NATO IN THE 1990s:

THE RESPONSE TO THE LEGITIMACY CHALLENGE AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE ORGANIZATION IN A CHANGING EUROPE

by

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Abstract

The political changes that took place in East and Central Europe during the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s had a huge impact on the security structures in Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its legitimacy was challenged when the former Soviet Empire started to crumble. This thesis addresses NATO's response to this legitimacy challenge. It is argued in the thesis that the response came in a two stage process. The first response was a debate where different reasons were given for NATO's continued existence. The thesis focuses only on the justifications used to maintain the organization. It was found that there were external and internal justifications and that the people partaking in the debate could be labelled either as belonging to the neorealist school or to the neoliberal school in the field of international relations. Neorealists tended to use more external justifications for keeping NATO. The external justifications are based more on threats than possibilities. It was argued that despite the absence of the Warsaw Pact, there were still threats that made NATO necessary. Neoliberal institutionalists used both external and internal justifications, but stressed the opportunities and NATO's positive effects as an international institution.

The second response to the legitimacy challenge posed to NATO was a process of change where both new ways of thinking and new ways of structuring the organization emerged. Both schools of thought agree that NATO was adapting to the new reality, but used their own arguments from the first stage when explaining the changes.

The conclusions drawn from the thesis are that NATO is needed as a security actor in Europe, and that the changes that NATO has undergone have been the right ones to satisfy both those who fear future conflicts and those who want to work for enhanced security. It is also concluded that in order to understand NATO's two responses, it is essential to study arguments from both schools of thought. The two

schools have good arguments and they complement each other which makes an analysis covering both fruitful.

NATO survived the legitimacy challenge and has recently decided to accept three new members in 1999. The process of change has not been an easy one for NATO, but the organization has without any doubt kept the position as the most important security actor in Europe. It is very likely that it will continue to keep that position for a long time to come.

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List of Abbreviations

ACE	Allied Command Europe
AHPCG	The Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group
APC	The Atlantic Partnership Council
ARRC	The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps
CFE	The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty
CJTFs	Combined Joint Task Forces
CMEA	The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CPSU	The Communist Party, Soviet Union
CSCE	The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DGP	The Senior Defence Group on Proliferation
DPC	The Defence Planning Committee
EC	The European Community
ESO	The European Security Organization
EU	The European Union
FSU	The Former Soviet Union
GDR	The German Democratic Republic
IBERLANT	Iberian Command Atlantic
ICBMs	Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
ICRC	The International Committee of the Red Cross
IEPG	The Independent European Programme Group
IFOR	The Integration Force
INF	The Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement
IRBMs	Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles
JCP	The Joint Committee on Proliferation
MBFR	Mutually and Balanced Force Reductions
MTIWG	The Military Transitional Issues Working Group
NAC	The North Atlantic Council
NACC	The North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVSOUTH	Naval Command South
OEEC	The Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	The PFP Defence Planning and Review Process
PFP	The Partnership for Peace Programme
PMSCE	The Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace
PPCG	The Provisional Policy Coordination Group
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SDI	The Strategic Defense Initiative
SFOR	The Stabilisation Force
SGP	The Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation
SHAPE	NATO's military headquarters
UN	The United Nations
UNPROFOR	The United Nations' Protection Force
WEU	The Western European Union

WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO	The Warsaw Treaty Organization
WUDO	The Western Union Defence Organization

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Introduction to the Thesis

I. Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is undergoing a period of profound metamorphosis. The political changes which took place in Europe in the end of the 1980s were extensive, and to a large extent, unexpected. No one ever imagined that the communist system in Eastern and Central Europe would fall apart so quickly. Even though many people in the West cheered this so-called victory, it also posed new problems. Well-established security structures were undergoing major changes because of the political changes which culminated in the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the disintegration of the former Soviet Empire. What these changes will mean for security in Europe has only recently begun to become clear to the world. Four decades of East-West ideological power struggle have come to an end. There is no longer a bipolar world where capitalism is head to head against communism in a manner that threatens the world with war and mass-destruction. As a result, there has been a decrease in military tension among the major powers in the world. This decrease in tension has strengthened the need and the will to redefine the concept of security.[1]

The traditional view of security concentrates on politico-military security concerns. The central actor is the state, and the fundamental threat to the state is the actions that threaten the sovereignty and independence of the state.[2] The ultimate threat is war. This traditional view of security, which has been prevalent for most of the Cold War, is slowly

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[1] See Nils Andrén, "Thinking about a New European Structure", in (eds.) Armand Clesse and Lothar Ruhl, Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990), pp. 89-90. See also Charles Fricaud-Chagnaud, "In Search of a New Formulation of the Concept of European Security..." Ibid., pp. 213-214.

changing, even though there are many different opinions. Ole Weaver has studied the evolution in perceptions of security and argues that the definition of the concept has not been a constant. Since World War II, the concept of security has evolved and transformed into a coherent and recognizable field of study where more and more people address the task of defining security:

> In this process of continuous, gradual transformation, the strong military identification of earlier times has been diminished - it is in a sense, always there, but more often in a metaphorical form, as other wars, other challenges - while the images of "challenges to sovereignty" and defense have remained central.[3]

The strong military identification that Weaver is talking about has especially diminished since the end of the Cold War due to the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Barry Buzan recognizes this, as well, when he notes that the end of the Cold War has taken the "spotlight from military power as the core determinant of international order and security, and opened up more space for the operation of economic, political and societal forces".[4] Similarly, Ken Booth states that armed forces will still exist, but that they will be less relevant as war-making institutions. He also says:

> Increasingly their (the armed forces) utility will be at low levels of violence - combating terrorism and drug-exporting, for example, or controlling migrations. At higher levels of violence their utility will be increasingly ritualistic, like a caveman's fire to scare away dinosaurs.[5]

This changed role for the military has fueled the never-ending effort on the part of academics and policy makers to re-define security and to make the concept broader. The attempts to re-define security commenced in the 1970s, but until the mid and late eighties the

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[2] Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 51-120.
[3] Ole Weaver, "Securitization and Desecuritization" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 50.
[4] Barry Buzan, "Security, the State, the 'New World Order', and Beyond" in (ed.) Ronnie D. Lipschutz, On Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 196.
[5] Ken Booth (ed.), New Thinking about Strategy and International Security (London: Harper Collins Academic, 1991), p. 338.

debate about alternative definitions of security was held in the margins of the field of international politics, and was not taken very seriously.[6] Five international commissions led by Willy Brandt, Inga Thorsson, Olof Palme, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Julius Nyerere each tried respectively to broaden the concept of security to include social, economic and environmental issues as well.[7] They helped to spread the idea that security is more than military aspects. These new interpretations have gained in strength from the increasingly relaxed relations between the superpowers which commenced in earnest during the latter part of the 1980s. When Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union in 1985, the idea that security could be something more than the traditional interpretation began to win acceptance on a broader scale than before. This process of re-defining security was given a push by the declaration of the United Nations (UN) Security Council Summit given January 31, 1992:

> The absence of war and military conflict among States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social and humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security.[8]

The collapse of the Soviet Union has also had the effect that the states of the world are now trying to identify the new international political structure of which they now are part. Can it be said that the world is a unipolar one led by the United States of America, or is it an increasingly multipolar world where ideologies play a minor role and where economic factors have become more important?[9] Some would even argue that a whole new security

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[6] Ibid., p. 335.
[7] Douglas Roche, "From Conflict to Community" in (eds.) C.G. Jacobsen, M. Spencer, E.L. Tollefson, World Security - The New Challenge (Toronto: Canadian Pugwash Group, 1994), p. 4.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.

structure is slowly being built to replace the old structures.[10]

When the Cold War ended there was a common perception that the world had become safer and more stable.[11] At the same time, certain aspects of stability were erased when the former Soviet Union dissolved.[12] This contradiction has preoccupied security experts. Generally, well-known patterns create stability and security. In this case, a whole system disintegrated, creating a situation in which the threat of war in Europe diminished radically, but the side effect of a shattered Soviet Empire was that the well-known patterns disappeared. The former Eastern bloc tried to get rid of an inflexible and corrupt political system and replace it with a Western-based democratic system. The lack of experience together with a poor economic base has brought about severe hardships. The unstable economic, political and social situation in these countries constitute the greatest source of insecurity in Europe today.[13]

NATO, a product of the Cold War, was established in 1949 to protect Western Europe against a perceived communist military and political expansion. During the Cold War the ideological and military structures hardened with NATO in the West and the WTO in the East. Time passed, political leaders changed, minor wars were fought (influenced by the major powers), but the basic struggle never changed. There were attempts to thaw the cold relations that characterized the Cold War, but the results were mixed. It seems as if the

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[10] See R. Seidelmann, "Towards a Common European Security Policy" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner and James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Brookfield, USA: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), pp. 113-114.; See also Carr and Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 15-16.

[11] Johan Jörgen Holst, The Future of NATO (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1993), p. 4.

[12] See Weaver, 1995, pp. 61-62. See also Mark Kramer and Richard Smoke, "Concluding Remarks" in (ed.) Richard Smoke, Perceptions of Security (New York: Manchester University Press/St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 281. See also Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994).

last attempt, that began with President Gorbachev, was the one that slowly led to the revolutionary changes we have seen. After it was clear that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a very expensive venture both in lives, political goodwill and money, the Soviet leadership showed signs of a willingness to improve relations, especially since the domestic economic situation was strained. Relations between the two blocs slowly improved when President Gorbachev, wanting to reform parts of the Soviet system, agreed to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. At the same time, President Reagan stopped stressing his plans of a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Cracks, caused for example by increasing unrest and protests among the people living in the East, began to appear in the walls surrounding the communist countries as the economic situation grew worse. The cracks were allowed to expand when the Soviet leadership decided to refrain from using the usual harsh methods, with which they used to respond to domestic unrest in the past. Finally, the walls fell down, which surprised people immensely, and which made them question the purpose of NATO. Without these events this thesis would not have been written.

The purpose of this introduction chapter is to introduce the reader to the thesis. First, the theoretical framework used in this thesis is presented followed by the aim of the thesis. Finally, there are definitions of the concepts that are used throughout the thesis.

II. Aim of the Thesis and the Theoretical Framework

NATO found itself in a totally new situation in the late 1980s. Four decades of

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[13] Kramer and Smoke, 1996, pp. 290-291.

ideological battle shaped by military rearmament had formed NATO into a military organization ready to defend the West against a conventional attack, and ready to deter a Soviet nuclear assault. However, the defence alliance was not prepared to meet the new challenges that developed after the fall of communism in Eastern and Central Europe beginning in 1989. The fact that the Warsaw Pact dissolved in February 1991, and the fact that the Soviet Union disintegrated after the coup in August of the same year, only added to the urgent feeling that NATO needed to change if it were to survive as a collective defence alliance.

It is argued here that the events that took place, and which ended the Cold War, challenged the legitimacy of NATO, as the threat perception upon which it was based, and its *raison d'être*, had altered significantly. In response to the legitimacy challenge, NATO has evolved. The question being asked in this thesis is: what was NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge? It was discovered when trying to answer the question that NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge came in a two stage process that can be described as why? and how?. Why did people (politicians and academics) want to keep NATO, and how did the organization adapt? This thesis will address the debate (which occurred as a response to the events in Eastern and Central Europe) dealing with the reasons for maintaining NATO, and which worked as the foundation for the actual changes that took place later. NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge has been addressed according to the two stages (each presented in a chapter) in this thesis. Here follows a brief review of the stages. In order to study these two stages a theoretical framework is used. The two different schools used in the framework will be described broadly. A more NATO specific analysis will be presented

in later chapters. At the end of the Introduction Chapter, a complete chapter outline is offered.

In order to be able to make a fruitful analysis and to make everything more orderly in a thesis, it is necessary to have a theoretical framework. Theories are different understandings of connections and relations between different phenomena, which you have developed as an academic, and which you want to test in the real world. All theories are similar in that they are abstractions of real phenomena.[14] In this thesis the two different perspectives, or schools, mentioned above, will be used. Neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism constitute two dominant schools in International Relations, and they provide a base for studying contemporary NATO. It is very important to stress that there are many factions within each school, each with a different slant of how things work. Instead of describing and using them all, the main stream ideas in both schools will be used. Here follows an introduction to the two schools. They will later be used in Chapters Two, Three and Four when the thesis addresses the two stages of NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge.

The neorealist school begins with the assumption that states must take care of their own security since no central authority exists which can look after the security needs of the world. Anarchy is the ordering condition of the international system.[15] Conflict rather than cooperation is seen as the norm, and what is more important in this thesis, "bipolar balances of power are stable and conducive to peace, while multipolar balances are unstable and

[14] Idar Magne Holme; Bernt Solvang, Forskningsmetodik (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1991), p. 51.
[15] Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 102-111.

conducive to war".[16] Neorealists recognize, however, that states might cooperate through institutions if there are good reasons to do so. The existence of a state of anarchy is such a reason, and states may well decide to form alliances if they can find a common ground. It should be noted though that "alliances reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the international distribution of power".[17] According to the neorealist school, defence alliances are only one of several ways of achieving security against adversaries. Without an adversary, or common enemy, states which have entered an alliance will lack the necessary incentive to continue the cooperation. As soon as the glue, that kept the partners together, begins to wear off, the defence alliance will begin to disintegrate. That is why many neorealists are pessimistic about the future of NATO. Kenneth Waltz, one of the greatest proponents of this school, stated late in 1993 that "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are".[18] This can be interpreted to mean that unless new threats arise in the North Atlantic area, NATO will be in trouble.

The neoliberal school has a different view of state actions and defence alliances. According to those who belong to this school, states calculate their interests not only by looking at the international distribution of capabilities. They also take into account the positive effects of international institutions. There is a conviction that institutions matter, and that institutions "enable the international system to 'transcend' the otherwise bleak

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[16] David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolutions of an Idea" in (ed.) David G. Haglund, Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont: Queens University, 1996), p. 19.
[17] Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica vol. 30, no. 3 (July, 1995), p. 299.
[18] Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", International Security 18 (Fall 1993), p. 75.

dictates of the doctrine of 'self-help'".[19] Defence alliances are not only a sign of temporary common interests among states, but they are also seen as agents shaping those interests, and as Alfred van Staden says, indirectly the institutions will shape the practices of states.[20] Institutional characteristics such as an organization's strength and degree of integration will have a major impact on the evolution of such alliances.

Both schools of thought agree that alliances and institutions are likely to fade away when their main purpose no longer exists. The difference between them is the view held by neoliberal institutionalists that there are greater incentives to keep and maintain an alliance/institution even after a case when the purpose is gone. This should be compared to neorealists who argue that it is only a matter of time before an alliance without purpose dissolves. Neoliberal proponents argue that there is a lot to gain from cooperation which should be a goal in itself.

NATO's continued existence is explained by neorealists as something natural. They do not believe that the purpose of NATO is gone. On the contrary, a military alliance is very much needed in an unstable, multipolar world. NATO is needed as a balancing tool since new and old threats still are perceived.[21] The threat from the Soviet Union does not exist any longer, but Russia, albeit temporarily paralyzed, may rise again and enter its role as West's natural enemy. With its military resources, its possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the risk of both internal and external conflicts in the hemisphere, Russia's security stance will profoundly affect security in the northern region.[22] Neorealists are

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[19] Haglund, 1996, p. 21.
[20] van Staden, 1995, p. 299.
[21] Haglund, 1996, p. 22.
[22] Kaiser, 1996, p. 136.

convinced that it is only a matter of time before something happens that will threaten Western Security.[23]

Other reasons are used by neoliberal institutionalists to explain NATO's persistence. Firstly, by maintaining an organization with well-established structures, decision-making processes and means of effective communication, NATO can meet its traditional goal of providing security for its members. Yet at the same time, NATO can transform itself from an exclusively military alliance to a more inclusive organization, where the goal is to extend security and stability to areas beyond the North Atlantic area. The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace programme are evidence of this extended role of NATO. The next step is enlarging the Alliance. Secondly, neoliberal institutionalists explain NATO's survival by pointing to the fact that the integrated military structure of the Alliance seems to have been successful in deterring and defending against the Warsaw Pact.[24] Thirdly, it is argued that the integrated military structure of NATO also functioned as an "international regime which contributed considerably to the denationalization of Western defence policies and the integration of Germany" into Europe's security community.[25] Strengthening the military alliance might be a good justification for NATO's continued existence, especially since the increased importance of Germany after the unification in October 1990. As stated before, there is fear in some countries that Germany could turn to aggressive and expansionist policies. The more integrated Germany is to the West, the safer these countries will feel.[26]

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[23] van Staden, 1995, p. 300.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid., p. 301.
[26] Kramer and Smoke, 1996.

It is argued in this thesis that it is absolutely necessary to use *both* schools in order to fully understand what happened to NATO. It is not enough to use the ideas of one of the schools without taking the ideas of the other into consideration. Each school provides a different way of looking at things and together they complement each other. They both have advantages and disadvantages which make them weak alone.[27] Only by putting the events into perspective, using both schools, can we gain a better understanding of what happened to NATO after the legitimacy challenge that was posed toward the Alliance due to the events that took place in Eastern and Central Europe.

III. The Response - Two Stages

The first stage in NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge is the political and academic debate, which began after it was clear that the communist regimes had fallen. In the debate there were many people who voiced justifications for maintaining NATO as *the* defence organization in Europe. These justifications were adopted not long after the first questions arose regarding NATO's legitimacy. The second stage deals with the *actual* changes that took place within NATO. It is argued in this thesis that the changes that took place within NATO came as a response to the political and academic debate that followed the initial challenge to NATO's legitimacy. This debate resulted in different justifications offered by politicians and academics.

With respect to the first stage of the response, the justifications offered for NATO's survival are divided into two groups, *external* and *internal*. This is done to make it easier to

[27] The advantages and the disadvantages will be outlined in Chapter Five. (The author)

comprehend the different arguments used to support NATO's continued existence. The first group, which looks at external justifications, examines arguments that propose that events happening outside the geographical and political sphere of NATO make it necessary or useful to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. These external justifications can be classified as either positive or negative.

The positive reasons are based on the hope that NATO can work as a tool in bringing the East closer to the West, and by doing so make the former communist countries more politically, socially and economically stable. This group of justifications are closely related to the neoliberal school where the positive characteristics, such as cooperation, is stressed. The common belief is that Europe and the world will become safer if the West helps these countries to become truly democratic states. Addressing students at Georgetown University in February 1996, NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, stated: "The challenge for your generation and mine is to consolidate democracy by extending NATO's security community to the other half of Europe".[28] NATO has stressed more and more its political role, and changed its military posture.[29] The former U.S. Secretary of State, James Baker, stated that NATO's new mission was to act as the forum where "Western nations cooperate to negotiate, implement, verify and extend agreements between East and West".[30] This would create a new security structure where the importance of military matters is reduced, and the importance of political matters is increased. The results of the positive justifications will be presented in Chapter Three, but one example of the changed political focus is the decision to

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[28] Javier Solana, "Renewing the Transatlantic Partnership: NATO Confronts the Next Century", Georgetown University, Washington D.C., February 20, 1996.
[29] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p.62.
[30] Phil Williams, "CFE and the Future of NATO" in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of European Security

make NATO resources available to support peace-keeping operations initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)[31] and the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia.[32] President Clinton's Partnership for Peace programme (PFP) is another example. The idea behind PFP is to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe.[33]

In addition to the positive justifications, there were also negative justifications based on a more explicit threat if you compare with the more implicit threat of the positive justifications. The negative justifications are stressed by the proponents of the neorealist school caused by its view of world affairs. They tend to be more pessimistic in their outlook. Many of the explicit threats which were perceived when NATO was created are now gone. New threats have replaced some of the old threats, and together they are said to give some legitimacy to NATO's persistence. Three new fears have come to the forefront in arguments justifying NATO's continued existence. First, there is the military threat. The states that replaced the Soviet Union continue to possess a vast military capability and, as seen in Chechnya, there is still a tendency to use military power to solve conflicts. Russia has not been able to convince the West completely that the country will not return to a confrontational and/or expansionist posture.[34] Another negative, external, reason is the risk of nuclear proliferation that has spread after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It has turned out to be very difficult to keep track of the nuclear warheads that were located in

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(New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1993), p. 138.

[31] CSCE is now called the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

[32] John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly vol. 109, no. 5 (Winter 1994-1995), p. 768.

[33] U.S. Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 10.

Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. There is also the problem of underpaid nuclear scientists in these republics. The fear of know-how proliferation is real.[35]

Now that we have reviewed the external justifications, we must also consider the internal ones. By keeping NATO, well-established routines of cooperation and channels of communication between the members can continue to serve the goal of stability and security. This goal is also perceived to be easier to reach if the United States is involved in Europe's security affairs, which it does through NATO. Another internal justification that has been used is that of cost efficiency. Defence expenditures have become an increasingly heavy burden for single states. Through the cooperation of developing weapons systems and conducting joint military maneuvers, it is believed that the costs can be kept at a lower level than what otherwise would have been possible for the members of NATO. As can be seen, the internal justifications are also related to neoliberal institutionalism in that they stress the positive things about keeping the organization.

We now turn to the second step of the response to NATO's legitimacy challenge: the actual changes. NATO is a special organization, created for specific reasons, in a very unique period. The 1990s have been a period of transition for the defence organization. We have seen, in recognition of the new landscape in Europe, an evolution of NATO that encompasses both its ways of working and its ways of thinking. The process of change, which is still underway, has been rapid despite the cemented structures caused by years of thinking and acting along long-established lines or patterns. At the same time, there has been a strong political desire from the Eastern and Central European countries to see NATO

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[34] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 770.
[35] Taylor, 1994, pp. 16-28.

change from its Cold War character into an organization where security can be extended eastwards.

The theoretical framework used in stage one is applicable in stage two as well. It seems as if explanations for the changes that took place within NATO follow the same lines as the justifications used by the two schools in the first stage. Neorealists like to explain NATO's new military structure with arguments connected to their theory that Russia, for example, still poses a threat to the West. NATO's enhanced political role is explained by neoliberal institutionalists arguing that that is the best way to extend security in Europe, and that NATO has the means and the experience to reach that goal.

IV. Definition of Concepts

Before turning to a chapter review, there are two concepts which need to be treated a bit more in depth: change and security. Since the concept of *change* has a very important role in the thesis, it is necessary to define what it means. It has been said that the only constant in human affairs is change. No political system can avoid dealing with change. Fernand Braudel, a French historian argued that there are three levels of change: the change which politicians and statesmen make; the slower movement in social and technological change; and the long evolution of basic ways of life and culture.[36] It seems as if the political changes taking place in East and Central Europe were caused by a mixture of the three levels above. Change is a word that can be interpreted in many different ways and academics frequently do so. The general interpretation in this thesis is based upon the interpretation of

[36] Rais A. Khan, James D. McNiven, An Introduction to Political Science (Scarborough, Ont.:Nelson Canada, 1991), p. 330.

The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus.[37] The concept is used in this sense: change is a process wherein someone or something alters its physical or metaphysical appearance or content, by itself, or by virtue of the influence of external factors. It is a process that can be explained by looking at causes and effects. The process of change can last during a longer or shorter period of time, and in some cases the process never ends. Change, more specifically in political terms, is the result of changes in support and demand on a system. This phenomenon is called *inputs*. These inputs will transform in political processes into *outputs*, which hopefully will satisfy the demands. "The matching of outputs to initial input occurs through feedback, which provides a real or perceptual measure of the system's response to interests and demands."[38] In connection with the discussion about change, it should be noted that the changes regarding NATO covered in Chapter Two differed from the changes described in Chapter Four. In the first case, there was no legitimacy challenge to talk about and the changes were part of the evolution of the Alliance. In the second case, the changes came as a response to external events that created a legitimacy challenge wherein NATO tried to prevent its demise.

The concept of security will be used in the traditional way in the sense that the state and state sovereignty are the targets which are threatened by terrorism, migration, revolutions, wars and other external and internal factors.[39] This is not to say that it is *only* military matters that can threaten a state or a group of states. Security is a multidimensional concept. The new threats, such as environmental, social and economic threats, which to

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[37] William T. McLeod, The New Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (London: William Collins and Co Ltd, 1987), p. 160.
[38] Khan and McNiven, 1991, p. 331.
[39] This definition is explained in for example Johan Galtung, Environment, Development and Military

some extent have pushed aside military ones, are accepted as having the capability of causing insecurity and instability.[40] The important thing to remember in this thesis is that it is the state which is considered to be the target of threats and which is the ultimate institution providing security guarantees for its population.[41] Threat is used in this thesis as something that endangers the security and stability of the state and the state sovereignty.

V. Outline of the Thesis

We now turn to a review of the chapters. After the Introduction Chapter, which consisted of introduction, the aim of the thesis, definitions and this outline, Chapter One offers a background with the establishment of NATO. It briefly describes the reasons for NATO's creation and the evolution of the defence organization. NATO's response to the events in Eastern and Central Europe in the 1990s (which is studied in chapters two, three, and four), therefore, can be placed within a frame of reference. The main points of the Chapter One stress the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellites during the Cold War, and thus explain why NATO evolved as it did. It also stresses the effect of the Cold War and the implications of this ideological struggle on NATO, implications that solidified security structures for four decades. They became so solidified that the security organization was caught by surprise when the Communist bloc began to disintegrate.

Chapter Two studies NATO's initial response wherein it offers justifications used by politicians and academics to maintain the organization. The first stage of NATO's response

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Activity (Oslo: Universitetsförlaget, 1992), pp. 75-82.

[40] To read more about different kind of threats please see Björn Hettne, Internationella Relationer (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992).

[41] States can enter alliances like NATO, but it is in the end always the single state that is responsible for

was the debate where mainly politicians and academics have attempted to meet the legitimacy challenge posed against NATO by coming up with justifications for NATO's continued existence. As stated before, these justifications have been divided into external and internal ones.

Chapters Three and Four examine the actual changes that have taken place with the purpose of explaining how and why NATO responded/adapted the way it did. Chapter Three concentrates on and describes the changes that took place within NATO after the first communist governments in East Europe began to fall, and looks at the Alliance from this point until the present day. The process of change in the Alliance commenced in 1990.[42] Since then, one can basically see two different sorts of changes. First, new ways of thinking have changed the ideological doctrines which determine the policies and the goals for the organization. The members of NATO have "updated their common strategic concept, maintained NATO's integrated military structure, and continue to engage in joint military planning, training and exercises".[43] New policies and fora have been established with the purpose of creating dialogue and cooperation regarding security between the former communist countries and the West. The Alliance has also taken on the task of becoming the peace-keeping tool of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia, where one of the tasks is to enforce the resolutions introduced by the UN.[44] Second, there are the new organizational structures in NATO's military and non-military bodies, of which the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and PFP are examples.

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providing security for its population. (The author)
[42] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 62.
[43] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 765.
[44] Ibid.

Chapter Four tries to compare and explain the changes that have taken place within NATO. Were the actual changes responses to the justifications used by politicians and academics during the period of the legitimacy challenge, and why did NATO turn out the way it did? The changes have been divided into two parts, just like in Chapter Three, where the first part explains the new way of thinking within NATO, and the second part explains the military changes that have taken place.

The final chapter contains the conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis. It also includes a discussion about NATO's future, and the importance of the defence alliance. The author argues that NATO will remain in Europe as an important actor in the security arena, and that the organization is needed both in the West and in the East. Its imminent expansion eastwards will enhance NATO's strength and possibility to survive on a longer term considerably. However, the enhanced importance of Europe might influence the relationship between the European half of NATO and the North American counterpart.

VI. Conclusion

As a summary of the chapter it can be said that this thesis uses a theoretical framework which is based upon two schools: the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalist schools. These will be used when studying NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge, which was caused by the political events in East and Central Europe at the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s. They will also be used when studying how the Alliance has adapted to the new security environment. The neorealist school mainly stresses the external justifications based upon threats described above as the reasons for NATO's

survival. The neoliberal school uses the justifications which stress the positive inherent qualifications of NATO and the possibilities to extend security eastwards offered in Europe.

The specific question asked in the thesis is: what was NATO's response to the legitimacy challenge? This response has been divided into two stages. The first stage deals with the political and academic debate. Since NATO's survival is a fact, only the justifications that argue that NATO should be maintained are studied. There are, broadly speaking, two sorts of justifications: external and internal ones. External justifications are based upon different threat perceptions while internal justifications concentrate more on NATO as an organization and the positive aspects of a maintained Alliance. The conclusion from outlining all the different reasons for keeping NATO is that the Alliance is needed in Europe. The second stage includes the changes which followed the initial debate in the first stage. There were both changes in thinking and in how NATO is structured. This process is still under way. Next chapter is a background chapter which has been included to introduce the reader to NATO and to provide him/her with a better understanding of the topics covered later in the thesis.

Chapter 1

Background to NATO: Its Creation and Evolution

I. Introduction

This chapter provides a brief background description of NATO and of its evolution. This background is essential to understand how NATO evolved and why it evolved the way it did. An in-depth description of NATO, all its bodies and functions is not feasible because the size of the thesis. Only important bodies, functions, events and major changes will be highlighted. This will be done in five sections. The first deals with the origins of NATO and the reasons for its formation. The second describes the evolution of the civilian and military structures of the organization as they existed in the early years. The third looks at the changes NATO has gone through over the years until the end of the 1980s. The fourth describes the events that laid the foundation for the major changes we see today. The final section concludes the chapter with a small summary.

II. Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

After World War II, Europe was more or less in ruins. All of the wartime allies, except for the Soviet Union, began to withdraw the majority of their troops from the war-torn countries[1] and a slow process of rebuilding Europe commenced.[2] Even though the second major war of the century had just ended, many people were concerned that

[1] It should be noted that large concentrations of troops were kept in Germany as occupation forces.
[2] Lord Ismay, NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Germany would once again have the capability to become a threat in Europe. This sentiment was especially common in France, which had experienced three German invasions in seventy years[3]. As a result of this fear, the Dunkirk Treaty was signed by Great Britain and France in March, 1947. As William Park says in his book Defending the West: "This treaty of alliance and mutual assistance was aimed specifically at the possibility of a renewed German menace".[4] On January 22, 1948, it was proposed by Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, that the collaboration between France and Britain should be extended to Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Less than two months later on March 4, 1948, the Brussels Treaty was signed by the countries mentioned above.[5] However, it was not Germany that turned out to be the main problem for the Western countries. The cooperation between the Western armies and the Soviet Red Army was not without strains, and after the end of the war the cooperation ended. Winston Churchill sent a telegram to President Truman, May 12, 1945, which illustrates some of the anxiety that began to grow regarding a possible Soviet threat:

> I am profoundly concerned about the European situation. I learn that half the American Air Force in Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of American armies out of Europe. Our armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to undergo a marked reduction...In a short space of time our armed power on the Continent will have vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down Germany. Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia?...I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpretation of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans, excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the territories under their control or occupied, coupled with the Communist technique in so many other countries, and above all their power to maintain very large armies in the field. What will be the position in a year or two when...Russia may choose to keep 200-300 divisions on active service? An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind.[6]

November 1954), pp. 3-4.
[3]Martina Roos (ed.) NATO, Västeuropeiska Unionen (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, August 1994), pp. 4-5.
[4] William Park, Defending the West (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), p. 11.
[5] Lord Ismay, 1954, pp. 7-8.
[6] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Instead of reducing the number of its troops and weapons, the USSR continued to increase the size and number of its armies. Private estimates from Western sources suggested that approximately 25-30 per cent of the total Soviet state budget was spent on defence and defence-related research and development in the post-war period until at least 1969.[7]

The international settlements which were reached towards the end of the war, one of which drew up the political map for example, were not honoured, and democratic regimes in the East European countries were not allowed by the Soviets to follow their own paths.[8] Poland became a sore spot in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. When the Soviet leadership backed a communist-led government in Warsaw in 1946, Truman interpreted that as a clear proof that Stalin intended to dominate all of Eastern Europe.[9]

These Soviet actions in the early post-war period were increasingly perceived as a threat by the West. 182,400 square miles were annexed by the Soviet Union between 1940 and 1945, a political decision that affected almost 25 million people who lived in these areas which had once been part of Finland, Poland, Romania, Germany, and Czechoslovakia.[10] The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were also annexed after a short period of independence between the two world wars. In areas which

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[7] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO - Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 77.

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), p. 20.

[9] Robert D. Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 205-206.; See also William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War (New York, 1992). See also Vojtech Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War (New York, 1979).

[10] NATO Information Service, 1969, pp. 15-16.

the Soviet Union could not annex, the Soviets stationed their armies and organized Communist infiltrations into popular front governments in an attempt dominate and control these countries. This added about 390,000 square miles to the sphere of Soviet influence in Poland, Eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania and Romania.[11] The Belgian Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paul-Henri Spaak, stated at the UN General Assembly in 1948: "There is but one Great Power that emerged from the war having conquered other territories, and that power is the USSR".[12]

Yet, it was not only in Eastern Europe where the Russians tried to exert their influence. Soviet troops tried, in vain, to get a foothold in Northern Iran after the war as they had territorial claims on Kars, Ardahan, and military bases in the Turkish Straits. The USSR also supported guerrilla movements in Greece, Indochina, the Philippines and Malaya. In 1945, the Soviet Union extended its influence in Asia by occupying the greater part of Manchuria and the northern parts of Korea. Finally, the Soviet Union supported unrest and strikes led by communist parties in Burma.[13]

Slowly, the sense of insecurity and uncertainty that some European statesmen (among which Winston Churchill was the most outspoken) had had for some time, began to spread in the West. Soviet policies were seen as extremely expansionist. The period 1947-48 saw great changes not only in the relations between the European countries and the Soviet Union, but also between the USA and the USSR. While the Western Europeans felt directly threatened by the Soviets because of their proximity, the Americans were more concerned about the long-term threats that the USSR might pose to

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[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid., p. 15.

the American economic and political leadership in the world.[14]

The idea of a security organization started to form after it became clear that the United Nations would not be able to eliminate this sense of insecurity. The Soviet Union was a permanent member on the Security Council and threatened to stop any serious attempts by the West to stop the Soviet plans.[15] Great Britain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, told U.S. Secretary of State, George Marshall:

> I am convinced that the Soviet Union will not deal with the West on any reasonable terms in the foreseeable future and that the salvation of the West depends upon the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe, backed by the United States and the Dominions, such a mobilisation of moral and material force as will inspire confidence and energy within, and respect elsewhere.[16]

This conversation became the first seed of what would later become NATO. Before that happened, the Brussels Treaty, which consisted of mutual defence obligations between Great Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, was signed in March, 1948. The United States approved of the slowly evolving cooperation taking place between the West European countries.[17] This Brussels Treaty was signed only a month after the communist take-over of Czechoslovakia, which was part of the Soviet Union's campaign to secure influence in Eastern Europe. Even though the Brussels Treaty was not the result of a "hostile" event, it did increase the determination of the member states to cooperate in a manner that would prevent, or decrease, ideological, political and military threats to the

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[13] Ibid., p. 18.
[14] Wichard Woyke," Foundation and History of NATO, 1948-1950", in (eds.) Norbert Wiggershaus and Roland G. Forester, The Western Security Community, 1948-1950, (Providence, USA: Berg Publishers, 1993), p. 251.
[15] Sir Winston Churchill and Canada's Louis St. Laurent had in 1946 discussed a defense alliance within the United Nations. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1989)
[16] Theodor Achilles, NATO Review (1979), p. 11. (vol. and no. unknown)
[17] Henrik Gustafsson, NATOs Utvidgning Polen och Lettland - Mellan Ryssland & Västeuropa, minor thesis, Växjö University, 1996 (Växjo: Växjö University, 1996), p. 13.

states involved.[18] Paul-Henri Spaak told the Soviet delegate Vyshinsky during a session in the UN Assembly in 1948:

> Do you know the basis of our policy? It is fear, fear of you, your policy, your government... The truth is that your foreign policy today is more audacious and more ambitious than that of the Tsars themselves.[19]

Even if the Americans approved of the cooperation, they were not prepared to take part themselves. All contemporary sources agree that the United States was not expecting a military attack on Europe by the Soviet Union. In the past, Washington's policy had been that the Europeans had to take the responsibility for themselves.[20] The idea of containing the spreading of communism soon won ground. George Kennan, an American diplomat in Moscow, wrote the famous, long telegram in which he tried to explain why the Soviets behaved the way they did. The main argument was that historic and cultural aspects in Russia/the Soviet Union made it natural for the Soviets to expand.[21] An event that helped that cause was the Berlin Blockade ordered by Stalin in June, 1948. The blockade lasted for 323 days, during which the Allies transported food and supplies to the city. The opinion of the Americans changed. Ernest Bevin's successor, Clement Attlee, expressed this the following way: "It wasn't, I think, until the Berlin airlift that American public opinion really wakened up to the facts of life. Their own troops were involved in that you see."[22]

It was against this background that discussions and negotiations began regarding

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[18] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 20.
[19] Wiggershaus and Forester, 1993, p. 251.
[20] Klaus Schwabe, "The Origins of the United States' Engagement in Europe, 1946-1952", in (eds.) Francis H. Heller and John R. Gillingham, NATO: The Founding of the Atlantic Alliance and the Integration of Europe, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), p. 169.
[21] Schulzinger, 1994.
[22] Park, 1986, p. 6.

the security of the North Atlantic area.[23] It was clear to Western leaders that the Soviet Union did not have friendly intentions towards them. First, the Soviets did not follow the agreement on a buffer zone between the West and the Soviet Union that would contain friendly nations. Secondly, the military build-up continued as if the war were still going on. Thirdly, the Soviets tried to achieve influence in countries that were considered a part of the Western "hemisphere" including Finland and Norway. Finally, the blockade of Berlin sent a message to the West that was anything but friendly.

The five countries which had signed the Brussels Treaty met on a regular basis. In July, 1948 the Americans and the Canadians joined these meetings as observers. In September of the same year, the Western Union Defence Organization (WUDO) was formed as a military agency under the Brussels Treaty. Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery was appointed permanent Chairman of the Land, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Committee, which was located in Fontainebleau, France. When the structure of NATO was being considered, the politicians looked at WUDO.[24] For instance, NATO adopted, among other things, the cost sharing principle used for infrastructure. This principle determined that no country should have to bear a heavier burden than the rest.[25]

Talks were held on the subject of extending the Brussels Treaty to include the North Atlantic area. It was the British and Canadians who initiated these discussions. Since the threat coming from the East was more than a military threat, the negotiators decided that if there were to be a North Atlantic Treaty it would have to include more

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[23] Please see Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty in Appendix I.
[24] Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 9.

than just a military organisation. Escott Reid stated in his essay, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949", that: "The treaty should rally not only the military and economic resources of Western Europe but also its spiritual resources in a dynamic, liberal and democratic counter-offensive against Russian totalitarianism."[26]

It has been argued that the discussions leading to the signing of the Alliance went through three different phases.[27] During the first phase only the United States, Canada, and Great Britain took part, and the discussions were held in secret. On the 6th of July, 1948, the second phase commenced. The talks related to this second phase were held in Washington between the State Department, the ambassadors of Canada and the Brussels Treaty countries.[28] The result of these talks was a report which made a number of recommendations. These recommendations stated that a North Atlantic treaty should:

1) promote peace and security;

2) express determination of the Parties to resist aggression;

3) define the area in which it would operate;

4) be based on a principle of self-help and mutual aid;

5) be military, but also promote stability and well-being for the peoples in question;

6) provide machinery for implementation[29]

The countries had decided from the beginning that any treaty would have to be within the United Nations' Charter. In December 1948, the countries reached an

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[25] Ibid., p. 114.
[26] Escott Reid, "Forming the North Atlantic Alliance, 1949", in (eds.) Don Munton and John Kirton, Canadian Foreign Policy, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, Inc., 1992), p. 33.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 10.

agreement on the basic principles. The major difficulty was the United States' initial reluctance to enter into any "automatic commitments".[30] The European countries, on the other hand, wanted a binding agreement. The next step was to come up with a draft of the North Atlantic Treaty, a work in which all seven countries were involved. The negotiations were long and difficult. Theodore C. Achilles, one of the US negotiators, said:

> The basic differences were due to the facts that the Europeans, particularly the French, wanted as binding and as long a commitment as possible, and the Americans, while agreeing in principle, were constrained by what the Administration and friendly senators thought the Senate would accept.[31]

In the third phase, other countries which were part of the North Atlantic area were approached. Italy, Portugal, the Republic of Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Denmark were all asked if they wanted to cooperate. All of the countries, except Sweden and the Republic of Ireland, decided to join the group of seven. On March 15th, 1949, these countries were formally invited, and three days later the Treaty was made public. On April 4th, twelve countries signed the North Atlantic Treaty in Washington.[32] These countries were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Treaty was ratified by the countries within five months of it being signed.[33]

To summarize the Treaty, one could say that the signatories considered an attack against any member state as an attack against them all. Article 5 is the crucial article in

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[29] Ibid.
[30] Nicholas Rengger (ed.), Treaties and Alliances of the World (Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman Group UK Limited, 1990), p. 177.
[31] Park, 1986, p. 10.
[32] Please see appendix I for the contents of the North Atlantic Treaty.
[33] Park, 1986, pp. 10-11.

the Treaty. The Parties promised to use any means, including the use of armed forces, which were seen as necessary to re-establish, and to maintain security in the North Atlantic area. Conflicts should, first of all, be solved with peaceful means according to the UN Charter. However, Article 51 stated that self-defence was allowed. Apart from the military aspects, the Treaty also included paragraphs on how to improve economic relations, and how to build up democratic institutions in order to work toward a peaceful world.[34] Especially Article Two stresses NATO as a tool for developing friendly relations between the members, and for eliminating conflicts within the Alliance. It was very much thanks to the Canadians that Article Two was included in the Treaty. This Article has gained new importance after the fall of the communist regimes.

