EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF A DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARISON OF MALAYSIA AND GHANA

by

Osei Agyeman Kwame

B. S.C., Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration, 2012

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Abstract

Malaysia and Ghana are two countries that both experienced European colonial rule and shared similar socio-political settings prior to independence. Both inherited underdeveloped economic and political systems from the exploitative colonial administrations. For both countries, the post-independence era saw the implementation of ambitious programs for national development, mainly through the adoption of the Developmental State model, which involves state-led macroeconomic planning for economic development. Currently, however, the two countries present contrasting levels of economic development, with Malaysia outpacing Ghana on several economic indicators. This study explains the differential levels of development by using the Applied Thematic Analysis Approach and concludes that Malaysia's economic success has its basis in a relatively conducive socio-political setting, stable political environment, viable institutional and bureaucratic structures that engendered efficient harnessing of resources, and continuity in implementing development plans.

Keywords: Developmental State, Applied Thematic Analysis

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables

List of Figures

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Dedication

This project is dedicated to my parents. My parents taught me that the best kind of knowledge to have is that which is learned for its own sake. Through interactions with and the advice of family and friends, I learned that even the largest task can be accomplished if it is done one step at a time.

Chapter One: Introduction and Statement of Problem

1.1. Introduction

In the post-WWII period, there was a wave of agitation for political and economic independence in Third World countries, which eventually marked a series of decolonization in East and Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Starting from a similar position of colonial background in more than a half century since then, some regions and countries have done substantially better than others. For instance, Japan[1]became the world's second largest economy after the United States from the post-World War II era to the end of the Cold War (1947-1991) (Johnson 1995). The economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan underwent rapid industrialization and maintained average growth rates of 7% annually between the early 1960s and 1990s to earn the accolades "*Newly-Industrialized Countries (NICs)",* "*The Four Asian Tigers or Four Asian Dragons"* for their success (World Bank 1993). Since the early 21st century, China (also known as factory of the world), India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines have developed into the NICs socioeconomic classification with their high-income economies specializing in areas of comparative and competitive advantage (Chang 2010). Despite the ending of the commodities boom[2] which reduced export revenues of resource dependent economies of Latin America and plunged many into economic crisis, GDP per capita in Chile averaged US$7,602 from 1960 until 2017, reaching

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[1] Japan as a colonizer itself was not formally colonized by Western powers but experienced formal semi colonial situations in the mid-sixteenth century when the Portuguese brought Catholicism, and new technology of gun and gunpowder into the country. See Miyoshi and Harootunian (1993) for further discussion.

[2] For instance, the 2000s commodities boom was the rise, and fall, of many physical commodity prices (such as those of food, oil, metals, chemicals, fuels and the like) during the early 21st century (2000–2014). The boom was largely due to the rising demand from emerging markets such as the BRIC countries, particularly China during the period from 1992 to 2013 (World Atlas 2018).

an all time high of US$15,059 in 2017 to become the richest economy in South America[3], an impressive growth since the end of the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy from the 1940s to end of the 1970s[4] (World Atlas 2018; Trading Economics 2018). Also, Brazil's US$ 3,146 GDP per capita in 2001 earned it a membership of BRICs (an acronym for emerging markets Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) in 2001, and was noted as one of the largest emerging markets economies expected to grow faster than the developed countries (Guriev 2015).[5] Table 1A in the Appendix shows that the resource and extractive production economies of Sub-Saharan Africa doubled their GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) from US$ 940 in 1960 to US$1,841 in 2010, but have remained in a least developed region, according to the United Nation's indicators of socioeconomic development.

This project attempts to explain why there have been differences in the levels of development in the newly industrialising regions of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), represented by Malaysia and Ghana, respectively. Why are those two countries that had similar economic and political profiles at the onset of their developmental endeavors experiencing unequal outcomes, with the former faring better than the latter? The former is generally faring better than the latter on various economic indicators. The average per capita gross domestic product (constant 2005 US$) in SEA increased from $1,167 in 1960 to $9,993 in 2014 (Table 1, Appendix). Within the same period, the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP)

[3] The arrival of Chile's Chicago boys (a group of Chilean economists who studied at the University of Chicago in the 1950s) in 1973, whom were enthusiastic converts of Friedman's free-market economic philosophies, and were then given free rein to implement on an unprecedented scale during Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship (1973 to 1990), changed Chilean society forever and made it one of the richest countries in Latin America. See Opazo (2016) for further discussion.

[4] As of 2012, the largest economic sectors by GDP in Chile was mining, business and personal services, wholesale, retail trade, and manufacturing. Only 4.9% of the GDP was contributed by the agricultural and allied sectors (World Atlas 2018).

[5] In the last 15 years, Brazil, Russia, and India have caught up with the smallest G7 economy (Italy) in terms of nominal GDP, while China has overtaken Japan and become the second largest economy in the world. Together, BRIC's nominal GDP is similar to that of the EU or US and is likely to overtake both in the coming few years. (Guriev 2015).

decreased from 34.6% in 1960 to 10.5% in 2014, while the manufacturing share of the GDP increased from 13.8% in 1960 to 25.3% in 2014 (Figures 2 and 3, Appendix). Over the years, SEA has become highly industrialized. The total agricultural raw material exports decreased from 39.6% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 2.8% in 2010, while manufacturing exports increased from 10% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 65.6% in 2010 (Table 1, Appendix). In contrast, the average per capita GDP (constant 2005 US$) in SSA increased from $940 in 1960 to $1,841 in 2014 (Table 1A, Appendix). The agricultural share of GDP decreased from 28.9% in 1960 to 7.5% in 2010[6] and manufacturing's share of GDP decreased from 10.6% in 1960 to 5.6% in 2013[7] (Figures 2A and 3A, Appendix). During that period, total agricultural raw material exports decreased from 23.3% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 4.7% in 2010, while total manufacturing exports increased from 4.2% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 10.3% in 2010 (Table 1A, Appendix).

While the data shows the existence of better economic conditions in SEA than in SSA in 1960, the changes in the former appear more persistent and dramatic. Such disparities between two the regions, which have many similarities in their social, political, and economic histories, set out as a puzzle among development economists. Socially, the nations in the two regions are multiethnic in their composition, a phenomenon that was largely imposed by European colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). Politically, both regions endured European colonial domination and economic exploitation (Stuchtey 2011). At the time of independence, both regions faced a dearth of domestic private capital and indigenous entrepreneurial capacities for economic development within their populations. The post-

[6] Last accessible data available from the World Bank's databank.

[7] Last accessible data available from the World Bank's databank.

independence educated elites were, however, determined to develop national pride and end their political and economic dependency on the colonial masters by embarking upon ambitious programs for national development. In that endeavor, most of the nations adopted the developmental state model for pragmatic reasons (Harrison 2002). The rapid rates of economic growth in the Soviet Union, without private capitalism, where the state assumed the leadership and preeminent role in macroeconomic planning became an attractive path forward under the existing circumstances (Chubarov 2012).

The key issue in this discussion, is the explanation of why the developmental state model has apparently been more successful in SEA than in SSA, two regions that inherited similar socio-political situations and concurrently adopted the same model of development. It is contended that the efficacy of the developmental state model depends on a nation's ability to closely adhere to and implement the principles and instrumentalities of the model. Stubbs (2012:92) has presented a summary of the historical overview of the experiences and main characteristics of successful developmental states as:

1. A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing
2. A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy
3. A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over planning, energy, production, finance and trade
4. A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development
5. Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line between public and private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development.

Various empirical and authoritative reports tend to buttress Stubbs' characterizations above. The World Bank (1993) has noted that successful developmental states (e.g., in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) are the ones that implemented right industrial polices in regards to their historical, political, sociological, and economic profiles. Dadzie (2013) has noted that the right industrial strategy was employed in Malaysia to mobilize the diverse racial groups together for national development. Similarly, in Singapore, Siddiqui (2015) observed that a better industrial strategy was implemented to develop both physical and human capital to complement the very few natural resources in the country to facilitate economic development. Subira (2011) mentioned an absence of similar appropriate industrial strategy in South Africa, based on its historical, political and economic profile, to build a strong links between the bureaucracy and business to guide industrial development. The implementation of such appropriate policies in terms of a country's profile is what Stubbs (2012) has described as rational industrial strategy for development (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Wade (1990) has also observed from his study on Taiwan, that successful developmental states have transcended both socialist and capitalist ideologies among the political elite in building domestic private capital. In Ethiopia, the political elites have been noted to lack a consensual development ideology (i.e., what entails a developmental state, and whether to accept neoliberalism or not) to enable the bureaucracy guide their industrialization attempt (Woldegiyorgis 2014). Sen (2017) observed a strong link between the bureaucracy and business in Indonesia (similar to Japan and South Korea in East Asia) that enables the bureaucracy to guide industrial development. The existence of successful ideologies among the political elites is an important factor that Stubbs (2012) credited for rapid industrialization and export manufacturing (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Amsden (1989) also in her study on South Korea observed that a sound macroeconomic environment was present in the successful implementation of its developmental states. According to Stubbs (2012), such a sound macroeconomic environment enabled the nation's pilot agency to control industrial policies through its influence over finance and trade (see Chapter Two for further discussion). Edigheji (2005) in his study on South Africa has noted that a strong and uncorrupted political leadership was present in successful developmental states. Stubbs (2012) has described a strong and uncorrupted political leadership as relatively autonomous and well-trained bureaucracy that is essential for national development (see Chapter Two for further discussion).

In general, while successful application of the developmental state model has been recorded in East Asia (i.e., where the developmental state originally started), Latin American has produced a different approach which takes place at a city (or municipal) level for rapid economic development (Petras and Veltmeyer 2009). However, a review of national development attempts in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa which adopted the developmental state model at the end of European colonialism, beginning from the late 19th Century through the 20th Century, has shown different outcomes. It appears that the pilot agencies in SEA and SSA have committed differently to the basic principles of the developmental state that may account for their different levels of outcome in industrialization and export-manufacturing. As already indicated above, this phenomenon influenced the selection of the two regions for the current study. But given that the countries in the two regions are varied in terms of their political and economic arrangements as noted in Chapter Three, Malaysia and Ghana from SEA and SSA, respectively are the main focus of this project. Malaysia and Ghana are roughly similar at their starting point, and also have comparable country profile (e.g., 63 years politically independent from British indirect rule and economic arrangement of resource extraction) as noted in Chapter Three for the purpose of analysis.

1.1.2. Statement of Problem

How is it that two countries with similar starting point of development have recorded different outcomes after applying the same development model (i.e., developmental state)? The developmental state is a controversial reading and interpretation because during much of the period neoliberalism, which support non interference of the state in economic development, has been the dominant economic orthodoxy. And yet, my project is arguing that the developmental state is the key concept for rapid development, especially for developing countries with European colonial experience (mainly because of the sociological, political and economic arrangement inherited after independence).

One of the starting points of neoliberal economic orthodox has been Ricardo's (1817) theory of comparative advantage, which encourages countries to engage in international trade even when one country's workers are more efficient at producing every single good than workers in other countries. This theory advances an increased role of the private sector in an economy to maintain comparative advantage, as well as to ensure efficiency in production. In regards, the intent for a limited role of the state in allocating national resources for the invisible hand of the market to optimize economic development. On that account, "good governance" (mainly democratic government) which protects property rights is the main stance in terms of the political arrangement. Those neoliberal development ideologies (or orthodoxy) have influenced a reconsideration of international rules: for example, a stronger advocacy for standardized foreign policies (e.g., for national governance and international trade rules), and have been championed by global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The IMF with its austerity measures (or policies) for sound macroeconomic environment, which support privatization and deregulation to increase trade and investment, has succeeded in shrinking governments budget deficits, eliminate hyperinflation, and maintained debt payment schedules for developing countries (e.g., the structural adjustment program in Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America during the early 1980s) (Williamson 2002; Welch 2005). The WB with its political agenda, which primarily focuses on "good governance" (mainly adopting democratic government) has recorded a stable political environment, especially in high growth rate countries[8] (Tidy and Mazui 1984; World Bank 2018). The United Nations with its social programs such as, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has reduced extreme poverty and inequality in developing countries [9](United Nations Development Programme 2018). The WTO has succeeded in organizing ground rules (i.e., standardized rules) for international trade leading to an increase in regional, bi- and multilateral trade agreements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTAA) (WTO 2018).

And yet, in spite of the successes recorded in the world under the neoliberal development ideologies, supporters of the developmental state are arguing it is a biased development ideology leaving some regions (e.g., least developed countries) and countries (e.g., resource-rich countries) behind. According to Chang (2010), the neoliberal development ideologies are similar

[8] The Tables 2A, 3, and 9A in Appendix show Ghana has recorded a stable political environment after 1983, and recorded a higher growth that countries in SSA with higher frequency of insurgencies.

[9] As many as 111 million more people completed primary school and 471 million extra people have been lifted out of extreme poverty as of 2013, compared to 1990s trends under the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). See the Brookings Institution (2018).
Also, the primary school enrolment rate in developing regions reached 91% in 2015, up from 83% in 2000. Moreover, about two-thirds of developing countries achieved gender parity in primary education. Progress has been particularly strong in Southern Asia. Only 74 girls were enrolled in primary school for every 100 boys in 1990. Today, 103 girls are enrolled for every 100 boys. See World Vision (2017)

to European colonial economic arrangement in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as discussed in Chapter Three, propagated by developed countries (mainly, Europe and the United States), through global institutions such as the IMF and the WTO for less developed countries. For instance, diamonds in it's raw stage mined in Jwaneng, Botswana (Sub-Saharan Africa), has to meet the WTO's standardized trade rules before it can be exported at a market determined rate (i.e., price determine by the forces of demand and supply hence the tendency of price fluctuation) to be refined in a manufacturing industry at Surat, India (South Asia), and sold as a luxury commodity (at a highly inflated price) in an auction in New York, United States (North America)[10]. Also, in her study of the market, power and politics of world trade in todays' globalized economy, Rivoli (2005) observed cotton cultivated in Mali (with cheap labour from women and rural poor), has to meet the WTO's standardized trade rules before it can be exported and processed into a T-Shirt by one of the global apparel brands' (e.g., Nike) supply chains in China (with labour price and working conditions below International Labour Organization requirements), and with a celebrity endorsement sold as a luxury good in North America. Such inequalities associated with the neoliberal development orthodoxy echoes Wallerstein's (1974) remarks of international division and specialization of labour at the height of European (e.g., Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium) industrialization. Thus, Wallerstein (1974) identified a three-level hierarchy in the global economy as the core, periphery, and semi-periphery in the global economy, where the core countries (i.e., more industrialized countries) exploit peripheral countries (less industrialized countries) for labor and raw materials. On that account, scholars such as Wade (1990) has indicated the role of state in national development is essential in the

[10] The Economist Times (2013) has reported that Nirav Modi (Firestar Diamonds) begun buying yellow diamonds from Sierra Leone, white stones from Russia and Armenia, and pink Diamonds from India. In 2007, he acquired Sandberg and Sikorski in New York, and since 2010 sends few pieces to each of the 16 auctions held annually by Christies and Sotheby in Geneva, Hong Kong and New York.

volatile globalized economy to adjust and implement appropriate policies, as well as direct the operations of the private sector to maintain comparative advantage and optimize resources for rapid economic growth. In regards, an appropriate and a pragmatic governance, based on a country's profile have been the main stance in terms of the political arrangement (World Bank 1993). This project supports the critic's view that the developmental state is a relevant policy for development, and Malaysia and Ghana are used as a case study to contribute to the debate (or literature). The rationale for a case study on Malaysia and Ghana was based on the ability to easily access secondary data to suit the research methodology, thus, Applied Thematic Analysis. There were limitations of resources (e.g., comparable and quantitative data) to pursue a more holistic understanding of a developmental state in the two countries.

1.1.3. Research Methodology

This project will explain the difference in development in Malaysia and Ghana, by utilising the concept of the Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA), which involves both quantitative and qualitative analysis. As already indicated in the previous section, the primary goal of this project is to test the hypothesis that Malaysia has attained better economic outcomes than Ghana due to a more effective implementation of the developmental state model in the former by employing a comparative analysis of secondary data and empirical textual information from scholarly research, government, and private sources. In this analytical approach, the organization of data will be done thematically, guided by the five characteristics of the developmental state model identified by Stubbs (2012). The analysis will disclose the respects in which the two nations have either conformed to or deviated from the basic principles of the developmental state model.

1.1.4. Organization of the Study

The rest of the paper is organized into the chapters described below:

Chapter Two: Methodology and Discussion of Developmental State Model.

Methodology: The Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA) methodological approach is described. The method of data collection, the definition of key concepts, the form of data analysis employed, and what informed the themes are also discussed. Thus, the chapter sets out the method and how the empirical research findings and textual documents on the development undertaking in Malaysia and Ghana are compared to the themes identified from the literature review of the developmental state. In all, seven themes are identified following the ATA process. Discussion of Developmental State Model: The theoretical and empirical research literature on the developmental state is reviewed and the main characteristics, as outlined by Stubbs (2012), will constitute the themes for the comparative analysis and evaluation of the respective performances of Malaysia and Ghana on their implementation. The chapter describes the characteristics of the developmental state, both strengths and weaknesses, and requirements for its successful application.

Chapter Three: Background review of SEA and SSA. This chapter presents information on the geographical, historical, political, and economic background of SEA and SSA. The background information of SEA and SSA are intended to paint a picture of the regions, pre- and post-independence. Also included is a detailed discussion on development approaches and plans in Malaysia and Ghana since independence.

Chapter Four: Analysis. The chapter uses both quantitative and qualitative data on Malaysia and Ghana to explain the differences in their respective levels of development. The two countries are assessed to see how the developmental state model has been applied and if the differences in development is due to a better application of the model in Malaysia than Ghana.

Chapter Five: Conclusion. In this chapter, the findings, limitations, and suggestions for further studies are discussed. The chapter includes a summary of the findings and policy implication about development in Malaysia and Ghana, and concludes with some recommendations.

Chapter Two: Methodology and Discussion of the Developmental State Model

In this chapter, the main principles or characteristics of the developmental state model are outlined from the review. Those will constitute the themes for the comparative analysis and evaluation of how Malaysia and Ghana have performed in their implementations of a developmental state. It is reiterated that this research is guided by the proposition that the disparities in economic development between Malaysia and Ghana employing the same development model (i.e., a developmental state) can be a function of the efficiency in implementing the principles of the model.

2.1. Methodology

As previously mentioned, this research will utilize both qualitative and quantitative information in a comparative analysis of Malaysia and Ghana, for which the ATA has been identified as a suitable methodology.

2.1.2 Applied Thematic Analysis (ATA)

ATA involves the utilization of both quantitative and qualitative data in an applied research context. The ATA, according to Guest, Namey and MacQueen (2012:15) "is a rigorous set of procedures designed to identify and examine themes from documented data or theories and incorporate them into interpretive analysis", and is best suited to questions of understanding and representation that are not easily quantifiable. It involves inductive analysis and conclusions from textual information and is appropriate for this project, which utilizes both statistical and qualitative textual data from various academic and non-academic sources. Thus, the semantic and latent attributes of ATA are appropriate for this project to assess characteristics of a developmental state such as a developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and a rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development as indicated by Stubbs (2012), which are not easily quantifiable. In that respect, the coded or adverse effects of the characteristics of a developmental state which are not easily quantifiable but essential for economic development are explained with the ATA. Consequently, the themes for the analysis, based on the five major characteristics of a developmental state model identified by Stubbs (2012), and other themes that emerged from the literature review, are used in assessing various empirical data on Malaysia and Ghana to gain an understanding of the contrast between the two countries.

2.1.3. The ATA Procedure

The following three procedures were used for this project:

1. Review the literature on developmental state and identify variables as yardstick for the themes

This involved a review of the literature on developmental state, including the works of Johnson (1982), Amsden (1989), Wade (1990), World Bank (1993), Chang (2010) and Stubbs (2012), to identify the salient themes and variables of the model for comparing the developmental approaches and histories of Malaysia and Ghana. In that endeavor, the selection of variables was guided by experts' reports on the core principles and best practices on the developmental state. Specifically, the variables involved the factors which define a successful developmental state (i.e., expert's reports on main factors that stand out in the empirical experiences of successful developmental states). In all, seven themes were identified for the analysis.

2. Identify thematic data on development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana from 1957

Scholarly reports on the development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana were reviewed and factors contributing to the growth and declines in their economic development were identified. The pertinent empirical information for the analysis was obtained from the economic development planning reports of Malaysia and Ghana, international and inter-governmental agencies including the Atlas of Economic Complexity, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the National Development Planning Commission, the Trade Map, the Transparency International, the African Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asia Nation, the Central Intelligent Agency World Fact Book, the Economic Planning Unit, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization. The private agencies and publications include the International Tin Research Institute, the Center for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) Anglophone Africa, the Global Economy, the Index Mundi, and academic and expert sources, on the bases of the identified themes.

3. Compare Malaysia and Ghana on their respective performances on the themes

A comparative analysis was done on how the respective empirical data on developmental undertakings for Malaysia and Ghana:

a) reflected the core principles and best practices of developmental state, and
b) have been similar or different between the two countries since 1957.

For this study, the two countries were compared on the empirical data on their developmental practices and outcomes assembled from scholarly, governmental, and private agencies. In determining the efficient implementation of the principles of the developmental state model, the presence or absence of the identified key variables or features, the consistency of their use, and general recognition in the empirical literature were used. Ideally, either having the presence of all the identified variables or same sets of variables in both countries will be perfect to conclude better implementation of a developmental state for national development. However, lack of comparable data and differences in the application of the variables base on each country's profile requires contextualized justification. In recognition that the comparison of respective performance (i.e., similarities or differences in indicators) cannot be effectively studied (e.g., measured) using standardized gaps, subjective judgement, which is supported by explaining with either qualitative data (e.g., expert's observation of the effect of such variable) or quantitative data (e.g., statistics) was used. The lack of comparable data for all variables is the primary limitation to the analysis.

2.1.4 Data Sources

As noted above, the data for analysis was obtained from scholarly literature and other secondary sources, including academic journals, textbooks, and the internet. The information obtained from the various sources are described below.

- The Atlas of Economic Complexity and the Trade Map provided data on trade volumes and trade commodities to assess the nature of trade in the two regions (see Table 4 and 4A, Appendix).
- The Ministry of Finance and Economic planning provided data on natural resources revenue and contribution in Ghana (see Tables 11 and 11A, Appendix).
- The National Development Planning Commission provided economic development planning reports in Ghana (see Table 9A, Appendix).
- The Transparency International provided data on corruption in Malaysia and Ghana to determine institutional autonomy in the two countries.
- The African Development Bank (ADB) and the Association of Southeast Asia Nation (ASEAN) provided data on industrial and trade policies in Malaysia and Ghana.

- The Central Intelligent Agency World Fact Book provided data on political climate in Malaysia and Ghana to assess governance and the degree of insurgency in the two countries (see Tables 2, 2A, and 3, Appendix).

- The Economic Planning Unit provided reports on economic development planning in Malaysia (see Table 9, Appendix).

- The Global Economy, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank provided key country statistics for indicators grouped under the following topics: economic policy, education, infrastructure, and trade. For instance, information on macroeconomic indicators such as inflation, gross domestic product, and balance accounts to assess the health of the economy in Malaysia and Ghana were provided by these agencies (see Tables 1, 1A, 8, and 8A; Figures 2, 2A, 3,3A, 4, and 4A, Appendix).

- The International Tin Research Institute and the Index Mundi provided statistical data on commodities prices and production in Malaysia and Ghana to assess revenue from resource production (see Tables 10, 10A, 11, and 11A).

- The Center for Learning on Evaluation and Results (CLEAR) Anglophone Africa provided reports on monitoring and evaluation of institutional agents in Ghana.

- The World Trade Organization provided data on global trade volumes and policies for members in the global trade.

