinc mine located 75km west of Ross River (see
Figure 2). It was developed in the Bhnd Creek region on the slopes of

Jgda

which

was referred to by the people as their 'food basket' because of the abundance of wildlife,
fish, berries, plants and building material. It was one of the two most important gathering
areas of the community. After the opening of the mine, the region was mainly abandoned by
the Ross River Dena because of the intense activities in the area, the in-migration of more
than a thousand outsiders, and the decreasing numbers of animals in the region. Instead the

T he Faro M ine is also called A nvil M ine and C yprus-A nvil M ine according to the ow ner o f the time.
^ T his m ountain does no longer exist; it has been dism antled as part o f the m ining operations.

62

region became the economic engine of the Yukon Territory for more than two decades,
accounting for about one third of the Yukon's economy (Weinstein, 1992).
Intense mining development started with a boom of staking and exploration activities
in the mid 1960s. The original owner of the mine was the Anvil Mine Corporation Limited
(Aho, 1966). From 1965 to 1970, the service town of Faro was built 25km outside of the
mine to accommodate the work force. To guarantee the development of the Faro Mine, the
government provided financial assistance (at least $28 million) for infrastructure, including
the building and upgrading of the Campbell Highway, the building of a bridge crossing the
Pelly River in Faro, man-power training, and the provision of substituted electricity
(MacPherson, 1978a). In turn. Anvil Mine Corporation Limited signed an agreement in 1967.
“Her majesty wishes to encourage and support the proposed mining development in order to
expand the economic activity of the Yukon Territory and to provide employment
opportunities for Canadians, particularly those residents in the ... Territory” (MacPherson,
1978a, p. 123). According to the Anvil Agreement the company agreed to undertake efforts
in hiring at least 5% local residents, particularly those of indigenous descent, in the first, 10%
in the second and 25% by the fifth year of operation (MacPherson, 1978a). At no point in
time have these goals been achieved. While "the company ... felt that ...i t had met its
obligations with respect to the employment of northern natives the government maintained
that, although the letter of the agreement may have been followed, the spirit of the agreement
had not been met” (Harper, 1982, p. 11)'^^.
Mine production started in 1969, and notwithstanding shut-downs in the 1980s and
1990s due to low metal prices and changes in ownership, continued operating until January
T he government initiated a study to investigate reasons for the failure o f providing em ploym ent for First
N ations in Faro. This study concluded that the com p an y ’s insensitivity tow ards indigenous p eo p le’s attitudes
and aspirations were the cause for the non-success o f the agreem ent (M acPherson, 1978).

63

1998. The Faro Mine had significant impacts on the surrounding communities, such as the
development and expansion of infrastructure (communication, energy, and social services)
for Faro and Ross River, and associated increase of secondary developments. As for Ross
River, Aho (1966), one of the men staking the Faro deposit, described the changes in the mid
1960s.
T he form er sm all com m unity o f Ross R iver has exploded with
developm ent. In 1965 it contained only about 30 people, m ostly Indians,
and a sm all trading post, w ith m inim al facilities, no school, no electricity,
little or no supplies, no sew er or water; and flying services were chartered
from W hitehorse 125 m iles aw ay by air. A few m onths later, spurred by the
heat o f the exploration activity, Ross R iver attained a developm ent area
status and boasts a fixed w ing and helicopter base. N orthw est E xpediting
and C om m unication base, T erritorial G overnm ent base for road crews.
A tlas E xplorations base w ith atom ic photospectrom eter - geochem ical
laboratory, electricity and water, a school, a modern motel and restaurant,
several new perm anent houses, tw o new churches, a large and w ell-stocked
store, fuel and propane depot, and m any other facilities o f an organised
com m unity (p.5).

In addition to the changes within the community, the expansion of infrastructure, such as the
construction of the Campbell Highway as part of the ‘Roads to Resources’ program^ as well
as the reopening of the North Canol road'*^ further opened Ross River to outsiders. The
positive impacts encountered by the Ross River Dena were minimal and mostly tied to the
beginning stages of intensive mine developments in the Ross River area, from about 19651970. In this time, local people were hired by exploration companies for prospecting, staking
and line-cutting. Indigenous workers were preferred to non-indigenous workers as they were
‘bush wise’ and harder working than their co-workers (Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977). The Ross
River Dena favoured this work over work in the mine as it was closely related to traditional
activities. However, with the stagnation of mineral exploration in the early 1970s these
employment opportunities diminished fast (Miller, 1971).
^ The 'Roads to Resources' program was initiated in 1959 under the Diefenbaker government to improve the
overall infrastructure o f the C anadian N orth and thus, to increase the num ber o f resource developm ent projects.
The North Canol was reopened to access m ineral rich regions along the Y ukon/N orthw est T erritory border.

64

Besides limited positive outcomes, the opening of the Faro Mine had severe
repercussions for the Ross River Dena in the form of social, cultural, environmental and
economic impacts. Various studies outlined these experiences; some of the authors were
direct observers in the community (e.g. Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977), while others were
scholars pursuing studies in the community (e.g. Dimitrov, 1984; Weinstein, 1992).
According to these studies, most of the impacts can be traced back to alcohol abuse, racism,
violence against the Ross River Dena, and ignorance toward their culture and traditions. The
impacts include among others, high death rate related to alcohol and drug abuse (e.g. car
accidents, burning in cabins, freezing in the cold, suicide)'^ family violence and break-up,
rape, loss of self-respect (Miller, 1971; Sharp, 1977). Further impacts encountered were
related to land use.
These include: problem s o f access to harvesting areas; changes in the
quality o f resource; com petition from other users o f the sam e resource;
changes to resource abundance; changes to peo p le’s ability to harvest the
resources; and disturbance to cultural and econom ic life. (W einstein, 1992,
p. 110)

These negative impacts experienced by the Ross River Dena are similar to those of many
other indigenous communities located in remote regions throughout the world (see section
2.4.1.). Yet, the impacts on the community were not formally acknowledged until 1990 when
Curragh Resources, then owner of the Faro Mine, offered to address the problems created by
the mine (Weinstein, 1992).
In fact, the mine was opened without assessing the socio-economic impacts the
development would have on the local indigenous population (Weinstein, 1992). Even to this

^ Alcohol-related accidents started in 1960. Since 1970, almost every year at least one person died related to
drugs and alcohol (Weinstein, 1992) (The statistic W einstein is referring to goes only until 1989; however, the
trend has not discontinued. In fact, in 2003 at least tw o people died o f drug and alcohol-related accidents.)

65

point, no comprehensive study has yet been completed to fully understand the impacts of the
Faro Mine on the First Nation community. This prompted Weinstein (1992) to ask:
W hat w ere the conditions that perm itted developm ent to proceed without
consideration for conflicts? A t best the blam e can be laid on ignorance of
the significance o f the land to Indian culture and econom ics. A t w orst blame
can be laid on racism . Som ew here betw een the two lies the ethnocentric
conviction that the replacem ent o f hunting, trapping, and fishing as the
m eans for m aking a living by w age-labour and com m ercial trade represents
an inevitable and universal step in hum an progress. In this view bringing a
m ine developm ent to the “door-step” o f an Indian band represents an
opportunity to m odernize and share in the benefits o f progress. Concerns
about land use conflicts did not have to be addressed because hunting,
fishing and trapping w ere not considered to be legitim ate or significant
econom ic endeavours. The expectation w as that they w ould be gladly
replaced w hen w age labour opportunities w ere available, (pp. 6-7)

Yet, the operation of the Faro Mine did not lead to the modernization of the Ross
River Dena, nor provide other benefits to the indigenous community. Employment was
limited to five individuals who quit within the first years of mine operation (MacPherson,
1978a), but the impacts were felt by the community as a whole. The Anvil Agreement struck
between government and industry had no effect on improving the status of the Ross River
Dena at the mine site (Sharp, 1977). Focussing strictly on employment and training the
agreement offered neither enforcement nor encouragement to increase benefits to the Ross
River Dena. Instead, the people felt increasingly marginalized and not taken seriously in their
attempt to communicate their concerns about environmental matters at the mine site'^^.

The size o f the current m ine site (including claim s) extends o ver approxim ately 360 square kilom etres with
approxim ately 147 square kilom etres o f disturbed land. It consists o f three open p it m ines (the Faro, V anG orda
and G rum pit), one refilled pit, several waste rock dum ps, one tailing pond (size: approxim ately three square
kilom etres; depth: up to 60 feet; volume: approxim ately 53,000,000 tonnes o f tailing slurry), settling ponds,
fresh water facility and dam , several creek diversions around the prem ise and a haul road stretching over 15 km,
connecting the pits, w aste rock dum ps, and mill building (T. Sm ith, personal com m unication, D ecem ber 18,
2 0 03 .

66

4.4.

Ross River Impact and Benefits Agreements
Although not exclusively focussing on indigenous peoples' interests, the 1967Anvil

Agreement has clear elements of an IBA as it specifies terms which intend to increase
indigenous peoples' participation in and benefits from a mining project. As with other early
agreements in Canada and Australia, the Anvil Agreement was negotiated between the
federal government and the resource company. Anvil Mine. This agreement proved to be
unsuccessful from the perception of the RRDC as it provided neither employment nor other
benefits to this First Nation community.
The early 1990s marked a new starting point for the Ross River Dena in their effort to
gain more control and receive more benefits from the Faro Mine, as Curragh Resources
Limited agreed to negotiate an IBA directly with the community to secure, among other
things, employment, training and business opportunities from the Faro Mine. However, with
financial responsibilities mounting from the Westray coal mine accident in Nova Scotia in
1992, and fines issued at the Faro Mine for equipment insufficiencies (MacKay, 1997),
Curragh Resources declared bankruptcy and an interim receiver (Deloitte and Touche) took
over the business at the Faro Mine.
When Faro Mine matters were discussed in court in 1993/94, the RRDC took the
stand in court to present their interest in the Faro Mine area. The result was a condition on
the future purchasers of the mine to complete an IBA with the RRDC. Eventually, Anvil
Range, mostly composed of former directors of Curragh Resources, bought the Faro Mine
and signed an IBA with the RRDDC^ in December 1994. It was a ground-breaking event for

T he RR D D C is the business arm o f the RRDC. It was founded in O ctober 28, 1982 by the RRDC. Initially,
the R R D D C was active through the D ena Store, a convenience store in Ross River. In the early 1990s, the
R R D D C gained im portance through the negotiation and im plem entation o f IB A s w ith m ining com panies such
as A nvil Range and Com inco. A pproxim ately 23 different businesses were opened and m anaged through the

67

the Ross River Dena; the first time in 25 years the government had acknowledged the
interests and rights of the people in the Faro Mine. The RRDC/RRDDC negotiated several
IB As in the 1990s, including IBAs for Grew Creek, Ketza River, Wolverine and the Kudz Ze
Kayah (KZK) mines. Except for the Wolverine Mine'^^, aU agreements have been signed.
Every one of these agreements varies slightly in content and in the duration of usage. This
study will focus on the efficacy of two agreements: the Faro Mine IBA and the KZK IBA.
These two agreements were chosen as both agreements were negotiated at the same time
(1994-95) and endured for about the same length of time (approximately 3 years). Further, as
these two agreements were the longest IB As in place, they were of great importance to the
community.
4.4.1. Faro Mine Im pact and Benefits Agreement
The Faro Mine IBA was signed on November 8, 1994 containing provisions for
employment, business opportunities, training, housing and payments for scholarships and
trapline support. In September of 1996, operations at Faro slowed down due to low metal
prices, and on December 20, 1996, almost everybody was laid off. People were hired back in
October/November 1997. In January 1998 the mine finally closed, which ended the Faro
Mine IBA (K. Suza, Mining Liaison OfEcer for RRDC/Anvil Range, personal
communication, November 7, 2003).
On Apnl 21,1998 the Ontario Court, once again, appointed Deloitte and Touche as
the Interim receiver of the Faro Mine. After the completion of several studies, the mine
finally was shut down for good. Reclamation planning is currently underway. The estimated
clean-up costs are $200-6(X) milhon, depending upon the money available and the clean-up
RRD DC (see Appendix 4.2.) (Zanasi, 1998). B y 1998, the R R D D C experienced serious financial difficulties
and closed its doors. The business becam e deregistered as o f M ay 29, 2003.
The exploration w ork stopped before the IB A could be signed.