It was a large step for the Americans to take when they signed the North Atlantic Treaty. By doing so, they had given the Western European countries a guarantee against aggression, a guarantee that had to be supported by military force.[35] This sort of engagement in European affairs was unprecedented. It was very different from the isolationist tradition of international policies that had almost been a "rule" in the United States.[36]

III. Building a Structure for the New Defence Organization[37]

The evolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization occurred in different phases distinguished by periods of reform. The first phase, which commenced

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[34] Roos, 1994, p. 4.
[35] Erik Holm, NATO och Warszawapakten (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, 1983), p. 3.
[36] Heller and Gillingham, 1992, p. 161.
[37] Please see appendix II for the early structures of NATO.

immediately after the Treaty was signed, and the phase saw the re-building of the armed forces of the European members.[38] Except for the defence machinery of the United Kingdom, the armed forces of the rest of the members were small or non-existent.[39] The United States created a programme of military assistance. In 1950, $1,450,000,000[40] were set aside for NATO. Of that amount, one billion dollars went to the European countries.[41]

In Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Parties agreed that they must develop policies to enable them to fulfil the obligations stated in the Treaty. A body called the Working Group was established to produce recommendations for suitable institutions and methods. The report that was produced by the Working Group was presented at the first meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Washington on the 17th September, 1949. What follows is a summary of the most important decisions during that meeting. First, the members of the Council were to be the Foreign Ministers of the countries. Secondly, it was decided that English and French were to be the two official languages of the organization. Thirdly, the Defence Ministers of the member countries would be part of a Defence Committee, which would be set up with the task of drawing up defence plans for the North Atlantic area. Fourthly, the Defence Committee would establish a Military Committee, which would be part of the military organization with military representatives from each country. It would provide policy guidance regarding military matters to the Standing Group, which was its executive body. Only representatives from

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[38] The use of these phases is taken from Lord Ismay, NATO – The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO – Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Services, 1969).

[39] Tomas Erazim, NATO - en organisation i förändring, minor thesis, Växjö University, 1994 (Växjö: Växjö University, 1994), p. 8.

[40] The value of the amount stated above is the value it had in 1950.

the United Kingdom, France, and the United States were to be members of the Standing Group. Fifth and finally, five Regional Planning Groups were to be established: the Northern European Group, the Western European Group, the Southern European-Western Mediterranean Group, the Canadian-United States Group, and the North Atlantic Ocean Group. These Planning Groups had the task to develop and recommend plans for the defence of their regions to the Military Committee through the Standing Group.[42]

At the second meeting in Washington on the 18th of November, 1949, it was decided to establish two other agencies. The first one was the Defence, Financial and Economic Committee which would consist of the Finance Ministers, and had, among other things, the task of developing, in cooperation with the other agencies, overall financial and economic guides for the future defence programmes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It also gathered information on defence expenditures and on resources in an attempt to develop methods for measuring costs and for transferring military equipment and surplus stocks between the member countries.[43] The members of the committee also had to come up with a plan for mobilizing financial and economic resources in time of an emergency.[44]

The second agency set up at the second Council meeting was the Military Production and Supply Board. It would work under the Defence Committee and find ways of coming up with supplies when they fell short of military requirements. A second

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[41] Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 23.
[42] Ibid., pp. 24-25.
[43] Robert S. Jordan and Michael W. Bloome, Political Leadership in NATO: A Study in Multinational Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 8.
[44] Lord Ismay, 1954-1955., pp. 25-27.

task was to plan for more effective ways of producing military equipment.[45] During the Defence Committee's first meeting in December 1949, a strategic concept was introduced for the integrated defence of the North Atlantic area. A programme would also be established to coordinate production and deliveries of weapons and equipment. This concept was based upon the principles of self-help and mutual aid. This was important since the Treaty does not require the signatories to rush to the aid of an attacked member.[46]

The organization now had a number of bodies and a structure. This structure was enough to get the organization started and it would change over the years, but at the time it was sufficient for implementing the most important decisions. The new bodies worked continuously collecting information and drawing up plans. One of the most important consequences of this was the experience of both civilian and military personnel working together in different committees and groups.[47] By this cooperation, channels of communications were developed which strengthened NATO and helped in times of crises.

The first major changes to the structure of the organization occurred in May, 1951, after it had become clear that the original structure was unsatisfactory. The changes were designed to enhance the efficiency of the organization. Most new organizations have problems at the beginning before routines are established, and NATO was no different. The common problem was that each NATO agency was being hampered in its work

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[45] Ibid., p. 27.
[46] Lisa Pierce, National Model United Nations 1995 - North Atlantic Treaty Organization (New York , 1995) , p. 3.
[47] Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 29.

because of lack of information from the other agencies.[48] Dean Acheson describes NATO's structure as a body - actually twelve bodies - without a head.[49] In order to solve this problem, the Defence Committee and the Defence Financial and Economic Committee were incorporated with the North Atlantic Council.

The North Atlantic Council was now the only body where there was representation at the ministerial level. The replacement, the Financial and Economic Board, which was responsible to the Council Deputies, was established in Paris together with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC).

The deputy, that each Foreign Minister used to have in NATO, was given the task of representing the whole government of the member country instead of being the deputy of the Foreign Minister. There was far too much work to do for the foreign ministers beside their other tasks, and by doing this NATO gained a more independent group of bureaucrats placed in Brussels, working with NATO-related business full time. The deputies became a permanent part of NATO, and an International Staff was set up to help them in their work.[50]

An enlargement of NATO was also discussed at the beginning of the 1950s. The Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey both wanted to become members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This fact made some member countries apprehensive because of Turkey's common border with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. Some member governments also claimed that it would extend the commitment too much if these countries were accepted. After many discussions, the Council recommended that the

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[48] Ibid., p. 43.

member countries accept Greece and Turkey since the advantages of having them as members were seen as more important than the disadvantages. NATO hoped to decrease the tension between Greece and Turkey by accepting these two countries, and NATO would also gain a strategic advantage in the battle to contain Communism with that extra territory. Greece and Turkey became full members in 1952.[51]

That same year the North Atlantic Council held a conference in Lisbon. One of the most important pending decisions at this conference concerned a coherent defence plan for NATO. A report from the so-called Temporary Council Committee was adopted.[52] This report suggested that the member governments should build up a NATO force consisting of 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft, and "strong naval forces" by the end of 1952. German participation in the defence of Western Europe was also discussed at the conference. So far, negotiations between the occupying countries and Germany had failed. However, during the conference the Parties came closer to a solution. During a meeting in Paris, held in 1954, relations were regularized between the Federal Republic of Germany and the NATO allies. It was decided that the country should be brought into the framework of the defence alliance. The year after, on May 5, the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO.[53]

Another important decision made in Lisbon was to totally reorganize NATO's civilian bodies. The NAC became a permanent agency in Paris with each member

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[49] Jordan and Bloome, 1979, p. 8.
[50] Erazim, 1994, p. 12.
[51] Lord Ismay, 1954, pp. 39-44.
[52] This Committee was set up to come up with a military acceptable plan for the defence of Western Europe. The Council could not be in session for the time necessary to deal with this problem. See Lord Ismay, 1954, p. 44.

government appointing a permanent representative, including a staff, which would help the political representative. Also, the Defence Ministers were to meet more than once or twice every year as had been the custom. In Lisbon Lord Ismay was also appointed the first Secretary General of NATO.[54]

IV. The Fledgling Begins to Fly

A second phase of NATO's evolution commenced in 1956 when the Report on Non-Military Co-operation within NATO, better known as "the Report from the Committee of the Three Wise Men," was released and accepted by the Council.[55] This report gave strong emphasis to political consultations between the member countries. These consultations are still the core activities of NATO today. Conflicts among member countries were to be solved within NATO as far as it was possible. It was also suggested that member governments had to notify the other members if decisions were made that could affect the Alliance, so that consultations could take place.[56]

In January, 1957, another agency was established, the NATO Political Committee. The members of this committee were to meet once every week to discuss political questions which concerned the members of the Alliance. In December 1957, the members met in Paris and agreed to establish stocks of nuclear warheads in the North Atlantic area, and to give the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) control over a number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). The role of nuclear weapons in NATO's

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[53] NATO Information Service, 1969, p. 37.
[54] Erazim, 1994, pp. 12-13.
[55] The members of this Committee were: Dr. Gaetano Martino (Italy), Mr Halvard Lange (Norway), and Mr Lester Pearson (Canada). See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1989, p. 30

defence increased when the United States declared in 1962 that the country would not diminish its number of nuclear weapons, and that five Polaris submarines would be committed to NATO. A NATO nuclear force was built up and the member countries agreed to share information related to the nuclear field.[57]

In 1966, General de Gaulle, and France, decided to withdraw completely from NATO's military co-operation. This did not come as a surprise because the president had opposed the integrated military organization since 1959. The French felt that an integrated defence system would deprive the country the control over its own military forces.[58] All NATO installations had to be removed from French soil. NAC headquarters was moved from Paris to Brussels. France's withdrawal from NATO's military side resulted in a minor reorganization of NATO's military structure.[59] The Standing Group was dissolved and the Military Committee was moved to Brussels from Washington. Smaller commands were integrated with larger ones and two new commands were formed in 1967: Iberian Command Atlantic (IBERLANT), and Naval Command South (NAVSOUTH).[60]

The third phase began in 1967 when the Council approved the Report on Future Tasks, or the Harmel Report as it also was called. It suggested a continued strong defence along with an "open door policy" towards the East European countries where the members looked for peaceful solutions to the existing tensions. A couple of years later

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[56] NATO Information Service, 1969, p. 39.
[57] Rengger, 1990, pp. 185-186.
[58] Ibid., p. 186.
[59] Adding to the military changes, a new committee was established in 1969. It was called the Committee on Challenges of Modern Society. Its task was to consider problems of the human environment. See Rengger, 1990, p. 188.

this report contributed to the new Ostpolitik which West Germany introduced. The result of Bonn's Ostpolitik was increased trade and decreased tension between East and West, and could ultimately be seen as one of the fundamental reasons behind the unification of Germany in October, 1990.[61]

The era of détente saw the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, in 1971, and it helped to originate the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which resulted in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.[62] Other conferences and discussions followed during the detente period, such as the Vienna conference on Mutual and Balanced Conventional Force Reductions, and in 1972, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT I) was signed.[63]

In June 1974, the "Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations" was signed. It concerned the relations between the European NATO members on the one hand, Canada and the United States on the other. Some European countries feared that the United States would not come to their help if there was a crisis. The declaration stated continued strong ties over the Atlantic and a serious commitment to the Treaty.[64]

The lack of general efficiency was still a problem for NATO, and in 1976 the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG) was created outside of NATO with the purpose of making the European armed forces more effective. The IEPG had four basic goals. First, money set-aside for research, development, and production of arms should be

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[60] Ibid., pp. 186-187.
[61] Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,1991), p. 32.
[62] This act was about Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1989, p. 95.
[63] Ibid., pp. 32-33.
[64] See Erazim, 1994, p. 9.; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 306.

used as efficiently as possible. Second, there was a wish to increase the standardisation of weapon systems and weapons. The third goal was to maintain a European military industry based on advanced technological expertise. The final goal was to encourage co-operation between North America and Europe.[65] Together with the Eurogroup, established in 1968 to strengthen the European part of NATO, IEPG has given the European Parties a sense of greater responsibility, and it has softened the criticism from some Americans who believe that the United States carries too heavy a burden when it comes to the NATO commitment. IEPG has also helped the process of integration between the countries.

The issue of burden sharing has always been a hot discussion topic in the past for NATO. The United States has always stressed shared responsibilities, even though the country has ended up paying more than its share. In fact, the North Atlantic Treaty might not have been ratified by the US Senate in 1949 if the American public and the Senate had known that the United States would subsidize Western Europe's defense for a long, long time.[66]

During 1976, the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee had meetings where it was decided that the NATO forces needed to be strengthened. The three elements of the NATO triad - strategic nuclear forces, theatre nuclear forces, and conventional forces - all had to be maintained. However, the need for strengthened conventional forces was especially stressed. Some 1115 combat aircraft were ordered by different members of the Alliance that year. In December 1979, the Foreign and Defence

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[65] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1989, p. 23.
[66] Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO - Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington, D.C.: The Cato

Ministers of the Alliance met and came up with the "Twin-track" Decision. NATO would deploy the new long-range theatre nuclear weapons, the Pershing II launchers, together with ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe. At the same time, the United States would try to negotiate with the Soviet Union to decrease the number of such weapons. The ministers also decided to make new proposals regarding mutually, and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe.[67]

Little changed within NATO during the first part of the 1980s. The Alliance was busy responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the events in Poland, as well as continuing efforts to reach an agreement on arms reductions.[68] At a NAC meeting in Rome, May 4-5, 1981, a communiqué was released which stated that all Soviet troops must be withdrawn from Afghanistan, and that Poland must be given the opportunity to resolve its own problems. Spain became NATO's 16th member in 1982, and the debate about Spain's relationship to NATO continued throughout the 1980s. Later that year the "twin-track" decision of December 1979 was reaffirmed at a meeting for the heads of state in Bonn on June 10, 1982.[69] NATO commenced the deployments of its intermediate range nuclear force in the United Kingdom in November, 1983.[70]

The second half of the decade saw more important events and changes. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces Agreement (INF) was negotiated and signed on December 8,

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Institute, 1994), p. 32.

[67] Rengger, 1990, pp. 190-191.

[68] On December 11, 1986, NATO Foreign Ministers issued the Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control. It called for negotiations on conventional stability, aimed at eliminating existing disparities in Europe. It also called for further confidence and security-building measures.; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 312.

[69] The "twin-track" decision was: 1) The deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. 2) The continuation of arms control negotiations.

[70] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 308-311.

1987, between Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev. It meant a total elimination of Intermediate Nuclear Forces. There was also a discussion going on within NATO regarding the modernization of the Alliance's tactical nuclear forces. This was a sensitive subject after the heated discussion regarding the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles at the beginning of the decade. A decision was postponed until 1990. In December 1988, the Soviets suggested further disarmament, which increased public pressure within the NATO states. Here was the beginning of the legitimacy crisis for the Alliance. It was decided that NATO should follow a path of step-by-step modernization of its forces. The members welcomed the Soviet proposals, but did so with suspicion, since a Soviet superiority was perceived, especially when it came to conventional forces.[71]

The rise of President Gorbachev to power in the Soviet Union and the détente between East and West was what set changes/reformations in motion. It was foreshadowing an era filled with rapid political changes, which would force the Alliance to rethink its structure, strategies, and goals.

V. The Years of Change

One can say that NATO has entered its latest phase with the beginning of this period. The far-reaching transformation of Europe began in 1989 and culminated in 1990-1991 when the two Germanies were unified, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, and the Soviet Union broke up.[72] The first free elections were held in Poland, and Tadeusz

[71] Rengger, 1990, pp. 193-194.
[72] Johan Jörgen Holst, The Future of NATO (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee,1993), p. 3.

Mazowiecki became Prime Minister of the first non-communist government in 40 years. Hungary opened its Western border on September 10, 1989, which resulted in a flow of East Germans fleeing their country. Egon Krenz was elected new leader of the German Democratic Republic, and Hungary's Parliament adopted a new constitution which states that Hungary was going to be a free and democratic state with its first free elections in 1990. November 1989, saw the Berlin Wall fall together with the communist leadership in Bulgaria. In December, Gustav Husak and his coalition government resigned, and Vaclav Havel was elected President of Czechoslovakia. Towards the end of the year on December 22, Nicolai Ceausescu's regime fell in Romania ending a very turbulent year for Europe.[73]

After these events, the threats that NATO had been trying to stop or prevent were to a great extent no longer existent. Some historical revisionists would argue that the threats were never there in the first place, and that the Soviet Union had only responded to US imperialistic policies.[74] The important thing to remember is that NATO countries perceived these threats and acted upon them.

In hindsight, it turned out that estimated numbers of missiles and conventional weapons belonging to the Warsaw Pact were wrong. The Soviet Empire was no more. The defence organization had managed to reach some of its goals but the rapid changes had left the members confused. Although the Warsaw Pact had dissolved and the new Russia was handicapped, it was still a very strong military power. NATO had to adapt to the new situation or face the consequences. Many people were of the opinion that NATO

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[73] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 315-319.
[74] Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945-60" in Gordon Martel, American

had played its role and that it was time to come up with something new. The number of voices criticizing NATO soon decreased when people realized that NATO could change and still had a purpose.

> Its (NATO's) demise was frequently announced by all those pundits who saw the alliance as a waning institution haunted by a succession of debilitating crises. But the alliance refused to die. Its internal discussions and adjustments were a sign of vitality and relevance rather than indications of atrophy.[75]

After the first shock had passed, NATO rapidly began a process of adaptation intended to cope with the changing world and the doubts directed toward NATO's legitimacy. NATO developed a new strategic concept, a new force structure, a new command structure and two new organizations, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership For Peace.[76]

VI. Conclusion

This historical chapter has highlighted some of the more important events in the development of NATO with the purpose of giving the reader a better understanding of the more recent events. As we have seen, it took some time at the beginning of its existence for NATO to establish itself as an effective defence organization. NATO was built upon the threat perception that the Soviet Union was an expansive power. The pace of development of the organization, and the structure, were influenced by the relations between the two Cold War-blocs. It was President Gorbachev and his reforms that laid the foundation for the decrease in tension between the East and the West. This decrease in

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Foreign Relations Reconsidered - 1890-1993 (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 107-108

[75] Johan Jörgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1992), p. 5.

[76] Ibid., p. 8.

tension caused the challenge towards NATO's legitimacy, which will be addressed in next chapter. It addresses the first part of NATO's response to the changing environment and the legitimacy crisis. The chapter takes into consideration the political and academic justifications that were used to maintain NATO as a security actor in Europe.

Chapter 2

NATO's Response: Justifications Used to Maintain the Organization

I. Introduction

John Stuart Mill once said that organizations are what they are, no matter how they are structured, or run, due to the deliberate actions of people.[1] Mill meant that it is people and their actions as members that will determine the destiny of an organization. The Swedish political scientist, Olof Peterson, uses Mill's ideas and argues that there are four prerequisites for an organization to exist. The most fundamental one is active participation. Without active members, whether they happen to be individuals, organizations, or states, the organization is bound to wither away. The other three prerequisites depend upon the first one. The members must accept the organization and its goals. They must also work to maintain the organization, and finally the members must strive to fulfill the goals of the organization.[2]

One important aspect is missing in Peterson's reasoning above, and that is purpose. There must be a purpose for the organization. One can also say that the organization must be needed. Without this need, it does not matter how hard the members work, or how many goals the organization has set up. People inside and outside the organization must perceive this purpose in order to give the organization *legitimacy*. Without legitimacy, it will be extremely difficult to uphold the activities of an

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[1] Olof Peterson, Makt i det öppna samhället (Stockholm: Carlsson Bokförlag, 1991), p. 137.
[2] Ibid.

organization.[3] The philosophical and theoretical foundation of legitimacy is that power, which is not legitimate, is extremely fragile, or vulnerable.[4] If organizations do not have the necessary legitimacy, their continued existence is threatened.