2.1.5. Developmental State

The idea of a developmental state as a model for economic development gained credence as theorists sought to explain the impressive rates at which East Asian states were developing during the 1960s and 1970s (Subira 2011). The proponents based their arguments on the observation that contrary to the prevailing free-market[11] model for development, the late industrializers[12] of East Asia owed much more of their developmental success to a high level of state intervention (Bishop and Payne 2017). Johnson (1982) demonstrated with a case study on Japan's economic growth that active state involvement in planning and oversight of national development was a significant factor in their development success, and concluded that a developmental state has an essential role in a country's effort to industrialize. He noted further that an elite state bureaucracy with the best managerial talent and highly educated or skilled individuals in government are essential for a developmental state (Johnson 1995). Leftwich's (1995) subsequent conceptualization of the term "*developmental state*" gained currency among international political economists in his analysis of state-led macroeconomic planning. Johnson (1995) and Stubbs (2012) identified the key features of a developmental state as encompassing carefully calibrated industrial policies spear-headed by the state to achieve economic growth by establishing competent rationalized state agencies or bureaucracies characterized by meritocracy. The state attempts to socially, politically, and economically guide the country in its industrial efforts, mainly in the long-run (Marwala 2006). For instance, the state politically guided the country's industrial efforts by establishing a political system in which the bureaucracy is given sufficient autonomy (but under the guidance of the state) to take initiative and operate effectively

[11] The free market model for development share the laissez-faire ideology (i.e., support non-intervention of the government in the working of a given economic environment), which is consistence with neoliberal economic policies. The neoliberal economic policies advocate the abstention by governments from interference in the workings of the market forces and enhancement of the role of the private sector in the economy. See Friedman (1962); Wade (1990) for further discussion.

[12] According to Amsden (1989) the late industrializers are subset of developing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan that began the twentieth century in an economically backward state, but raised their national income per capita on the basis of learning. They learned using either borrowed technology or through similar institutions, especially those associated with industrial policies.

to maintain focus and ensure better organization in the processes of the development agenda (Subira 2011).

In his elaboration of the developmental state, Mkandawire (2010) has identified the two main features as the ideological component and the structural component, both of which must be coherently supportive of each other in the developmental effort. The ideological component consists of the philosophy or vision, plans, and strategies, with specific goals and targets for either the political elite or industrial minded bureaucracy to operate. It involves stimulating civic awareness and to politically mobilize the nation to support the vision and goals of development (Julius 2006). The structural component, on the other hand, entails the development of institutions and bureaucratic arrangements necessary for implementing and carrying out the roles outlined in the industrial policies and plans, and whose success depends on the presence of competent teams of public officials with the requisite training and skills to engineer and finance the economy to promote national development (John 1998; Stiglitz 2001)

2.1.6. Characteristics of a Developmental State

In view of experts' reports that the requisite features for successful developmental states were uniquely or innovatively applied, based on a country's profile, Stubbs' (2012) summary of the historical experiences presents a generalized characterization for the purpose of analysis. Those characteristics are discussed below, and have been adopted as the themes for data analysis in this project.

1. "A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing" (Stubbs 2012:92).

This requires the state to identify vital institutions and markets to capacitate and galvanize the productive forces to achieve the industrial goals. Castelles (1992) has noted that the state's main priority is to attain high rates of accumulation through simultaneous promotion of both agriculture and manufacturing. In most cases, the underlying vision is to attain a diversified economy to reduce the dependency on production of agricultural and other raw materials (Reinert 2010). In that respect, the state builds and holds most sensitive and essential enterprises such as natural resources and potential global demanded industries, and often apply more strategic interventions including; - a) selectivity i.e., supports progressively shifting competitive advantages instead of just adapting to existing comparative advantages, - b). flexibility i.e., ensure high adjustment capacity of policies to the dynamic world market, - c). coherence i.e., the policies' impacts are cumulative, and - d). competitive i.e., adopt policies that promote competitive production in enterprises to achieve an export manufacturing economy (Laurisen 1993). Because of the strategic interventions, the state invests in both human and physical capital to harness national resources in its policy-making process (Charlotte 2008). For instance, institutions such as banks and credit unions are develop to build the financial sector in support of both primary and secondary level production (Stiglitz and Uy 1996).

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) industrial policies; developing institutions such as banks and state owned enterprises to support agricultural (primary) and manufacturing (secondary) production, b) sectorial development; developing global demanded goods and industries to promote export manufacturing, c) human capital development; developing vocational, technical agencies and programs (e.g., skill development centers) to train labour for industries, d) physical capital development; developing roads, power, harbours for easy movement of goods and to enhance trade.

2. "A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy" (Stubbs 2012: 92).

Ideally, state departments and agencies must have the capacity to promote economic growth without being influenced by interest groups, such as those from business and labour unions. In that respect, a highly developed and industrial minded bureaucracy with intervention capacity is required (Sibira 2011). The highly developed and industrial minded bureaucracy is necessary to ensure the state institutions are able to bridge the gap between the market and social goods[13] necessary for development (Subira, 2011). The expectation is that public authorities would be able to intervene to adjust economic activities in line with national development plans and targets. In that endeavor, Evans (2008) has emphasized the importance of the state's responsiveness to the demands and needs of the people. Meeting that expectation is supposed to create an 'embedded autonomy' in which the state can develop binding social ties with the citizens. For instance, the ability of state institutions (or structures) to link the market (e.g., private sector) to benefits the citizens (e.g., provide employment to the population even at lower wages), and at the same time ensure industrial growth and development. Edigheji (2005) has noted that a strong, committed, and uncorrupted political leadership is required to inspire selfless devotion and commitment in the general population to efficiently and effectively control the nation's resources..

A well-trained bureaucracy is attainable if the institutions managing state structures are knowledgeable on economic planning. In that regard, institutions such as universities, research, and skill development agencies, are developed to produce knowledgeable and competent public servants with the capability and political will to carry-out the vision (and ideology) of the state in the long-run (Stubbs 2012). Also, anti-corruption agencies are developed to ensure state

[13] Social good is an action or policies by the state that provides some sort of benefit to the general public. Examples are education and healthcare. See Boolkin (2015) for further discussion

institutions hold no allegiances, and to be autonomous in carry-out their mandated duties (Mkandawire 2010).

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) anti-corruption institutions; anti-corruption agencies, recruitment and expert training programs are develop to control dominance of interest groups, b) research and development institutions; universities, think-tanks, research agencies are develop to ensure the bureaucracy is able to read data and inform policy makers, c) branches of government; the judiciary, executive, and legislature are develop (or design) to build the political will to administer national development (i.e., ensure the structures laid down share the state's vision and ideology, e.g., promote meritocracy in public administration).

3. "A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over planning, energy, production, finance and trade" (Stubbs 2012: 92).

In that effort, the state promulgates and utilizes a variety of instruments and policies to regulate industry and trade. Onis (1991) has noted that the state institutions must play the strategic role in taming domestic and international market forces and harnessing them to national ends. The restructuring of incomes and assets, fiscal and monetary policies, and direct state ownership of key industries are some of the structural developments undertaken by the state for industrial growth (John 1998; Stiglitz 2001). According to Amsden (1989), getting the price wrong, for instance, where the state intervenes in the market system to control the exchange rate, wage level, and the interest rate to lower production cost for industries are also often employed to enhance business-government relationships. Thus, by encouraging export-led economic strategies, tariffs are reduced and floating exchange rate regimes, where national currencies are often devalued, are promoted to enhance competitiveness in exports (Amsden 1989). The state focuses on the necessary balance of the five macroeconomic prices – the profit rate, the interest rate, the exchange rate, the wage rate, and the inflation rate – that the market is unable to make right (Bresser-Pereira 2016).The expectation is that the state would be able to mobilize funds to effectively finance and control its programs for development (Mackenzie 2008).

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) macroeconomic regulatory policies; the use of direct government intervention by the central government to control exchange rates, inflation, savings, general level of wages, and debts managements to avoid overheated economy (e.g., manipulating figures to attract investors, scrutinize information accessible to the public by controlling media).

4. "A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development" (Stubbs 2012:92).

The state departments and agencies must engage in frequent negotiations and renegotiations of goals and policies to effectively implement both medium-term and long-term policies, independent of specific political figures or leaders (Mkandawire 2010; Cerna 2013). This is possible if the vision or strategies of the state can propagate civic awareness and politically mobilize the nation to support the development agenda (Julius 2006). Thus, a more conducive political environment, which transcends both socialist and capitalist ideologies, is required to ensure implementation of long-term national development plans (Wade 1990). The desire for a more conducive political environment is necessary to ensure policies by the state (or public administration) are coherent and supportive to legitimize actions of the developmentally-minded bureaucracy (Bresser-Pereira 2016).

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) political environment; presence of political stability and long-term development plans to ensure continuity (i.e., provide supportive political economy), b) rationalized bureaucracy; effective leadership to control cabals, factions, or interest groups.

5. "Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line between public and private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development" (Stubbs 2012:92).

The developmental state aims to build indigenous private capital (i.e., domestic private capital) for long-term economic growth and national development. Most often, a developmental state sidelines and builds the capacity of indigenous private capital before it is allow to freely operate in the economy. In that regard, indigenous private capital is restricted and rigidly guided into the most promising industries for long-term national interest. Thus, the goal of a developmental state is to build the capacity of indigenous private capital (for autonomous national development), however, deliberately distort them to serve specific national development objectives.

In that endeavour, the state must be able to discipline both capital and labour. With regards to capital, direct control (e.g., export targets) and licensing arrangements, which are not captured by business interests, are used to increase capital accumulation and stimulate private investments (Bruton 1994). Entrepreneurs must meet set productive targets and be competitive globally to continue receiving assistance in the guarantee of loan by the state from banks (Wade 2003). The state can nudge firms to produce more value-added products by requiring multinationals to merge with domestic firms (Wade 2005). Also, patents and tariff protection are used to spread new knowledge and new practices to upgrade the technological skills of industries (Chang 2010). Thus, investors wishing to set up production in a country are given temporary monopolies, such as patents or tariff protection to decrease cost of production for industrial growth (Wade 2010). The approach by a developmental state to discipline capital (to ensure efficiency in production) is not about rejecting markets, but rather recognising that, left to their own forces, they can have an adverse effects, including loosing comparative advantage in the dynamic global economy (Bresser-Pereira 2016).

With regard to labour, harsh adversarial relationships may occur (or are often promoted by the state) between trade unions and business groups, especially at the early stage of development to maintain comparative advantage in production (Amsden 1989). Labour laws are often tightened to control trade unions as a way of reducing the cost of labour for firms to be competitive in the global market (Jomo 1990). In this way, the cost of doing business is minimized and new industries spread to new areas from where they had first been set up.

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) guiding the capital market; discipline capital by setting targets to produce, b) guiding the labour market; discipline labour by managing agreements or controlling trade union to dodge labour agitation for better remuneration (e.g., wage control), c) protectionism; offering incentives such as tax holidays, decrease tariffs, restrict licensing to decrease cost of production or to attract investors such as public-private partnership.

As already indicated in the methodology section of this chapter, the themes for the analysis were primarily based on the five major characteristics of a developmental state identified by Stubbs (2012: 92). However, by following the ATA process to review literature on a developmental state and scholarly reports on development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana, two additional themes emerged. It has been noted that Stubbs (2012) five main characteristics of a developmental state are based on historical experiences of successful developmental states. In that respect, the historical experiences indicate that the developmental states have been more successful applied in East and Southeast Asia (see for instance Asmden

1989; Wade 1990; World Bank 1993; Stiglitz 2001; Chang 2010). In that regard, the region or geographical location in which a developmental state is located was considered as a theme to assess if it enables better application of the model.

In regards to the development undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana, both countries have abundant natural resources which attracted the colonial domination and economic exploitation (see Chapter Three for further discussion). As already indicated in Chapter One, an example of the reasons for adopting a developmental state for national development after independence was to end the colonial economic exploitation. In that respect, the management and utilization of natural resources by a developmental state was considered as a theme to assess if the abundant resources in the two countries harnessed better application of the model.

6. Impact of socio-political settings to national development.

Although developmental states are national development projects, the regional context matters as it provides externalities for a better application of the model. Socio-political settings involve the social and political factors that contribute to economic development (World Bank 2006). It is concern with factors such as trade and market access (i.e., where economic activities take place), geographical location (e.g., great cities to emerge where there are good harbours), and geopolitics (e.g., foreign policies influenced by geographical factors) that provides the environment for industrial development (Krugman 1999; Spencer-Oatey 2012; Beer and Lester 2015).

Historically, the developmental state has been more successful in East and Southeast Asia, especially among the Newly Industrialized Countries[14] (NICs) (Amsden 1989; World Bank 1993; Wade 2005; Stubbs 2012). The inductive characteristic of the ATA methodological

[14] Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are examples of NICs in the 1970s and 1980s. Examples in the late 2000s included China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.

approach informed the choice to assess the impact of socio-political settings in the two regions (i.e., SEA and SSA) of this project.

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) geopolitical factors; concentration of market and regional trade to attract investors and provide positive externalities for rapid development, b) geographical location: climate conditions such as occurrence of natural disasters, distance from the equator (e.g., seasons in a year to influence planning and innovation), closeness to big harbour to influence trade and investment, c) geopolitics; relationships with international organizations base on the global stratification or global social hierarchy, political climate (e.g., stability or instability) to attract trade and investment.

7. Management and utilization of natural resources for national development.

Natural resources are part of the real wealth of nations that provide revenue to the government, raw materials, and employment for industrial development. As such, the use of natural resources for industrial development can either enhance or hinder economic growth. The way resources have been managed and utilized, especially resource rents, by most states in Third World countries, after independence, has been noted by development economists among the factors contributing to the level of economic development (Robinson et al. 2006; OECD 2011). Sachs and Warner (2001) have observed that resource rents in most Third World countries attempting to industrialize after independence have been captured by predatory states. There have been issues of overdependence on resources by the state as a source of revenue, which have either increased corruption or affected economic planning through commodity price fluctuations, dubbed the resource curse (Robinson et al. 2006). Those pave an alternative way for former colonial masters to infiltrate economic activities, especially in their former colonies through foreign aid and multinational investments (Barrett and Whyte 1982). As a result, the countries are indirectly exploited and they may be unable to protect their domestic industries or domestic private capital from competition (Barrett and Whyte 1982). The inductive characteristic of the ATA methodological approach informed the choice to assess the management and utilization of natural resources in the two countries for this project.

Key variables and indicators for analysis: a) political factors; effective institutions or bureaucratic arrangement to manage and control resource rents and corruption, b) economic factors; diversification of the economy, or primacy of and dependence on agriculture and extractive industries to overcome resource curse, c) geopolitics; relationships with international organizations base on the global stratification or global social hierarchy to influence the nature of international trade and investment.

From the analysis of characteristics of a developmental state, it can be concluded that there is a possibility that the characteristics or themes interact and have joint impact. For instance, a better application or function of Theme 5, depends on a better application of the identified variables in Theme 1, Theme 2 and Theme 3. Also, a better application of Theme 7, depends on a better application of the identified variables in Theme 2. In the analysis chapter, examples of the interaction and joint impacts of the themes are elaborated.

In conclusion, the developmental state requires active state intervention in the economy to guide economic plans and programs for national development. The state requires autonomy and oversight, strategically designed policies, and guidance for long-term national development. In all, efficient bureaucratic arrangement is involved to overcome internal and external demands from interest groups to do things for their short-term gain, in directing the nation's long-term plans and development programs.

Chapter Three: Background of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

This chapter presents the regional profiles of Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and demonstrates how Malaysia and Ghana are comparable in terms of starting points to provide a case study in explaining the differences in their economic development. In addition to the need for regional overview of SEA and SSA, the extent to which the development undertaking in Malaysia and Ghana exhibit characteristics of a developmental state are described.

3.1. Geographical Background of SEA and SSA

Geographically, SEA is bordered in the north by China, west by India, and south by Australia. SEA was previously known as "Further India," "Indo-China," "East Indies," and "Malay Peninsula" before World War II (Savage, Kong and Yeoh 1994). The SEA region is an archipelago divided into two geographic settings: mainland and maritime region. The mainland section consists of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam. The maritime section consists of Brunei, East Timor, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore (see Figure 1, Appendix).

In SSA, the conceptual separation line is located at the southern edge of the Sahara Desert (see Figure 1, Appendix). The region covers areas where there are extremely dry conditions in the northern part and substantial precipitation in the southern humid forest. These consist of Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and

Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (The Library of Congress 2010).

3.1.2. Historical Background of SEA and SSA

From the beginning of the19th century, European powers colonized much of SEA and SSA (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). For instance, Malaysia was a British colony from 1800 to 1957, Singapore a British colony from 1819 to 1957, and Indonesia a Dutch colony from 1816 to 1975 (World Facts US 2008; Rijksmuseum 2017). Ghana was a British colony from 1867 to 1957, Nigeria a British colony from 1885 to 1960, and Côte d'Ivoire a French colony from 1893 to 1960 (Handloff 1988; Berry 1994; American Historical Association 2017). The imperial powers of Europe viewed their colonies as a source of raw materials and labour. Davis (1964) and Stuchtey (2011) have noted that from the beginning of the 1500s, colonial expansion was part of the economic development strategy of the colonial powers, who increased their wealth by imposing restrictive regulations on the colonies. In most cases, the colonial powers had no interest in developing manufacturing industries in the colonies, which rather served as dumping grounds for European industrial products in furtherance of the prevailing mercantilist arrangements. In that arrangement, the European powers were able to expand their empires and wealth through international trade (Ekelund, Hebert and Tollison 1989; Rankin 2011). The prevailing political arrangement allowed the colonies to be easily exploited for their precious metals, such as gold and silver, and other raw materials, such as palm oil, which fuelled the 19th century industrial machine (Austin 2010). In the process, the colonies were exploited and oppressed, sometimes violently, for material and human resources (Crowder 1964). The demand for industrial raw materials led to fierce competition among the imperial powers in the establishment of trade routes and trade networks, a greater European presence, and the sabotage or elimination of many local economic arrangements (Tracy 1990; Koponen 1993).

The European scramble for SEA and SSA, and the eventual partitioning of the regions among the key contestants, resulted in artificial national boundaries that defied existing ethnic or tribal alignments (Iyer 2008). The new colonial economic and political arrangements were designed to undermine any sense of indigenous control and autonomy. In some situations, a system of direct rule was introduced where the home government of the colonizing country made all of the political and economic decisions about how the colony was run (Hancock 2014). In this system, the indigenous local elites were removed from power and replaced by officials and administrators who had been brought in from the mother country to control the colonial political economy. The goal was to assimilate the colonies with foreign culture rather than preserve native traditions (Lewis 1962; Bleich 2005). Where indirect rule was introduced as the administrative strategy, the central authority and power over a colony resided with the colonizers, however, the indigenous local authorities were allowed some degree of autonomy in local governance (Gerring et al. 2011). Through this process, the military, taxes, and natural resources were controlled by the foreign officials, while almost every other aspect of life was left to the local elites (mainly traditional rulers) who sided with their foreign diplomats (Rudolph and Rudolph 1966; Okafour 1973). An indirect colonial administration used existing tribal structures and traditions as channels for establishing their rules and regulations. Consequently, the colonies became largely dependent upon the mother country for military, economic, and political support (Mazrui and Tidy 1984).

The introduction of Western education as part of the colonial activities facilitated the assimilation of the colonized peoples into Western culture. Religious leaders, social and political radicals, and militants rose to resist colonial exploitation. The decades after World War II therefore saw considerable political assertiveness among the educated and indigenous elite in the colonized nations in SEA and SSA (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). The emergence of political agitations by the colonized elites culminated in the push for political independence. Successively, the independence of Indonesia, Cambodia, and Malaysia occurred in 1945, 1953 and 1957, respectively (see Table 2, Appendix). Ghana's independence in 1957 was followed by Niger and Nigeria's independence in 1960, and Lesotho's in 1966 (see Table 2A, Appendix). Almost all the nationalist movements and agitations in SEA and SSA were aimed at the attainment of political and economic independence from colonial hegemony. In return, most of the leaders of the nationalist movements became Prime Ministers or Presidents of their respective countries after independence. Malaysia and Ghana, which are the main focus of this project, witnessed members of their nationalist movements who served as prime ministers under the colonial administration become their new leaders after independence in 1957 (Jeburun 2008; Saraceno 2014).

Both SEA and SSA under the independent administrations envisioned that the deployment of the developmental state model would address the sociological challenges they inherited from the colonial administration. The challenges included the factionalism created by the artificial colonial national boundaries for direct and indirect rule by the colonial administrators. Because of the potential appeal of a developmental state to both socialist and capitalist tendencies, it became very appealing to the political elite in their pursuit of flexible modes of production and political arrangements. The SEA region has consequently seen communism, monarchies, and dictatorial rule as their typical governing ideologies in the post-independence era. For instance, Vietnam after independence in 1945 adopted a communist state, Malaysia after 1957 adopted a constitutional monarchy, and Myanmar after 1967 adopted a military authoritarian approach to government (see Table 2, Appendix). In SSA, liberal democracy, which allows free and competitive multi-party elections was introduced after independence. Table 2A in the Appendix shows that Nigeria after independence in 1960 became a federal republic, Malawi after 1964 adopted a multiparty democracy, and Botswana after 1966 embraced a parliamentary republic. However, state authoritarianism as an approach to government has been the dominant political arrangement in SSA. The state authoritarianism were seen in the actions and advocacy of a one-party state by most of the leaders in SSA after independence (Mazrui and Tidy 1984). Goldery and Wantchekon (2004:1) have reported that "there have only been 189 country-years[15] of democracy in SSA compared to 1823 country-years of dictatorship between 1946 and 2000". The states in SEA and SSA were permitted the autonomy to implement a governing ideology that would politically mobilize the population in support of the national development agenda. Remarkably, the leaders of the newly independent nations embarked on ambitious programs of economic development and modernization, as were represented in their economic development plans. The next subsection presents an overview of SEA and SSA in post independence.

3.1.3. A. An overview of SEA in post independence

The countries in SEA have recorded political instabilities in their development attempts, but the management and occurrences of such instabilities have contributed to their level of economic development (see Table 3, Appendix). The 2016 corruption perceptions index reported by the Transparency International showed corruption to be high in SEA, but higher in countries like Cambodia and Vietnam. Some countries on the contrary recorded improvement on the corruption index. Singapore and Brunei have enjoyed an extended period of political stability

[15] Total number of years that countries in SSA have been independent.

after independence and have been ranked 7th and 41st out of 175 countries on the corruption index, respectively, an indication that stability has enabled the states to execute their plans to improve their institutions. The institutions in turn have been able to effectively guide the implementation of the principles of the developmental state model in SEA to develop manufacturing exports for rapid economic growth (see Table 4, Appendix). With the growth in manufacturing exports, the countries in SEA, with the exception of Cambodia, have increased the income level (see Table 2, Appendix). The growth in income has been maintained by sound macroeconomic policies, such as a balanced budget law in Indonesia (Indonesian Investments 2017). According to the Trading Economic (2017), Indonesia's inflation average was 10.42% from 1997 to 2017, with its highest point at 82.40% in 1998 and it's lowest at -1.17% in 2000.

In terms of natural resource management, a study by Sovacool (2010) concluded that the resource curse was absent in Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand. The five countries together have the largest endowment of combined per capita and total oil and natural gas reserves in SEA. However, Myanmar had the worst economic performance among the five countries in terms of per capita GDP (constant 2010 US$ at $1,420 in 2016), because of its weaker institutional structure (ranked 136 out of 176 on corruption index 2016), and its higher degree of political instability.

In addition, the socio-political setting in SEA has presented positive externalities, such as mentorship in industrial leadership, trade, and investment. There have been similarities and consistencies in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand for their economic management with the state's intervention policies for SOEs and restrictions on labour unions (Hill 2013). All this serves as an indication of how prudent policies disseminate in the SEA region for better economic management. SEA's geographical location in an area of trade and market concentration has also provided positive externalities, such as the developed infrastructures in Singapore and Thailand, attracting trade and investment in Vietnam and Cambodia (Bhattacharyay 2009). The geographical location has made SEA "the roller coaster of globalization interpreted as the accelerated integration of national economy into the global economy" (Bello 2007: 169). Thus, Vietnam and Cambodia have been able to develop manufacturing exports despite the weak institutions and political instabilities because of the positive externalities from their geographical location.

