

MARXIST-LENINIST IDEOLOGY, SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE  
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM OF STATES

by

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Marxist-Leninist Ideology, Soviet Foreign Policy  
and the Structure of the International System of States

Alexandre Grichine

**Abstract**

This work examines the relationship between Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet foreign policy in the context of the contemporary structure of the international system of states. To what degree does the ideology of a state shape the course of foreign policy pursued by that state? How does the structure of the international system influence a state's international behaviour? What happens if the ideological "foreign policy blueprint" comes into conflict with the requirements dictated by the structure of the international system?

This work will attempt to provide answers to these questions and to outline how structural constraints imposed on Soviet international behaviour during the 20<sup>th</sup> century diminished the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a determinant of Soviet foreign policy. It will demonstrate that, far from being "unorthodox" and "unique", Soviet foreign policy was governed by some of the same factors as were policies of other states in the contemporary international system.

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## Introduction

“The Soviet ideological prism reflects an image of the world that is virtually unrecognizable to a non-communist, yet it is on this image that Soviet foreign policy is based.”

V. Aspaturian.<sup>1</sup>

“I’ve done a great deal of reading on Communist ideology. This resulted in my understanding of the aims of international Communism and produced a steadfast American policy in meeting that threat.”

J. F. Dulles.<sup>2</sup>

“The unsubstantiated assumptions by governments that other governments’ behavior is strongly motivated by ideology (e.g. Washington assuming Moscow will pursue a communist foreign policy and Moscow assuming that Washington will pursue a capitalist foreign policy and both being surprised that neither does) has naturally led to ineffective foreign policies.”

W. Levi.<sup>3</sup>

From the three statements above we can see the essence of a debate going on for several generations among foreign policy scholars with regard to the role of ideology in determining the course of Soviet foreign policy. This debate is part of the larger debate concerning the right perspective through which a state’s international behaviour should be analyzed.

Many different schools of thought – Realism, Liberalism, Historical Materialism and others – emphasize different approaches to the understanding of a state’s behaviour in the international arena. However, most foreign policy scholars can be divided into two basic schools or approaches. One group of scholars sees the subject mainly from the perspective of decision-makers, whereas another group’s perspective emphasizes the environment or system in which states behave, or, in the words of Waltz, “reductionist”

and “systemic” theorists.<sup>4</sup> Those who favour the first approach seek to explain state behaviour in terms of decision-makers and their perceptions. Many highlight the importance of ideological assumptions shared by statesmen for the explanation and prediction of the foreign policy of that state. With particular respect to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, they argue that “the official ideology of Marxism-Leninism plays a central role,”<sup>5</sup> because “Soviet Marxism-Leninism influences and shapes the perceptual and conceptual world of Soviet leaders.”<sup>6</sup> Brzezinski, for example, argues that “the persisting and important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of Soviet leaders” is “essential to an understanding of their conduct of foreign policy.”<sup>7</sup>

On the other hand, supporters of a “system” level approach<sup>8</sup> argue that internal characteristics of a state, such as ideology, do not have any significant influence on the foreign policy of that state. They insist that the foreign policy of a state is determined by the structure of the international system, which imposes a certain type of behaviour upon states and forces them to engage in balance of power politics.

A main consideration that served as a reason for writing this paper was an apparent comparability of the foreign policies of the USSR and the USA during the Cold War. According to scholars who support the first point of view, ideology was the factor behind foreign policy decisions, in both the USA and USSR cases. For example, with regard to the USA, they say that Lockian liberalism strongly influenced American foreign policy behaviour. “Strands of the linkages between the ideological traditions and foreign policy behaviour,” Kegley says, “may be detected in American diplomatic history from the Monroe Doctrine to Vietnam.”<sup>9</sup> In a similar manner, Brzezinski, Ulam, Dulles, and



others argue that Marxist-Leninist ideology is the keystone to understanding Soviet foreign policy.

Considering that the ideologies represented by the American and the Soviet governments “contradicted each other in so many ways, that neither side could accept the ideology of the other,”<sup>10</sup> it was argued by both sides that their foreign policies were entirely different from each other, precisely because they were based on opposite ideological assumptions. On the other hand, others argue that the foreign policies of the two states during the Cold War appeared highly similar and characterized by expansionism and domination. This view was held not only by many foreign policy scholars,<sup>11</sup> but by a relatively unprejudiced observer.<sup>12</sup> In short, the policies of both matched the general pattern of behaviour of a superpower.<sup>13</sup>

This work will argue that the answer can be found in the Realist, particularly Structural Realist, approach. Without trying to dismiss the concept of ideology as a major motivational force behind foreign policy decisions, this work will nevertheless attempt to demonstrate that the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system of states on Soviet international behaviour significantly diminished the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology on Soviet foreign policy.

The particular focus will be on the relationship between Soviet ideology and Soviet foreign policy within systemic constraints in the formative period of the Soviet state. This work will show how, during the early stages of Soviet foreign policy development, the influence of the structure of the international system of states caused certain changes in the character of Soviet leaders’ perceptions of international relations, and transformed the ideologically defined goals of Soviet foreign policy in a way that

made them consistent with the Realist perspective of international relations, thus demonstrating that the Structural Realist approach appears to be the more effective tool in the explanation and analysis of Soviet foreign policy behaviour, than the “ideological” approach.

The main research question is thus, “Which influence on Soviet foreign policy – that of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or that of structural constraints – was stronger, and, therefore, played a primary role in Soviet foreign policy determination?” Such a narrow focus, essentially “ideology vs. structure”, might well raise some objections. Concentrating on only two factors shaping Soviet foreign policy, this work ignores other factors, such as domestic influences. Due to the severely limited space, it was impossible to present in this work a comprehensive analysis of all factors that could influence the course of Soviet foreign policy. Thus, my choice was to concentrate on two factors that, in my opinion, were the most influential in shaping Soviet foreign policy, especially in its formative stage.

I would like to emphasize that the absence of the discussion of other possible factors of influence on Soviet foreign policy in this work should not be understood as an attempt to exclude these factors from Soviet foreign policy analysis. Rather, their absence was necessary in order to present a clear and adequate examination of the aspects I chose to concentrate on, namely, the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology and the structure of the international system of states on Soviet foreign policy.

This work will be divided into several chapters. The first part of Chapter I, “The Concept of Ideology,” will examine the discourse on ideology with the purpose of defining the concept and its functions. It will highlight that ideology can serve both as a

motivation and as a legitimization device, and that these two uses do not always coincide. The second part will briefly examine the Realist perspective on international relations, and outline the role of the influence of the structure of the international system as the constraining and directing force that shapes a state's international behaviour.

Chapter II will outline the main assumptions of the pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine with the purpose of determining the perceptual framework of Soviet leaders at the moment of formation of the Soviet state.

It will also examine the arguments of scholars who support the view of ideology being the main determinant of Soviet foreign policy, and highlight the inconsistency between the content of the doctrinal innovations made by Soviet leaders during the post-revolutionary period and the basic pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist assumptions. This chapter will also suggest that the structure of the international system of states was responsible for changes in the Soviet leadership's perceptions of international relations, changes that resulted in a fundamental shift of Soviet foreign policy and modification of the official doctrine.

Chapter III will examine the evolution of Soviet leaders' perceptions of international relations as the direct consequence of the gradual process of adaptation of doctrine-based Soviet international behaviour to the requirements of the international system of states. It will highlight the Brest-Litovsk crisis in Soviet foreign policy as the crucial moment of confrontation between the requirements of Communist doctrine and the requirements of the international system of states imposed on Soviet international behaviour. It will be shown that the new Soviet perspective that emerged during the

Brest-Litovsk foreign policy debate became very similar to the Realist perspective on international relations.

Chapter IV will trace the subsequent evolution of Soviet foreign policy in order to demonstrate the enduring character of the new Soviet perspective on international relations that emerged during the Brest-Litovsk crisis. More specifically, it will show that certain trends in Soviet foreign policy that emerged after Brest-Litovsk marked the beginning of a continuing pattern of Soviet international behaviour, rather than a temporary setback.

Chapter V will summarize the evidence presented in previous chapters. It will underscore the changes that Soviet perceptions went through during the initial period of Soviet international behaviour. It will emphasize the effect of the structural influence of the international system of states as the main cause of these changes. On the basis of these findings, it will be concluded that, despite the undisputable role of Communist ideology as the major motivator of Soviet foreign policy, the constraints imposed on Soviet international behaviour by the international system of states diminished the importance of Communist ideology to Soviet foreign policy analysis. Considering the nature of the international system of states in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the structural Realist framework, it will be argued, presents a much more effective analytical tool for the study of Soviet foreign policy than Soviet official ideology.

## **Chapter I: The Concept of Ideology and the Realist Perspective on International Relations.**

### **Part 1: The Concept of Ideology.**

#### **The origins of the term.**

In order to examine the influence of ideology on the foreign policy of a state, it is necessary to determine what exactly ideology is. Modern scholars view ideology as a historical phenomenon that emerged with the Enlightenment.<sup>14</sup> The word “ideology” was invented by Antoine Destutt de Tracy during the French Revolution. For de Tracy, “ideologie” referred to a new “science of ideas,” literally an “idea-ology.”<sup>15</sup> The term “was first used to refer to a philosophy whose exponents explained all ideas as deriving ultimately from sensations,”<sup>16</sup> and “attributed to ideology the power to demonstrate the relationship between experience and ideas, and the relationship between truth and a well-ordered human world.”<sup>17</sup>

However, the original meaning of the term has had little impact on its later usage. The word “ideologue” almost immediately acquired a “derogatory meaning” that “was attached to it by Napoleon, who dismissed ideology, equating it with doctrinaire and utopian ideas.”<sup>18</sup> This negative overtone has accompanied the term ever since, and is evident in works of many scholars, such as Marx,<sup>19</sup> Oakeshott, Arendt, Talmon, and “end of ideology” theorists.<sup>20</sup>

#### **Modern discourse**

Since the 1960s, the term ideology has been revised according to the needs of conventional social and political analysis. Thus, “ideology” became a neutral and objective concept without the negative connotation once attached to it. For example,

Plamenatz says that the term ideology, in its modern sense, “is used to refer to a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community.”<sup>21</sup> Very close to Plamenatz’s definition of ideology we can find in the Russian *Filosoficheskii Slovar* (Philosophical Dictionary, 1954 ed.): “Ideology is a system of definite views, ideas, conceptions, and notions adhered to by some class or political party.”<sup>22</sup>

It would be useful, in my opinion, to quote several more modern definitions of ideology before making conclusions:

Rejai: “Political ideology is an emotion-laden, myth-saturated, action-related system of beliefs and values about people and society, legitimacy and authority, which is acquired to a large extent as a matter of faith and habit... Ideological beliefs are more or less coherent, more or less articulate, more or less open to new evidence and information.”<sup>23</sup>

Ball: “An ideology is a fairly coherent and comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for social and political action.”<sup>24</sup>

Johnston: “An ideology is a more or less consistent set of beliefs about the nature of society in which individuals live, and about the proper role of the state in establishing or maintaining that society.”<sup>25</sup>

Analyzing the discourse on ideology that was briefly examined on the pages above, we can easily find many similarities between different scholars’ views on what ideology is. Everybody, in general, agrees that ideology is, first of all, a “set of normative values and relatively enduring beliefs,”<sup>26</sup> which explains to its bearer how the world is,

and how it should be. It is also possible to establish that there is no “neutral,” unprejudiced ideology. Every ideology, as can be seen, views the world from perspective of a particular group, whose interests it is meant to defend. It may be a class or may be a group organized on the basis of other criteria. Yakovlev for one argues: “The theoretic content of ideology is a sum of political, legal, moral, philosophical, aesthetical, and other ideas, which reflect economic relationships in a society from the perspective of a particular societal class.”<sup>27</sup>

Thus, all political ideologies describe relationships between various groups and individuals in the same world. However, since they all view the world from the perspective of particular societal groups, they differ in their evaluative content, namely how the world and society **should** be organized. In other words, it is clear that every ideology contains in itself a stimulus for its bearer to impose change on those aspects of societal structure that this ideology finds unsatisfactory. And that brings us to the main question examined in this work – the relationship between ideology and political action.

### **Ideology and action**

There is no doubt among scholars that a relationship between ideology and political action does exist. Brzezinski states that, “ideology is the link between theory and action,”<sup>28</sup> and everybody in general agrees that ideology is “action-related.”<sup>29</sup> But there is a major disagreement between scholars on the exact nature of this relationship. Most of them agree on the existence of a direct causal relationship between ideology and action, that is, that the latter is caused by the former. “Those sets of beliefs or theories that are

ideological are also overtly prescriptive; they make value judgments, and they include injunctions and advice to men as to how they should behave.”<sup>30</sup>

This point is supported by Eccleshall, who states that “Ideologies share two principal characteristics: an image of society and a political program. The image renders society intelligible from a particular viewpoint. Aspects of the social world are accentuated and contrasted to illustrate both how the whole actually operates and ideally should be organized. The specific social image forms the core of each ideology. From it radiates a program of action: prescriptions of what ought to be done to ensure that social ideal and actual reality coincide. Prescriptions vary in accordance with the specific image of the good, or properly arranged, society.”<sup>31</sup>

Yakovlev in his book “Ideology” also argues that “ideology is a system of ideas and theories, values and norms, ideals and directives for action, which represent interests, goals and tasks of a particular societal class, and aim to preserve or eliminate the existing social order.”<sup>32</sup>

Skidmore shares the similar view: “A political ideology provides a program, and incites action.... A one-sentence definition might therefore be: ‘Political ideology is a form of thought that presents a pattern of complex political ideas simply and in a manner that inspires action to achieve certain goals.’”<sup>33</sup>

The clearest articulation of this position can be found in Donaldson’s definition of ideology: “An ideology is a comprehensive and consistent set of beliefs and values which usually begins with a critique of existing reality and a statement of goals, and contains a program for the radical transformation of society and attainment of these goals. As such, ideology consists not merely of an assessment of the situation, but an impulse toward



action, toward bringing about the desired change in the situation. An adherent of a [particular] ideology is provided both with a set of goals and with a distinctive way of looking at events... [Some] foreign policy analysts see [ideology] as a blueprint providing explicit guidance to foreign policy.”<sup>34</sup>

Another group of scholars, however, disagrees with the first group and insists that a causal relationship between ideology and action does exist, but the former is influenced by the latter, that is, people adjust ideology to be in accord with their actions and not the other way around. For example, Balaban in his book “Politics and Ideology” has defined ideology as “a system of ideas and beliefs that politicians create for the purpose of persuading people to support or reject a given policy.”<sup>35</sup> It is, in Balaban’s opinion, the function of “practical thinking” to guide political action. Therefore, one does not need to study the ideology of an individual in order to know how this individual will act. “In service of his ideology,” Balaban argues, “an individual may act in different and even radically opposing ways – or a particular act may be assimilated by whatever ideology is held by the individual.”<sup>36</sup>

Politics, according to Balaban, uses ideology as an argument to justify “eminently practical attitudes.” Because the ideological rationalization of some political attitude or act is invariably post-facto, he says, it should not be regarded as a motivation.


“Ideology is only the form that justifies the act: it is the cosmetic that politicians apply to the act to make it more appealing to the public. The word frees the deed. Now the act and its motivations have nothing to do with the ideological arguments offered up on their behalf. Ideology only concerns itself with the reception of its audience; politics makes use of the patterns of reception as a means to achieve goals other than explicitly stated as the content of ideology.”<sup>37</sup>

The main idea that Balaban develops in the course of his work is that ideology is used in politics not as a guide to action but as means to manipulate social consciousness. Instead of being a motivational force behind a political decision, Balaban argues ideology is merely a tool that helps leaders carry out decisions. And he is not alone; many scholars, irrespective of their views on ideology, made remarks on its extreme usefulness as means of achieving political goals. For example, Seliger defined ideology as ‘a group of beliefs ... designed to serve on a relatively permanent basis a group of people to justify... the legitimacy of the ... concerted action for the preservation, reform, destruction or reconstruction of a given order.’<sup>38</sup> Funderburk also argues that “of particular importance in the modern era is the role of ideologies as political belief systems that can be used to mobilize people for action.”<sup>39</sup> Finally, Rejai adds a similar argument: “Ideologies have a high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation and control; in that sense, they are mobilized belief systems.”<sup>40</sup>

A simplified summary of these arguments can be presented in Figure 1:

Figure 1.

**Flowchart of the Possible Ideological Influences on Foreign Policy Decision-Making.**



In short, from the discourse examined above, one conclusion could be made—that no matter to what degree policy-makers share the official ideological beliefs, they still use ideology to justify policy decisions in order to manipulate the masses' consciousness in a way that would provide mass support for the particular policy.

The main concern of this paper is: "How important is the study of official ideology of a particular state to the study of the foreign policy of that state?" From the examination of arguments presented in this chapter, two contradictory views can be noted.

The first is that the study of ideology is unimportant for foreign policy analysis because its main role is the justification of foreign policy decisions by policy-makers who are motivated by other considerations. That view finds its clearest reflection in the Realist school of thought. The next chapter will present a brief overview of the Realist position in international relations.

The second view is that ideology has a crucial importance in the study of foreign policy because it: a) shapes policy-makers' perceptions and values; and b) offers them a concrete program to act upon or, in other words, serves as a guide to action. Chapters three and four will consider this argument with regard to a particular state – the USSR.

## **Part 2: The Realist Perspective on International Relations**

### **Realism as a school of political thought.**

Realism in international relations theory has its intellectual roots in the older political philosophy of the West and in the writings of non-Western ancient authors such as Thucydides in Greece, Mencius and the Legalists in China, and Kautilya in India. Throughout history, such prominent scholars as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Hegel, among others, made their contributions to the development of the Realist school of political thought.<sup>41</sup>

Many prominent scholars, such as Niebuhr, Kennan, Kissinger,<sup>42</sup> and Morgenthau, contributed to the development of the Realist school of thought in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Morgenthau, who was given by other scholars such titles as “the ‘Pope’ of Realism in international relations”<sup>43</sup> and the “founding father of International Relations theory,”<sup>44</sup> made one of the most important contributions to the Realist school of thought in International Relations. To summarize Morgenthau’s argument briefly, “International politics... is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”<sup>45</sup>

Political Realism is, according to Keohane, based on three key assumptions that “furnished a usable interpretative framework for observers from Thucydides onward.” He articulates these assumptions as follows. “First, states are the key units of action. Second, they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends. Third, they behave in ways that are rational, and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms.”<sup>46</sup>

## **Balance-of-power theory**

The “balance-of-power” theory occupies a central position in realist thought. Morgenthau on this subject stated that “the aspiration for power in the part of several nations, each trying either to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a configuration that is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at preserving it.” He viewed a balance of power as “only the particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts.”<sup>47</sup>

In short, Moore states the main principle of the balance of power system as the following: “If any state attempts to expand its power and influence, other states will singly or in combination attempt to prevent this expansion.”<sup>48</sup> “An important corollary of the balance-of-power principle,” Moore adds, “is that any state that wishes to preserve its power and territorial integrity must ally itself with the opponents of an expanding state... The balance of power leads in this fashion to a system of coalitions and countercoalitions.”<sup>49</sup>

According to Moore,

“Among the major skills required for success and survival under balance of power conditions is the ability to evaluate correctly the strength and weaknesses of potential allies and enemies in order to shift one’s position in the distribution of power as rapidly and effectively as possible. Failure to do so may lead to conquest and defeat. By the same token, it is often necessary for the statesman to be on guard lest an ally become too strong, in which case it may be necessary to shift allegiance to the opposite camp. In a similar way, successful statesmen have to be skilled in detecting signs of dissension in the enemy’s camp and in playing upon such conflicts to further the survival of their own state.”<sup>50</sup>

The balance-of-power principle, Moore highlights, also “presumes that allies have to be sought where they may be found, and in the international arena it often occurs that

the choice dictated by power considerations does not correspond with ideological ones or those of cultural affinity.”<sup>51</sup>

### **The role of ideology**

Under these conditions, the Realist view on the role of ideology is demonstrated by Morgenthau’s statement that “the actor on the political scene cannot help ‘playing an act’ by concealing the true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a political ideology.” “It is the very nature of politics,” according to Morgenthau, “to compel the actor on the political scene to use ideologies in order to disguise the immediate goal of his action,” which is always power.<sup>52</sup>

This general point of view was also applied by Morgenthau particularly to the Soviet Union. The view that Soviet ideology is for the most part a rationalization of Soviet foreign policy, which [policy] is motivated by power considerations, can be also seen in works of Moore,<sup>53</sup> Sharp,<sup>54</sup> Daniels<sup>55</sup> and others.

### **Waltz’s theory of structural influence.**

The Realist position was further developed by Kenneth Waltz. In his *Theory of International Politics*, Waltz attempted to construct a theory that would not only describe the general pattern of states’ international behaviour but would also explain what compels states to behave in such a way.

Criticizing earlier political scientists’ attempts to explain international outcomes through examination of the internal characteristics of interacting units,<sup>56</sup> Waltz emphasizes the need for “systemic” theory that would deal “with the forces that are in play at the international, and not at the national, level.” He further argued that, “to the

extent that dynamics of a system limit the freedom of its units, their behaviour and the outcomes of their behaviour become predictable.”<sup>57</sup>

In Waltz’s theory, the concept of “structure” is the most important in explanation of behaviours and outcomes. According to Waltz, “the concept of structure is based on a fact that units differently juxtaposed and combined behave differently and in interacting produce different outcomes.” Structure, according to Waltz, “defines the arrangement, or the ordering, of the parts of a system.”<sup>58</sup> Using the term “structure,” Waltz refers to a “set of constraining conditions,” that “acts as a selector by rewarding some behaviours and punishing others.”<sup>59</sup>

Structures, according to Waltz, are defined by their ordering principles, the character of their units, and by the distribution of capabilities among units.<sup>60</sup> Waltz defines an international system as a “decentralized and anarchic” realm, formed and maintained by coactions of its units where a principle of self-help applies to the units. Waltz’s structure is state-centric: the main units of the international political structure are states that seek to ensure their survival. Speaking about the character of the units, Waltz defines states as “like units” that are not formally differentiated by the functions they perform, and that will remain like units as long as they continue to coexist in an anarchic realm. Since the international-political structure is anarchical, it can be defined, according to Waltz, simply by considering the distribution of capabilities among units: “Market structure is defined by counting firms; international-political structure, by counting states. In the counting, distinctions are made only according to capabilities.”<sup>61</sup>

The anarchical structure of the international system of states, according to Waltz, is responsible for the repeated patterns of state behaviours and outcomes. These



behaviours and outcomes are closely identified with the Realpolitik approach, the elements of which Waltz summarizes as follows: “the state’s interest provides the spring of action; the necessities of policy arise from the unregulated competition of states; calculation based on these necessities can discover the policies that will best serve a state’s interests; success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state.”<sup>62</sup>

Realpolitik outlines the methods by which foreign policy is conducted. Structural constraints, Waltz says, explain why states with fundamentally different internal characteristics, such as ideology and social system, repeatedly use the same methods. Finally, the theory of balance of power explains outcomes produced by these methods.

