LOOKING DEEPER INTO SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC POLICY OF THE
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FROM 2006 TO 2011
by

Matthew Raymond Alexander Graveline
B.J. Honours, Carleton University
MA International Studies, University ofNorthem British Columbia

RESEARCH PROJECT IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
IN
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN BRITISH COLUMBIA
January 2014

© Matthew Raymond Alexander Graveline, 2014
UNIVERSITY of NORTHERN
BRITISH COLUMBIA
LIBRARY
Prince George, B.C.

Abstract
The Federal Government of Canada from 2006 to 2011 presented a security discourse
and policy regarding the Arctic region. In order to understand the government' s use of
security language this project adopted the Copenhagen School ' s securitization theory. Using
this theory' s approach, this project dissects the relevant government discourses and policies,
pertaining to the Arctic, to determine which sectors the government attempted to securitize.
It will be demonstrated that the government has attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006
to 2011 , particularly in the traditional political and military sectors, while societal, economic,
and environmental sectors were not securitized but rather their possible threats were framed
as opportunities. These conclusions resulted from this government's political worldview
around conducting foreign policy and how it wanted to position Arctic security for Canada in
its growing Northern region.

ii

Acknowledgements
First I need to give a big thank you to my supervisor Dr. Heather Smith; she made me work
through my research. When she told me a section had been completed to her standards, I
knew I had done good work. Her willingness to be involved in my research was invaluable.
Dr. Gary Wilson allowed me to really tackle the political issues of northern policy and in his
quiet way he redirected me when I went astray. Finally thank you to Dr. Ken Wilkening who
stepped in at the latter part of my research and added the needed additional critical eye to my
research. Also my thanks to the Department of International Studies, without them, I would
not have gained the financial support needed to avoid stress over finances during my time
researching in their beautiful graduate office.
Another big thank you needs to go to my father who helped advise me when I encountered
obstacles and was part of my inspiration for completing this degree. Finally I need to thank
my wife, Laura who now knows my graduate work inside and out. Her silent encouragement
and patience allowed me to complete this journey.

Table of Contents
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... ii
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. iii
List of Charts ....... .... ............. ... .. .... .. ... ..... ................................................. .. ....... ....... ........... .. ... v
List of Acronyms .......................... ..... .. ...... ....... ... .... ........... .... ......... ........ ....... .... .......... ........... vi
Introduction .... ...... ... .............. ....... .. ........ ... ..... .......... .. .. .. .............. ..... .. ... .. ..... ...... .. ... .............. ... 1
Chapter 1: Securitization Theory .............................................................................................. 5
Political Security .................. .... ... .............. .... ........................ ... .......... .... ... ............. .... .. ... ... 11
Military Security ........ ................... ...... ...... .. ................. ..... .... ........ .. ......... .... .. .................... 11
Societal Security ..... ... .............. ....... ......................... ........................................ .................. 11
Economic Security .. ..................................... .. ....... ....... ........... ... ......... .. .......... ... ... .. .... ... .... 11
Environmental .... ... ..... .... .... .... ...................... ............... ..... ..... .... .. ...... .. ... ........................... 11
Chapter 2: Case Study ... ..... ......... ....... ............................................ .... .............. ... ......... ..... ..... 13
Methodology and Context ................................... ................ ................................................ 13
Political Sector .................................... ..... ....... .. .. ... .... .. ........ ............................................. 15
Military Sector ..... .... ... .... .... ............. ...... ............... ...... ....................... ............................... 24
Societal Sector ................................................................................................................... 36
Economic Sector ..... .................. ............ .. ..... ...... ... .... .... ...... .... ..... ...... ....... .... .. ... ....... ..... .... 44
Environment Sector ....... ............................... ................. .. .. .. ...... .... ..... ....... .... ...... ...... ..... .. .. 50
Chapter 3: Analysis ................................................................................................................. 57
Partisan Influence in Policy ............................................ ............ ......................................... 63
So What? Why Does All Of this Matter .................... ................. .. ..... ....... ............. .. .. ........... 65
The Theoretical and Practical Value of the Project .......... ........... ....... ................ ..................... 68
Further Research and Conclusion ........... ...................... ........ .... ........... ...... .......... ................. 70
Works Cited .................... ...... .............. .... .... ....................... ......... ...... ..... .......... .. .......... .... ...... 74

iv

List of Charts
Chart 1

The sectors and their elements

10

v

List of Acronyms
AAND
DEFAIT
DND

Aboriginal Affairs and N orthem Development
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
Department ofNational Defence

vi

Introduction
The Arctic region has experienced increased international attention in the last two
decades due to the effects of climate change, perceived untapped natural resources, and a
possible, faster shipping route to Asia (Huebert 2009). As the region grew in international
importance, governments of the Arctic states began to dedicate time and resources towards
asserting security for their respective northern territories. Aware of the increased
international interest in the Arctic, the Chretien government attempted to bring the region out
of the long-standing Cold War rivalry that existed between the Russians, the Americans and
their allies. In 1996, the Arctic Council was created as a partnership of the Arctic states and
the northern indigenous peoples to better foster discussion on how to manage the region
(Huebert 1999; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2013). The initial
enthusiasm of working together as a northern community to provide stability for the Arctic
region dissipated quickly after the 9/ 11 attacks (Koivurova 2009), causing a dramatic change
in priorities for Canadian foreign policy. The security of the Arctic was given low priority in
favour of combating international terrorism and supporting Canada's involvement in
Afghanistan. These changes in priorities were evident from the government's legislation,
speeches, and media coverage from 2001 to 2005 (CBC News Politics Sept. 6, 2011; Chase
2003; Chretien 2001; Clark 2001; Fyffe 2011, 1-17; McCarthy and Clark 2001; Parliament of
Canada 2002-2005; Sallot 2004).
In the 2006 federal election, the Conservative Party's Stand Up for Canada platform
promised to make the Arctic a priority for foreign affairs and national defence (Conservative
Party of Canada Federal Election Platform 2006). Once elected, this new federal government
continued to push ahead with an aggressive Arctic policy that was referenced in the 2007
1

Speech from the Throne (Government of Canada 2007), and detailed in the 2009 publication,

Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future (Department of
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Metis and NonStatus Indians 2009). This document identified four pillars for the government's new policy:
exercising Canadian Arctic sovereignty, promoting social and economic development,
protecting the north's environmental heritage, and improving and devolving northern
governance (Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009, 4).

Canada 's Northern Strategy was the most aggressive Canadian Arctic plan since the Cold
War (Byers 2009; Coates and Poelzer 2010; Huebert 2006; Lajeunesse 2008).
In 2010, the federal government released an international policy platform for its

Northern Strategy plan (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010). The four pillars of the
government's Arctic policy remained intact, but there were additions and changes in its
approach to certain environmental and economic challenges, especially in light of the

Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the economic crisis of 2008 1. In
2011, with its policy for the Arctic established, the federal government continued to use
security language and to promote actions intended to protect Canadian Arctic sovereignty.
This policy of the Canadian government appeared to focus a lot on security. With the
memory of the Cold War still fresh in many people's mind, the many security measures of
both of these policies could be translated in heightened security or securitization. To attempt
to securitize, someone with authority labels an issue or environment as a security problem
and tries to convince its audience that additional security measures are needed to counter it.
1

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill happened in 2010 and gave the international community reason to re-evaluate
offshore oil drilling and the economic crisis saw governments try to rebuild their capitalist systems in a variety
of ways.

2

In order for a democratic state to move forward with a heightened level of security measures,

it is important that it incorporates language and actions that will appeal to its national
population. This population includes distinct, smaller audiences such as the northern
communities. So while the government' s discourses demonstrated a firm commitment to
using language that tried to identify policy as needed for the state ' s security, the question that
needs to be asked is "did they attempt to securitize"? To answer this question, this project
will apply the Copenhagen School ' s approach to securitization as a means to better
understand if the federal government attempted to securitize its Arctic policy from 2006 to
2011.
Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap deWilde are three theorists who specialize in
analyzing government security discourse, especially in situations with heightened security
interaction (Buzan et al. 1998, vii-viii). Their collective theoretical work contributes to what
is commonly referred to as the Copenhagen School ' s theory of securitization (Buzan et al.
1998, 21-26). The Copenhagen School ' s securitization theory provides a framework for
identifying securitizing attempts, and to determine if the actor, through a speech act, has been
successful in heightening security. For example, if the government used language to facilitate
a perceived needed action to protect against an identified threat and its national populace
accepted it, then this situation has been securitized. In this environment, the securitizing actor
makes security its top priority in a particular area (Buzan et al. 1998, 24-27).
To better understand a government' s efforts to construct existential threats through its
language, the Copenhagen School separates security language into five sectors: political,
military, societal, economic, and environmental. Structured in this manner, the Copenhagen
School provides a practical theoretical tool that can be used to analyze how politicians and
3

policy makers communicate the rationale for different heightened securities (Buzan et al.
1998, 7-8). This project will use the Copenhagen School ' s theoretical framework of
securitization as a means to answer the following question: has the Canadian federal
government attempted to securitize the Arctic? It will be demonstrated that the government
has attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006 to 2011 , particularly in the traditional
political and military sectors, while societal, economic, and environmental sectors were not
securitized but rather their possible threats were framed as opportunities.
This project will review the Copenhagen School ' s securitization theory to explain
how it will be used to analyze the data sector by sector. After which this project's
methodology will be explained and then applied to analyze government speeches and media
releases from 2006 to 2011. With the completion of the case study, the analysis chapter will
ask how do these fmdings matter and assess their theoretical and practical value. Finally, this
project will end with suggestions of further research regarding primary data collection and
then a final comment on the Arctic region ' s value to the study of international security.

4

Chapter 1: Securitization Theory
In 1995, Ole Waever proposed the idea of securitization as a means of redefining and

broadening the use of the word "security" (Waever 1995, 47). His concern was that
governments were using more and more speech acts to justify heightened military and
political actions to a fearfully accepting populace. This process, if successful, he labeled
securitization (Waever 1995, 57). The goal of securitization theory is to investigate the
successful "move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan et al. 1998, 23). As
Waever states "a major focus of security studies should be the strong processes of
securitization: [ .. .] when, why and how elites label issues and developments as security
problems" (Waever 1995, 57).
This first chapter identifies the key elements of the Copenhagen School' s framework.
The securitizing actor is the body that tries to securitize the issue area. Second, the existential
threat is the constructed danger that needs to be securitized against. Third, the referent object
is what needs protection against this threat. This framework uses sectors to separate the
particular language into certain securities so these elements can be properly identified. There
are five sectors: a) political b) military c) societal d) economic e) environmental.
These are four of the framework ' s components but this theory' s process begins with
the identification of a securitizing actor. The Copenhagen School describes this element as a
unit that has "the position of authority ... thereby [increasing] the likelihood of the audience
accepting the claims made in a securitizing attempt" (Buzan et al. 1998, 33). The ruling elite 2

2

ln Canada, the ruling elite is the federal politicians because these individuals make a lot of money and are not troubled
with th e issues of th e rest of society.

