OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES
NO. 3 – October 2008

Indigenous Community Values and Commercial
Forestry: A Case Study of Tl’azt’en Nation.

By
Annie L. Booth & Norm Skelton

Dr. Booth is an Associate Professor with the UNBC Ecosystem Science and
Management Program, University of Northern British Columbia, 3333
University Way, Prince George, B.C., V2N 4Z9 Canada. Mr. Skelton is a
Research Associate with the Ecosystem Science and Management Program,
University of Northern British Columbia, 3333 University Way, Prince George,
B.C., V2N 4Z9 Canada.
The correct citation for this paper is:
Booth, A.L., Skelton, N. 2008. Indigenous Community Values and Commercial
Forestry: A Case Study of Tl’azt’en Nation. Natural Resources and Environmental
Studies Institute Occasional Paper No. 3, University of Northern British Columbia,
Prince George, B.C., Canada.
This paper can be downloaded without charge from http://www.unbc.ca/nres/occasional.html

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

ii

The Natural Resources and Environmental Studies Institute (NRES Institute) is a
formal association of UNBC faculty and affiliates that promotes integrative
research to address natural resource systems and human uses of the
environment, including issues pertinent to northern regions.
Founded on and governed by the strengths of its members, the NRES Institute
creates collaborative opportunities for researchers to work on complex problems
and disseminate results. The NRES Institute serves to extend associations among
researchers, resource managers, representatives of governments and industry,
communities, and First Nations. These alliances are necessary to integrate
research into management, and to keep research relevant and applicable to
problems that require innovative solutions.
For more information about NRESI contact:
Natural Resources and Environmental Studies Institute
University of Northern British Columbia
3333 University Way
Prince George, BC Canada
V2N 4Z9
Phone: 250-960-5288
Email: nresi@unbc.ca
URL: www.unbc.ca/nres

iii

NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

CONTENTS
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... 2
Introduction..................................................................................................................................... 3
The Challenges of Commercial Forestry and First Nations........................................................ 3
Forestry and Tl’azt’en Nation..................................................................................................... 6
The Study Methodology ................................................................................................................. 7
Tl'azt'en Nation ............................................................................................................................... 8
Acquiring Tree Farm License 42 and Creating Teeslee Forest Products ....................................... 9
The Challenges of Running an Industrial Tenure ......................................................................... 10
Access ....................................................................................................................................... 10
Running a Forestry Operation................................................................................................... 11
Traditional Values and Resource Extraction ............................................................................ 12
Community and Forestry: A New Challenge................................................................................ 14
Engaging the Community ......................................................................................................... 14
The Social Costs of Doing Business......................................................................................... 16
Family Politics in the Boardroom ............................................................................................. 17
Keeping Revenue at Home ....................................................................................................... 18
Managing Management ............................................................................................................ 18
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 19
References..................................................................................................................................... 21

1

NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

Abstract
This study examines the experiences of
Tl’azt’en Nation, a Canadian indigenous
community that became an early participant
in industrial commercial forestry. In doing
so, Tl’azt’en Nation encountered challenges
that reverberate today for indigenous
peoples seeking timber rights in Canada.
The authors demonstrate that considerable
tensions exist between traditional First
Nations' values and the values of a
commercial forestry operation and that
finding reconciliation between these
different values is not easy. Tl’azt’en
Nation's experiences suggest several key
factors for communities to consider and
address in undertaking forestry operations

that meet indigenous community values and
goals, including reconciling commerce with
culture, developing better mechanisms for
integrating any resource activity with
traditional values, improving community
engagement, working with community
members to ensure expectations are realistic,
and ensuring that community politics does
not unduly interfere with community
economic ventures.
Further, forest
companies looking to work with First
Nations should understand some of the
concerns First Nation communities face in
planning for community supported forestry
operations.

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2

Introduction
By the numbers, Canada’s indigenous
population ranks well below other
Canadians by almost any socio-economic
indicator chosen. Whether reviewing life
expectancy, child mortality rates, education
levels attained, employment, income or
housing, First Nations 1 are statistically
disadvantaged when compared with the
general Canadian population (INAC, 2008;
Cooke et al., 2004). In response, the
Canadian government has spent decades
attempting to improve the social and
economic conditions of First Nations by a
variety of mechanisms with mixed success.
Given that poor social conditions are
strongly related to poor economic conditions
in First Nation communities, great attention
has been paid to developing jobs and
businesses accessible to First Nations. As
almost 80% of First Nation communities are
located within Canada’s extensive forests
(Gysbers and Lee, 2003), it is not surprising
that there has been considerable interest in
increasing First Nations’ participation in the
forest industry (Parkins et al., 2006).
However, First Nations interested in
participating in the commercial forest
industry face several challenges, ranging
from business development in remote
geographical locations to serious conflicts
between traditional cultural values and the
requirements
of
commercial
timber
extraction. This paper examines some of the
challenges faced by First Nations in general
and then offers a case study of the
experiences of one British Columbian First
Nation which became an early participant in
an industrial forest tenure. We examine how
1

Canada legally recognizes three indigenous groups:
Indians, Inuit and Métis (INAC, no date). Collectively
Indian groups are referred to as First Nations. Depending
upon their status, treaties and various court cases, different
rights belong to different legal groups (Booth and Skelton,
2004).

3

Tl’azt’en Nation’s experiences confirm
other research on First Nations and forestry
but also raise other challenges rarely
discussed in the literature.
The Challenges of Commercial
Forestry and First Nations
One of the key challenges identified within
the existing literature examining First
Nations and resource development is the
challenge of economic development in
general.
Economic development within
First Nation communities (as is often the
case for non-native rural and remote
communities) is constrained by several
factors. Many First Nation communities are
geographically remote and lack easy access
to both processing facilities and markets.
Reliance is therefore often placed upon
primary resource production, such as
forestry or fisheries, high value market
goods (such as art or specialized clothing
and goods), or on ecotourism (INAC, no
date). Such enterprises can be fraught with
risk, start up costs, a demand for a
specialized labor force which might or might
not be available, and is highly subject to the
unpredictable fluctuations of the global
economy (Merkel, 2007; Parkins et al.,
2006). Access to an exploitable resource is
a first economic consideration.
Almost 80% of First Nation communities
are located within Canada’s extensive
forests (Gysbers and Lee, 2003), and there
has been considerable interest by First
Nations in participating in the forest industry
(NAFA, no date) and by the federal
government
in
encouraging
that
participation (Parkins et al., 2006). It is
worth noting that this growth in interest
comes at a time when studies suggest that
participation in the forest industry in Canada
not
benefitted
rural
Canada
has
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