“A properly stated balance of power theory,” Waltz says, “begins with assumptions about states.” “They are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination. States, or those who act for them, try in more or less sensible ways to use the means available in order to achieve the ends in view. Those means fall into two categories: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink the opposing one).” To the assumptions of the theory Waltz adds the condition for its operation: “that two or more states coexist in a self-help system, one with no superior agent to come to the aid of states that may be weakening or to deny to any of them the use of whatever instruments they think will serve their purposes.”<sup>63</sup> Thus, “the balance-of-power theory is built up from the assumed motivations of states and the actions that correspond to them. It describes the constraints that arise from the system that those

actions produce, and it indicates the expected outcome: namely, the formation of balances of power.”<sup>64</sup>

“A self-help system,” Waltz says, “is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer. Fear of such unwanted consequences stimulates states to behave in ways that tend toward the creation of balances of power. This theory requires no assumptions of rationality or of constancy of will on the part of all of the actors. The theory says simply that if some do relatively well, others will emulate them or fall by the wayside. Nor need it be assumed that all of the competing states are striving relentlessly to increase their power. The possibility that force may be used by some states to weaken or destroy others does, however, make it difficult for them to break out of the competitive system.”<sup>65</sup> Contrary to other scholars,<sup>66</sup> Waltz insists that “balance-of-power politics prevail wherever two, and only two, requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”<sup>67</sup>

In anarchy, Waltz argues, the most important goal is the security of a state. Agreeing with Morgenthau on this point, he states: “Only if survival is assured can states safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power.”<sup>68</sup>

The competition, Waltz says, affects not only military but also behavioural characteristics of a state. This effect, which Waltz named “socialization to the system,” can be seen especially clearly in the example of states “conforming to common international practices even though for internal reasons they would prefer not to.” “The close juxtaposition of states,” Waltz argues, “promotes their sameness through the disadvantages that arise from a failure to conform to successful practices.”<sup>69</sup>

The main prediction of balance of power theory in Waltz's interpretation is a "strong tendency toward balance in the system: that states will engage in balancing behaviour, whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts." What we should expect is not, Waltz says, that "a balance, once achieved, will be maintained," but that "a balance, once disrupted, will be restored in one way or another." Since the theory is based on the competitive nature of international politics, it specifically predicts that "states will display characteristics common to competitors: namely, that they will imitate each other and become socialized to their system."<sup>70</sup>

Waltz's theory allows him to conclude that "wherever agents and agencies are coupled by force and competition rather than by authority and law, we expect to find such behaviours and outcomes."<sup>71</sup>

#### **The View of Ideology from the Structural Realist Perspective.**

Waltz's main contribution to the Realist school of thought was in providing a rational explanation of certain characteristics of state behaviour. Moreover, emphasizing the structural influence of the international system as the major determinant of states' international behaviour, he also somewhat changed the Realist perspective on the relationship between ideology and behaviour. The earlier Realist belief was that power considerations are the main motivation behind foreign policies, and ideology only a tool for rationalizing these policies. According to Waltz, however, ideology may very well be a foreign policy motivation. However, the existing structure of the international system influences the state to a degree, when:

- a) the survival and increase in power of the state become the precondition for implementation of all ideologically defined goals; and,

- b) to ensure its survival and increase in power, the behaviour of a state (both external and internal, although the latter to a smaller degree<sup>72</sup>) has to match a certain pattern.

In other words, knowing the effects of structural influences on the behaviour of a state, we can draw the general pattern of the international behaviour of a state regardless of the official ideology of that state. The fundamental difference between Waltz and the earlier Realists on ideology is that Waltz does not say that ideology has no influence on the determination of foreign policy goals. What he says is that ideologically defined goals have the state's survival and power as a precondition. And to achieve these goals, the state will have to behave in a manner similar to other states, because the behaviour of all states is determined by the structural constraints of the international system. In short, regardless of the possible role of ideology as the motivational force of foreign policy, for the purposes of political analysis, we can safely assume that policymakers are motivated by power considerations (including a state's wish to survive), and the behaviour of a state will match the pattern that could be predicted by analyzing the capabilities of that state and the limitations imposed by the structure of international system on its international behaviour.

Recalling Figure 1 from Chapter 1, it is possible to say that the general Realist perspective considered ideology to be unimportant for the study of foreign policy because it perceived ideology only as a tool of political justification. The Structural Realist perspective, admitting the possibility of ideology being both a motivational force of foreign policy and its justification, still renders it less important than the structural constraints of the international system that largely determine the state's behaviour.

The main question finally comes down to “ideology vs. structural influence” as the major determinant of state behaviour, or whether it is possible for a state to build its international behaviour according to the ideological “blueprint.” A very significant group of scholars insist that it is possible, and regard ideology as one of the major factors, or even the most significant factor, in determining the course of Soviet foreign policy. “To some Western scholars,” White states, “the importance of the official ideology is such that we are justified in regarding Soviet foreign policy as ‘ideology.’”<sup>73</sup> But, in order to discuss their arguments, it is necessary first to examine briefly the main ideas contained in Soviet ideological thought.

## **Chapter II: Ideology and Foreign Policy**

### **Part 1: Soviet Ideology.**<sup>74</sup>

Officially, the body of Communist ideology is called “Marxism-Leninism,” and the works of Marx (written with his collaborator Engels) and Lenin constitute the “classics” of Soviet ideology.<sup>75</sup> Let us refer first to official Soviet sources on Marxism-Leninism for a short statement about the nature of the doctrine.

Ponomarev in *Political Dictionary* defined Marxism-Leninism as “the science of laws of development of nature and of society, of the revolution of the exploited masses, of the victory of socialism, of the construction of communist society; the ideology of the working class and its Communist Party.”<sup>76</sup>

Kuusinen, in *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, develops the argument further:

“Marxism-Leninism regards the world such as it actually is, without adding an invented hell or paradise. It proceeds from the fact that all nature, including man himself, consists of matter with its different properties.

The Marxist-Leninist world outlook stems from science itself and trusts science, as long as science is not divorced from reality and practice. It itself develops and becomes richer with the development of science.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that not only the development of nature, but the development of human society too, takes place in accordance with objective laws that are independent of man’s will.

By revealing the basic laws of social development, Marxism raised history to the level of a genuine science capable of explaining the nature of every social system and the development of society from one social system to another.”<sup>77</sup>

### **Marxism**

Marxism-Leninism – the Soviet official doctrine – has several elements. The first is the canon of the doctrine, the thought of Marx and Engels, who provided many of

the fundamental principles of Soviet ideology. The main contribution of Marx was his “materialist interpretation of history;” in other words, he argued that all social and political structures, as well as human consciousness, are formed on the basis of material and economic conditions of life.<sup>78</sup>

Marx viewed history as a continuous conflict between classes generated by economic development. During the course of its history, Marx argued, human society passed through four stages of development characterized by different economic foundations: ancient tribal society, slave society, feudal society, and capitalist society. Each stage was marked by a different mode of production, which in turn produced a different set of classes. For example, the feudal mode of production gave rise to two classes, lord and serf. The capitalist mode of production gave rise to the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The central concept in Marx’s work is the concept of “private property,” which “gave rise to a distinction between the few who own the means of production and the many who work it.” The ownership of the means of production, Marx argued, enabled “the few to oppress and exploit the many for the sake of profit and power.”<sup>79</sup> In short, Marx insisted that the “dynamics of conflict are inherent in the nature of class society, and that classes are in a process of interminable conflict with each other.” As he and Engels said in the beginning of the *Communist Manifesto*, “The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle.”<sup>80</sup>

According to Marx, there was a class polarization – an exploiting minority and the exploited majority – in each phase of history. During each stage of the development of the human society, the exploitation of the lower class by the governing minority

increased until it reached the critical point. At this point the governing class was overthrown by the underclass in revolutionary struggle. As a result, at the end of the each historical phase human society was transformed into a more progressive form, as feudal society was transformed into capitalist society, for example. Speaking about contemporary capitalist society, Marx believed that capitalism was reaching a height of its development and would be soon transformed into a more progressive socialist society.<sup>81</sup>

The important distinction made by Marx in his work is, according to Rejai, “the distinction between evolutionary change and revolutionary change. Evolutionary change takes place within each stage. Revolutionary change takes place between stages. One form of society cannot be transformed into another without massive upheavals.”<sup>82</sup> Class-based revolutions often took violent forms. Marx argued that such revolutions were necessary and inevitable, because without violence –armed uprisings and wars – it was impossible to overthrow the exploiting element of society.<sup>83</sup>

All previous revolutions left intact the main source of oppression and exploitation – private property. The capitalist stage of history, according to Marx, would end in a proletarian revolution that would be fundamentally different from all previous class-based revolutions. The coming proletarian revolution, Marx believed, would abolish private property once and for all. Since the abolition of private property would spell the end of the oppression and exploitation, classes and class struggle would also disappear. In short, “Capitalist society would be replaced by a classless society of human brotherhood, abundance, and peace.”<sup>84</sup>



Many international relations scholars emphasize the fact that Marx's work contains no systematic theory of international relations.<sup>85</sup> Nevertheless, it offers an analysis of two factors that are considered crucial by most foreign policy scholars. The first is the state, considered by many international relations theorists to be the main actor in international politics.<sup>86</sup> Marx described the state as one of the instruments that helps the bourgeoisie to control the proletariat, "a machine for keeping down the oppressed exploited class."<sup>87</sup>

Since the coming proletarian revolution would, according to Marx's expectations, eliminate private property, and classes and class struggle with it, there would no longer be a need for a state and it would eventually disappear.

The second factor that Marx analyzed in his work was nationalism, considered by most international relations theorists to be one of the main causes of conflict between states.<sup>88</sup> According to Marx, national differences and antagonisms were also destined to disappear after the successful proletarian revolution. As Ulam explains, in the *Communist Manifesto*, "there is an explicit statement that the materials of international politics – frontiers, militarism, religious differences, and the like – are of decreasing importance. The progress of economy and civilization makes nationalism itself of ever diminishing effect on the destiny of peoples."<sup>89</sup> According to Marx, nationalist conflicts were directly linked with capitalist exploitation. In the *Communist Manifesto*, he emphasized that "as the antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the hostility of one nation to another will come to an end." Thus, Marx and Engels rejected patriotism and national loyalty. "The workingmen," they said, "have no country."<sup>90</sup>

Marx replaced national loyalty with the idea of proletarian internationalism. By this, Noguee emphasizes, Marx "implied that the workers throughout the world had an

identity of interest that transcended the particular nationality of which each was a part. The slogan 'Proletarians of the world, unite!' was a call for workers in every country to associate themselves politically in a common effort to overthrow bourgeois rule everywhere."<sup>91</sup> The basis for unity of the world's proletariat was economic globalization created by capitalist expansion. In the increasingly interdependent world, he argued, the interests of both capitalists and proletariat went beyond national borders. The clear implication, Ulam says, "is that not only workers, but also the capitalists, 'have no country', in the sense that national loyalties do not take precedence over what a given class in a given country conceives to be its economic interest."<sup>92</sup>

"The very internationalism of the doctrine," Ulam highlights, "is based on the assumption that considerations of international politics have become and will continue to be less important. If the capitalists of England and France find their trade mutually profitable, then no considerations of national honour, no territorial dispute will impel them to go to war. By the same token, socialist France and England will find no reason for war or rivalry: their respective working classes will realize that the fullest development of their internal resources is the only way to the improvement of their countries' economic, and general welfare. War and with it much of international politics will simply become obsolete."<sup>93</sup>

To summarize Marx's argument, the worsening economic conditions in the capitalist system and the rise of proletarian class consciousness would, he believed, produce proletarian revolutions in the most advanced capitalist countries, where the proletariat is most numerous – Britain, the USA, Germany etc.<sup>94</sup> These revolutions would then spread through the entire world and open the door to the development of a more

progressive form of society – a “classless” society in which “all people share the common tasks of providing necessities.” The purpose is to “build socialism” and “create the conditions for the transition to communism.”<sup>95</sup>

### **Lenin's contribution**

The second main contributor to the formation of Soviet ideology was Vladimir Lenin, one of the most prominent Russian Marxists, the founder of the Russian Communist Party, and the first leader of the Soviet state, who accepted the burden of making Marxist theory relevant to the twentieth century and the Russian context. He tried to achieve this objective by using the Marxist perspective to interpret contemporary Russian developments and at the same time applying Marxist theory to these specific developments. Leninism, according to Rejai, “rests upon three articles of faith: (1) social reality can only be understood as classes and class conflict based on material, economic interests (in other words, Lenin accepted the Marxist notion that the class struggle is the chief driving force of historical development); (2) the only way to resolve the problem of class conflict is through violent revolution; (3) the only means capable of bringing about revolution is organization and leadership, embodied in the Communist Party.”<sup>96</sup>

As we can see from the discussion of Marxism on the pages above, the first two of Lenin's assumptions are perfectly consistent with Marxism. The third assumption, however, differs from Marxism substantially. As can be seen from the above discussion, Marx believed that revolutions occur spontaneously; the economic and social conditions deteriorate until they reach a critical point, and at that moment the underclass rises on its own accord to overthrow the governing class in a revolutionary struggle.

Although Marx did mention the “vanguard of proletariat” as the directing force of the revolution, he did not describe it in detail. According to him, this “vanguard” would consist of those who most thoroughly understand the nature of the class struggle and the necessity of revolution.<sup>97</sup> However, he did not perceive this “vanguard” as an outside force, assuming that the deteriorating conditions would create not only a revolutionary situation but also the revolutionary class consciousness.<sup>98</sup>

Contrary to Marx, Lenin argued that only a highly centralized party could plan and direct the proletarian revolution toward building socialism. He made this innovation in order to explain several contradictions between Marx’s prognosis and the actual trend of events in Europe, the most important of which were the failure of the proletariat in capitalist countries to develop a revolutionary class consciousness and the improvement, instead of deterioration, of its economic conditions.

In his famous pamphlet, *What is to be done?*, Lenin offered an explanation of this contradiction, arguing that the working class cannot develop a revolutionary class consciousness without a revolutionary party assuming the role of vanguard of the proletariat.<sup>99</sup> “The function of the proletarian vanguard,” Lenin wrote, “consists in training, educating, enlightening and drawing into the new life the most backward strata and masses of the working class and peasantry.”<sup>100</sup> This was necessary, he believed, because most working people suffered from false consciousness, the most harmful form of which, according to Lenin, was the “trade union consciousness.”<sup>101</sup> Lenin argued that a revolutionary class consciousness cannot come about spontaneously, but must instead be imported into the working class from outside by a vanguard party – “a select, highly disciplined, and ‘theoretical’ cadre of professional revolutionaries.”<sup>102</sup> Lenin defined a

Communist Party as a “vanguard capable of assuming power and leading the whole people to socialism, of directing and organizing the new system, of being the teacher, the guide, the leader of all the working and exploited people in organizing their social life without the bourgeoisie.”<sup>103</sup> Without such a vanguard, Lenin insisted, the working class would fall under the influence of the “trade union consciousness,” and, thus, would become a reactionary force.<sup>104</sup> “Organization, leadership, Communist party,” Rejai summarizes, “are strictly Lenin’s innovations and virtually the defining characteristics of modern communism.”<sup>105</sup>

World War I played a major role in shaping Lenin’s views, for he saw in it the possibility to speed up the “revolutionary change” between the stages of societal development. In *The Collapse of the Second International* (1915) Lenin argued: “It has long been recognized that war, for all the horror and misery it brings, brings a greater or lesser benefit, unmasking and destroying a lot of what was dead and decaying in human institutions.” Later that year, he repeated this idea: “Some wars in history, for all their beastliness, have helped the development of mankind, have destroyed harmful and reactionary institutions such as absolutism or feudalism.” He also added that, “Engels realized that, for all the horrors of war, and even though one cannot guarantee that a particular war will bring the victory of socialism, nevertheless he said that that victory would come.”<sup>106</sup>

Seeing World War I as a fortunate opportunity for an international revolution, Lenin severely criticized those who shared an anti-war position: “And objectively who profits by the slogan of peace? Certainly not the revolutionary proletariat. Nor the idea of using the war to speed up the collapse of capitalism.”<sup>107</sup> “The idea that war could be the

main agency to bring down capitalism,” Ulam says, “was something new in Marxist theory. Previously, Marxism had counted on the “inherent contradictions” of capitalism, its inability to run the very economic system it had created, to bring about its downfall. Now, it was capitalism’s inability to preserve an international order, to avoid disastrous wars, that afforded the great opportunity.”<sup>108</sup>

Lenin, according to Ulam, drew two deductions from this conclusion. First, revolutionary socialism received an opportunity to wage a revolutionary struggle by persuading the belligerent workers to turn their weapons not against each other, but against their own bourgeoisie.<sup>109</sup> In other words, Lenin believed that the task of world proletarian revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning World War I into a series of civil wars in all advanced capitalist countries. “Without civil war,” Lenin argued, “no great revolution has yet come to pass and without it no serious Marxist has ever imagined the transition from capitalism to socialism.”<sup>110</sup>

Second, the possibility of using the war to the socialists’ advantage diminished the importance of the Marxian stages of economic development. It provided a rationale for the occurrence of socialist revolutions in countries that, measured by Marx’s scale, were not developed enough to produce such revolutions. In other words, according to these arguments, “a world revolution might well have its starting point in Russia, even if the country was far behind Germany or England in economic development.”<sup>111</sup>

Lenin defended this position in *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916). In this work, Lenin offered an explanation of why, contrary to Marx’s expectations, capitalism had not collapsed. He argued that capitalism had undergone a fundamental transformation that Marx could not have foreseen. The essence of this

transformation consisted in the internationalization of capitalism; instead of remaining a national economic trend, capitalism became a global, international phenomenon. Thus, by “imperialism” Lenin meant “international capitalism.”<sup>112</sup>

The central ideas of *Imperialism* can be summed up as follows: “(1) as Marx said, capitalism is an economy of constant problems and crises; (2) the crises of capitalism necessarily lead to its internationalization; (3) the internationalization of capitalism will precipitate a series of wars and revolution; (4) these conflicts will spell the end of capitalism. Capitalism will self-destruct.”<sup>113</sup> That is why, speaking about imperialism as the “highest stage of capitalism,” Lenin meant the “most developed, the most sophisticated,” but also “the last, the final” form of capitalism.<sup>114</sup>

The significance of Lenin’s concept of imperialism was threefold. First, it extended Marx’s critique of capitalism by giving an explanation of why capitalism did not collapse. Lenin argued that the focus of the most brutal capitalist exploitation shifted from advanced capitalist countries to the underdeveloped countries of the colonial world. Therefore, capitalism was able to postpone its final crisis by bribing its own workers with the benefits derived from the exploitation of the “Third World” people, and, thus, preventing the development of the revolutionary class consciousness among the proletariat.<sup>115</sup>

Second, Lenin’s concept of imperialism expanded Marx’s interpretation of history by introducing to his four stages of societal development a substage called “imperialism,” a transformation Marx could not have predicted.<sup>116</sup>

Third, as could be seen from the previous discussion of Marxism, according to Marx, the revolutionary class consciousness is created by the deteriorating economic

conditions and increasing capitalist exploitation. In short, the revolutionary consciousness appears among the people that are most exploited and deprived. Since in the age of imperialism the focus of capitalist exploitation shifted from advanced to underdeveloped countries, the logical assumption was that people of these countries became the “carriers of progressive consciousness.”<sup>117</sup> In other words, Lenin’s theory revised Marx’s conception of revolution by emphasizing the possibility of occurrence of socialist revolutions in underdeveloped, nonproletarian countries.<sup>118</sup> In particular, this idea presented the rationale for the revolution in Russia, which “was neither capitalist, nor industrialized, nor even a nation in some respects in 1917.”<sup>119</sup>

Lenin made the following conclusions from the argument presented in *Imperialism*. First, due to the transformation of capitalism into militant imperialism, the generally peaceful teachings of Marx and Engels became outdated. Thus, every Marxist, according to Lenin, should pursue a revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie rather than concentrate on peaceful achievement of political power.<sup>120</sup>

Second, the international character of 20<sup>th</sup> century capitalism indicated the interdependence of the capitalist countries, and their dependence on colonial and backward territories. Therefore, Lenin argued that a world socialist revolution could start in any country that would happen to be the “weakest link” in the capitalist “chain,” irrespective of this country’s level of development.<sup>121</sup>

Thus, both the geographic and the social focus of the revolutionary struggle had to be changed. For the reasons examined above, the geographic focus of the revolutionary struggle had to be shifted from advanced capitalist countries to underdeveloped countries. But, in most underdeveloped countries, the industrial proletariat either was very weak or



did not exist at all, and therefore was not able to carry through the socialist revolution on its own. Therefore, Lenin's *Imperialism* appealed to "all social forces, classes and groups that for whatever reasons opposed feudalism, czarism, or imperialism."<sup>122</sup>

Briefly stated, Lenin's main idea was that, contrary to Marx's expectations, the proletarian revolutions would begin not in advanced capitalist countries, but in backward, underdeveloped countries where the people were most impoverished and led by a revolutionary party. This, according to Ulam, was "the most startling and fundamental revision of classical Marxism, the justification of what the Bolsheviks were to undertake in 1917."<sup>123</sup> It is also necessary to highlight that Lenin did not think that it was possible for a socialist revolution to survive in a backward country like Russia without the help of the proletariat of more advanced countries: "... the complete victory of the socialist revolution in one country is inconceivable since it demands the active cooperation of at least several advanced countries, among which Russia cannot be counted."<sup>124</sup> What he emphasized was that such a revolution would serve as a "starting point" for the world proletarian revolution, and in that Lenin saw its importance.<sup>125</sup>

Speaking about the ideological foundations of Soviet foreign policy, it is necessary to examine here a particular aspect of Lenin's theory of imperialism which many scholars consider to be one of the most important ideological bases of Soviet foreign policy: the Leninist doctrine of the "inevitability of war."<sup>126</sup>

The doctrine of the "inevitability of war" can be divided into two subtheories. The first is the inevitability of wars between capitalist powers as long as capitalism itself existed. Lenin maintained that imperialist powers will be going to war against each other, because, "as time goes on, there is less and less to colonize. Once the division of the

globe among the imperialist powers has been completed, capitalist countries will be competing – and fighting – over the same colonies.”<sup>127</sup>

Another subtheory is the idea of war between socialist and capitalist states. First of all, as could be seen from the above discussion on *Imperialism*, Lenin saw the revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie as the primary duty of every Marxist. He also believed that the socialist revolution in Russia could only survive with the support of similar socialist revolutions in other countries. That is why the only possible course of action for the Russian proletariat in case of successful domestic socialist revolution was, according to Lenin, to “rise up against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting to itself the oppressed classes of other countries, provoking among them a revolt against the capitalists, appearing if necessary with armed force against the exploiting classes and their states.”<sup>128</sup> In short, in the event of a successful revolution, Socialist Russia would immediately wage a revolutionary war against capitalist states.