5

occupy this position because they hold the power to make use of security terminology. This
actor is in charge of presenting the "speech act" which is when a "state representative moves
a particular development into specific areas and thereby claims a special right to use
whatever means are necessary to block it" (Waever 1995, 55).
The securitizing actor, however, does not decide whether an action is a successful
securitizing attempt. Only the fourth element, the intended audience, has the power and
legitimacy to accept or reject the government' s effort to securitize (Buzan et al. 1998, 31 ).
The audience is the most important element of the securitizing process. Government speech
acts use language that is designed to appeal to the national populace. The Copenhagen
School argues that for a government to deliver a successful securitization, it does not need to
"push the demand so high as to say that an emergency measure has to be adopted, only that
the existential threat has to be argued and gain enough resonance for a platform to be made
from which it is possible to legitimize emergency measures." (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). From
this platform securitizing actors must deliver a speech act that is constructed to gain audience
acceptance and therefore securitize the threatened environment (Buzan et al. 1998, 33-42).
Academics (Haacke & Williams 2008; Roe 2008) however take issue with this
theory' s process. The main limitation that they brought up about the Copenhagen School ' s
theory of securitization is that it cannot confirm the acceptance of a successful speech act by
the securitizing actor. The Copenhagen School claims that "by labeling something a security
issue ... it becomes one" (Waever 2004, 13). Jurgen Haacke and Paul Williams disagree. They
contend that dealing with the threat is what is required for it to be a successful security action
(Haacke & Williams 2008, 781-782). Paul Roe also problematized the actual process of
securitization as part of this limitation. He views securitization as a two-stage process, which
6

consists of identification (rhetorical securitization) whereby the securitizing actor tries to
highlight the threat (Roe 2008, 620-623), and mobilization (active securitization), where the
security action is implemented with the acceptance of the audience. Roe maintains that the
success or failure of security policy rests firmly in the mobilization of securitizing language
against the threat (Roe 2008, 622-632). The second main limitation to the Copenhagen
School ' s theory is the abstract nature of the language that is used in securitizing discourses.
As Roe argues, analysts need to recognize that securitization is audience-centered. In order
for the securitizing actor to be successful, Roe states that the government needs to configure
its speech acts so that the audience understands and accepts them (Roe 2008 , 622).
The introduction of a framework that would address these two limitations and identify
all the security considerations is crucial for developing audience accepted Arctic policy. This
proposed modified framework would also allow for deeper research into the federal
government' s securitization of the Arctic and a more comprehensive analysis of audience
reactions to the government' s discourse regarding the Arctic . This project will however use
the Copenhagen School ' s original securitization framework to review securitizing attempts
by the government in its current Arctic policy, because it provides insight for a gap analysis.
The suggested modification of this theory is outside the goal of this project because there is
no available data to show if securitization was successful in the Arctic from 2006 to 2011.
To do this review of security language, there are five sectors where securitizing
attempts can be observed. The first security sector is political. It covers the
institutionalization of rule and the stability of authority. Threats to the political sector are
aimed at the organizational stability of the state, its national identity, and organizing ideology
(Buzan et al. 1998, 142). Referent objects that actors attempt to protect include the territorial
7

state, emerging quasi-super states, 3 and self-organized stateless societal groups 4 (Buzan et al.
1998, 145). Securitizing actors are clear, authoritative leaders within the state system of
power (Buzan et al. 1998, 146). In this project' s case study, the securitizing actor will be the
Prime Minister and the rest of the executive branch, which includes the cabinet ministers.
The threats that the executive branch addresses take the form of "subversion of legitimacy or
denial of recognition" (Buzan et al. 1998, 150), and threaten state sovereignty because a
state' s legitimacy stems from power recognition by other states (Buzan et al. 1998, 150).
The second sector is military security. In this sector, the state is the most important
referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 49) and it considers the use of force as its primary means
of protecting the exclusive governing right of sovereign administrations. For the military
sector, there are defmed securitizing actors who deliver speech acts to the general public
(Buzan et al. 1998, 51). For this project, these actors are: the Minister ofNational Defence
and the Prime Minister. Existential threats are defined as intentional and direct action backed
with force aimed at the state (Buzan et al. 1998, 57). The threats for this sector would be
foreign announcements of force allocation or new northern forces or even military exercises.
For both of the traditional sectors of political and military security, 5 the securitizing actors '
speech acts are directed at the national populace and the international community. These two
groups are labeled the audience.
The third sector-societal security-is the most recent addition to the theory, and its
inclusion has expanded the scope of security considerably. The Copenhagen School argues
that identity is the core concept of the societal security sector (Buzan et al.l998, 119). They
3

These types of organizations are a collection of states such as the European Union (Buzan et al. 1998, 145).
These types of groups are tribes, minorities and clans that have stable political institutions but are not
recognized by international society (Buzan et al. 1998, 145).
5
These securities are narrow, state-centric defined use of protection and power

4

8

state that, "societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a
development as a potential threat to their survival as a community" (Buzan et al.l998, 119).
The societal security sector includes four threats: migration, depopulation, horizontal, and
vertical competition. Horizontal competition implies a rivalry of identity between societies
within a state while vertical competition refers to different levels of government seeking
jurisdiction (Buzan et al. 1998, 121). Examples of referent objects in this sector are tribes,
clans, nations, nation-like ethnic units, and races (Buzan et al. 1998, 123).
The fourth security sector is the economic sector. There are three main contending
positions to consider in this sector (Buzan et al 1998, 95). The first is the neo-mercantilist
position that prioritizes the state. The second position is liberal, which prioritizes the
economy. The third position is socialist in orientation. This position has the role of the state
as "tam[ing] economics toward social and political goals of justice and equity" (Buzan et al.
1998, 96). What all three positions have in common is that the state is the securitizing actor
and the referent object is the financial market (Buzan et al. 1998, 100-101). To determine
existential threats in this sector, it is important to focus on interactions between the different
actors and the referent object (Buzan et al. 1998, 103-109). For this project, the Canadian
federal government is seen as concerned with the economic activity of international
companies and federal financial transfers to the territories. For these last two non-traditional
sectors, 6 the securitizing actors deliver discourses intended for the national populace and the
northern communities.
The final security sector is the environment, and it is the most difficult sector to
securitize for two reasons (Buzan et al. 1998, 74-77). The first reason is because it is difficult
6

This term makes a distinction between the distinctly state-centric and other definitions of security that were
not traditionally taken up by states.

9

to provide substantive security to the natural environment because human interference
usually results in environmental destruction, not protection. The second reason is that there
are two different and competing agendas within this sector: the scientific and the political.
These agendas overlap and shape each other because the securitizing actor, the state, is
involved in both camps and follows a specific political and partisan direction. The
environmental scientific agenda is the information used for securitizing moves and it
determines the threats. The political agenda concentrates on three areas: 1) state and public
awareness of the scientific issues, 2) the acceptance of political responsibility to deal with
these issues, 3) and the political management of questions that arise.
There are several kinds of threats to the environmental sector but the one that is
relevant to this project is "the threat from human activity to the natural systems or structures
of the planet when changes made do seem to pose existential threats to parts of civilization"
(Buzan et al. 1998, 80). The prediction of environmental disasters is what typically leads to
securitizing moves. However, there is not a recognized securitization model for this sector
because the scientific and political camps cannot agree on what security action should take
priority. Which agenda takes priority between political or scientific within a speech act is
dependent on scientific authority (Buzan et al. 1998, 71-72). There are numerous securitizing
and counter-securitizing moves in this sector because everything from the disruption of
ecosystems, to economic problems related to the environment, are considered possible
disasters (Buzan et al. 1998, 72-75). For the environmental sector, the securitizing actor
directs its discourses to two audiences: the national populace and the international
community.

10

The table below captures the elements of the framework adopted here. It is divided
into the five security sectors. Each security sector is broken down into the four key elements
that create a framework used to identify securitizing attempts. All the elements listed were
derived from the Copenhagen School's Security: a New Framework for Analysis (Buzan et
al. 1998). Throughout this project, it is important to refer back to this Copenhagen School
framework to understand how the following speech acts were analyzed.
Chart 1: The sectors and their elements
Political
Security
Securitizing State- Ruling
~ctor
Elite

Military Security Societal Security
State- Ruling
Elite

State- Ruling
Elite

Economic Environmental
Security
Security
State- Ruling State -Ruling
Elite
Elite

Referent
Object

Territorial state State sovereignty State or nation State and
like ethnic unit !Financial

!Audience

!National
tpopulace/
IInternational
~ommunity

The
environment
with human
~arket
enterprise
lfhreats aimed at lfo determine The
Existential Threats are
In terms of
Threats
aimed at the
hreats there is a he survival of hreats in this environmental
organizational !wide spectrum of he community sector, it is
hreat identified
stability of the tpossible security
important to for this project
state, its
ssues, but they
is from human
focus on
activity to the
national
are all intentional
different
identity and
and directed.
interactions !natural systems
prganizing
between units lor structures of
~deology. All
he planet when
and the
hreats are non
changes
made
eferent objec
tviolent.
do seem to pose
existential
hreats to parts
pf civilization
National
populace/
International
Community

National
populace/
Northern
\_;ommunities

National
populace/
Northern
communities

!National
tpopulace/
International
~ommunity
11

The adoption of this framework for the project is valuable for four reasons. First, the
Copenhagen School ' s theory of securitization is used in this project because this theory
provides an established framework, which has certain elements and/or sectors that can be
used to analyze the Conservative government' s security discourse. Second, it is a framework
that identifies the language that governments use to present, announce, or argue the need for
better or heightened security to its audiences. Third, it also does not grapple with the
definition of security, but rather just accepts how governments use this term and embraces its
fluid nature. Fourth, it categorizes this language into the appropriate sector to limit possible
variables. This theory has already been applicable to help analyze real security situations. It
explored the 1971 Bangladesh War (Hayes 2012), dissected Latin American security before
and after 9/ 11 (Oelsner 2009), and examined cyber security and its use in the Estonian cyber
war in 2007 (Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009).
The Copenhagen School's theory of securitization has not yet been broadly applied to
the Arctic and therefore this is the first case study of this region using this theory. This case
study will analyze the relevant government discourses through the lens of the Copenhagen
School's five security sectors. These sectors help to analyze both traditional and nontraditional speech acts. The separation of language allowed there to be fmdings regarding if
the Canadian federal government attempted to securitize the Arctic from 2006 to 2011.

12

Chapter 2: Case Study
Methodology and Context
From the beginning of this research the goal of this project was to study security in
the Arctic. The first methodological consideration was how this investigation could be done.
A review was conducted of different approaches and theories that could help to draw out
issues of security interaction in the Arctic. From prior research it was known that the federal
government from 2006 to 2011 had been aggressively pursuing security policy for the Arctic
region but there was a need to identify a set of tools that could help determine how they were
framing this effort and what aspect of security they were focused on.
The Copenhagen School's securitization theory and its framework were decided as
the approach needed to conduct this research. The concept that an authoritative body would
try to present speech acts to legitimize heighten security measures in a particular
environment was the perfect description of what happened in the Canadian Arctic from 2006
to 2011 . The argument that security should be divided into five different sectors so security
language investigation could be more focused was sought after since the research reviewed a
five year period of government action. Finally, the fact that the theory established different
framework elements that were needed to identify a complete speech act allowed for the
creation of a methodology.
The next step was to determine what materials this research should review. There are
a lot of different perspectives on what this federal government did with security language
from 2006 to 2011 (Clark 201 0; Huebert 2005-2006; 2009). The goal was to hopefully
review the language of this government afresh. Its northern policy was the initial focus but

13

there was a realization that this policy was not the only aspect of this government' s speech
acts. After conducting some online searches on the AAND, DND, Finance, Foreign Affairs
and Prime Minister archives, 400 ministers ' speeches and 50 press releases were initially
collected as it was determined that they were the authoritative body that presented elite
speech acts in this environment.
Multiple steps were taken to narrow down the speeches and press releases that were
reviewed for the case study. First, in order to identify the right collection of speeches and
press materials, there was a need to analyze the collected data using previous research and
then the Copenhagen School's framework's requirements. Once this primary data had been
sorted into the different security sectors 115 speeches7 and 31 press releases from 2006 to
2011 were determined to have portions of the needed security language that fit with the
elements of the Copenhagen's theoretical framework. From this data set, some key
government ideas were drawn out in each area. Upon further review, these ideas were
identified to be the dominant themes for each sector. Next, using these dominant themes as
guides, another review of the all the ministers' speeches was conducted. Finally these
speeches were again filtered through a search of the four theoretical framework elements by
identifying: the actions of the securitizing actor, the highlighting of the referent object, the
presented danger of the existential threat, and a targeted audience.
The case study below is divided into the five security sectors of political, military,
societal, economic and environmental. The introduction of each sector begins with a listing
of the four framework elements and the four to five themes that were used to identify the

7 There were several speeches analyzed which were delivered members of Parliament or higher department
officials on behalf of Ministers.

14

securitizing attempts in each sector. After this introduction each sector's data will be used to
address each of these themes from 2006 to 2011 in a standard timeline. Within each sector
there are also some observations as to whether the government tried to securitize the sector.
The first sector of the case study is the one which had the most government speech acts,
political security.

Political Sector
The political sector is commonly accepted as the primary traditional security sector
because it is the security that governments have historically sought to protect. Based on the
Copenhagen School ' s theory, this sector's securitizing actor is the federal government and
the referent object that it is trying to protect is the territorial state. The existential threats are
aimed at the organizational stability of the state and its national identity such as: political
agreements to reduce a state's sovereign territory and foreign intentional disassociation of a
section of territory with a state's national identity. The government's audience is the national
and international community. The themes identified in the government speeches that relate to
the political sector are sovereignty, the importance of the north to Canada, the bilateral
relationship with the US, partnerships and international cooperation, and international
leadership. 8
First, sovereignty was the most often used theme in the federal government's
discourse from 2006 to 2011. This theme was first introduced against a portrayed dangerous
world where Canada's objective was to develop the independent capacity to defend its

8
This theme was derived from the constant language of the government emphasizing their leadership on the international
stage.