3.1.3. B. An overview of SSA in post independence

The countries in SSA, except for Botswana, have recorded an extended period of political instabilities after independence (see Table 3, Appendix). The prolonged political instabilities in the region have been characterized by a crippling state of political and economic lethargy and uncertainties in their macroeconomic climate. The African Capacity Building Foundation (2002) reported that between 1960 and 1975, an estimated 27,000 high-level Africans left the continent for the West, and that increased to 40,000 between 1975 and 1984, which then almost doubled by 1987, representing 30% of the highly skilled manpower stock. Additionally, a total of 60,000 professionals including doctors, university lecturers, and engineers left the region between 1985 and 1990, and they have been losing an average of 20,000 annually since (The African Capacity Building Foundation 2002). The increases in brain drain have weakened the institutional order for a pervasive degree of systemic corruption and inefficiencies in the implementation of the principles of the developmental state model. This is a reason why Africa's dictators could not successfully guide economic development, that is, they were deprived of a well-trained bureaucracy.

The 2016 corruption perceptions index reported by the Transparency International showed corruption is high in SSA, with countries like Nigeria and Angola, ranked 136th and 164th out of 175, respectively. Botswana has enjoyed an extended period of political stability after independence and was ranked 35th out of 175 countries on the corruption index in 2016, an indication that the stability has enabled the state to execute plans to improve its institutions. In all, the weaker institutions in SSA have been unable to effectively and consistently guide the implementation of the principles of the developmental state model to develop manufacturing exports and, hence, remained raw material exporters (see Table 4A, Appendix). Table 2A in the Appendix shows that, with the increase in raw material exports, the countries in SSA have recorded either low or lower income levels, apart from Botswana, Gabon, and South Africa. The sluggish growth in income levels are partly due to the weak macroeconomic environment in the region. Gross financial mismanagement has been a common practice in the countries of SSA. For instance, a total of 2.4 and 5 million of Togo and Mali's population, respectively, live on less than $2 per a day, yet their delegates for the August 2017 United Nations summit in New York spent from $8000 to $18,000 a day on hotel suites (National Broadcasting Corporation 2017).

With respect to natural resource management, the World Bank (2016) has reported the resource curse is present in countries like Angola, Burundi, Nigeria, Congo, Gabon, Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and Zambia. The political elites in Gabon, Congo, and Equatorial Guinea have been reported to use natural resource revenue to acquire luxurious properties overseas at the expense of national development. The Transparency International (2017) reported Congo's Nguesso owned 24 estates and operated 112 bank accounts in France, while Gabon's Bongo and his relatives owned 30 luxurious estates on the French Riviera, in Paris and its suburbs. Those are examples of how recent leadership in SSA is going to the doors of their former colonial masters to be colonized instead of committing to national development. Angola's central bank could not account for $4.2 billion in oil revenues from 1997 to 2002 even though the country over depends on its natural resource revenues for national development (Bekele 2017). These actions attract resource seeking investors with little or no interest in manufacturing and institutional development (see Theme 6 in Chapter Four for examples to this).

In caveat, a country like Botswana has controlled corruption to manage its natural resource revenues for economic growth. For instance, the World Bank (2017) and the Transparency International (2017) data show disparities in economic growth in Nigeria (one of the rich economies) and Botswana (one of the rich governments) in SSA. The economies of Nigeria and Botswana are defined by a single luxury export: oil and diamonds, respectively. Nigeria's GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) was $2,457 in 2016 and ranked 136th on the corruption index, while Botswana's GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) was $7,383 in 2016 and ranked 35th on corruption index. An indication of how Botswana's institutions have controlled corruption to increase their wealth.

In terms of socio-political settings, Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Liberia, among others, have witnessed a number of natural disasters, such as famine, flooding, and disease outbreak (e.g., HIV\AIDS, Ebola) in their development attempts (World Bank 2017). Production and trade to increase economic output in SSA are hampered by natural disasters, which produce negative externalities, such as infrastructural deficits that cost the region 2% in GDP growth annually (Okonjo-Iweala 2007). South Africa has been noted as the largest and most developed country in SSA because of its infrastructure (Johannes and Garlick 2008). That indicates the extent to which infrastructural deficits in SSA have impeded economic growth. The remaining sections in this chapter attempt to establish how Malaysia and Ghana present comparable country profiles for a case study, as well as how their development undertaking exhibit characteristics of a developmental state. Specifically, the sections begin with Malaysia's country profile, and is followed by Ghana's.

3.1.4 Malaysia's Political Profile

Before the introduction of British colonial rule in 1800, Malaysia was controlled by a number of Malay rulers and powerful chiefs who resided in well-defined territories, and Islam was the dominant religion (Ahmad et al. 2014). With the dominance of Islam in the country, the British promoted a professional religious hierarchy by forming an alliance with the monarchs, who were responsible for both religious and traditional establishments (Husin 2011). Such an alliance between the British and the monarchs is a typical example of how indirect rule was applied during the colonial administration.

The development of tin and rubber plantations in the late 19th century was successful in increasing demand for the commodities, which expanded the economy. The economic growth attracted immigrants, including a massive influx of Chinese, into the country (Reid 2010). The latter created political problems for the indigenous Malay rulers, because the indigenes had to compete with the immigrants for their resources (Gillen 1994). The British, therefore, proposed the formation of the Federated Malay State (FMS) in 1895, which standardized rules among its members to allow greater efficiency in administration and business. The FMS members agreed to seek the advice of the British on economic and military matters, except those relating to Islam, but restricted the authority of each ruler to his own state (Husin 2011). Such an arrangement is an example of how the British were primarily concerned with the economic and political business under their indirect rule, but not interested in other matters of the state. The benefits of joining FMS included centralized administration and the development of amenities, such as swimming pools, dance halls, cinemas, private schools, and clubs (Teik 2005). This development, however, was either absent from or less present in the Unfederated Malay State (i.e., non-members of FMS) (Suwannathat-Pian 2009).

Beginning in the early 1950s, the Malays elite group felt they were prepared to manage an independent country and, therefore, pushed for an end to colonial rule (Hutchinson 2015). Initially, Malaysia's plural society[16] was an obstacle for uniting under a common flag. The major ethnic groups represented in the population were Malay (51%), Chinese (24%), and Indian (8%) (Dadzie 2011). The mixed races prompted the formation of several racial political parties to protect ethnic interests. United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) were the main racial political parties (Yusoff and Awang 2009).

In 1952, UMNO and MCA formed the UMNO-MCA alliance and contested in the local government and town council elections (Ahmad 2009). MIC later joined UMNO-MCA to run in the general elections of 1955 (Ahmad 2009). Following that, UMNO-MCA and MIC became the governing coalition. Shuib et al. (2010) have mentioned that UMNO leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was elected the first chief minister and 10 members from the alliance were elected ministers. After the general election in 1955, the executive council was still dominated by British officials in furtherance of the indirect rule.

Tunku Abdul Rahman began his famous "*Merdeka"*[17] Mission to London in January 1955 to negotiate with the British for independence (Jeburun 2008). The British agreed and proposed 31st August 1957 as the day of Malaysian independence. According to Thomas (2007),

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[16]A society made up of different ethnic groups or cultural traditions where, in the political structure, ethnic or cultural differences are reflected. See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) for more details on a plural society.

[17] Merdeka is a word in the Indonesian and Malay language meaning independent or free.

the British drafted a new constitution that maintained the monarchs and granted special privileges to the Malays (e.g., the British maintained the authority of the Malays rulers to be responsible for both religious and traditional establishments). The special privileges to the Malays are examples of the channels the British used to propagate an inferiority complex among some ethnic groups to advance the divide and rule agenda (i.e., part of the artificial national boundaries created by the British). Those were among the sociological challenges inherited from the colonial administration at independence in 1957, which required Stubbs (2012) developmental state characteristics of a rational strategy to address for national development. The MIC and the MCA agreed to keep Malay as the national language, and the UMNO, in return, agreed to allow Chinese and Indians to participate in politics and be awarded citizenship (Fernando 2011).[18] That formed the basis for addressing the sociological challenges for national development. The ethnic allegiances intensified and resulted in bloody inter-communal riots between Malays and Chinese in 1969, which prompted UMNO, MCA, and MIC to unite under a common flag called the National Front (Brown 2005).

Tunku Abdul Rahman, on 27th May 1961, proposed a merger among Malaysia, Singapore, and the Borneo territories of Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei (Oh 1967). That was an attempt by Malaysia to economically benefit from Singapore's large number of industrial firms and its recognition as a major trading port in the SEA. Also, the Borneo territories were attractive to Malaysia because of their abundant natural resources, such as oil, natural gas, fertile agricultural land (that produced peppers), rubber, and timber. Malaysia, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak became one nation on 16th September 1963 (United Nation 1970). Two years later,

[18] The first general election of Malaysia was held in 1959, in which the Alliance won 74 seats out of the 104 seats contested.

however, on 9th August 1965, Singapore broke away from Malaysia and formed its own government. Malaysia, today, comprises Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak.

3.1.5. Malaysia's Economic Profile

Malaysia is rich in mineral resources and was a major supplier of primary products such as rubber, tin, copper and palm oil to the industrialized countries prior to independence in 1957 (Whah and Guan 2015). Malaysia was the world's largest producer of natural rubber and tin at the time of independence (Yusof and Bhattasali 2008). Copper and tin accounted for 55% of exports and about 30% of Malaysia's Gross National Product (GNP) in 1965 (Economic Planning Unit 2015). TED Case Studies (2015) reported that in 1979, Malaysia produced almost 63,000 tonnes of tin, representing 31% of world's output. At that time, more than 40,000 people were employed in tin production. The agriculture share of GDP decreased from 34.32% in 1960 to 9.06% in 2014, while agricultural raw material exports decreased from 51.83% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 2.64% in 2014 (Figure 2, Appendix). These figures indicate that Malaysia was primarily a raw-materials producing economy at independence in 1957 and the years immediately after. Palm oil production became a prominent economic activity when the European colonists returned from a visit to Ghana with seeds and knowledge on the techniques of cultivation and processing in 1917 (Fold and Whitfield, 2012). Since independence, Malaysia continuously expanded its palm oil business. There has been large scale cultivation, production and harnessing of palm oil. The improvement in the palm oil industry is an example of how Malaysia has transitioned from a primary to a manufacturing economy after independence in 1957.

Malaysia was the third largest economy in SEA (behind Indonesia and Thailand) and 35^{th} in the world in 2015 (Foo 2015). Table 1 and Figure 3 in Appendix show the manufacturing share of GDP increased from 8.05% in 1960 to 23.95% in 2014, while manufacturing exports increased from 5.18% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 67.20% in 2014. The chemical industry, which involves petrochemicals and oleo chemicals, is a major contributor to the Malaysian economy. Foo (2015) has reported that, Malaysia's exports and imports in 2015 were dominated by fuels (22% of exports and 16% of imports), chemicals (5% exports and 7% imports), plastics and rubber (7% exports and 5% imports), and vegetable by-products — primarily palm oil (8% exports and 3% imports). The development plans in Malaysia are discussed below to assess how it became an industrialized economy and meet the characteristics of a developmental state as identified by Stubbs (2012).

3.1.6. Developmental State Characteristics in Malaysia's Development Undertaking

Because the political elite of a developmental state is not specific to a particular political arrangement, the separation of powers between the three main arms of government — the legislature, executive, and judiciary — have been maintained under Malaysia's constitutional monarchy. The legislature is made up of the king, senate, and House of Representatives. The cabinet ministers make up the executive, while the judiciary consists of the courts (United Nations 2005). The sovereign is the head of state, his royal highness the king of Malaysia (or Yang di-Pertuan Agong), who is elected for a term of five-years by nine sultans of the Malay states (Dzulkifli and Zameri 2010). Thus, nine of the states in Malaysia are constitutionally headed by traditional Malay rulers, four appointed governors, and three federal territories sharing one ministry of federal territories. All the states are led by chief ministers who are nominated by state assemblies to advise their respective sultans or governors (Rajeev 2015). Also, on the advice of the council of elders (i.e., sultans and governors), his royal highness the king of Malaysia selects a prime minister as head of government (Muslim et al. 2013). The king is given the authority on the advice of the council of elders to select the prime minister but does not have the power to remove him.

Malaysia has a multi-party political system for electing representatives into parliament. Members of the House of Representatives are elected to serve a five-year term in government under a democratic political system (Noor 2016). The Prime Minister, as the head of state, together with the elected officials are responsible for running the activities of the government. The passing of legislation resides on the elected parliament, while the Prime Minister informs the king about parliamentary deliberations on matters of state (Parliament of Malaysia 2017). The legislative power of the government is divided into the federal level with parliament and the state level with the monarchy (United Nations 2005).

The judiciary contains the courts and is headed by the chief justice. The king, as the head of state, is not involved in law making but has the right to appoint the chief justice with advice from the prime minister in consultation with the sultans to deliver justice at the federal and state courts (Noordin and Keng 2008). To maintain the judiciary as an independent body, the chief justice cannot be replaced by the king without a vote passed by a majority of the House of Parliament. Both the monarchy and the parliament have been engaged in governance in the post-independence era, similar to the indirect rule under the British colonial administration. Malaysia's political arrangement to maintain and avoid power struggle between the monarchy and the parliament in the post-independence era is consistent with what Stubbs (2012) has indicated as a rational industrial strategy to facilitate economic development.

Also, prior to independence in 1956, Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) schemes were launched to help the landless poor, mainly rural Malays (Leng 2014). FELDA was both a state-controlled and self-funded program (with some early World Bank loans) that helped almost 120,000 families between 1959 and 1990 to develop 470,998 hectares of settler smallholdings and 340,142 hectares of commercial plantations (Leng 2014). Large areas (an estimated 100,000 acres or 40 000 hectares) were subdivided into 10 acre/4 hectare blocks and distributed to small farmers to boost agricultural production (Hamid 2000). Post-independent Malaysia, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, introduced its first national development plan for 1966 to 1970. This plan replaced the first draft for development in Malaya (now peninsular Malaysia) from 1950 (Economic Planning Unit 2015). Both the pre-independence era under the British indirect rule through the monarchy, who were Malay royals, and the post-independence developmental state in Malaysia have used agriculture to meet fractional demands for national development.

In view of the dearth of domestic private capital and the state's vision to be economically independent from the inherited colonial economic arrangement, the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy became the basis to achieve rapid industrialization and export manufacturing in Malaysia. The vision for rapid industrialization and export manufacturing exemplifies what Stubbs (2012) has described as the ideological component of a developmental state as indicated in Chapter Two. Malaysia adopted the ISI strategy to build and develop the capacity of its local industries to meet future demand and supply of manufacturing exports (Jomo 1990). With the enactment of the Pioneer Industrial Ordinance in 1957, incentives such as import tariffs were imposed to protect the domestic industry's production (Snodgrass 1995). At the same time, incentives, such as a five-year tax holiday, were offered to attract foreign investors into the country as a way to benefit from technological transfer, especially to promote labour-intensive[19] domestic manufacturing industries (Rashid and Elameer 1999). The intent was to match the

[19] Mainly electronics, textiles, and other labor-intensive industries were promoted.

supply of the raw materials from the country's natural resource producers of such raw materials, and also match the demand of the refined or manufactured goods from those raw materials. Also, by building the capacity of local industries under the ISI strategy, the state has anticipated an increase in government revenue (e.g., from tax) to be financially autonomous (i.e., to provide steady flow of funds) for the state's development plans. The autonomy in financing is what Stubbs (2012) has indicated enabled successful developmental states to control industrial policies.

Export Oriented Industrialization (EOI) strategy was adopted in 1968 with the decline in the local industrial sector, which was a result of distortion in locally-price and low-value-added products (Rani and Haflan 1990). The EOI became necessary after minimal successes were recorded under the ISI strategy. In that regard, the Investment Incentives Act (IIA) replaced the Pioneer Industrial Ordinance in 1968 (Kong 1969; Kadir 2005). During that period, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was used by the state to reclaim foreign enterprises in strategic sectors of the economy without affecting foreign private investment, especially the gross national investment (Jomo and Hui 2009). The nationalization of foreign controlled companies marked the first phase of the corporate restructuring. The state held the most essential and sensitive enterprises, especially large foreign companies in the plantation, agriculture, and commercial business sectors, such as Sime Darby, Guthrie Corporation, Highlands and Lowlands, London Tin, and Harrisons Malaysian Estates were nationalized (Whah and Guan 2015). To ensure the restructuring did not offset foreign private investment, joint ventures with foreign investors under an institutionalized "*genuine partnerships*"[20] were established between different industries

[20] In this type of partnership, the public partner has the power to influence the performance of the structures either by demanding readjustments or by redesigning processes whenever errors in the development of the mission for which they have been created are detected (see Cordeiro et al. 2011 for further discussion).

with the support from various government ministries, a consortium of banks, and ethnic-based business chambers (Whah 2010). Such partnerships between the state and foreign investors transcends the capitalist ideology, which has been dubbed by Wade (1990) as "governing the market," a characteristic Stubbs (2012) said depends on the links between the bureaucracy and business in a successful developmental state. Those developments, however, affected the share of capital by Malays and other indigenes. Hart (1994) has reported that *Bumiputera* (Malays and other indigenes) jointly owned only 1.9% of the share of capital of listed companies, whilst foreigners (mainly British) had 60.7% and the Chinese 22.5% by 1970.

Malaysia maintained its vision to move from the inherited colonial economic arrangement of raw material exports to manufacturing exports, which was consistent with Stubbs' (2012) identified export manufacturing characteristics for a successful developmental state. In that regard, Malaysia stepped up its palm oil production to avoid overdependence on its natural resources (e.g., copper, rubber and tin) when the world market was flooded by cheap synthetic rubber in the 1970s (Dadzie 2011). Palm oil was expanded by establishing agro-processing plants between the state and the private sector (Economic Planning Unit 2015). Such expansion in palm oil is another example of the capitalist version of a developmental state whose success depends on the link between bureaucracy and business, as indicated by Stubbs (2012).

The Economic Transformation Programme (ETP) was launched in 2010 to enhance manufacturing exports (Economic Transformation Programme 2016). The ETP considered private investment-led growth with the government acting as a facilitator to raise total Gross National Income (GNI), which is consistent with the "governing the market" mantra for a successful developmental state by Wade (1990). The private sector assumed the lead role in making investment and employment decisions. Kemubu Agricultural and Development

Authority (KADA) (2016) has reported that this contributed to 92% (RM1.3 trillion) of the overall investment in the 24 targeted high-growth National Key Economic Areas (NKEAs) by the state to be competitive in the global market.[21] The twelve main NKEAs are: Greater Kuala Lumpur/ Klang Valley; financial services; oil, gas, and energy; rubber and palm oil; wholesale and retail; tourism; electronics and electrical; business services; education; communications content and infrastructure; healthcare; and agriculture (Kemubu Agricultural and Development Authority 2016). Those are examples of sectorial development, a characteristic of successful developmental state as noted by Stubbs (2012).

Table 9 in the Appendix shows that Malaysia has developed several quinquennia plans since 1950, and each plan emphasized education and the development of skilled labour. The provision of primary and secondary education played a significant role in economic development, particularly in small towns, after independence in 1957 (Jomo and Hui 2009). In 1971, 84.83% and 35.22% of total Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER)[22] had enrolled in primary and secondary school, respectively. By 2011, the enrolment was 101.41%[23] for primary and 67.24% for secondary, respectively (Table 6, Appendix). The total number of pupils enrolled in vocational education increased by eight-fold between 1971 and 2011. It increased by 789.8% from 20,058 in 1971 to 178,480 in 2011 (Table 6, Appendix). During that period, total

[21] NKEA is defined as an important driver of economic activities that potentially and directly contributes towards the Malaysian Economic Growth measurable by the National Gross Income (GNI) indicator. NKEAs receive prioritized government support, including funding, top talent, and Prime Ministerial attention. See Kemubu Agricultural and Development Authority (2016).

[22] Gross Enrollment Ratio (GER) is a statistical measure used in the education sector to determine the number of students enrolled in school at several different levels (e.g., primary, secondary, tertiary and vocational school), and it is use to show the ratio of the number of students who live in that country to those who qualify for the particular level (World Bank 2015)

[23] Gross enrollment ratio for primary school is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary education, regardless of age, by the population of the age group that officially corresponds to primary education, and multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015). Therefore, it is obvious a 2.84% increase in total population will be a factor in 101.41% enrolment given that not all school going age will be enrolled and population growth is influenced by increase in birth rate which add to the age group

population recorded a 2.59% increase from 11.06 million in 1971 to 28.64 million in 2011 (World Bank 2017). Those developments were intended to ensure Stubbs' (2012) well-trained bureaucracy for successful developmental state application.

Table 4 in the Appendix shows that Malaysia's economic development has exchanged dependence on a limited range of primary products (e.g., tin and rubber) in 1957, for dependence on an equally limited range of manufactured goods (e.g., electronics and electronic components) at present. The remaining sections of this chapter elaborate on Ghana's country profile.

3.1.7. Ghana's Political Profile

Ghana is a very diverse country with over 100 different ethnic groups (Commisceo Global 2016). The major groups consist of Akan (45%), Mole-Dagbon (15%), and Ewe (12%) (Dadzie 2011). The British under the indirect rule granted leadership roles to minority ethnic groups[24], and also tended to favour cooperation with conservative chiefs (Popa 2010). That gave Ghana's elites experience with a modern representative government to such a degree where they felt prepared to manage an independent country and, therefore, pushed for an end to colonial rule (Thiboutot 2006). The initiative for independence began under the umbrellas of the United Gold Coast Convention (whose members were dominated by people from the majority ethnic groups) and the Convention People's Party (Saraceno 2014). The latter was founded by Kwame Nkrumah who became Ghana's first Prime Minister in 1957 and President on July 1st, 1960.

Nkrumah's advocacy for political and economic autonomy for Ghana and SSA made him influential in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement, a grouping of world states that adopted policies independent of Western ideology (i.e., noted critics of developmental state

[24] For instance, Nkrumah (first president of Ghana, and from a minority ethnic group) was prime minister in 1950 before independence in 1957. See Adriana Popa (2010) for further discussion.

ideology) (Gerits 2015).[25]A number of prominent intellectuals and heads of state in SSA, such as Patrice Lumumba of Congo, Julius Nyerere of Kenya, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Léopold Senghor of Senegal, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya (in North Africa) took up the cause to advance the Pan-Africanism ideologies which shared similar characteristics of a developmental state (South African History Online 2011). On that account, Ghana as the first independent country in SSA became attractive for supporters of the Pan-Africanism, such as African American political figures, artists, professionals, and business people[26] to advance those ideologies (Moreno 2012; Azikiwe 2016).

Three years after independence, a new constitution created the Republic of Ghana. Nkrumah declared himself president for life. Ghana, at that time, had become a one-party state under a powerful president (Fuller 2010). Because the developmental state is not limited to a particular political arrangement, Nkrumah ruled under an authoritarian governance to address the inherited sociological challenges among the diverse ethnic groups from the colonial administration (Ayitey 1990). However, Nkrumah's authoritarian rule, combined with a collapse in the nation's economy, prompted a coup when he was away in China in 1966 (Ayitey 1990). The pan-Africanism ideologies and quest for a one-party state have also been noted to have fueled the military coup d'etat in 1966 (Biney 2008).[27] His critics cited human rights abuse, corruption, oppression, and a declining economy as the cause for their actions.

[25] Nkrumah was an influential 20th-century advocator of Pan-Africanism. He was a founding member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and won the Lenin Peace Prize in 1962. The OAU advocated for the independence of the African continent, unification of Africa through regional blocs, neutrality or non-interference on security matters, rejection of colonialism and exploitation, and the importance of economic regeneration to replace colonial economic arrangement geared towards primary resource extraction. See South African History Online (2011) for a discussion.

[26] Maya Angelou and W. E. B. Du Bois are among the few known activists who visited and repatriated from the United State to support Nkrumah's ideology in Ghana.