On the other hand, from Lenin’s perspective, “the bourgeois rulers of the capitalist powers would regard this revolution as a direct and immediate threat to their class interests.”<sup>129</sup> In other words, capitalist states would also be forced to start an immediate war with Soviet Russia, because with the appearance of the first “Workers’ and Peasants’ State” the exploited classes in other countries would, seeing this example and receiving all possible help from this state, put all their efforts into promotion of their own socialist revolutions. Therefore, the only possible option for the bourgeoisie in order to survive would be go to war against Russia and to wipe out the Communist government early in its existence while it was still weak.<sup>130</sup>

From this perspective, the war between socialism and capitalism seemed to be inevitable indeed; therefore it is no wonder that on the moment of the acquisition of power in Russia, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders firmly believed that a clash between the two social systems was unavoidable. “International Imperialism,” Lenin argued, “could not under any circumstances, on any condition, live side by side with the Soviet Republic...”<sup>131</sup> Elaborating this position further, he argued that “either Soviet power triumphs in every advanced country in the world, or the most reactionary imperialism triumphs... One or the other. There is no middle course.”<sup>132</sup>

Lenin’s *Imperialism*, Ulam highlights, “provided what was soon to become Communism with a framework of reference on international affairs. *Imperialism* has served as the prism through which Soviet policy-makers have viewed the outside world and one of the basic premises of their foreign policy.”<sup>133</sup>

## **Part 2: Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy: The arguments**

In the previous section we examined basic assumptions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The question is to what degree these assumptions influenced the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. A popular view among Soviet foreign policy scholars is that Soviet ideology – Marxism-Leninism – was the most important source of Soviet foreign policy, the major determinant of Soviet international behaviour. Among international relations scholars, White says, “there has been general agreement that the official ideology plays a central role in Soviet politics.”<sup>134</sup> Brzezinski, for example, argues that “the persisting and important role of ideological assumptions in the thinking and actions of Soviet leaders” is “essential to an understanding of their conduct of foreign policy.”<sup>135</sup> Conceptual and

analytical factors of Soviet ideology combined together serve, according to Brzezinski, “to organize the Soviet vision of international affairs, to define goals, and to evaluate reality.”<sup>136</sup>

The argument about the crucial role played by ideology in the determination of Soviet foreign policy conduct is widely accepted by many prominent scholars. For example, speaking about the expansionist character of Soviet foreign policy, Aspaturian states that “expansionism is inherent in the Leninist-Stalinist ideology.”<sup>137</sup> Dulles, in his interpretation of Soviet foreign policy, used Stalin’s book “Problems of Leninism,” claiming that “the actual purposes of Soviet Communism are to be judged in light of its official creed.”<sup>138</sup> Mitchell insists that the foreign policy attitudes of the Soviet leadership “are not simply based on Marxist-Leninist ideas in some abstract sense – they are soaked into its bones.”<sup>139</sup> Hunt argues that much of Soviet foreign policy is “only intelligible on the assumption that it was primarily motivated by ideological considerations.”<sup>140</sup> The list is virtually endless. In this view, the crucial role was played by the official Soviet discourse on Marxist-Leninist ideology.

Ponomarev, for example, in the 1958 edition of *Political Dictionary*, under the entry “ideology” highlights Marxism-Leninism as the “guide to action” that leads to a revolutionary transformation of society:

“The ideology of the working class and its party is Marxism-Leninism – the revolutionary weapon in the struggle for overthrow of the exploiting system and for the construction of communism.”<sup>141</sup>

Other Soviet sources on Marxism-Leninism also emphasized that

“Marxist science of the laws of social development enables us not only to chart a correct path through the labyrinth of social contradictions, but to predict the course events will take, the direction of historical progress and the next stages of social advance. ...

The Marxist-Leninist theory is ... a guide to action. ...

Marxist-Leninist theory provides a scientific basis for revolutionary policy. He who bases his policy of subjective desires remains either a futile dreamer or risks being thrust into the background of history. That is why Lenin emphasized the need for a sober scientific analysis of objective situation and the objective course of evolution as the basis for defining the political line of the Party and for subsequently carrying it out with all revolutionary determination.”<sup>142</sup>

All Soviet sources constantly claimed that the foreign policy of the Soviet state was entirely different from its capitalist counterparts. Ponomarev, for example, presented the following arguments:

“Ever since those remote times when states emerged, ...foreign policy has always and everywhere been the weapon of the exploiting minority. The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia... gave birth to a totally new foreign policy, which served not the exploiters but the working class, which came to power and championed the interests of the entire nation. This... changed the nature of foreign policy, its objectives, the sources of its strength and influence, and its means and methods. Socialist foreign policy and the methods of implementing it were evolved by Vladimir Lenin, and as Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars, in addition to formulating the basic principles underlying this policy, he was the first to apply them in practice.

In the long run the policy of any state is determined by its economic and social system... The deep-lying distinction between the economic basis of socialism and that of exploiting societies gives rise to fundamental distinctions in foreign policy...

By virtue of its social nature, capitalist foreign policy is one of expansion and aggression, of preparing and starting wars of aggrandisement, of creating military blocks and furthering the arms race... The case is different with socialist foreign policy... [which] harmoniously combines the national interest of the Soviet state and people with the internationalist duties of the working class, which had come to power. It combines patriotism and dedication to the interests of the country with internationalism.”<sup>143</sup>

In addition, the “Soviet political elite’s verbal communications about the goals, instruments, and implementation of foreign policy”<sup>144</sup> also made a crucial contribution to the basis on which this assertion was built.<sup>145</sup> In other words foreign policy was based on statements of Soviet leaders, who constantly claimed to act in accordance with the

principles of Marxism-Leninism. Tugwell, for example, saw verbal communications of Soviet leaders as open statements about their exact intentions and the motives behind their actions: "The view that the Soviet Union's appearance as a great power in the traditional mold demonstrates any incompatibility with revolutionary intentions is dangerously mistaken. I think it demonstrates a dangerous reliance on violence or the threat of violence as the means to revolutionary ends. And it is not as though Soviet leaders have denied their continued commitment. ... Konstantin Chernenko, for example, wrote that the CPSU 'has time and time again proved its fidelity' to Lenin's behest that the Soviet government set a higher value on the world dictatorship of the proletariat and the world revolution than on all national sacrifices, burdensome as they are. Or Yuri Andropov, who was presumably praising his then boss, Leonid Brezhnev, said in a 1982 speech that the chairman's name was linked 'to the triumph of the magnificent cause: the victory of communism throughout the world.'" From an analysis of Soviet morality, ideology and military power, Tugwell reached the conclusion that Marxist internationalism was "the overriding factor in Soviet foreign and defence policy." "I think," he wrote, "that internationalism may be pushed onto the back burner from time to time, but even there, it continues to brew as circumstances allow. I think that the apparatus of state and the might of the Soviet armed forces are servants of the party in the cause of world revolution. They do not indicate a change of aim, only a modernization of method."<sup>146</sup>

### **Continuity or transformation?**

As proof that ideology was the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy, many scholars point to the "absence of any change in the doctrine of Soviet foreign policy since

it has been formulated.”<sup>147</sup> This view is firmly supported by Soviet sources. Izraelyan, for example, highlights that, during the years of the USSR’s existence, “the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR was steady and unshakable, and that the line of the CPSU in foreign affairs was consistent and faithful to principles [of Marxism-Leninism].” “The foreign policy of the Soviet Union,” he emphasizes, “rests invariably on a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and reflects the communist ideology. Firmness and adherence to principle in upholding the Marxist-Leninist foundations of the political course followed by the Soviet state... is a cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy.”<sup>148</sup>

As a particular example of the doctrinal continuity of Soviet foreign policy, Edmonds cites the *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, published in 1971, which defines the four basic tasks of Soviet foreign policy as:

- “to secure, together with the other socialist countries, favourable conditions for the building of socialism and communism;
- to strengthen the unity, solidarity, of the socialist countries, their friendship and brotherhood;
- to support the national-liberation movement and to effect all-round cooperation with the young, developing countries;
- consistently to uphold the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, to offer decisive resistance to the aggressive forces of imperialism, and to save mankind from a new world war.”<sup>149</sup>

Edmonds highlights that “this formulation follows word for word the resolution on foreign policy approved by the Twenty Third Congress of the CPSU in March 1966, which was repeated in turn by Leonid Brezhnev in his opening speech at the Twenty

Fourth Congress five years later.” He concludes his argument stating that the “doctrinal continuity of Soviet foreign policy” in the course of its history “has been remarkable.”<sup>150</sup>

However, this point of view is not as indisputable as it seems. Even Edmonds, for example, admits that “although Soviet foreign policy may have remained unaltered on paper... a gap has developed between theory and practice.”<sup>151</sup> Mackintosh argues even further that although, since the Russian Revolution in 1917, “Russian political thought had acquired an ideological element, now called Marxism-Leninism,” this ideology “has passed through a number of phases, and today its links with “classical” Marxism are rather remote.”<sup>152</sup>

Evidence can also be advanced to suggest not only the existence of a gap between the Soviet theory and practice of foreign policy but also fundamental changes being introduced to the doctrine in the course of the existence of the Soviet state. The two most important doctrinal innovations are the idea of “socialism in one country,” which is recognized as the “Stalin’s most important theoretical contribution” to the official Soviet doctrine,<sup>153</sup> and the idea of “peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems,” officially introduced by Khrushchev.<sup>154</sup>

Although the Soviet leadership claimed that both these ideas were directly based on the premises of Marxism-Leninism,<sup>155</sup> it is evident that both are clearly opposed to pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist thought, which envisaged the victory of socialism throughout the world and the impossibility of the peaceful coexistence of a socialist state side by side with capitalist states.

However, there is no doubt that both these ideas did have their roots in Lenin’s thought.<sup>156</sup> The explanation is simple: these ideas were grounded not in pre-revolutionary



Leninism, but in modifications to the doctrine made by Lenin in the **post**-revolutionary period.

That observation allows the hypothesis that there was a substantial difference between the pre- and the post-revolutionary content of Communist doctrine. The evidence in the following chapters will suggest this hypothesis to be correct. I will suggest that the factor responsible for the changes in Soviet ideological thought and, consequently, in the foreign policy of the Soviet state, is what Waltz termed “the structure of the international system of states.”<sup>157</sup>

In the next chapters, Waltz’s framework will be applied to the study of Soviet international behaviour during the formative years of the Soviet state. More specifically, I will show how the perceptions of the Soviet leadership on the subject of international relations were changing as part of a process of adaptation of Soviet international behaviour to the requirements of the international system of states, in Waltz’s terms, through “socialization to the system.”

### **Chapter III: Changing Perspectives**

#### **Part 1: “Revolutionary” Foreign Policy.**

As discussed in Chapter II, Lenin considered the question of what would happen to the Russian state and to international politics in general in case of a successful socialist revolution in Russia well before 1917.

Lenin reached the conclusion that it was practically possible for the proletariat to carry on a successful socialist revolution in Russia and establish a “revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry”. In the eyes of Bolshevik leaders, the successful socialist revolution in Russia would immediately encounter active resistance both from the outside and from the inside. From outside, it would be confronted by a united front of the bourgeoisie of all advanced capitalist countries determined to wipe out the new socialist Russian government in order to preserve the capitalist system, and, thus, to retain their privileges. From inside, the Russian socialist revolution would encounter a desperate resistance from the members of the property-owning class fighting for their survival. Therefore, Lenin and other prominent Bolsheviks considered the defeat of the socialist revolution in Russia to be unavoidable unless “the European socialist proletariat should come to the assistance of the Russian proletariat.”<sup>158</sup>

The powerful influence of Marx’s internationalist theme on the thoughts and actions of Russian communists could be clearly seen during World War I. As noted earlier, Marx stated that “workingmen have no country;” in other words, he replaced “national loyalty” with the “common interest” of the international working class. We also examined Lenin’s theory of imperialism, where he argued that the task of a world

socialist revolution could be successfully accomplished by turning the “imperialist world war” into a series of civil wars. Thus, Marxist thought extended by Lenin’s doctrine of imperialism provided the theoretical justification for the conclusion that the most effective course of action for the proletariat from the Marxist point of view during World War I would be to turn weapons against its own government rather than support this government by fighting fellow proletarians from other countries. As Lenin summarized this position, “A revolutionary class in a reactionary war cannot but desire the defeat of its own government.”<sup>159</sup>

Moore points out that, although “this tactical conclusion already possessed a theoretical basis in the general tradition of European Marxism”, only Russian Marxists, namely Bolsheviks, had enough faith in this tradition to base their actions on its premises. Thus, the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party controlled by the Bolsheviks issued, in September 1914, a “manifesto against the war, declaring that the task of socialism was to turn the conflict into a civil war. The Manifesto called upon socialists of each country to defeat their own bourgeoisie.”<sup>160</sup>

As to the question of what foreign policy the new Russian socialist state should pursue, Lenin’s writings of 1915-1917, according to Moore, consistently indicate his support for the program of “revolutionary war.” Since it was perceived that the Russian proletarian revolution could not survive without successful proletarian revolutions in other countries, especially advanced capitalist powers like Germany and England, it was assumed that, in case of a victorious socialist revolution in Russia, the Russian proletariat would immediately wage a “revolutionary war” against the rest of capitalist world in order to “set on fire the socialist revolution in Europe.”<sup>161</sup> That, so the Bolshevik

leadership perceived, was the only course of action that would enable the Russian proletariat to retain the gains of the socialist revolution in Russia itself. As Trotsky put it, “If the peoples of Europe do not arise and crush imperialism, we shall be crashed – that is beyond doubt. Either the Russian revolution will raise the whirlwind of struggle in the west, or the capitalists of all countries will stifle our struggle.”<sup>162</sup>

In Marxist-Leninist terms, Ulam suggests, “the Bolshevik coup of November could be rationalized only on the premise that the revolutionary stirrings already perceptible in France and Germany could thereby be turned into a full-fledged revolution.” Time proved this assumption to be wrong, and the socialist revolution in Europe never materialized. Because of that, future historians often criticized the Bolshevik analysis of the contemporary international situation. However, this analysis was not as far-fetched as it might look. Considering the conditions in 1917, Ulam argues,

“There were reasons – and not only doctrinaire – to expect a repetition of the Russian November in the countries of the West. Europe was sickened and weary after three years of inconclusive slaughter. Severe mutinies had shaken the French army. There had been revolutionary stirrings in the German fleet, an insurrection in Ireland. The unrest among its nationalities was already threatening to break up the Austro-Hungarian Empire into fragments. Thus, not only a doctrinaire socialist but a realist politician might have had sound reasons for anticipating a serious revolutionary situation gripping Europe in the wake of the developments in Russia.”<sup>163</sup>

In short, the revolutionary thought which inspired the 1917 Russian Revolution predicted proletarian revolution throughout the world. Most Bolshevik leaders firmly believed in the inevitability of the European revolution. The appointment of Trotsky as Commissar for Foreign Relations and his behaviour in the office underscores this fact. “The choice of Trotsky, second only to Lenin in prestige among the leaders and the most colorful figure of the revolutionary phase,” Ulam emphasizes, could be best “rationalized

on the grounds that the new regime did not need diplomatic relations in the old style, but an effective spokesman and propagandist for a world revolution.”<sup>164</sup>

Trotsky’s answer to the question of what kind of diplomatic work a communist state could have provides an interesting perspective on the importance of traditional diplomacy in the eyes of Bolshevik leaders. At the time of his appointment as Commissar for Foreign Relations, he remarked, “I will issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the people and then close up shop.”<sup>165</sup>

As Uldricks summarizes, “there is nothing in the available sources to suggest that the Soviet leaders regarded this new Commissariat as a very important institution. In contrast, a good deal of significance was attached to the International Department of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets, which was created at about the same time to manage relations with foreign revolutionary movements.”<sup>166</sup>

Thus, we can clearly see the priorities of the Bolshevik leadership on the moment of formation of the Soviet state. Since it was widely assumed among Bolsheviks that a Soviet Russia was simply the beginning of the revolutionary chain reaction, and the imminent world proletarian revolution would soon transform the world, they regarded “the niceties of diplomatic procedure” as “not only inconsistent with the proletarian virtue of the new rulers, but simply useless.”<sup>167</sup>

The experience of power, however, had a sobering effect on Lenin’s theoretical analysis after he found himself the chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the new Soviet republic. This experience led to the recognition by Lenin and other Bolsheviks that the powerful forces opposing their government could not be ignored and

that compromises and concessions would be necessary. Recognition in turn led to a major change in Communist goals and to the emergence in Russia of the policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “socialism in one country.”<sup>168</sup>

The change of attitude toward international relations occurred during the course of events that led to a Russian-German peace treaty signed at Brest-Litovsk. It is necessary to examine in more detail this initial period of Soviet foreign policy in order to draw conclusions about the reasons for the fundamental changes in both the goals and conduct of Soviet foreign policy that occurred during this period.

## **Part 2: From November to Brest-Litovsk.**

Immediately upon taking power on November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks ran into harsh realities that put their doctrinal beliefs to the test. First of all, the new government had to resolve the war problem, which had been heavily responsible for the failure of the Provisional Government.

Even before Lenin came to power, the Bolsheviks used the slogan “Peace, bread, and land” as a means of mobilization of popular support. After achieving power, they inherited from the czarist regime a dispirited, disorganized army, a population tired of war, and an internal order on the edge of collapse. In this situation, the Bolshevik government considered that its first task in foreign policy was to take Russia out of the “imperialist” World War I.<sup>169</sup> Hence the famous “Decree on Peace” - the first act of foreign policy of the “provisional workers’ and peasants’ government,” adopted by the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on November 8, 1917, the day after the successful revolution.

This first foreign policy act of the Soviet government clearly demonstrated the overpowering influence of Communist ideology on foreign policy behaviour and the perceptions of the Soviet leaders toward international relations in the early period of the Soviet state's existence. Eager to take Soviet Russia out of war, but faithful to their ideological principles, the Bolsheviks chose the method suggested by Communist doctrine.

The central belief of the Soviet leadership in the early period of the Soviet state's existence was that capitalist governments were inherently warlike and only the proletariat was capable of eliminating wars. In 1915, for example, Lenin explicitly stated that "our 'peace program'... must consist of an explanation of the fact that imperialistic powers and the bourgeoisie cannot give a democratic peace."<sup>170</sup> Therefore, the achievement of a stable peace was only possible with the overthrow of capitalism and the transfer of state authority to another class, the proletariat, in all major capitalist states.<sup>171</sup>

Thus, although the "Decree on Peace" begins with the words "The Workers' and Peasants' Government, created by the Revolution of October 24-25 and basing itself on the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, calls upon all the belligerent peoples and *their Governments*"<sup>172</sup> to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace,"<sup>173</sup> it was not formally communicated to the Allied or enemy governments, but was broadcast by wireless and offered to the foreign press.<sup>174</sup> Moreover, the document itself highlighted that its target audience was "the class-conscious workers of ... most advanced nations of mankind and the largest States participating in the present war."<sup>175</sup>

In short, the "Decree on Peace," although presented as an address to governments of all belligerent countries for the conclusion of a democratic peace, was in reality a

propaganda appeal designed to encourage the masses to revolt against their own governments, and thus bring about an end to the war.<sup>176</sup>

Lenin himself openly spoke about the true purpose of the document during his presentation of the “Decree on Peace” at the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies (November 8, 1917), where he highlighted the sincere desire for peace on the part of Soviet Russia in contrast to inherently warlike governments of capitalist countries:

“We offer peace to the people of all the belligerent countries upon the basis of the Soviet terms – no annexations, no indemnities, and the right of self-determination of peoples... This proposal for peace will meet with resistance on the part of the imperialist governments – we don’t fool ourselves on that score. But we hope that revolution will soon break out in all the belligerent countries; that is why we address ourselves especially to the workers of France, England and Germany. ... The revolution of November 6<sup>th</sup> and 7<sup>th</sup> has opened the era of the Social revolution... The labour movement, in the name of peace and Socialism, shall win, and fulfill its destiny...”<sup>177</sup>

A similar view was presented by Karl Radek, a prominent Polish-born Bolshevik, five years later, when he described the aim of Soviet foreign policy as “to arouse the popular masses in the allied countries in order that the governments, under pressure from the masses, might sit round the table with us for peace negotiations and thus lead to a general peace which would be more favourable to us.”<sup>178</sup>

“While this peace appeal,” according to Kennan, “unquestionably increased restlessness and yearning for peace in some circles of the western labour movement, it failed to achieve its central purpose: it produced, immediately, neither revolution nor peace, and the authority of the other warring governments remained unshaken.”<sup>179</sup>

The “Decree on Peace” also repeated the Bolsheviks’ pre-revolutionary promise to publish the secret treaties, in which belligerent allies had agreed on the division of the



future spoils of victory. The publication of these treaties, like the peace decree itself, was a direct appeal to the “peoples” of allied countries over the heads of their governments, in the hope that they would compel their governments to adopt the right policies. However, the publication of secret treaties in the Russian (*Izvestiya*, November 10, 1917) and foreign press (e.g., *Manchester Guardian*, December 12, 1917) “stirred up no great waves of revulsion” either.<sup>180</sup>

With direct appeals to the people being for most part ignored everywhere, and the continuing disintegration of the Russian armies, the Bolshevik government had no choice but to try to persuade the governments of belligerent countries to enter peace negotiations through traditional diplomatic channels.

On November 8, 1917, the commander-in-chief in the field, Dukhonin, received orders from Sovnarkom to propose to the enemy command immediate armistice negotiations. At the same time all allied ambassadors in Petrograd received a note from Trotsky that officially requested them to regard the “Decree on Peace” as a “formal proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts and an immediate opening of peace negotiations.”<sup>181</sup>

However, this diplomatic move was strongly rejected by the Allies, to whom the continuation of a fight, and especially Russia’s participation in it, was of primary importance. Thus, the Allied ambassadors in Petrograd chose to ignore the Soviet offer for a general armistice and subsequent negotiations for peace.<sup>182</sup>

The Germans, to whom the conclusion of peace with Russia would mean that a substantial number of troops would become available for transfer to the western front, where they were badly needed, gave the only positive response.<sup>183</sup> Thus, Germany

informed the Soviet Government on November 14 that it was ready to negotiate. On the basis of the German answer, Lenin once more asked the Allies to open peace negotiations together with Russia, adding that in the absence of an answer Russia would start negotiations on its own.<sup>184</sup> However, not a single Allied government showed its willingness to join in the move for a general cessation of hostilities. In this situation, Kennan highlights, “the Bolshevik government had no choice but to enter into independent negotiations with the Germans first, for an armistice, and then, reluctantly, for a separate peace.”<sup>185</sup>

The German-Soviet negotiations were opened on December 3 at Brest-Litovsk, a town near the front line between the two armies. These negotiations for the armistice, and later, the peace treaty, extended from December 1917 to March 1918. There were, according to Rosser, several phases to the negotiations, with “the Soviet position becoming more desperate at each stage.”<sup>186</sup>

The first phase covered the last part of December. The initial Soviet delegation was headed by Joffe, and included Kamenev, Sokolnikov, and Karakhan, all of them Bolsheviks of long standing. Consciously designed to illustrate the unique character of the new state, the delegation included, as well as military experts, a woman, worker, peasant, sailor, and soldier – all of the latter brought along only for show.