15

sovereignty (Government of Canada 2006). Throughout these six years, the other four
political themes were also used to support sovereignty.
In his first year in office, Prime Minister Stephen Harper used strong language to

present the need for stronger Canadian sovereignty, stating that his government would
establish uncontested authority over the entire Canadian Arctic region (Office of the Prime
Minister 2006b; 2006e). In his northern addresses, Harper spoke about Arctic sovereignty.
He listed different security measures from : the deep water port to extend the Navy' s Arctic
reach to aerial surveillance throughout the Arctic to underwater surveillance capacity (Office
of the Prime Minister; 2006e; 2006f). The biggest existential threat to Canadian territory was
foreign incursion which could lead to the instability of the region. Harper spoke very
candidly about how Canada should operate in its northern territories, declaring, "use it or lose
it. And we have no intention of losing it" (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). The 2007
Throne Speech stated that one of Parliament' s five priorities for that year would include
"strengthening Canada' s sovereignty and place in the world" (Government of Canada 2007).
The sovereignty theme was also evident in several of the speeches delivered by
Chuck Strahl, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (AAND) wherein
he reiterated the message of the Prime Minister and the measures outlined in the 2007 Throne
Speech (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007f: 2007h). In 2008, the
government announced that they were rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces and adding a
larger Arctic component that would focus on measures to protect Canadian sovereignty in
this region. The federal government also focused specific speeches on an upcoming
amendment to the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act that extended the protected
Canadian Arctic internal waters (Office of the Prime Minister 2008b; 2008).

16

In 2009, sovereignty remained the most prevalent theme, repeatedly cited in speeches
by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DEF AIT) Minister Lawrence
Cannon, as one of the main reasons for proposed heightened government security. When
Minister Cannon addressed sovereignty in the Arctic, his language was calm and firmly
established multiple existential threats to the region but focused on the international interest
in Canadian Arctic territory. In his words: "my government has invested significantly ... to
ensure that Canada secures recognition ... in the Arctic" (Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2009a). Despite this possible threat to Canada' s northern political recognition, he was
confident that the federal government had been working effectively to defend Canadian
territory from the rise of this foreign interest (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a;
2009c; 2009d; 2009e). Cannon, Strahl, and National Defence Minister Peter MacKay all
articulated a similar discourse regarding sovereignty enforcement and how Canada was
working with its Arctic neighbours to make sure that national borders were respected
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009e; Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; National Defence 2009c).
With the launch of the North ern Strategy in 2009, the theme of Arctic sovereignty
was strongly represented and given high visibility. The language that the government used
declared that Canada ' s Arctic sovereignty was non-negotiable and that asserting it was the
top priority for the government. It backed this up by declaring that Canada now had the
resources to defend its claims (Office ofthe Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2010b; Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development 2009f; 2009g; 2010a; Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2010a, 2010b; 2010c; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i; National Defence 2009g; 2009h; 2009k).
In April of 2010, Cannon was very direct with this message. In his words : "this government

17

is dedicated to fulfilling the north ' s true potential as a healthy, prosperous and secure region
within a strong and sovereign Canada" (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010c).
In August of that year, the Statement on Canada 's Arctic Foreign Policy was
introduced and contained similar discourses about Arctic sovereignty being a top priority for
Canadian foreign policy (Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010). In 2011 ,
there were four speeches that embodied the idea of enlightened sovereignt/ while still
maintaining the importance of a state to hold political authority to protect its own territory.
(Office of the Prime Minister 2011; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011 b; National
Defence 2011a; 2011d). This message was needed in order to defend against an existential
threat on the country' s national identity and stability. As new DEFAIT Minister John Baird
announced to the UN General Assembl y, "Multilateral institutions and multilateral action
result from a collection of sovereign decisions based on individual states ' own
interests ... Canada calls this ' enlightened sovereignty"' (Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2011b).
The second most prevalent theme for the political sector was the northern connection
to the rest of Canada. Harper initially introduced this northern theme by stating a need for
better sovereignty protection from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic (Office of the
Prime Minister 2006b ). Constructing the Arctic as an equally important region of Canada
was a constant refrain throughout this six-year period. While on his 2006 northern tour,
Harper connected the Arctic to Canada' s national identity (Office of the Prime Minister
2006e; 2006f). In his words: "' Our Land ' - just as Yukon and the Northwest Territories and
the entire Arctic Archipelago are ' Our Land "' (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). AAND
Minister Jim Prentice and Conservative MP Bob Mills, acting on the minister's behalf also
9

This term implies a nation makes changes to its own policy for the global good (Clark 2010)

18

l

addressed this northern linkage throughout 2006 (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2006a; 2006c; 2006d).
In 2007, Harper took the lead by referring to Canada as a ' northern nation ' of
'northern people ' (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e). The northern connection
theme was used to promote sovereignty, but it also helped legitimize other government action
in the north. Four separate AAND speeches by Minister Chuck Strahl contained messages
that the potential and prosperity of the north translated into success for the whole country
because Canada was a 'northern nation' (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
2007e; 2007f; 2007h). In 2008, Harper again spoke of the Arctic' s connection to Canada in
two speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2008a; 2008c).
With the government' s release of its core Arctic policy, the 2009 Northern Strategy
document, the connection between the north and the whole of Canada was cemented to
protect against the existential threat of foreign interest. By linking Canadian national identity
to the north, the government gave reason for its whole populace to care about possible
northern foreign incursion. AAND Minister Strahl reaffirmed the north as part of Canada' s
identity. In his words: "Canada is a Northern nation, an Arctic nation. The North is a
fundamental part of our Canadian heritage and our sense of who we are" (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development 2009g). Throughout 2009, this theme of northern connection was
embedded in the government's speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009b; 2009c;
Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009f; National Defence 2009k). DEFAIT Minister
Cannon continued to highlight Canada' s northern connection (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010f; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i). Then in 2011, after

19

two years of consistently focusing on the Arctic, there was only one mention of the north's
connection to Canada (Environment Canada 2011a).
Canada's bilateral relationship with the United States was the third key theme used
frequently in the Prime Minister' s northern speeches. The importance of the bilateral
relationship was highlighted as being essential for Canada' s trade and foreign policy. In a
northern speech, Harper connected the importance of Canada's friendship with the United
States to the proposed 2006 Arctic action plan and future Arctic resource trade (Office of the
Prime Minister 2006f). This same theme was used to suggest that if the Americans were to
impede on Canadian Arctic borders, Canada would be ready. In Harper's words : "as I tell
everyone, including our American friends, our jurisdiction, just as it does on the Atlantic and
the Pacific, extends 200 miles out into the Arctic Ocean. No more, and no less. Our
government has already begun to back our words with action" (Office of the Prime Minister
2006f). This relationship in the Arctic was both a security measure and a possible existential
threat. When reviewing this sector's theme connections this theme supported the main
sovereignty theme.
Throughout 2007, this bilateral relationship was not emphasized because in 2007 the
federal government was trying to stand firm on its primary theme of sovereignty by
highlighting its international leadership position. These two themes would be eclipsed if the
American government was brought into these speeches (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d;
2007e). The reason for this was due to the difference of opinion that Canada and the US
have concerning the status of the Northwest Passage: the Americans claim it is an
international strait, while Canada asserts that it is its internal waters (Charron 2005; Griffiths
2003; 2004; Huebert 2003 ; 2009, 8-9; Lajeunesse 2008, 1039-1 040). In 2008, the bilateral

20

relationship was only briefly mentioned when Harper discussed past work done in
partnership with the Americans in the Arctic (Office ofthe Prime Minister 2008b).
In contrast, the bilateral relationship with the United States was highlighted
frequently in 2009, with whole sections of speeches dedicated to and focused on this
connection (Environment Canada 2009d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a;
2009c; 2009d; National Defence 2009c). DEFAIT Minister Lawrence Cannon was usually
straightforward; "the United States is our premier partner in the Arctic [ ... ] I also intend to
explore ways to pursue a common agenda, starting in 2013, as Canada, and then the United
States, chair the Arctic Council" (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a). In 2010,
however, the bilateral relationship was mostly put aside with only one mention of Canada's
past bilateral efforts with the United States and the War on Terror (National Defence 2010i).
Harper ended 2011 with an address he made alongside President Barack Obama, where the
two leaders spoke about their strong partnership regarding North American security (Office
of the Prime Minister 2011).
DEFAIT Minister John Baird and Environment Minister Peter Kent also conveyed
this more intimate connection in speeches where they discussed the possibility of establishing
foreign policies and environmental initiatives. In Baird ' s words: "what is needed is a
common approach, with bilateral commitments driven by our mutual interests in both energy
security and climate change" (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011 a). The language
got even more American focused by the end of2011 with Kent stating, "our commitment to
reduce this country' s emissions by 17 per cent over 2005 levels by 2020 was deliberately
harmonized with the targets set by the United States, our largest trading partner and closest
neighbor. It makes sense given the integrated nature of our respective economies and

21

environments" (Environment Canada 20llc). This changing nature of the bilateral
relationship was relevant to the Arctic speech act because within these speeches the potential
of the northern economy and the fragility of the Arctic environment were at risk. The
concern was if this new, closer partnership did not work the government' s Arctic policy
would suffer in its support of the northern communities (Environment Canada 20llc).
The fourth theme of Canada' s international policy, relating to the Arctic, tended to
shift between 2006 and 2011 . In an address to the United Nations General Assembly in 2006,
Harper praised the work done by the broader international community while highlighting
Canada' s past international efforts around the world (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f).
Harper emphasized that Canada was not an island, so international cooperation was needed to
promote Canadian values. The fourth theme of cooperation was continued in 2007, but the
focus had changed. Instead of addressing cooperation across the world, the government
discourse now focused on intergovernmental and private partnerships in acknowledgement of
International Polar Year 2007-2008 10 (Environment Canada 2007; International Polar Year
2012; Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007h).
In 2008, the theme of international cooperation was included in speeches by the
Prime Minister and AAND, in reference to current international activities of the Canadian
Armed Forces and the International Polar Year (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2008a; Office of the Prime Minister 2008b; 2008c ). In 2009 and 201 0,
international cooperation themed language centered on how Canada was working with Arctic
states to ensure that all countries ' sovereignty were respected (Environment Canada 2009a;
2009b; 2009c; 2009d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d;
2009e; 2009f; 2010a; 2010b; 2010d; 2010e; 2010f; 2010g; 2010h; 2010i; National Defence
10

An international research initiative focu sed on the Arctic and Antarctic regions

22

2009g; 2009i ; 2010d; 2010i). Cannon's discourse around the United Nations' Law ofthe Sea
best reflected this language. In his words: "The process to delineate the extended continental
shelf is orderly and lengthy; it is not adversarial and it is not a race. It is a collaborative
process based on a shared commitment to international law" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2009d). In 2011, the theme of international cooperation was promoted
through Canada' s continued participation in traditional Western partnerships 11 (Environment
Canada 2011 b; 2011 d; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011 b; National Defence
201la; 2011d).
In 2006, Prime Minister Stephen Harper emphasized the fifth political theme of
international leadership in a speech that recalled the past threats of the World Wars and the
continuation of the War on Terror (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b). Harper stated that
his government would strengthen Arctic sovereignty to ensure Canada' s place in world
leadership (March 28, 2006, Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). But in 2008, government
discourse made no mention of Canadian international leadership and in 2009, Canada's role
as international leader was fairly neglected, except for slight reference in speeches by the
Prime Minister and three of his ministers (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development 2009g; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009a;
2009f; National Defence 2009c). DEFAIT Minister Lawrence Cannon voiced this selective
discourse best stating that, "Canada is an Arctic nation, an Arctic power" (Foreign Affairs
and International Trade 2009f).
In 2010, there was enhanced language about how Canada was leading by example
with its economic agenda, Arctic Council initiatives, and its contributions to International
Polar Year (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 201 Oc; 2010f; 2010h). Minister
11

Organizations such as the UN, NATO, NORAD and the World Bank

23

Cannon's language regarding Arctic resolutions promoted bold international leadership. In
his words: "we are confident that we will soon be able to resolve these differences in a
peaceful and orderly way, in accordance with international law" (Foreign Affairs and
International Affairs 2010f). In 2011, both the DEFAIT Minister and the Minister of the
Environment promoted Canada's international leadership through enlightened sovereignty
and Arctic environmental measures (Environment Canada 20lla; Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2011 b). Sovereignty as will be seen is also central to the military sector.

Military Sector
Military security is the most common type of security used to ensure power. In the
government's Arctic speech acts from 2006 to 2011, this type of security was invoked
frequently. As with the political sector, the securitizing actor in the military sector is the
federal government and the audience is the national and international community. The
referent object and the existential threat, however, are distinctly different from the political
sector. In the military sector, the referent object is sovereignty and it is different because it
correlates directly to protecting the territorial state from forceful action versus projected
sovereignty in the political sector. The existential threat is actions with the implication of
force by domestic or external forces such as: foreign buildup of regional forces, regional
foreign military exercises and even international incursions into internal waters.
To understand how the government used military security language to try to securitize
these framework elements, there were five prevalent themes identified. They were:
sovereignty, security 12 , protection, Canadian power, and force. Although the first two themes

12 This theme although labeled security, refers to physical defence actions or the announcement of such

actions by the government.