68

measures taken. It is anticipated that the mine site will not be returned to its former state
because of the scale of environmental damage and the costs associated with such an
endeavour. Therefore, water treatment and control will be necessary for a long time to come.

4.4.2. Kudz Ze Kayah In^pact and BeneBts Agreement
The KZK Mine is located 160km south of Ross River, west of Finlayson Lake (see
Figure 2). The Finlayson Lake region is well known by mining companies for its mineral
deposits, including lead, zinc, gold, and recently emeralds. Corporations such as Expatriate,
Teck Cominco and True North Gems have mineral interest (stakes) in this area.
In 1993, while Cominco planned exploration work in the KZK area, it started
negotiating an IBA with the RRDC, and, as in the case of the Faro Mine, more specifically
with the RRDDC. Similar to the Faro Mine Agreement, the KZK agreement incorporated
employment, training and business opportunities for the Ross River Dena. The agreement
was implemented between 1995 and 1998. However, exploration results showed that the ore
body is tainted with selenium, which makes it costly, and to this point unprofitable to extract
the lead and zinc, thus, exploration work stopped in 1998. Currently, Teck Cominco and the
RRDC are exploring the possibility of opening a land block which is immediately attached to
the KZK property. This area bears high hopes for being the core deposit in this area.

69

Chapter 5: Analysis
5.1.

Introduction
This chapter analyses the Faro Mine and KZK agreements negotiated between the

RRDC and industry, in terms of their success in providing benefits to the Ross River Dena,
by drawing on development theory (Chapter 1), and IBA literature and emerging IBA
theories (Chapter 2). The order of analysis corresponds with the theoretical framework in
Chapter 2: success of the IBA, process, content and other influences.

5.2.

Success
The success of the Faro Mine and KZK IB As has been measured in two independent

ways: (i) through the perception of the Ross River Dena regarding the benefits received
through the agreements; and (ii) through a comparison of the benefits negotiated in the
agreements with the benefits actually received.
5.2.1. Ross River Dena’s Evaluation of the Im pact and Benefits Agreements
The Ross River Dena’s perception of the benefits received through the IB As has been
measured through data gathered in a survey with community members (Appendix 3.2.). The
analysis of this survey revealed that community members perceived the benefits received
from the KZK agreement to be more positive than those received through the Faro Mine
agreement. The survey participants were asked to measure their satisfaction with the benefits
received on a scale fiom 1 (not at all) to 5 (very good). More than 90% of the respondents
evaluated the benefits received through the Faro Mine as less than 3, whereas the KZK IBA
was assessed by the majority of respondents as 3 (see Figure 3)^. Thus, the survey
respondents made two clear statements: first, neither of the IBAs was considered to be very
* W hile differentiating the answ ers received by gender it becam e apparent that, overall, w om en evaluated the
IB As worse than men. H ow ever, no effort has been undertaken to find out why this is the case (for respective
charts see A ppendix 5.1.).

70

successful in the long-term, and second, notwithstanding the overall assessment, the KZK
agreement was deemed to be more successful than the Faro Mine agreement.
Figure 3:

^

Dena witA

recgfvgd t/irowgA tAe /mpuct and

40% ■

%

I O Faro M ine IBA

& 30%

'

I ® K udz Ze K ayah IBA

10% o

0% -- :
Scale

5.2.2. Comparison of Agreements’ Content with Benefits Received
The following section compares the content of the agreements^' with the short and
long-term benefits actually received. In order to communicate the results of the analysis,
ratings have been given ranging from good, fair to poor. The ratings depended upon the
matching of the IBAs’ contents with the benefits experienced by the Ross River Dena paired
with an evaluation of circumstances and efforts taken by both parties to achieve positive
results. More specifically, the rating "good” was applied when the benefits outlined in the
IBAs were received and had positive impacts for community members. The rating ’Tair” was
used when the benefits outlined in the agreement were offered, but had few positive impacts
for community members. "Poor” has been given when the benefits outlined in the agreement
have not been provided or if they have been provided but they provided no positive outcomes
for community members. E none of the above ratings could be applied because of
While the content o f the Faro M ine IBA has been derived directly from the agreement, the content o f the
K udz Ze Kayah IBA has been based on data published in H enderson and V oogd (2001).

71

insufficient information, they were marked as '^uncertain". The evaluation does not rely
solely on the benefits that have been offered by industry, but also analyses if the benefits
received actually benefited the Ross River Dena. As such, this evaluation is meant not only
to demonstrate the performance of the companies, but also the ability of the people to receive
benefits from the mining projects. Following is a detailed justification for how the ratings
have been applied. The ratings are summarized later in Table 6.
Coopération
Both IBAs include a promise of cooperation. While representatives from the Ross
River Dena as well as Cominco expressed their satisfaction with the level of cooperation, the
opinions of interview participants about the quality of cooperation between the RRDC and
Anvil Range varied from limited (RRDDC representative) to good (Anvil Range
representative). Similar perceptions were reflected regarding the quality of IBA review
meetings. While regular quarterly meetings have been held between Cominco and the
RRDC/RRDDC in Ross River, the meetings between Anvil Range and the RRDC/RRDDC
were less consistent. In fact, a representative of Anvil Range complained that meetings
would be set up in Faro, and without notice the Ross River Dena would not show up.
However, documentation and my own observations demonstrate that often it is not
intentional to miss meetings, but a matter of community officials having to deal with intense
schedules. For example, in the 1990s, the RRDC dealt with an array of issues, including the
management of 3-5 mining developments and land claim negotiations. Many of the meetings
included the need to travel to Whitehorse (420km) or Watson Lake (location of the KTC
Office, 380km), which takes a tremendous amount of time away from daüy community
needs. It is an unfortunate practice of the RRDC not to inform other meeting participants of

72

the inability to attend a meeting. Possibly, this situation could bave been avoided tbrougb
meeting in Ross River.
As bas been encountered by Anvil Range, when consulting the RRDC regarding a
water license appbcation for the proposed Grizzly prqject^^, the attendance of community
members was improved when meetings of the developer were joined with meeting sessions
of the RRDC or similar events. Also, in the beginning of Cominco's consultation process
with the RRDC, they encountered poor participation of the community members in the
meetings. Instead of regarding the non-participation as a statement of no interest or no
concern by the people, Cominco hired a mining liaison officer who visited the elders and
asked for their comments and views regarding the proposed project. In general, the
cooperation between the RRDC and Anvil Range has been evaluated as fair and that with
Cominco as good.
Contracting

Both agreements outline the necessity of creating business opportunities. These
business opportunities have been acted upon by the RRDC/RRDDC in two ways:
establishing local businesses, and starting joint ventures with larger enterprises, such as
Beaver Lumber, Pacific Petroleum and Norcan. Local businesses created include line-cutting,
staking and construction enterprises. Both Anvil Range and Cominco used local businesses
for their operations. However, a review of the documentation shows that there were more
contract opportunities (at least 5-6 in 2 seasons) through Cominco than through Anvil Range
(in 1.5 years only 3-4 local contract opportunities). Considering the differences in size of
both projects, the percentage of contracts given to Ross River Dena was far higher at KZK
than at the Faro Mine. The large size as well as Faro's producing status may have
This project was a proposed underground p it on the Faro M ine property.

73

complicated finding appropriate small-scale contracts for Ross River Dena businesses. At
least on one occasion a contract at Faro could not be unbundled to allow for smaller business
ventures to take the offer. Contracts in both mines were usually short-term (3-4 weeks).
Anvil Range and Cominco have both used Ross River Dena joint venture businesses;
however, these joint ventures proved to be of little benefit to the people in terms of
employment opportunities. Although community members were hired in the start-up of the
joint venture, only a few people remained employed for a longer period of time. There is no
indication why that was the case. Financially, some of the businesses provided monetary
benefits; however, as all joint ventures were terminated shortly after the mine closed, no
long-term benefits were accrued by the community. Thus, the short and long-term benefits
through business opportunities have been evaluated as fair and poor for the Faro Mine and as
good and poor for KZK.
Employment

KZK was an exploration camp with a working schedule of two-weeks-in, two-weeksout which provided free accommodation and food. The work offered was mainly seasonal
and associated with 'bush work' such as camp construction, prospecting and cooking. Table
4 shows the type and number of jobs taken by Ross River Dena in 1995-1996. There are no
comparable data available for the years 1994,1997 and 1998.
By 1998, KZK had opened more than 50 positions to Ross River Dena (including
local contractors) and provided more than 165 months of working hours. The percentage of
indigenous employees compared to that of other workers was more than 50%. The number of

74

people quitting their job in 1995 was 19% and in 1996 11%^^. Noticeably, Cominco
representatives - from the Vice President to the supervisors at the mine site - participated in
cross-cultural training which aimed to create an increased understanding of Ross River Dena
culture and traditions, and as such, established bridges of respect. Further, communication
was recognised as an important factor in retaining good relations. Documentation confirms
that Cominco, instead of terminating employees, sought the assistance of the RRDC/RRDDC
to solve critical situations.
Table 4; Numbers and Type o f Ross River Dena Employment at Kudz Ze Kayah
N um ber o f people_________
T ype o f em ploym ent_______________________________1995_____________________1996
C am p C onstruction W orker
B ull C ook
C ook
C am p A ssistant
C ore Splitter
P rospector
G eochem ical A ssistant
G eophysical A ssistant
C am p Security

4
3
1

7
3
2

3

1
1
1
5

Note. A s this list is com prised o f data from different docum ents, it m ay not be com prehensive; how ever it gives
a general overview about the jo b s taken by the Ross R iver D ena in the years 1995-96.

In contrast to the bush work provided at KZK, the employment available to Ross
River Dena at the Faro Mine included mainly labouring and truck driving (see Table 5).
Table 5:
96j

ant/ typg

River Dena emp/oyment at tAe Faro Mine (October 7994-

T ype o f em ploym ent______________________________ N um ber o f people
L abourer
T ruck D river
Pit Utility
D ew atering
Student
A pprenticeship
M ining Liaison M anager

15
11
4
2
3
3
1

The reports for K ZK do not distinguish who ended the em ploym ent (the com pany or the em ployee). H ence,
term s such as term ination are not used. T here seems to be a greater acceptance by C om inco that people may
stop working. In such cases, new em ployees were hired.