In contrast, the German delegation consisted entirely of military officers. Field Marshal Prince Leopold of Bavaria officially headed the delegation, but the actual authority on the German side was exercised by the prince’s chief of staff, Major General Max Hoffmann, one of the best strategists of the German army and an expert on Russia.<sup>187</sup>

The contrast between two delegations was remarkable. As Wheeler-Bennett put it, “The whim of history willed that the representatives of the most revolutionary regime ever known should sit at the same diplomatic table with representatives of the most reactionary military caste among all ruling classes.”<sup>188</sup>

These negotiations are widely regarded as the “confrontation between utopia and reality,”<sup>189</sup> not only because of the contrast between the delegations, but also because of equally contrasting purposes. Germany wanted to conclude peace as soon as possible in order to get rid of the burdens of the eastern front and to obtain much needed goods, especially foodstuffs. The Bolshevik side, on the other hand, “was hardly serious about negotiation but wanted to use the peace talks as a forum for propaganda against the war and the warring powers, particularly Germany.”<sup>190</sup>

The Soviet leaders at that time still believed revolutionary propaganda disseminated at the negotiations would spark the European revolution. Kamenev, for example, in his speech to All-Russian Central Executive Committee on the eve of the signing of the armistice, expressed the sincere belief that “our words will reach the German people over the heads of the German generals, that our words will strike from the hands of the German generals the weapon with which they fool their people...”<sup>191</sup>

The coming European class struggle was crucial to Bolsheviks, and detailed questions of geography – who got what territory – were of little importance. “To the Bolshevik mentality of that time it mattered little whether the enemy, in the form of capitalist imperialism, gained further sources of territorial and material strength. It was not upon this ground that battle was being given. The battleground was that of social struggle, and therein frontiers mattered little in comparison with the fight of the

proletarian against the capitalist. It made little difference to them whether Lithuania was or was not ceded to Germany. What did matter was the struggle of the Lithuanian proletarian against the Lithuanian capitalist.”<sup>192</sup>

The Soviets therefore got the Germans to agree to “open” diplomacy. The negotiations received detailed coverage in the press of the world, and the Soviets tried every means to get propaganda into Germany. There also was the famous “fraternization proposal” – an additional request to the German government to organize special centres on every sector of the front where Russian soldiers could have discussions with German soldiers. The Germans’ agreement to this proposal could be proclaimed by the Soviets as a great victory and the means of dispersion of revolutionary propaganda among the enemy soldiers. In addition, the Soviets soon started to disseminate copies of a Bolshevik newspaper published in German language and other propaganda materials within the German army.<sup>193</sup>

It is also worth noting that, despite entering formal negotiations with the German government, the Soviet government did not abandon its efforts to appeal to the masses abroad over the heads of their respective governments. The illustrative example is the appeal sent on November 28, 1917, by the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic to the peoples of the belligerent countries, asking them to join in the negotiations for an armistice. The “Appeal to All Mohammedan Workers in Russia and the East” on December 7, 1917, the “Appeal to the Toiling, Oppressed, and Exhausted Peoples of Europe” on December 19, 1917, and the “Appeal to the Peoples and Governments of the Allied Countries” on December 29, 1917, are illustrations of the same pattern.<sup>194</sup>

However, these efforts failed to produce an immediate outcome desirable to the Soviets: to instigate the peoples of belligerent countries either to overthrow their governments or at least to pressure them into concluding peace on terms favourable to the Soviets. This left the Bolshevik government with only one possible tactic – delay. The Soviet government still hoped that, given more time, internal revolutionary pressure could be brought against the German government. The task to protract negotiations was assigned to Trotsky, who replaced Joffe as the head of the Soviet delegation. The Soviets also requested the negotiations be moved to Stockholm, hoping to give their propaganda easier entry into Germany to facilitate Trotsky's task. The Germans refused the request, however, and the second phase of the negotiations began January 9 at Brest-Litovsk.<sup>195</sup>

During this phase of negotiations, Trotsky proved to be a skilful negotiator. As already emphasized, his main task for the moment was to prolong negotiations. Trotsky successfully did this for several weeks, using every excuse to protract the discussion.<sup>196</sup> However, the game could not continue indefinitely, and on January 18 Hoffmann presented a map showing a blue line from Brest to the Baltic – the future Russian border. This ultimatum left no room for further discussions. Trotsky had no choice but to return to Petrograd for instructions.

### **Part 3: The Brest-Litovsk Debate.**

Trotsky's return to Petrograd "opened a famous and momentous debate that marked the first serious crisis in relations between Soviet Russia and the outside world."<sup>197</sup> With regard to the German terms, three alternatives were heatedly debated.

1. “Blitzrevolution.”<sup>198</sup> It had been previously assumed that, in the event of Germany insisting on unacceptable terms, the Bolsheviks would wage against it a “revolutionary war.” As shown in Chapter II, Lenin himself had proposed such a revolutionary war in 1915 in the event of the socialist success in Russia.

This view was based on the Bolshevik assumption that the victory of the Russian proletariat would encourage the revolution in Europe, and was further reinforced with the optimism resulting from the Bolshevik victory in October.<sup>199</sup>

Therefore, the “left faction” of the Soviet government, a bare majority headed by Bukharin, argued for a revolutionary war against European capitalism. The full realization of Russia’s military weakness was, according to Taracouzio, “overbalanced by the unmarred belief in the power of fraternization on the front lines: They were certain that the German soldier would refuse to fight when he confronted with an appeal to class solidarity with his Russian brothers who were laying down arms.”<sup>200</sup> To the supporters of this view, the only way of gaining the true objective of Marx was the proletarian victory over Imperial Germany and its allies. A peace separately concluded by Russia with Germany would, in the opinion of the Bukharin faction, ruin both the Russian and world revolutions.<sup>201</sup> The group also argued that “the proletarians of Europe deserved the first allegiance of the Soviets; a separate peace to save the skin of the Soviet regime would be a disgusting betrayal of communist ideals.”<sup>202</sup>

2. A modification of the extreme position of the left-wing communists was introduced by Trotsky, who believed that the Germans would not dare to advance into Russia. Subscribing to a general idea of worldwide Blitzrevolution, and believing, like Bukharin, that the immediate interests of the Russian revolution must be sacrificed to

those of world revolution, Trotsky did not consider the survival of the proletarian authority in Russia essential for the eventual triumph of world communism. He proclaimed his “neither peace nor war” formula according to which Russia would not sign a treaty but would stop fighting and demobilize. This would give, according to Trotsky, convincing proof to the European proletariat of the basic hostility between the Soviets and the Germans and, thus, would stop the persistent rumours the Bolsheviks were German agents. It might also instigate the European revolution. Trotsky wrote to Lenin: “My plan is this: We announce the termination of war and demobilization without signing any peace. We declare we cannot participate in the brigands’ peace ... after we declare the war ended ... it would be very difficult for Germany to attack us, because of her internal conditions.”<sup>203</sup> Trotsky’s point of view was widely supported among the Bolshevik leaders. Kamenev, for instance, optimistically spoke at that time, “There is no doubt that, if Germany dares now to lead her armies against revolutionary Russia, this ... will be the spark which in the end will cause the explosion and finally sweep away the whole edifice of German imperialism. We are convinced that Germany will not dare to make such an attempt, since, if that happens, we shall all the same, notwithstanding all obstacles, obtain peace in the end, though we shall then be conducting negotiations not with the representatives of German imperialism, but with the socialists whose efforts will overthrow the German government.”<sup>204</sup>

3. “Peace at any cost.” In a sharp opposition to Bukharin and Trotsky, Lenin insisted on the acceptance of German demands and signing a separate peace with Germany. “Under the circumstances,” Taracouzio emphasizes, Lenin “did not see any

possibility for Russia to go on with the war against Germany. Nor did he share Trotsky's illusions in regard to the timidity of the German armies."<sup>205</sup>

To Lenin it was evident that Soviet appeals to the masses had had no substantial effect abroad. He also believed a continuation of the war with Germany, which was infinitely superior in military terms than Russia at the time, would be suicidal. This course of action would not only lead to the dismemberment of Russia but would also destroy the newly established communist regime, which was to serve as an inspiration for the proletariat abroad. The only possibility of avoiding this outcome was, according to Lenin, "to limit their [Bolsheviks'] designs for peace to Russia alone," that is, to end the war between Russia and the Central Powers at any cost.<sup>206</sup>

In his *Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace*, Rubinstein says, "Lenin argued, with force and clarity, that the preservation of the revolution in Russia must outweigh the more uncertain prospects of world revolution: that at least for the immediate future, the interests of the international proletariat must be subordinated; and, indeed, the best way to ensure the eventual success of the world socialist revolution was first to safeguard the revolution in Russia."<sup>207</sup>

"The international situation ... precludes any possibility of predicting the time of the outbreak of revolutions and the overthrow of the imperialistic governments of Europe (including the German Government)... It is impossible to make such predictions, and every attempt to do so is a blind gamble... Under the circumstances it would be a very bad policy to risk the fate of the Socialist Revolution on the chance that a revolution might break out in Germany by a certain date... Our tactics must be based ... solely on the question of safeguarding the Socialist Revolution in one country until the others are ready to join..."<sup>208</sup>

Although Lenin regarded the interests of the Soviet state and the world revolution as identical, and, like other Bolsheviks, thought that one could not survive without the



other, he argued that the peace of Brest-Litovsk would help rather than hinder the world revolution: “[The] Soviet Socialist Republic in Russia will be a model for all other peoples and excellent material for propaganda purposes....” Therefore, he continued, “every... revolutionary... will admit that we were right in signing any disgraceful peace, because it is in the interests of the proletarian revolution and the regeneration of Russia.”<sup>209</sup>

“For the time being,” Lenin insisted, “we cannot make [revolutionary war] our object. Our socialist republic has done and is doing everything possible to give real self-determination to Finland, to Ukraine, etc. But if the concrete circumstances are such that the safety of the Socialist Republic is being endangered ..., there is no question that the interests of the Socialist republic must predominate.”<sup>210</sup>

Displaying a sharp sense of political realism, “Lenin preferred to see the original triumph suffer a humiliating setback rather than have it ultimately nullified by blind enthusiasm. He argued that the need of the moment was not an aggressive proletarian revolutionary war but revolutionary defence of the country of the proletarian dictatorship.”<sup>211</sup> To negotiate a peace was the best way to meet this need. The German terms, Lenin insisted, must be immediately accepted.

Lenin was able to persuade only 15 out of 63 party leaders to support his position. Sensing the mood, Lenin switched his support to Trotsky’s proposal, although he was sure that this alternative would fail, and Russia could lose even more territory in case of a German advance. But he was not ready to risk splitting the party. “We will only risk losing Estonia or Latvia, and for the sake of a good peace with Trotsky,” Lenin said with sarcasm, “Latvia and Estonia are worth losing.”<sup>212</sup> Thus Trotsky’s motion “to stop the

war, not to conclude peace, to demobilize the army” was passed at a Central Committee meeting on January 24, 1918. The only formal motion proposed by Lenin was the instruction to protract the negotiations as long as possible, which was also approved.<sup>213</sup> With these instructions, Trotsky departed for Brest-Litovsk on January 28, 1918. The third phase of negotiations started on January 30, 1918.<sup>214</sup>

The negotiations continued for several days, and might have continued indefinitely, but the eventual outcome was clear, and Trotsky was waiting for the convenient moment to declare his famous formula for “neither war nor peace.” The convenient moment came on February 8, when the Germans signed a separate treaty with the Ukrainian Rada. Expecting a forthcoming German ultimatum, Trotsky decided that the time had come to deliver his formula. On February 10, Trotsky declared that “Russia, while refusing to sign an annexationist peace, for her part declares the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria at an end.”<sup>215</sup> When asked for a clarification, Trotsky refused to negotiate further. He added only that he was “deeply convinced that the nations of Germany and Austria-Hungary would not allow their armies to advance.”<sup>216</sup> The Soviet delegates left Brest-Litovsk for Petrograd the same evening.

Trotsky’s formula proved futile. On February 16 the German High Command announced that the war would resume in two days. On February 18 German troops began a rapid advance in the direction of Petrograd. Only at this moment, Taracouzio emphasizes, were many of the Bolshevik leaders finally forced to realize that neither the policies of the extreme leftists nor of Trotsky were sensible: “The continuation of the war no longer promised the defeat of Germany, advocated by the former [leftists], and the German High Command did not see fit to accept the cataclysmal status of ‘no war, no

peace' proposed by Trotsky."<sup>217</sup> In the face of German advances, Lenin finally received by a bare majority an authorization to ask the Germans for a conclusion of peace.<sup>218</sup>

On February 23, the new, considerably harsher, German terms arrived. The battle in the Central Committee was resumed on the same day. Trotsky once again stated his objections, that to accept peace meant "to lose support among the leading elements of the proletariat."<sup>219</sup> Bukharin and some of his supporters still wanted a revolutionary war. In this situation, Lenin declared his own ultimatum, promising to resign unless the German ultimatum was immediately accepted. After hours of debate, Lenin finally won.<sup>220</sup>

On the same evening the same proposal came before Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets. In the face of a strong criticism and accusations of "compromising with imperialism," Lenin delivered an effective speech, arguing that "this shameful peace" must be signed "in order to save the World revolution, in order to hold fast to its most important, and at present, its only foothold – the Soviet Republic."<sup>221</sup> The motion was passed. A telegram was sent indicating the German demands would be accepted. Chicherin – a future head of the Commissariat of International Affairs – headed the delegation this time: according to Carr, neither Trotsky nor Joffe wanted to face the humiliation. The Soviet delegation left for Brest-Litovsk on February 24 with instructions to "sign without argument or discussion."<sup>222</sup>

On March 3, 1918, Soviet representatives signed the peace treaty at Brest-Litovsk, "a shameful peace," as Lenin put it, that stripped Russia of one-third of its population and most of the territories acquired during the last three centuries of expansion. However, the formalities of ratification had still to be approved and carried out in Moscow. The seventh party congress (March 6, 1918) repeated the old arguments on both sides. Lenin

again used cold logic and stated the compelling reasons for signing: “Our country is a peasant country, disorganized by war... We have no army, and here we have to exist alongside a robber country armed to the teeth... The world revolution will not come as speedily as we expected.”<sup>223</sup> Lenin argued that “the ‘triumphal procession’ of the first weeks of the revolution was over, and it was time to face harsh realities by arming and working.” After a long debate, the motion to ratify the treaty was passed. The debate was over.<sup>224</sup>

#### **Part 4: The Transformation of Soviet Perceptions**

“For the Bolshevik regime,” Rubinstein notes, “the Brest-Litovsk crisis served as a crucible from which emerged the outlines of a foreign policy.”<sup>225</sup>

Before 1917, most Bolsheviks sincerely believed that, after the success of the socialist Revolution in Russia, similar revolutions in other capitalist countries would quickly follow. In this case, “proletarian Russia would be surrounded by class allies who had wrested power from the bourgeoisie; frontiers and state sovereignty would lose their meaning, and class solidarity would override national differences as old political entities became caught up in revolutionary change.”<sup>226</sup> The security problem, therefore, would no longer present itself in its traditional form. Traditional international relations, and the balance of power politics that every state had to pursue in a potentially hostile international environment, would be replaced by principles of “proletarian internationalism, friendship and brotherly co-operation between peoples” as a guide in mutual relations between socialist countries.<sup>227</sup>

Since the survival of the Russian Revolution and the implementation of its goals were considered dependent on revolutions occurring in other countries, the early Bolsheviks defined the main objective of Soviet foreign policy as to promote such revolutions and help to sustain them. Therefore, instead of being confined within the borders of the old Russian state, security became “consciously and deliberately contingent on events well beyond those territorial confines.”<sup>228</sup> Shortly after the October revolution, Lenin said to his friends: “From now on Russia will be the first state in which a Socialist order has been established... I have another surprise coming ... It isn’t a question of Russia at all, gentlemen. I spit on Russia... This is merely one phase through which we must pass on the way to a world revolution.”<sup>229</sup>

In other words, the pre-revolutionary and the early revolutionary Communist doctrine, which served as the main basis of the early Soviet foreign policy, “emphasized horizontal or class cleavages, to the neglect of vertical or national cleavages.”<sup>230</sup>

However, events developed quite differently than expected by the Bolsheviks before the October revolution. During the course of events leading to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty, it became clear that the capacity of the Russian revolutionaries to affect events beyond the borders of the country was highly limited, and the revolutionary potential of the Western masses grossly overestimated. Despite all Soviet efforts,<sup>231</sup> the world revolution failed to occur.

The Communist leaders of the Soviet state had to adapt to the fact that their earlier definitions of the conditions for survival and of how to ensure it “were based on a situation which clearly no longer existed”<sup>232</sup> and, therefore, were no longer relevant. They also became convinced that, for the hope of eventual widespread revolution to

survive, the Soviet state itself had to be preserved. If socialism in Russia were to fail, then, as many Bolshevik leaders, including Stalin, emphasized, the cause of the world revolution would be lost. The creation of a strong and unassailable Soviet state, on the other hand, would help to promote international revolutionary movements much more easily and effectively. Therefore, the underlying principle of the new tactics adopted by the Bolsheviks during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations became “how can the socialist revolution most faithfully and reliably ensure the possibility of strengthening itself, or, at least, maintaining itself in one country until it is joined by other countries.”<sup>233</sup> “The Soviet government,” Carr emphasizes, thus “found itself almost involuntarily in the posture of defending, not the interests of world revolution, but national interests which any government of Russia would be obliged to defend.”<sup>234</sup>

The foreign policy failures suffered by the Soviet government during the early period of the Soviet state’s existence forced Lenin and the Bolsheviks to realize that “to persist in the pursuit of world revolution would be suicidal and, therefore, coexistence with the capitalist enemies was a condition of survival.”<sup>235</sup> This realization encouraged an interest by the Bolshevik government in balance-of-power diplomacy, and an extended coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states.<sup>236</sup>

The Brest-Litovsk debate brought an end to the “dogmatic absolutism, which assumed that the Soviet regime must maintain an attitude of equal and unqualified hostility to all capitalist governments and objected on this ground even to the conclusion of a separate peace.”<sup>237</sup> The Bolshevik leaders realized that it was the division in the capitalist world that “had enabled the Soviet government to establish itself and was the best insurance for its survival.”<sup>238</sup> As Radek wrote in 1921, it was the “fundamental fact”

which “stood at the cradle” of Soviet foreign policy. Lenin recognized the value of divisions in the capitalist camp in his “Twenty-one Theses for Peace”:

“By concluding a separate peace, we are freeing ourselves in the largest measure possible at the present moment from both warring imperialist groups; by utilizing their mutual enmity we utilize the war, which makes a bargain between them against us difficult.”<sup>239</sup>

“From this recognition of the pragmatic value of the division in the enemy camp,” Carr says, “it was only a short step to the conscious exploitation of it as an asset of Soviet foreign policy, and to the abandonment of any doctrinal assumptions of the uniform and unvarying hostility of the capitalist world.”<sup>240</sup> Lenin’s statement during his interview with Lockhart, an unofficial representative of the British government, on March 1, 1918, before the actual signature at Brest-Litovsk, at a moment when German armies were still advancing on Petrograd, confirms this point:

“We can afford to compromise temporarily with capital. It is even necessary, for, if capital were to unite, we should be crashed at this stage of our development... So long as the German danger exists, I am prepared to risk cooperation with the allies, which should be temporarily advantageous to both of us. In the event of German aggression I am even willing to accept military support...”<sup>241</sup>

Chicherin, the head of International Affairs Commissariat, in his speech at the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets (1918) also stressed that success of the policy of “waiting, manoeuvring” conducted by the Soviet state in order to “avoid dangers threatening its destruction” was due to the proper use by Soviet leadership of “the conflict of interests not only between the two coalitions [of capitalist states], but also within each of them.”<sup>242</sup>

In short, although Soviet leaders continued to perceive the world revolution as the ultimate security, they now considered Soviet national security essential for the eventual

success of world revolution.<sup>243</sup> They also realized that the only reliable and effective means to protect the Soviet state – “the citadel of revolution” – was to use traditional balance-of-power politics. Lenin later summarized this idea in his statement:

“Fundamental ... is the rule which we have not only theoretically learned but have practically applied and which shall remain a fundamental rule for a long time, until the final victory of socialism in the whole world; this is the rule that we must exploit the contradictions and divergences of views between two imperialisms, between two groups of capitalist states, pushing one against the other.... If we have not abided by this rule, we all should have hanged a long time ago on the trees to the satisfaction of the capitalists.”<sup>244</sup>

To summarize the argument in one sentence, the Bolsheviks started the Brest-Litovsk negotiations with the goal of promoting world revolution and destroying the existing international system of states; they ended them with the goal of ensuring Russia’s survival in this system.

## **Part 5: Acquiring Necessary Attributes**

In the international system of states, the Soviet state could only survive under certain conditions.