24

seem very similar in nature, the sovereignty theme in this sector was used to rationalize
security measures, whereas the security theme pointed out action being done to protect the
state. The theme of protection looks at the government language that is intentionally used to
connect government action or policy with a sense of protecting Canadians and their territory.
Finally, the theme of force is used to highlight government action or policy that insinuates
that it can use force if it needs to act. Each of these key themes will be addressed below,
beginning with sovereignty 13 .
Similar to the political sector, the speeches and press material associated with this
sector highlight a larger number of the government' s securitizing attempts. In the 2006
Speech from the Throne, Prime Minister Stephen Harper introduced the theme of sovereignty
in the Arctic. Under the subheading, "Rebuilding our Influence Abroad," he declared that the
government would strengthen sovereignty at home and then immediately announced the
Canada First Def ence Strategy. This policy was designed to repair the perceived weaknesses
of the Canadian Armed Forces. Harper stated that strengthened armed forces would help
protect Canada "from the Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic" (Office of the Prime Minister
2006b) from the existential threat of a foreign force.
In his northern addresses, he made strong connections between well-trained Armed

Forces and Arctic sovereignty, and discussed a northern Armed Forces exercise 14 (Office of
the Prime Minister 2006d). He also stressed the government's ability to physically protect its
northern borders with new Armed Forces infrastructure 15 (Office of the Prime Minister
2006e). In Harper's words: "you can 't defend Arctic sovereignty with words alone. It takes a

13 Sovereign is defined as the supremacy of authority as exerci sed by a sovereign state.
14

This exercise was called Operation Lancaster and it was part of the federal government's measures to protect
Northern sovereignty.
15
A deep water port, an Arctic training centre, and aerial surveillance

25

Canadian presence on the ground, in the air and on the sea" (Office of the Prime Minister
2006e). In support of the Prime Minister's claims, National Defence Minister Gordon
O'Connor discussed the need to strengthen the Forces and to defend sovereignty at home,
bringing up the urgent need to act in the Arctic against the existential threat of a foreign force
(National Defence 2006a; 2006d). Although he stated that he was concerned with the
condition of the Canadian Armed Forces O' Connor said, he would "put Canada first by
strengthening our national sovereignty and by increasing Canada's self-reliance in matters of
defence" (National Defence 2006a).
In 2007, the federal government announced that protecting sovereignty was one of its

highest priorities (Office of Prime Minister 2007d; 2007g; 2007h; National Defence Feb 16;
Dec 3). The Prime Minister stated that the government would "react ... strongly when other
countries show[ed] disrespect for our sovereignty over the Arctic" (Office of the Prime
Minister 2007e). The Throne Speech in 2007 outlined the different ways that the federal
government would act to defend sovereignty. It outlined a comprehensive mapping plan of
the Arctic seabed 16, the purchase of new patrol ships, and the enhancement of surveillance,
stating that sovereignty was at the core of why they were going to rebuild the Canadian
Armed Forces (Government of Canada 2007). AAND Minister Chuck Strahl and his
Assistant Deputy Minister reiterated the language that Arctic sovereignty needed to be
strengthened, with most of their discourse repeating the listed measures from the Throne
Speech (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007e; 2007f; 2007h).
Throughout 2007, the Canadian Armed Forces conducted three large military exercises 17 to

16 This mapping detail was to recognize their cooperative work with United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea which was working to determine legal status of the territorial sea in the Arctic.
17
The operations were Nunalivut, Narwhal , and Nanook.

26

showcase its ability to patrol and effectively defend Canadian Arctic sovereignty from the
existential threat of a foreign force (National Defence 2007b; 2007c; 2007f; 2007h).
In 2008, Harper linked the need for military security to the threat of international
smuggling. In his words: "the proliferation of international shipping in the North raises the
potential for shipwrecks, smuggling, illegal immigration, and even threats to national
security" (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). Minister Strahl pointed out that northerners
had expressed similar concerns when Harper visited the north that year (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development 2008a). The Department ofNational Defence (DND) presented
press material that stressed that they were protecting Canadian sovereignty with military
exercises, the purchase of new equipment, and the expansion of the Junior Canadian Rangers
(National Defence 2007h; 2007i).
In 2009, the federal government used language from the Northern Strategy policy
document. Consistent with the Northern Strategy, the Prime Minister emphasized two key
messages: that action to defend northern sovereignty had protected Canadian borders and that
threats warranting urgent action had all been identified (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b;
2009c; 2009d). The government stressed that it was taking international action in order to
assert Arctic sovereignty. Minister Cannon stated that Canada was "an Arctic nation and an
Arctic power. .. [that] occupies a major portion of the Arctic" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2009a). DND's press officials discussed military action to defend Arctic
sovereignty listed in the Northern Strategy blueprint. These releases included two successful
military exercises for sovereignty patrols, recognition of Arctic military units, and Arctic ship
and port construction (National Defence 2009d; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g; 2009h; 2009i; 20091).

27

All speeches that occurred in 2009 focused on present action and how it needed to
happen right away to protect from the existential threat of a foreign force. The reinforcement
of immediate sovereignty was tied in directly to the current northern military exercises. The
federal government made sure to focus their speeches on the government's new military
assets when emphasizing their sovereignty theme. In DEFAIT Minister Cannon ' s own words
they had: "committed new resources to protect and patrol the land, the sea and the sky"
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009e) In 2010, the theme of sovereignty was still
used frequently, but in a more subdued fashion. Federal government officials became an
advocate for national sovereignty for all states and pointed out it had already completed
actions to protect its own territory. That said, in 2010, the government' s security discourses
were less urgently worded when it came to asserting sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic
(Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010f; 2010i;) In an address
where he also quoted the United Nations ' ability to promote peace and development, Harper
stated: "we attend to our own affairs, in, for example, the protection of our Arctic" (Office of
the Prime Minister 2010b). Sovereignty also provided the rational for certain military
exercises and security purchases in 2010. (National Defence 2010a; 201 Oc; 2010e; 2010h).
In 2011 , the federal government aggressively promoted the theme of sovereignty. The
recently appointed DEFAIT Minister, John Baird, spoke to the international community
about the concept of enlightened sovereignty and how "multilateral institutions exist and
derive legitimacy from the independent decisions of sovereign states" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2011 b). The announcements of the three annual Arctic military exercises
and corresponding speeches regarding a strengthened Canadian Armed Forces presence,

28

especially in the Arctic, reinforced in this new angle of sovereignty presented by Minister
Baird (National Defence 2011a; 201ld; 20lle; 2011h).
The second key theme that arose in the discourse related to the military sector is
security. The first time that the government used the theme of security was the announcement
of Operation Ardent Sentry 2006. 18 This theme differed from sovereignty because its
discourse focused solely on the tangible measures put in place to secure Canadian territory.
Ardent Sentry 2006 was created so that the Canadian and American Commands could
coordinate responses to national threats (National Defence April26 2006c). The theme of
security was also integrated into a speech dealing with the Canada First Defence Strategy.
This speech implied that the government had trained soldiers in how to quickly deploy in the
Arctic to fight against any threat (National Defence 2006d).
Consistent with the theme of security in 2007, the federal government proudly
announced all its completed 2006 security measures. The Prime Minister emphasized
security when he highlighted Arctic policy (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f; 2007g). The
same year, National Defence used this theme when it described two military exercises that
demonstrated Canada's ability to deal with threats of direct force, and highlighted the
meeting of the Arctic Security Working Group (National Defence 2007b; 2007e; 2007g). 19
On several occasions in 2008, the federal government reiterated that it was establishing an
expanded, more extensive, and better equipped Canadian Armed Forces. This better equipped
and expanded force would be able to react to any situation (Office of the Prime Minister
2008b; 2008e; National Defence 2008b; 2008c; 2008e).

18 This military exercise was conducted with Canada Command and Northern Command in the United States to
prepare both for national disasters and emergencies
19

An organization to improve security for the region through national and provincial partnerships

29

A year later, in 2009, DEFAIT Minister Cannon addressed foreign diplomats at the
Diplomatic Forum in Whistler, British Columbia, and spoke about Canada's international
security efforts. The government announced that security in Canada ' s Arctic was being
strengthened because this region made up 40 per cent of the nation' s landmass (Foreign
Affairs and International Trade 2009f). DND Minister McKay and departmental media
releases stated that security would be better and more effective since there were more
Canadian military assets in the field (National Defence 2009a; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f;
2009i). This language again protects against this sector' s existential threat of a foreign force.
In MacKay' s words: "the Canadian Forces play an important role in achieving our goals in
the North ... the Government of Canada is making sure they have the tools they need to carry
out a full range of tasks in the Arctic" (National Defence 2009d).
In 2010, Cannon, McKay and DND releases continued with the theme of security by
announcing Canadian military actions that had secured several important events and areas
around the world (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010a; 2010d; 2010e; National
Defence 2010a; 2010b; 2010c; 2010d; 2010f; 2010i). In MacKay's words: "the Canadian
Forces successfully achieved their aim of demonstrating and improving upon their
capabilities to respond to safety and security challenges in our Arctic" (National Defence
201 Oc) The language suggested that without sovereignty and security being promoted and
constantly improved, Canada would not be able to defend itself against foreign threats
(National Defence 2011a; 2011d; Office of the Prime Minister 2011). In a joint US-Canada
announcement Harper announced: "Naturally, in this area as in all others, no loss of
sovereignty is contemplated by either of our governments" (Office of the Prime Minister
2011).

30

These two themes of sovereignty and security provide the rationale for the third
military theme, which is protection. Governments use the concept of protection to present the
referent object as in need of being defended from the intentional threat of a foreign force.
The protection theme was introduced by the Prime Minister in 2006 when he outlined the
different measures his government would take to protect Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006a; 2006b). The Prime Minister reinforced the theme of
protection by announcing counterterrorism measures nation-wide (Office of the Prime
Minister 2006c). DND Minister O'Connor continually unveiled measures that the Canadian
Armed Forces would use to 'protect' the security of the nation (National Defence 2006a;
2006d; 2006c; 2006b).
In 2007, defence officials highlighted the theme of protection through numerous

media releases. Military exercises and major meetings were presented as needed to protect
Canadians from any hostile intentional threat that could use force (National Defence 2007b;
2007d; 2007e; 2007i ; 2007g). The Prime Minister also spoke to this theme. In his words: "it
is no exaggeration to say that the need to assert our sovereignty and protect our territorial
integrity in the Arctic- on our terms- has never been more urgent" (Office of the Prime
Minister 2007d). In 2009, both the Office of the Prime Minister and National Defense
speeches and releases stated that more effective protection would only benefit Canadians and
there was no downside to increased protective action (National Defence 2009d; 2009e;
2009f; 2009g; 2009h; Office of the Prime Minister 2009c). This language is a case of the
government dealing with the military' s existential threat which calls for the protection of
territory from an intentional foreign force. In MacKay's words: "a primary reserve unit based
in the North clearly serves the interests of Canada and the Canadian Forces but I'd like to

31

also point out how the Yellowknife Companyl 0 benefits you and your city" (National
Defence 2009d).
In 2010, the theme of protection was highlighted in DND press releases. This theme

was promoted as the reason for military activity in both the Arctic and elsewhere (National
Defence 2010a; 2010b; 2010c: 2010e; 2010f; 2010h). In 2011, protection was implied to be
the driving force for agreements with foreign states, especially in the Arctic region (National
Defence 2011b), and rebuilding the Canadian Armed Forces (National Defence 20lld). The
Defence Minister went through a list of domestic defence operations that had saved Canadian
lives and trained southern Canadian soldiers to survive in the northern environment (National
Defence 2011 d).
The fourth theme, Canadian power21 stressed the military power of Canada in the
north. In his first year in power, the Prime Minister aggressively promoted the need for
physical assets that it would put in place to protect the Arctic region such as annual military
exercises, military infrastructure and an expanded Canadian Rangers force (Office of the
Prime Minister 2006d; 2006e). DND Minister O' Connor's language in a speech in 2006
emphasized the federal government's strong desire to rebuild and revitalize the Canadian
Forces so they could answer any national threat. He listed the adjustments that would be
made to Canadian power in the north. O' Connor remarked that: "it's our intention to devote
more people, more equipment and more money to the defence of our great Northern areas"
(National Defence 2006a). Throughout 2007, the federal government used the theme of
Canadian power to dissuade any intentional and physical threats from a foreign force. With
the announcement of the upcoming North ern Strategy, it stressed the current and future
20 A reserve company based in Canada ' s North, established in 2009 (CBC News 2009).
21 This theme is focused on announced government strength within a military context.