One of the fundamental reasons for a decline in legitimacy of an organization is when its goal(s) is (are) fulfilled, or when its purpose has disappeared, as might be argued in the case of NATO.[5] In order to legitimize its continued existence, the organization must define new goals. This often means that the organization must go through changes. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an excellent example of this. It was established to deal with war and major national catastrophes. After World War I, the organization found itself without tasks. A substantial loss of members was experienced together with declining contributions from the public. The organization managed to survive the crisis by adding a goal that made the general goal broader: to preserve and enhance peoples' state of health.[6] Another example of an organization which has tried to survive by adding goals is the Western European Union (WEU). Created after World War II, the organization was completely overshadowed by NATO during the Cold War. In the 1990s, WEU has stated that it has the intention of becoming NATO's European pillar.[7]

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[3] Other factors than purpose influence the legitimacy of an organization. Efficiency is one example. (The author)

[4] Agneta Karlsson, Om strategi och legitimitet (On Strategy and Legitimacy) (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991), p. 31.

[5] There are two ways of looking at goals and organizations. In system theory, the goals are not determining the activities of an organization. Instead, they are looked upon as depending variables where the goals are results from the activities of the organization. In rational theory, goals are independent variables which are governing factors for the activities of an organization. It is argued here in this thesis, that the latter theory is closer to reality. (The author) For more information about the two theories see Bengt Abrahamson, Varför finns organisationer? (Norstedts Förlag AB, 1986), p. 56.

[6] Amitai Etzioni, Moderna organisationer (Modern Organizations) (Stockholm: Aldus/Bonniers, 1973), p. 25.

[7] Daniel Färm, Europeiska Säkerhetsstrukturer - Anpassning till ett nytt konfliktmönster? diss., Växjö University, 1996 (Växjö: Växjö University, 1996), p. 31.

However, it is not yet clear whether or not WEU will succeed in persisting because the Brussels Treaty, which established WEU, expires in 1998.

NATO has faced the same sort of legitimacy challenge as the two organizations mentioned above in the late 1980s and early 1990s even though there were different reasons. The aim of this chapter is to study the debate that followed the legitimacy challenge and especially the parts of the debate dealing with the different reasons to keep the defence-alliance. As we will see, NATO has dealt with the legitimacy challenge by adapting to new realities. The two schools, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, look upon this adaptation in different ways as will be clear in this and later chapters. It has to do with the way their proponents regard different actors in society and how they look upon the world. The realist school, of which neorealism is an offspring, has been regarded as being more pessimistic in its outlook on the world, while the liberal school tends to take on a more positive outlook. These differences are reflected later in this chapter when the justifications for a continued existence of NATO are presented.

Whenever the existence of an organization comes into question, there will always be people who argue that the organization should be dissolved. There are many different reasons for a decline in legitimacy, but when it happens, the most common response from the organization is a review process wherein the goals and the ways of reaching those goals are scrutinized. Two important factors in this process are past performances and future purposes. Even if these factors are subjective in their nature, it is possible in most cases to determine whether or not an organization has been successful, and whether future goals are realistic and purposeful. If the organization has done well in the past,

accomplished some of its goals, or made progress toward them, it is usually easier to maintain the organization than if there is a lack of success or progress. This is argued especially by neoliberal institutionalists who stress the positive characteristics of institutions. It is even easier to save an organization if its members and people outside the organization see a clear purpose for maintaining it. In NATO's case, the two schools see different purposes for maintaining NATO. Goals can be added, or reformulated, and the organization can be re-structured. The purpose needs to be real since true legitimacy, both external and internal acceptance of the organization is required for an institution or organization to survive in the long run. Most of the purposes presented by the schools are relevant and important, but it is once again stressed that we need to consider both sets of explanations in order to gain a full understanding of the legitimacy challenge and the following justifications.

There is no doubt that NATO's credibility declined after the fall of the communist governments in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989. Long before 1989 there had been people who had argued that NATO was superfluous, too expensive and provocative. With the significant number of changes in Europe, NATO was perceived by many to suffer from a lack of rationale as can be seen in the public opinion polls conducted by the NATO Office of Information and Press.[8] Werner J. Feld discovered this as well:

> With the sharp reduction of the Soviet threat brought on by the disintegration of the Soviet government and society into a looser Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the rationale for NATO as the defender of Western values, so clearly visible over the last forty years, seems to be disappearing.[9]

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[8] Erika v.C. Bruce, "The Image of the Alliance: Public Opinion Seminar Gauges Support", NATO Review vol. 41, no. 6 (December 1993), pp. 6-11.

[9] See Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), p. 7.; see also S. Nelson Drew, Keith W. Dayton, William J. Erwin, Barry Keck and Philip C. Marcum, The Future of NATO (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), pp. 40-41.

As has been stated, NATO was mainly a product of the Cold War, created and turned into a highly integrated defence alliance with the purpose of deterring Soviet aggression. The chance of future Soviet, or Russian, aggression was almost eliminated by the events in Eastern and Central Europe. NATO was left without a real task, or at least a credible one. The legitimacy of the organization was therefore in jeopardy.

This chapter studies NATO's first response to the legitimacy challenge. It describes the attempts by politicians and academics to rationalize NATO's continued existence. There seems to be a lack of articles and books that fully takes on the task of describing and explaining the survival of NATO. The articles and books on the topic usually describe the changes without explaining why they have taken place, or why NATO survived.[10] On one hand, among those who attempt to explain NATO's survival it seems as if the more critical individuals tend to explain NATO's persistence by bureaucratic characteristics within the organization.[11] On the other hand, those who are more positively inclined toward NATO tend to explain the changes and NATO's survival as a natural process where the defence organization has adapted to new challenges and new tasks.[12] In both cases, the process is natural, but the second view encompasses many more reasons for survival other than bureaucratic inertia and internal demands to prolong

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[10] This statement goes for most sources dealing with NATO used in this thesis. There are a few exceptions among which these can be mentioned: John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions After the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly vol.109, no. 5. (Winter), 1994-1995., and Colin McInnes, "The Future of NATO" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995).

[11] See Richard K. Betts, "NATO's Mid-life Crisis", Foreign Affairs vol. 68, no. 2 (Spring 1989), p. 38.; see also Feld, 1993, p. 8.

[12] See Karl Kaiser, "Reforming NATO," Foreign Policy no. 103 (Summer 1996), pp. 129-130. See also John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 5, 1994-1995 (Winter), pp. 763-776.

the life of the organization. The different justifications used by politicians and academics will be presented below.

It is the sense of the author that the initial sense of a legitimacy crisis for NATO did not last very long. When the Soviet Union was dissolved (formally in December 1991), an anxiety over instability in Eastern Europe, and a fear of new problems and crises, replaced the feeling of euphoria. After the Cold War, a number of opinion polls were conducted in NATO countries. One example of such a poll is from West Germany where 80 per cent of people asked stated, as early as in October, 1988, that they "felt no military threat from Moscow".[13] Despite this, however, support for NATO did not decline, and in most cases there were no demands for a withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe.

> Polls taken within the European NATO nations at the end of 1989 and early 1990 show that only in Spain was there strong sentiment that neither NATO nor the U.S. presence in Europe remained necessary for the preservation of the peace and Western security.[14]

It seems as if people in NATO countries thought that there were reasons for keeping NATO other than the old goal of deterring an aggressive Soviet Union. This illustrates the fact that there was not only a majority among politicians and academics that wanted to keep the defence alliance.[15] As stated earlier in the introductory chapter, there must be true legitimacy for an organization to survive. It is difficult to reach that kind of legitimacy if only the intellectual elite agrees on an issue. As the ICRC managed to find a new purpose, NATO has also managed to achieve the same. Even if it did not last for very

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[13] "West Germans Shrug in a Poll", International Herald Tribune October 25, 1988.
[14] Drew et al., 1991, p. 49.
[15] The lack of resistance from politicians and academics suggests that a majority of people in these two groups wished NATO to survive. (The author)

long, NATO had a legitimacy problem. So, why does NATO still exist? The most fundamental reason is that people still see a purpose for NATO. There are some people who see this purpose, or need, as artificial, and argue that NATO should be dissolved.[16] Yet, according to the polls, there seems to be a majority that continues to believe that there is a real and important purpose for NATO, even if the purpose differs from case to case.

The thesis argues that this is indeed the case. There is a genuine need for NATO. There are tasks that best can be solved by the North Atlantic Alliance. It also argues that all of the following justifications had a bearing on NATO's persistence. Let us now turn to the justifications which were used by politicians and academics as a response to the changes in Europe in order to maintain the defence alliance.

II. Justifications to Maintain NATO

For the purpose of making it easier to comprehend the different justifications, it is argued here that it is possible to divide them into two major groups: *external* and *internal* justifications. As explained in the Introduction, external justifications are based on the assumption that there were external, positive and negative incentives or reasons, for keeping NATO as an organization. However, keeping NATO does not mean that the organization should be untouched. Most of the reasons and incentives are presented with the understanding that NATO has to change in an adaptation process. The internal justifications given are based on the assumption that there were inherent qualities within

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[16] Carin Rostrup Lundquist, "Är det dags att skrota NATO?" Helsingborgs Dagblad, November 18, 1990, sec. World News.

NATO that were worth keeping despite the fact that the danger posed by the Soviet Union was gone.

As was also stated earlier, the events that directly led to NATO's decline in legitimacy and that laid the foundation for the debate about NATO's future were external events in Eastern and Central Europe. Of course, nobody can say what would have happened if President Gorbachev had not come to power, or if the Soviet Empire with its satellites in Europe had survived the upheavals. The events that took place did change the pillars of the international security framework, of which NATO was an intrinsic part. Forced by these external events, NATO had to take a look at itself in the mirror to scrutinize its own identity. It was not the first time and most likely not the last time either.[17] The arguments, which were used by the spectators who wanted to keep NATO, are described below.

II a. Negative, External Justifications for Keeping NATO

Beginning with the external justifications for keeping NATO, one can find two sorts: negative and positive justifications. Negative justifications are those based on continued threats, imagined or real. No matter how politicians and strategists argue, Russia is still seen as a threat in some respects. This is clearly the strongest justification used by neorealists. In a world characterized by anarchy and conflict, there is no reason to believe that Russia all of a sudden has become a friendly nation. It is true that an aggressive Russia would now have to cross Poland, Belarus and Ukraine in order to reach

[17] The organization went through an identity crisis when President Charles de Gaulle decided that France would leave NATO in 1966.

the heart of the West.[18] It is also true that Russia's military capabilities have decreased substantially, due to the break-up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the struggling economy and the disruption of Russian defence production. But Russia has not been able to convince the world, and the West in particular, that the Russian Bear has been tamed. Henry Kissinger, considered a hard-core realist, argued in his book Diplomacy: "Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride the territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland, and is the heir of the most potent imperial traditions."[19] Part of the lasting suspicion is most certainly a remnant of the Cold War, but it would be wrong to argue that it is the whole story. Two events in particular have supported the neorealist perspective. First, there was the attempt to oust President Gorbachev in August 1991, by hard-line communists and parts of the Soviet military, indicating to the West that there were still people with power who would rather revert to the old system. The attempt also accelerated "the complete disintegration of the union and full delegitimization of the Communist Party, Soviet Union (CPSU)".[20] The second event was the war in Chechnya where Russia used military force to try to stop an independence movement. This war revealed two things. First, that the quality and effectiveness of the Russian army was poorer than expected. More importantly, though, it showed the West that Moscow was still prepared to use brute force instead of negotiations to reach its goals.[21]

However remote or unthinkable a Russian all-out assault on Europe might be,

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[18] Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 8.
[19] Henry A. Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 814.
[20] J. Philip Rogers, "Introduction: An Era of Revolutionary Change", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 14.
[21] Tyler Marshall (for Los Angeles Times), "Kriget i Tjetjenien påverkar Västeuropas försvar", Tempus

Norway and Turkey still face powerful concentrations of Russian conventional forces near their borders. In addition, it is not yet possible to rule out the scenario where a new Russian government would return to a more confrontational posture, where expansion is on the agenda.[22] Colin Powell expressed a similar sentiment in a 1991 speech:

> Soviet military power is hardly becoming irrelevant. Whatever the future hypothetical Soviet state may look like, it will still remain by far the strongest military power in Europe and Asia with millions of well-armed men in uniform.[23]

In addition, there is still a chance that political and military forces within Russia and the new republics will attempt to assert power and influence.[24] National sentiments and/or surfacing ethnic and other old conflicts could very well cause these kind of attempts. Such actions would create instability in Europe, and that instability could also be created by conflicts and insecurity within the Russian state. Political, economic and social instability constitutes a huge threat to the attempts made to turn Russia into a democracy. At the moment, one of the most explicit threats to these attempts is posed by organized crime, which has spread quickly during the past decade. It is seen by many as a cancerous abscess in Russian society.[25]

With an unstable society and a military, which is underfunded and in decay, Russia also poses an indirect threat through nuclear proliferation. Strategic nuclear weapons were stationed not only in Russia, but also in Belarus, Kazakhstan and in the Ukraine. After the break-up of the Soviet Union there were a number of "confusing and

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March 14-20, 1996, p. 12.
[22] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 768.
[23] Colin Powell, "The Eisenhower Centenary Lecture: Military Realities and Future Security Prospects", RUSI Journal vol 136, no. 1 (1991), p. 18.
[24] Cristoph Bluth, "The View from the East" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The Fututre of European Security (Aldershot (UK): Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995), p. 212.
[25] Louise I. Shelley, "Post-Soviet Organized Crime: A New Form of Authoritarianism", Transnational

occasionally contradictory series of statements, political commitments and legal undertakings".[26] It is not only the risk of losing control of the huge number of nuclear weapons that bothers many Westerners. There is also a chance of so called know-how proliferation to countries or groups which are seen as unfit to possess nuclear knowledge by the countries in the West. It is estimated that there are 2,000 former Soviet citizens with fairly extensive knowledge of nuclear weapons design, and 3,000-5,000 people who know how to enrich uranium, and how to produce plutonium.[27] Neorealists see all these dangers with Russia and argue that NATO must be kept to keep the balance of power when Russia is revived.

> NATO may enjoy an Indian Summer as Russia is temporarily paralyzed by internal strife and economic trouble; yet, as soon as the country manages to heal its wounds it will turn out to be the West's natural opponent again and pose a new threat to its interests.[28]

Neoliberal institutionalists acknowledge these threats as well, but they do not argue that NATO should be kept because military force will be needed when Russia becomes a serious threat again. They do not agree with the picture of anarchy and chaos in the world order. They stress the positive effects an institution like NATO can have on the threats mentioned above. Cooperation is the keyword. Some NATO allies provide financial and technical assistance in the process of destroying nuclear weapons from the former Soviet Union.[29] In addition, NATO is seen as a stabilizing factor for the region and for the newly democratized countries in Eastern and Central Europe. It is important to

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Organized Crime vol. 2, no. 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1996), pp. 122-138.

[26] Taylor, 1994, pp. 16-17.

[27] "West Europeans Push Conversion Plan for Russia", Defense News (February 28-March 6, 1994)

[28] Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica vol. 30, no. 3, 1995, p. 300.

[29] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), p. 83.

the West that these countries succeed in becoming stable democracies. All of Europe has much to lose if things go wrong. Failure could lead to "domestic turmoil, mass migration, armed conflicts, and even direct military threats to nearby NATO members".[30] By maintaining NATO, the neorealist proponents argue, the West would have insurance in case of possible future Russian aggression. This, however, would not be the only threat-perception that NATO would help to decrease. The neoliberal institutionalists argue that the organization would help monitor the return of nuclear weapons to Russia from the former republics, and to ensure that the risk of proliferation would be as minimal as possible. NATO would also act as a discouraging obstacle for extreme groups, which want to change Russia's course from democracy towards authoritarianism and an aggressive, external stance.

It should be noted that Russia is not the only threat that was used to give legitimacy to NATO. Former Yugoslavia, and the bloody war which was fought there, has clearly shown what could happen when old conflicts surface after a long time. There are a number of conflicts in Eurasia which must be resolved in the future. Examples of such conflicts are border disputes, water disputes and minority groups and human rights issues.[31]

Not all experts agree on the necessity of keeping NATO. A NATO that is re-vitalized, and perhaps with more members, could be so provocative to Russia that a

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[30] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 771.

[31] One specific example of such conflicts is the water dispute between Hungary and Slovakia over the waterflow in the river Danube. See Zsofia Szilagyi, "Hungary Continues Presenting Its Case at the Hague" OMRI Publications, no. 46, March 6, 1997.

Russian threat would be all but guaranteed.[32] Some of the sceptics still regard NATO as important, but want it to be cautious about changes and reforms. They use the old adage, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it".[33] Russia has now conceded and agreed to a restricted expansion of NATO. This has, as an American diplomat quoted in Svenska Dagbladet said, resulted in a diminished cohesion within the Atlantic Alliance. Neorealists would probably see a pattern here. With a decreased threat from Russia, NATO's legitimacy decreases.[34]

Together, the perceived threats outlined above have been used as negative, external justifications for keeping NATO as the leading defence organization in Western Europe. Here follows a short summary of the threats:

1) Social, economic and political instabilities in the former Soviet Union and its former satellites.

2) A continued military threat posed by Russia

3) Proliferation of weapons of mass-destruction

4) Know-how proliferation regarding weapons of mass-destruction

There is a very common argument used by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists in connection to these threat-based explanations, one that recognizes that NATO is the only organization which has the structure and the means to take on security tasks. NATO is a proven institution, and its success provides a good basis for future plans to enhance

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[32] Colin S. Gray, "NATO: In Trouble at the Crossroads Again", Strategic Review vol. 23, no. 3 (Summer 1995), p. 8.
[33] Ibid., p. 13.
[34] Mikael Holmström, "Skugga över historisk dag för Nato" Svenska Dagbladet, July 8, 1997, sec. World News, p. 6.

security in Europe.[35] More than forty years of cooperation, plus extended jurisdiction, has made operations, such as the one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, possible for NATO. This argument will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis.

II b. Positive, External Justifications for Keeping NATO

NATO's continued existence is not seen only as a response to threats. These justifications are used to a larger extent by neoliberal institutionalists. The former Secretary General of NATO, Manfred Wörner, did not see NATO as obsolete just because the military threat from the Soviet Union had diminished. He saw NATO as a highly important security actor in Europe when he spoke in 1990. Even without changes in goals or structure, Wörner argued that NATO had three important roles after the Cold War:

1. In its role as a political alliance and community of values for the free world: as an instrument of change and peace-building.

2. In its role as the transatlantic alliance: as the link and foundation that binds North America and Europe together in a community of destiny.

3. In its role as a security alliance: as an instrument to preserve peace and as a framework of stability that is the precondition of positive change.[36]

As we can see above, more positive reasons that stress cooperation and peace building are used in order to keep the institution of NATO alive. The neoliberal view is that it is possible to change the world for the better. NATO has taken the first role very

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[35] Johan Jörgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee,1992), p. 19.

[36] Manfred Wörner, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Security in the 1990s", Address to the Bremer

seriously. These positive justifications for NATO's survival argue that it is important for NATO to enhance its political identity. Since military security seems to be outdated, NATO should turn to the task of increasing security-building measures in Eastern and Central Europe. This led to:

> ...the July 1990 London Declaration's invitation to former Warsaw Pact adversaries to establish diplomatic liaison missions at NATO, extending to the Rome summit's creation of the US-German-proposed North Atlantic Cooperation Council, and continuing to the January 1994 inauguration of the Partnership for Peace.[37]

A majority of the changes in Chapter Three are based upon the idea that there was a need to seize the opportunity to extend security eastwards by opening up a dialogue as a first step. This wish was channeled through NATO. Here was a chance to decrease tension further, and an excellent opportunity to build a strong foundation for future cooperation between East and West. Not only did NATO's enhanced political profile result in the NACC and PFP, but also in the extended role of the Alliance as peacekeeper in Europe under the supervision of the UN and the CSCE. NATO's mission in former Yugoslavia has not been entirely successful, but the Alliance has tried to learn from its mistakes, and the newly formed Stabilization Force (SFOR - formerly known as Integration Force [IFOR]) will continue to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[38]

Manfred Wörner's second reason for keeping NATO, that of linking the United States with Europe, has been seen by many as the most critical function of NATO in the post-Cold War era.[39]

Tabaks Collegium, Brussels, May 17, 1990.

[37] Philip Zelikow, "The Masque of Institutions", Survival - The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), p. 11.