[27] Nkrumah escaped 5 assassination attempts before he was overthrown in the military coup d'etat in 1966. The frequency of assassination attempts on Nkrumah influenced the decision to train and recruit Chinese nationals in

After Nkrumah's government was overthrown in 1966, Ghana experienced a succession of military coups and prolonged economic decline. Three successive short-lived civilian governments were overthrown in coup d'états. The continuous decline in the price of Ghana's main exports of gold and cocoa after Nkrumah was overthrown, forced then president Busia and his administration to devalue the country's currency in December 1971 (Adom and Zogbator 2015). But because the government was unable to control inflation after the devaluation, internal pressures prompted military officers to seized power in a bloodless coup on January 13, 1972 (Adom and Zogbator 2015). The coup leaders, led by Col. Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, formed the National Redemption Council (NRC) which attempted to improve the economic condition by adopting policies which shared Nkrumah's pan Africanism ideologies (Bhasin and Annim 2005). To begin, all political parties were disbanded in an attempt to address the underlying ethnic and regional divisions within the society (Adom and Zogbator 2015). However, widespread corruption and the attempted non-party state (i.e., no multi-party system for non-partisan politics) in 1977 resulted in a violent coup by the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) on June 4, 1979[28] led by Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings (Bhasin and Annim 2005).

Following that, the AFRC attempted to end corruption in Ghana. They established secret special tribunals that tried dozens of military officers, government officials, and private individuals (Africa Watch 1992). Properties believed to be wrongfully acquired were confiscated. A number of indigenous entrepreneurs (mostly southerners who comprised the majority ethnic groups) had their businesses shut down or lost to the state on the accusation of hoarding, overpricing, and smuggling (Shillington1994). Those attempts were considered

Ghana's special security service for the president. See the New York Times (1964), Frimpong (2013) and Bah (2016) for further discussion.

[28] Rawlings took over power from Akuffo's government that held office after the arrest of Achempong.

targeted at the southerners who were mostly entrepreneurs and had a larger proportion of the nation's resources (e.g., minerals, agricultural land, both human and physical infrastructures). The increase in trials on the southerners reinforced ethnic alignments and factionalism. The AFRC accepted a new constitution with few amendments and scheduled a presidential and parliamentary election, which handed over power to the People's National Party (PNP), the third republic, on September 24, 1979 (Adedeji 2001).

The 1979 constitution was modeled after Western democracies (Zagel 2010). In that regard, it provided for separation of powers between an elected president, parliament, and an independent judiciary. The PNP administration's failure to end the declining economy increased corruption and inequality. For instance, policies implemented for exchange rate and trade controls in an attempt to address the balance of payment problem in the economy, as well as shield domestic industries from competition increased corruption among the bureaucracy who turned to favour cronies through channels such as import license for importer (see Chapter Four for further discussion). This resulted in another coup led by Flight Lt. Rawlings on December 31, 1981. Rawlings and his colleagues established the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC), which took over power from the PNP administration (Handley and Mills 2001). In the late 1980s, after nearly a decade of quasi–military rule under the PNDC, strong internal and external pressures on the government led to the promulgation of a liberal constitution in 1992 and the inauguration of a multi-party democracy in 1993 (Abdulai 2009). Since then, Ghana has held six successful multi-party elections.

3.1.8. Ghana's Economic Profile

Ghana is rich in mineral resources, and it was a major supplier of primary products such as cocoa, gold, and palm oil to the industrialized countries prior to independence in 1957

(Kolavalli and Vigneri 2013). It was the world's leading producer and exporter of cocoa and exported about 10% of the world's gold, at the time of independence (Konadu-Agyemang 2000). The dominance of bullion trade during the colonial era influenced Ghana's macroeconomic environment at independence. In 1957, the country inherited from the colonial administration £200 million (US$270 million) of foreign reserves, a relatively high per capita income, and a low national debt (Berry 1994). These macroeconomic indicators meant Ghana had a good foundation for adopting the developmental state for national development, especially in terms of the state's ability to fund its plans for such things as human and physical capital development.

Palm oil plantation received more investment as part of the colonial economic arrangement to extract raw materials to feed its manufacturing industries. Fold and Whitfield (2012:7) have noted that "palm oil plantations and mills were first established in the early 1900s by Alexander Cecil Goff in then Gold Coast (now Ghana)". Since then, palm oil production has remained part of agricultural development, but has recorded a declining rate of growth in post-independence Ghana to sustain and develop manufacturing industries of the crop (Fold and Whitfield 2012). The declining rate in palm oil production has increased Ghana's dependence on its main raw material exports of cocoa and, especially, gold in post-independence era. In regards, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 45.22% in 1960 to 30.83% in 2010, while agricultural raw material exports decreased from 12.30% in total merchandise exports in 1960 to 6.95% in 2010 (see Table 1A and 2A in Appendix). Also, the share of manufacturing GDP decreased from 11.19% in 1960 to 5.45% in 2013, whilst manufacturing exports increased from 0.95% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 20.68% in 2010. Table 4A in the Appendix shows exports are still dominated by raw materials, which indicate that Ghana has remained a primary producing economy pre- and post-independence. Ghana's development undertaking is discussed below to assess how it applied the developmental state and met the characteristics identified by Stubbs (2012).

3.1.9. Developmental State Characteristics in Ghana's Development Undertaking

Ghana's political arrangement after independence allows citizens who are eighteen years and above, to vote every four years to choose the government under the constitutional democracy. The president is elected as the head of state, while a member is elected from each constituency in Ghana in a multi-party election to represent their people in parliament (Government of Ghana 2017).[29] The country implemented a concept for separation of powers between the three main arms of government, which are the legislature, executive, and judiciary.

The parliament, led by the speaker of parliament, is assigned the legislative power to make the laws of the state within the limit set by the constitution, and the political party with the most seats forms the majority group and is led by majority leader in parliament (Friedrich Ebert-Stiftung 2011). The political party with the most seats won after the majority becomes the minority group and, is led by minority leader in parliament (GOG 2017). The executive power, led by the president, consists of cabinet ministers who work within the constitution and the laws made by the parliament. The chief justice leads the judicial power to enforce the constitution and laws made by parliament. Apart from the members of parliament who are elected by the people in a general election every four years, the president is assigned the power to appoint and remove the leader of parliament, the chief justice, and people to fill the various ministries (GOG 2017).

When under the colonial administration, the abundance of resources (e.g., minerals and fertile agriculture land for raw materials) in southern Ghana (which also made up the major ethnic groups) received disproportionate human and physical infrastructural development

[29] Ghana currently has 275 constituencies and only Ghanaian citizens and residents of a constituency who have attained twenty-one years are eligible to stands as a candidate to be elected as Member of Parliament. See Government of Ghana (2017) for further discussion.

(Amenyo 2008). The inequalities in capital projects under the colonial administration created fear among the northern and Trans Volta Togo land[30] tribes of southern domination (Amenyo 2008). To avoid factionalism and promote political participation of the developmental state model after independence, the state abolished competing political parties (which were primarily formed along ethnic lines) to mobilize the diverse ethnic and geo-political forces under a one-party state government. Free and compulsory universal education was introduced in northern Ghana after independence to build the human capital as part of the state's strategies to bridge the inequality gap between the north and the south (Asare-Bediako 2014). That is a typical example of the socialist variance of a developmental state, which reinforced the state's view that free education in the north was the key to power and wealth. Human capital development was considered as a rational policy to ensure the educated elites from the north become part of the government (i.e., be part of the bureaucracy to compensate for the deficit in natural resources, human and physical capital), and were able to guide the industrial agenda, which Stubbs (2012) has identified as a requirement for a successful developmental state.

On March 4, 1959, two years after Ghana's independence, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah introduced a five-year development plan for 1959 to 1964 as part of the ambitious programs for national development (Mensah1998). The first plan was replaced by a seven-year development plan that was designed to accelerate the pace of economic development and to kick start industrialization from 1964 to 1970. The seven-year development plan was inspired by President Nkrumah's visits to and affinity with China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe (Mensah 1998). The primary aim of the seven-year development plan was to turn Ghana into an industrial hub and serve as a role model for other countries in SSA (Serra 2013). In view of the scarcity of

[30] Trans Volta Togo land was a German protectorate along the border between Ghana and Togo, which was later divided between the British and the French in 1916. They voted in 1956 to be part of Ghana prior to independence and currently make up the Volta and northern Ghana. See Amenyo (2008) for further discussion.

domestic private capital and manufacturing industries in 1957, the ISI strategy was the basis for promoting Stubbs (2012) developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization. Hess (2000) has argued that the path to economic development pursued by Nkrumah was a combination of socialism and free market tendencies, which are consistent with the characteristics of the socialist and capitalist variances of a developmental state. The National Commission on Culture (2009:2) identified the primary objectives of Nkrumah's seven-year development plan.

(a) "Setting up industries wherever practicable to provide domestic substitutes for the manufactured staples of consumer demand, the supply of which has at present to be imported". The aim was to develop domestic private capital and entrepreneurs and to build the capacity of the local industries to meet the demand and supply of the country, a basis for achieving Stubbs' (2012) autonomous bureaucracy and manufacturing exports for successful developmental states.

(b) "Processing wherever economically feasible, those agricultural and mining commodities that are now exported as primary products, such as cocoa, timber and gold". The aim was to develop manufacturing exports for rapid industrialization as indicated by Stubbs (2012).

(c) "Setting up industries to provide materials for the building industry, in order to conserve foreign exchange, and to lower costs of construction". The aim was to develop a conducive macroeconomic environment to allow the pilot agency to control finance and trade as indicated by Stubbs (2012).

(d) "Setting up, as appropriate, basic industries in the fields of metals and chemicals".

(e) "Starting the development of other basic industries which will form part of later stages of industrialization in subsequent plans". The aim was to develop industries that could harness the country's natural resources for a multi-purpose use in the industrial attempts. For instance, processing bauxite into aluminum for roofing sheets and solar panels and, at the same time, build a hydro-power dam from the aluminum to facilitate manufacturing exports. These provide examples of Stubbs' (2012) rational industrial strategy for national development.

(f) "Planning industrial development in harmony with the development of other African countries". The aim was to develop SSA as a stronger regional bloc in the global economy, another example of the rational industrial strategy to be politically and economically independent from the inherited exploitative colonial administrative structures.

As indicated above, under Dr. Nkrumah's seven-year development plans, some of the factories that were established include a tomato and mango canning plant at Wenchi (which had the capacity to process 5,000 tons of tomatoes and 7,000 tons of mangoes each year), a chocolate factory in Tema, a vegetable oil mill, and textile and tobacco factories (Government of Ghana 2015). Those are examples of the National Commission on Culture's (2009:2) point (a) indicated above. Also, the creation of a gold processing factory in Prestea, a meat processing factory in Bologatanga, a shoe factory in Kumasi,[31] and a jute factory in Kumasi to manufacture cocoa sacks for farmers, are examples of point (b) above. A cement factory (Ghacem) was founded by the Government of Ghana in collaboration with Norcem AS of Norway on August 30, 1967 (GHACEM 2015), which is an example of point (c) from above. Moreover, a tyre factory in Bonsa and a glass factory in Abosso are examples of point (d) indicated above (Government of Ghana 2015).

The Volta Aluminum Company Limited (VALCO) was also set up to supply aluminum, mainly for Ghanaian owned companies, to be processed into cooking utensils, roofing sheets, and solar panels (VALCO 2016). As part of VALCO's plan, Akosombo hydro-electric power, Volta aluminum smelter, and Akosombo township (to house the workers for the accompanying

[31] Boots for all security institutions (Military, Police, Fire, etc.) were supplied by the shoe factory.

Akosombo hydro-electric dam) were constructed (Miescher 2012). Johnson, Howell and Evered (2015) have mentioned that the Volta river development was the biggest single step that had been taken in the economic and industrial development in Ghana. It involved an investment of £70 million in the hydro project, £57.6 million in the aluminum smelter project, and £7 million in ancillary development (Adarkwa 2012). Also, Government of Ghana (1964) indicated that building a second deep-water harbour at Tema was an attempt to push an export-led development and, at the same time, make Tema a port and industrial city. A total budget of £27 million was used to build the harbour, which became Africa's largest artificial harbour at that time (Adarkwarh 2012). Those were examples of the National Commission on Culture's (2009:2) point (e) above.

In respect to planning development with other countries in SSA, as indicated by the National Commission on Culture's (2009:2) point (f), the pan-Africanism movement in SSA after 1957 evolved into an ideology called the 'African socialism' (i.e., a socialism that emerged and evolved out of African experience and perceptions) (Mills 2017). The African socialism shared the central planning ideology of a developmental state, and considered the state to be effective in providing the resources (e.g., labour and capital) for developing domestic private capital and industries, a reason Ghana and other independent countries in SSA set up a number of state-owned industries in the immediate years of post-independence era (Mills 2017). Tanzania's Julius Nyerere was a strong advocator of the African socialism, which contributed to the University of Dar es Salaam becoming a major centre, defining African socialism in theory and in practice (Mills 2017). By the mid-1960s, over 30 African countries were independent, and many had leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, whose economic views shared the African socialism ideology (Mills 2017).

In Ghana, an ideological school under the young pioneer movement was introduced in the 1960s to advance African socialism (Annor 2009). To ensure SSA mobilize together as a stronger regional bloc in the global economy, President Nkrumah assisted Guinea with £10 million (US$ 14 million) when France withdrew its financial assistance to Guinea after independence in the 1960s (Annor 2009).

Thus, under Ghana's seven-year development plan, which was primarily based on ISI strategy and formed the basis for rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing in a developmental state, Nkrumah channeled investments into agricultural projects and new industrial enterprises, nationalized most foreign-owned enterprises, and, wherever possible, "Ghanaianized"[32] the public and private sectors (Berry 1994). Additionally, both physical and human capital were developed. Those were all attempts to preserve the ISI strategy as well as to transcend the socialist ideology for the successful application of the developmental state model.

With respect to the agricultural projects, Nkrumah identified agricultural development as a core economic sector for industrialization, mainly as source of raw materials to supply the industries and employment for a large section of the population (i.e., rural population). From the cocoa revenues, industries that would support import substitution processes were established. The Ghana Academy of Sciences and the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) were set up in 1959 to work in collaboration with the universities to increase cocoa production (Bridges 2016). In addition, the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission was tasked to research the use of nuclear energy in food and seed preservation, insect control, and to find out an alternative way to increase Ghana's manufacturing sector (Ghana Districts 2006). The Cocoa Research

[32] Advocated for use and consumption of made in Ghana goods, mainly by setting up industries to process and produce in Ghana.

Institute was established at Tafo, in the eastern region,[33] to encourage innovation to market and process cocoa. The tasks for the research institutions were intended to improve agriculture production to meet the demand and supply of the established industries and convert the country's raw material exports into manufacturing exports.

As part of human capital development, a minimum of "3,000 Ghanaians had been offered scholarships in academic work in western Europe alone to study engineering, medical and veterinary sciences by 1959" (Ghana District 2006). In October 1962, the University College of Cape Coast (now University of Cape Coast) was established to encourage research in education and train graduate teachers for second cycle institutions. The aim was to ensure trained bureaucracy to control, better interpret, and understand the impact of both investments and policies implemented in the national development agenda. As a result, a total of 67.19% and 43.09% of the population had enrolled in primary and secondary schools, respectively, in 1971. The enrolment increased to 106.74%[34]and 57.09% in 2011 for primary and secondary schools, respectively (Table 6 Appendix). The total number of pupils enrolled in tertiary education increased from 0.69% in 1971 to 12.08% in 2011 (Table 6 Appendix). Also, Nkrumah identified technical labour as a core variable for industrial growth and invested heavily in vocational training. The total number of pupils enrolled in vocational education almost doubled between 1971 and 2011. It increased by 81.3% from 39,630 in 1971 to 71,848 in 2011 (Table 5 Appendix). During that period, total population almost tripled, from 8.83 million in 1971 to 25.12 million in 2011 (World Bank 2017).

[33] Eastern region is one of the predominantly cocoa producing regions in Ghana.

[34] Gross enrollment ratios for primary school is calculated by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary education (regardless of age) by the population of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education, and multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015). In that regard, it is obvious a 2.84% increase in total population will be a factor in 106.74% enrolment given that not all school going age will be enrolled and population growth is influenced by increase in birth rate which add to the age group.

In addition to the human capital were policies for physical capital development. Nkrumah made the state machinery the primary agent that was responsible for building social and economic infrastructures (Buah 1998). In that regard, the connections and dealings between cities and towns were to be enhanced through the construction of roads along the country's spatial economy (Buah 1998). The purpose was to promote equal economic progress in all regions and eliminate the north-south gap created by the colonial administration. Adarkwa (2012:7) has reported that during the construction of roads along the country's spatial economy, main cities in Ghana, "Accra-Tema accounted for 59.5%, Kumasi had 16.5%, Sekondi-Takoradi 10.2% and other parts of the country accounted for 13.8% of all industrial establishments". Industries were built near sources of raw materials and along cities to ensure efficiency and decrease the cost of production (e.g., decrease transportation cost). Processing industries and marketing boards were set up to oversee trade of Ghana's major exports: gold and cocoa (Williams 2009).

According to the African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) (2015), Ghana was a nation ensnared in debt, rising inflation, and economic mismanagement beginning in the mid-1960s. An overvalued currency discouraged exports and began the "kalebule era"[35] (Young 1989). Ghana, at that point, lacked sufficient resources to finance the public-sector projects that Nkrumah envisioned. Foreign currency reserves were exhausted, and the government resorted to deficit financing and foreign borrowing to pay for essential imports.

The real per capita income fell by 2% annually between 1966 and 1982, while inflation rose from 6.2% to 123% per annum due to gross mismanagement of the economy by the various military leaders (Meng 2004). The 1970s were a period of steadily falling agricultural

[35] Kalebule means dominance of the black market. This period saw increased smuggling of cocoa to nearby countries, especially Côte d'Ivoire, for a higher price.

production, manufacturing output, and per capita income (Young 1989). As a result, the declining cocoa production and exports were accompanied by a rise in smuggling of the crop to neighbouring countries, especially Côte d'Ivoire (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2013). Personal enrichment and corruption became the norm of the day. And for most Ghanaians, the socialist agenda, by the late 1970s, had become a largely irrelevant construct that had ceased to provide economic benefits or opportunities for meaningful political participation.

Historically, the developmental state model for national development devolved into disillusion following the period of economic stagnation in 1975 (Harrison 2002; Chubarov 2012). The economic stagnation for the then Eastern Bloc meant Ghana no longer had enough support from its mentors to revamp its weakened macroeconomic environment. Alternatively, the increase in the global waves of globalization with its accompanying neoliberalism[36] led Ghana, under the leadership of former President Rawlings,[37] to sign on to the Economic Recovery Program (ERP) with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) with the World Bank in 1983 to reduce Ghana's debt and provide a sound macroeconomic environment for development (Vondee 2011). There existed 284 pure state-owned enterprises in 1980 (Huq 1989). And the government held the 22 most essential and sensitive enterprises, such as the utilities, cocoa, and mining industries, as at 1984 (Library of Congress 2010). Privatization of state-owned enterprises became a primary policy recommendation under both the ERP and the SAP.

[36] Neoliberalism shares the capitalist ideologies such as the free market system, and does not support state intervention in the economy as required of a developmental state. See Kapoor (2011) for further discussion on neoliberalism.

[37] Former president Rawlings had been in office for almost 20 years: 11 years as a military government and 8 years as a democratic government. See Rosemary Chinery (2000) for further discussion.

The Divestiture Implementation Committee, created in 1990 with the aid of the IMF, gradually auctioned off state enterprises to the highest bidder (Rothchild 1991). Foreign investors bought the majority of the enterprises, since many domestic entrepreneurs did not have enough resources to compete with their foreign rivals. This increased dependency at the expense of long-term self-sustaining development. By December 1990, divestiture of 34 enterprises had already occurred and, by 1992, initial measures of privatization of national banks had originated (Library of Congress 2010).

Because of the sale of state enterprises to profit-driven private investors under the ERP and the SAP, there was success in reversing the declining production of exports, especially in the cocoa, mining, and timber industries (Odutayo 2015). Following the early 1980s, gross national product grew at annual rates of 5% per year (Steer 2011). As a result, per capita income slowly began to rise and inflation decreased. Since then, Nkrumah's dream of a socialist Ghana has been replaced by neoliberal economic planning. The neoliberal economic planning has become the gateway for the US and the former European colonizers of SSA to enter Ghana's economy with trade and investment, mainly through multinational corporations (Jedwab and Osei 2012). Different development plans have been proposed by successive governments, all with mixed results (Owusu-Amoah 2015).

In summary, Malaysia and Ghana were former British colonies that adopted the developmental state model for national development after independence in 1957. Both countries were resource exporters and engaged in primary production at independence. The new leaders invested in structures for the implementation of the developmental state model to achieve their aim for economic modernization. However, different results have been observed between the two, which is the main interest under this study. In Chapter Four, the ideologies and principles of a developmental state as noted in Chapter Two are considered to guide the analysis.

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Chapter Four: Analysis

The analysis will involve a systematic review of comparable empirical data for Malaysia and Ghana, based on the themes or principles outlined for the developmental state model.

4.1. Theme 1: "A political elite committed to putting into practice a developmental ideology rooted in rapid industrialization and export-manufacturing" (Stubbs 2012:92).

The primary requirements for meeting Theme 1 are policies for economic diversification in both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and also policies for infrastructural and sectoral development.

4.1A. Agricultural development in Malaysia and Ghana

In Malaysia, the state developed programs for both small- and large-scale agriculture. The government created the postal savings system through an extensive branch network of post offices, especially in rural areas to encourage savings and provide financial assistance to farmers (Stiglitz 1996). Under the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) scheme, small landholders in particular were supported with financial assistance, while capital intensive production, such as fertilizer and chemical usage, were promoted among large landholders (Meyer and Nagarajan 1999). With the innovation in financial assistance, agricultural development, which is assessed using the share of land area, increased from 12.3% of total agricultural land in 1971 to 23.2% in 2011. That contributed to an increase in food exports from 9.42% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 11.90% in 2010 (see Table 5, Appendix). As part of the strategies for promoting the palm oil plantation, the government, in 2015, adopted a policy that decreased the environmental deterioration of the crop by conserving half of the country's naturally forested land, and also encouraged palm oil producers to improve productivity rather than expand cultivation efforts (Foh 2015). The improvement in productivity ensured a constant supply of the raw material for the industries set up by the state. That is an example of how Malaysia has transitioned from a primary (agriculture) to a manufacturing economy.

In Ghana, on the other hand, the state invested in state farms to promote large scale agricultural business, while a greater amount of the population engaged in small-scale agricultural activities, especially in rural areas. Due (1969) reported that from 1961 to 1966, 125 state farms were established by the State Farms Cooperation, 84 by the Workers Brigade and Young Farmers League, and 870 by the co-operatives as part of large scale agricultural development. The Agricultural Development Bank (ADB) was established in 1965 to provide financial assistance, especially for small-scale and rural agricultural development (Agricultural Development Bank 2014). The African Development Bank (2005) reported that policies, such as "Operation Feed Yourself /Industries" (enacted in 1972), which provided incentives, such as scholarships for farmers' children, contributed to agricultural growth rates from 4.5% in 1972 to 6% in 1973 and 7% by 1974. For instance, in real terms, the quantity of rice produced rose from 11,000 tons in 1971 to 61,000 tons in 1973, while maize recorded an increase from 53,000 tons in 1971to 430,000 tons in 1973 (African Development Bank 2005). In 1976, the first rural bank[38] was established to provide credit to small-scale farmers and to support rural businesses (World Bank 2017). Those increased food exports from 72.91% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 78.42% by 1980 (see Table 1A, Appendix). The agricultural share of GDP in 1980 was 60.06%, highest growth rate recorded in SSA at the time (see Figure 2A, Appendix). During that period, agricultural land development, which is assessed using the share of land area, increased from 51.42% in total agricultural land in 1971 to 69.09% in 2011. The steady growth in agriculture

[38] Currently, there are over 135 rural banks in the ten regions of Ghana providing micro finance and commercial banking activities in the rural areas (ADB 2017).

supplied raw materials for the industries set up by the state, such as the tomato and sugar cane factories, under the ISI strategy.