75

Ross River Dena employment numbers were constantly changing because of their high
turnover; however, at no time did Ross River Dena employees account for more than 5% of
the Faro Mine workforce (assuming an approximate total workforce of 400 to 5(X) people).
Comparisons between Ross River Dena employees and other indigenous employees offer
interesting distinctions between employment patterns of both groups (Figure 4 and Figure 5).
Figure 4 illustrates that Ross River Dena employment termination within the first three
months was 39% higher than that of other indigenous employees. Further, Figure 5
demonstrates that Anvil Range terminated 12% more Ross River Dena than other indigenous
people while the Ross River Dena participation in full-time positions was 27% lower than
that of the other group.
Figure 4: Comparison o f work duration between Ross River Dena and other indigenous
at rAf Faro Ming (DcfoAer 7P94-96)

O Ross River Dena

'
«

Employees

i ■ Other First Nation
Employees

20%

0 .5 n » n th s

0.5-3

3-12

12 months

and less

months

months

and more

Length of time

76

Figure 5:

/(ivgr Dema owf ofAgr W;gg»owj^ gmpZo^'gg^ (Ocfo^gr 7994-96)

50% '
M

O Ross River Dena
Employees
!

40 %

"8 30 % -

I

■ Other First Nation;
Eiiployees

20% -

Ë 10% 0% -

/
Employment Status

In 1995, special efforts were undertaken to hire Ross River Dena members. An Anvil
Range manager was sent to Ross River where he hired 17 people for the mine; however, the
majority of people left within the first month. This manager had no knowledge about why
people left, but assumed that they did not like millwork. He further stated that Anvil Range
did not go ‘chasing everybody’s heels’, which summarises the general approach taken by the
company. After 1995, Ross River Dena had to apply for jobs by resume. Anvil Range
terminated 33% of all Ross River Dena employees, mainly because of poor work ethic,
including lacking punctuality, absenteeism and inappropriate workplace behaviour (e.g.
leaving the workplace during scheduled hours)^. M ^or reasons the Ross River Dena gave
for not carrying on with a job included high rent payments in Faro and dislike of shift work.
Further motivations were determined through interviews and review of
documentation. For instance, the three mining liaison ofGcers working for the RRDC
independently stated that one mryor barrier for carrying on work was the inability of Ross
River Dena employees to communicate problems to their supervisors. Once criticized, they

54

For a broader discussion o f Ross River D en a’s lacking w ork ethic see section 5.5.2.

77

would rather leave the job than discuss problems and concerns with co-workers and
supervisors. Interviews with the Faro Mine liaison officer and government o^cials, as well
as documentation point to Ross River Dena not feeling accepted by non-indigenous co­
workers at the Faro Mine. One of the reasons was the negotiation of a Collective Agreement
between the United Steelworkers of America (USWA 1051) and Anvil Range (first signed
with Cyprus Anvil) which outlined, among other things, the requirement for workers to join
the union, the application of seniority rules for promotions, and special leaves of absence
available for indigenous employees to pursue traditional activities. The application of
seniority rules had huge impacts on the Ross River Dena as they could not become a truck
driver instantly, but had to work as a labourer for at least 2-3 months. However, the average
time for Ross River Dena labourers was less than 3 weeks before quitting. To overcome this
obstacle, training was offered through Yukon College (paid through the Ross River Training
Trust Fund^^) which enabled the people to start directly as truck drivers. The result was a
significant increase in average work time to more than 35 weeks.
Non-indigenous workers voiced their discontent against a special treatment of the
Ross River Dena. Thus, Ross River Dena employees did not like to take special leaves of
absences because of the tension it created between themselves and their co-workers. Further,
they felt that the union rules were too stringent in terms of work times (shift work) and
promotion (the Ross River Dena felt non-indigenous people were favoured). On July 26,
1996, a meeting was held between the RRDC/RRDDC, representatives of Anvil Range and
members of the Steelworker's Union to discuss the difficulties arising Aom the employment
practices at Anvil Range for Ross River Dena members. This meeting highlighted the need
for greater flexibility and tolerance from Anvd Range and the Union towards the Ross River
’ For more inform ation on the T raining T rust Fund see section ‘T raining’.

78

Dena. The meeting minutes indicate that a decision was made to go ahead with cross-cultural
training for the "vice president and their senior managers and down to the exploration guys".
However, this training was never undertaken. Reviewing interview transcripts of a study
undertaken by Dimitrov (1983), it seems that despite the Faro Mine IBA, many of the
reasons for low Ross River Dena employment in the 1980s were unchanged (e.g. challenging
conditions to get to work, and poor communication between indigenous and non-indigenous
workers).
Comparing the employment provided by Cominco with that of Anvil Range, the
former, for its size, was more successful in employing and retaining Ross River Dena
workers. This can be related to a number of reasons, such as the type of jobs, the working
conditions, and Cominco’s commitment to increasing indigenous work participation (crosscultural training and communication with the RRDC/RRDDC in overcoming problematic
situations). However, the impacts of the work and the on-job training provided have been too
short to leave good long-term benefits within the community. Thus, the KZK IBA was rated
good in the short-term and fair for the long-term. The rating for the Faro Mine IBA took into
account the initial effort undertaken by Anvil Range to employ Ross River Dena, as well as
the limited effort adopted to sustain this local workforce (cross-cultural training,
consideration of RRDC concerns regarding the collective agreement). Consequently, it has
been rated as good for the short-term and poor for the long-term.

(only Faro Mmg Z8A)
The Faro Mine agreement included the provision of summer jobs for indigenous
students from Ross River. The minimum age for acceptance was 18 years. Documentation
shows that in 1995 three students were hired: one student quit within the first three weeks.

79

and for the other two, no data are available. In the following years. Anvil Range was open to
hiring more summer students; however, nobody applied for the positions. No information is
available about why that was the case. Overall, this position has been evaluated as fair for the
short-term and uncertain for the long-term as no information is available.
Apprenhcej/iip pmgmnw fon/y Faro Ming /BA)
The Faro Mine IBA outlined opportunities for five Ross River Dena to enrol in
apprenticeship programs including heavy equipment mechanic, industrial mechanic,
industrial electrician, machinist, industrial instrument mechanic and welder. Documentation
shows that three individuals started apprenticeships: two as heavy equipment mechanics and
one as an electrician. One of the heavy equipment mechanics resigned after five months
work, the other two were not able to complete their apprenticeships within the lifetime of the
mine, yet they completed their certificates on their own (i.e. Trade Ticket). Interview
participants mentioned that it was difficult to find applicants with enough education to pass
the test for entering the program. One individual further stated that the entry level has been
lowered to allow people to start with the program, but he doubted that lowering the level
truly helps the Ross River Dena in completing an apprenticeship program. The program
assisted at least two individuals to start furthering their professional skills; however, as both
were not able to finish the program within the lifetime of the mine. Anvil Range's
contribution has been evaluated as fair-good for the short and long-term.
Trainmg
The Faro Mine IBA stated that given available resources and interest. Anvil Range
would offer RRDC members training in the area of mining technology, geology and
exploration, business administration, accounting, environmental technology, use of

80

computers, resource development planning, purchasing and warehousing, assaying and
contract law. However, except for the mining liaison manager, no other Ross River Dena
received formal education from Anvil Range. Instead, the Faro Mine required employees to
'work up the corporate ladder', starting with simple labour in the pit and mill. Workers were
given the opportunity to become a truck driver only after at least 2-3 months of work.
Training for tradesmen was provided through Yukon College. Similarly, Cominco offered
on-the-job training opportunities, and relied on further advanced training offered by the
Yukon College. The courses at the Yukon College (Ross River Campus) were funded
through the Training Trust Fund that was managed by the Ross River Development Society
(indigenous and non-indigenous board members) which was in place from 1996 to 1998.
This trust fund originated through payments from the RRDDC, YTG Department of
Advanced Education, and corporations such as Expatriate, Westmin Resources, Columbia
Gold and Cominco. Anvil Range did not contribute to the fund, which was ill-received by the
RRDDC who wrote in a letter to YTG “Anvil Range could take a lesson on corporate
responsibility". YTG contributed $100,(XX) to the fund in 1996 and 1997 acknowledging that
these funds are necessary to prepare the Ross River community members for mining
activities in their area. It is uncertain how much money was available in the trust fund
overall.
During its lifetime, the college increased its program drastically, offering a variety of
courses in the area of human development, mining and other subjects, which were taken by
approximate 50-60 people. Interview partners have evaluated the success of this training
initiative differently. An employee working out of Whitehorse to facilitate the training at the
Ross River Yukon College campus stated that the training offered was highly beneficial for

81

the Ross River Dena in the short and long-term. However the coordinator of the Ross River
Yukon College campus, as well as the instructor of life-skiU training, doubted the benefits of
the training. They stated that the abrupt stop of mining activities in 1998, and the related loss
of employment opportunities to local residents, made the training offered ineffective in
providing benefits to community members. In particular human development courses, which
were designed to prepare people for work environments through improving self-esteem and
confidence, were reliant on work accessibility after completion of the courses. As mining
activities have not picked up since the Faro Mine and KZK ceased their operations, the
professional skills acquired have not led to better employment in the long-term. Thus, the
short and long-term benefits from the courses given are highly dependent upon the time and
the subject of the courses offered.
In addition to payments into the training trust fund, Cominco sent three young men to
the British Columbia Institute of Technology in Vancouver for a technology program.
However, none of these three men stayed for more than one semester, because of low grades
and/or homesickness. Cominco representative Tony Keen stated that it is probably better to
educate people close to home. The match of the beneBts outlined in the agreement with the
actual benefits received have been evaluated for the short and long-term as poor for the Faro
Mine IBA, and as good and fair for the KZK IBA.

The Faro Mine IBA outlined a payment of $35,000 which would be used for
scholarship payments to Ross River Dena post-secondary students. Cominco negotiated
scholarship payments for every year the mine would operate. As the KZK Mine remained an
exploration camp, no formal scholarship payments were made. It is difficult to obtain reliable

82

information on matters surrounding the Anvil Range scholarship payments. It is still unclear
who managed the scholarship trust fund which was created to oversee the payments.
However, it is clear that the scholarship trust fund was set up in 1996 (late, considering that
the IBA was signed in November 1994) with payments for two years ($70,000). Students had
to apply to a committee appointed by Anvil Range and the RRDC, and were chosen
according to guidelines developed between Anvil Range and the RRDC. Five indigenous
students from Ross River received scholarships. However, the amount was so small
(approximated $250 per semester) that at least one student did not consider reapplying for the
scholarship. Rather, she decided to rely on student loans. Considering the small number of
students receiving scholarships and the limited time they have been paid (up to two years),
the question of what happened to the unused money remains. Neither the former RRDDC
and RRDC accountants, nor the mining liaison manager were able to give information about
the whereabouts of these funds. In light of the late establishment of the fund and the small
benefits it provided for applicants, the benefits for Faro have been evaluated as fair for the
short-term and poor for the long-term.