First, it had to create the means for its own military defence. Any breathing space granted to the Bolsheviks, Lenin argued during the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, had to be used for creating an army. “Learn to be disciplined, to introduce severe discipline; otherwise you will be under the German heel, just as you are under it now, just as unavoidably you will continue to be until the nation learns to fight, until it will have created an army which will not run away, but will be capable of enduring the most extreme hardships.”<sup>245</sup> During the autumn and winter of 1918-19 a Red Army was



conscripted, trained, and tried in battle. During the crucial 1918-1920 period for the Soviet state, this army proved itself as an effective instrument of military defence.<sup>246</sup>

Second, contrary to Lenin's original revolutionary concept of superseding the bourgeois state with new institutions (the Soviets), Soviet Russia had to create a strong government apparatus. Such a government apparatus was, according to Krippendorff, "the result of an externally imposed compulsion to survive."<sup>247</sup> There is compelling evidence that a large proportion of officials in the "central apparatus" of the early Soviet government and the Red Army consisted of veterans of the old, "bourgeois" regime, which the Communists were determined to destroy. Lenin himself complained in 1923: "...our state apparatus is to a considerable extent a survival of the past and has undergone hardly any serious change. It has only been slightly touched up on the surface, but in all other respects it is a most typical relic of our old state machine."<sup>248</sup>

Third, the economy had to be made to function, and the enormous lead which European capitalist industrial countries had over Soviet Russia in the development of productive forces had to be reduced, as quickly as possible. The early Soviet leaders not only did not want to separate Soviet Russia from the capitalist world market, they tried to integrate Russian economy into the capitalist world economy as far as possible. They considered Russia's raw materials as the major factor facilitating the economic integration of Russia into the world market. Lenin argued: "For the world economy to be restored, Russian raw materials must be utilized. You cannot get along without them – that is economically true. It is admitted even by ... a student of economics who regards things from a purely bourgeois standpoint. That man is Keynes."<sup>249</sup>

Lenin, Rykov and the others considered the acquisition of foreign capital, technology and professional skills by means of exporting raw materials and guaranteeing concessions to capitalist enterprises in Soviet Russia to be of prime importance for the recovery of Soviet Russia's economy.<sup>250</sup>

This shift in the Soviet leadership's view on the possibility and desirability of economic relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist powers was already evident by the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk treaty. At that time, Lenin himself "emphasized that there was no reason why a socialist state could not do business *indefinitely* with capitalist states."<sup>251</sup>

Finally, and most importantly, the Soviet state could not survive without establishing traditional diplomatic relations with other capitalist states. Immediately after coming to power Bolshevik leaders were predisposed to regard "the traditional methods of international law and diplomacy as alien to a proletarian state."<sup>252</sup> They argued that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the capitalist states was a "direct violation of socialist principles and ideals: no matter how noble the ends, certain means were automatically excluded on grounds of principle."<sup>253</sup> Trotsky, for instance, made the following remark: "For us there can be no allies from the imperialist camp. The revolutionary camp of the proletarians, advancing in an open battle with imperialism – these are our allies."<sup>254</sup>

Nevertheless, after the repeated failures of revolutionary tactics, and facing the possible destruction of the Soviet regime by the German army in February 1918, Trotsky was the first to propose that the Bolsheviks should ask the Allies for aid against Germany. Lenin also supported this decision, saying, "Please add my vote in favour of

taking potatoes and ammunition from the Anglo-French imperialist robbers.”<sup>255</sup> And even after the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed but not yet ratified, Lenin, Trotsky, and many other Bolshevik leaders “still hoped, through Allied help, to risk rejection of [this] treaty.”<sup>256</sup>

In August 1918, when the Whites and the Allies were pressing upon the Bolsheviks, Chicherin asked the Germans for aid against Allied intervention.<sup>257</sup> At that time, Marantz highlights, “Lenin went so far as to declare that under appropriate circumstances even a military alliance with imperialist governments would be acceptable.”<sup>258</sup> “We have often said,” noted Lenin, “that an alliance with one imperialist state against another to consolidate the socialist republic is not objectionable in the point of principle.”<sup>259</sup>

In other words, the failures of revolutionary policy in the early period of the existence of the Soviet state forced the Soviet leadership to adopt traditional balance-of-power methods, which assume that “allies have to be sought where they may be found, and that the choice dictated by power considerations does not necessarily correspond with ideological ones or those of cultural affinity.”<sup>260</sup> From Brest-Litovsk on, the Soviet government began to rely increasingly on traditional balance of power politics. In the development of the Commissariat for Foreign Relations itself, there was the marked shift from amateurism to professionalism.<sup>261</sup> Moreover, many scholars insist that all major Soviet foreign policy successes and even the survival of the Soviet state itself during its formative years were clearly attributable to the Soviet pursuit of traditional balance-of-power diplomacy.<sup>262</sup>

## **Part 6: The Modification of the Official Doctrine**

It is clear that external efforts to preserve the Soviet state taken by the Bolsheviks in the early period of the Soviet state's existence required cooperation, or at least peaceful coexistence, with some or all capitalist states. These foreign policy efforts were therefore in fundamental contradiction with pre-revolutionary Communist doctrine, which assumed that the Soviet state must "maintain an attitude of equal and unqualified hostility to all capitalist governments."<sup>263</sup> The alternative was "revolutionary war," which Soviet Russia clearly could not fight without support from the proletariat of advanced capitalist countries, and for which no significant support was forthcoming. Thus, the doctrine itself had to be modified according to the existing conditions.

A brief comparison of the re-evaluation of official Soviet views on the "world revolution" and "peaceful coexistence" using Lenin's public statements will help to demonstrate this point clearly. (See Table 1)

Table 1.

**Lenin's Public Statements 1918-1921:**

**The Reflection of Changing Soviet Official Views.**

World revolution		Peaceful coexistence
<p>"The socialist revolution in one country is inconceivable. The task is to gain time until the second socialist revolution, world-wide in scope, will arrive."<sup>264</sup></p>	1918-19.	<p>"It is inconceivable for the Soviet Republic to exist alongside of the imperialist states for any length of time. One or the other must triumph in the end. And before that end comes, a series of frightful collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable."<sup>265</sup></p>
<p>"The world socialist revolution is being delayed."<sup>266</sup></p>	1920.	<p>"Without having gained an international victory, which we consider the only sure victory, we are in a position of having won conditions enabling us to exist side by side with capitalist powers, who are now compelled to enter into trade relations with us. In the course of this struggle we have won the right to an independent existence.... It will be clear that we have something more than a breathing-space: we have entered a new period, in which we have won the right to our fundamental international existence in the network of capitalist states.... Today we can speak, not merely of a breathing-space, but of a real chance of a new and lengthy period of development. Until now we had actually no basis in the international sense."<sup>267</sup></p>
<p><u>May</u>: "We have made the start. When, at what day and time, and the proletarians of which nation will complete this process is not important... the ice has been broken; the road open, the way has been shown."<sup>268</sup></p> <p><u>December</u>: "I do not know whether this is for long, and I do not think that anyone can know."<sup>269</sup></p>	1921.	<p>"Is the existence of a socialist republic within capitalist encirclement at all conceivable? It seemed inconceivable from the political and military aspects. That it is possible both politically and militarily has now been proved; it is a fact."<sup>270</sup></p>

From Table 1 we can see a clear trend: as time passed, and the prospect of the world revolution became more uncertain, the more acceptable the concept of the peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states became. In other words, we can observe the process of the adaptation of the doctrine to external realities over a three-year period.

Thus, the new perspective on international relations that was adopted by the Soviet leaders during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations and developed further during the formative period of the Soviet state was fundamentally different from the Communist pre-revolutionary perspective on international relations on which Bolsheviks based their international behaviour immediately after they came to power. This new perspective was due to external circumstances over which the Soviet leaders had no control.

## **Part 7: The New Soviet Perspective on International Relations**

Let us briefly summarize the new Soviet views on international relations. The first crucial change in the Bolshevik perspective was to recognize the interests of the revolution and of the Russian state as essentially the same. They could be absolutely sincere stating: "We do not defend ... national interests; we declare that the interests of socialism, the interests of world socialism are higher than national interests."<sup>271</sup> Nevertheless, recognizing the Russian socialist state as the "socialist fatherland," and its defence as the defence of world socialism, Soviet leaders formulated the basic task of their foreign policy as "to ensure the possibility of strengthening the revolution, or, at least, maintaining it, in one country."<sup>272</sup> Simultaneously, Soviet Russia was increasingly

viewed as a state that: a) recognized itself as such; b) wished to survive; and c) wished to increase its power.

As Soviet Russia adopted these Realist perceptions and objectives, it also became subject to the structural influences of the international system of states. The transformation of Soviet Russia's international behaviour starting with Brest-Litovsk is totally consistent with the Realist picture of international politics drawn by Waltz, which was examined in Chapter I. The structure of the international system determines the kind of state-player likely to prosper. The successful player, in order to be such, has to possess certain attributes, such as a strong government and an army capable of its military defence. In order to survive, the Soviet state had to acquire these attributes no matter how inconsistent they were with Marxist doctrine.

The structure of the international system acts as a selector not only with regard to the attributes of its players. It also encourages certain behaviours and penalizes those who do not behave in prescribed ways. In other words, it constrains players from some actions and disposes them toward others. That is exactly what the Bolshevik leaders found out when they first entered the international scene. They discovered that their unorthodox revolutionary policy was not likely to bring them any substantial benefits; moreover, it was likely to impose on them great costs and increase the hostility of other states toward the new regime. At the same time, commonly accepted balance-of-power diplomacy, however distasteful it was to Bolsheviks, was their best chance to survive.

In other words, after recognizing itself as a state wishing to maintain its existence, Soviet Russia faced a particular task – to survive in the anarchical international system of states, the main principle of which is that of a self-help. In order to maintain its security,

it had to rely, as other states did, on the means it could generate and the arrangements it could make for itself. The main task it faced was to lessen the extent of its vulnerability to external aggression and economic dependency on other states; in other words, to become as internally strong and self-sufficient as possible.

Soviet Russia achieved this aim by a combination of internal and external efforts. Internally, its efforts were focused on the creating a strong government apparatus, increasing military strength and expanding economic capability.

Externally, there was an important shift from a revolutionary foreign policy to a balance of power diplomacy focused on accommodating its adversaries, where necessary, and acquiring allies in order to balance the power of its enemies.

In short, the Soviet state soon performed much the same tasks as other states, and in much the same fashion. In order to survive and prosper in the international system of states, Soviet Russia had to transform itself with the effect that the new Russian state came closely to resemble other states in the international system in terms of its external relations. It is necessary to emphasize that the personal views and values of Bolshevik leaders had no influence on this transformation. According to Marantz, Lenin himself openly admitted in 1920 that “the situation that had developed during the first years of the Soviet state’s existence was not at all what he had anticipated earlier.” “It is very strange for those of us who have lived through the revolution from its inception, who have experienced and observed our incredible difficulties in breaching the imperialist fronts, to see how things have now developed. At that time probably none of us expected or could have expected that the situation would turn out as it did.”<sup>273</sup>



In short, it is clear that Soviet Russia emerged from the Brest-Litovsk negotiations as a nation-state with the main goal of its foreign policy defined in terms of its national survival and national power. The conduct of this redefined foreign policy was based on a balance of power diplomacy as the most reliable and effective means to achieve goals defined in terms of Soviet national power given the existing structure of the international system of states.

There is much evidence to confirm that this shift from the goal of world revolution and revolutionary methods of foreign policy to the goal of national interest and traditional balance of power diplomacy was not a temporary tactic,<sup>274</sup> but the beginning of a continuing pattern of Soviet behaviour in international affairs. A brief general review in Chapter IV of the development of Soviet foreign policy during the Soviet Union's existence will help to demonstrate this point.

## **Chapter IV: Continuing pattern of international behaviour**

### **Part 1: Leninist Foreign Policy**

From Brest-Litovsk on, the Soviet Union began to rely on traditional balance-of-power diplomacy, the key tactic of which was the exploitation of differences between capitalist countries in order to prevent them from forming a united front against Soviet Russia. The first large-scale triumph won by the Soviets through the techniques of balance-of-power diplomacy was the detachment of Germany from a position of dependence on England and France by the “Rapallo Treaty” of April 16, 1922.

According to Kennan, the Rapallo pact gave to the Germans flexibility in policy toward the victorious states that they did not have before. For the Soviets, this treaty established a “useful precedent for diplomatic recognition by other great powers.” It decisively “detached Germany from the ranks of those pressing the Soviet government for payment of the debts of previous Russian governments and for compensation for the foreign property nationalized in the Russian revolution.” Finally, it “disrupted every possibility of a united front of the European powers in their economic dealings with Russia at the moment of maximum Russian economic weakness.”<sup>275</sup> As Chicherin said, this treaty signified that “if Britain forms a united front against the USSR, Germany will not join such a coalition.”<sup>276</sup>

During the 1920s, the Soviets continued successfully to exploit the diplomatic struggle among England, France and Germany, using every opportunity to prevent capitalist unity toward Russia. An illustrative example is the “Berlin Treaty,” which was concluded between Russia and Germany on April 24, 1926 and repeated the essentials of

the Treaty of Rapallo. The Berlin Treaty, according to Kennan, “was a neutrality pact, specifically reaffirming the Rapallo relationship, providing for neutrality if either party should be attacked by a third party, and banning participation in any international action along the lines of an economic or financial boycott of the other party.”<sup>277</sup>

The Soviet policy of using one power against another was not confined to European affairs. In the early twenties, according to Kulski, “Soviet Russia skilfully made use of the antagonisms between Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Kuomintang China on the one hand and the Western Powers, notably Great Britain, on the other by giving support to lesser capitalist states against the great Powers.”<sup>278</sup>

The second key tactic of Soviet balance of power diplomacy in the 1920s was the “neutralization” of Russia’s immediate neighbours so they could not serve as bases for a new intervention. The real success for this Soviet policy of “erecting around the USSR an anti-aggression barrier of international treaties, promises, and understandings”<sup>279</sup> came in 1929, when Russia invited the border states to Moscow to sign the “Litvinov Protocol” – essentially a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression. This Protocol, which effectively obligated all Russia’s neighbour states from Estonia to Persia to a policy of non-aggression, was a “decisive link in the long chain of the Soviet Government’s efforts toward universal peace and especially peace in Eastern Europe.”<sup>280</sup>

According to Triska, “the policy of coexistence with the bourgeois world had become in the 1920s an established guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy, and only two important Western nations remained firmly hostile to the new Soviet Union – the United States and France. The other Western nations had developed a working relationship with the Bolsheviks on the basis of bargaining and mutual expediency. The

Bolsheviks had broken through to a workable foreign policy and a viable pattern of international relationships.”<sup>281</sup>

The “temporary” failure of world revolution had also brought about another development – a sharp change of attitude toward the utility of revolutionary means of foreign policy in comparison with balance-of-power politics. In other words, the aim of temporary coexistence with balance of power diplomacy as its means was accepted as the way to achieve the main goal, the preservation and strengthening of the Soviet state.

One of the most illustrative examples of this changing attitude is Soviet international behaviour during the war with Poland in 1920. The “Address to the Polish People,” issued by All-Russian Central Executive Committee in January 1920, explicitly stated that although Bolsheviks “still appear before the whole world as champions of communist ideals,” they “are not striving, and cannot strive, to plant communism by force in other countries.”<sup>282</sup>

During February 1920 Lenin, Trotsky, Joffe, Litvinov, Radek, and others, gave interviews to the foreign press on the “opportunities of peace and commercial relations between Soviet Russia and the capitalist world.” Radek, for example, emphasized that Russia was “ready to conclude peace with every country which up to the present has fought against us,” but in the future would be prepared to establish normal relations with Soviet Russia. He further emphasized that “if our capitalist partners abstain from counter-revolutionary activities in Russia, the Soviet Government will abstain from carrying on revolutionary activities in capitalist countries.”<sup>283</sup>

There was a considerable revival of revolutionary hopes when the defensive war conducted by the Soviets against Poland in 1920 was, for a brief time, transformed by the

military successes of the Red Army into a “revolutionary crusade.” The Russians began to set up Soviets on Polish territory under the control of the Red Army and even established a Polish “Provisional Government.” However, even at the height of the Red Army’s campaign against Poland, the Soviet government continued negotiations with Great Britain aiming to end USSR-UK hostilities and to establish normal diplomatic relations. These actions strongly suggest that, in early 1920s, the Soviet leadership “had already begun to entertain serious doubts about the imminence of a worldwide revolutionary conflagration,”<sup>284</sup> and thus assigned a higher priority to the preservation of the Soviet state through balance of power diplomacy.

The confirmation of this argument can be clearly seen in Soviet behaviour with regard to events in Germany in 1923, when, despite the high hopes entertained by the Soviet leadership for the successful proletarian revolution in Germany, the Soviet government was willing to offer German communists only limited commitment. In other words, it was willing to provide volunteers and offer tactical guidance, but was not willing to start a full-scale war, which might jeopardize the security of the Soviet state itself.<sup>285</sup>

In general, considerable evidence demonstrates the subordinate role of international communism in the Soviet view of the international situation. This evidence clearly shows a higher priority given in the 1920s by the Soviet leadership to the Soviet national interest and balance-of-power diplomacy in contrast with the primary focus on revolutionary objectives and tactics that was evident in the initial foreign policy behaviour of the Bolsheviks. In most cases the application of a balance of power policy conflicted with the revolutionary aspirations on the part of the Bolshevik government.

Most of the regimes with which the Soviet Russia established, or tried to establish, friendly relations were strongly anti-Communist, be they advanced capitalist states like Germany, or nationalist regimes such as Kemal's regime in Turkey,<sup>286</sup> or the Kuomintang regime in China.<sup>287</sup>

Finally, the "temporary" failure of a world communist revolution produced a change within the hierarchy of the International Communist Movement itself. "The more the issue of the world revolution receded, the more the Russian Communists took over the leadership of the Comintern, since they represented the only country in which there had been a successful revolution."<sup>288</sup> The Communist International became a centralized, highly disciplined organization under Russian leadership, which officially proclaimed "the cause of Soviet Russia as its own cause."<sup>289</sup>

"The failure of the world revolution," Triska argues, "brought about the supremacy of Soviet communism and the Soviet comrades began increasingly to shape both the Comintern and communism in such a way that each would serve the new and only revolutionary country, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic."<sup>290</sup>

"Thus," Ulam highlights, "from the position of 1917-1918 – that Soviet Russia exists to promote the world revolution – the Communist view by 1928 had shifted to the position that the world revolutionary movement exists to defend and promote the interests of the USSR."<sup>291</sup>

It also should be emphasized that, even as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the record of the international Communist movement during 1920s was not impressive. As Ulam summarized it, "during this period, the Comintern sought in vain for a revolutionary opening in a Europe that had settled down."<sup>292</sup> Thus, the extension of

Soviet power and influence during 1920s was more attributable to the achievements of Soviet diplomacy than to the Comintern's efforts.

After Lenin died in 1924, the Foreign Affairs Commissariat under Chicherin's leadership was permitted to function with relative independence for some time due to the struggle for succession among Lenin's leading colleagues. During this period the Commissariat carried on in the traditions and concepts of the Lenin era, which were summarized in Lenin's statement:

“So long, as we remain, from the economic and military standpoint, weaker than the capitalist world, so long we must stick to the rule: we must be clever enough to exploit conflicts and antagonisms among the imperialists, slowly accumulating strength and maintaining the oasis of Soviet power in the middle of a raging imperialist sea.”<sup>293</sup>

## **Part 2: Stalin's Foreign Policy**

By 1927, Stalin was able to secure a political victory over the opposition and emerged as the leader of the Soviet state. During his time, the general goals of Soviet foreign policy remained essentially the same, and Soviet foreign policy trends that originated with Lenin received further development.

First of all, as already emphasized, and contrary to the earlier belief of the impossibility of the coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist states for a long period of time, Soviet leaders eventually had come to realize that, in light of the contemporary situation, peaceful coexistence with capitalism was both possible and desirable. As Stalin said in 1925, “What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after the war has become a whole period of respite.”<sup>294</sup> In other words, during the 1920s, the Soviet leadership's belief of the possibility of the short-time coexistence with capitalist states was replaced by the belief of the possibility of the extended coexistence between the Soviet state and

the capitalist states. Furthermore, although the Soviet leaders still regarded war to be inevitable as long as capitalism existed, they came to think that, by the skilful use of balance of power diplomacy, they could avoid major military conflicts: "If a war should come, it would be a war between rival imperialist camps."<sup>295</sup>

Stalin's position was influenced by two developments. First of all, the late 1920s witnessed the "temporary" stabilization of capitalism, with industrial output in some countries exceeding the prewar level.<sup>296</sup> In addition, the revolutionary hopes of the Soviet leadership were further disappointed by the absence of any substantial progress there. By the end of the 1920s, Wesson notes, "foreign Communist parties were decadent; ten years after the founding of the Comintern, they had less than one tenth as many members as socialist parties. In many countries they were repressed or nonexistent. Practically nothing had been achieved through the colonial world to which Lenin had looked eagerly. The most promising venture, in China, had the most dismal outcome – the complete destruction of the Chinese Communist movement." Weaker attempts at United Fronts, in Poland and Britain, were equally unfruitful, and also harmful for Soviet diplomatic relations with these countries.<sup>297</sup>

In these circumstances, Stalin proposed the policy of "socialism in one country" as the only sensible course of Soviet policy. The essence of this policy was the building of a powerful "socialist" Russia instead of trying to bring about proletarian revolutions in other countries. Contrary to Trotsky, whose opinion reflected the earlier Bolsheviks' view that Russia's survival depended on the "world revolution," Stalin argued that socialism could and should first be built in Russia alone. A socialist Russia in turn would serve as the "base" for world revolution when that time arrived.<sup>298</sup>



Stalin considered two factors to be essential to the advancement of Soviet power. The first of these was the expansion of Russia's own industrial and military power. The second was the exploitation of differences between the great powers of the capitalist world, which became the essence of Stalin's statesmanship. In other words, Stalin's victory established an indisputable priority of Soviet national security over the interests of the international Communist movement. It also emphasized balance of power policy rather than revolutionary tactics for safeguarding the security of the Soviet state.

This point of view is clearly confirmed by examination of Soviet behaviour with regard to the major development of the interwar period – the rise of Germany and Japan as expansionist states. The rise of aggressive militarism in Japan and of Nazism in Germany represented a serious double threat to the Soviet Union, a threat both from the East and from the West. The realization of the extent to which Soviet security was being undermined by these developments produced in the mid-1930s a Soviet policy aimed at creating an alliance with Western democracies, which appeared to be logical allies against fascism. The goal of this policy, according to Kennan, “was to strengthen the resistance of the western powers, particularly France and England, to Hitler, with a view either to frustrating his aggressive activities to such an extent as to cause him to lose prestige internally and to fall from power, or, if that could not be accomplished, to assuring that it would be the western powers, not Russia, who would bear the brunt of resulting military conflict.”<sup>299</sup>

This policy consisted of a dual effort: first, France and Britain had to be persuaded that it was they, not Russia, which were most endangered by fascist aggression; and, second, “these powers had to be tied to specific obligations of mutual

military assistance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and other powers, which would assure that the weight of their influence and power would be fully enlisted as a restraint on Hitler's ambitions."<sup>300</sup>

The effort to implement this policy took several forms. One of them was the entrance of the Soviet Union into the League of Nations in September 1934. Up to this time, the Soviet propagandists and statesmen consistently denounced the League as an instrument of the forces of imperialism. But, in light of the Nazi and Japanese threat, the Soviets attempted to make the League function as a balance of power instrument, and thus become an obstacle to the ambitions of Germany and Japan.<sup>301</sup>

Another major move undertaken by Moscow to pursue alliance policies was an attempt to create an "Eastern Locarno" system that would provide immediate mutual assistance to any victim of aggression in Eastern Europe. As a supplement to the "Eastern Locarno" system, Moscow attempted to conclude a bilateral mutual assistance treaty with France.<sup>302</sup> The Soviet leadership hoped that the demonstration of solidarity represented by the "Eastern Locarno" system would help to prevent a war from developing in the first place.<sup>303</sup>

In case Soviet efforts to avoid military confrontation with Germany and Japan through balance of power diplomacy would prove unsuccessful, the third major Soviet move was the great rearmament program, which aimed at strengthening the Red Army and continued through the 1930s.<sup>304</sup>

Despite the scope of Soviet efforts to restrain European fascism, these efforts were unsuccessful. Several weaknesses, such as strong mutual distrust between the Soviet Union and Western democracies, ensured the League of Nations was completely

ineffective in restraining fascist aggression. The language of a Franco-Soviet treaty of mutual assistance in case of aggression, signed on May 2, 1935, was ambiguous and complicated, and its operation was made dependent on prior action by the League of Nations. In addition, the French government's hesitation and delays with its ratification reduced this treaty's value as a political demonstration to almost negligible proportions.

The reoccupation of the Rhineland by the Germans in 1936 clearly showed how insignificant this treaty was in German eyes. The failure of the Western powers to react to this German move with any strong measures also demonstrated how ineffective the Pact was for Moscow's purposes.<sup>305</sup>

At this point the Soviet leadership began to suspect that the Western democracies were not really interested in peace and security, and were trying to divert Germany and Japan against the USSR. The Munich Conference (September 29, 1938) is considered by most scholars as a key point in the collapse of the anti-Axis coalition.<sup>306</sup> At this conference, the French and British leaders attempted to "appease" Hitler by yielding to his demands with regard to Czechoslovakia. The Soviets, moreover, were not invited to this conference.