In caveat, between 1966 and 1982, Ghana experienced short-lived agricultural policies and governments due to a series of coup d'etats (National Development Planning Commission 2015). Both external (e.g., under IMF's ERP and WB's SAP) and internal (e.g., military officers, public servants, and indigenous entrepreneurs tried under the special tribunals on corruption charges as noted in Chapter Three) interest groups rallied on the instabilities to advocate their demand (e.g., in terms of liberal economic policies, public goods and national resources allocation).That affected long-term plans and programs for agricultural development. For instance, by 1990 the ADB had deviated from its primary focus of assisting rural agricultural development with loans to include international banking and trade services (ADB 2014). As a result, the share of agriculture in GDP decreased from 45.22% in 1960 to 30.83% in 2010 (see Figure 2A, Appendix). The decline in agriculture from the inadequate supply of raw materials collapsed the industries built under ISI strategy, especially agricultural industries, such as the tomato and sugar cane factories.

In summary, the bureaucracy in Malaysia and Ghana designed and implemented right policies for agricultural development after independence in 1957. However, Malaysia's bureaucracy has committed to ensure consistency in its agriculture policies for better application of developmental state, whereas Ghana's deviated and recorded inconsistences in their policies after the first coup d'etat in 1966. That explains why Ghana's industrial plans after independence could not grow to transform to become an export manufacturing economy.

4.1B. Manufacturing development in Malaysia and Ghana

In Malaysia, export processing zones were established to attract FDI in support of the EOI and, by 1980, employment in the export processing zones represented 8% of manufacturing, which was an improvement in employment from ISI[39] (Leinbach 1982). Because of the increase in FDI, the Domestic Investment Initiatives (DII) was launched in 1993 to build indigenous private capital (Piei and Tan 1999). The DII was designed to promote domestic content in local output, a policy to strengthen and enhance industrial linkages in the local capital market (Piei and Tan 1999). As a result, Malaysia in 1995 became one of the largest host countries for FDI in SEA, and received the biggest share of FDI in the region (Piei and Tan 1999). Multinational companies,[40] such as Intel and Hitachi, set up research units under EOI, which accelerated the pace of technology transfer for manufacturing development (Sivalingam 1994). Those policies for industrial development increased the share of manufacturing in GDP from 8.05% in 1960 to 23.95 in 2014 (Figure 3, Appendix).

Ghana, on the other hand, built the largest artificial harbour in Africa and processing zones in 1962, to import foreign technologies by collaborating with multinationals for a manufactured export led economy (Government of Ghana 1964). However, the lack of continuity in the state's programs during the 17 years of political instability from 1966 to 1983 distorted manufacturing development. The demands from interest groups (as discussed in Section 4.1A) weakened the foundation built for the manufactured export led economy. For instance, economic privatization and deregulation became the main condition for multinationals to invest under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and Economic Recovery Program (ERP) after 1983. That

[39] The aim was to promote labour-intensive manufacturing with the State anticipating 15,000 to 20,000 jobs per year, but only 6,800 jobs were generated per year. See Sivalingam (1994) for further discussion.
[40] Electrical and electronics accounted for 65% of all jobs in the export processing zones. More than 42% of the firms were from US and accounted for 29% of employment. See Sivalingam, (1994) for further discussion.

resulted in the gradual auctioning off of the industries (mostly state-owned industries) to foreign investors. The premature privatization and deregulation did not help nurture young industries because of market competition. According to the Ghana statistical service (2014), finance and insurance, information and communication dominated SAP and ERP investments programs in Ghana, with little investment in manufacturing industries. Those are among the reasons the share of manufacturing in GDP decreased from 11.19% in 1960 to 5.45% in 2013, while the share of services in GDP increased from 28.79% to 48.75% (see Figures 3A and 4A, Appendix). The lack of diversity in the economy, especially with the decline in both agricultural and manufacturing sectors did not support better application of developmental state in Ghana.

In summary, Malaysia and Ghana implemented the identified variables for manufacturing development after independence. However, Malaysia maintained and applied the identified key variables more effectively than Ghana because of the inefficiencies from the inconsistent use of the principles of developmental state in the latter. Specifically, Ghana deviated from the developmental state principles by falling for demands from interest groups (e.g., with the hasty change to economic liberalization after 1983).

4.1C. Infrastructural development in Malaysia and Ghana

In Malaysia, with most of the production processes in manufacturing, especially in the export processing zones, being labour-intensive, the state invested in vocational and skills development to improve its human capital with technical skills. Given that vocational enrolment increased by eight-fold, with a population increase of 2.84%, there is an indication of improvement in the total number of technical labour trained for industrial development, even though inadequate to match the total population. The state tasked firms to levy 1% of their employee salaries for approved governmental training under the Human Resource Development

Corporation (HRDC), enacted in1993 (Ritchie 2004) [41]. That ensured labourers had the required job training to meet industrial requirements and expectations for the growth in manufacturing. The improvement in human capital was also attractive for business because the investor cost in recruiting skilled labour was reduced. Additionally, trade and investment were attractive with the improvements in physical capital, such as roads, ports, and telecommunications, especially under the Privatization Master Plan of the sixth Malaysia development plan (Economic Planning Unit 2015). Developing physical capital supported the easy flow of goods and services for the manufacturing industries, such as the established petroleum refiners, breweries, and cement plants.

With respect to Ghana, polytechnics and vocational institutions were established to train technical labour for the industrial market (Akyeampong 2010). According to Ampiah et al. (2013), vocational training has recorded less investment and undermined to become a last option for failed students that do not get admission into universities. Those are among the reasons for the increase in primary and secondary school enrolments (Table 6, Appendix). Also, the programs for technical education were redesigned after 1983 with the new focus of training pupils in primary and secondary education in anticipation of better job opportunities in the service sector after graduation (Achempong 2004). It has been noted that some of the recommendations under SAP were to demand general skills instead of specific training or apprenticeships, and so encouraged an increase in high school enrolment (Achempong 2010). In addition, the 17 years of pre-university education in Ghana has become political and keeps changing with changes in the government, which interrupts long-term plans for human capital development (Akyeampong 2010). Quantity has been superior to quality education, especially

[41] At least five ministries had developed comprehensive vocational and industrial training, each with its own physical infrastructure, curricula, and teaching staff.

when school enrolment increases (e.g., when there is an increase in the number of school years) without an improvement in school infrastructures to match the change (i.e., proportional increase in school infrastructures to match enrolment).[42] The dominance of interest groups in Ghana's policies for human capital development account for the inadequate technical labour to attract large-scale capital investment and development, hence the declining growth rate in the manufacturing sector.

In regard to physical capital, the rapid infrastructural development, which occurred after independence, halted during the period of political instability from 1966 to 1983. Since 1983, plans and policies for infrastructure development have been changed and discontinued with the changes in government (see Table 9A, Appendix). There have been reports of infrastructure deficits in road, water, and electricity over the years. For instance, a quarter of Ghana's 3.8 million homes are electrified, and electricity satisfies about 10% of total energy demand, which is mainly produced from hydro sources (Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research 2008). From the late 2006 to 2007, due to a severe drought and underinvestment in power capacity, Ghana's consumers were affected by endemic power cuts (ISSER 2008). The hydroelectric dam constructed after independence has seen less investment and maintenance over the years, so it was unable to meet the increased consumption by the growing population. Ghana still experiences electric power fluctuation, which is not attractive for trade and investment, especially from foreign investors.

The World Bank (2017) has identified road deficits among the cost of doing business in Ghana. Though unattractive for investment in manufacturing, services, such as banking and telecommunication, which are easier to operate with technology, are still an investment option. The service sector is complemented with the labour trained from the investment and increases in

[42] See British Council (2015) /E585 for further discussion on quality and quantity education in Ghana.

secondary and tertiary education. The available labour to support the service sector is a factor to the decline in both agriculture and manufacturing but steady growth in service sector (Figures 2A, 3A and 4A). Thus, the steady growth in the service sector has been attractive for investment in secondary and tertiary education, but have adversely created a graduate unemployment problem. According to the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic Research (ISSER) (2016), only 10% of the country's university graduates are employed after school, with some securing a job after 10 years. The service sector neither employs substantial graduates because of the increasing use of technology in its operations (e.g., banking with computers) nor creates proportional jobs to meet the number of graduates.[43] While in 1995 only 13.4%, 0.4%, and 1.5% of jobs requiring a university degree also demanded skills in computers, communication, and personal attributes, respectively, in 2000 the proportions increased to 45.7%, 38.6%, and 41.8%, respectively (Boateng and Ofori-Sarpong 2002). Both the continuous increase in the demand for labour with computer knowledge and improvements in technology, which operates with a small labour size, indicate that the state is not fully benefitting from the increase in the investment in secondary and tertiary, to the decrease in vocational education for industrial growth. Rather, the improvement in the service sector is mainly benefiting foreign private capital (e.g., economic liberalization to increase FDI and MNC under the IMF and WB recommendation) than building domestic private capital for better application of development state.

4.1D. Sectoral development in Malaysia and Ghana

One major requirement for sectoral development is carefully selecting potential global products or industries with the right programs and policies (Chang 2003). In Malaysia, investing in human and physical capital, as discussed above, helped to maintain a comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufacturing, such as textiles and electronics for sectoral development.

[43] See Boateng and Ofori-Sarpong (2002) for further discussion.

With the enactment of the Second Industrial Master Plan (IMP2) which promoted the "Manufacturing Plus Plus" in 1996, global competitiveness and productivity became the primary requirement for FDI (Piei and Tan 1999). Those were appropriate industrial policy, programs and products for sectoral development because it provided employment and a chance to build on the indigenous skill base. Those enhanced local production capacity for economic autonomy.

In Ghana, the textile industry was selected for sectoral development because it had high demand locally for cultural purposes and potential to become a global product (Adikorley 2013). Technical education was designed to trained labour in spinning, weaving, dyeing, printing, and stitching (Bruce-Amartey et al. 2014). Under the ISI strategy, protection was offered to the textile industrial, which saw dominance in the industry by local firms to build domestic capital [44](Quartey 2006). Bruce-Amartey et al. (2014) have reported that the textile industry employed 25,000 of the labour force, accounted for 27% of total manufacturing employment and operated at about 60% of plant capacity by 1977.

However, policies for deregulation and liberalization under SAP and ERP, after the 17 years of political instability, enabled easy market entry into the textile industry after 1983. The period saw smuggling[45] of wax prints into the country to compete with local industries. Even though manufacturing exports have increased from 0.95% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 20.68% in 2010, textiles and clothing have decreased from 16.15% of total merchandise exports in 1970 to 6.44% in 2010 (Table 7 Appendix). The premature economic liberalization under SAP and ERP were not the right policy, and have impeded the growth in the textile industry, which was Ghana's sectoral development.

[44] Only 5% were involved in joint ventures with foreign investors and the remaining 95% were locally owned.
[45] Annually, GH¢50 million ($US11, 396,045) in revenue are lost due to smuggling and pirated textiles from overseas. See Amankwah-Amoah (2015) for further discussion.

In summary, Malaysia has committed to effectively implement the identified variables for agricultural, manufacturing, infrastructural, and sectoral development, and has been consistent with its usage for a more successful application of the developmental state than Ghana. The main differences between the two countries are the advent of political instability in 1966, with its accompanying economic liberalization after 1983 in Ghana which did not support the growth of domestic private capital as required of developmental state. The consistency in implementing the identified variables explain the growth in manufactured exports in Malaysia and primary exports in Ghana (see Tables 4 and 4A in Appendix).

4.1.2. Theme 2: "A relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy" (Stubbs 2012:92).

Because Malaysia and Ghana inherited under developed institutional structures from the colonial administration, regulatory and advisory agencies were established and enacted to ensure an autonomous and well-trained bureaucracy. The design and functioning of those structures to ensure better application of a developmental state model are discussed below.

4.1.2A. Performance of anti-corruption agencies in Malaysia and Ghana.

In Malaysia, the strategy by the state to monitor corruption in its institutions began after independence in 1957, with the establishment of the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) (Met 2000). MACC was designed as a replica of Hong Kong's and Australia's anti-corruption agencies, which are made up of five independent bodies to ensure transparency in its operations. By 2010, data bases for corruption charges were modelled in MACC's set up and are accessible to the general public, in addition to the 14 anti-corruption courts established to expedite corruption trials within a year (MACC 2016). The database is used as a reference by both civil servants and business groups before approving financial services, operating permits, and entry visas (MACC 2016). The Certified Integrity Officer (CeIO) program was also launched in 2010 to train both government and private officers to monitor and ensure transparency within firms (National Key Results Area 2013). As of 2013, 155 officers from both the public and the private sectors had been trained as CeIO-certified integrity officers to monitor corruption within firms (NKRA 2013).

Over the years, MACC has been successful in reducing corruption and gradually weeding out corrupt practices from the 1.6 million Malaysian civil servants, an estimated 11% of the country's labour force (Norton 2010; Ismail 2017). An estimated US$700 million corruption scandal involving president Najib was exposed by MACC in 2015, which increases public trust and confidence in the institutions (Guardian 2016). Bribe payers index[46] of Malaysia recorded a score of 7.6 out of 10 in 2011, which was slightly below the global average of 7.8, an indication Malaysia is closing the gap (i.e., improving) on institutional corruption (Sajari et al. 2016). Malaysia was ranked the 54th least corrupt out of 175 countries in 2015 (GAN Integrity 2018). During that period, the judiciary was graded medium risk and efficient in settling disputes, while the police have been recognized for their effectiveness in enforcing law and order in spite of allegations of abuse of power (GAN Integrity 2018).

In all, the design of Malaysia's anti-corruption agencies have shown four main characteristics to ensure autonomy and efficiency in operations.

i) Five independence bodies in MACC to ensure transparency. That means interest groups have to go through 5 bodies, which means it is more difficult to influence agencies.

ii) The corruption data base is accessible to the public. This creates awareness among the population so as to control the influences of dignitaries or powerful interest groups.

[46]First launched in 1999 by the Transparency International to measure the degree of bribe demanded by firms before service are delivered. The higher the index is, the more unlikely for any firm to engage in bribery. See Sajari et al. 2016 for further discussion

iii) Certified Integrity Officers (CelOs) to train corruption officers. This ensures that officers are better informed of their mandates in order to meet their job expectations.

iv) Anti-Corruption courts to expedite corruption trials within a year. This ensures delays in corruption trails are minimized.

With respect to Ghana, the criminal justice system was charged with the responsibility for investigating and prosecuting corruption after independence, but the Commission of Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) was sub-contracted under the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) in 1993 to handle institutional corruption (Asibuo 2014). The President of Ghana appoints the heads of various institutions, including ACA, and has the power to retire their appointment at any time (Anti-Corruption Authorities 2015). Because of the autonomous power given to the president in making appointments, public servants have been dependent and held in allegiance to the ruling government of the day. For instance, the Metropolitan/Municipal/District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) were ordered to hand over their duties three days after a new president was sworn in 2017 (Ghanaweb 2017). Those political arrangements have enhanced corrupt practices among civil servants when in power, and they are gradually eroding any sense of nationalism.[47]

The partisan nature of Ghana's institutions makes it difficult to control corruption, especially in public administration. As reported by Justice Francis Emile Short, Former Commissioner of CHRAJ, "the Commission's attempts to control corruption is faced with a number of limitations including financial constraints, inadequate trained staff and inability to prosecute corrupt officials" (Short 2015:9). He mentioned that "CHRAJ can only report corrupt persons to the attorney general, which the latter may choose not to prosecute, especially if the

[47] Frequent change in government officials with change in government have decreased their commitment in line of duties, creating popular slogan "Aban Adwuma" meaning government work need less commitment to personal or private work.

persons involved are members of the existing political administration" (Short 2015:9). For instance, a public private partnership between the republic of Ghana and a Ghanaian businessman in 2008 to construct stadia was used as a channel for public funds to be transferred into private pockets. In the aforementioned PPP agreement, the government's budget for the project was inflated for the additional amount to be paid into cronies' (i.e., sort of cartel in the public administration) pocket. The supreme court of Ghana in 2014 ruled that the private businessman return GH¢51 million (US$11, 850,846) as judgment debt to the state, but is yet to be refund three years after the ruling (Amidu 2016). The mention of the then attorney general and minister of justice, as beneficiary of $1 million out of the contentious judgment debt case has made enforcing the ruling difficult (Amidu 2016). With respect to financial constraints faced by the anti-corruption agencies, Joseph Whittal, the current CHRAJ boss, noted that only GH¢450,000 (US$108,449) of the budgeted GH¢15,240,000 (US$3,672,822) was received from the government in 2015 (Ghana Web 2017). This demonstrates the lack of commitment by the state to build strong institutions to control corruption.

Public servants have been known to demand tips to expedite services because of the inadequate remuneration (GAN Integrity 2018). In addition to the demand for tips, the security agencies have been ranked the highest of corrupt institutions, with 89% of Ghanaians perceiving corruption among police officers (Afrobarometer 2017). Also, three quarters of the citizens perceive the courts to suffer from corruption, and the judiciary system has been ranked as high risk due to its corrupt practices (GAN Integrity 2013). An extortion and bribery case involving 180 judicial officials, 34 judges, and several state attorneys and prosecutors was revealed in 2015 by a private investigative journalist, which corroborates the assumption of judicial corruption in

Ghana (Mark 2015). In 2015, Ghana was ranked the 56th least corrupt out of 175 countries (Transparency International 2016).

In all, Ghana's anti-corruption agencies lack the autonomy to operate by showing the following characteristics.

i). One independent body (i.e., the president in making appointments). As such, it is easier for interest groups to influence agencies, just as dignitaries can influence anti-corruption agencies.

ii) No central data base. A factor that shows little desire and investment by the state to develop infrastructural structures to control corruption.

iii) No training. There are no special officers trained to prosecute corruption charges.

iv). No special court. This contributes to the delays in prosecuting corruption charges.

In summary, Malaysia and Ghana have had several programs to build their institutions for national development. The data shows corruption is high in both countries, 54th and 56th in Malaysia and Ghana, respectively. This is due to the fact that both countries have trouble prosecuting high-placed officials. The law does not fully apply to high profile dignitaries, cronies or the rich as it deals with the poor or vulnerable in the society in their corruption fight. On that account, it can be seen that the anti-corruption agencies are working hard to expose corruption in the society, but ensuring that all those accused of corruption are dealt with is often a futile endeavour. Bribe-taking by the police in enforcement of the law is so rampant that those who can't afford to pay are denied justice whilst the rich and powerful are able to avoid prosecution for corruption and other illegalities. The effects of corruption on each country's economic development depends on the difference in its management. While cronies are favorite candidates to be awarded contracts in Malaysia, the more public awareness from the investments in corruption institutions, together with policies such as clause and targets, leave investors with little option not to deliver (see Theme 5 for further discussion on clause and targets in production). In Ghana, there are weaker anti-corruption mechanisms, such that there is the predominance of dignitaries and political appointees who are awarded contracts with no clause for investors in production, and who either loot from the state coffers or just produce shoddy work. Whilst both countries have the agencies to monitor, evaluate, and prosecute corruption in state institutions and to control abuses by interest groups, Malaysia provides better financing, training, and infrastructures for its integrity and accountability program. Although there may be some transparency issues in the management of the national purse, the work ethic and efficiency in project monitoring appear to have boosted Malaysia's economic growth. On that account, it is subjectively concluded that Malaysia anti-corruption institutions are working better based on the rapid economic growth than Ghana's.

4.1.2B. Performance of research and development agencies in Malaysia and Ghana.

In Malaysia, research and development in public administration increased to over 80% from 1957 to 1985 (Brown 1993). The aim was to assist the public sector to make informed decisions in support of national development. The Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development (APITD), which involved domestic and foreign researchers, was introduced to collaborate with existing research agencies under the National Council for Scientific Research and Development in order to expand and build local research capacity (Brown 1993). In an attempt to make Malaysia autonomous in research, APTID projected self-financing targets of 30% by 1995 and 60% by 2000 for state-owned research institutions (Brown 1993). The goal was to enable the state to direct research focusing mainly on addressing challenges in the country's development attempt.

In general, research and development has received much attention and investment in Malaysia to assist regulatory and advisory agencies with timely and informative ideas for national development. As a result, data is accessible and readily available to help policy makers in making informed economic decisions. There is evidence that the Economic Planning Unit[48] (EPU) has periodically reviewed and recommended plans and policies for economic development. In all, three main characteristics have been exhibited by the research agencies in Malaysia to be autonomous.

i). Increase in research in public administration to 80% by 1985. This indicates the state's interest in providing scientific evidence to inform its bureaucracy in carrying out their operations.

ii). APITD. The state has implemented a policy to train expertise in research by collaborating with foreign researchers. At the same time, the state foresighted self-financing for each period to control foreign dominance and donor influence.

iii). Periodic review by EPU. Ensuring that the bureaucracy is informed of the new trends means they are able to adjust and upgrade to meet current demand in their operations.

In Ghana, public universities were equipped and received more funds from the state to conduct research after independence. However, public universities' research expenditures fell from 0.7% of GDP to 0.2% of GDP from 1976 to 1983 (Effah 2003). The interest and funding for research in public administration reduced until private agencies (mostly donor funded) increased interest in research[49] (Centre for Learning on Evaluation and Results Anglophone Africa 2013). Private research agencies are faced with inadequate technical staff and limited statistical data, so they collaborate with public universities, but tend to dictate the research focus

[48] The main government agency conducting research for planning and policy for the country's development attempts.
[49] These involve consultants, private universities, think tanks, and professional evaluators.

with their funding (Owusu-Amoah 2013). The donor-funded research creates bias findings based on the stance of funders. Also, because public administration lacks the autonomy in research, outcomes are mostly ignored, especially when they are not beneficial to the donors. For instance, Theme 1 shows the lack of continuity in the implementation of the agricultural policies are the cause of the decline in its growth. However, recent donor funded research is advocating for Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) as the solution to the declined agricultural production (Gakpo 2017). An advocacy when successfully implemented is likely to create dependence on donor countries for GMO seeds in furtherance of the colonial economic arrangement. In all, the following less autonomous characteristics have been exhibited by the research agencies in Ghana.

i). Research in public administration has decreased. The decrease indicates less scientific evidence available to inform the bureaucracy in carrying out their operations.

ii). Donor funded research. That indicates the state has less autonomy to control foreign dominance and donor influence in directing research to focus on addressing the nation's challenges.

iii) Financial constraint. This demonstrates less interest by the state to invest in research agencies, so it is easier for interest groups to influence research focus with their funding.

To conclude, Malaysia has continued to invest in research by providing finance and infrastructures to be autonomous, whereas Ghana has recorded less investment and become dependent on donors. The data suggests presence of better scientific evidence to affect policies in Malaysia than Ghana.

4.1.2C. Performance of tertiary education in Malaysia and Ghana.

Table 6 in the Appendix shows the state in Malaysia has continuously invested in education to train its bureaucracy. By establishing partnerships with foreign researchers, skills were transferred into the country. Therefore, learning from foreign expertise and investing in primary, secondary, and tertiary education was easily comprehended. Tertiary education provides the required training to engage in research activities and serves as a source of labour for managerial positions. Also, tertiary education trains the bureaucracy to understand and interpret data from the research agencies for national development.

Similarly, Table 6 in Appendix indicates educational institutions have received more investments in Ghana to train pupils for admission into universities. The increase in education indicates investment by the state to train its bureaucracy for managerial positions. That also means it is easier for the bureaucracy to be able to interpret and comprehend research outcomes for national development.

In summary, Malaysia has anti-corruption and research agencies, which are not captured by interest groups, and invested in education simultaneously for a relatively autonomous, well-trained bureaucracy. Tertiary education ensures that the bureaucracy have scientific understanding of research findings from the research agencies on the challenges of the country, and are not influenced by interest groups in implementing policies to address them.

On the other hand, Ghana's anti-corruption and research agencies have shown less autonomy in their operations. There has been an improvement in education to train the bureaucracy to manage public administration. However, the lack of autonomy in anti-corruption and research agencies do not complement the training from education agencies. As a result, the bureaucracy is not able to enforce and direct research to address national challenges. On that account, business and interest groups can influence the bureaucracy to implement research findings to their advantage. The better institutions in Malaysia than Ghana, are among the reasons the 20 years of political leadership under Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, and President Jerry John Rawlings, in Malaysia and Ghana respectively, recorded higher economic growth in the former than in the latter.

4.1.3. Theme 3: "A pilot agency that controls industrial policy through its influence over planning, energy, production, finance and trade" (Stubbs 2012:92).