economically in general, as reliance on
single resource industries fails in the face of
global economic changes (Stedman et al.,
2005).
As a strategy, focusing on
encouraging First Nation communities to
enter the forest industry as a sole economic
development activity might not produce the
anticipated long term benefits.
Currently, participation by First Nations
within Canada’s forest industry is relatively
restricted. A 2003 study by the National
Aboriginal Forest Association indicated that
First Nations across Canada hold only 4% of
Crown 2 Timber licenses. While a 2007
review by Natural Resources Canada
indicates that over 1,000 forestry operations
are operated by First Nations (NRC, 2007),
most are small operations. NAFA found, for
example, that only 5% of major forestry
operations (large volume with long term
leases) were operated by First Nations
(NAFA, 2003). 3 Research suggests that
several constraints limit First Nations’
ability to operate larger tenures:
a) the land base readily available to First
Nations, their Reserve lands, is too small
(White-Harvey, 1994), and reserve lands
are legally the responsibility of the federal
government while the commercial forest
base is largely under the management of
the provincial governments (Graham and
Wilson, 2004; Wilson and Graham, 2005;
Ross and Smith, 2002);
b) most Crown forest land is already
allocated to non-native commercial
forestry companies (Wilson and Graham,
2005);
c) a lack of aboriginal experts in nonindigenous forestry science and practice
2

Ninety-four percent of Canadian forests are publicly
owned and managed by either the provincial or federal
Crown (“Crown lands”) in trust for its citizens (Ross and
Smith, 2002).
3
These were found in only three provinces, rather than
evenly distributed across Canada (NAFA, 2003).

forces First Nations to rely on professional
outsiders with different values (Parsons
and Prest, 2003);
d) forestry operation and development costs
are often prohibitive (Brubacker, Gladu
and Bombay, 2002; Ross and Smith,
2003);
e) the government imposes and enforces
regulations surrounding conventional
forestry operations, including the volume
of logs to be harvested, road building,
stream protection minimums, etc., which
cannot accommodate, or accommodate
poorly, Aboriginal ethics, values, culture,
uses (especially of non-timber forest
products), constitutionally recognized
treaty rights, and particular understanding
of the land (Bombay, 2002; Booth, 2008;
Kremar et al., 2006; Lewis and Sheppard,
2005; Parsons and Prest, 2003; Ross and
Smith, 2002).
These considerable constraints can be
difficult for First Nations to meaningfully
resolve. Access to commercial forest is
strictly controlled by the provincial
governments. First Nations must compete
with other groups, industrial or otherwise,
for existing forest tenures as they become
available. Several provinces have taken
steps to specifically allocate volumes of
timber,
sometimes
quite
substantial
volumes, to First Nations, but a one-time
volume allocation is not the same as a long
term tenure as it offers little in the way of
long term certainty or level of economic
return. The National Aboriginal Forestry
Association (NAFA, no date) has long
advocated for a specific First Nation tenure
and improved long term access to forest
lands; however in the face of growing
economic uncertainty in the forest industry
in Canada, few industries are willing to part
with their tenures and few governments are
willing to destabilize a shaky industry
through tenure reform (Wyatt, 2008). One

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

4

exception to this is in areas where treaties
with First Nations were not historically
settled. Modern treaties under negotiation
appear to include both greater land
settlements than did historical treaties, but
can also include provisions for additional
access to timber rights (see for example the
Nisga’a
Treaty
(http://www.aincinac.gc.ca/pr/agr/nsga/isspap_e.html).
Co-management agreements and joint
venture agreements between First Nations
and forest industries, provincial or territorial
governments are another method of
obtaining access to timber and at least
partial control over forest management. The
nature of these agreements can vary widely,
but generally include some form of shared
responsibility for, and control over, forest
management and harvest activities as well as
profits (Curran and M’Gonigle, 1999).
Some scholars argue that such agreements
represent a reasonable method by which
First Nations can gain access to timber
rights (Ross and Smith, 2002; Tresesder and
Krogman, 2000; Wyatt, 2008). Others point
out that co-management usually requires
First Nations to conform to non-native
management structures, may or may not
incorporate First Nation values, does not
acknowledge or recognize the complicated
terrain
of
legally
contested
but
constitutionally and court recognized title
and rights, and perpetuates continued
submission to a dominant culture (Rodon,
2003; Stevenson, 2006; Wyatt, 2008).
Certainly any such agreements need careful
consideration and negotiation but even so
might achieve only partial success (Grainger
et al., 2006; Mabee and Hoberg, 2006).
Technical requirements are also a significant
hurdle. Even if access to a large tenure is
achieved, the development requirements
within a tenure may be prohibitive for an
economically strapped First Nation. While
some funding might be available through the

5

federal First Nations Forestry Program
(http://www.fnfp.gc.ca/), not all Nations will
receive it, nor will all costs be covered.
Developing internal professional expertise
also poses challenges. Industrial forest
operations require the oversight of
Registered Professional Foresters, a legally
protected profession in many parts of
Canada. Achieving the designation requires
a four year university degree and a period of
apprenticeship. Parsons and Prest (2003)
estimated that in 2002 less than 20 First
Nation were Registered Professional
Foresters. While that number might well
have increased in recent years, it will take
substantial time before all First Nations have
indigenous expertise available to them. A
similar case can be made for access to
professionals with strong business and
marketing skills who also understand and/or
share First Nation values.
Economic
development that does not reflect aboriginal
values is often fraught with difficulties
(Anderson et al., 2006; Cornell and Kalt,
2006; Williams and Bootsman, 2008).
Finally, and most critically, research
suggests that First Nations look for many
values in forestry operations, very few of
which can be met under traditional industrial
forestry regimes (Beckley, 1998; Bombay,
1993; Booth, 2008, 2003, 1998; Booth and
Jacobs, 1990; Graham and Wilson, 2004;
Kosec, 1993; Lewis and Sheppard, 2005;
Merkel, 2007; Michel and Gayton, 2002;
Middleton and Kusel, 2007; NAFA, 2002a;
NAFA, 2002b; Parsons and Prest, 2003;
Sherry et al., 2005; Smith, 1998; Treseder
and Krogman, 1999; Wyatt, 2008). While
some First Nations will make the choice to
conform to standard industrial forestry
requirements, for the sake of employment
and income opportunities, many are looking
for some form of compromise that would
permit both timber extraction and an intact
ecosystem that supports constitutionally
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

protected rights 4 (and often treaty protected
rights) to traditional hunting, fishing and
gathering into perpetuity. Of particular
importance for First Nations is the respectful
treatment of the land (Booth, 2008; Ross and
Smith, 2002). While there are particular
sites that are properly considered sacred, for
many it is the entire land base that must be
treated as sacred, with consideration and
with respect. In addition, provision must be
made to ensure the survival of fish, wildlife
and plants. Many species are required for
spiritual and cultural maintenance; others
are still vital parts of a land based diet.
Preservation of culturally significant sites,
including archaeological sites, historical
sites, traplines and berry gathering spots, are
vital for First Nations (Bombay, 1993;
Merkel 2007; Parsons and Prest, 2003; Ross
and Smith, 2002; Smith, 1998). Activities
that irreparably damage the land irreparably
damage First Nations cultures and many
Nations are fighting to ensure the survival
and transmission of their culture to the next
generations. In the face of multiple resource
extraction activities, including industrial
forestry, maintaining access to a functioning
land base is a serious challenge for most
Canadian First Nations. 5 Thus, when they
choose to participate in forestry, they often
seek tenure and operational structures that
will facilitate the integration of multiples
values into extraction activity, an
“aboriginal forestry,” rather than mere
participation in conventional forestry
(Parsons and Prest, 2003; Ross and Smith,
2002).
Aboriginal forestry, state Parsons and Prest
(2003):

4

Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, Section 35.
As an example, the authors are working with a BC First
Nation that in 2007 was working around 30 existing and
proposed industrial developments within their traditional
lands (Muir, 2007).