Both the Faro Mine and the KZK IBA included provisions for establishing mining
liaison positions. While the costs for the Faro Mine position were split equally between the
RRDDC and the mining company, the costs for the KZK position were covered by Cominco
entirely. These positions were created to facilitate hiring of Ross River Dena, and to improve
cross-cultural communication between the RRDC/RRDDC and the mine. The working place
of the two managers differed; while the Faro Mine liaison officer worked mainly in the
human resources department of Anvil Range, the KZK mining liaison o%cer worked within

83

the RRDDC office. This had implications on the portfolios held by both individuals. While
the Faro Mine liaison officer was engaged extensively in activities outside the IBA, the KZK
mining liaison manager worked full-time in the interest of the RRDC. The Faro Mine liaison
ofGcer appreciated the widened work spectrum; however, it is questionable if the diversion of
focus assisted in improving the working conditions at the mine for RRDC members. Further
differences in approaching the job were revealed in independent interviews with both
officers. While the Faro Mine liaison officer stated that she treated the position as a '9 to 5'
job (hence, she was not available on week-ends), the KZK liaison officer articulated that,
disregarding business hours, it was imperative to be available at all times to workers and
industry to solve problems.
It is difficult to assess the impacts the different approaches to the position had on the
discrepancies between employment conditions at the Faro Mine and the KZK Mine. Yet,
taking into account the training received by the Faro Mine liaison manager and the general
efforts made to improve the working relations between the RRDC/RRDDC and Anvil Range,
the benefits received have been evaluated in the short-term as fair, and poor-fair in the longterm. The evaluation of the KZK mining liaison position took into account the commitment
of Cominco to pay the whole position, the commitment of the officer to put all effort into
providing job opportunities for the RRDC members, as well as the fact that the KZK mining
liaison officer is still employed to undertake tasks such as property security and
environmental monitoring (e.g. water sampling, monitoring caribou). Thus, the beneGts
received from the KZK mining liaison manager were evaluated as good for both short and
long-term.

84

ManaggmgMf

Co»/)' Faro Mme /BAj

The Faro Mine IBA speciOed that as soon as a Ross River Dena fulfills the
requirements for a management position and a position becomes available, this person would
be hired by Anvil Range. Kurt Forgaard (former president of Anvil Range, 2003, personal
conversation) remembers that the RRDDC initiated discussions on this topic. He stated that
the Faro Mine liaison was probably the closest to being able to take the job; however, that
she was not interested in the job and in learning the mining business. Yet, the Faro Mine
liaison officer does not remember having been approached with this subject. Thus this
section was evaluated with poor for the short and long-term.
Board o f D irectors (only Faro Mine IBA)

The Faro Mine IBA included stipulations that if the RRDC held 2% of Anvil Range
shares or more, they would receive a seat on the Board of Directors. As the RRDC did not
own any shares, this provision was not applicable.
Environment

Both the Faro Mine and the KZK IB As outhned that Anvil Range and Cominco
would follow environmental policies set out by government; in particular, the regulations
specified in the water licenses for each mine. The question of the protection of the
environment versus the operation of mines is a highly contentious topic for RRDC. A history
of more than 30 years of environmental degradation on mine sites and the mines'
surroundings aU through the Ross River Dena traditional territory, and carelessness about
local people's views and concerns, has left Ross River Dena knowledgeable and, at the same
time, suspicious of mining impacts on the environment. This is especially true for matters
concerning the Faro Mine. The RRDC insisted that the Faro Mine water license did not

85

include sufficient conditions to protect the environment. Consequently, any incident at the
Faro Mine was treated with suspicion. The former Anvü Range senior environmental
engineer stated that environmental standards at the Anvd Range were very good compared to
those of other mines. He added that Anvd Range was committed to good environmental
standards. However, he also recads two controversial issues over time: raised ammonia
levels, which were resolved through amending the water license; and smad spids occurring
when redding heavy trucks, which was finally solved through the use of a new fuel dispenser
and the development of proper procedures.
Documentation revealed further environmental failures at the mine. On February 18,
1996 the Metafina Chemical building^^ was found containing rusted barrels with very toxic
chemicals leaking into the soil. While the barrels with the most toxic substances (carbon
disulphide) were shipped to Alberta, 23,000 litres of other chemicals were dissolved (10%)
and put into the Faro Mine tailings. A further spill occurred around August 17-18, 1996,
“when a pipeline broke in a building used for producing explosives. Thousands of litres of
water poured through the plant and then into a ditch beside Rose Creek”. After first
disregarding the severity of the spill, a federal civil servant later stated “the spill was more
harmful than his ofGcials Grst believed". The RRDC was greatly concerned about effects on
drinking water, effects on fish and other animals. Further, as some Ross River Dena members
still used the area for hunting and trapping activities, the Council was upset that Anvü Range
neglected to contact them about the issue. In a letter to the RRDC, Anvü Range stated “we
accept your comment that Anvü was negügent in advising RRDC of the spül of coppercontaminated water. However, in no way was this meant to reflect our commitment to the co­
operation agreement between Anvü Range Mining Corporation and the RRDC". For the
’ This building was not ow ned by A nvil R ange, b ut was located on Anvil R ange property.

86

RRDC this incident was additional proof of the disregard for their concerns regarding the
environmental viability of the land.
In addition, during the four years of operation, the Ross River Dena have not been
engaged by Anvd Range in any environmental study at the mine site. Except for $10,000
paid in 1997 to the RRDC to review a water license application for the Grizzly project (a new
pit planned on the Faro property), the community have not been involved or consulted on any
environmental issue. A RRDC ofGcial added that, at the time Anvil Range intended to start
up the Grizzly project, company representatives came to the community to give presentations
on the environment; however, the vocabulary of the oral and written presentation was highly
scientific and thus alienated people from the meetings. After discussing the matter with Anvil
Range representatives, efforts were made to present information in a more understandable
way, yet with only limited success. Considering the numbers of spills which occurred, the
inability of the RRDC to participate in studies and the frustration in communicating with
Anvil Range on these matters, the short and long-term environmental benefits have been
evaluated as poor.
The cooperation in environmental matters at KZK was perceived differently by the
Ross River Dena than that at the Faro Mine. A management advisory committee was
established with representatives from Cominco and the community. This board offered an
avenue to discuss concerns and answer questions regarding the environment, employment,
training and business opportunities. The two main concerns regarding the environment at the
KZK site were the health of the caribou whose calving grounds are near to the mine site, and
the water quality of the streams which are connected to one of the largest lakes in the Ross
River Dena traditional territory; Frances Lake. At least one study on caribou has been

87

undertaken using scientiAc as well as traditional knowledge. Cominco seemed to be
responsive to the concerns of the RRDC and incorporated measures into their design to avoid
environmental hazards. Further, a heritage study has heen conducted to investigate traditional
use and artefacts in the mining area. A questionable undertaking is a proposed airstrip, which
is strongly opposed by the RRDC. As the project was put on hold, this matter is still
outstanding. Because of their commitment (demonstrated through including Ross River Dena
concerns in the overall project design and the undertaking of studies important to the
indigenous people) Cominco’s environmental cooperation with the RRDC has been
evaluated in the short and long-term as good.
Trapline Support

Both mines contributed to a trapper’s trust fund: Anvil Range was supposed to pay
$25,000 per year while Cominco agreed to two annual payments of $35,000. By January
1996, Anvil Range had contributed $25,000 and Cominco $105,000. Documentation gives no
further indication of payments made. Further, considering Anvil Range’s shut-down from
December 1996 to October/November 1997 and the financial difficulties encountered by the
end of 1997, it is highly possible that Anvil Range did not make any more contributions to
the fund. The fund was set up by the trapping committee in 1996, which was accountable to
the RRDC. During its two-year lifetime, the trust fund served a variety of purposes: annual
payments of $1,500 to approximately 30 elders, supplements to Ross River Dena trappers,
training, education of children, bunting trips to provide meat for elders and wages for
coordination of the fund. To justify elders and trapping supplement payments, the recipients
had to provide receipts for purchased trapping and hunting equipment. The fund was set up to
slowly accumulate money for future use; however, as the mines closed during 1997-1998, all

88

money was spent within the two years the fund was in place. Given the differences in
commitments to the contributions made for the fund, the beneAts received from the Faro
Mine project were evaluated for the short-term as fair whereas those from KZK were
considered to be good. The ratings for the long-term are uncertain because of the lack of data.
Co/Mmwnify pro/get
According to the Faro Mine IBA, in the years when Anvil Range was profitable, the
company would provide community support services based on best effort. According to
documentation. Anvil Range contributed $2,700 from November 1994 to January 1996.
Asked about donations from Anvil Range and Cominco for social and cultural purposes, staff
of the Margaret Thompson Centre'’^ in Ross River could not recall any donations from Anvil
Range, but several contributions from Cominco on different occasions. Documentation
shows that Cominco contributed to run a Community Treatment Centre in Ross River,
(affirmed by personal conversation with D. Parker, January 19, 2004). The contributions
from both companies have been evaluated for the short-term as fair for Anvil Range and
good from Cominco. The long-term benefits from both agreements are uncertain.
Housing (only Faro Mine IBA)

The Faro Mine IBA outlined the equal sharing of costs for 25 new trailers ($28,(XX)
per trailer) for the RRDC. The trailers were transported and set up in Ross River. Mike
Rawlings (November 2(X)2, personal conversation) states that these houses were of great
benefit to the RRDC. Still, at least one Ross River Dena member maintains that the costs for
installing the trailers were unexpectedly high (more than three times the cost of the trailers),
creating a huge financial burden on the community. Thus, he argued, the houses had little
positive impact on the community. However, the high instalment costs were caused by a
57

C entre for social activities and assistance as w ell as health matters.

89

Ross River Dena contractor. Further, to this point in time, Ross River experiences a constant
housing shortage. The 25 trailers provided by Anvil Range are a predominant sight in the
community. The trailers have must alleviated RRDC housing pressure considerably, in the
past as well as at the present. Thus, the provision of housing has been evaluated as good in
the short and long-term.
Tax Advice fonZy Faro Ming TBAj
The RRDC/RRDDC was offered the sharing of cost for tax advice with Anvd Range
through the Faro Mine IBA. According to Kurt Forgaard (2003, personal conversation) an
offer to share tax advice had been made, but the offer had not been taken up by the
RRDC/RRDDC. Mike Rawlings (November 2002, personal conversation) confirmed that
this offer had not been taken; however, there is no information available about why (e.g. if it
was not wanted, if it was too expensive). Hence, the rating uncertain was given.
Payment fo r Activities to retain Right o f First Proposal (only Faro Mine IBA)

The Faro Mine agreement set out that Anvil Range, given its profitability, would
make annual compensation payments of $100,000 to the RRDDC on December 31 of every
year^^ to retain the "Right of First Proposal"^^. As of January 30, 1996, only one payment of
$100,000 had been made to the RRDDC^. No documentation about further payments is
available. The Faro mining liaison officer does not recall any further payments. Further,
given the financial difficulties encountered by Anvil Range (see above) it is highly possible
that Anvil Range paid only $1(X),(XX) to the RRDC between the signing of the contract in
November 1994 and the closure of the mine in February 1998. Therefore, the benefits

^ The brst payment was due on January 24, 1995.
The R ight o f First P roposal m eans the rig h t to have priority for any new exploration activity in the Faro M ine
area (see below).
A ccording to a report by the aboriginal m ining liaison officer for the Faro M ine from January 23, 1996, Anvil
Range had already m issed one o f the two paym ents at this p o in t in time.