The influence over planning, energy, production, finance, and trade is to ensure that the economy overcomes challenges associated with macroeconomic management, such as high inflation and external shocks on the exchange rate (i.e., currency crisis). This section assesses the macroeconomic environment in Malaysia and Ghana to determine if they followed the identified variables for a more successful application of the developmental state.

4.1.3A. Macroeconomic Indicators in Malaysia

Macroeconomic indicators are statistics that provide insight into the performance of an economy. It helps to monitor and measure the growth of an economy and to make a projection. Table 8, below, is example of macroeconomic indicators in Malaysia since 1961.

Table 8: Macroeconomic Indicators in Malaysia

Year	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2014
Economic Growth (%)	7.6	5.75	6.94	9.55	0.52	5.29	6.01
Inflation (%)	-0.18	1.61	9.7	4.36	1.42	3.2	3.14
Savings (%)	***	25.02	22.33	29.31	32.5	34.12	29.24
Government Debt (% of GDP)	***	***	***	73.32	43.05	50.03	53
External Debt (% of GDP)	***	16.99	38.04	36.6	52.48	49.81	60.17

Tax Revenue (% of GDP)	***	***	***	19.39	17.79	14.79	15.61
Total reserve (% of GDP)	***	117.98	54.73	68.60	66.09	92.18	58.99

Source: Global Economy (2015); World Bank (2017)

4.1.3B. Macroeconomic management in Malaysia: Exchange Rate Policies

After independence, the Malaysian dollar (now ringgit) was pegged to the British pound, but switched from the pound in 1972 to peg against the US dollar after devaluation in the British pound[50] (Bank Negara Malaysia 2017). Malaysia adopted a managed floating exchange rate system after 1973, primarily because of the increase in the capital inflow[51] (Elizabeth and Bauer 2011). To avoid currency crises under the floating exchange rate regime, the central bank used either expansionary or contractionary monetary and fiscal policies, depending on the performance of the economy (Elekdag et al. 2012). The aim was to reduce speculation and be able to adjust policies to signs of currency fluctuation for exports to be competitive. Since 1975, Malaysia has turned to a dirty float, where the currency is pegged with a basket of currencies (Aziz 2013). The basket of currencies was not to be disclosed after 1986 due to depreciation in the US dollar (Elizabeth and Bauer 2011)[52].

4.1.3C. Why Macroeconomic management in Malaysia was right

The Table 8 above shows Malaysia's macroeconomic indicators have been favourable for rapid growth since 1961. The economy grew steadily, averaging an annual growth rate of 5.96% from 1961 to 2014, with a minimum of 0.52% in 2001 and a maximum of 9.55% in 1991 (refer to Table 8). The total reserves were highest at 117.98% of the share of total external debt in

[50] A wider band of 4.5% for fluctuations of the market exchange rate was allowed.
[51] As discussed in Chapter Three and theme 1 in this chapter, foreign direct investment increased in the export zones after Malaysia switched to Export-Oriented Industrialization (EOI).
[52] See Elizabeth and Bauer (2011) for details on the main monetary and fiscal policies used over the years

1971, an indication that enough reserves were kept during the pegged exchange rate regime by the central bank to supply the market with the right money supply to maintain the fluctuations in inflation and the exchange rate. The state revised the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) to a flat rate in 1989 for all financial institutions to control speculation and competition among the banks (Piei and Tan 1999). That accounted for the lowest inflation of -0.18% recorded in 1961. Thus, Malaysia under the ISI and pegged exchange rate regime recorded the highest reserves to increase reserve cover for retained imports (i.e., be able to finance imports and to balance any unexpected capital movements), which contributed to the lowest external debt of 16.99% share of gross national income (GNI) recorded in 1971.

Malaysia did not adopt full-scale financial liberalization. The central bank in 1994, under the Exchange Control Act of 1953, imposed restrictions on the floating exchange market by limiting nontrade related currency swap transactions, as well as prohibited the sale of short-term monetary instruments (e.g., Treasury bills) to non- residents (Piei and Tan 1999). That maintained the high reserves to give the central bank the ease, whenever there is the need to mop up excess liquidity for a competitive export, with the launch of EOI strategy in 1968.

Beginning in the 1980s, the state strengthened prudential regulations, also known as regulations for safety and soundness, to control financial indiscipline (Stiglitz 1996). For instance, modern prudential rules together with traditional interactive monitoring where supervisors elicit cooperation by using the government's leverage over branch licensing, reduced governments' leverage on bank, rediscounts, adopted the capital adequacy requirements for international settlements, and required stronger indirect prudential regulation (Stiglitz 1996). The government budget deficit from 1988 to 2015 averaged -2.96% of GDP: highest at 2.40% of GDP in 1997 (during the Asian Financial Crisis) and lowest at -6.70% of GDP in 2009 (Trading

Economics 2017). The average government debt from 1961 to 2014 was 42.34% of GDP (see Table 8). The state's effort to manage its spending has ensured that fiscal policies are able to withstand adverse shocks. In their study of the effect of external debt and macroeconomics performance, Loganathan and Sukemi (2010) observed that, although Malaysia has witnessed unstable macroeconomic environment in some periods in its development attempts, the external debt was sustainable with its macroeconomic performance over the years.

The Table 8 above shows inflation has remained below 4% throughout the last five decades, with the exception of 9.7% in 1981. The lower inflation reduces the degree of uncertainty for long term planning. Also, the average value for savings to GDP was 28.75%, with a minimum of 22.33% in 1981 and a maximum of 34.12% in 2011. The state encouraged domestic savings through the Employees Provident Fund (EPF), where both employers and employees invest 75% of their savings portfolio in Malaysia Government Security (MGS) (Brown 1993). At the same time, companies were compelled to rely on retained earnings to finance their projects to ensure efficient use of funds (Brown 1993). The MGS was used to raise funds from the domestic capital market to finance the state's development expenditure. The interest rate was lowered, and as a results household's incomes were transferred to the corporate sector which has higher propensity to save (Stiglitz 1996). By increasing national savings, the pressure on interest and exchange rates were effectively managed with the high reserve accumulated.

In summary, there is evidence that Malaysia has strong macroeconomic indicators, particularly in the areas of reserves, external debt, inflation, and savings, which are consistent with sound macroeconomic environment for rapid economic growth. On that account, the state has become autonomous in establishing policies for national development. For instance, Malaysia stood out as a country in SEA that refused IMF financial assistance and economic advice after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 (IMF 2000). Because of the conducive macroeconomic environment, the managers have been able to control production, finance, and trade for industrial development.

4.1.3D. Macroeconomic Indicators in Ghana

Table 8A, below, provides macroeconomic indicators in Ghana.

Table 8A: Macroeconomic Indicators in Ghana

Year	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2014
Economic Growth (%)	3.43	5.22	-3.5	5.28	4	14.05	3.99
Inflation (%)	26.44	9.56	116.5	18.03	32.91	8.75	15.49
Savings (%)	***	14.44	5.61	11.7	16.86	16.78	15.79
External Debt (% of GDP)	***	22.86	36.56	67.65	131.77	29.28	49.77
Tax Revenue (% of GDP)	***	***	***	13.16	17.19	14.87	***
Total reserve (% of GDP)	***	7.94	17.44	14.70	5.48	52.68	***

Source: Global Economy (2015); World Bank (2017)

4.1.3E. Macroeconomic management in Ghana: Exchange Rate Policies

Ghana, after independence, adopted the fixed exchange rate regime where the Ghanaian pound (now cedi) was pegged to the British pound up to 1966 and the U.S. dollar up to 1982 (Ministry of Finance 2017). With the introduction of economic liberalization under the WB's SAP and IMF's ERP in 1983, the country adopted a flexible exchange rates regime following three stepwise approaches, involving the auction, the interbank, and the forex bureau market (Bank of Ghana 2001). The aim was to eliminate the direct control of the exchange rate by the state, with policies such as import license for importers, for a liberal regime (i.e., exchange rate determine by market forces, demand and supply). Ghana is currently managing a floating exchange rate system where the forces of demand and supply determine the exchange rate but with some intervention from the central bank (Mumuni and Owusu-Afriyie 2004).[53]

4.1.3F. Why Macroeconomic management in Ghana was not right

The economy grew unsteadily, averaging an annual growth rate of 4.64% from 1961 to 2014, with a minimum of -3.5% in 1981 and a maximum of 14.05% in 2011 (refer to Table 8A). Ghana recorded the second lowest total reserves at 7.94% of GDP in 1971, under a pegged exchange rate regime and the ISI strategy. With the minimal success under the ISI strategy as discussed in Theme 1, Ghana remained a primary producing economy (i.e., dependent on earnings from its raw material exports). On that account, the total reserve earnings in the economy became more vulnerable to the decline in price of Ghana's main exports, gold and cocoa in 1975, so the exchange rate depreciated.

Beginning in the 1980s, the main monetary policies adopted by the central bank was a move from the direct control measures towards a market based system to achieve price stability. Under the market based system, reserve money served as the main operating target, money supply (M2+) as the intermediate target, with the final target being inflation (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Under the financial assistance and economic advice from the IMF, the state adopted full-scale financial liberalization where policy instruments used included open market operations in both government securities and foreign exchange, repurchase agreements, reserve requirements imposed on deposit money banks, and the setting of interest rates (Youngblood 2000). According to Table 8A, inflation rose to 116.5% and a negative growth rate at -3.5% in 1981.Thus, under the pegged exchange rate regime, output growth fell more sharply during

[53] See Younger (2003) for more details on the main monetary and fiscal policies used over the years.

downswings and the exchange rate could not fall enough to keep the country's commodity exports competitive.

The central bank maintained the managed floating exchange rate by determining the amount of currency in circulation either by injecting or draining reserves from the banking system (Youngblood 2000). For instance, in 1998 and 1999, the central bank was successful in maintaining a stable nominal exchange rate, but at the cost of running down its international reserves (Youngblood 2000). The Ghana cedi in 2013 became the 2nd worst performer in SSA after the South African Rand with a 23% depreciation, prompting an injection of US$60 million by the central bank to control further decline (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Contrary to the anticipated stability after the injection, panic buying of the dollar increased the black market premium (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014).

Inflation in Ghana is positively related to money supply and the exchange rate, while it is negatively related to real income (Bawumia and Abradu-Otoo 2003). Laryea and Senadza (2017:7) reported that, "a 100% increase in the exchange rate in Ghana is statistically significant on prices of domestic consumer price index with an estimated rise of 5% to 10%". The increase in inflow of capital after the economic liberalization under SAP and ERP in 1983 was successful in reversing the negative economic growth of -3.5 in 1981 to 5.28 in 1991 reaching all time high at 14.05% in 2011. Table 8A shows inflation decreased from 116.5% in 1981 to 18.03% in 1991. Because reserves decreased from 17.44% of GDP in 1981 to 14.70% of GDP in 1991, the increased inflow of capital after the economic liberalization meant government had to increase borrowing under the managed floating exchange rate system to maintain stability in currency from the speculative activities from the interbank and the forex bureau market. It has been noted that since 2002, the central bank under the Bank of Ghana Act 2002 adopted inflation targeting (mainly targeting single digit inflation) as a strategy for conducting monetary policy (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Under the inflation targeting strategy, the central bank together with the Ministry of Finance set and target a specific level of inflation[54] depending on the fiscal position of the government (Quartey and Afful-Mensah 2014). Quartey (2010) has noted that targeting single digit inflation by the central bank does not optimize growth in Ghana, therefore, *"getting the price right*" characteristic of a developmental state was not achieve.

In their study of the effect of trade and exchange rate policies in Ghana, Laryea and Senadza (2017) noted one cause of budget imbalances in the country is financial indiscipline by government, especially during election years. The regulatory authorities have been noted to increase money supply which adversely affects interest rates (Laryea and Senadza 2017). The central bank is legislated to be the government's financier, and also mandated to set interest rates depending on the cost of servicing the government's debt (Youngblood 2000). The authority of the central bank in its operation is undermined by the economic priorities of the government (e.g., increase spending during election years) due to the autonomy of the president to appoint head of various institutions in the country (e.g., governor of the central bank) as discussed in theme 2. Because of the lack of financial discipline, the government budget deficit to GDP from 2004 to 2016 averaged -8.36%: highest at -0.40% in 2004 and lowest at -24.20% in 2008 (Trading Economics 2017). Also, the debt to GDP averaged 58.13% from 1990 until 2015, with a maximum high of 111.90% in 2000 and a minimum low of 26.20% in 2006 (Trading Economics 2017). The external debt increased to 131.77% in 2001, causing a rise in inflation to 32.91%, a fall in economic growth to 4%, and the reserve declined to 5.48% (refer to Table 8A). As a result, Ghana had to sign into donor debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

[54] See Quartey and Afful-Mensah (2014, 5) for targeted inflation rate from 2002 to 2012.

(HIPC) initiative in 2001[55] and be dependent on aid[56] for development (IMF 2002). The average value for savings to GDP during that period was 13.53% with a minimum of 5.61% in 1981 and a maximum of 16.86% in 2001 (Table 8A). The cedi redenomination in 2007 became necessary as a result of years of decline in the currency's value, which decreased confidence in the national currency (Aziz 2009).[57]According to Youngblood (2000) nominal interest rates have been maintained at high levels to induce the banks and the non-bank public to hold large quantities of securities issued by the government to finance its large budget deficits. For instance, the interest rate in the last quarter of 1999 was raised from 26% to 45% by 2000 to control depreciation of the Ghana cedi (Youngblood 2000).

The Table 8A indicates Ghana recorded its highest growth at 14.05% in 2011, with the addition of oil production to its commodity depended economy. However, the increase in borrowing while failing to keep public spending under control after the beginning of oil production in 2010 changed the economic fortune in 2014, where economic growth dropped to 3.99%, forcing another IMF bailout (Mark 2014).

In summary, Ghana has shown mixed macroeconomic performance since independence, with significant shocks being amplified by policy slippages and resulting in external and domestic imbalances. The policies after the full-scale liberalization in 1983 encouraged capital flight, which made the primary producing economy (i.e., agricultural and extractive products) more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations to ensure autonomy in financing. That has

[55] HIPC initiative assistance was $781 million in Net Present Value (NPV) terms, equivalent to a total debt-service saving of $1,446 million over the next 20 years. Debt-service savings from multilateral lenders delivered $95 million per year over the next 10 years. See IMF and IDA (2002) for further discussion.

[56] Aid makes up 16% of Ghana's annual budget. See Tierney et al. (2011) for further discussion.

[57]Majority of financial transactions are done with cash, so commercial banks were facing high cash-based transaction costs because relatively large quantities of notes were needed for transactions. See Aziz (2009) for further discussion.

made the managers of the economy dependent on aid and donor funds and, therefore, unable to control industrial policies by influencing production, trade, and finance for sustainable growth, especially for a manufacturing economy.

In general, the central banks in Malaysia and Ghana have worked with the state to provide the required money supply to the market to control inflation, exchange rate and interest rates in a bid to make exports competitive. Thus, the central bank has been the main agency that has maintained the link between the state and business to control industrial policy.

4.1.4 Theme 4: "A rational industrial strategy that facilitates economic development" (Stubbs 2012: 92).

A stable political administration as a rational industrial strategy is its enabling environment for investment and continuity of long-term development plans. Malaysia and Ghana are assessed on those variables as rational strategy to facilitate economic development.

4.1.4A. Political Environment in Malaysia.

There has been strict adherence to separation of powers between the monarch and the parliament (a political arrangement which is similar to the British indirect rule). Both the royals and the citizens have maintained democratic processes in choosing leaders among the monarchy and the parliament, respectively. At the same time, there has been compromise for an inclusive government, by creating multiple layers of leadership for the three main racial political parties to merge together. As a result, the Barisan Nasional (National Front), a coalition of United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC), have remained the dominant ruling party since independence. The enforcement of separation of power present accountability, checks and balance among the governing bodies.

That has created a stable political environment which has enabled the implementation of long term plans for national development (see Table 3, Appendix).

In addition to maintaining cooperation between the monarchy and parliament, the government has implemented policies to control and meet the demands of interest groups. It has been noted that the major political instability in 1969 was due to the widening economic gap among the racial groups, especially the Malays.[58] The state's policies to address the inequality gap favored the most affected groups. Even though the government acted as a custodian for the economic interest of all the racial groups, the social position of the Malays as the indigenes of the country to record asymmetrical distribution of economic assets made the government prioritized its custodian for Malay economic interests (Guan 2005). Part of the government initiatives were established new industrial activities in selected growth areas and placed them under Malay control, while offering training in technical and consultancy services to improve the Malays' entrepreneurship and management position (Brown 1993). The government reassessed the initiative to narrow the economic gap through a new development policy called the National Economic Policy (NEP) in 1971 (Roslan 2001). This occurred after complaints of unequal allocation of the nation's riches, particularly by Malays.[59] To narrow the economic gap among the various ethnic groups, Brown (1993) reported that the state introduced ownership restructuring targets in 1973 where the share of corporate wealth that could be owned by indigenous Malaysians, other Malaysians, and overseas investors was 30:40:30, respectively. Also, state-owned banks introduced quotas, which gave indigenously owned enterprises

[58] In Malaysia, the major flaw of political instability occurred on May 13th, 1969. This was a result of ethnic violence between Chinese and Malay groups in Kuala Lumpur, then part of the state of Selangor (see Dadzie 2011).

[59] Between the 1964 and 1969 elections, ethnic tension regarding the asymmetrical distribution of economic assets was emerging despite some progress towards equality in certain sectors. At that time, Malays owned 1.5% of all equity in companies in Peninsular Malaysia, Chinese owned 22.8% and Indians 0.9%. See Ritchie (2004).

preferential access to funds. Table 9 in Appendix shows meeting the demands of the various interest groups and governing in line with the constitutional mandate has created a stable political environment for continuity in development plans. The vision for national development has been maintained, irrespective of the political regimes. The political stability in the country has helped the various administrations adopt and adapt to new techniques for rapid economic growth.[60]

Though Malaysia has maintained the rule of law and allowed a democratic process in the selection of leaders to fill the various administrative positions, the leadership has been noted to be autocratic in delivering their duties. The U.S. State Department (2009) reported civil rights violations, such as labour rights abuse, and forced imprisonment, in Malaysia's political administration. However, the autocratic style has been channeled mainly towards the delivering on economic plans than to retain political power in government, which has fueled the country's industrial growth (International Labor Organization 2016).

In summary, the political climate in Malaysia has been rational to facilitate economic development. The boundaries and consistencies set in running the monarchy and the parliament to meet the basic needs of the governed and resolve factional conflicts through the equitable distribution of resources have helped to maintain political stability in the country. For instance, the political stability provided an enabling environment to switch from the failed ISI strategy as discussed in theme 1 to the EOI strategy. Also, by having representatives of each racial and interest group in the political administration and being accorded the same degree of power and responsibility both at the federal and state level puts pressure on the leadership to perform to please their groups. The pressure on the leadership to perform drove the desire to achieve the

[60] See Economic Planning Unit (2017) for reviews and policy adjustments in Malaysia's development plans since independence.

national agenda rather than meeting group interests. In regard to the issue of civil rights violations by the autocratic leadership, there is evidence of no targeted group (e.g., specific racial group), but a national issue affecting all citizens. The increase in the middle class from the growth in per capital income will gradually decrease the extent of civil rights violations, which is a feature of growing democracy.

4.1.4B. Political Environment in Ghana

By sidelining the monarch (or chiefs)[61] in the political administration after the end of the British indirect rule in 1957 has created power struggles to delay plans for national development. The chiefs, who mostly hold on to traditional customs and beliefs, present different ideologies in governing their territories (Antwi-Bediako 2018). The delays in adopting and adapting to new trends by the traditional rulers, as well as the inequitable distribution of resources increases factional conflicts. Also, an inclusive government for national development has been impossible with the sole autonomy by the president to appoint leaders for the three arms of government, especially with the support from the power of the majority group in parliament. Those have deepened partisan politics and impeded long-term national development.

As discussed in Chapter Three, there was no compromise for an inclusive government after the first president formed his own party by breaking away from his former party prior to independence. That increased agitations both internally and externally in the attempts to create a one-party state, which resulted in a series of coup d'états from late 1966 to 1982 (see Table 3, Appendix). The 17 years of political instability resulted in short-term planning and abrogating of national plans under each regime (see Table 9A, Appendix). One million Ghanaians, including

[61] In Ghana, customary authorities– namely chiefs and family heads– are responsible for protecting and administering rights to land for the benefit of the communities that they govern. This allow the chiefs to lease land to investors who are able to forego requirements by state institutions (e.g., the mineral commission) for their operation. See Antwi-Bediako (2018) for further discussion.

locally trained teachers, were deported from Nigeria in 1983 (Anaman 2006). The African Capacity Building Foundation (2002) reported that 60% of all Ghanaian doctors trained locally in the 1980s have left the country; an indication of the extent to which brain drain increased during the instability period to retard economic growth. Due to the political turmoil, policy makers had to restructure development plans by strengthening state institutions and drafting a new constitution in 1992 to maintain a stable political environment for six successive multi-party elections (National Development Planning Commission 2010). The National Development Planning Commission was established in 1994 and the first long-term development plan, the Ghana Vision 2020, was proposed (NDPC 2010).

The Ghana Vision 2020 could not be completed because of the democratic arrangement that followed the 1992 constitution. As discussed in Chapter Three, attempts to end corruption by confiscating properties from the elites in the early 1980s created divisions and alliances among the population, which has resulted in a monopoly of power between two main political parties in Ghana. A situation where members see nothing good from the development plans of the opposite camp. Although the two main political parties sharing the monopoly have held power each in every 8 years since 1992, there has been discontinuity and abrogating of national development plan with every change in government. For instance, the Ghana Vision 2020 lasted for 5 years because of change in government in 2000 (see Table 9A, Appendix). Table 9A in the Appendix shows there has been completion of development plans since 2000. That is a result of the 8 years of power held by the two main political parties. However, both political parties have changed the national plans in each 8 years assumption of power, under the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I and II) and the Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I and II), respectively (see Table 9A, Appendix). For example, the total of 17 years pre-university education keeps changing with the changes in government, which interrupts long-term plans for human capital development (Akyeampong 2010). The human capital development, which was used as rational strategy to mobilize the diverse ethnic groups together, especially in northern Ghana, has been turned into partisan politics since 1992. This has increased inequality and widened the economic gap between the southerners and the northerners, similar to the colonial development.[62]

In summary, the period of instability in governance from the first military coup d'état in 1966 and the restoration of a constitutional democracy in 1992, had an immense adverse effect on national economic planning and development. For instance, the political instabilities did not provide an enabling environment for Ghana to either adjust policies or switch from the ISI strategy to EOI to grow its domestic industry before the full-scale economic liberation in 1983 under the ERP and the SAP. The period of democratic rule after 1992 has also been marked by political rancor between the country's two major political parties, who on their respective assumptions of power have rejected most of the existing plans from their predecessors, irrespective of their viability. The post-independence era in Ghana has, therefore, been characterized by discontinuity and short-term development planning, weak institutional structures for oversight, and a lack of accountability in developmental expenditures. Those do not ensure a more successful application of the developmental state.

[62] See Qui (2012) and Government of Ghana (2017) for further discussion of inequalities in regional economic developments in Ghana.

4.1.5 Theme 5: "Strong links between the bureaucracy and business that blurs the line between public and private and allows the bureaucracy to guide industrial development" (Stubbs 2012:92).

The link between the bureaucracy and business to develop domestic private capital in Malaysia and Ghana are discussed below.

4.1.5A.The link between the bureaucracy and business in Malaysia.

In Malaysia, to ensure efficiency in production, industries, mostly underperforming State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) were divested, and also targets were set (e.g., clause to lose incentives) for selected industries in their operations (Brown 1993). The government directed credit to priority firms, groups, industries, and also set a 60% target of total investment for the share of domestic investment in the long run (Piei and Tan, 1999). The fear of losing government support enhanced efficiency in production and ensured that the targets to build domestic private capital by the state were met. An example is the Proton Saga, which to a degree enjoyed a monopoly in their operation to produce the so-called Malaysian car (Bello 2007). The Proton Saga guaranteed a monopoly for "a state-directed joint venture between a state-owned firm and a foreign automobile transnational corporation, Mitsubishi in their operation, thereby, controlled two-thirds of domestic market in 2007" (Bello 2007:170). Labour laws were tightened to control trade unions to maintain a comparative advantage, especially in labour-intensive manufacturing (Jomo 1990). As a result, the initiatives for public-private partnership in industries, were successful in developing domestic private capital.