32

purchase of new assets such as ice breakers for initiating sovereignty and security in the
Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister 2007d; 2007e; National Defence 2007a; 2007i; 2007j).
As Harper proudly stated : "the steel-reinforced hulls will be able to crunch through ice up to
a metre thick, meaning the ships will be able to patrol the length of the Northwest Passage
during the months a Canadian naval presence is necessary" (Office of the Prime Minister
2007d).
This theme of Canadian power was heavily used in 2008. DND announced that it was
increasing Canada' s physical military assets, and emphasized how the Canadian Armed
Forces were effectively patrolling the north (National Defence 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2008f;
2008g). In 2009, the communication of new military measures and increased military activity
allowed the federal government to proclaim Canada' s new military power to both the
Canadian populace and the international community. The Prime Minister showcased all of
the Canadian northern military action (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b), and the DEFAIT
Minister stressed that strengthening Canadian Arctic power would be a priority (Foreign
Affairs and International Trade 2009a; 2009d; 2009f). Defence officials constantly
showcased their new physical assets and the Arctic military exercises (National Defence
2009a; 2009d; 2009e; 2009j ; 20091). In 2010, the federal government continued to promote
the country's new military power in the north by linking past Canadian action in UN war
prevention to the need for Canadian power in the Arctic (Office of the Prime Minister
2010b).
In addition, the federal government launched the Statement on Canada 's Arctic

Foreign Policy, which highlighted additional measures designed to strengthen Canadian
power in the Arctic internationally. It also gave prominence to the actions that were being

33

taken to advance its policies forward (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010f; 2010g).
That same year, the Armed Forces promoted Canada' s renewed national military strength
(National Defence 20 I Oa; 201 Ob; 20 I Oc; 20 I Oe ). In 20 II, the federal government's formal
address to the United Nations General Assembly ultimately defined this independent
Canadian power message perfectly. DEFAIT Minister John Baird boldly stated that Canada
did not '" go along' in order to ' get along"' (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011 b).
What he meant was that in terms of international initiatives, Canada would stand for what it
thought was right and it now had the power to do so.
The last theme of the military sector is force, and it was often used in conjunction
with the theme of Canadian power. Force as a theme is identifiable when actors use
aggressive language and declare the need for action. Having announced its power, the federal
government now made sure to show its intention to use this strength, if needed. The federal
government announced that with a proposed, larger presence in the Arctic it would protect
Canadians (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e; 2006f). In 2006, Prime Minister Harper
announced a 12-day military exercise in the Arctic labeled Operation Lancaster, to assert
Canadian sovereignty in the north (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). After announcing
that he had witnessed the military action of Operation Lancaster, the Prime Minister bluntly
stated: "Operation Lancaster is a very important exercise. Because it demonstrates our new
Government's commitment to asserting Canada's sovereignty over our Arctic territory"
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). He continued this language by pointing out that "if you
want to be taken seriously by other countries, you have to say what you mean and mean what
you say" (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). The federal government did not hide its
intention to use force in the Canadian Arctic if threatened. It announced completed and future

34

military exercises that were organized to showcase this position (Office of the Prime Minister
2007d; 2007e; National Defence 2007b; 2007d 2007f).
The fifth theme of force was not heavily used in 2008 speeches, but physical assets
from the Canadian First Defence Strategy were still referenced in language discussing the
defence of Canada (National Defence 2008g; Office ofthe Prime Minister 2008b). The Prime
Minister clearly presented the need for force with the unveiling of the Canada First Defence
Strategy to his national audience. He announced: "if a country wants to be taken seriously in
the world, it must have the capacity to act. It's that simple" (Office of the Prime Minister
2008b). Looking at the government security discourse for 2009 through the lens of force, the
government communications plan aimed to highlight that Canada was not afraid to use force
by acquiring military equipment, highlighting recent military exercises, and even the further
development of military assets in the future (National Defence 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009g;
2009h; 2009h; Office of the Prime Minister 2009b). As the leader of this securitizing attempt,
the Prime Minister stated, "as I've said before, we understand the first principle of Arctic
sovereignty is ' use it or lose it' . And we will continue to strive to provide the tools you need
to do just that, including new helicopters, ships, and planes for the Forces, and a new
icebreaker for the Coast Guard" (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b). In 2010, the federal
government only presented the theme of force through military exercise announcements,
which stated that DND had completed these exercises and was now trained to act effectively,
if provoked (National Defence 201 Oa; 201 Of; 201 Og). This type of messaging continued the
following year, and focused on the effectiveness of northern military assets (National
Defence 20lla; 20lld). All of these themes highlight the need to protect Canada from the
existential threat of a foreign force.

35

Societal Sector
The societal sector is the most recent addition to the framework ' s security sectors that
governments are trying to champion. Upon reviewing Canadian Arctic speeches and policies,
it became clear that the current federal government has not really promoted a discourse or
measures that identify an existential threat in this sector. Rather it chose to highlight
opportunities instead of threats. In terms of identifying the securitizing actor, there is only
one possibility to choose from within this case study: the federal government. The referent
objects here are the northern communities and the existential threats are aimed at their
survival such as : insignificent social infrastructure, a lack of employment and in the case of
the north, protection against the environmental elements. The audience for this sector is the
national populace and northern communities. The dominant themes in the government' s
discourse are governance, northern control, job creation, social development, and community
stewardship.
The theme of governance was used to point out that better government standards
would help the north be sustainably successful. Social development was used to highlight
government investment into social programs, whereas community stewardship was brought
out when ministers actually began to speak the cooperative language the Inuit were looking
to be used. For community stewardship, it was mixed with other more government oriented
themes so it will be addressed throughout the societal sector' s review. For the three nontraditional sectors, the themes will not always be presented systematically or separately
because the government speeches reflected an interwoven importance of these topics. Often
times, one or two themes were used to support one another in even a single government
speech.

36

The first theme in the societal sector is governance. In April of 2006, the Harper
government discussed devolution22 for the north and the self-government agreements for its
inhabitants. The Harper government went through the different methods that it would use to
engage in northern development, stating this region needed to pursue appropriate governance
avenues. AAND Minister Jim Prentice stated, "transparent, accountable and effective
governance not only guarantees a voice for Northerners, but also ensures that voice is heard
clearly" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a). The government also
discussed water, housing, and education, and how it would address them through its efforts to
change the current federal-territory infrastructure agreement.
The federal government discourse promoted the advantages of devolution as a means
to help northern communities control more aspects of their own societies. The key message
was that money alone could not solve all the societal issues afflicting Aboriginal peoples but
that good governance was a critical step (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
2006b ). On behalf of the AAND Minister, the Member of Parliament for Red Deer, Bob
Mills, delivered a societal security speech linking job creation through resource development
with effective governance (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). In 2007,
the language targeted the northern audience with the announcement of funding for
infrastructure development. Governance would continue to be strengthened through land
claims and self-government negotiations (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
2007d; 2007e; 2007f; 2007g).
In 2009, in reference to the successful devolution ofNunavut, the federal government

used language to promote the fact that better governance, more northern control, and more
effective social development, such as funding for economic development projects in the
22 "The passing of the power or authority of one person or body to another·· (Oxford English Dictionary 20 13).

37

north, were all linked to the federal government's effective assistance in management of the
territories (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b). The federal government
insisted that efforts towards better governance were progressing, but it still tended to focus
more on promoting the traditional security elements. At the launch of its Northern Strategy
policy, Cannon announced, "northerners are at the heart of our strategy" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2009e).
In his last speech as the Minister of AAND, Chuck Strahl used community-connected
language to promote his view of effective northern governance. This showed his desire to
connect with the northern audience on their level. In his words: "what we are looking for is a
structure that will meet your needs, respect the land claims and look after our priorities"
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). In a speech delivered by the AAND
Minister in 2011, entitled Honouring the North West Territories Devolution in Principle, the
Minister used language that underscored the role of devolution in effective governance. He
stated that, "it will. .. ensure ... decisions being made in the North by Northerners there will be
more local control of decisions and more local accountability" (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2011a). All the language within the theme of governance spoke of
bettering the community, the people and the land. This government was laying out clear
language of opportunities.
The second theme in the societal sector is northern control, which focused on the
increased ability of the north to have the resources they needed for effective devolution. This
theme also saw the intermixing of several other themes to make its speech acts more
powerful. The federal government first used the theme of northern control in 2006 as part of
a discussion on the growing potential of the northern communities. Then AAND Minister

38

Jim Prentice, when discussing next steps stated, "[I] cannot stress enough the importance of
strong working relationships among Aboriginal and other northern governments ... it is
imperative that we work together" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a).
That same year, northern control was referenced once again when the federal government
announced the Mackenzie Pipeline project, which Harper argued was the key to future
prosperity in the north. He stated that this initiative was the avenue to northern job creation.
In his words: "without them, no amount of transfer payments will give the North the future it
deserves" (Office of the Prime Minister 2006f). In 2007, Chuck Strahl was appointed as the
Minister of AAND and in his first speech he used much more community-focused language,
indicating a shift in language from the previous minister. Strahl's first three speeches
included all five societal language themes.
It was at this point in time that the federal government seemed to realize that resource
development for job creation was important to the communities when it was considered
alongside the two other themes of northern control and community stewardship of the
environment (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007e; 2007f; 2007g). In 2008,
the federal government put in place initiatives that allowed for social development and job
creation through northern control (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a).
Regarding Nunavut's devolution, they used the northern control themed language to promote
the view that there was now better governance and more effective social development
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b). As Minister Strahl ' s words stated:
"This protocol also demonstrates that the Prime Minister and our government means it when
we say we want Northerners to have more decision-making power over their territory"
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b).

39

In August of2009, the Prime Minister delivered three speeches and connected all
three themes of northern control while also highlighting social development and job creation.
These speeches steered away from traditional security and emphasized the need to focus on
the northern communities and economic development, as these actions were the identified
measures to protect the communities (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2009d). In
one of his August speeches Harper announced a labour agreement that would create new jobs
because it would in part train northern people who wanted the education. In his words:
"Northerners want to succeed, but many do not have the skills or training they need to
achieve their dreams" (Office of the Prime Minister 2009d). The federal government's
language became a lot more targeted on community stewardship. In speeches and
communiques, the federal government began to consistently reference the northern people
(especially the Inuit) and linked their well-being to the government' s policies and programs
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009a; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2009e; 2009f;
2009g). This type of language pointed out the opportunities that the federal government was
bringing to the north.
In his last speech as AAND Minister, Strahl used community-connected language to
promote that governance, social development, and community stewardship were best utilized
through northern control (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a). After his
departure, this type of language continued to be delivered by other senior members of the
government, including his successor John Duncan, as the Harper government continued to
target the themes of social development and job creation through northern control
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010b; 2010c; 2010d). This language again
emphasized opportunities instead ofthreats to the community. In 2011 , the government

40

formally acknowledged the Canadian Rangers and their contribution to northern security and
sovereignty. However, the language used focused on the Canadian Rangers' ability to foster
northern control and governance in the Arctic region through their position in the community
(National Defence 201ld). Their position as protectors also strengthened their northern
control role.
The third theme in the societal sector speeches was job creation. In 2006, Harper
touched on job creation through the Mackenzie Pipeline, as it was key to future prosperity in
the north (Office of the Prime Minister 2006e). Conservative MP Bob Mills' speech on
behalf of AAND also spoke to job creation through resource development (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). In 2007, the Minister continued to link resource
development and job creation by stating that agreements were underway to make the societal
environment better (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a). Throughout the
year, he made several announcements about successful job creation initiatives due to
resource and energy development (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007c;
2007d; 2007g; 2007h). In 2008, the federal government represented by AAND Minister
Strahl presented a message that "northerners, too, must play a meaningful role in these
projects and be able to benefit directly from their growing economy" (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2008a).
In August of2009, the Prime Minister delivered speeches that regularly incorporated

the theme of job creation. In these speeches, he addressed the need to focus more on
community and economic development (Office of the Prime Minister 2009b; 2009c; 2009d)
He presented a speech that addressed a possible local job creation initiative. He observed,
"the local fishermen are missing ... a safe, efficient harbour to tie up their boats and offload

41

their catch" (Office of the Prime Minister 2009c). When the federal government promoted
the Northern Strategy, it repeatedly referenced the northern people, especially the Inuit, and
linked their well-being, in part, to job creation, stating that the government would work with
the Inuit in its implementation (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009a; 2009b;
2009c; 2009e; 2009f; 2009g). In 2010, the AAND Minister continued the theme of job
creation in his speeches (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010b, 2010c,
2010d). The theme of job creation spoke directly to the bettering of northerners ' lives, again
fitting into language of opportunity.
The fourth theme in the societal sector is social development. AAND Minister
Prentice first communicated the government' s excitement for this type of development, in
2006 in a speech to the Circle ofNorthern Leaders (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2006a). Any effective social development protected the fragile survival of the
northern communities. He discussed social development through infrastructure concerns and
outlined how the government would address these issues in an effort to change the federal
support framework. Then northern communities would control more aspects of their own
society. In Prentice ' s words: "ideas must be generated first from Aboriginal leaders not
imposed by Ottawa" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006b ).
In 2007, there were government communications that social development initiatives
were progressing, and that agreements were underway to make the northern societal
environment better. Patrick Borbey on behalf of the AAND Minister spoke about
recognizing that "northerners [were] taking the lead" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2007a). Elizabeth Hansen, on behalf of the AAND Minister, claimed that
climate change adaptation was needed for social development and that the International Polar

42

Year's research would help in this regard. She emphasized that Polar Year would be focused
on traditional knowledge and offering specific science training to community members
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007d).
In 2008, Harper also pointed out that social development was now possible because
of devolution negotiations. These devolution negotiations meant that community stewardship
was being attempted. In Harper' s words, "it will give all Nunavik people 23 a say" (Office of
the Prime Minister 2008a). In an AAND speech regarding Nunavut' s devolution, several
themes, including social development, were drawn out as being key for economic
development projects in the north. As AAND Minister Strahl stated, "Nunavut is truly a way
of life" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008b ). In August of 2009, even the
Prime Minister weighed in on social development. The Prime Minister spoke of the need to
focus more on the community and economic development in the north and steered away from
traditional security (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d).
The Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy did a much better job addressing
all the different societal themes. One of this policy' s most significant societal measures was
the partnership with the Inuit Circumpolar Council. 24 This partnership was established to
determine future social development and community stewardship (Minister of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade 2010). In his last speech as AAND Minister, Strahl again
emphasized community connections. He framed the government's work as, "informed by
Northern life and driven to help you 25 fulfill your economic needs: job training, skills
development, community infrastructure"(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
201 Oa). He showed his willingness to include Inuit in the planning of social development. By
23 The Nunavik people are Inuit people that live in the Northern part of the province of Quebec.