5

"…encompasses sustainable forest
management…and can be further
refined as the application of
sustainable forest land use practices
learned over time that incorporates
the respectful interaction between
the forest and Aboriginal people of
today for the benefit of generations
unborn." (p. 780).
While there is growing interest in aboriginal
forestry within the Canadian government,
few industrial forest companies have moved
to adopt its tenets (Wyatt, 2008). This
leaves First Nations interested in forestry as
an economic activity with few easy choices.
Forestry and Tl’azt’en Nation
Our case study considers one First Nation’s
experiences with operating a large industrial
forest tenure in British Columbia while also
attempting to protect the multiple forest
values demanded by their community. In
1982 Tl'azt'en 6 Nation was granted the first
Tree Farm License (TFL 42) in British
Columbia to be operated by a First Nation
(operated as Tanizul Timber, Ltd). They
subsequently developed a sawmill (Teeslee
Forest Products) in the early 1990s. Our
findings demonstrate that while many of the
challenges discussed in research literature
were encountered, the community also
encountered challenges rarely discussed in
the literature. Our research confirms that an
aboriginal tenure, implementing aboriginal
forestry principles, while not a consideration
for this First Nation, can potentially address
some, but not all, of the issues that First
Nations must contend with in reconciling
traditional values with commercial resource
extraction, but that finding reconciliation
between these different value sets is not
6

Tl'azt'en First Nation serves as a descriptor for the
socio-political group. Tl'azt'en is the singular form
referring to a member. Tl'azt'enne is the plural form
of Tl'azt'en.

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

6

easy. However until such reconciliation can
be negotiated, indigenous peoples will
continue to face barriers in entering the
commercial forest sector.

The Study Methodology
In 1996, researchers at the University of
Northern British Columbia (UNBC) were
approached by Tl'azt'en Nation to document
their experience with TFL 42 in a
collaborative initiative between Tl'azt'en
Nation and UNBC. 7
Researchers and
Tl’azt’en Nation were interested in two
areas of research: documenting the events
and decisions leading to the acquisition of
the TFL and the mill, and determining past
and current community views about the
impact, consequences and value of engaging
in a commercial forest tenure and the
conflicts and tradeoffs.
During this qualitative research project,
forty three interviews were conducted
between 1996 and 1998 with Tl’azt’en
members who had been involved in the
establishment and operation of TFL 42
(Tanizul Timber Ltd.) and the mill (Teeslee
Forest Products Ltd.), or whom held a
significant interest in the TFL operations
(for example, those whose traditional
territory was affected).
Additional
interviews were conducted during this
period with non-Tl’azt’enne who had been
involved in the TFL in various capacities.
Eight focus groups with community groups
were conducted, including Elders, Tanizul
and Teeslee Board members, and youth.
Researchers made best efforts to interview
participants with a wide range of views on
the TFL both within and outside the
community.
Individuals were selected
7

The study was funded by Forest Renewal BC.
Research assistance was provided by Beverly Bird
(Tl’azt’en Nation), Christine Callihoo, Phil Morris
and Cheryl Pierre (Tl’azt’en Nation).

7

through the recommendations of key
personnel,
through
reading
through
secondary documentation, and as individuals
expressed an interest in contributing to the
project.
Roughly 11% of the adult
population participated through focus groups
and interviews.
Interviews and focus groups were audio
taped with permission and each tape
transcribed. Each interview and focus group
transcript was reviewed by at least two
researchers and key ideas and themes were
individually identified. Researchers then
determined through discussion those themes
and ideas that seemed significant or
representational of many participants.
Themes and ideas were compared both
within and across individual interviews and
focus groups. Quotes used in this article are
taken from transcriptions and were chosen
for their reflection of these key ideas and
themes. To honor privacy concerns, we
identify the speaker only by their role (i.e.
administrator or community member). 8
While we were not able to interview all
community members, we believe we did
identify many of the perspectives that
existed
within
the
community,
encompassing both positive and negative
perspectives, those both critical and
supportive of the TFL and the mill and of
Tl’azt’en Nation itself.
Readers should be aware that the ideas and
opinions expressed within the interviews
and focus groups are relevant within the
period that the data was collected, 19961998.
Tl’azt’enne are likely to have
different viewpoints regarding forestry and
related issues in the present, given changing
experiences, knowledge and circumstances.
The researchers were given access to the
Nation's
extensive
secondary
8

This was the agreement reached in our Informed
Consent requirements at the time of the research.
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

documentation, which provided records of
correspondence on the acquisition of the
TFL, letters from community members, and
other material useful in identifying political
process and community interest. Extensive
use was made of the Provincial Archives to
develop an understanding of the provincial
government’s perspectives.
Research findings were checked and
confirmed by Tl’azt’en authorities in 1999.
However, the authors maintain sole
responsibility for any errors and omissions.
While every effort has been made to
represent the views of the Tl'azt'enne fairly
and accurately, the authors acknowledge
inevitable problems with linguistic and
cultural translations. 9