Those initiatives used by the state to build domestic private capital complemented foreign private capital when the state relaxed its role to promote private-led development. The complementarity and cooperation between both sources of capital have been attractive to business and allowed the state the autonomy to continue to intervene in the market by directing industrial development. An example is the state's policy to develop 24 National Key Economic Areas (NKEA) by allowing the private sector to make investment and employment decisions under the Economic Transformation Programme in 2010 (ETP 2016). Such a link between the bureaucracy and business is possible because of the better application of the identified variables in Malaysia, as discussed in themes one, two and three in this chapter.

4.1.5B.The link between the bureaucracy and business in Ghana

Foreign-owned enterprises were nationalized and underperforming SOEs continued to receive government bailouts in spite of inefficiencies and corrupt practices (Killick 1994). Also, by establishing joint ventures with foreign investors, no targets were set, and the existence of liberal labour laws made trade unions stronger (Gockel and Vormawor 2004). With no targets set for production and stronger labour unions, cronies and cabals were empowered to influence policies to cover their inefficiencies, which did not help to build domestic private capital. The state's inability to build domestic private capital empowered foreign private capital (after 1983) to invest on conditions such as privatization and deregulation under the umbrella of the IMF's ERP and the World Bank's SAP. The state was unable to resist those demands from the interest groups (i.e., foreign private capital) because, at that time, the foreign capital was a requirement to rebuild the economy due to the poor macroeconomic conditions discussed in theme three. As a result, the state lost the autonomy to direct the market for national interest. The weak links between the bureaucracy and business are the result of the weaker application of the identified variables in Ghana, as discussed in themes one, two and three in this chapter.

4.1.6. Theme 6: Impact of socio-political settings to national development.

Both the SEA and the SSA regions are assessed to see if the socio-political settings contribute to a better application of the developmental state model in Malaysia than in Ghana.

4.1.6A. Impact of Socio-political settings to Malaysia's development

SEA, over the years, has shown consistencies and similarities in their policies for development, which have been described by scholars as the Asian model (World Bank 1993). In the Asian model, due to the underdeveloped institutions and infrastructures at the early stage of development, the leadership strictly adheres to pragmatic political and industrial policies for rapid economic growth. The leaders in the early stage of development are often dictators who curtail civil liberties to reach targeted development goals. Leitch (1989) has observed that deviant behaviours, such as corruption and opposing views, are abolished or trialed without following legal procedures. The intent is to avoid delays, such as in the legal process, to support the vision for national development. Jin (2003) noted that public information (e.g., media) is controlled by the state. This is to propagate the state's plans and vision for national development. For instance, information broadcast by the media is regulated to ensure it is consistent with the governing ideology for national development. Labour (e.g., unions) is restricted to forgo pressure and agitations from interest groups for remuneration and better conditions of service (e.g., fair wages and maximum legal work hours) (Jomo 1990). The World Bank (1993) has observed that sound macroeconomic policies and infrastructural investments are kept in place with an aim of transforming the country into a market economy. Also, the IMF (2004) has mentioned that policy reform, for instance liberalization of the trade and financial sectors, is used in the later stages of development. Infrastructural investments, trade, and financial policies in the Asian model are consistent with the characteristics of a developmental state as indicated in Chapter Two which contribute to a more successful application of the model. The leadership style and policies from the Asian model have been consistent, and also similar to offer mentorship, competition, and innovation for rapid economic growth in Malaysia.

The Asian model has produced rapid economic growth and development of global competitive goods and services. Table 4 in the Appendix shows examples of the global competitive goods and services produced from the Asian model in SEA include electronics and apparel in Malaysia, banking and financial services in Singapore, and computers and electrical circuits in Thailand. The consistencies, similarities, and mentorship become positive externalities for Malaysia to enjoy rapid economic growth.

The market attractiveness in SEA is another positive externality for rapid economic growth in Malaysia. Burton (1989) has mentioned that the economic power of SEA has improved with the rise of the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in East Asia, mainly by increasing market concentration in the region. For instance, an estimated "$15 billion worth of Japanese (e.g. of NICs) direct investment flowed into SEA between 1985 and 1990" (Bello 2007: 170). The access to foreign capital attracted FDI into SEA to increase market concentration in the region, thereby, enhanced Malaysia's export orientated policies for manufacturing development. The market in the region was attractive for labour-intensive industries, such as textiles and apparel.

The growth in the apparel industry in Malaysia is the result of setting itself up as a contract manufacturer of global brands, such as Marks and Spencer, GAP, Adidas, and Nike, in the 1980s (Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation 2017). Because of the competitive market in the textile and apparel industry, in terms of pricing and the expectation for producers to supply swiftly to changes in consumer preferences in the fashion world, global brands find the market in Malaysia attractive to relocate. The region offers positive externalities for top brands to minimize operation costs. For instance, Vietnam and Cambodia offer cheap labour for the apparel industries to be competitive in pricing (Workers Rights Consortium 2013). In addition, Singapore's large number of industrial firms, well-developed financial institutions, and home to some of the largest ports in the world, as noted by Oh (1967), provides ready financial services and trade for transnationals to relocate. Those factors make the market attractive for firms to relocate to Malaysia because of its experience as a producer of the top brands in textiles and apparel. The textile and apparel industry, with an estimated export growth rate of 7.80% annually, accounted for 1.70% growth of GDP of the manufacturing sector in 2012 (Lee et al. 2014). Thus, the positive externalities in SEA help to maintain Malaysia's export oriented policies for growth in the manufacturing sector.

Also, the volume of trade among SEA attracts firms into the region, which promotes economic growth. Table 4 in the Appendix indicates the Association of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) has maintained 6% of the total share in the world's exports since 2001. A total of 70% of Malaysian exports are shipped to other Asian countries, 11.6% is shipped to North American, 10.9% to Europe, and 2.4% to Africa (Workman 2017). The Economic Watch (2010) reported that Malaysia's export partners in 2009 involved Singapore 13.9%, China 12.2%, the U.S. 10.9%, Japan 9.8%, Thailand 5.4%, and Hong Kong 5.2%. At the same time, Malaysia's import partners involved China 13.96%, Japan 12.5%, the U.S. 11.2%, Singapore 11.1%, Thailand 6%, Indonesia 5.3%, South Korea 4.6%, Germany 4.2%, and Taiwan 4.2%. The increase in the volume of trade in the region benefits Malaysia's development attempts because of the concentration of purchasing power and availability of intermediate inputs in the region.

The concentration of the market and the volume of trade increases the GDP per capita in the region, which elevates its ranking in the world's socioeconomic hierarchy. International organizations, such as the World Bank, classifies industrialized countries on top of the world's socioeconomic hierarchy using the per capita GDP. Table 1 in the Appendix shows the average per capital GDP in SEA increased from $1,167 in 1960 to $9,993 in 2010. With the exception of Cambodia, Table 2 in the Appendix shows the income level of the countries in the region have increased (e.g., from low to either lower or higher income). The growth in income increases the level of industrialization by determining the nature of economic activities. For example by shifting economic production from primary to manufacturing. The World Bank (1993) has cited some Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) in SEA as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines due to the improvements in their income levels since independence. Those developments increase the rank of SEA in the socioeconomic hierarchy to become a global force (i.e., a strong regional or geopolitical bloc) in the world economy.

SEA as a strong geopolitical bloc is able to influence international policies. The bargaining power of the ASEAN as a regional bloc has increased over the years on international platforms, like the World Trade Organization (WTO). The ASEAN has been successful in organizing and speaking with a single voice on common trade interests in recent years. An example is the ruling in favour of Malaysia and Thailand in 1998 on WTO's "Dispute Settlement: DS58" on the import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products by the United States (WTO 2017). Malaysia benefits from the bargained favourable policies for the region.

In summary, Malaysia's socio-political setting present positive externalities, such as mentorship, trade, market, infrastructures, and stronger geopolitical force, for economic development. These pragmatic policies are disseminated in SEA for a more successful application of the developmental state model.

4.1.6B. Impact of Socio-political settings to Ghana's development

In SSA, the period immediately after independence was accompanied by political instabilities, ranging from the assassination of most nationalist leaders and frequent occurrences of coup d'états, stemming from strong internal and external pressures on the government (Koutonin 2014; Table 3 Appendix). Most of the leaders of the pan-Africanism movement (i.e., African socialism), such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sylvanus Olympio of Togo, were either assassinated or overthrown in a military coup (CIA 2002). Colonial treaties, for instance the Colonial Debt, which requires former French colonies in SSA to pay for the infrastructure built by France in their countries during colonization (and are still paying) drained the available funds for development (Koutonin 2014). Also, colonial treaties like the Automatic Confiscation of National Reserves, which allow former French colonies to access only 15% of their deposited national monetary reserves into France's central bank per annum, limited the amount of funds to finance the state led development after independence (Koutonin 2014). [63] According to Koutonin (2014), France withdrew its financial assistance when Guinea under the leadership of Sékou Touré in the 1960s disagreed with such colonial pact. As a result, Sylvanus Olympio of Togo in the 1960s, negotiated with France for an alternative form of payment to meet the colonial pact. Those did not help to advance the African socialism ideology with similar characteristics of the developmental state model that begun in the early 1960s. Also, those developments in the immediate period after independence account

[63] An estimated 80% of the foreign reserves of francophone countries in SSA are deposited in the "operations accounts" controlled by the French Treasury. The countries have to borrow the extra money from their *"own"* 65% deposited (i.e., 15% less the 80% deposited) from the French Treasury at commercial rates. See Koutonin (2014) for further discussion on colonial treaties in SSA and France influence on former colonies in post-independence era.

for the change in the primary focus of post-independence national development plans from economic to political development. Since then, the political leadership has been more concerned with increasing political power through violence or election fraud than increasing economic growth.

Dictatorship regimes have used guerrilla tactics to oppress political activists while democratic regimes have subverted political activists through clientelism and patronage politics to increase political power (Carbone 2007; Kura 2008). The increase in political instability from the nature of political arrangements has affected infrastructural development in the region, which requires $93 billion annually (about 15% of SSA's GDP) to meet the deficit (World Bank 2010). The higher infrastructure deficit adds to the cost of doing business, which is not attractive to foreign private investors. The African model to development has been more concerned with the political interest than economic, and served as a yardstick for its members, therefore, less innovation and competition for long-term industrial development.

The abundant natural resources in SSA have become attractive for primary production. SSA is home to the world's largest arable land and has the second largest tropical forest (World Bank 1993). That has attracted high agricultural production in the region. The export earnings of a single agriculture commodity as a percentage of GDP in 2009 were Benin (Cotton) 38%, Burkina Faso (Cotton) 44%, Burundi (Coffee) 61%, Cameroon (Cocoa) 16%, Cote d'Ivoire (Cocoa) 39%, Ghana (Cocoa) 49%, Kenya (Tea) 27%, Malawi (Tobacco) 65%, and Rwanda (Coffee) 25% (Addison et al. 2015). Table 4A in the Appendix shows agricultural production (e.g., crops) in SSA are identical and have dominated their exports.

The region also accounts for 30% of all global minerals and 8% of the world's oil reserves (U.S. Geological Survey 2017). The African Development Bank (2016) observed that minerals make up 70% of total SSA exports and 28% of GDP. The abundant resources in the region attract resource seeking FDI to engage in primitive production instead of manufacturing production. A total of 75% of FDI in SSA within 1985 to 1991 was concentrated in the mining and oil extraction industries (Boocock 2002). That was the period when most of the countries in the region were rebuilding from political instabilities and the SAP and the ERP for better economic management had been introduced by the World Bank and the IMF, respectively. The volatility of commodities prices in the global market makes extractive production less competitive than a manufacturing market. For instance, SSA's share of global manufacturing is uneven to its population given that only about 1% of global manufacturing takes place there in spite of it been home for 15% of the world's population (Deutsche Welle 2011). Table 4A indicates SSA has remained a primary commodity exporter, with an average of 2.4% share in world's exports value from 2001 to 2010.

In spite of the abundant natural resources in the region, the largest concentration of high risk countries increasingly vulnerable to natural disasters, such as famine, drought, and earthquakes, are in SSA (Benson and Clay 2003). Lukama (2010) has reported that from 1974 to 2003, 379 natural disasters occurred in parts of SSA. For instance, an estimated 400 deaths and the emigration of almost a million refugees accompanied the Mozambique Flood in 2000, which required reconstruction costs of $250 million (Mandel 2002). Also, the United Nation (2015) has reported that between 1995 and 2015, 77 droughts occurred in East Africa alone. The U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (1983) reported that from 1982 to 1983, drought in major food producing areas in Ghana contributed to the spread of bush fires, which destroyed up to 35% of total food production. Table 1A shows stagnant growth in food and agricultural export since the 1980s, which, is an example of how natural disaster has impeded agricultural development in

Ghana. The macroeconomic mismanagement in Ghana during the 17 years of political instability, together with the famine in 1983, limited the government's option than to sign onto the ERP and the SAP to loose its autonomy to control national industrial policies. The economic costs of the natural disaster, which include damage to infrastructure and deaths of the economically active labour population, involuntarily diverted national funds for development to be used as disaster relief. The frequency of natural disasters makes the region less attractive for investment, especially in regard to investing in capital-intensive manufacturing industries. In the case of Ghana, flooding is more frequent in the rainy season and a predictable seasonal occurrence in the capital (Lukama 2010). This situation is more worrying for economic growth as Ghana's capital is endowed with the best infrastructure, a larger market, and manufacturing activities.

The market in the region is underdeveloped because of poor infrastructures from natural disasters and extractive production. The IMF (2014) has reported that less than one-fourth of total SSA road network is paved, despite the fact that road transport accounts for 80% of freight and 90% of passenger traffic. The high transport and insurance cost 30% of the value of exports in SSA's manufacturing development (IMF 2014). Table 1A in the Appendix shows that regional trade, especially in manufactured goods, is not enough to attract investments due to the infrastructure deficit. The share of manufacturing exports increased from 4.15% of total merchandise exports in 1960 to 10.27% in 2010, which is not enough to produce a higher positive externalities for rapid economic development. Because of that, Ghana has not benefitted enough from regional trade to develop a stronger supply response nor raise potential growth.

Furthermore, the income level in SSA has not been enough for the region to emerge as a strong geopolitical bloc in the world economy. The average GDP per capita (constant US$ 2005) in SSA increased from $940 in 1960 to $1, 841 in 2010 (Table 1A Appendix). This development means SSA remains a low income, primary producing region as per the World Bank's country groupings. Therefore, SSA as a geopolitical bloc is less powerful to be influential in global politics. That becomes a challenge to influence policies on an international platform such as the WTO. An example is the deadlock on agriculture subsidies and import quotas between developing and developed countries at the WTO.

In summary, SSA does not present a more conducive environment nor positive externalities for economic development. The geographical location is less attractive for trade and manufacturing investment because of the abundant natural resources and natural disaster occurrences. While the natural disasters have destroyed and impeded infrastructural development, the natural resources have hampered trade, especially in manufacturing. In spite of the hindrances to development from the abundant natural resources and natural disaster occurrences, the leadership in SSA have not been proactive to design pragmatic policies to address those challenges for rapid economic growth.

4.1.7 Theme 7: Management and utilization of natural resources for national development

Since 1957, it has been observed that periods of rising commodity prices are much shorter than those of falling prices, with an average of 37 months for booms and 63 months for slumps (Page and Hewitt 2001; IMF 2012). Commodity prices have fallen by 64% since 1957 with an average real rise of 28% and falls of 37%. The extent to which utilization of natural resources (i.e., resource curse) has affected economic development and the application of a developmental state in Malaysia and Ghana are discussed below.

4.1.7A. Relative contribution of Natural Resources in Malaysia

The main natural resources in Malaysia are tin, petroleum, timber, copper, iron ore, natural gas, and bauxite (Central Intelligent Agency 2017). The total natural resource rent (% of GDP) was 19.72% in 1971, reaching a record high of 25.40% in 1981. The contribution of total natural resource rents to GDP has decreased after 1981, falling to a low of 7.23% in 2014 (Table 10 Appendix). At the same time, the total percentage of income from natural resources to GDP was lowest at 1.44% in 1971 and highest at 15.5% in 1991. It has recorded a decreasing growth rate since 1991 (see Table 10, Appendix).

Table 10 in the Appendix shows that the contribution of natural resource to GDP has declined over the years, as illustrated by the record of tin production, in which Malaysia was ranked 9th among the top tin producing countries in the world in 2014 (World Atlas 2017). Malaysia produced 28.9 tons of tin in 1988 earning revenue of $203,792 at a price of $7,051 (Table 10A Appendix). The total metric tons of tin production have decreased since 1988 and income from tin production has shrunk. At a price of $5,595 and a total output of 20.7 tons, earnings decreased to $115,836 in 1991. An increase in price to $26,051 in 2011, and 3.3 tons of tin produced resulted in total earnings of $85,969, lower than total revenue in 1988. Table 10A shows that fluctuations in the price of tin has had less significant impact on total revenue because of the decrease in tin's total output. The fluctuations in commodity price has not been a major influence of total revenue earned because of the decrease in production volume.

Table 1, Figures 2 and 3 in the Appendix show that Malaysia's revenue from natural resources has fallen over the years because of diversification in the economy. The diversity in the economy has decreased the government's overdependence on natural resource revenue and offered variety in its exports. The prime exported products have shifted from raw to manufacturing exports, which makes Malaysia less vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity pricing (Table 4 Appendix).

The regulatory authorities managing Malaysia's natural resources have also been efficient to minimize corruption. As part of the measures to make production in the resource sector transparent and to be accountable to the general public, information on natural resource operations, such as production volumes, prices, export values, royalties, and taxes, are periodically published by the finance ministry (Natural Resource Governance Institute 2017). The resource companies are quarterly audited and the reports are published to be accessible to the general public. The United Nation Office of Drug and Crime (2016) has observed the government's commitment to reduce corruption in natural resource development, by organizing workshops between key agencies and players to discuss challenges and mitigations.

Moreover, Malaysia has managed its natural resources to increase the wealth of the nation. The government has promoted inclusive growth where resource revenues are invested in ways that benefit the public. According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017), the state established a national trust fund in 1988 to save resource rents to be invested in physical and human capital. There is an annual report on the funds by the finance ministry, where information on the balance and the investments made are published to be accessible to the public. The World Bank (2017) has observed such government initiative as a success story, which has increased average incomes of the bottom 40% of rural households by 7.1% a year, on average, over two decades.

In summary, Malaysia's natural resources have been less vulnerable to fluctuations in commodity prices because of the decrease in government dependence on resource revenue, mainly by diversifying into manufactured exports. At the same time, the resources have been managed to minimize corruption and increased the nation's wealth. Those developments are characteristics of an economy that has overcome a resource curse for rapid and sustainable long-term growth.

4.1.7B. Relative contribution of Natural Resources in Ghana

The main natural resources in Ghana are gold, timber, diamonds, bauxite, manganese, rubber, silver, salt, and limestone (Central Intelligent Agency 2017). The total natural resource rent (% of GDP) was 2.34% in 1971 reaching a record high of 19.54% in 2014 (Table 11 Appendix). At the same time, the total share of income from natural resources in GDP has recorded an increasing growth from 1.21% in 1971 to 19. 45% in 2011 (Table 11 Appendix).

Table 11A in the Appendix shows that the contribution of natural resources have been increasing over the years, as illustrated by the record of gold production, in which Ghana has been ranked 10th among the top gold producing countries in the world in 2015 (World Atlas 2017). Ghana produced 0.4 million ounces of gold in 1988 earning revenue of $174 million at a price of $437 (Table 11A Appendix). The total output from gold production has recorded an increasing growth, which has increased total earnings since 1988. The increase in total output to 0.8 million ounces increased revenue to $289 million in 1991, in spite of a decrease in price to $362. A record increase in price, at $1,569 in 2011, and 3 million ounces of gold produced resulted in income of $4,707 billion. Table 11A shows that fluctuations in the price of gold have had no adverse effect on revenue because of the increase in gold's total output.

Figures 2A and 3A in the Appendix show that Ghana's revenue from natural resources have been increasing because it has less diversity in its economy and has remained a raw material producer. Agricultural production has decreased due to factors such as an increase in demand and higher returns in mineral production. The mining sector, by 1999, accounted for

50% of foreign direct investment and from 1983 to 2011 (i.e., beginning of the period of SAP and ERP liberalization), was responsible for $11.5 billion in total direct investment (Aryee 2012). Despite the fact that mining in Ghana involves gold, manganese, diamond, bauxite, iron, limestone, and salt, 90% of the total value of minerals comes from gold production (Akabzaa 2007). There has been pressure on agricultural land to be converted for mineral production. For instance, an average of 2% of agricultural land is transformed annually for mineral production (Tomo 2016). That has declined agriculture production including Ghana's main cash crop, cocoa. Because cocoa production is dominant at the same location as gold production (mainly in southern Ghana), the share of cocoa exports decreased from 58.9% of total merchandise exports in 1965 to 38.6% in 2000 (Anaman 2006). Those are among the reasons the exported goods have remained primary products (Table 1A Appendix).

Moreover, Ghana has not managed its natural resources to increase the wealth of the nation. The increase in resource revenue has made the state less interested in finding a sustainable alternative source of revenue, such as taxation (e.g., increase the tax base to include the informal sector), so it has increased its borrowing from external sources when projected revenues are not met (Ofori 2009) [64]. The state has become less autonomous in its resource management through borrowing because donors either turn to influence policies on resource management or get to hold shares in resource production. Akabzaa and Darimani (2001) have indicated that the government's foreign currency reserves have decreased due to incentives that allow investors to retain, on average, 75% of export earnings in offshore accounts. Such incentives were introduced after a new mining code was enacted in 1986 as part of the IMF's

[64] According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2000), the state's expenditure on industrial development resulted in a budget deficit of 6% of GDP in 1965. The TED Case Studies (1995) reported an estimated $1.5 billion had matured in loan repayments by 1974 as a result of increased borrowing by the state to support its development agenda.

condition for financial assistance in 1983 (Akabzaa and Darimani 2001). That is an example of how the U.S. and former European colonizers have found a channel (e.g., through loans and FDI) into Ghana's economic arrangement for their advantage. That affects the total earnings to increase the government's foreign currency reserve, which contributes to the unstable currency markets, especially with the increasing demand for foreign currency by importers. The general price level is increased through currency speculation in the imported manufactured goods dependent economy of Ghana. With respect to donors holding shares in Ghana's natural resources, the China Development Bank has been granted a share in Ghana's crude oil as part of a $3 billion loan with collateralizing future oil revenues in 2012 (Amundsen 2013). That is an example of an emerging superpower (China) influence on Ghana's economy. Those developments become leakages to the wealth of the nation from the increasing natural resource revenue in Ghana.

In addition, the dependence on resource revenues has enhanced institutional corruption in Ghana. The partisan political environment in Ghana has become an obstacle in controlling institutional corruption. Amundsen (2013) has observed that politicians are favourable candidates to secure license permit to start operations and are awarded public contracts for their private business. Ghana's increasing resource revenue is siphoned into private pockets through politically appointed managers to manage the resource sector. For instance, the Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO) (2017) reported a corruption scandal in Ghana's COCOBOD[65] of $512 million in 2016 with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) being the main orchestrator (Modern Ghana 2017). Also, in their studies on extractive industries in Ghana, Bitetti and Malone (2011) observed that corporate influence is common in Ghana's resource industry. They

[65] The Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) is a Ghanaian government-controlled institution responsible for the management, production, processing, and marketing of cocoa. See COCOBOD (2017) for more details.

reported that a gold mining company publicly presented keys to two Land Rover vehicles to community leaders to influence their operation. Those corporate bodies and investors are able to ignore Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) through bribing, which contributes to the low level of development in Ghana.