[38] Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21st Century", NATO Review vol. 45, no. 1 (January 1997), p. 3.

[39] Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.,

> The basic lesson of this century's two world wars is clear: Without a stabilizing U.S. political and military role, Europe is prone to conflict, and because of the U.S. national interests involved, the United States will inevitably become embroiled in those conflicts. It is much better to maintain a reduced but significant U.S. presence in Europe to help deter such conflicts than to withdraw and thereby make them more likely.[40]

We see a neorealist tendency in the quotation above and in this reason. NATO is a stabilizing factor and the United States is the most important actor in the Alliance. This is to say that the Alliance still needs American leadership, particularly within the integrated military structure, and that Europe alone could not provide for its own security. It is a fact that the United States has the most capable military in the world both in terms of numbers and quality.[41] However, this has nothing to do with the plans of strengthening the role of Europe, the so-called European Pillar, when striving for security on the European continent.[42] NATO without the United States would be considerably less effective both when deterring possible enemies, and when extending security. Even French officials, who used to be the most vocal critics of U.S. involvement, now acknowledge and appreciate the enduring value of having U.S. forces on European soil.[43]

The third role for NATO as a security alliance is more debatable since there are other organizations in Europe which can fulfill this role of being a forum and a framework for stability and peace. Both the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE - former CSCE) and the WEU are institutions which exist and function.

1996), pp. 27-47. See also Stanley R. Sloan, NATO's Future: Beyond Collective Defense Report released September 15, 1995 (marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/secdef/ind/natofutr.asc).

[40] David M. Abshire, Richard R. Burt, R. James Woolsey, The Atlantic Alliance Transformed (Washington D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 1992), p. 2.

[41] Kevin F. Donovan, "The American Response to European Nationalism" in (eds.) David G.Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, Joel J. Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO.:Westview Press Inc., 1994), p. 98.

[42] Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO and the United States", in (eds.) S. Victor Papacosma and Mary Ann Heiss, NATO in the Post-Cold War Era, Does it Have a Future? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 162-165.

Some people argue that a European Security Organization (ESO) should be created, where countries from both Cold War alliances (NATO and WTO) should join to promote security and peace. Such an organization would be based upon the architecture and experience from these two institutions.[44] The proponents of NATO, both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, argue that NATO is the only organization with the necessary experience and with the means to fulfill the task. It is argued that NATO's main competitors had problems of their own which effectively hindered them from becoming major security actors in Europe. CSCE was large and inflexible. Its rule of veto for the members meant that the institution lacked a powerful executive function. The European Union (EU), then the European Community (EC), moved toward a greater role in the field of security, especially with the Maastricht Treaty, but that changed when some EC members raised concerns about the Treaty. The WEU approved of EC's plan to increase the security role of Europe, but the motivation to go on disappeared when the spirit of reform died in the Community. The exclusion of the United States also made WEU a less attractive option. The lack of real alternatives was a strong justification for keeping NATO. NATO may not have been the perfect institution, but it was better than the rest of the options. There were no real demands to create something new, which made NATO look best, since of all the institutions with roots in the Cold War, NATO was considered to be the most successful one.[45]

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[43] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 766.
[44] Ullman, 1991, pp. 63-64.
[45] Colin McInnes, "The Future of NATO", in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth, Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot(UK): Dartmouth Publishing Company 1995), p. 88.

II c. Internal Justifications for Keeping NATO

There are two major internal aspects that have been used to justify NATO's persistence after the legitimacy crisis and which will be highlighted here. Both are very much connected to the neoliberal school since they stress cooperation, communication and the positive outcomes of having institutions. The first internal justification deals with the channels of communication and cooperation that have developed and grown over time through the work of the Alliance. The second one deals with cost efficiency.

The first internal justification can be labeled as reassurance, and both schools agree with this even though neorealists tend to stress the balance between states, while neoliberal institutionalists stress integration. "The continued existence of NATO, including its integrated military structure, and the U.S. military experience, assures its members that they have nothing to fear from one another."[46] Together with other institutions as the EC, NATO has contributed to (West) Germany's integration in the West European family after World War II. This integration has meant greater stability, but there are still people who fear a resurrection of the "old Germany's" expansive policies. The military and political cooperation within NATO has meant a greater degree of trust between the members in the past,[47] and it was argued that NATO would provide:

> ...both an element of political stability in a rapidly changing environment, and a well-established forum for military consultation and cooperation, a forum whose cogs...were well oiled, and whose mechanisms for consultation had a wealth of experience.[48]

Closely connected to the first internal justification regarding NATO's channels of

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[46] Duffield, 1994-1995, p. 773.
[47] The only possible exception to this is Turkey and Greece, which still have conflicts among themselves to resolve. The conflict on Cyprus is only one example. There are territorial disputes as well.
[48] McInnes, 1995, p. 90.

communication and cooperation is John S. Duffield's argument, which is both neorealist and neoliberal in its nature, and which states that NATO reduces the possibility of conflicts among its European members in three ways: "it increases transparency; it inhibits the renationalization of their security policies; and by binding the United States to the continent, it ensures the maintenance of a balance of power in the region".[49]

Duffield's first argument argues that the more open a system is, the more trust there will be. The fear of hidden agendas decreases, and if the openness is supplemented by intimate cooperation on different levels, there is a great chance for stability. NATO provided the West European countries with such an opportunity due to the historical circumstances that brought the Cold War. Just because the Cold War is over does not mean that this cooperation and trust become less important for the member states. The European Union could most likely take over this role, but here it is necessary to look at the whole picture. This internal reason for keeping NATO should be seen together with the rest of the reasons both external and internal.

The second argument is the most neoliberal of the three. NATO countries formulate and execute their security policies not on a purely national basis, but as part of the Alliance. By doing so, the natural rivalry and competition is kept to a minimum. Participation in NATO's integrated military structure also helps to reduce military self-sufficiency, which limits the opportunities for a country to build up an independent military capability.

Finally, the security guarantees of the United States together with its forces in

[49] Duffield, 1994-1995, pp. 774-778.

Europe is one of the most important security factors for many of the European member states. U.S. participation in NATO enhances the belief that the Alliance offers greater security when it comes to external threats. The extensive military burden that the United States bears also allows the other members of NATO to limit their own armed forces. This is a matter of concern in some quarters of the United States.

Another internal justification used by neoliberal institutionalists to keep NATO is that of cost efficiency.[50] For a country to maintain a credible military defence costs large sums of money, money that some countries are not willing to spend. One solution would be to remain in a collective group, such as NATO, where military integration, joint military maneuvers, and joint military projects would let a country keep its capability to feel relatively safe against military aggression.[51] Most members would gain by continuing the cooperation. The exception might be the United States which bears the heaviest burden. The European countries cannot replace the American resources without immense efforts, which is seen as very difficult task with diminishing defence budgets throughout Europe.[52] At the moment, there are questions as to the costs of accepting new members into NATO. Even so, the costs of a NATO enlargement should be put into context. If more members lead to enhanced security, then the costs are worth paying if they are seen in a longer term. There are also strategic benefits to an enlargement.[53]

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[50] van Staden, 1995, p. 300.
[51] Zelikow, 1996, p. 12.
[52] Gunilla Herolf, NATO och det framtida Europa (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, January, 1994), p. 2.
[53] Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler, F. Stephen Larrabee, "What will NATO Enlargement Cost?", Survival - The IISS Quarterly vol. 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996), pp. 25-26.

IV. Conclusion

Continued threat from Russia, new threats from small heterogenous republics with internal economic, social and political conflicts, risk of proliferation concerning nuclear weapons, opportunities to extend security and increase cooperation between the East and the West, maintained links over the Atlantic Ocean, continued integration and cooperation within NATO aiming at continued reassurance between the members and cost efficiency. These are the most common justifications that were used to maintain NATO in the face of the legitimacy challenge. The negative, external justifications concentrate on continued threats, and are constantly used by neorealists. To them, things change in the world, but anarchy lingers on no matter what. There are periods of tension and there are periods of détente, and there is no reason to dissolve NATO just because we have entered a period with less tension in the world. The other justifications are used more often by neoliberal institutionalists, even though neorealists use some of them from time to time, or agree with others. There is no doubt that they all have had an impact on the decision to keep NATO as the most important security institution in Europe and North America. To what extent they have affected the decision-makers is very difficult to say. The justifications used by the two schools do not contradict each other. They live side by side and complement each other in a way that makes it very useful to use both when one tries to understand the world we live in. Neorealists have found a way to explain why NATO should continue to exist even though some of the threat perceptions may seem exaggerated. At the same time, neoliberal institutionalists have a strong case in an era where cooperation across borders is increasingly seen as the best tool to enhance security

and welfare.

All these justifications helped to decide the fate of NATO, but there is another reason for the continued existence of NATO that has little to do with the justifications used by the two schools, but needs to be mentioned.[54] This explanation is based on the self-preserving instincts, which can be found within any organization. Once an organization is well-established, deeply rooted interests will form, and which will attempt to maintain the organization, and thus oppose any radical changes to it.[55] Werner J. Feld, among others, argues that any bureaucratic organization or institution has a wish to prolong its life. In addition, successful organizations usually want to extend their goals and grow as institutions.[56] Neoliberal institutionalists are probably those who will support this theory the most, even if they do not agree that it is the most important reason for NATO's survival. Colin McInnes argues that NATO was no exception to the rule, and that it was one of the reasons for NATO's survival. He says that "inevitable bureaucratic inertia and the self-preservation instincts of (international) civil servants" helped justifying NATO's continued existence.[57] Richard K. Betts explains this a bit further when arguing that NATO is quite institutionalized. NATO's "structure and consultative process have been thoroughly bureaucratised, and declarations of shared interests, objectives and commitment to cooperation have been ritualised".[58] This kind of continuity is part of the reason why East-West conflict during the Cold War was looked

[54] The explanation fits within *some* neo-liberal variants. (The author)
[55] Etzioni, 1973, p. 24.
[56] Feld. 1993, p. 8.
[57] McInnes, 1995, p. 88.
[58] Betts, 1989, p. 38.

upon as rather stable and predictable most of the time.[59] John S. Duffield has chosen to describe this phenomenon in a slightly different way. He argues that NATO had, and has, a special capacity for "institutional adaptation".

This explanation is not enough to guarantee any legitimacy for NATO, but its bureaucracy is still to be reckoned with, and it helped NATO in its adaptation process. The process of adaptation or change began to some extent even before it was clear that NATO would survive. The result of this process is presented and described in next chapter that addresses the changes both in thinking and in structures that took place within NATO.

[59] Ibid.

Chapter 3

Description of the Changes that Took Place within NATO

I. Introduction

> The North Atlantic Alliance has been the most successful defensive alliance in history. As our Alliance enters its fifth decade and looks ahead to a new century, it must continue to provide for the common defence... We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past decades. Yet our Alliance must be even more an agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We reaffirm that security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance...[1]

This declaration was issued in London in 1990 by NATO. It reflected the fact that NATO members were urging to preserve the organization while also admitting that changes were needed. After having observed the justifications used to maintain the organization, it is now time to turn to the actual changes that have taken place within NATO since 1989. Therefore, this chapter will highlight and describe changes of NATO after the fall of Communism and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union (FSU). It examines the changes resulting from the decision to maintain NATO, and from the feeling of new or changed security needs in the North Atlantic area, and in Europe. It is a descriptive chapter. Attempts to explain the changes are presented in Chapter Four.

The first part of this chapter addresses the changes regarding the new way of thinking - NATO's enhanced political role. Any organization which has existed for more than forty years is bound to have well-established routines, doctrines, and ways of dealing with day-to-day matters, as well as with crisis situations. This is true for NATO as well. The legitimacy challenge that NATO experienced resulted in the political and academic

debate that was discussed in last chapter. The legitimacy challenge also resulted in an urgent review of NATO's goals and procedures. As has been stated earlier in this thesis, the threat from the Soviet Union had changed dramatically which in effect deprived NATO of its *raison d'être*.[2] After some initial angst, the review commenced and results came quickly. Sections of this chapter deal with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), NATO's new role as a peacekeeper, the Partnership for Peace programme (PFP), and the ongoing enlargement debate. These actions were taken as a result of NATO's enhanced political role and as a result of improved relations with the former communist countries.[3]

In the second part of the chapter, changes in military structure and in military strategies are discussed as the organization has changed its form as well in order to adapt to new strategies, new demands and new challenges. The creation of a new force within NATO, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), gives NATO the opportunity to react quickly and to respond to different situations that may arise within the North Atlantic area. This force is meant to have the capability to operate outside NATO's traditional sphere of interest, as was seen during the war in the Persian Gulf. Another structural change that will be discussed later in the chapter is the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). CJTF makes it possible for non-NATO members to participate in NATO-led operations. Adding to this, a number of new bodies have been created within

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[1] From the London Declaration on a Transformed Atlantic Alliance, the London Summit, July 1990.
[2] Colin McInnes, "The Future of NATO" in (eds.) Cristoph Bluth Emil Kirchner, James Sperling, The Future of European Security (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1995) , p. 88.
[3] US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 8.

NATO among which the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation (DGP) is one.[4] All changes described in this chapter lay the foundation for next chapter which attempts to explain why these changes occurred and why NATO has survived.

II. Political Changes - A New Way of Thinking

As was outlined in the last chapter, the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the disintegration of the USSR took away some of NATO's reason for existing.[5] Parts of international relations theory state that military alliances formed to respond to one or more specific threats will disintegrate when the threats disappear.[6] Formed to respond to the military and ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union and its satellites, NATO was facing an imminent legitimacy crisis.[7]

In response to that legitimacy crisis, the debate began which was addressed in Chapter Two. The conclusion, which a perceived majority of people taking part of this debate agreed on, was that NATO was still needed. NATO began a transformation that still is taking place today. This process of change began in 1990 as events continued to occur which affected security structures in Europe. Reasons, both external and internal, were used to help this transformation. The foreign ministers of the Alliance met in Turnberry, UK, in 1990, and their conclusion was that NATO could become one of the

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[4] Ibid., pp. 8-9.
[5] See Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington: The Cato Institute, 1994), p. 109.; and Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.,1996), p. 62. See also Robert Levine, Transition and Turmoil in the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Taylor & Francis Inc., 1992), p. 2.
[6] David Haglund (ed.) Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, 1996), p. 19.; See also Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987)
[7] John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War", Political Science Quarterly, vol. 109, no. 5, 1994-95, pp. 764-765.

major architects for building a new and peaceful order in Europe.[8] They stated:

> Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.[9]

It was time for NATO to change. The first stepping-stone was NATO's London Summit in July 1990. Russia was declared to no longer be an adversary of the members of the Alliance.[10] It was admitted that the European security environment was changing. As was stated in the introduction to this chapter, NATO sought to increase its political role and to open up a dialogue with the Eastern European countries. NATO phrased this goal as a task to "reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the cold war, and extend to them the hand of friendship".[11]

It is interesting to note that NATO's perception of security began to change along with the development process. Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis argue that NATO began to recognise the emergence of a European security architecture where security in the new Europe had more than one dimension. Security, according to these authors, embraces economic, political, ecological, and defence dimensions and not just the military view of security.[12] NAC saw institutions like the Alliance, the EC, the WEU, and the Council of Europe as key institutions in this security structure. NAC also argued that the European members of the Alliance should get an enhanced role and responsibility when it came to transforming the Alliance.[13] All security organizations in Europe should work together in

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[8] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 63.
[9] North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry," NATO Review vol. 38, no. 3, 1990.
[10] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 7.
[11] Richard H. Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 75.
[12] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 64.
[13] Ibid.

this new security structure:

> The Council welcomed efforts further to strengthen the security dimension in the process of European integration and recognise the significance of the progress made by countries of the European Community towards the goal of political union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy.[14]

Even though other security organizations have a role to play, NATO has a "particular position" due to its capabilities.[15] At a ministerial meeting in Copenhagen in June 1991, the Alliance identified four core security functions that it would perform in Europe:

1) To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

2) To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

3) To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

4) To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.[16]

These four security tasks became part of the "new Strategic Concept" that was firmly outlined later in November, 1991, at the Rome Summit. At the meeting in Copenhagen, a statement was also issued that would come to guide NATO's policies in the future, and which would form the foundation of NATO's attempts to extend security in Europe. It declared: "We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division

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[14] Ibid.

[15] By capabilities NAC means the military capabilities and the well-established structures that NATO has developed.

of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free."[17]

NATO's new Strategic Concept reaffirmed the four core functions of the Alliance outlined in Copenhagen, and broadened the concept of security caused by the changing security landscape. The new strategy reaffirmed the importance of collective defence, while at the same time it stressed co-operation and dialogue with the former Warsaw Pact countries. For the first time ever, the task of addressing security threats beyond the North Atlantic area was identified, a task which lay the foundation for future peacekeeping and coalition crisis management operations. The document also addressed the changing threat against the Alliance. The threat was no longer a massive military attack from the East, but had rather turned into diverse and "multidirectional" risks[18] such as:

> ...the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.[19]

These new risks, together with possible "out-of-area" missions for NATO, made it necessary to radically restructure "the forces and missions of NATO's integrated military commands".[20]

The new Strategic Concept document repeated the statement that even though other European organizations such as the European Community, West European Union, and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, are important for an emerging security identity, NATO is the only institution which can perform the four security

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[16] North Atlantic Council, "Ministerial Meeting, Denmark," NATO Review vol. 39, no. 3, 1991
[17] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8.
[18] Werner J. Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 15-16.
[19] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 75.
[20] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8.

functions mentioned above. It therefore was seen as the "essential forum for consultation and the forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members".[21]

II a. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council

The North Atlantic Cooperation Council was part of the "extended hand of friendship" towards the East that was expressed during the London Summit. The actual council was established in late December, 1991, immediately following the Rome Summit in November of the same year where all details had been decided. NACC would provide NATO and the East European countries with a forum in which common security concerns, defence planning, conceptual approaches to arms control, democratic concepts of civilian-military relations, civil-military relations of air traffic management, and how to change military production into civilian production, could be discussed.[22] NACC's first meeting included the sixteen members of the Alliance and foreign ministers from Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and also a representative from the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, many of the new republics joined NACC.[23]

NACC did not turn out to be the success everybody had hoped it would be. By 1993, many countries and people were disillusioned with the council. One of the reasons

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[21] Feld, 1993, p. 16.
[22] See William Yerex, "The North Atlantic Cooperation Council: NATO's Ostpolitik for Post-Cold War Europe", in (eds.) David G. Haglund, S. Neil MacFarlane, Joel J. Sokolsky, NATO's Eastern Dilemmas (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), p. 181.; and Gunilla Herolf, NATO och det framtida Europa (Stockholm: Utrikespolitiska Institutet, January, 1994), p. 4. See also Feld, 1993, pp. 15-16.
[23] Yerex, 1994, p. 183.

for that was that it was not enough to *discuss* different issues. NACC lacked a "machinery" for action, which made it pointless to discuss some issues of importance.[24] Secondly, and more importantly, NACC did not provide the former Warsaw Pact countries with any security guarantees, which they very much wanted. They began to suspect that NACC was a way for NATO to avoid bringing Eastern countries closer. They found that the dialogue and the cooperation were not enough.[25]

William Yerex, a Canadian Lieutenant Colonel, points out that it was the former communist countries which "clearly identified NATO as the focal point for security and stability" in Europe.[26] This honour puts NATO in a difficult position however. Russia must not feel threatened by NATO's moves or by the enthusiasm that has been shown, when it comes to NATO, especially by the Central European countries. A more or less stable and secure Russia is essential for any serious attempts to enhance security in Europe.

II b. Peacekeeping

In June 1992, the Strategic Concept was extended. The extension discussed the necessity to adopt preventive diplomacy and crisis management, even outside NATO's territories. After being charged with crisis management outside the Alliance area, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO would undertake peacekeeping operations outside the North Atlantic area on a case-by-case basis under CSCE (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]), and under the United

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[24] Haglund, 1996, p. 25.
[25] McInnes, 1995, p. 93.