Tl'azt'en Nation
The Tl'azt'enne's Traditional Territory is
located in north-central British Columbia
around the Stuart and Trembleur Lakes.
Their traditional territory (over five
thousand square kilometers) is centered in
the communities of Tache, Binche, and
K'uzche (Grand Rapids). Four reserves are
permanently inhabited with a total
population of 1,281 (2004), most of whom
live in Tache. Most Tl'azt'en economic
patterns follow an articulated mode of
production combining hunting, gathering,
fishing, as well as, full time, part time, and
seasonal wage labor (Hudson, 1983).
Prior to the arrival of the Europeans,
Tl'azt'enne were self-sufficient hunters and
gatherers. Recognizing the importance of
natural resources, Tl'azt'enne had a system
known as keyoh, which organized and
regulated the ownership and use of natural

resources within their territories. Keyoh are
land planning units carefully managed
through an extended clan/family system
with strict rules about who could use the
area and how; unauthorized use was a
serious infraction (Aasen, 1992). Rights of
use were managed through the bahlats 10
system (more commonly known as a
potlatch system), where conflicts were
resolved and resources re-distributed
between Tl'azt'enne. Tl'azt'en continue to
use both systems in modern resource
management initiatives.
Hunting, gathering, and fishing, and the
forest
industry
(and
its
attendant
employment and business opportunities) rely
upon a healthy forest ecosystem.
Sustainable, healthy, and productive forest
management is an essential goal for
Tl'azt'enne. They were, and are, extremely
concerned about managing their forests to
preserve ecological integrity and to provide
maximum benefits to community members
still actively utilizing the land and its
resources (Morris and Fondahl, 2002). The
decision in the 1980s to participate in an
industrial forest tenure, with its attendant
operational requirements, was therefore not
an easy choice for the community and
created significant community tensions
without necessarily delivering the benefits
the community expected as part of the
economic-traditional values trade-off they
had condoned. These tensions, and failure
to achieve significant benefits were, in part,
the product of the unique circumstances
surrounding the acquisition of the TFL.
However, in part, they illustrate the reality
of the challenges alluded to previously,
which might affect many First Nations

9

Researchers interested in an alternative presentation
of the data might wish to view a video produced as a
part of this project, which allows Tl'azt'enne to speak
for themselves. See Without the Forest, We Are
Not Tl'azt'enne. (Booth, 1999b).

10

The Bahlats is a system of resource governance
and resource distribution, societal recognition and
identity, law and justice, and title inheritance (Aasen,
1992).

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

8

entering into mainstream industrial forestry,
and so warrant consideration.

Acquiring Tree Farm License 42
and Creating Teeslee Forest
Products
During the 1960s, the British Columbia
government supported the construction of a
rail line west from Prince George to Fort St
James to provide the forest industry cheap
transportation of logs and chips east and
south. A further round of construction was
announced extending the rail line north and
west out of Fort St. James to allow access
into remote forests. The route proposed
would cross seven Tl'azt'en Reserves.
Throughout the 1970s, the Nation negotiated
with British Columbia Rail for adequate
compensation for lands that would be
affected by the rail line. At the same time,
negotiations were being held with the
provincial
government
over
other
encroachments on traditional territories.
Frustrated by the slow pace of negotiations
with the province, Tl'azt'en Nation
blockaded the rail line on April 28, 1975.
The blockade lasted three and a half months,
considerably
impacting
the
region's
economy (Morris and Fondahl, 2002).
The Nation felt that access to timber rights
would provide long-term benefits to the
community and began, in 1977, to negotiate
with government for timber rights. In 1981,
the Nation was invited to bid on a tree farm
license within their traditional territory. A
legal corporation, Tanizul Timber Company,
was established by the Nation to bid on and
operate TFL 42. Tanizul was owned by the
Nation and shares were held in trust for all
band members by a six- member Board of
Directors. In February 1982, Tanizul was
granted TFL 42, an area based, twenty five
year, renewable license with exclusive rights
to harvest timber on 54,000 hectares of
crown land. Of key interest for Tl’azt’en

9

Nation was the opportunity to include seven
parcels of reserve land within the TFL (at
the time, reserve lands were scattered)
(Morris, 1999; Morris and Fondahl, 2002).
While Tl’azt’en leaders had some
understanding of the immense challenge
they were undertaking, they had given
considered thought as to perceived benefits:
"In the long run, our community is
interested in being more self-sufficient
than we are now. We have a tremendous
amount of dependence on government
grants. …this dependency is not helpful
to our communities in the long run.
What we need to do is to continue to
work with what resources we have to
establish viable enterprises that can help
build our own nation back to where it
was once … to survive into the future as
a people."
(Tl'azt'en political leader
1997)
Tl'azt'en also had reasons for taking on a
TFL instead of another type of tenure. The
TFL is the largest tenure available in British
Columbia, usually held by large forest
companies. It offers a long term renewable
lease and a larger volume of wood than
other tenures, given that it is area based
(rather than based upon volume of wood):
"In the forestry circles, a TFL is the best
tenure you're going to get. It's a pretty
special thing… This is much more
something to be proud of, something sort
of flattering even, that the Province of
British Columbia did this." (Tanizul
Registered Professional Forester 1997)
As it became clear that the TFL would not
provide many jobs, and that those jobs that
might become available would require
experience and expensive equipment,
Tl'azt'en Nation decided to investigate the
possibility of establishing a lumber mill.

NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

"Now it was our belief from day one that
we wanted to build a mill and to utilize
the volume that we had.... Government
said you couldn't do it so they put a
restriction that we could not build a
processing facility. What we did was to
set up a sister company and went ahead
and did it anyway. The Deputy Minister
of Forests kind of kids us about it."
(Tl'azt'en political leader 1998)
"The federal government, they put
conditions on the money that we
received. We could not add to existing
processing facilities; …we couldn't buy
new equipment. We had to buy old
equipment. That particular condition, in
effect, it forced us into a high level of
inefficiency and ...we couldn't compete
in the normal business market."
(Tl'azt'en Administrator 1997) 11
Teeslee Forest Products was opened in 1990
with twenty year old equipment. At its peak
it employed forty people. However, many
felt that the mill had been set up by the
government to fail, given that they could
only use old equipment. The equipment
could not handle logs off the TFL, given
their size and the size of the available saws,
so Teeslee had to buy logs while Tanizul
sold on the open market. Teeslee also
suffered from mismanagement.
While
Teeslee survived during a good economy,
poor markets in the mid-1990s caused a
crisis. When it was discovered that a
massive debt had been created by
mismanagement, the Nation had no
alternative but to close Teeslee. It was a
serious blow to the community:
"The boys really enjoyed that sawmill
there, over 40 of them worked. It made
them feel good. Then they had financial
11

A few Tl’azt’enne also stated that there was
intentional interest in an older mill that would
provide more jobs than a modern mill.

commitments.
They were buying
furniture and buying vehicles. And now
that their job is gone, I don't know but
maybe they'll be losing their vehicles
and things like that." (Tl'azt'en Elder
1997)
The mill has not yet been re-opened. The
TFL continues to operate in 2008, but has
rarely done so at a profit or with the
employment
opportunities
community
members expected. The operation of an
industrial tenure has proved challenging for
Tl’azt’en Nation for several reasons, some
of which are supported by existing literature,
while others need better examination.