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received through these payments have been evaluated as poor-fair for the short-term and poor
for the long-term.
Fifjït CalZ OMExpZoration

(onZy Faro AfZng ZBA)

Anvil Range reserved the right for first bids for any exploration work in a 50 rmle
radius of the Faro Mine area through annual payments (see above). However, as no new
exploration activities took place outside the Faro Mine, this clause has not been taken
advantage of by Anvd Range.
The ratings given in the above sections have been summarized in Table 6.
Table 6: General overview o f the benefits received through the IBAs
B enefits

Faro M in e IBA

K Z K IBA

Short-Term

Short-Term

Long-T erm

L ong-T erm

C ooperation

Fair

G ood

C ontracting opportunities

Fair

Poor

Fair-good

Poor

E m ploym ent opportunities

Fair

Poor

G ood

Fair

Sum m er jobs

Fair

Uncertain

n/a"

A pprenticeships program s

Fair-good

Fair-good

n /a "

T raining

Poor

Poor

G ood

Scholarships

Fair

Poor

n/a*

A boriginal Liaison O fficer

Fair

Poor-fair

G ood

M anagem ent position

Poor

Poor

n/a"

Fair

G ood

B oard o f directors

n/a"

E nvironm ent

Poor

Poor

G ood

G ood

T rapline support

Fair

U ncertain

Good

U ncertain

Community project supports

Fair

Uncertain

G ood"

U ncertain

Paym ent to retain R ight o f First
Proposal
Housing

Poor-fair

Poor

n /a "

G ood

G ood

n/a"

Tax advice

U ncertain

F irst call on exploration activities

n/a'

n/a"

n/a"
n/a

n/a"

Part o f agreem ent content but not obtained because conditions w ere not met.
These sections w ere not applicable to the K Z K IBA.

As the table indicates, the benefits received through the Faro Mine IBA in the short-term are
evaluated as mainly fair and in the long-term as mainly poor, whereas the benefits received
91

through the KZKIBA were evaluated for the short-term as good, and for the long-term as
fair. Considering that the survey of the Ross River Dena's perception was undertaken at a
time when long-term benefits can be observed, it is striking that this perception coincides
with the analysis summarised in the Table 6. The above results of community perception, and
comparison of IBA content and the benefits received is further supported by statements of the
mining liaison officers for the Faro Mine and KZK and industry representatives. While both
the Faro Mine liaison and the president of Anvil Range agreed that the Faro Mine IBA was
unsuccessful, the KZK mining liaison officer and Cominco managers closely involved with
the KZK IBA expressed their satisfaction with the success of the KZK agreement. This leads
to the question of why the agreements have been evaluated so differently.
5.3.

Process
The process used to negotiate and implement the agreements was similar, though with

some distinctions. The negotiation of both agreements happened within the same year along
with the negotiation of at least one other IBA for the Ketza River Mine. Chapter 22 of the
Umbrella Final Agreement stipulates that Yukon First Nations should be given economic
opportunities, and therefore be included in planned projects. However, the chapter is open for
interpretation, und thus difficult to rely on. Therefore, IBA negotiations are generally
initiated through the water licensing process; companies must obtain such a license, and First
Nations can threaten to oppose them. It is uncertain what, in particular, triggered the
negotiation of the IBAs under investigation. As stated earlier, a court order (R. v. Curragh
Inc.; May 7, 1994) designated that any future buyer of the Faro Mine had to negotiate an IBA
with the RRDC and report on the agreement to the court. Yet, Kurt Forgaard (2003, personal
conversation) stated that the negotiation of the agreement was independent of any court

92

decision, but initiated by the need to receive a water license. Meanwhile, Tony Keen (2002,
personal conversation) stated that, in the case of the KZK mine, it was not the need for the
water license, but the desire of the company to have an agreement with the RRDC that
promoted the negotiations. Hence, in the absence of land claim agreements, the means to
negotiate an agreement are uncertain; however, there seems to be a general trend that the
need to obtain water licenses is a leverage tool for First Nations.
The negotiation of the agreements was undertaken by a negotiating team comprised
the Ross River Dena Chief and councillors, the CEO of the RRDDC and a further community
member. The team was established to negotiate economic benefits from planned
developments on Ross River Dena traditional territory. The usual approach taken by the team
was to approach the companies to discuss main points of the agreement and then to
communicate the offer in community meetings so as to receive advice from the members.
Then, the negotiating team went back to the negotiating table and so forth. Usually, the
agreement was accepted by community members when reviewed for the third time and
consequently signed. In the case of the KZK Mine, Cominco insisted that 75% of all
community members had to sign the agreement to ensure members’ approval of the
agreement. This has not been the case for the Faro Mine^\
The amount of funding available for the IBA negotiations differed greatly. While for
the negotiation of the first agreement (Ketza River Mine) money was accessible from
different government funds, the negotiation of the Faro Mine agreement was funded through

Q uestion num ber 7 o f the com m unity survey intended to investigate the degree o f RR D input into the
negotiation o f the IB A s. From a scale o f 1 (not at all) to 5 (very good) people stated that the KZK IBA offered
more opportunities to give input to the IB As than the Faro M ine IB A (see A ppendix 5.2.). U nfortunately, no
inform ation is available for w hy Ross River D ena perceived differences in their input to the negotiation. One
explanation is C om inco’s requirem ent o f 75 % o f the people having to sign the agreem ent. A nother explanation
is that Com inco hired a person to go to elders’ houses to seek inform ation for a heritage study.

93

the Resources Access Negotiation Program, which offered approximately $84,000 for the
negotiation of the agreement. As the funding received through the Resource Access
Negotiation Program was limited to an annual amount, no money was available from
government to negotiate the KZK IBA. However, with the signing of the Faro Mine IBA, the
RRDDC received an annual payment of $100,000, which then was used to negotiate the KZK
agreement. Further, Cominco contributed funds to negotiate the agreement, and, after
signing, paid a $250,000 signing bonus. One major difference, in terms of the process used to
negotiate the IB As, concerns the completion of complementary studies. Whereas no detailed
socio-economic studies have been completed for both projects to investigate the impacts of
the mine on the Ross River Dena, at least a traditional use and a caribou study have been
undertaken for the KZK project to investigate the presence of culturally important sites and
the condition of the Finlayson caribou herd.
As for the implementation of the agreements, mining liaison officers were appointed
for both mines to oversee and assist in the implementation of the agreements. Both officers
had to monitor and report the benefits received by Ross River Dena members on a monthly
basis to the RRDC and the RRDDC. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, meetings were held
with both companies at a more or less regular basis. In summary, according to the data
available both processes were fairly similar except for the Traditional Use Study (TUS)
undertaken for the KZK project. Thus, it is questionable if the process itself could have
caused the differences in the IBA outcomes.

5.4.

Content
Analogous to process, the content of both IBAs is very similar. As presented in Table

6, the agreements are composed of the same core elements: employment, training, business

94

opportunities and compensation payments. These elements are typical for a wide number of
IBAs negotiated in the 1990s^^. The Faro Mine IBA includes a few more benefits including
scholarship payments, apprenticeship programs and housing. It is interesting to notice that
the provisions for apprenticeships and housing were the few rather successful benefits
received by the community.
In the survey completed with Ross River Dena and community members closely
involved with the management of the IB As, participants were asked about their opinion with
regard to which benefits should be included in future IB As. Noticeably, the three most
common answers (provision of employment, training, and community involvement in the
project) have been fulfilled by Cominco to a much higher degree than by Anvil Range.
Further, survey respondents were asked how they would like to see development going
ahead. The most common response was that it should include: the protection of the land,
water and animals; the requirement for reclamation after mine closure; respect for their
traditional landownership; the use of traditional knowledge in the design and operation of the
mine; and respectful communication and understanding of cultural differences. Here again,
Cominco has met these criteria (applicable to this point of mine exploration), whereas, from
RRDC perspective. Anvil Range did not. The fact that both IB As were similar in content
(Cominco actually provided less beneBts on paper than Anvü Range), but were evaluated
differently in terms of their success, indicates that in the above discussed case studies, it was
not the content or process of the agreements which influenced their overall success, but
additional factors.

(see H enderson & Voogd, 2001; Kennett, 1999a)

95

5.5.

Additional Influences
As explained in Chapter 2, the success of the IBA is further shaped by additional

influences. These can be grouped into three types: project-related influences, communityrelated influences and industry-related influences. These types are not exclusive, but may
merge at occasions.

5.5.1. Project Related Influences
Project related influences are an important factor for the success of the IBA. This
study demonstrated that the success of the Faro Mine agreement was influenced by the
history of the mine development. The RRDC had, at the time of signing the IBA, a twentyfive year history of being ignored by government and industry regarding their concerns for
the well-being of the environment and their community. Further, commitments were made in
the past which influenced the management of the IBA such as the Collective Agreement and
the IBA negotiated (but not signed) with Curragh Resources. The Collective Agreement
limited RRDC/RRDDC ability to adapt working patterns at the mine to accommodate for
cross-cultural challenges. The IBA negotiated with Curragh complicated matters as it
occasionally led to confusion about the content and intent of the Faro Mine IBA. Further,
many survey and interview participants pointed to their negative experiences with racism and
the deterioration of the environment at the Faro Mine, which, arguably, may pre-date the
signing of the Faro Mine IBA. Finally, the working conditions offered at the Faro Mine (e.g.
shift work, low paying jobs, need to commute between Ross River and Faro and need to pay
rent in Faro) were financially less favourable than those offered at KZK (for a comparison
see Appendix 3.3.). These project related factors influenced negatively the success of the
Faro Mine agreement.

96

In comparison, the KZK project with Cominco as owner was new in Ross River Dena
traditional territory. Cominco had the opportunity to build good relations right from the
ground. This included the completion of TUSs on caribou migration and historic sites in the
KZK area. Further, the work at the KZK camp was mainly related to bush activities which
suited people’s skills and life style. In contrast to the Faro Mine shifts (4 day shifts, 4 days
off, 4 night shifts) the schedule at KZK (two-weeks-in, two-weeks-out of the camp^^) better
fit the needs of the workers. Also, Ross River Dena employees made up the majority of the
KZK workforce, which assisted in them feeling accepted by co-workers. It was of financial
assistance to the workers that living expenses were low in the camp as accommodation and
food were provided. Also, as the employment was organised directly through the RRDDC,
Ross River Dena members did not pay income taxes. Additionally, living in the camp limited
the amount of alcohol consumption, and assisted punctuality as less travel to work was
required. Finally, there are indications that many Ross River Dena preferred short-term work
over long-term commitments, offering the opportunity to pursue traditional activities while
being able to earn wages which pay for hunting and trapping equipment.
5.5.2. Community Related Influences
Community related influences had tremendous implications on the limited success of
the agreements. As the influences are numerous, they have been sorted into two categories:
(i) challenges created by the nature of mining operations and (ii) challenges faced by the
community. Mining operations are defined by certain elements, such as the fast start-up and
shut-down of mining operations due to dependency on changing metal values, the exhaustion
of the resources, and the high costs of mining. Changing metal prices on the world market

The shifts varied if a contractor provided the work. O ne person recounts that the w orking tim es in the first
year were 21 days in the cam p, 21 days off, and in the second year 6 w eeks in the cam p and 1 w eek off.