Nations.[27] According to James Goodby, there are five different sorts of peacekeeping operations which might be needed in the future:[28]

1) To carry out humanitarian functions, such as organising shipments of food and medicine under hazardous conditions;

2) To observe a situation that contains some risk of conflict;

3) To patrol borders or other sensitive areas;

4) To establish a buffer zone between adversarial military forces;

5) To protect enclaves of ethnic minorities.[29]

The Defence Planning Committee (DPC) ordered its permanent session to study peacekeeping, and come up with measures which would improve NATO's peacekeeping capabilities within areas such as command and control, logistic support, infrastructure, training and exercises.[30] Studies concluded that there were three *main* areas where NATO could support peacekeeping operations:

a) Non-material resources, e.g., information, expertise, coordination with other agencies.

b) Material resources, e.g., Alliance infrastructure, transportation, telecommunications, logistic support.

c) Constituted military forces such as the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, elements of the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and the NATO Airborne Early Warning Force, forces from individual Allied nations to include military combat units and support elements.[31]

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[26] Yerex, 1994, p. 185.
[27] Richard Latter, NATO in the New Europe (London, Wiston House Conference Centre, 1995) Wilton Park Paper no. 99., p. 15.
[28] James Goodby is a Professor at Carnegie-Mellon University, and was head of the U.S. delegation to the Stockholm Conference on disarmament in Europe, and vice-chairman to the START talks.
[29] James E. Goodby, "Peacekeeping in the New Europe", in (ed.) J. Philip Rogers, The Future of European Security (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 101-102.
[30] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 120.
[31] Ibid., pp. 120-121.

NATO would also take part in operations such as: "monitoring cease-fires; withdrawals of forces; supervising disarmament and control of weapons; escorting, controlling and protecting convoys; creating safe corridors; creating and monitoring buffer zones; creating and supervising disarmed or neutral areas; establishing communications; providing a full range of logistical assistance; removing hazardous munitions and commanding, coordinating and/or controlling peacekeeping forces from NATO and from non-NATO countries and regional organisations".[32]

We have already seen NATO involved in a "peacekeeping" operation in the former Republic of Yugoslavia under the umbrella of the United Nations. There have been a number of problems for NATO in its role as a peacekeeper. These have arisen from the fact that there have been mutually incompatible aims, and these have limited the chances for an effective NATO military contribution.[33] NATO has supported the UN in former Yugoslavia by planning the operation, and from 1992 and onwards, NATO naval forces have, together with the WEU, monitored the Adriatic part of the Mediterranean. In November 1992, these forces helped enforce the UN's arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia and the economic sanctions imposed by the UN on Serbia. Ten NATO members sent troops to be part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) operation, and an operational NATO headquarters was made available. NATO air forces were used to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia, and they were also used to protect the UNPROFOR forces on the ground.[34] NATO actions in the area were criticised when the Alliance launched its first attacks since it was founded. A number of actors were critical

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[32] Ibid., p. 121.
[33] Latter, 1995, pp. 6-7.

of the use of violence in a peacekeeping operation. President Yeltsin denounced the actions, and said that NATO had "appropriated the role of judge and judicial executor" and that NATO was exceeding the mandate of the UN.[35]

II c. Partnership for Peace

Former US Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, announced the idea of the PFP programme at a meeting in Travemünde, Germany, on October 20-21, 1993. However, it was not until the Brussels Summit in January, 1994, that the programme was embraced by the whole Alliance.[36] The PFP initiative was an attempt to go beyond the dialogue and cooperation that had begun with the NACC. The general idea was that NACC would take care of the political cooperation while PFP would handle the military cooperation.[37] The idea behind the PFP was to "forge a real partnership with the new eastern democracies as well as other European states...".[38] The programme was placed under the authority of the NAC, and all participants were welcome to take part in political and military activities regarding the partnership. All new countries that were willing to participate were invited to sign a Framework Document in which they promise to preserve democratic structures, and to maintain the principles of international law.[39] Partnership for Peace is declared to seek:

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[34] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 122.
[35] Canadian Press, "Serb civilians scurry for cover as NATO jets step up bombing," The Vancouver Sun September 8, 1995.
[36] David G. Haglund, "NATO Expansion: Origins and Evolutions of an Idea", in (ed.) David G. Haglund, Will NATO Go East? (Kingston, Ont.: Queen's University, 1996), p. 26.
[37] Herolf, 1994, p. 4.
[38] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 10.
[39] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 141.

1) facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgetary processes;

2) ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

3) maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

4) the development of cooperative military reductions with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

5) the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.[40]

After signing the Framework Document it is up to the country seeking membership to decide how extensive the commitment will be, and what resources that country is willing to commit to the relationship.[41] The final agreement is formalized in an agreed Individual Partnership Programme worked out on a bilateral basis. The overall work programme produced by NATO and the individual programmes will be updated every year.[42]

In addition to PFP's tasks, NATO has promised to consult with any PFP member that perceives a direct threat to "their territorial integrity, political independence or security".[43] NATO will go no further than that, and no real guarantees will be given. Even though PFP was created to ward off early demands from the central and eastern European countries to become members of the Alliance, it is a fact that one of the functions of the PFP is to build a foundation for new states to become members when NATO decides to

[40] The Framework Document for Partnership for Peace.
[41] Carpenter, 1994, p. 25.
[42] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 10.
[43] Latter, 1995, p. 12.

expand.[44] Active participation in PFP and its activities will play an important role in the process that NATO is going through when it comes to expanding the Alliance.[45] NATO has decided to make PFP stronger. Military cooperation between members and non-members will be intensified, which will make it easier to expand the Alliance in the future.[46]

The idea of expanding NATO has meant a number of problems, some of which have turned out to be difficult to solve. The most acute problem has been to convince Russia that NATO is not a threat. Moscow first welcomed NATO's decision to launch the PFP programme because it meant opportunities for military co-operation *and* it looked as an alternative to an enlargement of the Alliance. That changed when NATO became more and more convinced that it should expand the number of members, and said so publicly. Conservative forces in Russia saw an enlargement as an aggressive move by NATO, and a blow against Russia's pride.[47] A policy document regarding the US Government's view on NATO from 1995 stated that:

> ...the United States considers the Partnership an integral and lasting part of the new European security architecture. As the Alliance has made clear from the outset, participation in PFP will not guarantee admission to NATO but it is the path to membership for countries wanting to join.[48]

It did not help that the Alliance attempted to convince Russia that the PFP is not

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[44] Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Former Soviet Union (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), p. 118.
[45] John Borawski, "Partnership for Peace and beyond," International Affairs Vol. 71 No. 2 (April 1995) , p. 234.
[46] Holmström, July 8, 1997, p. 6.
[47] Russia and NATO reached an accord in mid-May wherein Russia allows NATO to expand eastwards, but will remain officially opposed to the expansion. Geoffrey York, "Russia, NATO Reach Accord", The Globe and Mail May 15, 1997, A1
[48] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 12.

constructed as a defence, but rather as a safety insurance.[49]

As of September 1995, 27 countries were participating in PFP's activities in addition to the original 16 members of NATO. Some of them might one day become full members, but for those which do not, the NACC and PFP will continue to be a platform for active cooperation.[50] So far, a number of important developments have taken place for PFP. Among the 27 non-NATO countries that joined in September 1995, all Warsaw Pact countries, and their successor states, except Tajikistan, were participating. Second, a Partnership Coordination Cell has been established at Mons, Belgium with the task of carrying out coordination and planning necessary to implement PFP programmes. Most participants have a liaison officer stationed there. Third, the initial Partnership Programme from 1994 has been extended for 1995 to include hundreds of training, planning and consultation activities involving most of NATO's principal committees. Fourth, most partners have concluded agreed Individual Partnership Programmes, and updating processes of these programmes have already taken place. Fifth, there have been a number of different exercises involving forces from the different countries and more are being planned.[51] Finally, a PFP defence planning and review process (PARP), was launched in January 1995. The main goal with PARP is to develop partner forces in order for them to be able to operate effectively with NATO forces. In 1995, 14 partners had chosen to be part of this process.[52]

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[49] Henry Kissinger, "NATOs roll är ännu inte överspelad," Svenska Dagbladet August 27, 1994, sec. Under Strecket

[50] Gebhardt von Moltke, "NATO moves towards enlargement," NATO Review January 1996, p. 5.

[51] For a specified list of exercises please see North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), pp. 254-259.

[52] US Department of Defense, 1995, pp. 10-11.

The most recent plan is to strengthen Partnership for Peace in order to avoid a situation where countries between NATO and Russia, such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, become gray zones, at the same time as NATO prepares itself for a first expansion process where Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the first candidates.[53]

II d. NATO's Enlargement Debate

Closely related to the Partnership for Peace programme is the debate concerning whether or not to expand the number of members of NATO. This debate commenced soon after the fall of Communism in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1990, the Soviet Union agreed to sign the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany," which stated that the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) could join the Federal Republic of Germany, and through that also join NATO, provided that no foreign troops were stationed in the former GDR.[54] It has been argued that Soviet leaders received oral reassurances in 1990 that NATO would not expand more than including former East Germany.[55] Ever since the German reunification, several other countries, such as Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and the Baltic States have sought to gain security guarantees from West European institutions. A membership in NATO, with its structure and resources, seemed to be a good step to take in addition to closer relations with the EU. NACC, and to some extent also PFP, were disappointments for those

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[53] Mikael Holmström, "USA ser Sverige som nyckelpartner," Svenska Dagbladet August 18, 1996, p. 8.
[54] Borawski, 1995, pp. 237-238.
[55] Fredrik Braconier, "Ryssland-Nato eniga om avtal," Svenska Dagbladet, May 15, 1997, sec. World News.

countries which quickly wanted to integrate with Western security.[56] It is not only the former communist countries that have argued for an expansion. Prominent voices in the West have argued that NATO must expand or die, or as a diplomat said: It must "go out of area or out of business".[57] At the NATO Summit in Madrid, 8-9 July, 1997 it was decided to invite Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO. These three countries will begin negotiating in order to become full members in 1999 when NATO has its 50th birthday, and on the 10th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall.[58] Romania and Slovenia were not accepted, but are next in line if the Alliance decides to expand in the future. Countries like Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Bulgaria and Albania have shown a strong interest in becoming members as well, but they are not considered to have fulfilled the requirements of political and economic stability yet.[59]

The road to the decision to expand NATO has been long and complicated. The Alliance has had a hard time dealing with the enlargement idea. This is explained by different opinions among its own members, and because of the problem with Russia's disapproval of an expansion . The need to extend stability eastwards was a primary concern, but NATO tried at the same time to be sure that the benefits of collective defence would not be sacrificed. There is also an economic question. Nobody knows how much it will cost to bring in new members. The big question is: "How could central

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[56] Hans Christian Hagman, "Morgondagens NATO - frågor kring alliansens expansion," Internationella Studier No. 4 (1993), p. 10.
[57] Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy no. 98 (Spring 1995), p. 116.
[58] Mikael Holmström, "Tidtabell klar för utvidgat Nato", Svenska Dagbladet December 11, 1996, sec. World News, p. 9.

European security be promoted, Russia not provoked, and the alliance kept cohesive and purposeful, all at the same time?"[60] Germany, Canada and the United States have been the nations most in favour of an expansion. The pro-expansionists talk about "exporting stability" and a "widening of the community of democracies" but there are also pitfalls to enlarging the Alliance according to Karl-Heinz Kamp, head of the Foreign Security Policy Section at the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung. Adding to the fact that nobody knows how much it will cost, Kamp argues that PFP should be more appreciated for letting the security environment in Europe become clearer, and for moving ahead slowly. He also says that proponents for an expansion forget how complicated relations between Russia, Central Europe, and the West really are.[61]

The extent of these complicated relations were shown in 1993 when President Yeltsin first expressed his view that Polish and Czech memberships would not pose a threat to Russia. He announced not long after that through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Kozyrev, that Russia was determined to stop any attempts from former Warsaw Pact allies to join NATO.[62] The Russians wanted the CSCE to be the tool used to enhance security in Europe. Some NATO members argued that by considering Russia's opinion, NATO gave Russia veto power when it comes to enlargement. This fear has now disappeared since NATO has decided to expand. Russian threats have become warnings instead. Russia's new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jevgenij Primakov, argues that an expansion of NATO will inevitably lead to a new division of Europe. Russia is still

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[59] Mikael Holmström, "Skugga över historisk dag för Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6.
[60] Borawski, 1995, p. 236.
[61] Kamp, 1995, p. 118.
[62] See Hagman, 1993, p. 10.; See also Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 140.

against an expansion, but is prepared to keep a dialogue with the Alliance going.[63] After a meeting between President Clinton and President Yeltsin in Helsinki, March 21, 1997, it was decided that the time had come to negotiate a special agreement. The Russian demand for a veto was turned down. President Clinton stated that Russia would be allowed to have a voice, but not a veto. The final statement from the meeting contained, among other things, these four points:

1) The two presidents had "agreed to disagree" regarding the issue of NATO enlargement.

2) There were guidelines for the special agreement between NATO and Russia
. NATO is prepared to agree that no nuclear weapons will be stationed in new member states.

3) A general agreement that OSCE should be strengthened in order to achieve a more stable and integrated Europe.

4) There was also an urgent request that all CFE-signatories (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty) should ratify the agreement, and a request that a new framework for a revised CFE treaty should be produced during the spring/summer.[64]

Even though NATO has promised not to place any nuclear weapons in the new member states, they will still be protected by NATO's nuclear umbrella.[65] On May 14, 1997, this special agreement was signed. It regulates both Russia's cooperation with NATO and Russia's influence in the enlargement process. It was decided that a permanent council will be set up where Russia shall take an active part. Russia will *not* have a veto against NATO expansion. Another important part of the document is NATO's "three nos"

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[63] Mikael Holmström, "Ryssland väljer försonlig linje mot Nato", Svenska Dagbladet December 12, 1996, sec. World News, p. 8.
[64] Karin Henriksson, "Natoutvidgning trots ryskt missnöje", Svenska Dagbladet March 22, 1997, sec. World News, p. 6.

regarding nuclear weapons. In a considerable time in the future, NATO has *no* reason, *no* plan and *no* intention to change its deployment of nuclear weapons. However, NATO states clearly that it intends to keep its freedom of action in case the security environment changes.[66]

The new NATO has been characterised as a train, where the task of the members is to get four new cars rolling before the summit in Madrid in 1997.[67] The first car is the enlargement itself. NATO must keep its promises to the East European states. The second car will be a new, extended Partnership for Peace for those countries which will not be accepted in the first round of new members (for example the Baltic states), or for those which have no intention to join the Alliance (Austria, Finland and Sweden). The United States has suggested that an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) be established with the purpose of tying countries that belong to both NACC and PFP closer together and increasing the political co-operation. They will be able to send ambassadors to NATO and also have officers stationed at NATO headquarters which are responsible for peacekeeping operations.[68] The third car is a new military command structure where both France and Spain will take part after decisions to join the military cooperation. France decided to join in December 1995, and Spain joined in November 1996.[69] There are 65 NATO commands today, but this number will be reduced to 35. These will also be taking on the new tasks of crisis prevention and peacekeeping. NATO resources will become

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[65] Mats Svegfors, "Nato växer och närmar sig", Svenska Dagbladet December 12, 1996, sec. Editorial
[66] Fredrik Braconier, "Nato behaller sin handlingsfrihet", Svenska Dagbladet, May 16, 1997, sec. World News, p. 6.
[67] Holmström, December 11, 1996, p. 9.
[68] Henrik Brors, "Nato expanderar osterut", Smålandstidningen December 11, 1996, sec. World News
[69] Mats Svegfors, "Mera spanskt i Nato", Svenska Dagbladet November 16, 1996, sec. Editorial, p. 2.

"Europeanised" so that they can be used by the European Union or WEU. The fourth and last car in the train will be readied for Russia if the country changes its mind, and wants to join the train. This is what the situation looks like today. NATO has changed substantially, but more is to come. The expansion of NATO will be the most important change, and the issue will continue to stir up emotions for a number of years to come.

Before turning to the changing military structures, it merits mention that NATO's civilian structure has changed somewhat as well. The North Atlantic Council has established a number of committees and groups since January, 1994, in order to manage the new tasks. The Political-Military Steering Committee on Partnership for Peace (PMSC) is one of them. It works as the principal working forum for PFP. The Joint Committee on Proliferation (JCP) is another new committee that consolidates the work of two other groups, the Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP) and the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation. The SGP's task is to develop an overall policy framework on proliferation and serves as a forum for consultations on the political aspects of the issue. DGP does the same thing except that it deals with the military aspects of proliferation. In May 1994, the NAC also created the Provisional Policy Coordination Group (PPCG). In conjunction with NATO's Military Authorities, PPCG shall assist the NAC in examining how NATO's political and military structures and procedures shall be developed and adapted to work more efficiently and flexibly. The group will do the same thing when it comes to NATO's peacekeeping missions and the cooperation with the WEU, where the development of the Combined Joint Task Forces is

one part.[70]

III. Changing Military Structures

NATO's answer to the new security environment was not limited to NATO's enhanced political role, which first resulted in NACC and later in PFP. The other major development was to review its military structure. Since the Alliance was established, NATO has mainly been a military defence alliance. During the Cold War, NATO's strategy was mostly of defensive nature:

> It involved a 'layer cake' defence in depth and a commitment to defend the forward edge of the Alliance area. The intention was to defend all areas of the Alliance simultaneously, to deploy a forward presence and a significant reinforcement capability was required.[71]

The new strategy is part of NATO's new Strategic Concept, which replaced the old strategy. It concentrates less on balance and threat, but more on the task of developing and maintaining stability.[72] Because of the changing security, NATO was given the task of providing the forces and capabilities needed to deal with crisis management and crisis prevention operations, including peacekeeping, while keeping the old goals of defending security and territorial integrity of NATO's members.[73] A consequence of the fact that the military threat from the East had declined substantially, and the fact that NATO's political role was stressed, was that there was a political wish in member states to reduce NATO's military resources. Instead of a counting on large numbers of forces, "enhanced flexibility and mobility" would become the new concept.[74] NATO's military headquarters (SHAPE)

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[70] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 99-100.
[71] Latter, 1995, p. 14.
[72] Ibid.
[73] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 163.
[74] Christopher Conliffe, "The Alliance Transformed: A Sceptical View", in David G. Haglund, S. Neil

presented a proposal for the new force structure during 1990. The new structure emphasizes mobility, flexibility and the need to continue the process of modernizing NATO's forces. The proposal suggested three types of forces in the new structure: Covering Forces, Main Defence Forces, and Reaction Forces. The Covering Forces would have the task of identifying and delaying aggression.[75] The Main Defence Forces consist of armoured and mechanized divisions, and they are ready to stop, and annihilate enemy forces should they break through the Cover Forces. The Reaction Forces have two purposes: either they can be used to handle crises that need a quick response, or they will serve as reinforcements. The Reaction Forces were divided into two forces: Immediate Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces. The former forces would be created from existing units such as the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force, and naval units stationed in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. The Rapid Reaction Forces, of which the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps is the land component, would be multinational, and be the symbol of NATO's new role in Europe and of its capability to leave the Cold War behind. It would at the same time give NATO an instrument that the Alliance could use to meet the new kind of challenges and threats. It was decided that the new force will be led by the British, and comprise eight or ten divisions, some of which are planned to be multinational. They will be of different size and different content, so that NATO could chose the best units depending on what kind of situation the Alliance

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MacFarlane, and Joel J. Sokolsky (eds.) NATO's Eastern Dilemmas, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc., 1994), p. 31.

[75] NATO later changed the name and the purpose of the Cover Forces into Augmentation Forces which will serve as a strategic reserve.

would have to deal with.[76]

At the Brussels Summit in January 1994, it was decided that NATO's adaptation of its military structures and procedures would continue. It was important that NATO would be able to conduct its missions efficiently and flexibly. It was also decided that the European pillar of the Alliance would be strengthened by:

> ...facilitating the use of NATO's military capabilities for NATO and European/WEU operations; and assisting the participation of non-NATO partners in joint peacekeeping operations and other contingencies as envisaged under the Partnership for Peace.[77]

Part of the adaptation was extensive force reductions. There was a 25 per cent reduction in the total number of NATO ground combat units and NATO's peacetime strength, when it comes to land forces in the Central Region[78], was reduced by more than 45 per cent. The number of naval vessels assigned to NATO was reduced by 10 percent. NATO air forces were also reduced. There was a 25 per cent decrease in the total number of combat aircraft assigned to NATO and a 45 percent reduction of the air forces in the Central and Northern Regions. The air forces coming from North America were cut back by 25 percent as well. Since then, the Alliance has further reviewed its forces deployed in Europe.[79]

The reductions of resources mentioned above also include the nuclear part of NATO's defence forces. Nuclear weapons are now officially seen as political tools, even more so than earlier, and there have been significant reductions in the deployment of

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[76] McInnes, 1995, pp. 87-109. ; See also North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, for an in-depth description of NATO's new military structure.