The Challenges of Running an
Industrial Tenure
Access
The literature identifies in general five
challenges which face First Nations
interested in operating an industrial forest
tenure. Two challenges asserted in the
literature regard the restricted access First
Nations have to a suitable land base. While
on the surface, this finding was not upheld
by Tl’azt’enne experience, a closer look
reveals how Tl’azt’en Nation was the
exception that proved the rule. Our research
indicated that the Tl’azt’en were successful
in their bid for a TFL only because the
provincial government had illegally allowed
the rail line to intrude onto reserve lands.
Without that first legal violation, with an
accompanying blockade, increasing federal
concern, and an awareness of the American
Indian Movement in the United States with
its accompanying violence, it is doubtful the
government would have considered the
Tanizul bid, let alone encourage Tl’azt’en
Nation to submit it.
Several industry
professionals
familiar
with
the
circumstances of the TFL (interviewed as
they were involved in early Tanizul
operations) stated so categorically and

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

10

independently, adding that the Tanizul bid
would not have succeeded in a conventional
bid process. At least two also stated that
many in the government expected that
Tl’azt’enne would fail in their efforts to
operate an industrial tenure. This sentiment
was echoed by many Tl’azt’enne, who felt
that they were set up by the government to
fail, thereby proving First Nations were not
capable of meeting industrial forest
demands. While these statements were
speculative, the fact is that it was not until
the late 1990s that another BC First Nation
successfully bid on a TFL, and few Nations
across Canada operate other, larger tenures.
Independent access to large, long term
tenures remains a significant issue for many
First Nations (NAFA, no date).
Running a Forestry Operation
The prohibitive nature of an industrial
tenure’s operating costs and a lack of
community expertise are other challenges
raised in the literature, and the Tl’azt’en
case study confirms these are significant.
As an industrial tenure, TFL 42 had several
crucial differences from any other TFL in
BC, which had consequences for Tl'azt'en
First Nation. TFL 42 was in area the
smallest TFL in British Columbia and at the
time had a comparatively small Annual
Allowable Cut (a government dictated
required timber harvest volume).
The
amount of wood allotted turned out to be too
small to meet all of the Tl'azt'en's goals:
"The TFL is pretty limited in the area.
And what we'd like to do, given the fact
that it's limited in size and the allowable
cut has been reduced year by year, that
we expect that in …about 10-15 years
the allowable cut will be about 80,000
[cubic] metres compared to where we
started at 125,000 metres a year."
(Tl'azt'en political leader 1997)

11

The size restricted the amount of timber that
could be harvested every year, which in turn
limited the number of harvesting contracts
that could be offered. In turn, this resulted
in limited opportunity to acquire the
expensive machinery needed by a
contractor.
As a consequence, few
Tl'azt'enne had the opportunity to start a
contracting business, as there was not
enough volume to offer the long-term
commitments financiers wanted to see
before lending money. Further, according to
one forester involved in the TFL’s
establishment, while the area had some
excellent stands of timber, much of it was
located over challenging terrain, which
required considerable experience and
expensive equipment to safely log. This
meant logging costs quickly exceeded
market prices for raw logs, and that even
more contracts had to be given to outside
experts. The lack of in-house expertise, as
raised in the literature, did indeed prove to
be a difficult challenge that was never really
overcome by the Tl’azt’en.
However, it is unclear that a larger area or
larger AAC would have benefited the
Tl’azt’en. The TFL also came with some
expensive baggage. Tanizul paid for the
costs of road construction, bridge building,
forest planning, and reforestation as part of
the cost of operating a TFL. Much of this
professional work was contracted to nonNation companies as few Tl’azt’enne had
either the training or the necessary
equipment. This meant any profits tended to
be swallowed up by costs and or flowed out
of the community rather than circulating
within. Without huge economic reserves,
the ability to acquire operating loans, or the
ability to employ community members, a
TFL of any size would have been a difficult
venture for many First Nations. Further, a
larger AAC might have had a greater impact
on cultural and social values, values of
significant concern under the smaller AAC.
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

Government policies regarding TFLs were
also problematic without economic reserves
or existing expertise. Every year at least
fifty percent of the AAC must be logged,
without regard for the price of raw logs, or
the desires of the community.
Many
Tl'azt'enne felt that too much timber was cut
every year, but Tanizul could have lost the
TFL if the logging was not done. Because
of the requirement to log within a restricted
timeframe, time could not be spent training
people on the job or on alternate forestry
practices. Further, the wood had to be sold,
even at a loss, and it had to be sold on the
open market. Finally, the Tl'azt'en had to
pay stumpage 12 :
"…last year we paid close to 60% of our
total revenue into the government for
stumpage. This year, it's the same or
more. It's about 62% this year that
we've paid into Crown stumpage …and
it's killing us, you know." (Tl'azt'en
Administrator 1997)
Without the deep pockets available to major
multinational forest companies to ride out
economic ups and downs, the Tl’azt’en, as
would likely be true for other First Nations,
were and are extremely vulnerable to global
market conditions (Tl’azt’en Administrator
1997). This is a factor often overlooked by
smaller companies, but one that can doom a
smaller forest operation. A more flexible
tenure, with less rigid cutting requirements,
would have significantly assisted Tl’azt’en
Nation’s efforts and would be an important
component of an aboriginal forest tenure.
Advance planning focusing on building inhouse expertise and equipment subsidies
would have also greatly enhanced retaining
revenues within the community, creating
economic development spin-offs and

12

Stumpage is a tax imposed on timber companies by the
government to cover various costs and to benefit public
coffers.

improving community acceptance of an
industrial tenure.
Traditional Values and Resource
Extraction
The last challenge commonly identified
within the literature is the potential for
conflict between traditional values and uses,
which rate a functioning ecosystem and a
more spiritual relationship with the
ecosystem highly, and the demands of an
industrial tenure, which focuses almost
exclusively on maximum timber production.
Our research with the Tl’azt’enne
demonstrates that this was not only a
significant challenge, but was also a
considerable source of tension within the
community.
In contrast with a corporation, a First Nation
community has a very different view of the
land and the community’s relationship to
that land. A multinational corporation has
no loyalty to a locale and will move on once
the resources are extracted. This is not
usually true for a community, First Nations,
or otherwise. British Columbia is littered
with resource towns that died, or struggle
terribly to survive once a major resource is
exhausted. For First Nations, however,
geography is about more than economic
survival. The Tl’azt’enne, for example,
have resided in their territory for an
estimated four thousand years according to
anthropologists (Aasen, 1992), or since time
immemorial according to Tl’azt’enne, and
thus have ties to the landscape, its natural
and human history, that are almost
unimaginable to a culture with at best a twohundred year history. Unlike a corporation,
they cannot nor will not “cut and run” from
their forests. A resource extraction activity
that significantly impairs the ability to
continue to successfully reside within the
traditional territory or limits the ability to
practice culturally vital and constitutionally
and/or treaty protected rights to hunt, fish