97

trigger the fast pace of the start-up and closure of mining operations, which causes
difficulties to effectively prepare for mining developments for example in terms of acquiring
the necessary information for the project for assessment work and preparing for job
opportunities. Also, fast and unexpected mine closures can cause tremendous financial stress
on communities which are accustomed to receive regular payments from mine operations,
and which fail to prepare for sudden mine closures. For example, the RRDC was unprepared
for the swift opening of at least 5 mines in the early 1990s and with the falling of metal
prices, the unexpected closure of these within about 3 years. The RRDDC took advantage of
those developments through the swift development of different ventures and other business
opportunities; however, as no emergency measures for sudden mine closures were developed
the corporation was unable to account for the missing incomes. This resulted in the crash of
the RRDDC and its associated businesses in 1997-98. Long-term planning for mining
ventures requires an indigenous community to be highly flexible and dynamic as skills and
business ventures must be transferable to economic sectors other than mining.
Also, mining operations such as the Faro Mine are reliant on the use of large-scale,
expensive equipment, which requires their constant use to retrieve the costs. The poor
punctuality and absenteeism of Ross River Dena employees at the mine site accmed high
costs on Anvil Range, which in turn limited the success of the IBA. Therefore, it is
imperative to increase people's understanding of the cost of doing mining business, paired
with fallback mechanisms in the case of a worker being unable to attend work (e.g. waiting
list for workers in case of no-shows).
The challenges faced by the community include the lack of professional training,
formal education and work experience, lack of work ethic and lack of political stability

98

within the community. The lack of skills and higher education had huge implications on the
job levels available to them and employment continuation, which was especially severe at the
Faro Mine where, aside from the mining liaison position, nobody had higher positions than
truck driving and simple labouring^ (see above).
The lack of skills and experience had repercussions on the ability to efficiently
manage the RRDDC. In 1998, Poushinsky Consulting, Whitehorse was asked to prepare a
Management Review report for the RRDDC, which incorporated an investigation of financial
matters of the corporation. This report outlines the lack of effective accountability structures.
Zanasi (1998) stated “important decisions were often made without the formal sanction of the
Board or shareholders and possibly without their knowledge” (p. 6). Other problems leading
to the financial difficulties of the corporation were the accumulation of high debts of some of
the businesses (e.g. Dena Petroleum and Sah Dena Cho Hardware), the failure of charging
cost recovering prices (e.g. trailers were rented for significantly less than the costs incurred),
the lack of book keeping for businesses (e.g. Dena Petroleum), and the payment of high
overhead business costs in times of little business (Zanasi, 1998). Further, funding
opportunities available through the IBAs were not managed properly by the RRDDC. For
example, YTG paid twice into a training tmst fund to increase Ross River Dena participation
in the mining activities on their traditional territory. However, the RRDDC was unable to
provide reports for the monies spent. YTG undertook investigations to trace financial actions
undertaken by the RRDDC, but this proved impossible because of poor and/or missing data.
Consequently, the Department of Education rejected subsequent funding to the RRDC.

^ O ne Ross River D ena m em ber w orked at the m ine in the hum an resources departm ent on his own term s
w ithout being form ally recognized as an indigenous person. Thus he is not accounted for in any statistic.

99

Further, a challenge repeatedly mentioned throughout the investigations for this study
is the missing work ethic of Ross River Dena workers, specifically poor punctuality,
absenteeism and a long-term commitment to employment. Social factors related to this
challenge are alcohol and drug abuse, and a history of dependency on social assistance
payments. However, it would be simplistic to reduce poor work ethic to social factors as they
also include cultural factors, such as the apprehension of many indigenous workers about
communicating problems with co-workers and supervisors. Instead, people prefer to quit
work. The RRDC strove to overcome these obstacles through life skill training courses which
aimed to prepare people for jobs, including building self-esteem and communication skills.
However, data indicate that these courses were offered too late in the process to truly benefit
the Ross River Dena members in pursuing and maintaining job opportunities. Instead of
applying their new skills in the workplace, people experienced the downfall of the local
economy due to the crash of the mining sector. Additionally, the trend of quitting jobs after a
few months of work indicates that not all Ross River Dena may be interested in full-time
employment, but rather appreciate the opportunity to make some cash and then continue on
with traditional activities, thus merging the traditional and modem sectors of community
economics.
The lack of political stability of the Ross River Dena First Nation added to the
complexity of the challenges faced by the community. As a result of the hnancial problems
faced by the RRDDC in 1997, voices became loud to replace its management. In the same
year the biannual Council elections took place at which the political leadership of the
community was almost completely replaced, and because of the strong ties between the
political and business leaders, the management of the RRDDC too. This had implications on

100

the efGcient continuation of business and relationship with the mining operators as new trust
had to be built between the partners. Furthermore, the contradictions about financial matters
of the RRDDC and the inability to rebuild a financial history of the corporation contributed
to tensions within the community and created further economic challenges, such as
competition of businesses without market support.
Finally, the merging of political and economic ambitions by the RRDC created
further problems. For example, members of the Council were also decision makers in the
RRDDC. One interview participant mentioned that it was difficult to ‘change hats’ when
going from one office to another and to separate political ambitions from the necessities of
running a successful business. Interview participants from government and industry, as well
as literature in the field (Wolfe, 2001) underline the importance of separating business from
politics in order to pursue successful business enterprises.
5.5.3. Industry Related Influences
The sum of industry related influences on the success of IBAs can be traced back to
the companies’ commitment to honour the intent of the IB As, which is mainly to provide
employment, training and business opportunities to Ross River Dena to allow them to benefit
from economic activities on their traditional territory. This commitment can be expressed in
different ways, for example, through respectful and effective communication, considering
and learning about indigenous communities’ culture and customs, ensuring communities’
input into decision-making at the mine site, creating and offering maximum employment,
training and business opportunities for indigenous community members, and making efforts
at overcoming challenging situations throughout the IBA process.

101

Cominco has demonstrated this commitment. Experienced in working with
indigenous communities, Cominco made efforts in responding to questions and concerns of
community members and incorporating these into KZK's design and operation (e.g.
exploration start and finishing date is dependent upon the migration times of the Finlayson
caribou herd). Cominco’s commitment to the IBA was further demonstrated in the
participation of managers and supervisors in cross-cultural training, the completion of a TUS,
and the steady communication e^orts taken by Cominco with the RRDC/RRDDC to clarify
obstacles.
In comparison, little effort has been undertaken by Anvil Range to overcome cultural
differences, and ‘to go the extra mile’ to build a respectful partnership with the RRDC. This
may have been affected by three factors: the little experience Anvil Range has in working
with indigenous people as it is a junior company; the negative history the Ross River Dena
had with the Faro Mine; and the financial difficulties Anvil Range had to face from its start.
5.5.4. Government related Influences
As explained earlier, YTG supported the negotiation of the Faro Mine IBA with
funding from the Resources Access Negotiation Program, which was not available for the
negotiation of the KZK agreement. However, as the Faro Mine IBA provided financial
resources for the negotiation of the KZK IBA, the lack of government funding had no direct
implications on the success of the IBAs. Further, YTG provided funding for economic
activities resulting flom the IBAs of the RRDC/RRDDC with contributions to the training
trust fund. While this funding contributed to some extend to successful economic activities,
the funding was provided too late to take fuU advantage of the employment opportunities
which were available. Aside from the funding for the negotiation of the Faro Mine IBA and

102

the contributions to the training fund, the government had no association with the
relationship of the RRDC with Anvil Range and Cominco. Thus, the influence of
government on the success of the IBA is very limited, and can be, in the overall scheme of
things, be neglected.

103

Chapter 6 : Conclusion and Recommandations
Conclusion
The goal of this thesis is to increase the understanding of Impact and Beneûts
Agreements (IBA) used to increase development of indigenous communities in remote
regions of well-developed countries. This goal has been achieved through a number of
objectives: (i) defining and setting criteria for indigenous development, (ii) developing a
framework for evaluating IBA success in providing benefits to indigenous communities and
thus in enhancing indigenous development, and (hi) analysing and evaluating two IBAs
negotiated and implemented by a remote indigenous community, and (iv) based on the
analysis, recommending criteria for the proposed IBA framework which improve the success
of IB As. This thesis focuses on IB As negotiated directly between indigenous communities
and industry.
In Chapter 1, indigenous development has been defined as a community-based
process which lastingly improves peoples’ quality of life from a cultural, social, political and
economic community point of view. Further, it has been identified that the current focus of
indigenous communities towards development is a concentration on economic factors which
are believed to trigger the further development of communities from a political, social and
cultural point of view. This approach corresponds with modernization theory, which
anticipates the development of communities through economic means; however, what differs
is the question of who guides economic decision-making, and thus, which criteria are taken
into account. An essential part of indigenous economic development is the cooperation of
indigenous communities and industry to establish ventures which are successful from
communities’ as well as industry’s point of view.

104

C h u te r 2 introduced one of the tools used to achieve such cooperation: IB As. These
are arrangements negotiated between indigenous communities (or governments) and
industries, which aim to mitigate adverse development impacts on indigenous communities
and their traditional ways of life, their cultures and environments, while providing local short
and long-term benefits to the affected indigenous communities, and thus stimulating their
economic development. While IB As can be used for different resource development
ventures, this thesis focused on IBAs for large-scale mineral development projects since
these developments have been identified as being of special importance to the economic
development of remote indigenous communities.
Despite the high number of IBAs negotiated throughout the world, there is only a
small body of descriptive and analytical IBA literature available, because of the often limited
time available to people who typically negotiate IB As to publish their experiences,
confidentiality provisions of the agreements, and the short lifetime of many mining ventures.
With the exception of work undertaken by O’Faircheallaigh, no framework for the analysis
of IB As is available. O ’Faircheallaigh ’s work is recent and focuses specifically on the
content of IBAs. However, this thesis demonstrated that this approach is not sufficient to
evaluate the success of IBAs as the content may not necessarily match the benefits received
by the community. Hence, this thesis proposes a new general Aamework for the evaluation of
IB As. This framework is based on work undertaken by O'Faircheallaigh, and is expanded
through the use of additional IBA literature and knowledge gained through the case studies.
The framework determines the main factors for successful IBAs, such as content and process,
as well as additional factors, such as those related to the community, government, industry

105

and the project itself. This framework is broad, as no initial criteria for the different elements
of the framework are available.
A first attempt to develop such criteria has been undertaken for the purpose of this
thesis as it analysed two IB As negotiated by the Ross River Dena; a small indigenous group
located in a remote part of the Yukon Territory. In the 1990s, the RRDC negotiated several
IB As for resource development projects on their traditional territory, including the Faro Mine
and KZK Mine agreements. These two IB As were chosen for analysis because of their
importance to the community. Chapter 3 introduced the methodologies used to pursue the
research project, such as the study design, and the methods for data gathering and analysis.
The case studies were introduced in Chapter 4. Further, the chapter illuminated the
challenges to an exact analysis of the IB As, such as their short lifetime (about three years),
confidentiality clauses of one of the agreements, the lack of accessible documentation from
the community, governments and industry about the IB As’ processes and benefits, and the
hesitation of some people involved in the negotiation and implementation of the IBAs to
participate in the study. While these challenges limited the analysis of the IBAs (Chapter 5),
they also outlined the complications involved in studying IBAs.

Recommendations
Despite these challenges, it was possible to identify a number of limiting as well as
encouraging criteria for successful IBAs and offer recommendations for future IBA
negotiations and implementation of the RRDC. These recommendations have been
categorized according to the IBA framework into process, content and additional influences.

106

#

Develop a set of community goals before negotiating an agreement as this fosters
community involvement with the IBA, and offers a reference tool to communicate the
negotiating achievements to the community.

#

Carry out studies which investigate the socio-economic impacts of the proposed
project, and document the heritage artefacts and use of the area.

»

Make sure that the community understands and accepts the negotiated agreements
before signing it.

•

Establish effective communication processes between the negotiating team and
community to keep communities constantly involved in the process. If community
participation in meetings is low, find different ways to keep people involved, such as
going from house to house to talk to people.

•

Focus implementation efforts on the provision of benefits for the membership.