24

This international Inuit organization lobbies on behalf of its people around the world.

25 The italics were the author' s emphasis.

43

2011, though, there was only slight mention of social development through devolution
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2011a). Throughout this sector the
government did not frame any existential threats but rather positioned its language to
highlight opportunities such as community development and devolution (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development 2010a; 20lla).

Economic Sector
When looking at the economic sector for securitizing attempts during this time
period, the securitizing actor is the federal government. The referent object is both the state
and the fmancial markets. The existential threats come out of interactions with those markets,
both domestic and international such as badly managed international resource projects and
the promise of new forms of government employment. The audience is the national and
northern community. In order to see how all these elements interact, the next section will
examine four themes that arose in the speeches: economic potential, resource management,
energy superpower, and economic crisis. For this sector the theme of resource management
was used to promote the natural resource programs and funding the government was
initiating to help the northern economy.
The speeches and press materials related to this sector showed that the government
was worried about the northern economy but they did not frame it as an existential threat.
During his 2006 northern tour, Prime Minister Harper' s speech included the economic
sector' s first theme, economic potential for the north. In his address, Harper referenced the
north's natural gas and oil reserves and highlighted the fact that there were now more
accessible routes for exploration and development (Office of the Prime Minister 2006d). In a
speech at the United Nations he went so far as to refer to Canada as an ' energy superpower'
44

(Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). That same year, the Member of Parliament for Red
Deer, Bob Mills, speaking on behalf of the AAND Minister, cited a list of measures that
needed to be done so that barriers could be tom down and the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline
could become a reality in the north (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006a).
As 2006 came to an end, AAND Minister Jim Prentice continued to highlight the north's
economic potential in conjunction with resource management. (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2006c; 2006d). In his words : "resource-development projects also
stimulate other activity and help to diversify local economies" (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2006d). This language highlighted opportunities moving forward .
In 2007, Harper continued to advance the message about Canada's economic

potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b). He used Canada Day to profile the country's
economic potential in the north (Office of the Prime Minster 2007c), specifically linking
northern economic potential to natural resource development (Office of the Prime Minister
2007d). In the fall of2007, Canada' s economic future was given a much higher profile when
Harper stated "we are building an energy superpower, with the largest potential for marketbased supplies of oil and gas in the entire world" (Office of the Prime Minister 2007f). In all
of its speeches in 2007, AAND stressed that the north ' s economic potential would be realized
through resource management. These speeches also affirmed that the north had many natural
resources, which could be in part accessed through the Mackenzie Gas Project. In 2007
another underlying government message was that the strongest economic asset in the north
was its people (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e;
2007g; 2007h).

45

In 2008, in the midst of the global fmancial crisis, Harper argued that Canada was
strong and still had economic potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2008e). In 2009, the
global crisis threatened northern economic potential. Harper pointed out that this crisis was a
reason to focus on the Arctic' s economic potential with words like "its full economic
potential", "strong northern economy" and "a future of unprecedented opportunity" (Office
of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). With the launch of the Northern Strategy,
AAND Minister Chuck Strahl discussed how the presented policy measures would still bring
out the Arctic ' s economic potential and opportunities (Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2009c; 2009e; 2009f). In 2010, Minister Strahl introduced deregulation and economic
funding that would help with the Arctic ' s economic potential (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 201 Oa). By 2011 , the government indicated that there was a need to
have a healthy balance between environmental regulations and development leading to
economic potential (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011a; 2011b; Environment
Canada 2011c).
Resource management was the second economic theme in the government' s Arctic
speeches. In his government's inaugural year, Harper regularly delivered speeches with
messages about economic potential and better resource management (Office of the Prime
Minister 2006f; 2006g) and was already referring to Canada as an "energy superpower"
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006d; 2006f). There were several references to the north ' s
economic potential in conjunction with resource management (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Dec. 2006c; 2006d). Looking at the economic discourse by AAND,
the government stressed resource management as the path to realizing the north ' s economic
potential. AAND repeatedly mentioned the Mackenzie Gas Project and its economic value to

46

the north because it would help advance resource management and the opportunities that
would come with that (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007c; 2007d;
2007e; 2007g;2007h).
In 2008, Harper referred to the ' cold rush ' for northern resources as a driving force

of future northern economic potential, but it would only be possible with careful management
of its resources (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c). The following year, resource
management became the reason cited for foreign interest in the Canadian Arctic region. The
global demand for the immense deposits of valuable natural resources drew this interest
because as Harper stated "[f]ew regions of the world are so richly endowed with natural
resources" (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). The implication was that if
these natural resources were not secured by Canadian interests someone else would come in
and take the north ' s economic potential away. The political sector framed foreign interest as
a threat. In the economic sector foreign interest gave reason for possible prosperity in the
northern economy. This government seemed to emphasize language of opportunity in its
northern economic speeches again and again. An example of this hope was the federal
government announcing the creation of the Northern Economic Development Agency. Its
creation was framed as a federal move towards better education and responsible, local
handling of resource management (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). In
2010, AAND addressed how the region was developing in terms of economic potential
through better resource management (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2010a).
The third economic theme of the federal government's Arctic policy was that Canada
was an energy superpower. This theme further strengthened the importance of profitable
resource management. In its first year in office, the federal government started to refer to

47

Canada as an ' energy superpower', citing key natural resources to supplement this claim
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006g). In 2007, Harper continued to popularize Canada's new
title of 'energy superpower' (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b ). Even during a small
address on Canada Day, Harper presented this theme with the statement that Canada was "an
emerging energy superpower" (Office of the Prime Minster 2007c). In another instance,
while giving a general overview of Canada's activity internationally to the Council on
Foreign Relations, the Prime Minister publicly affirmed Canada's new energy title. In his
words: "we are building an energy superpower, with the largest potential for market-based
supplies of oil and gas in the entire world" (Office of the Prime Minister 2007£). This
language spoke to limitless opportunities.
The fourth theme for economic security was identified in the government's Arctic
policy as economic crisis. In 2008, the Prime Minister stated that this economic crisis would
cause states to come together for a common solution. He declared that he wanted to work
with all states to discover solutions for the financial crisis while affirming Canadian
economic strength (Office of the Prime Minister 2008e). In 2009, he portrayed the economic
crisis as an issue that needed to be dealt with by the government to grow northern economic
potential (Office of the Prime Minister 2009a; 2009c; 2009d). He argued that his government
was taking action "to counter the effects of the global recession" (Office of the Prime
Minister 2009d). The northern economy was intimately linked to the global economy
because the Canadian federal government's ability for financial transfers to the north was
affected. The government therefore acted quickly to change a possible issue into an
opportunity.

48

The federal government touched on the severity of the economic crisis in more detail
when it officially launched its Northern Strategy policy (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2009f; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009e), stressing how the
policy measures in that document would "hold ... the key ... to [Canada's] economic
prosperity"(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009f). AAND pointed out that
all the measures being undertaken were designed to strengthen the northern economic
development efforts (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009b; 2009c; 2009f). In
Strahl's words, "the future prospects of the North continue to be bright despite the influence
of the world-wide economic downturn" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
2009b).
In 2010, the Prime Minister again addressed the problem of how the federal
government would improve Canada's ability to overcome the crisis and prosper (Office of
the Prime Minister 201 Oa; 201 Ob ). He stated that political ideology needed to be put aside
and quick short-term initiatives ignored (Office of the Prime Minister 2010a). The
government touched on the economic crisis while addressing Canada' s ability to weather the
storm, and actually see recovery and growth through its Arctic plan (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade 2010a; 2010d; 2010h; 2010i). Finally, in 2011, as the crisis started to
lessen, the government balanced concerns regarding proper environmental regulations with
strong economic growth (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2011 a; 2011 b;
Environment Canada 2011c). This government did not frame an existential threat in this
sector but rather used the possible threat of economic crisis to promote avenues for economic
opportunity.

49

Environment Sector
Just like the last two non-traditional sectors, this government did not attempt to frame
an existential threat in the environmental sector. Similar to other sectors, the securitizing
actor is the federal government, and the audience is the national population of Canada and
the international community. The referent object is the natural environment with human
habitation. The existential threat is "human activity to the natural systems or structures of the
planet when changes made do seem to pose existential threats to parts of civilization" (Buzan
et al. 1998, 80). These threats included quick changes in the environment that were not
predicted in the process of the extraction of natural resources. In order to see how all these
elements interact, this section will examine five themes that arose in the speeches:
environmental protection, resources management, energy superpower, climate change, and
environmental research. The government framed much of its environmental efforts in the
Arctic as a theme of environmental protection. Unlike the economic sector, the government
used the theme of resource management in this sector to profile its efforts ofbeing
environmentally conscious when moving forward with resource development. Finally, the
energy superpower theme for this sector shows the government' s efforts of being a clean
energy superpower.
From the beginning of its administration, this government' s language highlighted the
first theme of environmental protection. A key message was that the government needed to
do a better job because environmental threats affected all Canadians (Environment Canada
2006a; 2006c; 2006d). Environment Minister Rona Ambrose initially presented the
government' s frustration with the lack of environmental work being done in the past.

50

Adopting a partisan position she attacked the Liberal Party' s previous policy as she declared:
"' environmental do-goodism ' [and] [w]ell, that is not good enough for our government.
Canadians deserve better, our environment deserves better" (Environment Canada 2006c ).
The following year, on both the national and international stage, the federal government
insisted that environmental protection was a top priority for Canada. The Prime Minister,
AAND Minister Chuck Strahl, Assistant Deputy Minister Patrick Borbey and Director
General Elizabeth Hansen stressed that they were in favour of a realistic plan that was
balanced against economic initiatives (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2007a;
2007b, 2007d, 2007e, 2007f, 2007g; Office of the Prime Minister 2007f; 2007g). In the
words of the Prime Minister: "we are reconciling effective environmental action with the
reality that Canada has a growing population and growing economic output" (Office of the
Prime Minister 2007f).
In 2008, the federal government maintained this discourse in reference to the
Canadian Arctic and outlined a three-prong action plan to protect, preserve, and clean up the
north (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2008a; Office of the Prime Minister
2008c). In 2009, the federal government released its North ern Strategy policy document. One
of its pillars was environmental protection (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d;
2009f).
One year after the release of this policy document, the government' s discourses went
through an interesting shift from protection to stewardship. There was discussion about
environmental stewardship, especially from outgoing AAND Minister Chuck Strahl when
addressing regulation. In his words: "we will strengthen environmental stewardship to ensure
the North's precious environment is protected" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern