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

12

and gather is not easily reconciled with First
Nations culture. TFL 42 was the cause of
much bitterness amongst the Tl’azt’enne for
its impacts on the land.
"I feel for the people who have their
traplines, for people who use the place
for … plants, for berries, and for the
moose, where the moose and the bears
live off the land, and then when the
logging comes in, and it's our own
people logging off the areas, there is a
lot of concerns...Whenever we go out for
traditional medicines, we can't do it
right in our back doors anymore because
of all the spraying and all the logging
that's done." (Tl'azt'enne community
member 1997)
This community member told us that she
believed that her father had chosen to die
after his trapline had been logged by
Tanizul.
By their own analysis the biggest failure the
Tl'azt'enne have faced in operating Tanizul
Timber is in integrating Tl'azt'en values into
a commercial forestry operation.
"There's a conflict right there. …trying
to look at a bottom line and manage in a
traditional way - and we haven't really
been able to marry those two
successfully ... when you go into the bush
to take a plant for medicine, you return
something back. And then in logging
you go in there and clear-cut an area,
you don't put anything back except new
trees ... it bothers me …because you
have different thinking about how that
forest should be managed." (Tl'azt'en
political leader 1997)
The conflict is not surprising.
The
restrictions placed upon a commercial
license such as a TFL would make any
integration a tremendous challenge. To
keep the TFL, Tanizul had to harvest a
minimum amount of timber regardless of

13

whether the community thought that the
amount was too much. Practices such as
pesticide or herbicide use or logging close to
a stream edge, were required by the
government at that time, again regardless of
what community members thought (in 2008,
the
Tl’azt’enne
have
achieved
a
herbicide/pesticide ban in their traditional
territory). But, some argued, the Tl'azt'enne
should be able to take into consideration the
need to meet community concern:
"The government in the early 80s was
really not too impressed with this
Tl'azt'en idea of no herbicides. They
weren't too tolerant of it and even now
there's some that may not be very
tolerant of it… Why don't we do a little
special thing here and just say okay,
TFL 42 is a no herbicide area?"
(Tanizul
Registered
Professional
Forester 1997)
Similarly, the elders were worried about
logging going too close to lake and river
banks. In the 1980s, the Ministry of
Forestry had riparian setbacks of 25 metres,
the Elders wanted setbacks of 100 metres.
However when the new Forest Practices
Code came into effect in the early 1990s, it
supported the Elders' position.
"I was told, 'well the Elders don't like to
log right to streams and we don't like to
do that here at Tanizul!' … Alright, I'll
put up with that kind of innovative
thinking. Ten years later, under the
Forest Practices Code, that's full blown
illegal for that stream, that piece of
timber. It's really quite a humbling little
story for me but I think it's good for
people to hear it so that they understand
that
foresters,
forestry,
forest
technicians, it all sounds pretty
scientific, especially if you read the
Forest Act or some policy manual or
some guide book. ….ten years from now

NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

we could be laughing at it." (Tanizul
Registered Professional Forester 1997) 13
The role of traditional values could also be a
point of conflict between native community
members
and
non-native
forestry
professionals:
"Our cultural values are so important
and we keep saying that it is so
important. So you bring somebody in
that is not aware of our true cultural
values and they think of it in …a totally
different aspect, and they come in not
understanding us and that's where this
conflict starts happening." (Tl'azt'enne
Elder 1997)
However, several people told us that there
was a change in how people viewed the
forest after the arrival of the TFL:
"…Tl'azt'en First Nation people, now
view the forest as a financial resource
that they can use, or that they can look
at to providing for their family. So it has
changed some values, family values, or
traditional values." (Tl'azt'en community
member 1997)
Tl’azt’enne we spoke with were highly
uncomfortable with this change, particularly
as it began to pit community members
against each other and exacerbated splits
between Nation Elders and younger
community members.
Without an aboriginal tenure that can permit
flexibility in how many logs are removed
and how they are removed, that can permit
alternative forest management options, and
that allows successful continuation of
traditional activities through the protection
of the ecosystem, industrial forest tenures
will always present a significant challenge
13

It is worth noting that, where it could,
Tanizul did try to exceed standard
harvesting practices and protect or enhance
sites within the TFL.

for a First Nation and can lead to choices
that might compromise both community
unity as well as community economic
development.

Community and Forestry: A
New Challenge
One fundamental difference between TFL
42 and any other TFL is that the Tl'azt'en
Nation required and requires the operation to
be responsive to Tl'azt'enne community
goals and concerns.
This requirement
presented the Tl’azt’en with challenges not
well documented in existing literature on
forestry and First Nations. Further, little
attention has been paid to the challenges of
instituting new developments within a small,
politically tightly knit community nor of the
unintended consequences of new economic
development.
Community based natural resources
development has usually been discussed in
the abstract, and is often presented in a
relatively positive light.
Natcher and
Hickey (2002: 350) suggest that the concept
of community in resources management is
recognized on an international scale and
that: "the values and wisdom of local
knowledge, and time-tested traditions of
communal stewardship melded to a course
of asserting rights of use and authority over
traditional lands, indigenous peoples, are
now beginning to re-position themselves
with the institutions most responsible for the
management of these homelands.” They
assert that this will produce a more equitable
role where decision making shifts to a more
localized level. However, little is said about
the significant difficulty in meaningfully
engaging a community over the long term.
Engaging the Community
Some Tl'azt'enne told us that, in the
beginning, the community was involved in

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

14

the discussion leading to the application for
TFL 42.
"They had community meetings and a lot
of people used to show up… the hall
used to fill right up because everyone
wants to know what Tanizul was all
about. So they were informed really well
plus they went out to the Elders and met
with the Elders."
(Tl'azt'enne
community member 1998)
One speaker clearly offered support for the
value of the role the community plays in
long term resource management initiatives
like the TFL:
"Why I think Tanizul will succeed … is
because [the people] take pride in what
they have. They'll push to make it work
and they'll push that much harder than
anybody else would from the outside."
(Tl'azt'enne community member 1998)
Yet, in spite of best efforts to include
community members in the decision to
acquire the TFL, it was very clear that many
community members had an unrealistic idea
about what they could really expect from
operating the TFL:
"[Tanizul] was a life time thing that was
going to last and it was always going to
be our Band members working …it was
going to get most of our people off
welfare …having jobs. It was going to
produce later on. It was going to get
bigger and bigger, they were going to
add onto the sawmill, and people were
going to get into buying their own
machines…" (Tl'azt'en Elder 1997)
There was a great sense of promises-made in
early meetings regarding jobs and
community improvement:
"…where's all the production that they
promised and where's all these things
that they promised the Band and the
Band members that they were going to