The Munich Conference forced the Soviet leaders to abandon any remaining illusions about using Western democracies to balance the power of Germany and its allies. Their earlier suspicions were now extended to the conviction that Britain and France had left Hitler a free hand against Russia. Stalin, at the Eighteenth Party Congress in March 1939, in his explanation of the Anglo-French retreat before the military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan, placed the main emphasis upon what he saw as a conspiracy to encourage German and Japanese aggression against the USSR.<sup>307</sup>

Thus, “the end of 1938 found Russia isolated in both the West and the East. The Red Army could not stop a combined attack by Germany and Japan. Some diplomatic arrangement was needed to turn the potential aggressors against the West, or at least delay any attack.”<sup>308</sup> In these circumstances, Stalin decided that the goal of Soviet non-involvement in the coming war could best be achieved by a “deal” with Hitler.

These considerations resulted in the famous Non-Aggression Pact, signed by Russia and Germany on August 23, 1939. The treaty was intended to secure Russia from a German attack and at the same time save the Soviet Union from the involvement in a general European war to serve Anglo-French interests. As the result of this treaty, the Japanese pressure on the eastern border of the USSR was substantially reduced.<sup>309</sup> In addition, the Soviets received an opportunity for territorial adjustments in the West.<sup>310</sup> By concluding this treaty, Russia also obtained time to increase its military strength. Many scholars agree that, in light of the information available at that time, the conclusion of the pact by the Soviets was a very rational action in terms of contemporary power politics.<sup>311</sup>

It is also worth noting that, at the time of signing the agreement, the Soviet government “took special pains not to burn all its bridges with the West,”<sup>312</sup> which proved to be wise in the course of events that followed. The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, automatically made the Soviet Union the ally of the Western democracies, which were in war with Germany from 1939. However, the Soviet-Western suspicions were only temporarily eased by wartime alliance. The post-World War II pursuit of strategic influence on both sides, dictated by mutual distrust, increased the hostility between the West and the USSR, and the alliance proved to be short-lived.<sup>313</sup>

In the anti-Axis coalition, the Soviets pursued the same policy that they had followed in previous years. The essence of this policy was to stay on guard in regard to both enemies and allies, and try to create a means of protection from both. Throughout the war, Moore emphasizes, "Soviet policy was directed not only toward a military victory, but also toward emerging from the conflict in as strong a position as possible in relation to both allies and current enemies."<sup>314</sup>

During World War II, Stalin's policy – the acquisition of territory and the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence – was largely successful.<sup>315</sup> From the end of World War II to the end of Stalin's rule in 1953, Soviet foreign policy continued to follow a similar course – to maintain and, if possible, expand the Soviet sphere of influence.<sup>316</sup> As a result of the course of Soviet foreign policy pursued during the World War II and in the post-World War II period, Stalin "was able not only to regain most of the former empire of Tsarist Russia, but to extend Russia's influence into areas never before under Russian domination."<sup>317</sup> In words of Litvinov, "There has been a return in Russia to the outmoded concept of security in terms of territory – the more you've got, the safer you are."<sup>318</sup>

It could be seen from this brief review that, in the words of Sonnenfeldt, "Stalin's victory established an enduring conception of security that in its fundamental elements was essentially traditional. The Soviet Union was a state which had to stand on guard over its frontiers and territorial integrity. To do so, it needed military forces to deter or ward off potential invaders; it could utilize, and to some extent rely upon, the admittedly fragile but still not insignificant protection of the 'bourgeois' international order and its legal norms; it could seek alliances or other forms of association, including

economic ones, with other members of the traditional state system; and it could and would try to manipulate the external balance of power.”<sup>319</sup>

It was already shown that the balance of power policies of the Soviet state were for the most part in conflict with its policy aimed at promoting world revolution. It was also emphasized that, starting with Brest-Litovsk, the goal of Soviet national security was given a much higher priority by the Soviet leadership than the goal of promoting world revolution. There is much evidence that, during Stalin’s era, the conflict in Soviet decision-making between pursuing Soviet national interests and pursuing world revolution resulted in an almost unconditional victory for the goal of Soviet national interests.

First of all, after Hitler came to power, Stalin repeatedly assured Germans that even the policy aimed at the extermination of the German communist movement pursued by Hitler and his government at that time did not represent an obstacle to the development of good relations between the USSR and Nazi Germany.<sup>320</sup> The German and the Soviet governments extended the Treaty of Berlin in May 1933, and thus, officially at least, both countries continued to pursue relations in the spirit of the Rapallo agreement.<sup>321</sup>

Then, at the end of 1933, Soviet foreign policy starts a new course – to seek alliance with Western democracies against fascism. Litvinov outlined the essence of this new phase in Soviet foreign policy in his statement to the Central Executive Committee of the Supreme Soviet on December 29, 1933. After his speech, “his listeners and the whole country,” according to Ulam, “were to be left under no misapprehension that any

considerations of Communist solidarity, any traditional phrases and formulas, would stop the Soviet government from seeking peace and security for Russia.”<sup>322</sup>

Moreover, since it was perceived by the Soviet leadership that an alliance with the Western democracies required “emphasizing Soviet similarities to the West and deemphasizing the differences,” the Soviet Union at that time sought to acquire a “new image,” which would indicate a “sharp break with its revolutionary past and a sense of identity with the Western democracies.”<sup>323</sup> As a consequence, the Soviet revolutionary foreign policy was abandoned altogether.<sup>324</sup>

This shift in Soviet policy can be clearly seen in Soviet behaviour with regard to Spanish civil war. First of all, contrary to the charges of contemporary European conservatives,<sup>325</sup> the Soviet intervention in the Spanish situation was not motivated by a desire to promote communism wherever possible, but was based on balance-of-power considerations. As Kennan evaluated the situation, “The immediate and energetic intervention of Germany and Italy on behalf of General Franco meant that, if Russia failed to intervene on behalf of the Spanish-Republican government, an early and dramatic victory of the insurgents could hardly be avoided. Such a victory would have meant the encirclement of France by the fascists, the probable triumph of fascist tendencies within France itself, and the further weakening of western resistance to Hitler. The way would then be clear for a German aggression toward the East.”<sup>326</sup>

Secondly, even while supporting the Spanish Republicans, Stalin was determined to demonstrate to the Western democracies that Russia was no longer pursuing the world revolution, and therefore could be a dependable ally. Although the situation in Spain clearly had very promising revolutionary opportunities, Stalin prohibited the Spanish

Communist Party from taking governmental power. Moreover, Russian and Spanish communists strongly resisted attempts of Spanish anarchists and socialists, whose behaviour pursued a much more Leninist pattern, to turn the government left. The communist slogan declared: "This is not a revolution at all; it is only the defence of the legal government."<sup>327</sup> As Wesson emphasized, "faithful to the United Front ideal of putting defence ahead of social aims," the Spanish communist party under Soviet orders "actually became the right wing element of the governing coalition."<sup>328</sup>

Moreover, when it became clear to the Soviet leadership that the Soviet policy toward Spain would not bring any benefits to the USSR in terms of strengthening the anti-Hitler coalition, but might actually result in direct Soviet involvement in full-scale war with Germany and Italy, the USSR halted its aid to Spain and "left Spanish leftism to its agonies."<sup>329</sup>

Finally, the Comintern itself was dissolved on May 22, 1943 when Stalin considered that its existence could jeopardize the goals the Soviet government was trying to achieve through traditional diplomacy.<sup>330</sup>

The evidence that shows the priority of balance of power diplomacy over revolutionary considerations in Soviet foreign policy during Stalin's era is virtually endless: an alliance with Germany in 1939, when Moscow stated that it had "always had full understanding for the Hitler's domestic opposition to Communism;"<sup>331</sup> dismissal of communist internationalism – proclaiming democracy instead of proletarian dictatorship as the goal of the world communist movement and the final dissolution of the Comintern - by the Soviets during World War II, since ideological differences could destroy an alliance between the USSR and West;<sup>332</sup> the post-World War II Soviet policy aimed at



increasing the sphere of Soviet influence and control, pursued “with no regard for ‘revolutionary’ conditions or the interests and concerns of indigenous Communist parties.”<sup>333</sup> The priority of national interest considerations over revolutionary considerations in Soviet foreign policy thinking during Stalin’s era is thus indisputable.

With the replacement of revolutionary considerations by national interest considerations as the main elements of Soviet foreign policy objectives, and revolutionary tactics by balance of power diplomacy as the main elements of Soviet foreign policy conduct, the role of world revolution in Soviet foreign policy became increasingly to supplement Soviet balance of power diplomacy. A brief review of the relationship between the international Communist movement and Soviet foreign policy during Stalin’s era will help to demonstrate this point.

As described earlier, the world Communist movement was, prior to 1930, transformed into an instrument of Soviet foreign policy aimed at promoting the interests of the USSR instead of world revolution.

By 1930, this transformation was complete. The foreign Communist parties became “slavishly subjugated” to the Soviet Communist Party and its leader. Marxism-Leninism became subordinated to the Soviet national interest, and internationalism was replaced by loyalty to the Soviet state and to Stalin. The only essential quality for the leaders of foreign communist parties became loyalty in execution of Moscow’s policies. In short, Ulam summarizes, “by 1930, if one wanted to remain a Communist, one had to be a Stalinist.”<sup>334</sup>

As an obedient instrument of Soviet foreign policy, the Comintern in 1930s pursued the course of policy dictated to it from Moscow. The following several examples

will help to demonstrate that, during Stalin's rule, it was used not to promote world revolution but to help the Soviet Union in achieving objectives based on balance of power considerations.

Initially, when the rise of National Socialism in Germany was considered by the Soviet leadership to be a desirable phenomenon, German communists pursued, under Moscow's orders, a course of policy that greatly aided Hitler's success.<sup>335</sup>

When Hitler's regime was considered a threat to the Soviet Union's security, Moscow sought to create an alliance with Western democracies. At the same time the Comintern proclaimed a new policy in which all capitalist states, instead of being presumed imperialist, were divided into the "aggressive" and "peace loving." Communist parties, Moscow ordered, "should cherish bourgeois democracy until it could be replaced by proletarian democracy."<sup>336</sup> As a result of this new policy, communists in western democracies were ordered by the Comintern to assist liberal and even conservative groups in the fight against fascism. Until this time, Communist deputies in the French parliament, for example, opposed all defence measures of the "capitalist warmongers;" after Stalin's new instructions, the French communists began to support their government's defence policy.<sup>337</sup>

But then, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed. According to the new line for the Comintern, formulated by Moscow, Hitler once again became a friend, and democracies once again became responsible for the "imperialist war." At that time, Rosser emphasizes, "it became obvious to all but the most thoroughly conditioned party faithful that foreign communists were merely tools of the Soviet state."<sup>338</sup>

Thus, Soviet foreign policy from the establishment of Soviet state through the Leninist and Stalinist eras of Soviet foreign policy evolved from being based exclusively on pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine to being determined by considerations “quite similar to those that had traditionally assured the physical survival of nation-states in times of peril.”<sup>339</sup> As Sonnenfeldt summarizes, by the end of Stalin’s era, the Soviet Union had become a state “concerned with its territorial integrity and physical security; it sought to extend its frontiers as far as possible against the incursions of the potential enemy; it sought allies, regardless of political orientation; it tried to buy time when necessary with economic and other concessions; and it set aside revolutionary goals abroad both because they disrupted the traditional diplomatic efforts aimed for survival of the Soviet state, and because, if pursued, they might even have heightened the threat.”<sup>340</sup>

### **Part 3: Khrushchev’s Foreign Policy – The Final Stage of Evolution**

The final stage of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy occurred under Khrushchev, who consolidated his power in 1957. The evolution was influenced by two factors. First of all, the Soviet position within the international system of states had greatly improved. Despite its difficult beginning, the Soviet Union had become one of the two world’s greatest powers. This transformation of a weak revolutionary state into a powerful national state substantially reduced Soviet revolutionary enthusiasm. As shown in the pages above, Soviet concepts originally based on pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist thought were substantially revised during the evolution of Soviet policy. The most crucial change occurred when, contrary to earlier beliefs, the success of the world socialist revolution was declared to be dependent on the security of the Soviet state. This revision led to fundamental changes in other ideological concepts. The value of allies

became judged not on the basis of faith to Communist ideological principles, but on the basis of their possible contribution to the national interest of the Soviet state. “War” changed from a positive phenomena that encouraged progressive social change to a negative phenomena that jeopardised the success of world revolution by endangering its stronghold – the Soviet state. Consequently, “peace” also shifted from a negative phenomena that benefits the exploiting classes to a positive phenomena that enables the proletarian revolution represented by the Soviet state to preserve and further develop its achievements.

In short, by the 1950s, the Soviet Union had become a powerful nation, playing a very important part in a world balance of power. The realization by the Soviet leadership of the enormous efforts invested by the USSR, of “what it had achieved in contrast to what it may achieve,” made them “even more reluctant than before to take any major risks that could endanger its position in the world.”<sup>341</sup> From the revolutionary state existing to promote the world revolution, the Soviet Union had evolved to a “bureaucratized state administering a complex economy and interested in order and stability.”<sup>342</sup>

The second factor was the development of nuclear weapons. The Soviet attitude toward relations with capitalist countries changed significantly as the Soviet political elite began to realize the implications of nuclear weapons. As Khrushchev said in 1957, “War will be, under contemporary conditions, an atomic war with all its consequences.”<sup>343</sup> Realizing that the Soviet Union could not easily recover from the disaster of a nuclear war, the Soviet leadership realized that the use of war, under these conditions, could be justified only on the grounds of a direct threat to national survival. Therefore, “the Soviet

leaders could no longer believe that war was inevitable as long as capitalism existed because that meant that to all intents and purposes socialism was doomed. The two theories of the inevitability of war and the ultimate triumph of socialism were incompatible and, not surprisingly, the first of these theories was retired.”<sup>344</sup>

This re-examination of the Soviet relationship with the noncommunist world found its reflection in Khrushchev’s Central Committee Report to the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. In this report, Khrushchev reformulated concepts of the world devised by Lenin and adhered to by Stalin. He described the contemporary situation not in terms of two camps – socialist and capitalist, but in terms of three camps. The “colonial and semicolonial” areas of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were declared a separate camp instead of being a part of the capitalist camp. In the same report, Khrushchev reinterpreted Lenin’s view on war. He concluded that at present time the war between the imperialist and socialist systems was not “fatally inevitable” and could and should be avoided.<sup>345</sup>

This 1956 report revealed premises of Soviet foreign policy toward noncommunist countries that were to define Soviet foreign behaviour from that moment onward. These premises became the basis on which the new theory of “peaceful coexistence of differing social systems” was constructed. The term “peaceful coexistence” itself was “extracted from its historical context and original connotation as an expedient tactic for survival in adversity and raised to the stature of a strategy of indefinite duration.”<sup>346</sup> The theory of “competitive coexistence” was also constructed on these premises. The essence of this theory was the replacement of military by political and economic instruments as the main means of achieving Soviet foreign policy goals.

Upon these premises was also built the theory of the “isolation of world capitalism through recruitment of the third world of colonial, semicolonial, and former colonial peoples into the ranks of world socialism.”<sup>347</sup>

As a result of the USSR becoming a great power and of the development of nuclear weapons, Soviet policy-makers found it dangerous to rely on military means to advance national goals. Thus, the primary tools for conducting that struggle became economic, political, and ideological in nature. Let us briefly examine these tools, which assumed an important role in Soviet foreign policy conduct, starting with the economic policy of the USSR.

One example of economic methods of achieving Soviet foreign policy objectives is the Soviet foreign aid program that began in 1954-55. This program was designed to assist new states in three principal ways. It granted credits on favourable terms; it provided them with extensive scientific and technical assistance; and, finally, it established trade relations between the USSR and the developing countries “on a mutually advantageous basis.”<sup>348</sup> It is necessary to emphasize that, despite all Soviet ideological pronouncements, the Soviet foreign aid program was primarily a response to the American program, and its basic motive was to minimize Western influence in areas of strategic concern to the USSR.<sup>349</sup>

In light of the diminished importance of military means, the Khrushchev era also witnessed the development of traditional diplomacy as the best method of achieving the direct objective of Soviet foreign policy: the strengthening of the position of the USSR vis-à-vis the leading countries in the West. Despite the continuing Soviet pronouncements that Soviet diplomacy constituted the “new type of international

relations,” firmly based on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism,<sup>350</sup> a lot of evidence suggests that, in 1950s, it could be considered “new” only “to the extent that the use of the regular diplomatic corps for espionage and subversive purposes found its rationalization and justification in the ideology of international class struggle.”<sup>351</sup> Furthermore, considering that even Soviet sources defined the main task of Soviet foreign policy in 1950s-1960s as the establishment of “normal diplomatic relations with the capitalist states” and “peaceful settlement of all questions in dispute on a realistic basis,”<sup>352</sup> it is evident that, since its first development by early Bolsheviks, the Soviet concept of diplomacy was fundamentally revised to adjust to new conditions. As a result of this adjustment, Marxist-Leninist principles, such as proletarian internationalism, occupied a subordinate position to the national policy objectives of the USSR in Soviet foreign policy-making.<sup>353</sup>

The final ingredient of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War has been the ideological component. In the 1950s, in the context of “peaceful coexistence,” the manipulation of political forces in areas outside the Soviet sphere of influence could bring substantial benefits to the Soviets. For that purpose, the Soviet leadership developed a complex “propaganda apparatus” which was assigned the task of conducting the ideological struggle around the world. This apparatus included foreign communist parties, the government ministries of Foreign Affairs, Culture, and Foreign Trade and all committees and programs related to them, Radio Moscow, numerous newspapers and periodicals, and other organizations. It is necessary to emphasize here that this ideological instrument of Soviet foreign policy was created and used not to benefit world Communism in general but to “propagate Soviet Communist doctrine and to persuade

others to support Soviet policies and Soviet-sponsored organizations”<sup>354</sup> - in other words, as a supplement to traditional diplomacy in achieving goals dictated by the national interest of the USSR.

It is also necessary to note that, despite its significantly diminished role,<sup>355</sup> the military still remained a necessary instrument of Soviet foreign policy. Despite the growing emphasis on other foreign policy means, the Soviet leadership continued to keep this instrument “in constant readiness,” maintaining the world’s largest armed forces, and allocating from 10 to 25 percent of GNP to military related industries.<sup>356</sup>

The examination of the evolution of Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev era presented in this work is very brief. However, in my opinion, it successfully performs its tasks - to highlight major changes in the Soviet leadership’s perceptions during the Khrushchev era, and to demonstrate that these changes served to reinforce rather than diminish specific trends in Soviet foreign policy that originated with Brest-Litovsk and have remained permanent characteristics of Soviet foreign policy ever since. The very limited space allowed for this work does not permit the continuation of this discussion, and the literature available on Soviet foreign policy during the Khrushchev period and afterwards is large. Most scholars agree that the changes outlined above were major changes in the perceptions of Soviet leaders and had a significant effect on the course of Soviet foreign policy, and after that time there were no significant changes either in the perceptions of Soviet leaders or in the course of foreign policy pursued by the Soviet government. In other words, there is a consensus among scholars that the transformation of Soviet foreign policy during Khrushchev period outlined in this work was the final stage of Soviet foreign policy evolution.<sup>357</sup>



In conclusion, the evidence shows that during the Khrushchev era and afterwards “Soviet foreign policy showed remarkable persistence and continuity in its tactically versatile pursuit of the key objectives,” which were “to sow and exploit discord between the countries of Western Europe and the United States and among NATO members; to foster its security, which [the Soviet leadership] believed lay in a weakened West and retention of a favourable balance of power; and to increase the political, economic and military leverage that it could bring to bear on concrete issues.”<sup>358</sup>

#### **Part 4: Summary**

This chapter examined three phases of development of Soviet foreign policy: the period of Leninist foreign policy from Brest-Litovsk until Stalin’s consolidation of power; the period of Stalin’s foreign policy, and Soviet foreign policy in the post-Stalin period. While this has been a broad and brief survey, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that certain trends that emerged in Soviet foreign policy during the negotiations of Brest-Litovsk were further developed in the course of Soviet history.

As already emphasized, the most profound shift in Soviet foreign policy at the time of Brest-Litovsk was the replacement of revolutionary considerations by national interest considerations as the major determinant of Soviet foreign policy objectives. After Brest-Litovsk, the main objective of Soviet foreign policy was “to maintain or expand the national power of the Soviet state.”<sup>359</sup>

The other trends that emerged in Soviet foreign policy starting with Brest-Litovsk were an increasing preference toward the use of balance of power diplomacy and an increasing subordination of revolutionary tactics to traditional diplomacy. It is clear from

the preceding review that, far from being temporary, these aspects became permanent characteristics of Soviet foreign policy.

In sum, starting with Brest-Litovsk, the Soviet Union became increasingly socialized to the international system. This course of Soviet foreign policy development substantially narrowed the differences between Soviet foreign policy and the foreign policies of other states both in goals and in strategies chosen for their achievement.

The final chapter will summarize the structural influences of the international system in imposing certain standards of behaviour upon Soviet state.

## Chapter V: CONCLUSION

From the evidence examined in this work it is clear that the structure of international system had a major influence on Soviet leaders' perceptions and Soviet foreign policy behaviour.

On the moment of coming to power, the perceptions of Soviet leaders were shaped by pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which viewed both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie as movements international in character and not attached to any particular country. Thus, in its emphasis of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine did not attach significance to any particular state and rejected national sentiments in favour of proletarian internationalism.

These perceptions served as the basis for the "unorthodox" foreign policy behaviour of the Soviet state in the early stage of its existence, such as direct appeals of Bolshevik leaders to the working masses abroad instead of negotiating with foreign governments in order to achieve their foreign policy objectives.

However, these Bolshevik perceptions of the international situation were soon compelled to change under the influence of the structure of the international system. As a result of the Bolshevik revolution, proletarians had acquired a country. During the Brest-Litovsk negotiations the Bolsheviks became increasingly aware of the low revolutionary potential in the rest of the world.<sup>360</sup> In this situation, as Lenin put it, "the most important thing, both for us and from the point of view of international socialism," became "the preservation of Soviet Russia." This view is also clearly seen in Stalin's later statement, "An internationalist is he, who unreservedly and without hesitation and without

conditions is prepared to defend the USSR because the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement, and to defend and to advance this movement without defending the USSR is impossible.”<sup>361</sup>

Thus, Soviet leaders came to regard the goal of eventual triumph of the world communism as dependent on survival and national power of the Soviet state. They also, as emphasized in Chapter III, came to view the rest of the world in terms of states as major actors. It is, in my opinion, correct to say that the structure of the international system imposed its state-centric character on Soviet perceptions.