51

Development 2010a). There was also language implying responsible management of marine
life (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010b; Environment Canada 2010a) and other
environmental funding initiatives (Environment Canada 201la). This shift in the approach
continued in 2011 , with a call for stricter environmental regulations (Environment Canada
2011 b). This type of announcement suggested the government was serious about its
opportunity to be an environmental steward.
The second theme of the environmental sector is resource management. The
importance of searching for natural resources in the north has always been a priority for the
government of Canada. In this federal government' s inaugural year, there were no themes in
its discourse promoting resource management of the north. The Prime Minister' s message at
the time was simple, "I want .. . to encourage northerners to embrace the jobs and prosperity
that will come with private sector energy resource development" (Office of the Prime
Minister 2006g) . But in 2007, the government introduced an additional resource message. It
focused its messaging on the potential resource development that the northern region offered,
stating that it was essential to the future of the Canadian economy (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2007d, 2007h).
The federal government speeches also emphasized the need for substantive resource
management when addressing the importance of northern natural resources (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development 2007a; 2007g; Office of the Prime Minister 2007b;
2007f). The next year, due in part to the international economic crisis, the government' s
discourse discarded the notion of management and focused on profitable northern resource
development (Office of the Prime Minister 2008c, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2008a). To focus on development they used the phrase ' cold rush ' (Office of

52

the Prime Minister 2008c). With the launch of the Northern Strategy and the government's
support for environmental protection, the Arctic ' s regional importance was recognized due to
its abundant natural resources (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g). In
2010, there were dual messages with two of the three speeches highlighting the resource
potential of the region and the third promoting the need for effective guidelines for its proper
use (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010b; 2010h; 2010i). Again this government
seemed to try to highlight the opportunity to strengthen environmental regulation.
From the beginning of its time in office, the Harper government promoted the third
environmental theme of Canada being an energy superpower, with the Prime Minister stating
that Alberta must become a world leader in environmentally responsible energy production
(Office of the Prime Minister 2006h). In 2006 the discourse was focused on clean energy.
Then just one year later, in 2007, the government proclaimed to the world that Canada was
now an energy superpower and that they had an energy plan that justified this status. The
Prime Minister supported this claim by referencing Canada' s significant oil and gas reserves.
(Office of the Prime Minister 2007a; 2007f). However, one year later the federal government
shifted its discourse back again to the idea of Canada becoming a leader in clean energy
(Office of the Prime Minister 2008e).
In 2009, with the launch of the Northern Strategy, the government's message focused
on "the potential for exploitation of energy" (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009d)
and that Canada was an energy supplier, not a superpower (Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 2009d; Environment Canada 2009e). In 2010, it resurrected the energy superpower
theme, but modified the language considerably to more accurately reflect its position in the
energy sector (Environment Canada 2010b). In 2011, it continued with this language, by

53

pointing out that Canada was the main energy supplier to the United States (Foreign Affairs
and International Trade 20lla).
The fourth theme of climate change has been used in a variety of ways in government
discourse over these five years. Environment Minister Rona Ambrose stated that this
particular issue was complex and the government had difficulty addressing it, especially
internationally. In her words: "The situation that each country faces is unique. Each country's
stage of development, levels and sources of emissions, vulnerabilities, adaptation needs and
the makeup of their economies all differ" (Environment Canada 2006b). By the end of the
year, the government used this messaging in reference to the Canadian Arctic, stating, that
the changing climate effects were already being felt, but with proper research it hoped to
provide the northern communities with adaptation measures (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2006d). In MP Bob Mills ' words: "The impacts of climate change are
already apparent in the North. We must find ways to improve energy efficiency and adapt to
the impacts we cannot avoid" (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2006d). This
language of opportunity seemed to indicate that this government wanted to highlight all
possible opportunities in the changing climate.
In 2007, the Prime Minister refined the government's language, stating that although
it would take a global effort to deal with climate change, Canada had a plan that was realistic.
The stated plan was not one size fits all. At the same time, however, the Prime Minister
announced that other states could not just argue that climate change was not their
responsibility (Office of the Prime Minister 2007b; 2007£). The following year, the federal
government pointed out that it was providing direct assistance to territorial governments for
adaptation to climate change, but not for direct solutions to reduce their effects. It also stated

54

that Canadians needed to become more resilient to the changing climate (Office of the Prime
Minister 2008c, Environment Canada 2008). Coinciding with the launch of the Northern
Strategy in 2009, the government committed itself to the goals of the Copenhagen Accord. 26
That year the government discourse supported this commitment and its opportunities to better
the environment.
Supporting the Copenhagen Accord allowed the government to promote itself as
taking action that was internationally approved (Environment Canada 2009a; 2009b; 2009d;
2009e; 2010a; Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2009f). When the Northern Strategy
policy document was launched, it was heralded as a commitment by the government to deal
with the impacts of climate change in the Arctic (Foreign Affairs and International Trade
2009d). In 2010, Environment Canada insisted that Canada was serious about climate change
(Environment Canada 2010b). In 2011, though, Environment Canada continued with the
language of working with international partners to combat climate change and promoted its
continuation of funding and works towards adaptation (Environment Canada 2011 b; 2011 c;
2011d).
The final theme of the environmental sector is environmental research. At the end of
this government's first year in office, MP Bob Mills delivered a speech announcing that
additional research would lead to better environmental solutions (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development 2006d). Throughout the next year, the federal government's discourse
was aimed at trying to convince the national populace that federal research would help the
north. For example, the federal government provided financial funding and physical support
for the International Polar Year, a set of research initiatives that, among other things, were
designed to provide insights on the impacts of climate change in the Arctic. By 2009 and
26 This accord was the result of the 15 h international conference in December 2009 to address climate change.
1

55

201 0, the federal government' s discourse focused on the other themes of environmental
protection, resources management, energy superpower and climate change, while the
promotion of the fifth theme, federal research, was not highlighted.
The two speeches that were delivered in these years, however, were aimed at
convincing Canadians that Canada was still working on federal, environmental research
(Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2009g; Foreign Affairs and International
Trade 201 Oi). The Statement on Canada 's Arctic Foreign Policy was released using this
language and, despite some changes in how the federal government would proceed to protect
the natural environment with human habitation, the document did not indicate a drastic
change in environmental research (Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2010f).
Throughout this sector, the government chose to highlight opportunities rather than threats
just as it did in the speeches and releases identified for the societal and economic sectors.
With all the sectors' themes and framework elements reviewed there is now a need to
analyze what these findings say about the federal government and its security priorities in its
Arctic policy.

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Chapter 3: Analysis
This project reviewed the federal government's speeches from 2006 to 2011 and
showed that the government' s security discourse was focused primarily on trying to
securitize traditional security sectors. In the more non-traditional securities of social,
economic and environmental, the government spoke of opportunities and did not address
existential threats. In the speeches examined from 2006 to 2011, the executive branch of the
government, represented by the Prime Minister and his cabinet ministers, seem to base its
need for security in the Arctic solely on the protection of sovereignty and accessing the
region's natural resources . Over this five-year period, this preference was demonstrated
through the consistent use of familiar themes by this government to address the particular
existential threats of the organizational stability of the state, and the intentional actions by a
foreign force. This threat framing meant there was a focus on traditional Arctic security,
which consists solely of political and military objectives.
To understand the findings of this project, this analysis will be divided into four
sections. First, it will show how the federal government framed existential threats in its
securitizing attempts in the traditional sectors while only focusing on the opportunities and
not threats in the non-traditional sectors. Second, the question of why this government
focused on traditional securities will be explored. Third, this project's research will be
analyzed to determine its value. There will be a review of the project' s research and its
findings on: Canadian international affairs, Canada' s Arctic policy, this government's
treatment of certain people. It will also discuss the practical and theoretical use of the
Copenhagen School' s securitization framework in investigating the current Canadian Arctic

57

policy. Finally, there will be a review of the practical and theoretical value of this project,
followed by a short discussion of the collection of primary data for further research and a
concluding note on the Arctic region's value to international security.
First, the government' s securitizing attempts will be reviewed sector by sector. In the
political sector the federal government seemed to follow a structured, deliberate plan.
Starting in 2006 and continuing through 2011, the federal government attempted to securitize
by framing Canadian Arctic sovereignty as being threatened by foreign and international
interests. If Canada did not defend its sovereignty in the Arctic, it could lose this part of its
territory, an outcome which was deemed unacceptable. The Prime Minister lead the
securitizing attempt with language stating that Canada needed to strengthen its Arctic
territory or it would lose it to the existential threat of foreign political interests. The
government framed Canada as a northern nation over and over again. This discourse is now
very familiar to Canadians. They are constantly reminded in the media that Canada is the
true north strong and free . From the reviewed speeches ' discourse this government initially
portrayed the Arctic as its untamed frontier that it needed to amass resources to defend. In
order not to lose the interest of the southern, more populated areas of Canada, the
government' s speech acts seemed to make an effort to highlight the importance of the high
north to the whole of Canada.
The Prime Minister in particular stressed that Canada was a northern nation and that
this is a fundamental part of Canadian heritage and identity (Office of the Prime Minister
2007d; 2007e). This language, however, dissipated by 2011 with only one speech referencing
this connection. Also the government used the always turbulent, sometimes dependent
relationship with the United States to present a discourse of a possible threat or partner in

58

moving forward on Arctic sovereignty measures. The government also emphasized the need
to move forward with the acquisition of certain military assets and other measures.
With the release of the Northern Strategy document, the government tried to push the
theme of Canada being an international leader in the Arctic, along with Denmark, Russia and
United States. However, it had to be selective with its language to not offend its major Arctic
state partners, such as the United States. Some of the discourse of the political sector,
especially around sovereignty, was strongly emphasized by the government and addressed
the existential threats with urgency. Other themes of its Arctic political discourse were not as
strong, so this government used the military existential threat of the foreign buildup of forces
to back up the urgency for why Canadians should accept traditional security in the Arctic.
In the military sector, there was an emphasis on a threat to Canadian sovereignty from

an actual force. The government was blunt with their securitizing attempts in this sector. The
Prime Minister presented the ability for Canada to use its newly acquired Arctic power
through the 'use it or lose it' themed discourse and direct lines such as "react. .. strongly when
other countries show disrespect for our sovereignty over the Arctic" (Officer of the Prime
Minister 2007e). National Defence's discourse focused on the fact that they were becoming
more effective in the region because of their promised military assets and yearly northern
training. This type of language reinforced the speech act that Canada was preparing for a
real, possible threat of force, and the promised action in the speeches was occurring. For this
sector, this government was acting on its language. Sovereignty was a theme used in both
traditional sectors and it order to emphasize its intentions to protect their territory from
foreign interests they would have military exercises to point out its commitment.

59

Right from the beginning, the federal government discussed the need for the
Canadian Forces as imperative for sovereignty for all three comers of Canada "from the
Atlantic to the Pacific to the Arctic" (Office of the Prime Minister 2006b). The Defence
Minister and departmental documents promoted this need for visible protection against a
force by constantly highlighting military exercises being done in the Arctic. This intentional
use of security language in attempting to securitize also resulted with some of the themes in
these two sectors being emphasized in some years and not seen as necessary in others. With
regards to its bi-lateral relationship with the United States, in 2008 this government did not
focus its speeches on this relationship, but the year after, it decided it needed to bring this
issue to the forefront of its speeches. Another example of this government' s focus changing
over the five years was its northern connection theme. Initially used to call attention to the
need for sovereignty in the Arctic, by 2011 it seemed as if this government believed that it
had firmly connected the Arctic to national sovereignty and so there was only one mention to
this theme in this final year.
While the traditional sectors showed strong securitizing attempts with the framing of
existential threat speeches in the other three sectors referred more to opportunities and did
not even try to frame a threat. In the societal sector the reason for a lack of government
securitizing attempts was two-fold. First, all the themes spoke to opportunities to help
stabilize the community. Second, there was an overlap of securities by this government in
the use of its themes and promoting economic initiatives to deal with social issues. The
theme of northern control was central to many government speeches. The interesting overlap
with the northern control theme was that northern resource projects were also promoted to
provide opportunities for this type of control by northerners. The government handled

60

speeches with the theme of job creation by implying that because of new business interest,
good, long-term appropriate jobs would just develop throughout this sector. This type of
language framed opportunities rather than threats.
Another interesting example of the government' s overlap of security language played
out in the speeches referring to the Canadian Rangers. This group of national reservists
served political and military security objectives in protecting northern sovereignty while also
enriching societal objectives such as community education and northern control. The review
of government speeches determined that this federal government did not see a need for
security in the societal sector. Rather this government saw a need to ensure opportunities for
northerners to better take control of their region, as communicated in the speeches of AAND
Minister Chuck Strahl, the Prime Minister and the properly readjusted partnership with the
Inuit Circumpolar Council.
In the economic sector, between 2008 and 2011 , this government saw a need to try
and securitize the national economy against the threat of unsure international investors and a
failing international economic system (Flaherty 2009, 7). In the north however they spoke
more of opportunities instead of focusing on the framing of this national existential threat of
the international economic crisis. Most of the themes that were identified as prevalent, such
as regional economic potential, resource management and energy superpower, spoke of a
government trying to handle economic security differently in the north. The economic crisis
did play a part in the language of this sector however it was mostly used to point out the
reason for these northern opportunities. There was also an overlap of economic language into
the other two non-traditional sectors. This government's ability to point out social benefits
with economic development and the strengthening of environmental regulation because of

61

economic projects would suggest that they did have the ability to make a securitizing attempt
in this sector if they had chosen to do so. The best example of this intended language of
opportunity was the government initially framing foreign interest and activities in the
traditional sectors as existential threats, while in the economic sector this interaction was
linked to prosperity for the northern economy. This sector' s language of opportunity also
painted the theme of energy superpower solely as strength for the country and never spoke of
any of its weaknesses for this region.
The environmental sector' s language demonstrated this government' s biggest attempt
to promote opportunities, rather than threats. There were again multiple securities found in
the speeches regarding safe, environmentally regulated resource extracting projects in the
north. There was also an interesting theme shift for energy superpower from Canada as the
world leader in environmentally responsible energy production to Canada as the main energy
supplier to the United States. With its authority to present environmental security language
already weakened by its promised traditional and economic security measures, this
government chose again to focus on its opportunities to improve the environment. This
federal government's language of "our environment deserves better" (Environment Canada
2006c) and "ensur[ing] the North ' s precious environment is protected" (Aboriginal Affairs
and Northern Development 2010a) indicates that they saw a threat but it was never framed in
its speeches. Rather the threat was minimized and opportunities to improve the environment
were emphasized. Even when language of opportunity seemed inappropriate the government
presented in the North ern Strategy the discourse lines of "climate change adaptation"
partnered with "oil and gas development" (Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern
Development 2009). The language of opportunity became ever more apparent the year after

62

the launch of this policy document when the government shifted its themed language from
environmental protection to environmental stewardship in hopes of better promoting its
created opportunities.