15

give, that they were supposed to give us
a big portion of money to each
community."
(Tl'azt'en
community
member 1997)
In this sense, members of the community
were greatly disappointed, TFL 42 simply
could not meet all community needs in a
way community members were often led to
expect. The biggest error that Tl’azt’en
Nation committed was in not being crystal
clear with community members on what this
economic development could in reality
produce. This is likely an issue of which
any First Nation government must be wary.
False hopes about the benefits of any
proposed economic development can lead
quickly to bitterness and political unrest
when those hopes are dashed.
Any community, as Burda (1994:4)
illustrates, suffers from a: "vulnerability to
corporate rationalization, mergers and
dependence on a single industry". Given the
reliance that many community members had
on the TFL solving all community problems,
it is no wonder that many felt a vested
interest in its operations and felt particularly
betrayed when the TFL surprised them by
operating like a business (as it had to, to
meet government requirements).
For
example, one manager (1997) noted that
what was important in planning was to
recognize that traditional values were often
at the heart of what otherwise is an
unexplainable
community
response.
Further, respect for traditional values is at
the heart of needing to establish a good
working relationship with traditional users
of the land like the Keyoh holders. Yet,
several people interviewed felt that Tanizul
had not dealt well with the keyoh holders in
terms of notifying them when parts of their
trapline were to be cut or in terms of
offering compensation. In this arena, they
felt that Tanizul Timber Company should be

NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

showing non-native forest companies the
way.
"…if I had a Keyoh in that area, I would
have spoken out quite loudly. I would
have put a lot of effort into what I was
saying. I would have expected a lot of
tangible, meaningful, results from my
own Band…" (Tl'azt'enne community
member 1997)
The research literature has also addressed
poorly the importance of a regular, on-going
community engagement strategy over the
life of an industrial development, as well as
the difficulty in achieving it. People we
spoke with remember being told many
things about the tree farm license early on in
the acquisition process. Many Tl’azt’enne
also were aware of the establishment and
operation of Teeslee. What was remarkable
to us in our interviews, however, was
people’s lack of knowledge regarding
current operations of the TFL and the mill,
and the need for community input. We
spoke to many people who stated that they
had little idea about what was happening
with the TFL and no idea about the mill. A
number of the younger Band members told
us they were not really aware of the TFL or
the mill until they began working at one or
the other. One reason given for this was that
benefits were hard to see in the community,
an indication of how many of the original
promises were not fulfilled:
"If it's making money it's a good thing
and I want my piece of it. If it's losing
money, I don't even want to hear about it
and if it's just breaking even, it's
boring." (Tl'azt'enne community
member 1998)
Older people had different reasons for why
there was little knowledge or interest in the
TFL:
"I don't think I own it, like as a person…
We were told at the beginning that we

were the owners and we all had shares
in it, but I think it's sort of faded away.
People don't feel like that. We've sort of
lost track of it, I think, is the general
feeling." (Tl'azt'en Elder 1997)
Others cited cultural constraints:
"Most of the First Nations, they don't
like to ask questions too much. Like
when the sawmill was on a rocky road,
they just let things happen to them. They
aren't really asking questions… Maybe
you'll offend him." (Tl'azt'en
Administrator 1997)
Many community members felt at the time
of our research that the lack of interest in
Tanizul and Teeslee was driven by the
failure of the management personnel and of
the Boards of Directors to allow or
encourage that interest. The community did
not participate if their opinions and ideas are
not sought out. On the other side, it was
apparent how frustrated management was
when they told us how hard they worked to
get the community to give them clear goals:
The Tl’azt’en study demonstrates both the
crucial nature of a clear community
engagement
and
communication
strategy/strategies, but also some of the
challenges implicit in a community engaged
in a long term venture and which might have
other issues with which they are occupied.
"Oh, it's been a problem for years and as
far as I'm concerned, if anybody doesn't
come to a meeting… definitely is not
going to know. And we've tried every
way that we have now, communication
on our TVs, when we have a meeting
we'd hook up onto it. Even that, well
they'd just say, well okay, shut it off!"
(Board Member 1997)
The Social Costs of Doing Business
A second challenge poorly addressed in the
literature is the often unintended
consequences of bringing an industrial

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

16

development into a community. There were
a number of social consequences for
Tl’azt’enne when the TFL and the mill came
to the community. For example, until a
gravel road was put through into Tache in
the mid 1970s with the advent of the
railroad, Tl'azt'en Nation was relatively
isolated and necessarily self sufficient. We
were told that community members
supported each other and shared resources.
As access to the reserve grew so too did
social change. Many of the Elders and
others we spoke with were dismayed by the
outlook and attitude of the kids and
teenagers who never had to work to survive:
"And people worked hard for their
living. In 1972, the power came in, the
Hydro came in, ...for many different
reasons it was good. I think that was the
beginning of getting spoiled. Like you
didn't have to worry about your food
anymore. Like your food could be kept
cold in freezers or in fridges so people
began to forget about doing dry meat
and things like that... Nowadays, the
young people, they all figure that it was
like this all the time. It was never. We
had to work." (Tl'azt'en Elder 1997)
The acquisition and operation of TFL 42 and
the mill added to the basic changes to
Tl'azt'enne life style.
"I think when we looked at the business,
we should have been very aware of the
social impacts it would have on our
communities. Because having jobs is
good, but when you have the other things
like the addictions to drugs and alcohol,
that was another area we just sort of
pushed aside and we didn't really focus
on how it would affect our people."
(Tl'azt'en Administrator 1997)
While few indigenous communities are
currently so isolated from main stream
culture, a new influx of money and

17

increased access to goods and services,
including drugs, can have serious impacts on
a community that has not planned for an
increase in social support services. Further,
provision needs to be made for sudden
downturns in a one industry economy.
Tl’azt’en Nation was poorly prepared to deal
with downturns in the price of logs and the
loss of the mill had devastating impacts of
families that had invested in new trucks or
home improvements and then lost the
income.
Family Politics in the Boardroom
A challenge that has only been addressed
rarely in the literature (Davis, 2000) is the
significant issue of community politics.
Tl’azt’en Nation, like many Carrier Nations,
was once a collection of semi-nomadic
extended families that occupied their keyoh
and came together on various occasions for
social and economic purposes. The federal
government forced these families in to
permanent shared settlements as a
community without regard for cultural
norms and expectations. Small community
politics can be unpleasant at the best of
times.
When long standing, historical
family ties, loyalties and disagreements are
added, politics can become personal and
problematic. Family politics became a
serious issue affecting Tanizul; it was
difficult trying to run a business with
families occupying the Boardroom.
"Tanizul Timber is a small company. Bit
of planning, bit of a clear vision and
mandate, and it would be pretty easy but
you stir in the politics and the family and
all the rest of it, it gets wildly
complicated." (Tl'azt'en Elder 1997)
One person described the problem he faced
in hiring a crew in that he couldn't hire more
than two members of any one family. The
competence of individuals became less of a
concern then ensuring all families felt an
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