[77] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, p. 164.

[78] The Central Region is basically Germany. A Soviet conventional attack was always expected to come through Germany which explains why large concentrations of troops were stationed in Germany.

[79] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 164-165.

nuclear weapons on the European mainland.[80] There is a new arms reduction initiative, the START III, that will, if it is negotiated and ratified, reduce the number of nuclear warheads in Russia and in the United States to 2,000 each by the year 2007.[81]

When NATO decided to help the UN in Yugoslavia in 1992, the structure had to change to adapt to the new task. NATO was looking for a way to make it possible for non-members of the Alliance to participate in NATO-led operations. In 1994 the answer to the problem was found. The solution was called Combined Joint Task Forces. Any challenge will be met by the "provision of separable but not separate military structures..."[82] The CJTF is designed to respond in a flexible way to new challenges, and to strengthen the European pillar of NATO through cooperation with the WEU. Whether WEU or NATO is leading a future operation, it enables non-members such as PFP participants to take part in any operations.[83]

As a response to the changing policies and the changing security environment, NATO has also made following changes to its military structure, which are only examples: A Military Cooperation Working Group (MCWG) has been established to coordinate cooperation activities undertaken under the authority of the NATO military authorities. To help the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Forces, a Military Transitional Issues Working Group (MTIWG) was established to provide a forum for the Military Committee. Finally, an Ad Hoc Planning Coordination Group (AHPCG) was created to address the coordination of peacekeeping operations and crisis management

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[80] Latter, 1995, p. 15.
[81] Henriksson, March 22, 1997, p. 6.
[82] US Department of Defense, 1995, p. 8.
[83] Ibid., p. 9.

between NATO and non-members.[84]

IV. Conclusion

These changes presented above are the most important so far in NATO's quest to adapt to the new reality. The goal of this chapter was to outline the most important changes within NATO during the 1990s. The changes were divided into two parts. The first addressed the new way of thinking, and the second addressed the new structure of NATO. One of the most important decisions was that of the planned expansion of the Alliance. By including countries in Eastern Europe, NATO has improved its chances to survive in the long run, and perhaps more importantly, improved the chances of a long-lasting peace in Europe. In what way are the changes described above, explained by politicians and academics? Are they enough? Scholars, among them Colin McInnes, see them as enough to guarantee NATO a short-term future, but when it comes to NATO's long-term future they become more uncertain. As McInnes says: "A political role may be sufficient to ensure the Alliance's survival, but not its centrality".[85] This question will be brought up in Chapter Five which concludes this thesis. It is now time to turn to Chapter Four where the changes outlined above are studied and explained using the theoretical framework presented in the Introduction Chapter.

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[84] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1995, pp. 152-153.
[85] McInnes, 1995, p. 107.

Chapter 4

Explaining the Changes

I. Introduction

In previous chapters, the background of the Alliance has been presented, NATO's continued existence has been discussed, and in last chapter the most important changes since the collapse of the communist systems in Eastern Europe were discussed. In this chapter the question of why these changes took place will be addressed. In the process of evolving, NATO had different options. If we can understand, or even begin to understand, why certain changes took place, then we have gained a greater knowledge of how things work in the fields of organizational theory and international relations. This will enable us to go on to a much more difficult task -- that of predicting what is going to happen in the future and what changes will take place. The structure of this chapter is the same as in the previous chapter. First, comes a section explaining the new way of thinking within NATO, and then a section dealing with NATO's new structure follows. The theoretical framework will be used again in this chapter.

II. Explaining the New Way of Thinking

After a short period of inertia, a review process for NATO began in 1990. The foreign ministers of the member countries met and discussed the future of the Alliance. There was unanimous consent that NATO still could perform important tasks to maintain stability in Europe and enhance security. The foreign ministers agreed that the original

main goal was still important, but not enough. The defence alliance needed to adapt:

> Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.[1]

The foundation for any adaptations was the success NATO had with coordination, political consultations and other forms of intra-Alliance cooperation that had taken place in the past.

The former Secretary General, Manfred Wörner described NATO as "the midwife of change", which had the opportunity to influence a historic process. He also stated, in connection with his three suggested roles for NATO described in Chapter Three, that by using the Alliance as a political tool, NATO could help "to form a security structure favorable to political change on which you could build forms of an undivided Europe".[2]

One of the fundamental decisions which has had major implications for all changes that have taken place within NATO was that of involving the Alliance's former adversaries in the process of extending security. At the London Summit in July 1990, the Heads of State invited the Warsaw Pact members to establish diplomatic liaisons with NATO. CSCE was given an enhanced role to deal with broader political topics in Europe. It was suggested in the London Declaration that CSCE should be institutionalised "to provide regular consultation between member-states", and that a series of CSCE review conferences should be held.[3]

The "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe" began to take

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[1] Fergus Carr and Kostas Ifantis, NATO in the New European Order (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1996), p. 63.
[2] S. Nelson Drew, Keith W. Dayton, William J. Erwin, M. Barry Keck, Philip C. Marcum (eds.) The Future of NATO (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991), p. 52.
[3] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 63.

its form in June 1991. It was a document that stated that NATO did not want to isolate any country, and that it was important that a new division of the continent would not evolve. So far, it had only been words, but during 1991 words became actions and turned into more solid plans. The plans for NATO were interrupted at the beginning of 1991 when the events in the Persian Gulf led to war. The war, which ended successfully for the Western-led coalition, showed what an effective war-machine the West had.[4] It is highly probable that the turn out of the war strengthened NATO's legitimacy as the only real defence organization able to protect the interests of the West. The war strengthened the view of neorealists that the world is full of potential conflicts, and that NATO is still very much needed.

As stated earlier, the decision to approach the former communist countries set the agenda for the events that followed. A large part of the explanation for the "new way of thinking", which was dealt with in last chapter, can be found in the survival debate between the two schools in Chapter Two. External events had changed the conditions that NATO was working under. The debate following the legitimacy challenge created in itself a basis for the new way of thinking. A new way of thinking was as natural as it was necessary. NATO's legitimacy debate was bound to result in an array of different suggestions for the future. The most potent ideas amalgamated into a framework where NATO could adapt and evolve.

The new way of looking at security was clearly part of this. The sudden acceptance of a broader interpretation of security can be explained by looking at the

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[4] J. Werner Feld, The Future of European Security and Defense Policy (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 8-9.

transition period from two angles.[5] First, it was easier to legitimise NATO's continued existence if security meant more than military security. The inherent military threat for which traditional security was needed has declined. By broadening the concept of security, more multi-faced threats to security could be used as justifications for maintaining NATO. Neorealists on one hand still maintain that there is a military threat, but they do not disregard the "new" threats on the other. These threats just add to the justification that NATO is needed against the military threat. To neoliberal institutionalists the use of the broader concept of security is a natural part of the new way of thinking. The new way of looking at things is based on the opportunities for cooperation and reform that arose because of the political turbulence in eastern and central Europe.

The second way of dealing with this is to disregard NATO and the attempts to justify its future and to admit that there were certain factors that made it logical to broaden the concept of security. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union, and the dissolution of WTO and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) created a number of new and old states in which there exist dire social, economic and political problems.[6] Each one of these "new" problems is enough to cause instability within their borders as well as outside the borders of these countries. Problems, which existed during the communist era such as minority groups and crime, were earlier kept under the surface by the harsh communist system. Now, when they have surfaced they may be considered

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[5] Most neorealists argue that security has more than one dimension. Björn Hettne, Internationella Relationer (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992), pp. 18-19.

[6] The old and worn out industry in Central and Eastern Europe nearly collapsed in the aftermath of the political upheavals in 1989-1990 in the attempts to create free market economies. This resulted in extremely

to pose a threat to security. Migration has also become part of the security debate. It poses a threat to security, at least in theory. Western Europe must not only fear migration from the East, but also from the South according to some. Whatever one chooses to link to the concept of security, the point is that NATO's leadership has realized that "security arrangements are untenable without political, economic and social concomitants".[7] The result of this new way of looking at security was NATO's new Strategic Concept presented at the Summit in Rome, November 1991.

Out of this realisation came the decision to enhance NATO's political role and to open up a dialogue with the East European countries at the same time as NATO would continue to provide its members with security understood in the traditional way. This pleased both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. NATO and the West took a self-confident stance. Cooperation, dialogue, and affiliation with the Western Democracies were thought to spread stability. There was also the idea that the eastern European countries had a lot to learn from the West. The advantage with the plan to increase cooperation on multiple levels, according to neoliberalists, was that NATO could use its own institutions and the experience gathered for more than forty years in its work.

The idea that the former communist countries should be brought closer to the West opened another issue. If NATO could stretch its arms into former enemy countries, why could not NATO extend its area of interest to other areas as well? If NATO was to become a tool of stability making, it was logical to look at other areas in NATO's vicinity where political unrest is present as well. The result of that kind of thinking can among

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high unemployment in these countries and a lower living standard for the populations.

[7] Jerold D. Green; F. Stephen Larrabec; Ian O. Lesser, "NATO is Looking South, and Mideast Peace Stands

other examples be seen in the dialogue that NATO is having with Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, and Jordan.[8] Having overcome the initial angst, NATO seemed to stress the fact that it had successfully survived the Cold War, and that no other institution could measure up to its standards.

The wish to extend security and to cooperate closely is the core of the new way of thinking. It was out of the wish for closer cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact countries that the North Atlantic Cooperation Council grew. The goal was a "shared security culture based upon cooperation, mutual consideration and restraint, openness and shared responsibilities".[9] Established in December, 1991, this sub-organization to NATO commenced its work of getting the East and the West to start cooperating. In search for closer relations with the East and Central European countries, NACC became a framework for "dismantling the remnants of the confrontation of the cold war, both the physical and the mental relics".[10] NACC has accomplished the task of getting most of the new republics and the former communist countries to join NACC. One consequence of the talks has been an economic restructuring in the East. However, this has proven to be very difficult because of the state of most of the economies in those countries. It seems as if the "Iron Curtain" has been replaced with a "Poverty Curtain".[11]

NACC turned out to be a good beginning, but the frustration increased both in the West and in the East when governments wanted to deepen the cooperation. Former US

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to Gain," International Herald Tribune January 18, 1995.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Johan Jörgen Holst, A Changing NATO in a Changing Europe (Oslo: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1992), p. 12.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Gunilla Herolf, "NATO och VEU - vilka roller spelar de?" Samhällsmagasinet EPOK 1995, pp. 17-18.

Secretary of State, Warren Cristopher, called NACC a "paper relationship".[12] This frustration laid the foundation for the Partnership for Peace-programme, which will be dealt with later in this chapter.

The growing number of inter-state conflicts and ethnic conflicts after the end of the Cold War resulted in an increased demand for peacekeeping operations by the UN. Between 1988 and 1992 the number of UN-led peacekeeping operations was greater than the total number of operations carried out during the entire Cold War. The UN has also shown a new activeness after the success with the war in the Persian Gulf.[13] Since most of the influential countries in the UN also are members of NATO, it was natural for most neoliberal institutionalists that NATO would be influenced by the new assertiveness of the UN since international institutions influence states and the behaviour of states.[14] This assertiveness together with the fact that NATO was looking for a new identity at the time were important reasons for NATO's decision to become the tool of the UN and the CSCE. This was especially true since the conflict in former Yugoslavia showed tendencies to grow worse, and the conflict area was clearly in NATO's neighbourhood. NATO's new Strategic Concept talked about the need to adopt preventive diplomacy and crisis management, so it did not come as a surprise when the North Atlantic Council declared in June 1992, that NATO was ready to support peacekeeping operations on a case-by-case basis under the CSCE. A few months later, in December, this offer was extended to

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[12] Ted Galen Carpenter, Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars (Washington D.C.: The Cato Institute, 1994), p. 25.
[13] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 110.
[14] Alfred van Staden, "A Lasting Alliance? On the Creation, Evolution, and Future of NATO", Acta Politica vol. 30, no. 3., 1995 (July), p. 299.

operations under the supervision of the UN.[15] By this move, NATO had added a new goal, and reestablished legitimacy to the organization, at the same time as the defence alliance attempted to extend stability and security in the region. As with the example of the International Red Cross in the Introduction Chapter, NATO solidified its legitimacy by adding new tasks. It is important that the organization is perceived to have tasks that are seen as achievable and important to the members. The timing was very good. The willingness of the UN to take on more peacekeeping operations had to be supplemented by a tool that could take on the tasks. Again, NATO had the experience, the structure and the means to perform exactly those tasks that the UN was looking for. This new task of peacekeeping was linked with the task of increasing cooperation with NATO and the rest of the European countries. NATO sought cooperation with NACC when developing plans for peacekeeping operations, and received support from NACC in December 1992 when NACC promised to share expertise and cooperate in planning operations.[16]

The limits of NACC became obvious when the members wanted to go beyond the dialogue stage which was underway in order to deepen relations. When NACC was established there were high hopes among some of the Central European countries that it would be a waiting room for countries which wanted to join NATO. This was especially true in former Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary which all hoped that NATO's member states would consider them ready to become members of the defence alliance.[17] In these countries, and in other former Warsaw Pact countries, Russia is seen as a military

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[15] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 120.
[16] Ibid., p. 121.
[17] Mats Carlbom, "Natos framtid blir ett nätverk av allianser," Dagens Nyheter November 20, 1993, sec. World News, p. A 13.

threat, and a threat to their new independence. A membership in NATO is seen as a protection against the Russians.[18] Russia's initial interest in seeing its former satellites getting closer to NATO was soon replaced by a hard-core resistance. In a letter to the governments of NATO, President Yeltsin stated that he firmly opposed any attempts to enlarge NATO. NATO and Russia should guarantee the security of the Central European countries together.[19]

With NACC, which was not enough to satisfy the needs of some of the newly democratic states, it was clear that NATO had a problem. On one hand, security would be extended and cooperation increased if new members were allowed to join, but the risk of having a defensive, and assertive Russia on the other hand, was far from what NATO wanted to have. There was a risk that the situation would become more insecure with more members. Yet, it was impossible to ignore the fact that there was a strong security need among most of the Central European states as well as many of the former Soviet Republics. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were all occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II, and they have been among the countries which have been the most eager to approach the Western community. They see NATO as the only alternative when it comes to achieve military security.[20] Many of the countries interested in a NATO-membership have also approached the European Union. One can argue that neorealists have been the most positive to an enlargement. They understand the feeling of insecurity that exists in many former communist countries, while neoliberal institutionalists fear increased tension between NATO and Russia. They want to cooperate as much as possible with the

[18] Herolf, 1995, p. 18.
[19] Carlbom, 1993, p. 13.

Russians to enhance security. Neorealists see this as futile as it is only a matter of time before Russia becomes aggressive again.

The solution to this security need, at least on a short-term basis, was the Partnership for Peace programme which former US minister of defence, Les Aspin, presented in October, 1993. This programme meant that countries outside NATO could cooperate to a degree that they decided themselves. It gave the former communist countries a chance to get familiar with NATO's military routines and structures. PFP's fifth goal, stated in Chapter Three, is "to develop...forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance".[21]

By establishing PFP, NATO gained some time. PFP would not give any of the full range security guarantees that would accompany a full membership in NATO, but it was a step on the way for those who coveted a membership. However, there were still neoliberal institutionalists who believed in NACC as the best way of slowly increasing cooperation without upsetting Russia, and thus increase tension. For them, PFP represented a weakening of NACC and its goals.[22]

Nevertheless, those wishing to become NATO-members did not give up these efforts after joining the Partnership-programme, and NATO's internal discussion regarding an enlargement did not stop. On the contrary, it seems as if PFP triggered the process which led to NATO's decision to expand. NATO's members viewed PFP differently. One of the explanations why enlargement slowly became accepted might have

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[20] Håkan Hagwall, "Nato fick lite fart på Nordiska rådet," Svenska Dagbladet November 13, 1996, p. 2.
[21] Richard Latter, NATO in the New Europe (London: Wiston House Conference Centre, 1995), Wilton Park Paper no. 99., p. 12.
[22] Uwe Nerlich, "Die NATO als Kernstück einer europaischen Sicherheitsstruktur," Europa-Archiv

been that the United States took an early view that expanding the Alliance was a positive thing, and that PFP should be seen as a waiting room:

> For some, PFP will be an essential tool in the demanding task of preparing themselves to meet the responsibilities of full NATO membership. PFP also provides a valuable framework for evaluating the ability of each partner to assume the obligations and commitments of NATO membership - a testing ground for their capabilities.[23]

Why is it that NATO has proceeded with this plan to expand when Russia has opposed this so vehemently? It might be that enlargement serves two important purposes. First, extending stability and security in Europe will benefit the countries in NATO both economically, and when it comes to security. Second, it is a way of making the victory of the Cold War final. It is a rather cynical, but the fact is that the geographical and strategic map would look different should a Cold War situation ever occur again, something that neorealists see as a clear possibility. This is not as bold as it sounds. This is exactly what some Russians fear or suspect. At the beginning of 1997, Russian Minister of Defence, Igor Rodionov, stated that an enlargement of NATO might constitute a military threat against Russia. A group of high-ranking officers have also, in an open letter to President Yeltsin, suggested that Russia should target its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at the West European capitals again.[24] These are not scattered comments or statements. There seem to be those in Russia who use the enlargement politically to scare people, but there is also a deep feeling that it would be a severe blow to Russia's pride, a sign of lost importance, and of lost influence. Ambassador Julij Kvitsinskij belongs to the conservative forces in Russian politics, and he is also counselor to the speaker in the

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vol. 49, no.17 (September 10, 1994), p. 505.

[23] US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for Europe and NATO (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, June 1995), p. 12.

[24] TT-AFP, "Frostiga samtal om utvidgning av Nato," Smålandstidningen January 21, 1997, sec. World

Duma. He is one of the people neorealists point at when they argue that Russia is bound to regain its former aggressive posture. At a conference in Sweden in January 1997, Kvitsinskij had following to say:

> NATO's enlargement is in reality an attempt to prepare a military attack on Russia. But one day Russia will escape from the trap, and you can be sure of that, as sure as you can be that night follows day. Russia will be reborn and show gratitude towards her friends, but teach her opponents what justice is.[25]

NATO probably feels that now is the right time to expand. Russia is too weak to pose a real threat to any expansion plans. The goal is to try to convince Russia that letting other countries join NATO does not pose a threat other than to its ego. NATO does not want to humiliate Russia. Lech Walesa, the former President of Poland, describes NATO's expansion plans as a peaceful process.[26]

At the "Summit for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation and Security" in Madrid, July 8-9 1997, NATO's future was shaped and defined. It was not only NATO's future that was outlined. In some regards, the decisions made at the conference will shape Europe for the 21st century, and it is the final proof of the new way of thinking. This is what NATO achieved at the Madrid Summit:

1) NATO invited the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to begin accession negotiations with the defence alliance. The Alliance's goal is to be able to welcome new members in 1999. The three Baltic states, Romania and Slovenia are next in line.

2) NATO will launch an enhanced Partnership for Peace initiative to widen the scope of cooperation with the partners, particularly in political consultations and

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News.

[25] Mikael Holmström, "Nato beskylls för anfallsplaner," Svenska Dagbladet January 29, 1997, sec. Domestic News: 9. (This is quote is translated from Swedish. Some minor nuances might have been lost in the translation. [the author]).

[26] Lech Walesa, "Wary of a Weakened Russia, Walesa Urges NATO Expansion," The Globe and Mail March 14, 1997, sec. International News, p. A 10.

operational planning and activities.

3) NATO will further develop an enhanced relationship with Ukraine

4) NATO aims to reach an agreement with Russia which would ensure a strong, stable, and enduring security partnership. It has been decided to establish a special NATO-Russia council where Russia can have a say but no right to veto.

5) NATO will put the finishing touches on a reformed command structure to improve the capability to carry out NATO's new mission of crisis management, to enable all Allies to participate fully in the structure and to contribute to the building of the European Security and Defence Identity. This will be done through regional commands.