«

Keep effective and ongoing communication between the indigenous community and
industry to improve relations and create understanding for each others concerns and
limitations.

Co/ifgni
Ensure that the agreement contains provisions for:
*

employment, business, training and advanced education opportunities;

# cross-cultural training of the non-indigenous (i.e. learning about indigenous history
and culture) and indigenous workforce (i.e. Life Skills training, learning about needs
of mining business);

107

#

a mining liaison officer position which strictly focuses on the integration of
indigenous community members into the workforce, training and other educational
programs;

#

the consideration and use of Traditional Knowledge in the design and execution of
the project;

#

the participation of the indigenous community in the monitoring of direct and indirect
environmental, social and economic impacts by the mining development; and

#

effective communication and dispute resolution processes which foster a positive
partnership between the indigenous group, industry and government.

Additional Influences

Project related influences
#

Be prepared for the short lifespan of a mine. Do not exaggerate the creation of
businesses associated with the mining development.

Community related influences
#

Separate business and political goals and objectives.

#

Prepare community members for positive as well as negative socio-economic effects
of the mine. Offer training that prepares community members for mining activities.
Investigate which areas of employment and business are transferable to other business
sectors, and thus, foster long-term benefits from the development.

#

Require community members to join an orientation which teaches prepares
community members for successful participation in a mining workforce.

#

Keep open and effective communication with industry and government to foster
positive partnerships.

108

Industry related influences
*

Commit to the success of the IBA.

#

Seek the input of indigenous people in the design and management of the mine.

*

Keep communicating with the community on all aspects of the mining venture with
relevance to the indigenous community.

*

Require from the workforce participating in cross-cultural training with the goal to
minimise conflicts and increase the understanding between the indigenous and nonindigenous workforce.

•

Employ the mining liaison officer to advance the employment and training of the
indigenous workforce and increase the overall capacities of the community.

Government related influences
•

Create incentives for industry (e.g. legislation) to foster the negotiation of IBAs to
increase indigenous participation in large-scale mining ventures.

•

Make available sufficient funding for indigenous communities to participate
meaningfully in IBA negotiations.

#

Fb-ovide assistance for capacity building before project start-up to allow for
maximization of benefits sought through indigenous community members.

This study demonstrates that the single most important criterion for successful IBAs
is the commitment the different parties bring to the negotiation and implementation of the
IBA. This seems to be especially true for indigenous groups that have not completed land
claims and, thus, are not supported by government regulations in their quest to steer
development on their traditional lands. Given the lack of legislative support, indigenous

109

groups are highly dependent upon the good will industry brings to a project. Thus, one of the
key questions is how commitment from industry can be achieved. One prerequisite is the
respect by industry of cultural differences between the indigenous and non-indigenous
communities, and an understanding of the interest indigenous people have in the protection
of their land base and their communities. Further, it takes organisation and responsibility
from the indigenous group to demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with industry on issues
such as indigenous employment and training, and the protection of the environment and
cultural sites. Cooperation between industry and indigenous communities cannot be created
without trust; however, this trust is not easily achieved but is the product of a constant effort
to engage in communication and openness about each other’s challenges and limitations.
This study indicates that senior companies, such as Cominco, seem to be willing to take extra
efforts to make the agreement work. This increased effort can be attributed to the need of
major companies to practice corporate responsibility in order to increase market
compatibility and avoid conflict. The study further indicates that junior companies, which
struggle with basic financing of their operations, are less inclined (or are even unable) to
demonstrate commitment towards the development of indigenous communities affected by
their mining operations.
Development of indigenous communities through large-scale resource development
ventures such as mining projects is difficult to predict because of factors such as mineral
prices, the viability of a company and political pressure. The resulting patterns of boom and
bust are challenging to the economic development of indigenous communities in Alaska, and
northern regions of Australia, Canada and Russia. Further, given the relatively short time of
indigenous peoples being involved directly in the development of their communities,

110

development will not be achieved instantly nor strategically structured. Black Knippers
(1999) states "real development, of the sort we are calling empowerment, wiU never be neat
and orderly and predictable. For better or worse, consequences do not derive directly from
any identifiable constellation of motives. But the same uncertainty that makes development
work so frustrating also makes it intriguing, challenging and promising" (p. 267). IBAs are
but one means to strive for development. In the past 10 years, indigenous development has
steadily increased and taken different avenues. Currently, one of the largest projects pursued
by indigenous peoples in Canada is the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. Facilitated by
the completion of land claim agreements, indigenous communities along the proposed path
have built partnerships and established joint ventures to maximize the benefits anticipated
from the project. In the 1970s, Berger (1977) stated that land claim negotiations must be
resolved and control be given to indigenous peoples to determine their own future in order to
achieve viable business ventures in the Canadian North while protecting the land base for the
indigenous population. The next decades will demonstrate if these predictions are correct and
if indigenous development can be achieved that leads to socially, environmentally and
economically viable indigenous communities.

Future Research
This thesis presents a new framework with an initial set of criteria for successful
IBAs. However, as these criteria are based on the analysis of only two agreements negotiated
by one indigenous community, more studies of this kind must be performed in order to verify
the framework and expand on the criteria presented in the study. This task is challenging as
such research projects demand extensive field work in terms of the variety of data sources

111

and the length of the study process^^, as well as the restrictions that confidentiality clauses
put on access to, and publishing of, information. Moreover, analysing IBAs is complicated
because of the high number of variables (outside influences and variances in process and
content).
This research project focused specifically on IBAs negotiated between two specific
parties: an indigenous community and industry; hence, no regard has been given to the
influence other players would bring to the negotiating table. Besides an investigation of
increased stakeholder participation on the success of IBAs, questions arise about the effects
governmental regulations could have on improving and clarifying the negotiating and
implementation of IBAs for indigenous communities without land claim settlements. While
this question is of little concern to indigenous communities in Alaska, the title to land of
indigenous peoples in Australia, Canada and Russia is less certain.
Finally, current research on IBAs concentrates strongly on the provision of economic
benefits to communities. However, in accordance with indigenous development theory,
economic development steered through IBAs must ultimately lead to successful social and
environmental community development. Therefore, it is essential to investigate if and how
IBAs are actively promoting community well-being, and how this process can be improved
to guarantee the development of healthy and culturally vibrant indigenous communities.

It can take more than a decade from the initiation to a point in tim e w here one can analyze the long-term
benefits o f an agreem ent on the com m unity.

112

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119

Appendices

120

Appendix 1.1. Principles of the Four Worlds International Institute
Four strategic foundation principles of the Four Worlds International Institute are:
1. Development comes Aom within: others may help, but the driving force for change,
healing, growth and progress must come from within the communities themselves.
2. No vision, no development: the people need to be able to visualize health and wellbeing for themselves in order to be able to create it in the world.
Individual and community transformations must go hand in hand: the healing,
learning and growth of individuals, and the transformation of community
relationships and conditions are mutually interdependent.
3. Holistic learning is the key to deep and lasting change: learning is at the heart of
sustainable change processes. Human beings are multi-dimensional learning beings,
physically, emotionally, intellectually, spiritually and volitionally.
4. The elders' worldview holds that the spiritual and material are inseparable and
interdependent, that everything is related to everything, that healing (self, community,
nation, earth) depends on our capacity to understand ourselves, and that humans are
gifted by the Creator with the power to transform and heal the world.
(directly quoted from Croal & Darou, 2002, p.9 )

121

Appendix 1.2. Common principles for indigenous development
Common principles for indigenous development identified by participants of the conference
"Native self-reliance, renewal and development" held in Vancouver, August 19-24, 1984.
"1. Control [of development] should be vested in the local community for directing its
own planning process to ensure relevance to local needs, circumstances, and
aspirations. ...
2. Top-down decentralization of planning control from government is complemented by
bottom-up participation of all community groups throughout the planning process. ...
3. Bands and tribes often need outside technical assistance. However, much work can be
done by the communities themselves with suitable trained planning staff to research
and analyze resource market opportunities. Where specialized expertise is required
from outside, it should be controlled by the community.
4. Development planning should integrate all the strategies for decision-making,
community organizing, and technical assistance described above. ...
5. Planning at the local level should be facilitated rather than controlled by government.
The Federal Government can improve the climate for bands and tribes to undertake
their own development planning by transferring programs responsibilities, providing
block funding, and removing legal and policy impediments. Government should
provide support for bands when they negotiate with provincial/state agencies and the
private sector...., government's own strategic and program planning should be
responsive to Indian planning ...".
(Sinclair, 1985)

122

Appendix 2.1. General Content of Impact and BeneAts Agreements negotiated in Canada

1.

Introductory Provisions

Proamhle and Recitals
P urpose
D ciinitions
Identification o f Parties and Specification o f B eneficiaries
Ciuning into Effect o f the Agreement
T erm o f A greem ent
Overall Description o f the Project
P roject Phases
Aboriginal Support f w the Project

2.

Employment and Training

General Employment Provisions
Identification o f E m ploym ent O pportunities and L abour Supply
l.alxmr Force Developm ent Plan
E m ploym ent-R elated Com m unity O utreach
Recruitment and Hiring
E m ploym ent Preferences
On The-Ioh and other Training
Contracting and Subcontracting
AMwenticeship Programs
Educational and Scholarship P rogram s
Em ployee Evaluation aix) Advancement
L abour Relations and D iscipline
W (*k Rotations and Vacations
T ransportation
Work Site Conditions - Accommtxlation, Fond and Recreation
C ounselling and E m ployee Support
Language o f Work
Cross-Cultural Issues
Restrictions on Em ployees
Com m ittee on Em ploym ent O pportunities and Issues
Aboriginal En^loym ent Cooidinator
Evaluation o f Aboriginal Employment

3.

Economic Development and Business Opportunities

General Provisions Regarding Contracting and Business ()|q)orlunities
Identification o f B usinesses and B usiness O pportunities
General Preferences for Aboriginal Businesses
Procedure for Securing C ontract G oods and Services on a Com petitive Basis
Unbundling' o f Contract o f Contract Requirements
M onitoring o f Contracting
Assistance for Local Business D evelopm ent
Research and D evelopm ent
R ij^t o f Hrst Refusal on Equipment and Properly
C om m ittee on E conom ic and B usiness D evelopm ent__________ ____________

123

4.
Social, Coltnral and Community Support
Communicalion and Cunsultaiion
Social and C om m unity A ssistance - Counselling

Community PmjecW and Physical Inlrastrucfure
A boriginal C ultural and E conom ic A ctivities

Monitoring of Social Inmacts

5.

Financial Provisions and Equity Participation

Rationales for Cash Payments
Fixed C ash Paym ents
Variable Cash payments
Suspension o f Paym ents
D evelopm ent and Remedial 1 und
A djustm ents for Inflation
Tax Implications
Com pensation Provisions
Security Deposit
E quity Interests and Joint V entures
Expenses for Administration, Management and Implementation o f the IBA
R eim bursem ent o f N egotiation Expenses

6.

Environmental Protection and Cultural Resources

(ieneral Provisions Regarding Environmental Compliances
Specific Environm ental Protection and M onitoring Provisions
Wildlife
A bandonm ent and R eclam ation
Protection o f Cultural R esources and A reas of Cultural Significance

7.