This change in the character of Soviet perceptions helps to explain a fundamental contradiction between the real course of Soviet foreign policy aimed at the increase of Soviet national power and Marxist-Leninist principles of class struggle and proletarian internationalism on which it was supposed to be based.<sup>362</sup> As noted by several Soviet foreign policy scholars, “while the Soviets were creating the theoretical underpinnings of a policy aimed at support for ‘progressive-revolutionary’ regimes, the concrete aspects of Soviet foreign policy were moving in a different direction.”<sup>363</sup> The major factors that have increasingly influenced Soviet interest in and policy toward an individual country have been this country’s actual or potential strategic importance for the Soviet Union and the possibility of disrupting influence patterns of the opponents of the Soviet Union in a particular region.<sup>364</sup>

As I stated earlier, as a result of change in Soviet perceptions imposed by the structure of the international system, the Soviet leaders came to view the international system in terms of states as major actors, and chose to pursue the goal of the world socialist victory through the maximization of power of the Soviet state. From this

perspective the friendly regime of a state, even an anti-communist one, was considered a much more influential political actor than any local movement, even communist. Thus, the character of a friendly regime did not make a significant difference as long as this regime constituted a useful ally of the USSR in the world power struggle.

The evidence also suggests a profound impact of the structural constraints of the international system on Soviet international behaviour. It was shown in Chapter III that, as early as at the time of Brest-Litovsk negotiations, Soviet leaders realized that a revolutionary foreign policy was not likely to bring them any substantial benefits in terms of the Soviet national interest, but could further aggravate an already desperate situation. In that situation they had no choice but to reject revolutionary tactics in favour of the time-proven balance of power diplomacy which helped other states to survive in the international system. The evidence presented in Chapter IV confirmed that, far from being temporary, this behavioural change became a permanent characteristic of Soviet foreign policy. It is thus possible to conclude that the structure of international system imposed its standard of behaviour on the Soviet state.

It is necessary to emphasize that the changes in Soviet perceptions and behaviour outlined above did not mean that Marxist-Leninist ideology ceased to be a prime motivating force of Soviet foreign policy. Rather, Soviet foreign policy-making during and after the Brest-Litovsk could be summarized as the continuous effort by the Soviet leaders to “reach pragmatic solutions” to arising problems “within the general framework of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.”<sup>365</sup>

In other words, ideology continued to define the long-range goal of Soviet foreign policy - the triumph of world communism.<sup>366</sup> However, pragmatic considerations helped

to find the most effective strategy for the achievement of this goal within the context of “external circumstances which the Soviet leaders did not control and over which they had only limited influence.”<sup>367</sup> In short, pragmatic considerations dictated that, given the existing set of circumstances, the achievement of the long-range goal of world communism could be best ensured through the achievement of the medium-range goal of the USSR’s security by improving its position in the international system of states.

Thus, the course of policy chosen by the Soviet leaders starting with Brest-Litovsk was the best option for the achievement of the goals prescribed by Communist ideology. Ideology combined with pragmatism “dictated that the prime goal of Soviet foreign policy was survival of the Soviet state, not the pursuit of world revolution or any such ideological ‘will-o’-the-wisps.’”<sup>368</sup> In general, this “mixture of ideology and practical considerations”<sup>369</sup> produced the shift from revolutionary tactics to balance of power diplomacy in Soviet foreign policy.

The evidence examined in this work described the process of adjustment of ideologically predetermined Soviet perceptions and international behaviour to the realities of the existing structure of the international system of states, which the USSR was unable to overthrow and replace with a new socialist system. It was shown that, as the result of this adjustment, Soviet perceptions (and consequently Soviet international behaviour) changed in a way consistent with the Realist perspective on international relations. Thus, despite the ideological pronouncements of Soviet leaders, I argue that major Soviet foreign policy decisions starting with the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty were in fact reactions to changes in the international balance of power; in other words, “the

pragmatism of 'Realpolitik' was dominant even if it was coyly draped in a red banner of Marxist internationalism."<sup>370</sup>

If balance of power considerations served as a basis for major Soviet foreign policy decisions starting with Brest-Litovsk, then it is clear that "the importance of ideology in guiding Soviet foreign policy has never been so great as would appear from the contention that its practitioners believe in and follow it."<sup>371</sup> Nevertheless, throughout the course of the USSR's existence, foreign policy decisions made by the Soviet leadership were constantly expressed and justified in ideological terms.

In my opinion, the continuing reliance of the Soviet leadership on Communist ideology in the formulation and justification of Soviet foreign policy can be explained by various factors.

As noted in Chapter I, ideology has a high potential for mass mobilization, manipulation and control. Marxist tradition is particularly strong in that respect. Marx in his work "German Ideology" treated ideology as the means by which the ruling class defended its interests and maintained the capitalist system through manipulation of social consciousness.<sup>372</sup> Lenin in his work "What is to be done?" saw socialist ideology as a weapon of class struggle, fighting against bourgeois ideology and defending the interests of proletariat. Arguing that the working class must combat the bourgeoisie on all fronts of the struggle, Lenin emphasized that of these fronts the theoretical was at least equally important. He argued that Engels recognized "not two forms of the great struggle of Social-Democracy (political and economic), as the common opinion states, but three, placing the theoretical struggle on a par with the first two."<sup>373</sup>

An illustrative example of the Marxist-Leninist view of ideology is Lenin's doctrine of "induced proletariat consciousness." Lenin insisted that, while the socialist consciousness of the working class is "the only basis that can guarantee our victory," it is the task of the party "to imbue the proletariat with the consciousness of its position and the consciousness of its task." This doctrine of vanguard control over the proletarian movement by a select, highly disciplined group of professional revolutionaries, Carlsnaes highlights, "in effect amounted to the 'political expropriation of the proletariat' by a small group of the bourgeois, revolutionary intelligentsia of Russia."<sup>374</sup>

Ideology thus helped to maintain internal control. The Soviet regime needed ideology to maintain its authority and the stability of the Soviet political system. According to Mayer, "Ideology functions as the legitimation device. It is to convince the citizenry that the Party and its leaders have a legitimate claim to rule them. More broadly, it is to convince the people that the entire system of government is legitimate."<sup>375</sup>

In the "doctrine of the induced proletarian consciousness" Lenin suggests the masses are much more apt to support policies of a particular regime if they fall under the influence of its ideology first. And since this strategy worked in Russia in 1917, the logical step for the Bolsheviks was to try ideological subversion against external enemies, especially because they lacked any other means at the time. The fact that the Bolsheviks realized after the revolution that they overestimated its external potential does not override the fact that ideology proved to be to a certain degree an effective tool of influence on foreign public opinion and thus helped Bolsheviks to ensure the survival of their state. As Rubinstein emphasized, "The stress on fomenting world revolution




developed out of initial military weakness and, having proved its effectiveness as a weapon, has remained an integral part of the Soviet diplomatic arsenal.”<sup>376</sup>

Therefore, I argue that the main reason for the continuous employment of Communist ideology as a justification of foreign policy decisions by the Soviet leaders was to gain both domestic and international support for the course of foreign policy pursued by the Soviet government.<sup>377</sup>

The summary of the argument is shown in Figure 2. First of all, Figure 2 shows different components of Soviet foreign policy: the “objective” (which for the purpose of this work is divided into “long-range goals” and “short-range goals”), the “strategy” for its achievement, and the “justification” of the course of policy chosen by Soviet leaders. It also highlights two major factors of influence on Soviet foreign policy: Marxist-Leninist ideology and the structure of international system of states. The figure shows that, as a result of constraints imposed by the structure of international system, only two aspects of Soviet foreign policy remained under the dominant influence of Communist ideology – the long-range goal of Soviet foreign policy and the justification for the course of policy conducted by the Soviet government. The other components of Soviet foreign policy – its short-range goals and the strategy chosen for their achievement – became determined by structural influences of the international system of states.

Figure 2.

**The Outline of Ideological and Structural Influence on Different Aspects of the Soviet Foreign Policy Process:**



Thus, as a result of the constraints imposed by the structure of international system, the impact of Communist ideology on the course of Soviet foreign policy was limited. This view of the impact of ideology on Soviet foreign policy is supported by numerous scholars.<sup>378</sup>

As emphasized in the discussion of Realism in Chapter 2, in the anarchical international system attempts of one state to improve its position by increasing its power are always accompanied by efforts of other states to match this power increase. It is thus by definition impossible for the state to feel completely secure in the anarchical system of states. Thus, the preservation of the Soviet state and increase of Soviet national power became a strategy of indefinite duration. In other words, it is clear that the concentration of Soviet leaders on short-range goals and adjustment to the structure of the international system had, as Moore put it, “caused the means to eat up the ends.”<sup>379</sup>

This conclusion is widely supported by Soviet foreign policy scholars. Rostow, for example, characterized Soviet foreign policy as “a series of responses to the outside world which, especially before 1939, took the form of such actions as were judged most likely, on a short-range basis, to maintain or expand the national power of the Soviet regime.” Despite the Soviet Union’s substantially improved international position after WWII, Rostow says that “there is no evidence that the foreign policy criteria of the regime ... changed.”<sup>380</sup>

Rosser argues that the “long-range theoretical predictions and the utopian goals of ideology ... did not distort daily decisions in Soviet foreign policy,” which were made on

the basis of sober analysis of the international distribution of power.<sup>381</sup> Wesson also says that “the significance of ideology was much greater for long-range expectations than for day-to-day operations, in which (although not in statements) Soviet diplomacy was often hardly distinguishable from traditional great-power politics. Marxism-Leninism claims to tell about the climate, not the weather.” Throughout Soviet history, he argues, “ideology seemed to carry little weight alongside ordinary considerations of balance of power.”<sup>382</sup> Especially illustrative here is Litvinov’s statement in justification of friendly relations with Hitler in 1933: “We as Marxists are the last who could be reproached with allowing sentiment to prevail over politics.”<sup>383</sup>

In short, I argue that, due to the anarchic nature of the international system, the ultimate goals of Communist ideology ceased to be “empirically operative”<sup>384</sup> in Soviet foreign policy determinations at the moment when Soviet leaders first defined the achievement of national security as the prerequisite to any other aims.

Another aspect of the relationship between Soviet official ideology and Soviet foreign policy deserves a separate consideration. As emphasized in previous pages, due to the structural constraints of the international system, Marxist-Leninist ideology ceased to be a major determinant of Soviet foreign policy decisions. However, these decisions still had to be rationalized and justified in ideological terms. This caused, as shown in Chapters III and IV, continuous efforts of Lenin and his successors to revise and amend Communist theory in order to make it conform to contemporary circumstances.<sup>385</sup> The obvious examples of the modifications introduced to Communist doctrine under the influence of the structure of international system are “Peaceful Coexistence” and “Socialism in One Country”.

Soviet ideology thus became a “creative, constantly developing doctrine,”<sup>386</sup> which “derived at least as much from the strategy as vice versa.”<sup>387</sup> As a result, the Soviet Communist theory became increasingly descriptive rather than prescriptive in the course of Soviet history. As Marantz argues, “for Lenin [and his successors] it can truly be said that theory ‘did not determine the nature of action; action determined the meaning of theory.’”<sup>388</sup> In the process, the role of Marxism-Leninism shifted increasingly from being a guide for Soviet foreign policy to being a post-facto rationalization for policy decisions.<sup>389</sup>

Let us recall some of the arguments presented in the discussion on ideology in Chapter 1, and Soviet ideology in particular in Chapter 3. Many scholars viewed Soviet ideology as the major determinant of Soviet foreign policy on the grounds that it shaped Soviet leaders’ perceptions of the international situation, determined goals of Soviet foreign policy and offered to Soviet leaders a concrete program of political action.

Let us also recall the structural Realist position, which states that, due to the constraints imposed by the structure of the international system, an increase in national power and a certain pattern of international behaviour is a necessary precondition for the implementation of any ideologically motivated goals. Therefore, Realists argue that that structure is the major determinant of a state’s foreign policy.

The evidence presented in this work demonstrated that, in the initial period of Soviet foreign policy, Marxist-Leninist ideology indeed served as the major determinant of Soviet leaders’ perceptions, Soviet foreign policy goals and Soviet international behaviour. However, the evidence also highlighted the changes imposed on Soviet foreign policy by the structure of the international system. First of all, it was emphasized

that, contrary to the Marxist perspective that viewed the world in terms of two opposing international movements, the Soviet perception of the international situation shifted to the state-centric point of view consistent with the Realist perspective. It was also emphasized that the Soviet national interest - survival and increase in power - was admitted by Soviet leaders to be a necessary condition for the realization of the ultimate goal of world socialist victory. Finally, it was demonstrated that Soviet international behaviour shifted from revolutionary tactics to the common pattern of state behaviour described in the Realist theory of the balance of power.

In short, the evidence demonstrated that the structural influence of the international system not only substantially reduced the impact of Marxist-Leninist ideology on day-to-day Soviet foreign policy, but caused fundamental changes in the Communist doctrine itself. Therefore, I argue that, although Communist ideology undoubtedly played a motivational role in Soviet foreign policy, the limits imposed by the structure of the international system of states rendered the structural Realist perspective a much more effective tool for the analysis of Soviet foreign policy than the “ideological” perspective. In other words, regardless of the ideological inclinations of Soviet leaders, we can assume that Soviet statesmen thought and acted in terms of national interest defined as power.<sup>390</sup> We can also assume that Soviet ideology was a tool for implementing Soviet foreign policy decisions more than a “blueprint providing explicit guidance to Soviet foreign policy.”<sup>391</sup>

## Epilogue

This work examined the relationship between Communist ideology and Soviet foreign policy. It has been shown that Marxism-Leninism served both as a motivation behind Soviet foreign policy and a tool of its implementation. However, this work has demonstrated that the influence of the structure of the international system of states was the primary determinant of Soviet foreign policy conduct: even official Soviet sources admitted that, in the course of Soviet foreign policy, foreign policy decisions were worked out by the Soviet leadership on the basis of “a level-headed appraisal of the balance of strength in the world arena.”<sup>392</sup>

The record of Soviet international behaviour presented in this work indicates that Soviet leaders were forced to adjust to the general pattern of behaviour in the international system of states. This pattern of international behaviour was described in Chapter I in the discussion of the Realist perspective on international relations and finds its clearest reflection in the structural Realist theory of the balance of power. As stated by Moore, the essence of this theory is that one should oppose “the power that in growing stronger threatens one’s own security,” and in order to do so, “one should seek allies where they can be found, independently of cultural and ideological affinities.”<sup>393</sup> Soviet foreign policy behaviour was consistent with these principles despite Soviet statements to the contrary. Considering the fundamental difference between this type of international behaviour and the type of international behaviour suggested by pre-revolutionary Marxist-Leninist doctrine, we can conclude that Moore is absolutely correct saying that “the structure of world politics imposes a certain form of behaviour on states that is independent of the social and economic structure of these states.”<sup>394</sup>

Levi summarizes the argument:

“The system does not impose any ideology of its own on the policymaker; the system does, however, dictate a good deal of behaviour related to the pursuit of interests, regardless of ideology... Large or small, no state can altogether escape some of the influences of the system upon its foreign policy-making because every state is to a larger or smaller degree affected by the behaviour of other states and must react, and react to some extent in a manner prescribed by the system. There is a certain automatism in the international system to which all states are subject in some way, and it has nothing to do with their ideologies...”<sup>395</sup>

With this statement, I would like to conclude this work.



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## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> Vernon V. Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 337.

<sup>2</sup> Dulles, quoted in Fabian Vaksman, *Ideological Struggle: A Study in the Principles of Operation of the Soviet Political Mechanism* (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1987), 5-6.

<sup>3</sup> Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, V. 14.1, 1970, 24.

<sup>4</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 18. For the general information about the debate, see, for example, J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp.20-29. For the information about the debate concerning the appropriate level of analysis with regard to Soviet foreign policy in particular, see Morton Schwartz, "The "Motive Forces" of Soviet Foreign Policy, A Reappraisal," *The Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs*, Vol. 8, Monograph No. 2 (1970-71), 1.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen White and Alex Pravda, eds. *Ideology and Soviet Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 1.

<sup>6</sup> Ogden Gavanski, *The Soviet Union as a Rational-Revolutionary State: A Conceptual Framework for Studying the Impact of Ideology on Soviet Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia, 1986), iv.

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<sup>7</sup>Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), 132.

<sup>8</sup> The clear articulation of his position can be seen in works such as: Werner Levi, "Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*, V. 14.1, 1970; Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959); and Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979).

<sup>9</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 245.

<sup>10</sup> Vaksman, *Ideological Struggle*, 25.

<sup>11</sup> A very telling comparison between motivations behind Soviet and American foreign policies can be found in John T. Rourke, *Making Foreign Policy: United States, Soviet Union, China* (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990), Part II, chapters 4 and 5, pp. 49-76.

<sup>12</sup> According to Don Munton, the general Canadian public in the 1980s viewed the increase of power and influence as the main goal of foreign policies of both superpowers. It also regarded the expansionist policies of both countries to be equally responsible for Cold War East-West tensions: (Don Munton, *Peace and Security in the 1980s: The View of the Canadians* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute For Peace and Security, 1988), pp. 6-8, 17, 42.)

<sup>13</sup> On American foreign policy, see, for example, John Spanier and Steven W. Hook, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1995), 11. On Soviet foreign policy, see Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph

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L. Nogee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 283.

<sup>14</sup> This opinion is supported by Rejai and Gouldner, for example. (Mostafa Rejai, *Political Ideologies: A Comparative Approach* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), 14; Gouldner quoted in John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 75.)

<sup>15</sup> Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies: An Introduction*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998), 6.

<sup>16</sup> John Plamenatz, *Ideology* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd, 1979), 15.

<sup>17</sup> D. J. Manning, *The Form of Ideology: Investigations into the Sense of Ideological Reasoning with a View to Giving an Account of Its Place in Political Life* (London: George Allen and UNWIN Ltd, 1980), 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>19</sup> Goran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology* (London: Verso Editions and NLB, 1980), 4.

<sup>20</sup> Andrew Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 10.

<sup>21</sup> Plamenatz, *Ideology*, 15.

<sup>22</sup> The *Filosoficheskiy Slovar* (Philosophical Dictionary, 1954 ed.), quoted in R.N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of the Doctrine" in *The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy* ed. Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980), 101.

<sup>23</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 11.

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- <sup>24</sup> Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 9.
- <sup>25</sup> Larry Johnston. *Ideologies: An Analytic and Contextual Approach* (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1996), 13.
- <sup>26</sup> Levi, "Ideology, Interests and Foreign Policy," 4.
- <sup>27</sup> M. V. Yakovlev, *Ideology: The Difference between the Marxist-Leninist and the Bourgeois Concepts* (Moscow: Misl, 1979), 9.
- <sup>28</sup> Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), 132.
- <sup>29</sup> For example, Rejai says, "ideologies are action-related systems of beliefs, norms and ideas". (Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 11.)
- <sup>30</sup> Plamenatz, *Ideology*, 76.
- <sup>31</sup> Robert Eccleshall et al., *Political Ideologies: An Introduction* (London: Hutchinson, 1984), quoted in Johnston, *Ideologies*, 12.
- <sup>32</sup> Yakovlev, *Ideology*, 9.
- <sup>33</sup> Quoted in Johnston, *Ideologies*, 13.
- <sup>34</sup> Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 32.
- <sup>35</sup> Oded Balaban, *Politics and Ideology: A Philosophical Approach* (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995), xvii.
- <sup>36</sup> Balaban, *Politics and Ideology*, 97.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 97.

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<sup>38</sup> Seliger quoted in John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 79.

<sup>39</sup> Charles Funderburk and Robert G. Thobaben, *Political Ideologies: Left, Centre, Right* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), quoted in Johnston, *Ideologies*, 12.

<sup>40</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 11.

<sup>41</sup> James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), 93.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 94, 103, 111.

<sup>43</sup> Statement by E. Hoffmann, quoted in Martin Griffiths, *Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation* (London: Routledge, 1992), 35.

<sup>44</sup> Stanley Hoffmann, quoted in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 10.

<sup>45</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 25.

<sup>46</sup> Keohane, *Neorealism and Its Critics*, 7.

<sup>47</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 161.

<sup>48</sup> Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 189.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 189-190.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 190.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 190.

<sup>52</sup> Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 84-85.

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<sup>53</sup> Barrington Moore, Jr. *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power: The Role of Ideas in Social Change* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

<sup>54</sup> Samuel L. Sharp, “National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics” in *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. Erik P. Hoffmann and Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1980), 108.

<sup>55</sup> Robert V. Daniels, “Doctrine and Foreign policy” in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 154.

<sup>56</sup> Such as Morgenthau and Kissinger (Henry A. Kissinger, a statesman and an International Relations scholar, Realist school of thought), whom Waltz calls reductionists, because they “reified their systems by reducing them to their interacting parts.” Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Random House, 1979), 61,63.

<sup>57</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 72.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 81.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid, 73-74.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 82.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., 88-99.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, 117.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., 117-118.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 118.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 118-119.

<sup>66</sup> Morgenthau, for example, says that the balance of power can “impose its restraints upon the power aspirations of nations” only if competing nations first “accept the system

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of balance of power as the common framework of their endeavors.” Without such a consensus, the “balance of power is incapable of fulfilling its function for international stability and national independence.” Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 226-227.

<sup>67</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 121.

<sup>68</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 126; Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 12-13.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., 127-128.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>71</sup> Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 117.

<sup>72</sup> This will be particularly shown in the example of Soviet Russia’s behaviour during its formative years in Chapter III.

<sup>73</sup> Quoted in Stephen White and Alex Pravda, eds, *Ideology and Soviet Politics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 1.

<sup>74</sup> This chapter will examine mostly pre-revolutionary works of Marx and Lenin as constituting the body of the original Marxism-Leninism, in order to establish a reference point for the later analysis of the evolution of the doctrine under the influence of external circumstances.

<sup>75</sup> John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 26. It is necessary to add that virtually all sources I consulted agree with this point of view.

<sup>76</sup> B. N. Ponomarev, ed., *Politicheskiy Slovar’*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1958), 337, quoted in *Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. Jan F Triska and David D. Finley (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 109.

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<sup>77</sup> O. W. Kuusinen et al., *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d. [1960]), 16-19, quoted in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 107-108.

<sup>78</sup> Vincent, *Modern Political Ideologies*, 92.

<sup>79</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 92.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>81</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 93.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., 93.

<sup>83</sup> T.A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 25.

<sup>84</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 94.

<sup>85</sup> V. Kubalkova and A.A. Cruickshank, *Marxism-Leninism and theory of international relations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 12-13; Joseph L. Noguee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), 15; etc.

<sup>86</sup> The scholars associated with the Realist school of thought, examined in Chapter I, for example.

<sup>87</sup> Quoted in Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism*, 39.

<sup>88</sup> Noguee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 15.

<sup>89</sup> Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1973*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), 13.

<sup>90</sup> Noguee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 16.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid.