Partisan Influence in Policy
The reasons that the federal government made securitizing attempts in the traditional
sectors and did not try to do so in the non-traditional sectors was suggested from the evidence
below that this federal government was driven by its political worldview. Concerning its
Arctic policy from 2006 to 2011, this government seemed to focus on framing existential
threats for the traditional political and military sectors because they saw these securities as
being most valuable to its Arctic strategy. As a Conservative government, this federal
government's executive branch holds to a particular, aggressive and fairly unilateral, at most
favoring single partnerships. The Conservative Party of Canada is a coalition of the previous
Progressive Conservatives and the Canadian Alliance, whose ideology is different than
traditional conservative thinking. The portion of the party' s ideology that matters for this
research is its view on foreign policy, which seems to be focused on strengthening Canada.
In Canada in the World: Internationalism in Canadian Foreign Policy, Heather

Smith and Claire Sjolander state that "Prime Minister Stephen Harper has rejected the long
tradition of internationalism, diplomacy, multilateralism and peacekeeping that has defmed
Canada's role in the international community since the end of the Second World War"
(Smith and Sjolander 2012, xiii). They explained that the goal of their edited volume was to
assess the relevance of internationalism and whether it had changed with the election of the
Conservative government (Smith and Sjolander 2012). Kim Nossal argues that Canada has
moved away from conducting its foreign policy with a liberal internationalism approach, and

63

instead has embraced a partisan and muscular approach (Nossal2012). Finally, Justin Massie
and Stephane Roussel argue that this neoconservative movement, which is how they describe
the new Conservative Party of Canada, focuses on domestic law and order and shows distrust
for international organizations. Its specific foreign policy objective is to become the United
States' closest partner and most reliable ally (Massie and Roussel2012).
This observed foreign policy orientation is interesting, especially when reviewing its
Arctic focus. Upon review of this government' s Arctic policy focus , Smith states that "the
Conservative discourse about the Arctic emphasizes sovereignty as control and ownership"
(Smith 2012, 206). Control translates into a focus on military activities and a securitization of
the north. This government' s foreign policy is very state centric excluding, in particular, the
Inuit (Smith 2012). Nossal supports Smith' s view of how this government plays its ' Arctic
card ' (Nos sal 20 12). He focuses in on the aggressi ve nature that it used to push traditional
security discourse and measures; for example, Harper' s ' use it or lose it' line and the Arctic
foreign policy' s statement that the government would never waiver in its commitment to
protect its north to its expansion of military assets. Nossal points out that the apparent
disappearance of internationalism has to do with the partisan, Manichaean worldview of the
Conservative government (Nossal2012, 32), and the lack of audience rejection of this
government' s recent positioning of Canada in the world (Nossal2012).
Petra Dolata-Kreutzkamp also supports the view that in terms of this government' s
Arctic policy, discourse plays a huge part. She states that this government' s construction of
Canada as a northern nation, and tying in the importance of Arctic sovereignty into national
identity, has shifted its position from co-operative soft power, to military hard power
(Dolata-Kreutzkamp 2010). This federal government between 2006 and 2011 was driven by

64

ideology. This shift caused this government to emphasize its stronger security efforts in the
two traditional sectors while focusing on the opportunities, rather than the threats, of the nontraditional sectors.

So What ? Why Does All Of this Matter
Now that the material and findings have been reviewed there is a need to examine
four questions to determine the value of this work. The fust question examines what these
findings say about Canada and the world. This government has decided to embrace the
realities of the country' s geography and Arctic policy is now part of its primary agenda,
allowing Canadians to be more aware about what is happening in their north, which happens
to make-up 40 per cent of their country. This new Arctic focus means that Canadian
international policy could promote a new regional strength to other states.
As was seen in all five-security sectors, this government is trying to deal with the
Arctic ' s threats and opportunities. This project argues that although it is at least an important
first step, this government' s approach still needs to be reconsidered. On the other side of the
argument, a focus on the Arctic could mean that there will be less focus on another region of
Canada. It seems that this government sees a need to focus on the Arctic region because of
international pressure, a changing climate and an opportunity for natural resource wealth.
Second, the anal ysis of this government' s speeches and press releases tell us a lot
about the current Arctic policy. It shows that this government was very concerned with the
traditional political and military security of this region in framing its existential threats and
then pointing out the solutions to these threats. On the one hand, the problem with this
approach is the traditional existential threats remain hypothetical, except for the American
refusal to recognize the North West Passage as internal waters. On the other hand, in the

65

other three non-traditional sectors, framed opportunities hint at possible threats such as
community instability if devolution is not properly achieved. If natural resource projects are
not properly realized, there could be multiple issues to the northern community, the
environment and the northern economy. Finally if climate change adaptation is not
understood, there are several environmental issues centering on climate change that could
cause harm to the northern communities.
Third, the review of this government material highlighted the singular approach that
the government took in developing this policy and its exclusion of the people who have lived
in the Arctic for generations and were its first peoples. Natalia Loukacheva argues that an
inclusion of northern regional governments and northerners is crucial to Canadian Arctic
foreign policy and the federal government does not actively engage them (Loukacheva
2009). Ken Coates and Greg Poelzer after reviewing the government's key Arctic document,
North ern Strategy, found it lacking as a strong Canadian Arctic plan. Their first
recommendation was to develop "a long term plan to invest in northern infrastructure"
(Coates and Poelzer 2010). They were not suggesting going community to community and
getting their desired shopping list, but rather development that would help community,
commercial and military needs. They point out that this would actually strengthen Canada' s
sovereignty claims (Coates and Poelzer 2010).
In an interview shortly after the 2007 Throne Speech, Mary Simon, the newly elected
president of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatarni, stated that she was ready to work with the federal
government to develop an effective Arctic policy. Simon proclaimed that the Inuit
considered themselves to be patriotic Canadians because they helped the government with
the ownership of the region, and that the best way for the government to assert sovereignty

66

was with a presence in the area, and the Inuit were that presence. She then linked the need for
this presence with the Inuit's need for assistance in community and economic development
(Reaction to October 2007 Throne Speech). As Simon stated, "huge gaps in health, education
and housing between Inuit and the rest of Canada remain a source of shame at home and
abroad" (Simon 2009). Simon's commentary zeroed in on the fact that the government's
policies did not firmly address the sector's referent object of the survival of the community.
Instead this government presented the Arctic with government created opportunities such as
devolution and federal decided investments into the communities, such as a training
programs and a deep water port.
Fourth, what this review exposed about the Copenhagen School's securitization
theory was that its practical use was not as objective as initially thought and there are some
limitations. When all four elements are identified, one can determine if there were
securitizing attempts. Yet, how to determine strong enough language that highlights a
framing of a subtle threat versus an opportunity? This theory's pre-constructed elements,
which allowed for a given definition of the different securities, provided for an unhindered
analysis of security interaction.
Initially when this theory was reviewed for use in this project it was thought to be an
easy checklist that would help to determine security interactions without having to create
new criteria. As presented in each sector, there is a definition for each element' s
identification. The problem is how to apply these definitions to government speeches. The
existential threats of each sector are very abstract in nature, as is the referent objects, so a
system of prevalent themes to help organize the government speeches into the particular
sectors had to be applied. It was realized that Roe's critique regarding government

67

securitizing discourse was correct and it needs to be a lot more focused to gain fmal traction
to audience acceptance (Roe 2008, 622). There was also the needed decision regarding which
speeches were to be placed in multiple sectors. Despite the sector's different definitions,
many political speeches also applied to the military sector and many societal speeches also
played a huge part in the economic and environmental sectors. The other difficult aspect of
analyzing with this theory was the securitization process was hard to identify in primary
material.
It became evident that even with the identified themes it was difficult to objectively
identify framed threats and protected referent objects. For this reason, after reviewing the
results, it was decided to point out exactly what the data said rather than try to create a result.
This means that Roe's critique that securitization is a two-stage process has some real
practical value (Roe 2008, 620-623). The idea that researchers would have to show
identification and mobilization of security would allow more certainty in the results.
Completing this project using the Copenhagen theory also emphasized some
advantages to this theory. The most significant one is that there was no need to identify the
qualifiers for the different securities. The Copenhagen School, although abstract with its
definitions, did divide security into five sectors and pointed out four different elements that
were needed for each sector. This structure allowed the analysis to focus on the security
interaction rather than determining if it was a particular security and what the government
was attempting to do.

The Theoretical and Practical Value of the Project
This project's approach to the Copenhagen School's theory emphasized certain
advantages and disadvantages to its use. Looking at the larger context, what is the theoretical
68

value of this project to the study of security? Its value is twofold. First, the fact that there
was a direct application of this theory' s framework to primary government data revealed
results that were somewhat mixed.
Trying to adhere to most of the elements laid out in Buzan' s Security: A New
Framework for Analysis (Buzan et al. 1998), there was an attempt to objectively frame the

primary Arctic data directly through the constructed lens of the framework, identifying the
securitizing actor, the audience and even highlighting from the given definitions the framed
existential threats and referent objects. These elements created a roadmap to work through,
but there was some need for clarification and criteria assistance along the way.
Second, this is the first time that this theory has been broadly applied to the Canadian
Arctic region and therefore the results are the first of its kind. This aspect of the research
was difficult from the beginning because the government's speeches were not always
designed or delivered to directly address existential threats or referent objects. Also, because
the time period being reviewed (2006 and 2011) is still recent, there was not a lot of
secondary analysis to compare with this project to get a sense of any gaps in its analysis.
This first attempt also made the research very open because there were not a lot of preconstructed obstacles that needed to be avoided.
The practical value of the project is twofold. First, Canadians can gain an
understanding of how their government handles policy development, in particular security
policy which will allow them to be more informed on their government's decisions come
next election. By understanding how this government uses security they can decide if this
political party is the one they want developing their Arctic policy with its traditional
approach come 2015. Second, policy analysts both domestic and international can take these

69

findings and use them to determine the next steps forward for this government regarding its
Arctic plan. Finally with this project's securitization research analysts could better examine a
government's security language and determine if its focus on traditional versus nontraditional security helped or hurt the nation's security policy.

Further Research and Conclusion
The value of this project speaks to the desired next steps for further research. The
practical and theoretical value sections both address the fact that it is the first time that this
theoretical approach has been attempted on this data set during a specific time period. The
biggest obstacle that presented itself early on in the research was there was very little data
regarding audience acceptance of this government's speeches and media releases. There is a
need for both northern and southern responses to a variety of probing questionnaires and
interviews because both groups have very different perspectives on what is needed for the
Arctic. This proposed research is important because it will help better determine the
effectiveness of the federal government to deliver security language that is readily accepted
by various, target audiences. By conducting this research, this project's case study findings
could be better supported, and the different speeches ' language better explained. In so doing,
this proposed research would address a major gap in the current analysis by obtaining a
deeper understanding of how governments communicate with its citizenry regarding security
issues, and to what extent those messages are accepted.
The Arctic region is becoming an increasingly important part of the world. It is where
the future of marine transportation and trade could be headed. It is the best indicator of how
the international community is doing in terms of combating climate change. It presents an
opportunity for governments to support effective and collaborative growth of their nations
70

and even a possible arena for a devastating international conflict. Despite its low population
and lack of infrastructure development because of all these possibilities, this region has the
chance to serve as a model for best practices in government security discourse and policy.

71

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