Other Substantive and Procedural Provisions

Amendment and Renegotiation o f the Agreement
A nticipation o f project E xpansion and other P rojects o f A ctivities
Confidentiality and Release o f Infwmation
Im plem entation C om m ittee
Annual Reporting on Agreement implementation
Form al Evaluation o f the A greem ent
Dispute Resolution
E nforceability and R em edies
'Boilerplate' Contractual Provisions

(Kennett, 1999a)

121

Appendix 2.2. Schedule 26-1 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement
Matters considered appropriate for Inuit benefits
(Section 26.3.1)
1. Inuit training at all levels.
2. Inuit preferential hiring.
3. Employment rotation reflecting Inuit needs and preferences.
4. Scholarships.
5. Labour relations.
6. Business opportunities for Inuit including:
(a)

provision of seed capital;

(b) provision of expert advice;
(c)

notification of business opportunities;

(d) preferential contracting practices.
7. Housing, accommodation and recreation.
8. Safety, health and hygiene.
9. Language of workplace.
10. Identification, protection and conservation of archaeological sites and specimens.
11. Research and development.
12. Inuit access to facilities constructed for the project such as airfields and roads.
13. Particularly important Inuit environmental concerns and disruption of wildlife,
including wildlife disruption compensation schemes.
14. Outpost camps.

122

15. Information flow and interpretation, including liaison between Inuit and proponent
regarding project management and Inuit participation and concerns.
16. Relationship to prior and subsequent agreements.
17. Co-ordination with other developments.
18. Arbitration and amendment provisions.
19. Implementation and enforceability, including performance bonds and liquidated
damages clauses.
20. Obligations of subcontractors.
21. Any other matters that the Parties consider to be relevant to the needs of the project
and Inuit.

123

Appendix 2.3. Federal Russian regulation regarding resources development
The Decree CoMceming C/rggnt MgajMrgj/br Frotgcting

Ecomo/nic

Activity q/'t/ic Native Minority FeopZcf q/^t/ic NortA issued on April 22, 1992 sets out
1)

the m inisters o f the republics are directed to,
define the territories o f traditional land use that are p art o f their
national heritage and which cannot be alienated w ithout their
consent for industrial or other developm ent which is not connected
to traditional econom y;
b) to transfer w ithout cost to kinship com m unities and fam ilies
belonging to the native m inorities o f the north those lands
associated with traditional econom y for a lifelong, inheritable
ow nership or leasing;
c) to give priority rights to m ake agreem ents and receive licenses for
the use o f renew able natural resources to kinship com m unities and
fam ilies belonging to the native m inorities of the north;
d) to define traditional territories in order to effect there sustainable
resource developm ent; and
2)
to the governm ent o f the Russian Federation, to w ork out a
regulatory system for the use o f lands and resources on the traditional
territories o f the peoples o f the N orth only with the approval of
environm ental expertise.
(W iget & Balalaeva, 1997, f 20)
a)

124

Appendix 2.4. 'Cape York Model' for M^or Project Negotiations

Stage 1:

Initiation of Process

Stage 2:

Creation of Framework
Steering Committee
CYLC Negotiating Team
Memorandum of Understanding

Stage 3;

Information Collection and Community Consultation
Anthropological Work
(membership of Steering Committee confirmed or adjusted)
Economic & Social Impact Assessment (ESIA)
(ESIA Report feeds into statutory project approval process)
Other Studies

Stage 4:

Establishing of Aboriginal Negotiating Position

Negotiating Process

Stage 5:

Stage 6:

Endorsement and Signing of Agreement

Stage?:

Implementation

(O'Faircheallaigh, 2(XX))

125

Appendix 3.1. Questionnaire for Partly Structured Interviews

Questionnaire for Process Pardcipants
Success
How would you describe the purpose of a socio-economic agreement?

How do you think one can recognize a successful socio-economic agreement?

Do you consider the socio-economic agreements with Anvil Range and Teck Cominco to
be successful or non-successful?

What do you think are the factors for the success or non-success of these agreements?
Can you tell me why?

Process
The process of negotiating agreements generally is described in literature as consisting of
different steps;
Start/ Initiation

Information gathering

Negotiation

Implementation

Monitoring

I

Evaluation

126

Using this diagram, can you describe to me the process used by the Ross River Dena to
negotiate the KZK and Faro Mine socio-economic agreement? If you have not taken part
in all of the steps, please tell me about the steps you have been involved with.
What were the goals and objectives of the Ross River Dena community for the socio­
economic agreements with Anvil Range and Teck Cominco?

How have these goals and objectives of the Ross River Dena been determined?

How did the Ross River Dena try to achieve these goals and objectives?

Could you please comment on how the community has been involved in negotiating the
socio-economic agreements?

How important do you think is the process used to negotiate a socio-economic agreement
for the actual success of this agreement?

Content
Do you think that the content of the socio-economic agreements reflected the goals and
objectives of the community for the Kudz Ze Rayah and the Faro Mine Project? Can you
tell me why you think so?

Do you think the content of the socio-economic agreements was sufficient to provide
long-term benefits from resource development for the Ross River Dena community?

How important do you think is the content used to negotiate a socio-economic agreement
for the actual success of this agreement?

Conclusion
Do you think socio-economic agreements are a suitable tool for providing benefits from
resource development for the Ross River Dena? Please teU me why you think so.

If you had no financial or legal limitations, how would you approach resource
development in order to benefit your community members?

127

Appendix 3.2. Survey for Ross River Dena Community Members

Questionnaire for Ross River Communitv Members
ZfMporkmt. 7b anfwgr tAe gwgftio/M

m art

rig/it .ÿ^ware

Are you a Ross River community member?

o

yes

□

no

Are you Ross River Dena?

o

yes

□

no

If no, are you member of another aboriginal group? o

yes

□

no

Sex:

female

□

male

□ 55-64

o 65-74

Age group:

o
□24-34

□ 35-44

□ 45-54

Did you live in Ross River (or Faro) during the following years?
□ 1994

□1995

□ 1996

□ 1997

□ 1998

1.a) Which beneûts did you get through the E m k Ze ÆayaA Socio-economic Agreement?
□ none

□job

□ trapper support

□ training/apprenticeship
□ business opportunities

□

□ scholarships

others .......... .............

Lb) Which benefits did you get through the A nvil Range Socio-economic Agreement?
o none

o job

o trapper support

o training
o business opportunities

o scholarships

o others .............................................

2.a) When and for how long did you work for the Æmfz Ze ÂayaA Mine?
Year

for how long

what kind of job

128

2.b) When and for how long did you work for the f a r o Mine? (between 1994-1998)

Year

for how long

what kind of job

3.a) When and which business opportunities did you get through the Kudz Ze Kayah
Socio-economic Agreement?
Year

what kind of business

3.b) When and which business opportunities did you get through the Anvil Range Socio­
economic Agreement?
Year

what kind of business

129

4.a) In how many on-job training/off-job training/apprenticeship programs did you
participate organized by Tect ComtMco?
On-job training program
O one
2
□ 3
O 4 and more

□

off-job training program
o one
□2
□3
□ 4 and more

apprenticeship program
□ one
□2
□3
□ 4 and more

4.b) In how many on-job training/off-job training/apprenticeship programs did you
participate organized by Anvil Range U d .l
On-job training program
□ one
□2
□ 3
□ 4 and more

off-job training program
□ one
□2
□3
□ 4 and more

apprenticeship program
□ one
□2
□3
□ 4 and more

5.a) For how many semesters did you receive scholarship money from Teck Cominco ?
□
□
□
□
□
□

1 semester
2 semesters
3 semesters
4 semesters
5 semesters
6 and more semesters

5.b) For how many semesters did you receive scholarship money from Anvil ikrngf fAf. ?
O 1 semester
□ 2 semesters
O 3 semesters
O 4 semesters
O 5 semesters
O 6 and more semesters

130

6.a) On a scale from 1 to 5 please tell me if the Amk Ze AioyaA Socio-economic
Agreement gave enough beneGts for the Ross River Dena community members?
fair

Not at all
1
□

2
□

3
□

Yes, very much
4
□

5
□

I do not know

□

6.b) On a scale from 1 to 5, please tell me if the f w o Mine Socio-economic Agreement
gave enough beneGts for the Ross River Dena community members?
fair

Not at all
1
□

2
□

3
□

Yes, very much
4
o

5
□

I do not know

□

7.a) On a scale from 1-5, please tell me if you had an opportunity to discuss concerns and
wishes related to the K udz Ze Kayah Project when it was negotiated?
fair

Not at all
1
□

2
□

3
□

Yes, very much
4
□

5
□

I do not know

□

7.b) On a scale from 1-5, please tell me if you had an opportunity to discuss concerns and
wishes related to the Faro Mine Project when it was negoGated?
fair

Not at all
1
□

2
□

3
□

Yes, very much
4
□

5
□

I do not know

□

131

).) What would you negotiate for future socio-economic agreements with resource
companies?

9.) Which are important values which should guide resource developments on Ross River
Dena traditional territory?

Do you have any further question or comment?

132

Appendix 3.3. Wage comparison of a Ross River Dena working at Faro and KZK

Faro Mine
Working conditions: Shift work - 4 days on, 4 days off
switch between day and night shifts
Position:

Pit Labourer

Wage:

$15 per hour/ $2655 per month

Costs (for stay in Faro):
Taxes

$800

Rent

$350

Utilities

$150

Food

$200

Travel Ross River/Faro

$80

Wages minus Costs:

$1,075 per month

KZK Mine - Contract by Expatriate Resources Ltd. (1996)
Working conditions: 21 days on, 21 days off (to allow for job sharing)
Position:

Geophysical Assistant

Wages:

$120 per day/ $1,680 per month

KZK Mine - Contract by Expatriate Resources Ltd. (1997)
Working conditions: 6 weeks on, 1 week off
Position:

Geophysical Assistant

Wage:

$120 per day/ $3,780 per month

133

Appendix 4.1. Businesses of the RRDDC counted in 1998
1)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Businesses managed and operated by the RRDDC
Ross River Dena Development Corporation
Trading Post
Dena Petroleum
Laundromat
Canada Post Contract
Fire Fighting Crews
Trailers
RV Park
Daycare
Sewage pumpouts

o
o
o
o

Joint Ventures where the operation is managed by the Joint Venture partner
Pacific Dena Transport
Sah Cho Hardware
Expediting
Mbizeh-Norcan

o
o
o
o
o
o
o

Administration related to agreements/contracts with mining companies
Anvil Range
Cominco
Boliden (Westmin Resources)
Expatriate Resources
Atna Resources
YGC Resources
Columbia Gold

2)

3)

4)

Administration of funding under government programs,
o Centenial Anniversaries Program (RV Park construction)
o Fire fighting training

(Zanasi, 1998, 2)

134

Appendix 5.1. Evaluation of female versus male responses to satisfaction of benefits
received through Impact and Benefits Agreements
Figure 6:
q/'tAg
/(ivgr Dena witA
/mpoct nmf Bgne/ît.y Agreement

receiveff tAmwgA ATWz Zg

14

f 1?
-0« 10
B" s
as
o 6
k
"0 4
z 2

N M ale
O Female

0

Scale

Figure 7: Satisfaction o f the Ross River Dena with benefits received through Faro Mine
Impact omf
Agreement

□ Female

135

Appendix 5.2. Ross River Dena evaluation of their input to the negotiation of the Impact
and Benefits Agreements
Figure 8: Ro.;.; River Dena evaiwation q/'t/ieir inpwt to tAe negotiation o/^tAe Faro Mine
an^f Rad!z Ze Raya/i Agreement.^
a

80% ,

S 50%

§

a Faro Mine
«KZK

20 %

136