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- <sup>92</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 13.
- <sup>93</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 13.
- <sup>94</sup> Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism*, 55.
- <sup>95</sup> Kenneth R. Hoover, *Ideology and Political Life* (Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1987), 96.
- <sup>96</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 99-100.
- <sup>97</sup> Hoover, *Ideology and Political Life*, 96.
- <sup>98</sup> Walter Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of Its Usage By Marx, Lenin, and Mannheim* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 112.
- <sup>99</sup> Noguee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 18.
- <sup>100</sup> Quoted in Terence Ball and Richard Dagger, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 158.
- <sup>101</sup> Lenin wrote: "...the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness, i.e. the conviction that it is necessary to combine in unions, fight the employers, and strive to compel the government to pass necessary labour legislation, etc." Quoted in Ball, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 158.
- <sup>102</sup> Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology*, 112.
- <sup>103</sup> Alfred B. Evans, *Soviet Marxism-Leninism: The Decline of an Ideology* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 20.
- <sup>104</sup> Ball, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 158.
- <sup>105</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 100.

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- <sup>106</sup> Quoted in P. H. Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), 18.
- <sup>107</sup> *The Lenin Collection*, I (Moscow, 1924), 208, quoted in Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 26.
- <sup>108</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 26.
- <sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.
- <sup>110</sup> V.I. Lenin, "Prophetic Words" (1918), quoted in Vigor, *The Soviet View of War, Peace and Neutrality*, 18.
- <sup>111</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 26.
- <sup>112</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 104.
- <sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, 105.
- <sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>115</sup> Ball, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal*, 158-159.
- <sup>116</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 108.
- <sup>117</sup> Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, 20.
- <sup>118</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 108.
- <sup>119</sup> Hoover, *Ideology and Political Life*, 99.
- <sup>120</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 28.
- <sup>121</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 108.
- <sup>122</sup> Rejai, *Political Ideologies*, 109.
- <sup>123</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 28.

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- <sup>124</sup> V.I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (4<sup>th</sup> ed.; Moscow, 1950), XXVIII, p. 132, quoted in Paul Joseph Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World: A Study in Doctrinal Change, 1917-1964* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 44.
- <sup>125</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 28.
- <sup>126</sup> On this subject, see Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 11; Donaldson, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, 29-30; Nogee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 21; Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 25; etc.
- <sup>127</sup> Rejai, 107.
- <sup>128</sup> Quoted in Nogee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 21.
- <sup>129</sup> Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World*, 67.
- <sup>130</sup> Vigor, *The Soviet View of War*, 23-24.
- <sup>131</sup> Quoted in Nogee, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 21.
- <sup>132</sup> Lenin, *Works*, XXVIII, 189-190, quoted in Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World*, 69.
- <sup>133</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 30.
- <sup>134</sup> White, *Ideology and Soviet Politics*, 1.
- <sup>135</sup> Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, 132.
- <sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.
- <sup>137</sup> Aspaturian, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 335.
- <sup>138</sup> Quoted in Vaksman, *Ideological Struggle*, 6.
- <sup>139</sup> Judson R. Mitchell, *Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on International Relations* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1982), xiii.

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<sup>140</sup> R. N. Carew Hunt, "The Importance of the Doctrine" in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 107.

<sup>141</sup> B.N. Ponomarev, ed. *Politicheskii Slovar'*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1958), 199-200, quoted in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 109-110.

<sup>142</sup> O. W. Kuusinen et al., *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, n.d. [1960]), 17, 19, quoted in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 110.

<sup>143</sup> Ponomarev, *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 9-11.

<sup>144</sup> That is what Triska, for example, based his arguments on: "Doctrine and Events in Soviet Foreign Policy" in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 107-148.

<sup>145</sup> Consider the opinion that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union was fundamentally different from that of the other states, because it was motivated by Communist ideology in contrast to other states' policies having, to a western observer, some understandable rational reasons behind them.

<sup>146</sup> Maurice Tugwell, "The Revolutionary Dynamic in Soviet Foreign and Defence Policy," in Brian MacDonald, ed. *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1984), 31-32.

<sup>147</sup> Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2.

<sup>148</sup> Israelyan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 8, 15.

<sup>149</sup> Ponomarev, *Istoriya Vneshnei Politiki SSSR* (1971), quoted in Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 2.

<sup>150</sup> Edmonds, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1962-1973*, 2-3.

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>152</sup> Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Foundations of Soviet Grand Strategy," in MacDonald, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, 6.

<sup>153</sup> Evans, *Soviet Marxism-Leninism*, 29.

<sup>154</sup> Paul Marantz, "Peaceful Coexistence: From Heresy to Orthodoxy," in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels and Nancy Whittier Heer, eds. *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics* (London: Harvard University Press, 1976), 294.

<sup>155</sup> Evans, *Soviet Marxism-Leninism*, 29; Marantz, "From Heresy to Orthodoxy" in Cocks, *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, 294.

<sup>156</sup> Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 13; John A. Armstrong, *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 38.

<sup>157</sup> The Waltz's concept of international structure was already discussed in detail in this work. For additional information see Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Structure and the Balance of World Power" in James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 304-314.

<sup>158</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 51-52.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 55-56.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 56.

<sup>162</sup> Quoted in Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1953), 17-18.

<sup>163</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 53.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., 54.

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<sup>165</sup> Quoted in Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1930* (London: Sage Publications, 1979), 17.

<sup>166</sup> Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology*, 16.

<sup>167</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 54.

<sup>168</sup> Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, eds. *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), 2.

<sup>169</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II: Imperial and Global*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1985), 3.

<sup>170</sup> Lenin, XIII, 239, quoted in T.A. Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 59-60.

<sup>171</sup> In other words, the Bolsheviks believed that peace was possible only after a triumph of the worldwide proletarian revolution and the replacement of the present international system of states with the new (socialist) type of international system.

<sup>172</sup> Emphasis added.

<sup>173</sup> "Decree on Peace," Adopted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> All-Russia Congress of Soviets (November 8, 1917) in *Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1967* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), 27.

<sup>174</sup> Richard F. Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), 94.

<sup>175</sup> "Milestones...", 29.

<sup>176</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 90.

<sup>177</sup> Quoted in Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 90.

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<sup>178</sup> Edward Hallett Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923* (London: Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1953), 12.

<sup>179</sup> George F. Kennan. *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1960), 14.

<sup>180</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 12-13; and Robert G. Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969), 31.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid, 25-26.

<sup>182</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 94.

<sup>183</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 32.

<sup>184</sup> Georg Von Rauch, *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), 72.

<sup>185</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 14.

<sup>186</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 96.

<sup>187</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 57.

<sup>188</sup> John W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The forgotten peace. March 1918* (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1938), 114-115.

<sup>189</sup> Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, *Utopia in Power: the history of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the present* (New York: Summit Books, 1982), 51.

<sup>190</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 33.

<sup>191</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 33.

<sup>192</sup> Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 116.

<sup>193</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 96; Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 58.

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<sup>194</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 65.

<sup>195</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 97.

<sup>196</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 61.

<sup>197</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 32.

<sup>198</sup> As previously described in this work, the original Communist thought envisaged the attainment of Marxian peace in Europe by a short-cut method, i.e. by immediate world revolution, without the preliminary stages prescribed by Marx. It was expected by Bolshevik leaders that World War I could be transformed into a series of civil, revolutionary wars, which would bring about communist "peace" by the extension of social revolution to new areas without delay. See, for example, Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 66.

<sup>199</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 32.

<sup>200</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 67.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>202</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 98.

<sup>203</sup> Quoted in Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 99.

<sup>204</sup> Quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 33.

<sup>205</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 68.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>207</sup> Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 3rd ed., (New York: Random House, 1972), 41.

<sup>208</sup> V.I. Lenin, "Twenty-One Theses for Peace," reprinted in Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 385-391.



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- <sup>209</sup> Quoted in Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 194.
- <sup>210</sup> Lenin, “Twenty-One Theses for Peace,” reprinted in Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 385-391.
- <sup>211</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 69.
- <sup>212</sup> Quoted in Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 99.
- <sup>213</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 36.
- <sup>214</sup> Ibid., 37.
- <sup>215</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 38.
- <sup>216</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 67.
- <sup>217</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 70-71.
- <sup>218</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 39.
- <sup>219</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 40.
- <sup>220</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 100.
- <sup>221</sup> Quoted in Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 100.
- <sup>222</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 41.
- <sup>223</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 71-72.
- <sup>224</sup> Carr, *Bolshevik Revolution*, 41-42.
- <sup>225</sup> Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 43.
- <sup>226</sup> Frederic J. Flernon, Erik P. Hoffmann, and Robbin F. Laird, eds., *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Lenin to Brezhnev* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1991), 76.

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- <sup>227</sup> Wladislaw W. Kulski, *Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1959), 134; also A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev, eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1980*, Vol. I (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1981) 14.
- <sup>228</sup> Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 76.
- <sup>229</sup> David Shub, *Lenin*, revised ed. (Harmondsworth, 1966), 304, quoted in Tugwell, "Revolutionary Dynamic" in MacDonald, *The Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, 23.
- <sup>230</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 191.
- <sup>231</sup> To quote Lenin, "We have done everything possible and impossible... to give other nations a chance to join." V.I. Lenin, "21 theses for peace" in Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk*, 386, 388.
- <sup>232</sup> Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World*, 72.
- <sup>233</sup> Lenin, "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," January 20, 1918.
- <sup>234</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 157
- <sup>235</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 4.
- <sup>236</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 76.
- <sup>237</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 42.
- <sup>238</sup> Ibid., 42.
- <sup>239</sup> Radek and Lenin quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 42.
- <sup>240</sup> Ibid., 42.
- <sup>241</sup> Quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 47.
- <sup>242</sup> Chicherin, "Report on Soviet Foreign Policy to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets," July 4, 1918.

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- <sup>243</sup> Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 44.
- <sup>244</sup> Lenin, Sochineniia, XXXI, 410-411, quoted in Kulski, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 101.
- <sup>245</sup> Quoted in Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 73.
- <sup>246</sup> Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 46.
- <sup>247</sup> Jahn, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 28.
- <sup>248</sup> Quoted in Richard Pipes, *Survival is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America's Future* (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1984), 27.
- <sup>249</sup> Quoted in Jahn, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 30.
- <sup>250</sup> See Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World*, 88, Jahn, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 30, Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism*, 108, etc.
- <sup>251</sup> V. Kubalkova and A. A. Cruickshank, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 108. Emphasis in original.
- <sup>252</sup> Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 39.
- <sup>253</sup> Paul Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives in East-West Relations* (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1988), 17.
- <sup>254</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 196.
- <sup>255</sup> Quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 46.
- <sup>256</sup> Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), 103-104.
- <sup>257</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 194.
- <sup>258</sup> Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 18.
- <sup>259</sup> Quoted in Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 18.
- <sup>260</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 190.

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<sup>261</sup> For example, when Trotsky resigned as head of the Commissariat, his successor was Chicherin, an aristocrat by birth and a former employee of the czarist Foreign Ministry. From that moment, the “traditional ways of diplomacy reasserted themselves.” (Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 83). For a detailed analysis of the development of the Soviet diplomatic corps, see Teddy J. Uldricks, *Diplomacy and Ideology: The Origins of Soviet Foreign Relations 1917-1930* (London: SAGE Publications, 1979).

<sup>262</sup> Samuel L. Sharp, “National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics” in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 114; also see Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 42; Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 44; etc.

<sup>263</sup> Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 42.

<sup>264</sup> Lenin, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 124, quoted in Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, 107.

<sup>265</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XXXVIII, 139, quoted in Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 11.

<sup>266</sup> Lenin, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State*, 129, quoted in Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, 107.

<sup>267</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XLII, 22-23, quoted in Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 12.

<sup>268</sup> Lenin, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State*, 356-7, quoted in Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, 107-108.

<sup>269</sup> Lenin, *On the Foreign Policy of the Soviet State*, 366, quoted in Kubalkova, *Marxism-Leninism and Theory of International Relations*, 107-108.

<sup>270</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XLIV, 301, quoted in Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 13.

<sup>271</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 195.

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- <sup>272</sup> Lenin, "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," January 20, 1918.
- <sup>273</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XLIV, 291-2, quoted in Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 13.
- <sup>274</sup> As was suggested by Tugwell and Triska, for example. (Maurice Tugwell, "The Revolutionary Dynamic in Soviet Foreign and Defence Policy," in Macdonald, *Grand Strategy of the Soviet Union*, 32; Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 3).
- <sup>275</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 47.
- <sup>276</sup> Ponomaryov, *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 238.
- <sup>277</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 62.
- <sup>278</sup> Kulski, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 104.
- <sup>279</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 123.
- <sup>280</sup> Taracouzio, *War and Peace in Soviet Diplomacy*, 123-124.
- <sup>281</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5.
- <sup>282</sup> Quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 159.
- <sup>283</sup> Quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 160.
- <sup>284</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 198.
- <sup>285</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 154-155.
- <sup>286</sup> For details, see Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 206.
- <sup>287</sup> For details, see Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 154.
- <sup>288</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5.
- <sup>289</sup> *Kommunisticheskiy Internatsional v Dokumentah* (1933), 152, quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 189.
- <sup>290</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5.

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- <sup>291</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 181.
- <sup>292</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 160.
- <sup>293</sup> Lenin, *Sochineniia*, XXV, 498, 501, quoted in Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), 11.
- <sup>294</sup> Quoted in Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 149.
- <sup>295</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 207.
- <sup>296</sup> Ponomaryov, *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 234.
- <sup>297</sup> Robert G. Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective* (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1969), 104.
- <sup>298</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 149.
- <sup>299</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 83.
- <sup>300</sup> *Ibid.*, 83.
- <sup>301</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 162.
- <sup>302</sup> *Ibid.*, 163.
- <sup>303</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 85.
- <sup>304</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 162.
- <sup>305</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 86.
- <sup>306</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 362; Frederick L. Schuman, *Russia Since 1917: Four Decades of Soviet Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957), 199; Ponomaryov, *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 352; etc.
- <sup>307</sup> Stalin, “Report to the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of Soviets of the CPSU,” March 10, 1939, quoted in Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 362; also see Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 257; Ponomaryov, *History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 352.

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<sup>308</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 179.

<sup>309</sup> One of the conditions requested by Soviets before signing the pact was that Germany would use its influence to stop Japan's campaign against the Soviet Far East. Germany agreed to this condition. (Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 185) In addition, the conclusion of the pact by itself caused a "soothing effect on the attitude of Japan," and resulted in "détente in Soviet-Japanese relations." (Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 277)

<sup>310</sup> The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact also included a secret protocol, which contained "a 'delimitation' of the respective 'spheres of interest' of the two countries in Eastern Europe." According to this protocol, Russia was promised control of the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, and Rumanian Bessarabia. Stalin, according to Rosser, saw it as a great opportunity "to expand Soviet defensive perimeter – to create a buffer zone between Germany and Russia." (Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 186; see also Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, 261)

<sup>311</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 364; Shuman, *Russia Since 1917*, 260; Frederic J. Flernon, Erik P. Hoffmann, and Robbin F. Laird, eds., *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Lenin to Brezhnev* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1991), 79; Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 196; for instance.

<sup>312</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 278.

<sup>313</sup> Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, 319.

<sup>314</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 366.

<sup>315</sup> The following territories were absorbed by the Soviet Union in the West: Northern and Southern Border Regions in Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, part of former East

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Prussia from Germany, Eastern Poland, Ruthenia from Czechoslovakia, and Bessarabia from Romania. (Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since WWII*, 47.)

In the Far East, the USSR annexed the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin from Japan, and gained joint control with the Chinese Nationalist Government of Port Artur and the port of Dairen. Plus, the Chinese government recognized “status quo” in Mongolia, in other words, accepted Mongolia as a Soviet satellite, and granted to the Soviets a joint control of the critical railroad network in Manchuria. (Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 219-222.)

<sup>316</sup> For example, speaking about Europe, the most important Soviet achievement was the establishment of Soviet hegemony in most countries of Eastern Europe. In Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia the process of satellization was complete by the end of 1947 – beginning of 1948. (Finland, Yugoslavia, and Albania are controversial cases) The Soviet Union also put considerable, although unsuccessful, efforts into expansion of its sphere of influence to include Iran, Turkey, Greece and other European countries. (Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 420-431) In short, during the World War II and postwar years the USSR achieved “domination over the entire area between the USSR’s western border and Western Europe.” (Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since WWII*, 46.)

<sup>317</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 207.

<sup>318</sup> Quoted in Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 54.

<sup>319</sup> Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, “Soviet Perspectives on Security,” in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 77.



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- <sup>320</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941*, 82; Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 159-160, etc.
- <sup>321</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 194; Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 160.
- <sup>322</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 205.
- <sup>323</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 7.
- <sup>324</sup> Schuman, *Russia Since 1917*, 196; Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 195.
- <sup>325</sup> For details, see Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 125, for example.
- <sup>326</sup> Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 86-87; see also Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 167.
- <sup>327</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 168.
- <sup>328</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 124; see also Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 244.
- <sup>329</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 125; for additional details on Soviet involvement in Spanish Civil War see Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 166-169; Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941*, 86-89; etc.
- <sup>330</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 11; see also Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 346-347.
- <sup>331</sup> Quoted in Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 363.
- <sup>332</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 201.
- <sup>333</sup> Sonnenfeldt, "Soviet Perspectives" in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 79.

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- <sup>334</sup> Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 184, Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 107.
- <sup>335</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 109; Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 82, etc.
- <sup>336</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 118.
- <sup>337</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 162, 164-5.
- <sup>338</sup> *Ibid.*, 187.
- <sup>339</sup> Sonnenfeldt, "Soviet Perspectives" in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 79.
- <sup>340</sup> *Ibid.*, 79-80.
- <sup>341</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 18.
- <sup>342</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 215.
- <sup>343</sup> Quoted in Kulski, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 129.
- <sup>344</sup> Dinerstein, *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 6.
- <sup>345</sup> Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 23-24; See also Kulski, *Peaceful Co-existence*, 208-209.
- <sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.
- <sup>347</sup> *Ibid.*, 24.
- <sup>348</sup> Israelyan, *Soviet Foreign Policy: A brief review 1955-65*, 91-93.
- <sup>349</sup> Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 180-188; also Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 259-261.

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<sup>350</sup> These arguments were examined in detail in Chapter II. For additional information, see Chapter “New Type of International Relations,” in F. Israelyan. *Soviet Foreign Policy: A brief review 1955-65* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), 47-50.

<sup>351</sup> Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 209.

<sup>352</sup> Israelyan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 14.

<sup>353</sup> This view is widely supported by Soviet foreign policy scholars, for instance Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 302; Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 210; Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 6; etc.

<sup>354</sup> Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 239.

<sup>355</sup> It was decided by the Soviet leadership that the use of military was justified “only in the most extreme and threatening cases.” (Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 208) Thus, the suppression of the Hungarian revolution (1956), which directly jeopardized the unity of the socialist block, was “the only instance in the 1954 – 1966 period in which the Soviet Union employed its own armed forces in direct combat.” (Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 118)

<sup>356</sup> See, for example, Mark Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety: Security and Politics in Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia* (New York: Longman Publishing, 1995), 29.

<sup>357</sup> Most scholars agree on this point. For example, Rosser states, “Khrushchev’s successors brought no perceptible difference in the general Soviet line toward the world.” (Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 343). The same theme could be observed in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 94; Rubinstein, *Soviet*

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*Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 304; Marantz, *From Lenin to Gorbachev*, 48; Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 317; etc.

<sup>358</sup> Rubinstein, *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 112.

<sup>359</sup> Sharp, "National Interest," in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 113; Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety*, 18.

<sup>360</sup> In other words, it became evident that the structure of the contemporary international system was "stronger than the attempts of the Bolsheviks to overthrow it and replace it with a new system." (Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 215).

<sup>361</sup> Lenin and Stalin quoted in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 156.

<sup>362</sup> As argued by Angelov, for example: S. Angelov, ed. *Socialist Internationalism: Theory and Practice of International Relations of a New Type* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), 17-18.

<sup>363</sup> Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds. *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World* (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975), 12.

<sup>364</sup> Ibid. See also: Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 404; Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety*, 17-18; and "Soviet Foreign Aid Program" in Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, pp. 180-207.

<sup>365</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 40.

<sup>366</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 67; see also Kurt London, "Summaries and Conclusions" in *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, edited by Kurt London (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 322; etc.

<sup>367</sup> Erik P. Hoffmann, "Soviet Foreign Policy Aims and Accomplishments from Lenin to Brezhnev," in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 68.

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<sup>368</sup> Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety*, 18.

<sup>369</sup> The phrase originally used by Moore (Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 89), in the context of this work refers to the combination of the ideologically determined long range goal of Soviet foreign policy and the strategy for the achievement of this goal (including short-range and medium-range goals) determined by pragmatic considerations of Soviet leadership.

<sup>370</sup> Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety*, 17; Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, 405.

<sup>371</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 403.

<sup>372</sup> Walter Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology and Political Analysis: A Critical Examination of Its Usage By Marx, Lenin and Mannheim* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981), 47-48.

<sup>373</sup> Quoted in Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology*, 104-105; see also M. V. Yakovlev, *Ideology: The difference between the Marxist-Leninist and the bourgeois concepts* (Moscow: Misl, 1979), 96.

<sup>374</sup> Carlsnaes, *The Concept of Ideology*, 112.

<sup>375</sup> Alfred G. Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in the Soviet Political System," quoted in Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 111-112. See also: Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 28-29; Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 7, etc.

<sup>376</sup> Rubinstein, *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, 44.

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<sup>377</sup> On this subject, see: Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 400-401; Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics*, 7; and the chapter "Propaganda and Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy" in Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, pp. 239-258.

<sup>378</sup> See Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 67; Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 115; Donaldson, *The Foreign Policy of Russia*, 33; etc.

<sup>379</sup> Moore, *Soviet Politics – The Dilemma of Power*, quoted in Sharp, "National Interest," in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 113.

<sup>380</sup> Rostow quoted in Sharp, "National Interest" in Hoffmann, *Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 113. See also Triska, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 112; Galeotti, *The Age of Anxiety*, 18; etc.

<sup>381</sup> Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 68, 71.

<sup>382</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 404.

<sup>383</sup> Quoted in Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 404.

<sup>384</sup> Sharp, "National Interest," in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 227.

<sup>385</sup> Lenin himself, while expecting Communists to be loyal to Marxist-Leninist ideas, warned that "they must never allow ideology to become a political straitjacket in which flexibility of tactics had to be sacrificed to dogma." They must be reasonable enough, he emphasized, to know when to take "two steps backward" in the interest of the realization of the ultimate goal of the Communist doctrine: "the strictest loyalty to the ideas of the Communist must be combined with the ability to make all the necessary practical compromises...." Lenin, "Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder," *Selected Works* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, Ltd., 1938), 138, quoted in Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 26.

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<sup>386</sup> N.S. Khrushchev, "Za noviye pobedi mirovogo kommunisticheskogo dvizheniya," *Kommunist*, No. 1 (January, 1961), 20, quoted in Gehlen, *The Politics of Coexistence*, 42.

<sup>387</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 403.

<sup>388</sup> Marantz, *The Soviet Union and the Western World*, 20.

<sup>389</sup> Wesson, *Soviet Foreign Policy in Perspective*, 403; Zimmerman, "Soviet Foreign Policy and World Politics" in Fleron, *Classic Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy*, 120; Dinerstein, *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy*, 5; Rosser, *An Introduction to Soviet Foreign Policy*, 71.

<sup>390</sup> This view is widely supported by Soviet foreign policy scholars who could be associated with the Realist school of thought. Schuman, Moore and Morgenthau are just a few examples.

<sup>391</sup> Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Noguee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1998), 32.

<sup>392</sup> Israelyan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, 17.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, 408.

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*, 408-409.

<sup>395</sup> Levi, "Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy," 23.