equal opportunity for employment. Given
the scarcity of employment, many of the
worst conflicts in the community were over
who got a job and who did not:
"…prominent
members
of
the
community, councillors, and various
other people were continuously at the
Board of Directors meeting or banging
on the general manager's door wanting
to know why my son isn't employed, why
my daughter can't work here, what the
hell are you doing with this white guy in
this job." (Tl'azt'en Administrator 1997)
Telling people "no" is difficult and a very
difficult task for a manager or supervisor. It
is more complex in a small, close-knit
community:
"The community has to make decisions
and it's difficult for First Nations
communities to make those calls because
of the relationships. It's hard for an
individual to tell his uncle or his aunt
that they're fired. It's hard for them to
make that decision... So somewhere
along the line, they have to make that icy
decision. You may not be popular but
you know it's the health of the
community that's at stake." (Tl'azt'en
Administrator 1997)

shop, and earned income quickly left the
community:
"We contribute to the local economy in
the neighborhood of $23-24 million
dollars revenue every year. But in our
community, we don't have very much to
show for it. We don't have stores that
are community-owned or individually
owned. We have some small concession
outlets and that's pretty much all we
have. So what is happening is that the
money we generate flows...into the
neighboring communities to help build
those economies up." (Tl'azt'en political
leader 1997)
All of these issues needed to be thought
through, yet these were issues that
Tl’azt’enne had little time to consider before
suddenly trying to run an industrial forest
tenure. Steering a course between demands
of traditional culture, community needs and
business requirements is one of the toughest
issues a First Nation will face in operating a
timber business, and a continuing challenge
to Tl'azt'en Nation. Any type of business
needs to recognise the full scope of the
demands that need to be met.
The
Tl'azt'enne were given little time to fully
consider the many decisions they needed to
make and so ran into problems.

Finally, sometimes the greatest challenge
was in simply trying to run the TFL and the
mill as businesses, regardless of community
expectations.
The literature makes
reference to the importance of community
appropriate
economic
development
(Anderson et al., 2006; Cornell and Kalt,
2006), yet the reality of achieving
community appropriateness within the
expectation of meeting community goals is
not always straight forward.

Managing Management
While the general intent of Tanizul and
Teeslee was clear, what was not clearly
hammered out was the management
structure, the goals, and the community’s
vision and goals for each business. Not
thinking through long terms goals meant that
even the one clear goal, jobs, was difficult to
meet and in fact created false expectations
on the part of community members:

Keeping Revenue at Home
Another problem that isn’t well addressed in
the literature is how to keep revenue in the
community. Tl’azt’enne went elsewhere to

"…nobody really sat down and said:
'Okay, if you want employment, first of all,
let's look at the types of employments.'
Let's just look at the types of positions this

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

18

TFL can sustain, right? Nobody asked the
question: 'Well how are we going to
ensure these things happen?'" (Tl'azt'en
Elder 1998)
The problem was that the long term goals
were imprecise. There was, for some time,
confusion as to the reporting structure
between the community, the Chief and
Council, and the Tanizul and Teeslee
Boards. Who had the authority for decisionmaking was never clearly established
(Tl’azt’en political leader 1998).
One of the outcomes of this situation was
that the operations manager never had a
clear mandate to direct his decision-making:
"You cannot run a company where the
manager doesn't know his mandate,
doesn't know the objectives of his Board,
his Board doesn't even know its own
mandate. He doesn't know if he's
reporting to the Board of Directors or
the Chief and Council, or the Tl'azt'en
people in general." (Tanizul Registered
Professional Forester 1997)
The Tl'azt'enne faced other challenges in
ensuring they had knowledgeable people in
two key areas: the governing Boards and the
management staff.
"You have to trust the judgement of
those people who are there. You have to
rely on their abilities and their
judgements given their backgrounds,
…and trust that they will make good
decisions... because it's a community
based company, … [the direction] every
Board member comes in from is for the
welfare of the community, for the
welfare of the people, and the well-being
of the company." (Tl'azt'en political
leader 1997)
Running a business meant making the hard
decisions, the ones that pit the business
against community desires and expectations.

19

This required the courage to make unpopular
decisions. The other groups that needed
expertise were the governing Boards. Both
Tanizul and Teeslee decided on appointed
Boards of Directors to oversee operations.
Some Directors had more expertise than
others:
"Yeah, all the loggers. They've got
knowledge here. There's people who
have been … there since year one. But
other people like the elders, they are on
the Board but they've never been
logging. They've never been in the bush
except for trapping and hunting... Pretty
hard to sit on the Board without any
knowledge of logging and you don't
know what a cubic metre is, you know.
… What the hell is this cubic metre. I
didn't know stuff like that." (Board
Member 1997)
The requirements for a Board position need
to be carefully considered. The expectation
must be clear, the Board actively oversees
the operations of the company and they need
knowledge to do this well.

Conclusion
Tl'azt'en Nation was offered an unusual
opportunity in 1982, a community controlled
tree farm license. In 1992, they were able to
add their sawmill. Given the challenges
they have met, from outside the Nation in
the form of commercial forest values and
those challenges from within, in the form of
“land as identity” values, the fact that
Tl'azt'en Nation has not been completely
successful as a commercial forestry operator
is overshadowed by what they have
succeeded at, the maintenance of traditional
values in the face of outside influence and in
continuing to operate TFL 42.
Their
persistence in striving to better the Nation is
demonstrated in their undertaking other
ventures, including the John Prince Research
Forest, in collaboration with the University
NRESi Occasional Paper No. 3
October 2008

of Northern British Columbia.
Their
experiences,
however,
contribute
significantly to our understanding of key
challenges which First Nation’s face in
choosing to participate in industrial forestry
or in seeking to amend the compromises and
opportunities aboriginal forestry tenures
might offer in the future.
The interlocking challenges of community
politics,
community
expectations,
community knowledge and community
expertise are challenges than can confront
even the most politically astute and well
advantaged Nation. Engaging in a large
industrial development must be thought
through carefully and planned for
thoroughly, an option that Tl’azt’enne did
not have. Some areas of concern, such as
the impact of community politics, are often
difficult ones to even raise, let alone plan
solutions for, as few wish to admit that such
circumstances exist within their own
community. Yet a Nation that does not
confront and address the sorts of challenges
faced by Tl’azt’en Nation does itself and its
community
members
a
significant
disservice.

Some of the challenges discussed in this and
other studies have the potential to be solved
through the acceptance and implantation of
an aboriginal forestry ideal and an aboriginal
tenure system as advocated by NAFA and
others. Such systems facilitate access to the
resource base and encourage operational
requirements that permit the necessary
flexibility to meet First Nation values, goals
and rights. Better funding envelopes and
training programs could offset the issues of
operational costs, access to equipment and
contracts, and in the development of
community
expertise
(although
not
protection against global economic swings).
What an aboriginal forestry tenure will be
challenged to address is the social
circumstances of a community and its
expectations. That challenge remains the
responsibility of each Nation wishing to
engage in industrial forestry; one that each
must plan to resolve.

Booth & Skelton y Indigenous Community Values & Forestry

20

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