In summary, the economy of Ghana has remained dependent on natural resource revenue and primary commodities producers since independence. There is evidence of a decrease in agriculture production because of an increase in mineral production. The growth rate supports the Prebisch–Singer hypothesis of minimal growth for a primary production dependent economy. Also, there is evidence of influence on national policies by donors through aid and debt relief. On the contrary, fluctuations in commodity prices have had no adverse effect on the resource revenue because of the increase in production. Rather, mismanagement and corruption have become leakages to the increasing resource revenue. Although Ghana resource development exhibits some elements of a resource curse, it has not been the main cause of slow economic development, but rather mismanagement and "policy curse."[66] The inability of the state to manage resource revenues from interest groups does not enable a better application of the developmental state, hence the minimal economic growth recorded over the years.

4.1.7. C. Key Characteristics or Themes that are related and have joint impact

From the analysis of characteristics of a developmental state, it can be concluded that a better application or function of Theme 5 depends on a better application of the identified variables in Theme 1, Theme 2 and Theme 3. For instance, the state's inability to build domestic private capital as a requirement of Theme 1 makes foreign private capital (or business and interest group) stronger in Theme 5 to push for their demands (i.e., direct investment focus for their private interest instead of national interest). Thus, the state's inability to build domestic

[66] Policy curse sarcastically means bad policies.

private capital empowers foreign private capital or business to invest on conditions such as privatization and deregulation.

Another example is Theme 3 where the pilot agency cannot control industrial policy or unable to resist demand from foreign private capital or interest groups (e.g., the IMF or World Bank) which provide loans or aids, if there exist weak macroeconomic variables. A good illustration is Malaysia's ability to resist expert advice from the IMF after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 because of its strong macroeconomic standing. Ghana, on the other hand, often had to accede to the IMF's conditions and demands with its macroeconomic management.

Also Theme 2 shows that all the identified variables need to be working simultaneously for a better application of a developmental state. For instance, the lack of autonomy among anti-corruption and research agencies in Ghana detracts from the performances of their well trained bureaucratic personnel. The bureaucracy often has to yield to the directives and demands of interest groups, such as donors, in addressing national challenges. While anti-corruption institutions in Malaysia may not be fully transparent, they are provided better facilities including corruption courts and research officers who ensure that those who are awarded contracts and public businesses execute them according to stipulated guidelines and standards.

Also, in a situation where there is a weak corruption institution (i.e., Theme 2), the presence of domestic private capital (i.e., Theme 1) can ensure a strong link with foreign private capital to allow the bureaucracy to guide industrial development (i.e., Theme 5).

Chapter Five: Conclusion

5.1. Conclusion

Malaysia has enjoyed an extended period of political stability after independence. The country's political environment has been characterized by an overwhelming respect for the rule of law, and the government has been successful in mobilizing the citizens to support the development agenda through equitable distribution of resources and rewards among different factions. The stability has enabled the state to execute its plans to improve and develop its institutions and attract external investments. The institutions, in turn, have been able to guide the nation's development by effectively implementing the principles of the developmental state model. The bureaucracy has also managed to shield their resources from predators and have helped to build various linkages to benefit from the country's geographical location in an area of trade and market concentration, which also provides positive externalities in infrastructures and technology.

In contrast, Ghana has recorded a longer period of political instability after independence. The country experienced a series of military coups from the late 1960s to the early 1980s, which resulted in the abrogation of development plans with, little or no consideration for their merits. For more than two decades after 1966, Ghana was characterized by a crippling state of political and economic lethargy and uncertainties in its macroeconomic climate. The resulting bureaucratic inertia and weakening of the institutional order that opened the door to a pervasive degree of systemic corruption and inconsistent and inefficient implementation of the principles of the developmental state model. The data shows that Ghana started well and laid down most of the basic infrastructures for a more successful application of the developmental state model. The political instabilities adversely affected the implementation of the developmental policy in its process of gestation. The prevailing circumstances enabled both external forces (including the Bretton Woods institution, foreign private capital and donors), and internal forces (such as political affiliates and cronies, rival ethnic groups and competing interest groups) to influence development of new national policies, some of which were completely different to the initial developmental state principles

After 1983, the policy makers in Ghana completely abandoned the basic principles of the developmental state model mainly by eliminating the central role of the state in preference for policies of economic liberalization in directing economic planning. The ensuing inconsistencies detracted from the foundation for the developmental state model that was laid down in 1957. Failure of the bureaucracy in stamping out institutional corruption resulted in pilferages from national coffers and the "resource curse." The continuous increase in dependence on resource revenues in a geographical location with vast natural resources and higher rates of natural disasters have resulted in negative externalities (such as resource seeking investors, and have negatively affected infrastructural development to attract substantial trade and manufacturing investment).

Given its rapid economic growth, in spite of the high rate of corruption in Malaysia and the stagnating economy in Ghana under unstable political regimes that necessitated the revamping of its macroeconomic environment for improvement after the change to economic liberalization after 1983, this study will qualitatively conclude that the presence or absence of effective institutions could account for the differences in the level of development in the two countries. The information examined also shows that it is not necessary for all the identified variables in the developmental state model to be present or effectively working simultaneously for its successful application, especially at the early stage of economic development. The observed inverse link between the rate of corruption and the level of economic development is one illustration of the latter case.

Whilst the study has uncovered a myriad of essential developmental variables, overall, it recommends the building and maintenance of strong national bureaucratic institutions manned by well educated and trained, patriotic and committed personnel by the developing nations of Sub-Saharan Africa as, perhaps, the most important variable in the developmental effort.

The study finds effective institutions in Malaysia as the main factor guiding its economic growth and, therefore, recommend that Ghana (and SSA in general) bring back elements of the developmental state model, if not wholly, to rebuild its institutions for national development. The study suggests that if SSA can rebuild their institutions, the vast resources can be used as a comparative advantage in the today's global economy of trade wars (e.g., U.S.-China, NAFTA) to negotiate trade and investment for rapid growth. The study challenges the standardization of rules with the increasing waves of globalization, as well as the new normal of aid for development by the IMF, the World Bank, and the global superpowers (i.e., developed countries), in Ghana (and all of SSA) to increase migration (both legal and illegal) for economic opportunities at the borders of donors if not reconsidered. By relying on empirical literature on developmental undertakings in Malaysia and Ghana, this study propose future research address the limitation of subjectively concluding effective institution as the main difference in Malaysia's economic success, and seek to understand the circumstances and impulses which shaped the institutions that created the industrial policies for rapid growth.

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Appendix: Tables and Figures: Southeast Asia (SEA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
Figure 1: Geographical location of Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: The Food and Agriculture Organization (2011)
Note: 1. Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia are painted in green
2. Ghana and Malaysia are painted in yellow

Figure 1A: GDP per Capita (constant 2005 US$) Malaysia and Ghana



Source: Extracted from World Development Indicators (WDI) 2015

Table 1: Economic Indicators of Southeast Asia

Country	SERIES							
		1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2014
Malaysia	Rural population (% of total population)	73.40	66.55	57.96	50.21	38.02	29.09	25.99
SEA	Rural population (% of total population)	81.45	78.49	74.49	68. 34	61.79	55.43	52.91
Malaysia	Urban population (% of total)	26.60	33.45	42.04	49.79	61.98	70.91	74.01
SEA	Urban population (% of total)	17.79	21.51	25.51	31.66	38.21	44.57	47.09
Malaysia	Agricultural[67] raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)	51.83	50.05	31.00	13.80	2.61	2.64	
SEA	Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)	39.56	34.07	14.34	5.70	1.95	2.82	
Malaysia	Food exports (% of merchandise exports)	9.42	12.64	15.05	11.66	5.54	11.90	
SEA	Food exports (% of merchandise exports)	24.85	24.45	14.51	12.18	6.33	8.92	
Malaysia	Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)	5.18	6.55	18.75	53.78	80.43	67.20	
SEA	Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)	10.01	10.86	22.30	57.77	78.70	65.55	

[67] Data available for Agriculture and Manufacturing exports start from 1962 instead of 1960

Malaysia	School enrollment, secondary (% gross)		33.82	45.64	54.66	66.16	66.88	
SEA	School enrollment, secondary (% gross)		32.00	41.00	49.00	64.00	78.00	
Malaysia	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)	$ 1,158.67	$ 1,762.95	$ 2,610.58	$ 4,080.06	$ 5,468.45	$ 6,840.94	
SEA	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)	$ 1,167.52	$ 2,152.14	$ 3,535.47	$ 5,718.06	$ 7,812.48	$ 9,993.03	

Source: World Bank (2016)

Table 1A: Economic Indicators of Sub-Saharan Africa

COUNTRY	SERIES	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Ghana	Rural population (% of total population)	76.75	71.04	68.84	63.56	56.07	49.29
SSA	Rural population (% of total population)	85.27	80.76	74.42	57.53	49.71	47.69
Ghana	Urban population (% of total)	23.25	28.96	31.16	36.44	43.93	50.71
SSA	Urban population (% of total)	6.23	10.56	17.14	33.87	41.81	43.83
Ghana	Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)	12.30	8.66	3.57	14.70	10.25	6.95
SSA	Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)	23.30	18.77	4.04	7.53	6.22	4.74
Ghana	Food exports (% of merchandise exports)	72.91	77.75	78.42	50.94	48.42	60.67
SSA	Food exports (% of merchandise exports)	62.96	48.42	13.86	16.35	11.89	12.98
Ghana	Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)	0.95	0.47	0.93	7.74	14.75	20.68
SSA	Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)	4.15	4.17	1.90	3.36	4.83	10.27
Ghana	School enrollment, secondary (% gross)		43.09	39.15	35.95	41.04	57.09
SSA	School enrollment, secondary (% gross)		8.00	14.00	20.00	26.00	42.00
Ghana	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)	$ 474.45	$ 459.93	$ 359.36	$ 406.06	$ 502.49	$ 702.75
SSA	GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)	$ 940.07	$ 1,401.36	$ 1,479.25	$ 1,506.38	$ 1,603.82	$ 1,841.10

Source: World Bank (2016)

Table 2: Social Profile of Southeast Asia

Country Name	Income level	Colonizing Power	Independence Day	Years of Political freedom	Type of Government
Brunei Darussalam	High income	Britain	23-Feb-84	31	Constitutional Sultanate
Cambodia	Low income	France	09-Nov-53	62	Constitutional Monarchy
Indonesia	Lower middle income	Netherlands	17-Aug-45	70	Republic
Malaysia	Upper middle income	Britain	31-Aug-57	58	Constitutional Monarchy
Myanmar	Lower middle income	Britain	4-Jan-48	67	Military Authoritarian
Philippines	Lower middle income	Spain, United States	4-Jul-46	69	Republic
Singapore	High income	Britain	31-Aug-63	52	Parliamentary republic
Timor-Leste	Lower middle income	Portugal	28-Nov-75	40	Republic
Thailand	Upper middle income	No Western powers	5-Dec-60	55	Constitutional Monarchy
Vietnam	Lower middle income	France	2-Sep-45	70	Communist State
Lao PDR	Lower middle income	France	22-Oct-53	62	Communist State

Source: Adapted from World Bank (2017); CIA (2016)

Table 2A: Social Profile of Sub Saharan Africa

Country	Income level	Colonizing Power	Independence day	Years of Political freedom	Type of Government
Benin	Low income	France	1-Aug-60	55	Republic
Botswana	Upper middle income	Britain	30-Sep-66	49	Parliamentary Republic
Burkina Faso	Low income	France	5-Aug-60	55	Parliamentary Republic
Chad	Low income	France	8-Nov-60	55	Republic
Cote d'Ivoire	Lower middle income	France	7-Aug-60	55	Republic
Gabon	Upper middle income	France	17-Oct-60	55	Republic
Ghana	Lower middle income	Britain	6-Mar-57	58	Constitutional Democracy
Kenya	Lower middle income	Britain	12-Dec-63	52	Republic
Lesotho	Lower middle income	Britain	4-Oct-66	49	Parliamentary constitutional monarchy
Malawi	Low income	Britain	6-Jul-64	51	Multiparty democracy
Niger	Low income	France	3-Aug-60	55	Republic
Nigeria	Lower middle income	Britain	1-Oct-60	55	Federal Republic
South Africa	Upper middle income	Britain	31-May-10	21	Republic
Togo	Low income	France	27-Apr-60	55	Republic

Source: World Bank (2016); CIA (2016)

Table 3: Frequency of Insurgencies in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa

SEA	Frequency of insurgence	SSA	Frequency of Insurgence
BRUNEI	1962	ETHIOPIA	1974-1977/ 1991/ 1994/1998
CAMBODIA	1970/1975/1979/1997	GHANA	1966/1967/1972/ 1978/1979/1981
EAST TIMOR	1975-1999	NIGERIA	1966/1975/1976/1983/1985/1990/1993
INDONESIA	1965/ 1966	KENYA	1970/1982/2007
LAOS	1959/1960/1964/1965/1966/1973/1975	TANZANIA	1964/1980/1983/1988
MALAYSIA	1948-1960	SOUTH AFRICA	1994/1983
MYANMAR/BURMA	1962/1988	SUDAN	1958/1959/1966/1969/1971/1975/1976/1977/1981/1984/1985/1989/1990/1991/1992/1996/2004
PHILIPPINES	1986-1990/2001/2003/2006	BURKINA FASO	1966/1980/1982/1983/1987/1989/2014/2015
THAILAND	1932/1971/1976/1977/1981/1985/1991/2006/2014	COTE D'VOIRE	1980/1991/1995/1999/2001/2002
VIETNAM	1945-1960/1963/1967/1972	UGANDA	1966/1971/1974/1975/1979/1980/1985/1986/1987
SINGAPORE	1948-1960/1961	BOTSWANA	coup free zone from 1960-2015

Source: CIA (2016)

Table 4: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Southeast Asia

Exporters	major exports	Exported value in 2001	Exported value in 2010	Exporters	Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Aggregation
(ASEAN) Aggregation		$383,514,501	$1,051,793,527	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2001	6.3
Singapore	Refined Petroleum , Integrated Circuits, Computers ,Oxygen Amino Compounds , and Packaged Medicaments	$121,753,789	$351,867,167	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2002	6.3
Malaysia	Refined Petroleum , Petroleum Gas, Palm Oil , Integrated Circuits , and Computers	$88,004,487	$198,790,691	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2003	6.3
Thailand	Computers , Rubber , Delivery Trucks , Refined Petroleum , and Gold	$64,919,226	$195,311,520	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2004	6.2
Indonesia	Coal Briquettes , Petroleum Gas , Palm Oil , Crude Petroleum and Rubber	$56,316,867	$157,779,103	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2005	6.2
Viet Nam	Broadcasting Equipment, Crude Petroleum , Leather Footwear, Computers , and Coffee	$15,029,192	$72,236,665	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2006	6.4
Philippines	Integrated Circuits , Computers , Semiconductor Devices ,Office Machine Parts , and Electrical Transformers	$32,150,203	$51,497,515	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2007	6.1
Brunei Darussalam	Crude Petroleum , Petroleum Gas , Acyclic Alcohols ,Jewelry and Diamonds	$3,508,207	$9,026,151	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2008	6.1

Myanmar	Petroleum Gas , Rough Wood , Dried Legumes , Non-Knit Men's Coats , and Rubber		$7,625,237	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2009	6.5
Cambodia	Postage Stamps, Knit Sweaters, Knit Women's Suits, Non-Knit Women's Suits and Non-Knit Men's Suits	$1,499,274	$5,590,104	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2010	7
Lao People's Democratic Republic	Refined Copper, Copper Ore, Rough Wood , Non-Knit Men's Suits , and Sawn Wood	$333,256	$2,069,374	Average	6.34
	Average	$76,702,900	$191,235,187		

Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (2015) and Trade Map (2015)

Table 4A: Top exports, value and percentage share in world exports: Sub-Saharan Africa

Exporters	major exports	Exported value in 2001	Exported value in 2010	Exporters	Africa Aggregation
Africa Aggregation		$114,663,249	$495,794,239	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2001	1.9
Nigeria	petroleum and petroleum products, cocoa, rubber	$18,046,079	$86,567,913	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2002	1.8
South Africa	gold, diamonds, platinum, other metals and minerals, machinery and equipment	$25,997,549	$82,625,557	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2003	1.9
Côte d'Ivoire	cocoa, coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, fish	$3,649,816	$10,283,509	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2004	1.8
Ghana	gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, aluminum, manganese ore, diamonds, horticulture	$1,716,127	$5,233,390	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2005	2.1
Gabon	crude oil , timber, manganese, uranium	$2,521,519	$8,556,428	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2006	2.5
Botswana	diamonds, copper, nickel, soda ash, meat, textiles	$2,532,938	$4,693,238	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2007	2.8
Sudan	oil and petroleum products; cotton, sesame, livestock, groundnuts	$1,811,881	$11,529,255	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2008	3.3

Democratic Republic of the Congo	diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt, wood products, crude oil, coffee	$1,238,880	$5,639,706	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2009	3
Kenya	tea, horticultural products, coffee, petroleum products, fish, cement	$1,520,157	$5,169,112	Share in value in world's exports, % in 2010	3.3
Chad	oil, cattle, cotton, gum Arabic	$84,179	$3,034,942	Average	2.44
Burkina Faso	cotton, livestock, gold	$174,837	$1,288,134		
Malawi	tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, wood products, apparel	$449,410	$1,071,173		
Niger	uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas, onions	$211,269	$483,502		
Benin	cotton, cashews, Shea butter, textiles, palm products, seafood	$204,165	$533,902		
Mali	tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee, peanuts, wood products, apparel	$712,873	$1,996,261		
Togo	cotton, phosphates, coffee, cocoa	$220,246	$667,222		
	Average	$10,338,540	$42,656,911		

Source: Atlas of Economic Complexity (2015) and Trade Map (2015)

Table 5: Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP): Malaysia and Ghana

Years		1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
Mineral rents (% of GDP)	Ghana	0.11	1.81	0.76	0.13	7.53
	Malaysia	0.19	0.64	0.16	0.01	0.41
Total natural resources rents (% of GDP)	Ghana	2.30	7.32	5.36	10.39	19.09
	Malaysia	6.46	19.41	15.78	12.95	11.41
Agricultural land (% of land area)	Ghana	51.42	52.74	55.90	63.77	69.09
	Malaysia	12.28	15.53	20.93	21.26	23.22

Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

Table 6: School enrollment; Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Vocational: Malaysia and Ghana

Years		1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
School enrollment, primary (% gross)	Ghana	67.19	77.71	79.94	81.82	106.74[68]
	Malaysia	84.83	94.54	93.60	97.29	101.41[69]
School enrollment, secondary (% gross)	Ghana	43.09	39.89	35.95	39.03	57.09
	Malaysia	47.47	7.51	54.66	65.87	67.24
School enrollment, tertiary (% gross)	Ghana	0.69	1.62	0.98	5.71	12.08
	Malaysia	3.88	4.34	7.98	27.92	35.97
Secondary education, vocational pupils	Ghana	39,630	38,723	36,500	14,090	71,848
	Malaysia	20,058	18,521	65,460	134,302	178,480

Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

[68] Gross enrollment ratio for primary school is calculate by dividing the number of students enrolled in primary education regardless of age by the population of the age group which officially corresponds to primary education, and multiplying by 100 (World Bank 2015)

[69] The last available data for Malaysia is in 2005 (101.41%)

Table 7: Inputs: Value added, Manufacturing: Malaysia and Ghana

Years		1970	1980	1987	2003	2010
Chemicals (% of value added in manufacturing)	Ghana	4.43	4.53	5.32	9.70[70]	9.70
	Malaysia	8.62	5.43	14.68	10.31	11.55
Machinery and transport equipment (% of value added in manufacturing)	Ghana	2.94	1.27	0.77	0.59	0.59 [71]
	Malaysia	5.50	7.51	5.31	35.52	27.85
Textiles and Clothing (% of value added in manufacturing)	Ghana	16.15	10.79	7.87	6.44	6.44[72]
	Malaysia	3.45	6.97	6.97	2.83	1.95

Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015)

[70] The percentage for Ghana in 2003 and 2010 are for 1993, the last available data

[71] 0.59% was in 2003, the last available data

[72] 6.44% was in 2003, the last available data

Table 9: Malaysia's National Development Plans since 1950

Name	Planned Period	Implementation (Years)
1.First draft for development in Malaya	1950 – 1955	5
2. General Plan of Development	1956 – 1960	5
3. Second Five Year Plan	1961 – 1965	5
4. First Malaysia Plan	1966 – 1970 (5 years)	5
5. Second Malaysia Plan	1971 – 1975 (5 years)	5
6. Third Malaysia Plan	1976 – 1980 (5 years)	5
7. Fourth Malaysia Plan	1981 – 1985 (5 years)	5
8. Fifth Malaysia Plan	1986 – 1990 (5 years)	5
9. Sixth Malaysia Plan	1991 – 1996 (5 years)	5
10. Seventh Malaysia Plan	1996 – 2000 (5 years)	5
11. Eighth Malaysia Plan	2001 – 2005 (5 years)	5
12. Ninth Malaysia Plan	2006 – 2010 (5 years)	5
13. Tenth Malaysia Plan	2011 – 2015 (5years)	5
14. Eleventh Malaysia Plan	2016 – 2020 (5 years)	Ongoing

Extracted from Brown, 1993; EPU, 2017

Table 9A: Ghana's National Development Plans since 1950

Name	Planned Period	Implementation (Years)
1. The First 10- Year Development Plan	1951-1959 (10 years)	5
2. The Consolidated Development Plan	1957-1959 (2 years)	2
3. The Second Development Plan	1959-1964 (5 years)	4
4. The 7-Year Plan for National Development plan	1963/4 - 1969/70 (7 years)	3
5. The 2-Year Development Plan	1968/9 – 1969/70 (2 years)	2
6. The 1-Year Development Plan	July 1970 – June 1971(year)	1
7. The Year Development Plan	1975/ 6 – 1979/80 (3 years)	3
8. The Economic Recovery Programme/SAP	1983 – 1989 (7years)	7
9. The Ghana Vision 2020 – The First Step	1995 – 2020 (25 years)	5
10. The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I)	2002/3 – 2005/6 (3 years)	3
11. The Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II)	2006 – 2009 (4 years)	4
12. The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA I)	2010 – 2013 (3 years)	3
13. Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA II)	2014 – 2017	Ongoing

Extracted from (CLEAR-AA, 2013: p6; NDPC, 2015)

Table 10: Average size of total Natural Resource Production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014

Year	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2014
Total (% of GDP)	19.72	25.40	20.39	8.29	9.06	7.23
Income (% of GDP)	1.44	14.41	15.5	12.32	11	***

Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015), Global Economy (2015)

Table 10A: Average size of Tin production for Malaysia 1971 to 2014

Year	US Dollars per Metric Ton	Production (000 tones)	Income (US$ 000 million)
1988	7051.633	28.9	203,792.2
1991	5,595.962	20.7	115,836.4
2001	4,489.436	5	22,447.18
2011	26,051.45	3.3	85,969.78

Source: Statistical analysis conducted with data from International Tin Research Institute (2011) and IndexMundi (2017).

Table 11: Average size of Total Natural Resource Production for Ghana 1971 to 2014

Year	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	2014
Total (% of GDP)	2.34	6.77	5.40	9.50	18.11	19.54
Income (% of GDP)	1.21	6.19	5.37	10.39	19.45	***

Source: Adopted from World Bank Development Indicators (2015), Global Economy (2015)

Table 11A: Average size of Gold production for Ghana 1971 to 2014

Year	US Dollars per Troy Ounce	Production Million ounces	Income (US$ million)
1988	437.0483	0.4	174.8193
1991	362.1825	0.8	289.746
2001	270.9892	2.2	596.1762
2011	1569.211	3	4707.633

Source: Statistical analysis conducted with data from Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP, 2015), Gold Sheet (2017), IndexMundi (2017) and 24hourGold (2017)

Figure 2: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia



Source: World Bank (2016)

Figure 2A: Agriculture, value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank (2016)

Figure 3: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia



Source: World Bank (2016)

Figure 3A: Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank (2016)

Figure 4: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), Southeast Asia



Source: World Bank (2016)

Figure 4A: Services, etc., value added (% of GDP), Sub-Saharan Africa



Source: World Bank (2016)