6) The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which is a new institution instigated by NATO, met for the first time in Madrid. The intention is to give Europe's 28 non-members of NATO a greater chance to influence politically.[27]

III. Explaining the New Military Structure

NATO realised after the communist empire had begun to crumble that there was no longer a need to pursue annual real increases in defence expenditures. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and the prospects of an improved security situation in Europe decreased the necessity to keep large numbers of troops at alert.[28] It was clear that the "old" NATO equipped to prevent a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact, and deter a nuclear attack, would not be much of a use in the rapidly changing security environment. Military structures are designed to implement NATO strategy in an efficient way. These structures had to change dramatically if they were going to meet the new demands of the 1990s. The new strategic concept that was developed in the aftermath of the Cold War tried to do exactly that. Conventional and nuclear balance

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[27] See Javier Solana, "Shaping NATO for the 21st Century", NATO Review vol. 45, no. 1, 1997, p. 3.; See also Mikael Holmström, "Skugga över historisk dag för Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6.

became less important because the Soviet Union did not pose the same threat as it used to do. The former Warsaw Pact members competed with each other in their attempts to approach the West. The urge to reach a military, strategic balance was replaced by the task of trying to achieve and maintain stability in Central and Eastern Europe.[29] Crisis management was added to the goals of the Alliance. The chance of regional crises breaking out seemed to increase with ethnic conflicts in many of the new republics and with the crisis in former Yugoslavia as a constant reminder.

The new situation with a diminished threat-perception explains the reduction in resources, and the fact that NATO was able to make savings of 25 percent.[30] The new goals that NATO had taken on and the new situation mentioned above made it necessary to change the force structure as was described in Chapter Three. Mobility, flexibility and multinationality were all results from the decreased threat. With mobile and flexible forces it was not necessary to maintain the same numbers as earlier which meant that defence cuts could be introduced. These defence cuts had a positive effect for NATO in that it helped increasing the legitimacy of the organization among the public in the member states where huge defence budgets have been problematic for politicians to defend.

One explanation for creating multinational forces is that it would relieve NATO from having the historical heritage of "occupational forces" in other member countries.[31] It was also done to prevent a future challenge from WEU, which has experimented with,

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[28] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 62.
[29] Latter, 1995, p. 14.
[30] Ibid., p. 15.
[31] Feld, 1993, p. 9.

for example, French and German troops training and working together.

When NATO's Strategic Concept was extended in 1992, NATO was charged with the task of crisis management outside the Alliance area. The structure was not prepared for peacekeeping operations and modifications were necessary to accommodate this:

> The required Command and Control structures for peacekeeping on a large scale outside the Treaty area simply did not exist. The response was therefore ad hoc, using structures set up for in-area operations.[32]

The need to create such structures explains NATO's response of establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces. Flexibility was again the key word. CJTFs could easily be set up, and non-NATO members could take part in the operations without disturbing NATO's other tasks. The CJTF solution also met the demand of being rather cheap.

NATO's decision to keep nuclear weapons in its arsenal is explained by the fact that they unfortunately cannot be disinvented. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) concluded that:

> for the foreseeable future, the deterrence of war will continue to require the maintenance of strategic nuclear forces and widespread Alliance participation in an appropriate mix of survivable and nuclear forces in Europe.[33]

Even though nuclear forces continue to be part of NATO's weaponry, nuclear weapons do not have the same importance as during the Cold War. As stated in Chapter Three, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are now more of a political nature than military, and the numbers have been reduced. It might be as much an economic question as it is a question of decreased tension in Europe, but nobody had expected the nuclear weapons to be abolished after the Cold War.

The explanations regarding NATO's military re-structuring that neorealists and

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[32] Latter, 1995, p. 15.

neoliberal institutionalists use are almost the same. Both argue that changes were necessary and that the changes that took place were natural in the adaptation process. The difference is again that they stress different motives for the changes. Neorealists tend to argue that the changes were made to better meet the new threats that have surfaced, while neoliberal institutionalists argue that it was necessary to restructure NATO's military parts so that it would be easier to integrate other countries and in order to fulfil the new tasks of which peacekeeping is one of the most important ones.

IV. Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to explain NATO's second stage and the changes that were described in Chapter Three using the theoretical framework. One can argue that it to a large extent is the era of neoliberal institutionalists. There is a widely spread optimism at the moment in Europe that security can be increased, and that NATO by enlarging is doing this. Proponents of this school would argue that the new way of thinking, and the institutional changes that we have seen within NATO, is a sign of a flexible institution that is adapting. It is adapting in order to use the opportunity to enhance security in Europe by increasing integration and cooperation between the East and the West. The new way of thinking does not mean that "old" ways of thinking will die out entirely. As with most things in society they live side by side. Neorealists stress the growing number of inter-state and ethnic conflicts that have surfaced. In addition to keeping NATO in case of a Russian return to an aggressive stance, they also see the

[33] Carr and Ifantis, 1996, p. 63.

changes as a response to the new threats. They do not see the opportunities the same way as neoliberal institutionalists do.

Changes will continue to occur, and many of the explanations presented in this chapter will look differently in the light of history. That might not lie too far in the future, since we have entered an eventful decade. It is now time to turn to the concluding chapter where conclusions will be presented and where the study is discussed.

Chapter Five

Conclusion

I. Introduction

NATO has entered a new phase after the decision was made to keep the Alliance. Several events and changes have occurred during the time that has passed after the end of the Cold War, many of which have had huge impact on the work and structure of NATO. This chapter includes a summary of the thesis, and it will address the conclusions drawn from the study, which includes an evaluation of the theoretical framework that has been used. This is followed by a section dealing with the significance of the thesis and also future areas of research. Finally, there is a concluding discussion by the author that gives his personal view regarding what happened to NATO and the future of the Alliance.

II. Summary of the Thesis

This thesis has established that there was a legitimacy challenge directed towards NATO when the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact decreased due to the internal, political upheavals that took place in Eastern Europe. The overall question that was asked in this thesis was: what was NATO's actual response to the legitimacy challenge? The author has studied two stages of the response. The first stage constitutes the survival-debate that took place not long after NATO's legitimacy was being questioned. Since NATO's survival is a fact, the thesis concentrated on the justifications used to keep the organization. Two major groups could be found taking part in the debate,

and they were mainly consisting of politicians and academics.[1] One group used negative, external justifications for keeping NATO. These people, the neorealists, argue that there are both old threats and new threats that legitimise NATO's continued existence. The other group, the neoliberal institutionalists, use both positive, external justifications and internal justifications which mainly stress cooperation, and the positive aspects of NATO as an international security institution.

The two schools also give somewhat different explanations to the new way of thinking and NATO's new structure that has emerged in the second stage of NATO's response. Most of the proponents from the two schools agree that NATO was adapting to the new security situation in Europe, but their explanations follow to a large extent their justifications given in the first stage. Neoliberals argue that NATO is needed to enhance security by extending cooperation eastwards and to maintain peace as a peacekeeper for the UN. They explain why NACC, and PFP for example, were created, by pointing at this need for NATO. Neorealists also explain the changes looking back at their justifications used to maintain NATO. They argue that a disintegrated Soviet Union and a dissolved Warsaw Pact pose new and modified threats to the West that demand a new kind of military defence. It explains NATO's focus on mobility and flexibility in the Alliance's new military structure they say, while neoliberals argue that the new structure saves money and is necessary if NATO shall work as a peacekeeper where there are other demands on the military structure. The conclusions drawn from the study are explained in next section.

[1] It is the author that has labeled the people taking part in the debate. They themselves might not agree with the labelling. It is also broad generalizations.

III. Conclusions Drawn from the Study

There are some conclusions that are drawn from the study. The first one concerns stage one in NATO's response that deals with the debate and the question why politicians and academics want to keep NATO. No matter which school these people belong to, it is clear that they agree on at least one thing: NATO is the best solution to their worries or their hopes. The qualities of the organization, its experience, its means, its close cooperation, its structure and its legitimacy in the eyes of its member states, all these aspects helped both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists make up their minds. That is why they do not argue with each other when it comes to the most important conclusion that both schools draw: NATO is needed!

There has not been major disagreement when it comes to stage two either. The question of how NATO has adapted is, apart from the different explanations given by the two schools, not very contested. It seems as if most neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists agree that the changes conducted were the right ones. The conclusion for stage two of NATO's response is that NATO now has what it takes to please both those who fear future conflicts and those who believe in enhanced security through cooperation and integration.

Despite the agreement, the two schools do not see eye to eye on all things. As we might have expected, there are advantages and disadvantages by using either of the two schools presented in this thesis. The neorealist school has the advantage of having history on its side. History has shown that the world is full of conflicts and that states may have to pay dearly if they begin to relax too much. Neorealists are often described as suspicious

and negative in their thinking, but there are many events in the past that justify that suspicion. On the other hand, it should be noted that parts of the ideas neorealism is based upon are outdated, especially when it comes to NATO. One can not draw the same conclusions about the NATO we see today and the NATO that existed during the Cold War. As stated earlier, NATO has moved on from being the traditional defence alliance it once was. NATO has come to encompass so much more than only the military component, which is still seen as the most important task among some members.[2] One of the favourite terms that realists in general like to use is balance of power. Today, it is more difficult to talk about balance of power when the bipolar world has been replaced by a more multipolar world.[3]

The neoliberal school is more positive when it stresses the opportunities that have emerged after the end of the Cold War. Neoliberal institutionalists are more flexible when it comes to actors than neorealists who argue that the state is the main actor. By looking at institutions as well, neoliberals have an advantage that neorealists lack. But what it gains from seeing the opportunities that have arisen and the importance of institutions, the school loses when it sometimes disregards the negative sides that neorealists stress and the fact that NATO is based on the cooperation of single states. There is also an idealism that sometimes shines through. Idealism is good as long as it does not turn into *naïveté.* The two schools do not contradict each other. They just have different ways of looking at the world and phenomena that take place, and they stress different things.

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[2] Mikael Holmström, "Nato enades om utvidgningen" Svenska Dagbladet July 9, 1997, sec. World News, p. 7.
[3] There are, however, different views on how to interpret balance of power. (The author)

It is the strong opinion of the author that the arguments of neither school, or neither group, is enough if one wants to understand why NATO survived and why NATO evolved the way it did. One needs to take all justifications and arguments into consideration before it is possible to draw any conclusions, because neither school is wrong. Both ways of looking at things are valid and necessary. All reasons brought up in the debate helped determine NATO's fate and subsequently also the process wherein NATO evolved. It is often argued that the more angles you use when studying an object or topic from, the better you will see, and the better you will understand. Björn Hettne, is one of them. He argues in the introduction to his book, Internationella Relationer, that a one-sided focus on one theoretical perspective can explain the world on the surface in a good way, but if this results in a systematic misinterpretation at the same time, then we will estrange us from reality rather than getting closer.[4] It is equally important to use a broad-minded view, looking at the response of the Alliance from more than one perspective, when one studies NATO. It is not argued here that the members of the two groups/schools are fundamentalists. There are people like Colin McInnes and John S. Duffield that do what is suggested here. Duffield, for example, explains NATO's persistance by using arguments from both schools, using both internal and external justifications. The most fruitful analyses tend to come from people like Duffield. However, this does not mean that one cannot stress ideas from other schools, or stress ideas from one specific shool, as long as all possible angles have been taken into consideration. Few people other than those mentioned have realised the importance of alternative interpretations of the same

[4] Björn Hettne, InternationellaRelationer (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992), p. 5.

phenomenon. The conclusion is thus that *all* justifications given were valid and contributed to NATO's survival and continued evolvement.

The two stages that were studied show that NATO's response was rather quick and at the same time not hasty. The almost unanimous support for maintaining the Alliance made the process easier even though the motives for keeping NATO differed. It is also noted that the second stage of NATO's was of a dual nature which helped in the quest of overcoming the last doubt about the ability of the organization to adapt. NATO could probably have kept the old military structure while still adopting the new way of thinking. This would most likely not have worked in the long run. The changes went hand in hand in a way that benefited NATO. As a final conclusion it must be argued that NATO's evolution, or response, was well-balanced, well-timed and conducted so that both people in the West *and* in the East perceived NATO to be the best security solution for Europe when it comes to stability. Without political stability it is nearly impossible to meet the other security needs as social and economic security for example.

IV. Significance and Future Areas of Research

One of the significant aspects of this thesis is that it looks through both lenses and acknowledges the importance of using more than one lens. Without doing this it is impossible to predict anything. John W. Burton stated in his book, World Society:

"...individual, group or other behaviour cannot be analysed and explained adequately by

attention only to one aspect of it,...It requires all disciplines to explain behaviour in such a way as to enable prediction."[5]

A second significant aspect of the study is that it analyses a contemporary international organization which influences, and is influenced by, many governments when it comes to foreign, defence and security policies. This is important because it represents an organization that has effectively dealt with the changing concept of security. It is also important because we might learn things about other international institutions when it comes to enhancing security and cooperation. The UN has been scrutinised the last few years and many people want to see reforms. Perhaps, they should look at NATO and its response to the legitimacy challenge. There are many differences, but also similarities. It could be fruitful future study to compare NATO and the UN when it comes to legitimacy and dealing with challenges. A third significance of this thesis is that it gives a face to the changes within the oldest defence alliance and also to some of the security needs in Europe today. More importantly, these changes have not yet been sufficiently covered in a comprehensive way by academics. This thesis is one of few works that studies the whole process of an evolving NATO since the political turmoil began in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989. There is a limitation in this thesis and that is that it does not bring up other theoretical schools to complement the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalist schools. It was the choice of the author to use, what many people argue are, the most important theoretical schools *today* within international relations.

There are a couple of areas where future research would be fruitful in connection to this thesis. As long as NATO exists there will always be a need to study the organization

[5] John W. Burton, World Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 15.

and its activities. As this thesis has treated the short-term survival of the defence organization, it would be interesting to analyse its future long-term chances to survive in Europe, especially if the EU and NATO expand over the next few years. Will there be another legitimacy challenge for NATO if Russia becomes a true democracy and decides to become a member of the organization? Legitimacy is another field that would be interesting to study further. Is legitimacy more or less important for an organization today, and does it matter where in the world the organization works? The concept of security is a third field where further studies can be made. The definition of security will never be static, but the question is if military security will be totally replaced by, for example, economic and social aspects, or if we will see a continued development of a broad interpretation of security as a concept? A fourth and final field that is always important is the security needs of the world, and in this case Europe. Before determining and outlining these needs it is very difficult to work effectively towards enhanced security. What are the security needs of Europe today? That question has been touched upon in this thesis, but not adequately. There are many more questions raised in connection to this thesis. The ones mentioned above are but a sample. Now, we come to the final discussion of the author, which gives a personal view of aspects addressed in this thesis.

V. Conclusion and Final Discussion of the Author

It was a very broad debate concerning NATO that followed the end of the Cold War. There is no doubt that NATO's legitimacy had diminished due to the changed threat perception and the changing security environment in Europe. It was discovered that there

were too many reasons that spoke for a continued existence of NATO to threaten its existence. First, NATO has come to provide more than security for its members over the years. The consultations and the close military and civilian cooperation, which have evolved throughout the decades, have been important to NATO and to western Europe as a whole. It is possible that it would have been enough to keep NATO for that reason. The chance that the United States would have wanted to keep its strong ties with Western Europe is rather strong, even if that would have meant reducing the American financial burden in the Alliance. Second, one has to argue that keeping NATO as a defence alliance has a preventive purpose. Here, the author agrees with many neorealists. We cannot say for sure that Russia has given up the old expansionist ideas of the former Soviet Union, or that the new strong Germany will not exert its leadership-power more in the future. The sentiments after the World War I come to mind. The euphoria when that war ended can be compared for example to the sentiment when the Berlin Wall was torn down on November 9-10, 1989. That comparison does not mean that we should expect a third world war in a couple of years, only that a certain cautiousness should be exercised. However unlikely, or remote, the security situation in Europe can change for the worse.

The changes that took place within NATO came as a response to the new way of thinking and to the decision to adapt to a new reality. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council and the Partnership for Peace Programme were excellent ideas and a good beginning to the extended cooperation with the East and Central European countries. NATO's peacekeeping role emerged from the successful outcome of the war in the Persian Gulf and from the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

The changes within NATO's military structure were perhaps the most natural and the most expected ones. It was impossible both for economic and legitimacy reasons to keep the old structures. There was no need for large numbers of troops and huge arsenals filled with weapons of mass destruction. In the new era, mobility and flexibility were stressed as key factors when the threat of a Soviet mass invasion turned into a threat of smaller conflicts that could break out on short notice.

The most surprising event that has taken place is perhaps NATO's early enlargement. Nobody could predict in 1989 that the Warsaw Pact would dissolve and that three of its former members would begin negotiating in 1997 for a membership. Many people are worried that the process is too quick. It is argued here that it is of outmost importance that Russia is as much involved as it can and as much as it is allowed. The relationship NATO-Russia is the key to security in Europe today and for a long time to come. Closer relations between the West and Russia can only benefit the security situation. Therefore, it is important for NATO to be careful and diplomatic when dealing with Russia and its former satellites. The West has to realize that the Russians are proud and that they have security concerns of their own. This cautiousness should not be brought so far that political forces in Russia can use it for short-sighted political gains. An open dialogue on all levels would be very much appreciated from a security point of view.

What lies ahead for NATO then? Predictions are always difficult to make, but the Alliance will continue to be the most important security actor in Europe for a very long time to come. By the decision to enlarge, NATO has not only assured its continued existence, but also given itself new blood. The biggest threat against NATO as an

organization is not the legitimacy challenge any more. It may be seen as a contradiction, but the improved security situation in Europe threatens the cohesion within NATO that was very much based on the external threat of the Soviet Union. Now, when that threat is all but gone, the cohesion within NATO is in jeopardy.[6] At the meeting in Madrid, France played the *enfant terrible* by attempting to convince the rest of the members that Romania and Slovenia should be accepted as well. Although, it was more of a French attempt to exert power, it shows that the Alliance might have future problems agreeing on important decisions.[7]

Despite this, it is likely that we will see a second expansion of the Alliance beginning in 1999 when the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have been accepted as members. Much can happen in a very short time, but it is difficult to see what Russia has to gain from stopping the course of events. It should be totally clear to the Russian political leadership that NATO lacks the political willpower, political backing and the ability to pose a military threat to Russia. The only way NATO could gather the necessary political strength to pose a military threat is if Russia chooses an expansionist path in the future and thus becomes a threat to NATO and the new states in East and Central Europe. In that case it is more or less self-inflicted. However, this does not prevent Russian politicians from using NATO expansion as a tool in domestic politics as a diversion from internal problems. The best possible outcome we can hope for is that NATO and Russia on one hand and the EU and Russia on the other, increase cooperation on all levels. Increased cooperation and integration is so far the best way to enhance security and welfare in the

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[6] Mikael Holmström, "Skugga över historisk dag för Nato", Svenska Dagbladet July 8, 1997, p. 6.
[7] Mikael Holmström, "Ett nytt samarbete skapas i Europa", Svenska Dagbladet July 11, 1997, sec. World News.

region and NATO is a very important tool. Only time will tell if the goal of increased security is reached. We have been presented with an excellent opportunity, and so far it seems as if NATO uses this opportunity.

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Appendix 1

The North Atlantic Treaty

Washington D.C., 4 April 1949

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.

They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty:

ARTICLE 1

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes ot the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

ARTICLE 3

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE 4

The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE 6[1]

For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack:

- on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France[2], on the territory of Turkey or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic Cancer;

[1] As ammended by Article 2 of the Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey.

- on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic Cancer.

ARTICLE 7

The Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way the rights and obligations under the charter of the Parties which are members of the United Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 8

Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE 9

The Parties hereby establish a council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The council shall be so organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The council shall set up such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 3 and 5.

ARTICLE 10

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

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[2] On 16 January 1963, the Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 3 July 1962.

ARTICLE 11

This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit of their ratifications.[3]

ARTICLE 12

After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE 13

After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

ARTICLE 14

This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatories.

[3] The Treaty came into force on 24 August 1949, after the deposit of the ratifications of all signatory states.

Appendix 2

NATO's Early Structures

NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY ORGANIZATION
APRIL 1956

CHART No. 1



COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL
APRIL 1956



CHART No. 2

Source: Lord Ismay, NATO - The First Five Years 1949-1954 (Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954)

CHART No. 3

NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF/SECRETARIAT
APRIL 1956



NATO MILITARY ORGANIZATION
APRIL 1956



CHART No. 4

CHART No. 5

ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE
APRIL 1956



ALLIED COMMAND ATLANTIC
APRIL 1956



CHART No. 6

Appendix 3

NATO's New Structures



Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995)

NATO's Civil and Military Structure